Deposit insurance and the composition of bank suspensions in developing economies
Subtitle: lessons from the state deposit insurance experiments of the 1920s
By: Ching-Yi Chung, Gary Richardson
Contributors: Richardson, Gary; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12594; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12594.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Description: "Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917.  All abandoned the systems between 1921 and 1930.  Scholars debate the costs and benefits of these policy experiments.  New data drawn from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions in these states.  In typical years, suspensions due to runs fell.  Suspensions due to mismanagement rose.  During the penultimate year of each system, the bank failure rate rose to an unsustainable height and the system ceased operations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/8/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.