Trade policy and illegal immigration
By: by Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Ryo Takashima.
Contributors: Takashima, Ryo
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1568; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1568
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Illegal aliens -- Mathematical models.; Tariff -- Mathematical models.; Equilibrium (Economics) -- Mathematical models.
Description: "We use a version of the Meade model to consider the effects of interdependent import tariffs in the presence illegal immigration. First, we consider the small union case and derive the Nash tariff equilibrium for two potential members of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). We analyze conditions under which a movement from the Nash equilibrium to complete intra-bloc tariff elimination (FTA) is likely to be welfare augmenting. The paper also considers how reduction of the external tariff may impact the Nash equilibrium tariffs of the potential bloc members. The analysis is extended to the large union case to consider the conditions under which terms of trade of bloc members improve with respect to the non-member nation(s)"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/28/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.