APPOINTING CENTRAL BANKERS: THE POLITICS OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN...
Series: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
Published: 2003
Place of publication: NEW YORK
Language: und; eng
Number of pages: 160
Description: "This book examines how the president and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. The book answers three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the president alone or both the president and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process?" "The analysis shows the conditions under which the president alone, both the president and the Senate, or neither may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects historical political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System." "The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process."--BOOK JACKET.