Why do incumbent senators win?
Subtitle: evidence from a dynamic selection model
By: Gautam Gowrisankaran, Matthew F. Mitchell, Andrea Moro.
Contributors: Mitchell, Matthew F., 1972-; Moro, Andrea.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10748; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10748.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: United States. Congress. Senate -- Elections.; Incumbency (Public officers) -- United States.; Political campaigns -- United States.
Description: "Since 1914, incumbent U.S.  senators running for reelection have won almost 80% of the time.  We investigate why incumbents win so often.  We allow for three potential explanations for the incumbency advantage: selection, tenure, and challenger quality, which are separately identified using histories of election outcomes following an open seat election.  We specify a dynamic model of voter behavior that allows for these three effects, and structurally estimate the parameters of the model using U.S.  Senate data.  We find that tenure effects are negative or small.  We also find that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats.  If incumbents faced challengers as strong as candidates for open seats, the incumbency advantage would be cut in half"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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