Incentives in tournaments with endogenous prize selection
By: by Christine Harbring, Bernd Irlenbusch.
Contributors: Irlenbusch, Bernd.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1340; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1340
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position. In the present study we investigate whether this sabotage problem is mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real-world organizations we employ a controlled experiment. Our data provide clear evidence that agents' behavior is not only guided by competition between agents but also by the possibility to punish the principal via sabotage"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/19/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.