The "passing on" argument in the context of private enforcement of competition law rules.
Published: 2006
Language: eng
Number of pages: 102
ISBN-13: 9780494212318
Subjects: University of Toronto. -- Faculty of Law -- Dissertations.; Price fixing.; Unjust enrichment.; Antitrust law.; Monopolies.; Competition, Unfair.
Description: Several decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered two landmark decisions in the field of antitrust damage law---"Illinois Brick" and  "Hanover Shoe"---that both dealt with the problem of "passing on" supra-competitive overcharges. Neither in Canada non in Europe, "passing on" has been an issue but until recently, since a trend has developed in both legal orders to shift the enforcement of competition laws from public to private agents. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate different policy options for the "passing on" problem. The analysis is based on a general reflection on the rationales of private enforcement and examines the economics of "passing on". It is argued that since compensation is hard to achieve, it is dubious whether private enforcement can be defended on the grounds that private litigants are more efficient enforcers than public agents.
Notes: Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-03, page: 1281.

Thesis (LL.M.)--University of Toronto, 2006.

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