The dictator's army
Subtitle: battlefield effectiveness in authoritarian regimes
By: Caitlin Talmadge
Series: Cornell studies in security affairs; Cornell studies in security affairs
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2015
Place of publication: Ithaca; London
Language: eng
Number of pages: 304
ISBN-13: 9781501700293; 9780801453472
Subjects: Buddhism and politics; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988; Military policy; Vietnam War (1961-1975) fast (OCoLC)fst01431664; Authoritarianism; Politics and war; Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) fast (OCoLC)fst00978774; Political aspects; Decision making
Description: Talmadge presents a compelling new argument to help us understand why authoritarian militaries sometimes fight very well—and sometimes very poorly. Talmadge's framework for understanding battlefield effectiveness focuses on four key sets of military organizational practices: promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management. The Dictator’s Army offers a vital practical tool for those seeking to assess the likely course, costs, and outcomes of future conflicts involving nondemocratic adversaries, allies, or coalition partners.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Introduction: the puzzle of battlefield effectiveness; title: A framework for explaining battlefield effectiveness; title: Threats and military organizational practices in North and South Vietnam; title: Battlefield effectiveness in North and South Vietnam; title: Threats and military organizational practices in Iraq and Iran; title: Battlefield effectiveness in Iraq and Iran; title: Conclusion: threats, military organizational practices, and the battlefields of the future.