Optimal provision of multiple excludable public goods
By: Hanming Fang, Peter Norman.
Contributors: Norman, Peter, 1966-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13797; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13797.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents' valuations are private information.  For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we demonstrate that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied.  Bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies in two ways: first, it may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one; second, it decreases the extent of use exclusions.  If the regularity condition is violated, then the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/13/2008.

Includes bibliographical references.

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