Natural resources, institutions, and civil war
Subtitle: lessons from Mexico
By: Noel Maurer
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 06-044; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 06-044
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 60
Description: A growing literature in economics and political science argues that natural-resource-abundant countries are more likely to be governed by corrupt governments and experience political instability. The experience of Mexico during 1880-1930 casts doubt on this hypothesis. Mexico's mining industry grew rapidly under a very corrupt dictatorship. When that dictatorship fell and the polity lapsed into civil war, the mining industry was barely affected. The Mexican case suggests that extractive industries may be remarkably insensitive to changes in economic institutions or political instability. Causality may run from corrupt government or civil disorder to an economy relatively dependent on natural resource extraction, rather than the other way around.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.