Bundling among rivals
Subtitle: a case of pharmaceutical cocktails
By: Claudio Lucarelli, Sean Nicholson, Minjae Song
Contributors: Nicholson, Sean; Song, Minjae; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16321; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16321.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Description: "The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.  We empirically analyze the welfare effects of cross-firm bundling in the pharmaceutical industry.  Physicians often treat patients with "cocktail" regimens that combine two or more drugs.  Firms cannot price discriminate because each drug is produced by a different firm and a physician creates the bundle in her office from the component drugs.  We show that a less competitive equilibrium arises with cocktail products because firms can internalize partially the externality their pricing decisions impose on competitors.  The incremental profits from creating a bundle are sometimes as large as the incremental profits from a merger of the same two firms"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/4/2010.

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