Inefficiency in legislative policy-making
Subtitle: a dynamic analysis
By: Marco Battaglini, Stephen Coate.
Contributors: Coate, Stephen.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11495; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11495.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Legislation; Policy sciences
Description: "This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining.  The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation.  The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense or air quality) and the distributive spending is district-specific transfers (e.g., pork barrel spending).  Investment in the public goodcreates a dynamic linkage across policy-making periods.  The analysis explores the dynamics oflegislative policy choices, focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of taxation andallocation of tax revenues.  The model sheds new light on the efficiency of legislative policy-makingand has a number of novel positive implications"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/5/2005.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.