On-the-job search and sorting
By: by Pieter Gautier, Coen Teulings, Aico van Vuuren.
Contributors: Teulings, C. N.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1687; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1687
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Job hunting.; Labor productivity.; Unemployment.
Description: "We characterize the equilibrium of a search model with a continuum of job and worker types, wage bargaining, free entry of vacancies and on-the-job search. The decentralized economy with monopsonistic wage setting yields too many vacancies and hence too low unemployment compared to first best. This is due to a business-stealing externality. Raising workers' bargaining power resolves this inefficiency. Unemployment benefits are a second best alternative to this policy. We establish simple relations between the losses in production due to search frictions and wage differentials on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. Both can be used for empirical testing"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/10/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.