Bayesian persuasion
By: Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow.
Contributors: Gentzkow, Matthew.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper  15540; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no.  2009.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "LIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">Bayesian Persuasion var djConfig = { parseOnLoad: true, isDebug: false };NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH HOME PAGE Bayesian PersuasionUse a mirror (1048 K)Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow NBER Working Paper No.  15540*Issued in November 2009NBER Program(s): IO POLWhen is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question.  Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology.  We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender.  We characterize the optimal mechanism.  Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/1/2009.

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