Logistical implications of operational maneuver from the sea
Contributors: Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.) 
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1997
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 33
Subjects: AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS; TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT; BATTLE MANAGEMENT
Description: The U.S. Marine Corps concept for the projection of naval power ashore is Operational Maneuver From the      Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS calls for movement of Marines from ships at sea directly to objectives deep inland      without requiring a pause to build up combat power on the beach. Support for ground forces is expected to      come from the sea, and be delivered primarily by air. This demands that sea based logistics assets remain      sufficiently close to shore to allow air assets to conduct resupply operations directly to the battlefield. The      implication of this is that Navy ships may sacrifice operational and perhaps tactical mobility while sustaining the      Marine operation. This thesis determines the distance from the coastline sea based Combat Service Support      (CSS) assets will be able to maintain and still support operations of a given magnitude, and how tactically      constrained Navy ships will be in order to support this concept of expeditionary warfare. It focuses on the time      distance weight/volume relationships involved, and takes into account characteristics of the resupply assets, such      as aircraft availability, capacity, method of employment, and the effects of combat attrition. Three methods of      employing a Marine Expeditionary Unit are studied, ranging from a traditional force mix to the use of small      infestation teams. The analysis shows that the available CSS assets will not support a traditional ground force mix      at the distances envisioned, but will Support the use of small teams. To fully realize OMFTS and still allow ships      to maintain the desired standoff from shore will require a shift to more lethal Marine forces with much smaller      logistical demands. Until such a force is feasible, the Navy should plan on providing support to Marines from      close to shore. s and mission requirements.
Notes: Thesis advisor, Wayne P. Hughes.

AD-A333 347.

Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research) Naval Postgraduate School, March 1997.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-30)

dk/dk cc:9116 01/15/98.