A liberal theory of natural resource property rights
By: by Joseph Mordechai Mazor
Contributors: John F. Kennedy School of Government
Published: 2009
Language: eng
Number of pages: 581
Subjects: Natural resources; Law and legislation; Communal Natural resources
Description: A variety of contemporary political disagreements, including debates over fossil fuel ownership in the Arctic, carbon emission standards, indigenous land rights, and the use of eminent domain, raise pressing questions of justice. Yet existing theories of natural resource property rights are underdeveloped and thus ill-equipped to answer these questions. I develop a liberal theory of natural resource property rights which is founded on the equality of natural resource claims, which advocates for equal division of natural resources, and which considers how the principle of equal division can be justly implemented. I begin by defending the equality of natural resource claims. I argue that people should be seen as having equal claims to the pristine natural resources that remain after all those who contributed to the value of these resources have been appropriately compensated. And since the value of these remaining natural resources is not generated by anyone's labor, I contend that libertarians ought to endorse equal claims to these resources. I argue that liberal egalitarians have good reasons to endorse equality of natural resource claims as well. I then consider how equal claims to natural resources should be respected. I develop criteria for evaluating conceptions of equal claims and use these criteria to dismiss Collective Ownership, First Possession Appropriation, Common Access, and Harmless Appropriation conceptions.

Instead, I defend an Equal Division conception which grants each person an equal amount of natural resources. Finally, I consider how the principle of equal division should work in practice. I engage with the problems of heterogeneity, unexpected change, future people and multiple nation-states. I propose a system of leases of varying lengths with the rents to be distributed equally. Furthermore, I draw the following conclusions: (1) Certain decisions regarding non-separable resources such as the air should be made collectively. (2) We have obligations to each other to conserve for future people. (3) Natural resources are uniquely subject to international redistribution because they are both individually and nationally undeserved. (4) Preventing the appropriation of the Arctic seabed by particular nations is feasible step towards achieving a more just global distribution of natural resource property rights.
Notes: "May 2009."

Dissertation acceptance Certificate signed by: Dennis F. Thompson, Chair; Nancy L. Rosenblum, T. Nicolaus Tideman, Eric A. Beerbohm, Jerry R. Green.

Thesis (Ph.D., Granted by the Committee on Political Economy and Government)--Harvard University, 2009.

Includes bibliographical references.