Free will and four English philosophers
Subtitle: Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill
Publisher: Burns and Oates
Published: 1906
Place of publication: London, England
Language: eng
Table of contents: title: THE CONTENTS; title: THOMAS HOBBES; title: Section I. Doctrine of free will stated. Not every action free, nor every free action equally free. Calculability of human action (cf. Hume, Sections III, IV; Mill, Sections I, VIII) Page I; title: Section II. Spontaneous, Voluntary, Secondarily-automatic 7; title: Section III. Cause and condition 10; title: Section IV. Sufficient cause 14; title: Section V. Moral character of the Deity on the necessarian hypothesis (cf. Hume, Section XI). Predication of God and His creatures analogous, not univocal 16; title: Section VI. Necessarian theory of punishment (cf. Mill, Sections XI, XII) 22; title: Section VII. Necessarian view of consultation. Necessarianism renounced in practice. Its effects on morality (cf. pp. 195, 22 5) 24; title: Section VIII. Praise in the absence of free will 28; title: Section IX. Hobbesian piety 3 1; title: Section X. Hobbesian repentance 34; title: Section XI. Hobbesian prayer 34; title: Section XII. Hobbesian definition of sin. When voluntariness may co-exist with necessity 36; title: Section XIII. Compulsion and free will 39; title: Section XIV. Grades of free will. Freedom not to be confounded with power (cf. Locke, Sections I-III) 43; title: Section XV. How far the will can be said to be determined by the last practical judgement 50; title: Section XVI. The abiding now of eternity (cf. Mill, Section II). The Heraclitean flux 53; title: Section XVII. Free will other than the absence of impediments to action 63; title: Section XVIII. A free volition not an entirely new move in the mind 66; title: Section XIX. Necessarianism not provable by the law of excluded middle 70; title: x FREE WILL; title: JOHN LOCKE; title: Section I. Free will not power to carry out what one wills Page J $; title: Section II. The same 77; title: Section III. The same (cf. p. 200) 78; title: Section IV. Faculty and habit 8 1; title: Section V. Examination of the argument that man cannot forbear willing for or against arty given proposal, and therefore is not free. What is irresolution? 82; title: Section VI. Free will not a regressus in infinitum. Restatement of the process of free will 87; title: Section VII. Is the will determined by the greatest present uneasiness? St Augustine on the uneasiness of this present life and the peace of the life to come 90; title: Section VIII. Locke's admission in the second edition of his Essay that man's liberty lies in his power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of his desires while he examines the value of  them. This suspensory power may operate negatively, without any positive volition thereto. Volition can be formed only upon present complacency 100; title: Section IX. It is not true liberty to break loose from the conduct of reason 105; title: Section X. Recapitulation of the argument with Locke 106; title: DAVID HUME; title: Section I. A test of contradiction between philosophers, real or verbal (cf. p. 194) 115; title: Section II. Idea of necessity, whence derived. Not entirely from the uniformity of nature. It involves a consciousness of self, and a measuring of self against nature 117; title: Section III. Calculability of human actions, so far as our experience goes, not inconsistent with free will. The inference of absolute calculability rendered suspect by the fact of self-consciousness. Ferrier on the consciousness of self 125; title: Section IV. Principle of habitual volition and principle of averages together sufficiently explain the calculability of human actions, without recourse to necessarianism 133; title: Section V. Free will and personality. Root error of an impersonal psychology (cf. Mill, Section III) 137; title: Section VI. Necessity a quality of the agent, not of the looker-on. How is it that we are so much at fault in the prediction of our own conduct? 141; title: Section VII. Cause and explanation. Every free volition has a " cause," but not an "explanation" in the technical sense (cf. Mill, Sections III, VIII) Page 144; title: Section VIII. Free will and chance 1 50; title: Section IX. Doctrines theologically "dangerous." Necessarianism not merely dangerous, but contradictory of the Church's teaching 152; title: Section X. Influence of character on conduct. A free volition eminently a personal act 156; title: Section XI. Theological consequences ofnecessarianism. Hume against Hume. Vulpine humility 159; title: JOHN STUART MILL; title: Section I. The doctrine called Philosophical Necessity unproven by experience * 165; title: Section II. Free will and divine foreknowledge 166; title: Section III. "Mysterious constraint," "magical spell," "mystical tie" of cause and effect, misconceptions of the phenomenalist school due to their ignoring of personality. Volition not a mere phenomenon of physical science 1 70; title: Section IV. Necessity as meaning "uncounteractableness" 178; title: Section V. Mill and the Owenite. Is a man's character formed for him or by him? 183; title: Section VI. Can we alter our character? 185; title: Section VII. Mill admits free will after all (he revokes his concession, p. 23 1 : cf. Locke, Section VIII: Hume, Section XI, for similar concessions. Hobbes alone never flinches, but see p. 28) 186; title: Section VIII. Why brute agency is necessary agency. Away from necessity, no induction possible. Calculability of human action. " Cause " and " explanation " 189; title: Section IX. Consciousness of free will 198; title: Section X. Are we conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion ? (cf. pp. 53, 103) 201; title: Section XI. Utilitarian theory of punishment (cf. Hobbes, Section VI). New treatment of homicidal mania 205; title: Section XII. Retributive punishment. Connexion of sin and suffering, no mere subjective association. Civil punishment, how retributive 216; title: Section XIII. List of actions good and evil unchanged by determinism. Intellectual necessity. Brute necessity 225; title: Section XIV, Mill's final protest against fatalism. Modified fatalism. Roundabout fatalism. Determinism: fatalism in theory, not in practice 229