owl or ostrich  U.S. Policy of calculated ambiguity to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons
By:  Mark A. Lakamp
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1998
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 70
Description: The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in      response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack. Many factors affect decisions about the      role nuclear weapons play in U.S. counterproliferation strategy. This thesis describes the policy of calculated      ambiguity and offers some observations about its prospects and pitfalls. The thesis presents evidence that      suggests nuclear weapons could play a positive role in the U.S. counterproliferation strategy, at least in some      circumstances. It also explains how such a role could conflict with the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Such a role      would also violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United      States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons      without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of      CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may damage the national interest.
Notes: "December 1998."

Thesis advisor(s): David S. Yost, James J. Wirtz.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998.

Includes bibliographical references.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

US Navy (USN) author.

dk/dk cc:9116 3/3/99.