On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union
By: V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe.
Contributors: Kehoe, Patrick J.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;; 330; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 330.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 2003
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Monetary unions.; Fiscal policy.
Description: "The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies.  If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs.  If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable.  This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/10/2004.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.