Rating banks
Subtitle: risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry
By: Donald P. Morgan.
Contributors: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Series: Staff reports ;; no. 105; Staff reports (Federal Reserve Bank of New York : Online) ;; no. 105.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Published: 2000
Place of publication: [New York, N.Y.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Banks and banking -- Ratings.
Description: "The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that bank and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other firms.  Moody's and Standard and Poor's split more frequently over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts.  Uncertainty over the banks stems from their assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change.  Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets.  Our findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/18/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.