The Power of Agency
By: Michael Brent
Publisher: [publisher not identified]
Published: 2012
Place of publication: [New York, N.Y.?]
Language: eng
Description: My dissertation addresses a foundational problem in the philosophy of action, that of explaining the distinction between actions and mere events. Actions, I argue, have a uniquely active component that distinguishes them from mere events and which can be explained in terms of effort. Effort has several features: it is attributed directly to agents; it is a causal power that each agent alone possesses and employs; it enables agents causally to activate, sustain, and control their capacities during the performance of an action; and its presence comes in varying degrees of strength. After defending an effort-based account of action and criticizing what is known as the standard story of action, I apply my account to situations in which an agent displays strength of will, such as when one struggles to perform an action while overcoming a persistent urge to do otherwise. I conclude by offering an explanation of mental action that demonstrates the extent of our powers of agency within the domain of the mental.
Notes: Department: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Akeel Bilgrami.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2012.