Bargaining tactics and strategy in a Government/Contractor bilateral monopoly
By:  Dennis Gerard Van Veen
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1998
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 161
Description: The purpose of this research is to examine potential bargaining strategies and tactics which might be used to      respond to an offer perceived as unfair or unreasonable from a sole source offeror. Initially, a sole source      offeror normally has considerable bargaining leverage over the Government. Pricing data needed to properly      evaluate the seller's quotation may be incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable. Urgent and compelling need may      require accelerating the procurement process. Using bargaining theory and the classic economic paradigm of      bilateral monopoly as a foundation for the research, potential bargaining strategies and tactics were evaluated      through a survey of 62 Department of Defense contracting specialists. A primary conclusion of the research is      that attaining a bargaining agreement that reflects a fair and reasonable price under bilateral monopoly      conditions is not possible unless the Government possesses adequate information to accurately assess the      fairness and reasonableness of the offered price.
Notes: "March 1998."

Thesis advisor(s): David V. Lamm.

Thesis (M.S. in Management) Naval Postgraduate School, March 1998.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-160).

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Also available online.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat reader.

US Navy (USN) author.

dk/dk cc:9116