History, institutions and economic performance
Subtitle: the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India
By: Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer
Contributors: Lakshmi Iyer; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 02-27; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 02-27.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 29
Description: Do historical institutions have a persistent impact on economic performance? We analyze the colonial institutions set up by the British to collect land revenue in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments, agricultural productivity and investments in public goods in the post-Independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. We verify that these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity of the historical institutions, and argue that they probably arise because differences in institutions lead to very different policy choices.Keywords: History, land tenure, development. JEL Classifications: O11, P16, P51
Notes: "June 2002."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 27-29).

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