Quality disclosure and certification
Subtitle: theory and practice
By: David Dranove, Ginger Zhe Jin.
Contributors: Jin, Ginger  Zhe.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15644; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15644.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification.  After comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure, we address three key theoretical issues: (i) Why don't sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of "unraveling?" (ii) When should government mandate disclosure? and (iii) Do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information? We further review empirical evidence on these issues, with a particular focus on healthcare, education, and finance.  The empirical review covers quality measurement, the effect of third party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior, as well as the economics of certifiers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/16/2010.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.