When 3+1>4
Subtitle: gift structure and reciprocity in the field
By: Duncan Gilchrist, Michael Luca, Deepak Malhotra
Contributors: Luca, Michael, author; Malhotra, Deepak, 1975- author; Harvard Business School
Edition: Revised edition
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 14-030; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 14-030.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2014
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 25
Work titles: It's not the size of the gift; it's how you present it
Description: Do higher wages elicit reciprocity and hence higher effort? In a field experiment with 266 employees, we find that paying above-market wages, per se, does not have an effect on effort relative to paying market wages. However, structuring a portion of the wage as a clear and unexpected gift (by offering a raise with no further conditions after the employee has accepted the contract--with no future employment) does lead to higher effort for the duration of the job. Targeted gifts are more efficient than hiring more workers. However, the mechanism makes this unlikely to explain persistent above-market wages.
Notes: "September 2013. (Revised May 2014.)"--Publisher's Web site.

Revision of It's not the size of the gift; it's how you present it: new evidence on gift exchange from a field experiment.

Includes bibliographical references (page 15).