Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders
Subtitle: evidence from shareholder proposals
By: Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, Stephen R. Stubben
Contributors: Ferri, Fabrizio; Stubben, Stephen R.; Harvard Business School
Edition: Rev.
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 08-048; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 08-048
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 61
Description: Using a sample of 620 non-binding, majority-vote (MV) shareholder proposals between 1997 and 2004, we analyze the frequency, determinants and consequences of boards' implementation decisions. The frequency of implementation has almost doubled after 2002, reaching more than 40%. Shareholder pressure (e.g. the voting outcome and the influence of the proponent) and the type of proposals are the main determinants of the implementation decision, while traditional governance indicators do not seem to matter. Outside directors implementing MV shareholder proposals experience a one-fifth reduction in the likelihood of losing their board seat and in the likelihood of losing other directorships.
Notes: "Revised 03/08"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.