Free will
Subtitle: a philosophical reappraisal
By: Nicholas Rescher.
Publisher: Transaction Publishers
Published: 2008
Place of publication: New Brunswick, NJ
Language: eng
Number of pages: 173
ISBN-13: 9781412808743
Subjects: Free will and determinism
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: The nature of free will; title: Requirements of freedom : preeminently deliberation; title: Free will requires the absence of thought-external; title: Determination over choices and decisions; title: Choice and decision are crucial; title: Doing and trying; title: Free action and agent causality; title: Modes of freedom; title: Metaphysical and moral freedom; title: Moral freedom is removed by manipulation and especially; title: Compulsion; title: Intention and moral standing; title: Moral freedom of the will involves agent intent and motivation; title: Ramifications of freedom; title: Free will requires up-to-the-end revisability but this does not gainsay probabilistic predictability; title: Issues of revision and control; title: The counterfactual dimension : "could have done otherwise"; title: Problem cases : machines and lunatics; title: Free will as outside causality but compatible with it; title: Averting the zenonic fallacy of casual regression; title: Averting predetermination (contrasting pre-determination with precedence determination); title: The crucial contrast between events and eventuations; title: Choices and decisions as terminating eventuations; title: Free will stands outside the stream of natural causality; title: On freedom and causality; title: Free will excludes pre-determinism but not motive determinism; title: Motivational determinism vs. casual necessitation; title: Motivations and motives; title: Freedom from what? : certainly not from one's own motives; title: And reasons: freedom demands motivational determination; title: Free will requires motivational determinism; title: Determination by one's autonomous motives is the crux of moral freedom; title: Compulsion is impulsion; title: Objections to motive determinism can be met; title: Freedom and motivation; title: Must an agent choose his motives for a decision to qualify (morally) as free?; title: Freedom does not require motivational self-construction; title: Does freedom require self-understanding?; title: Willing to will : does freedom require the will to be self-endorsing?; title: Does freedom require the approval of intellect and reason?; title: Does freedom require self-approved motives?; title: Buridan's ass : a random willfulness is not freedom; title: Compatibilism regains : what free will excludes is not agent; title: Determination but gant-bypassing nature determination; title: The explanation of free acts via agent determination; title: Freedom, responsibility, and "could have done otherwise"; title: Reasons and motives impel but do not compel; title: Compatibilism again; title: Mind-matter partnership; title: A two-sided coin; title: The issue of initiative; title: A salient duality; title: Mind-brain interaction works by coordination not by causality; title: Does free will exist? deliberations; title: Pro and con; title: On evidentiating free will; title: Is free will unscientific?; title: So does science counter-indicate free will; title: Free-will naturalism and evolution.