Investigating corruption
By: Canice Prendergast.
Contributors: World Bank. Development Research Group. Public Economics.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2500; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 2500.
Publisher: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics
Published: 2000
Place of publication: Washington, DC
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Political corruption -- Prevention -- Econometric models.; Bribery -- Prevention -- Econometric models.; Public administration -- Corrupt practices -- Prevention -- Econometric models.
Genres: Econometric models.
Description: Why incentive contracts and independent investigations may not be the perfect solution to the problem of bureaucratic corruption.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 36-37).
Title from title screen as viewed on Oct. 01, 2002.
"December 2000"--Cover.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.