Does shareholder proxy access improve firm value?
Subtitle: evidence from the business roundtable challenge
By: Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser, Guhan Subramanian
Contributors: Bergstresser, Daniel; Subramanian, Guhan; Harvard Business School
Edition: Rev.
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 11-052; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 11-052
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 44
Description: We use the SEC's unexpected announcement on October 4, 2010 that it would significantly delay implementation of its proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional ownership in particular, lost value on that day. We also examine intra-day returns and find that the value loss occurred just after the SEC's announcement. Our results are consistent with the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC's August 2010 Rule.
Notes: "November 2010, revised November 2011" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.