The strategy of conflict
By: Thomas C. Schelling.
Publisher: Harvard University
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 309
Subjects: Negotiation.; Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Description: Explores the international politics of threat, or, deterrence.
Notes: Originally published: Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1980.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: I: Elements of a theory of strategy; title: The retarded science of international strategy; title: An essay on bargaining; title: Bargaining, communication, and limited war; title: II: A reorientation of game theory; title: Toward a theory of interdependent decision; title: Enforcement, communication, and strategic moves; title: Games theory and experimental research; title: III: Strategy with a random ingredient; title: Randomization of promises and threats; title: The threat that leaves something to chance; title: IV: Surprise attack: a study in mutual distrust; title: The reciprocal feat of surprise attack; title: Surprise attack and disarmament; title: Nuclear weapons and limited war; title: For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory; title: Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "noncooperative" games.