The appeals process and adjudicator incentives
By: Steven Shavell.
Contributors: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 485; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 485.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "The appeals process -- whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher authority -- is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decisionmaking procedures).  It leads to the making of better decisions, because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones.  Further, it yields this benefit without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur and would thus make decisions to forestall the actual occurrence of appeals"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/28/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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