Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies
By: Philip Keefer
Contributors: World Bank
Series: Policy research working paper -- 4185; Post-conflict transitions working paper -- no. 1; Policy research working papers (Online) -- 4185.; Post-conflict transitions working paper -- no. 1.
Publisher: [World Bank]
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Washington, D.C.]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 28
Subjects: Civil war; War; Moral and ethical aspects; Modern History
Description: This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions.
Notes: Title from electronic t.p. (viewed on Apr. 16, 2007).

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.