On the equilibrium concept for overlapping generations organizations
By: Edward C. Prescott and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull.
Contributors: Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;; 282; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 282.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 2000
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "A necessary feature for equilibrium is that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational.We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation.We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition.We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equilibrium, that satisfies this condition.We show that equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality.Moreover, the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/15/2005.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.