When are auctions best?
By: Jeremy I. Bulow, Paul D. Klemperer.
Contributors: Klemperer, Paul.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13268.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13268.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 37
Subjects: Sale of business enterprises; Corporations -- Purchasing; Auctions
Description: We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue.
Notes: "July 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 27-30).

Also available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).