Divorce and the excess burden of lawyers
By: by Martin Halla
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 2962; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2962
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Divorce suits; Lawyers; Property
Description: "We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners' dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers' fees, each spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome this socially inefficient situation. This model is estimated and tested with rich micro-data from court records. Employing a multiple treatment matching procedure we estimate the causal effect of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property, on the length of the divorce process and on the quality of the divorce settlement"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/13/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.