On the bayesian selection of Nash equilibrium
By: by Akira Tomioka.
Series: Technical report - Stanford University, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences -- no. 279; Economics series - Stanford University, Insstitute for Mathematical studies in the Social Sciences; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 279.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences
Published: 1979
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 42
Subjects: Equilibrium (Economics); Game theory.
Other titles: Bayesian selection of Nash equilibrium.
Notes: Prepared under National Science Foundation grant SOC75-21820-A01.

Bibliography: p. 41-42.

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: We can't disagree forever / John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis Constrained excess demand functions / Heraklis M. Polemarchakis.