Optimal discretion in the application of rules
By: Steven Shavell.
Contributors: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 509; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 509.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Discretion is examined as a feature of the design of rule guided systems.  That is, given that rules have to be administered by some group of persons, called adjudicators, and given that their goals may be different from society's (or a relevant organization's), when is it socially desirable to allocate discretionary authority to the adjudicators and, if so, to what extent? The answer reflects a tradeoff between the informational advantage of discretion -- that adjudicators can act on information not included in rules -- and the disadvantage of discretion -- that decisions may deviate from the desirable because adjudicators' objectives are different from society's.  The control of discretion through limitation of its scope, through decision-based payments to adjudicators, and through the appeals process, is also considered"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/26/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.