Educational policy and the economics of the family
By: Abhijit V Banerjee
Contributors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 03-09; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 03-09.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 38
Description: This paper analyzes the implications of alternative ways to model decision making by families for educational policy. We show that many of the policy implications associated with credit constraints cannot be distinguished from the implications of models of the family that differ from the conventional Barro-Becker model. We then argue that it is the combination of credit constraints and non-conventional preferences that provides a robust basis for government intervention to promote educational investment. Keywords: Family, Intergenerational Transactions, Education. JEL Classification: O15, O16, D13.
Notes: "November 2002."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 35-38).

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