Killing in war
By: Jefferson McMahan.
Series: Uehiro series in practical ethics
Publisher: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press; Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Oxford; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 250
ISBN-13: 9780199548668
Subjects: War -- Moral and ethical aspects; Combat -- Moral and ethical aspects; Military ethics; Conscientious objection; Responsibility
Description: "Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? Jeff McMahan argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. McMahan argues, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause."--Publisher's description.
Notes: Includes index.
Table of contents: title: The morality of participation in an unjust war; title: The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants; title: The traditional criterion of liability to attack in war; title: Can unjust combatants satisfy the principles of Jus in Bello?; title: The basis of moral liability to attack in war; title: Arguments for the moral equality of combatants; title: Justification and liability; title: Consent; title: The boxing match model of war; title: The gladiatorial combat model of war; title: Hypothetical consent; title: The epistemic argument; title: Institutions as sources of justification; title: The duty to defer to the epistemic authority of the government; title: The duty to sustain the efficient functioning of just institutions; title: Fairness to fellow participants; title: The collectivist approach to the morality of war; title: Transferred responsibility; title: Symmetrical disobedience; title: Conscientious refusal; title: Excuses; title: Sources of allegiance to the moral equality of combatants; title: The conflation of morality and law; title: The conflation of permission and excuse; title: Excusing conditions for unjust combatants; title: Duress; title: Epistemic limitation; title: Diminished responsibility; title: Skepticism about excusing unjust combatants; title: Consistency; title: Are unjust combatants excused by epistemic limitations?; title: Liability and the limits of self-defense; title: Different types of threat; title: The relevance of excuses to killing in self-defense; title: Culpable threats; title: Partially excused threats; title: Excused threats and innocent threats; title: Nonresponsible threats; title: Justified threats and just threats; title: Liability to defensive attack; title: The moral status of unjust combatants; title: Liability and punishment; title: The relevance of excuses to the distribution of risk; title: Child soldiers; title: Civilian immunity and civilian liability; title: The moral and legal foundations of civilian immunity; title: The possible bases of civilian liability; title: Civilian liability to lesser and collateral harms; title: Can civilians be liable to intentional military attack?; title: Civilian liability and terrorism.