Of coalition and speed
Subtitle: passage and duration of statutes in Uruguay's Parliament, 1985-2000
By: Eric Magar and Juan Andrés Moraes
Contributors: Andrés Moraes, Juan
Series: IBEI working papers -- 2008/15; Working papers (Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals) -- 2008/15.
Publisher: Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Barcelona
Language: eng
Number of pages: 33
Subjects: Legislation; Legislative power; Legislative bodies; Executive power; Politics and government
Description: The paper explores the legislative process in search for some of the alleged consequences of cabinet coalitions in a presidential system. Coalition effects should be less evident in the success of executive initiatives: strategic behavior hampers this intuitive measure of performance. Better measures, because less subject to strategic considerations, are the odds of passage of legislators' bills and the time proposals take to be approved. Thus measured, coalition effects are discernible. Analysis of the universe of proposals processed in the fragmented Uruguayan Parliament between 1985 and 2000 reveals that coalition, observed about half the period, swells success rates of coalition members by 60% on average (and by as much as 150% for those close to the president). Event history analysis shows that coalitions cut the wait for an executive bill by 3 months, 1/6th the average wait. The reverse effect is felt on the duration of legislators' bills.--Abstract, p. 3.
Notes: "June 2008"--T.p. verso.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-33).