A model of private equity fund compensation
By: Wonho Wilson Choi, Andrew Metrick, Ayako Yasuda
Contributors: Metrick, Andrew; Yasuda, Ayako; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17568; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17568.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper analyzes the economics of the private equity fund compensation.  We build a novel model to estimate the expected revenue to fund managers as a function of their investor contracts.  In particular, we evaluate the present value of the fair-value test (FVT) carried interest scheme, which is one of the most common profit-sharing arrangements observed in practice.  We extend the simulation model developed in Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) and compare the relative values of the FVT carry scheme to other benchmark carry schemes.  We find that the FVT carry scheme is substantially more valuable to the fund managers than other commonly observed (and more conservative) carry schemes, largely due to the early timing of carry compensation that frequently occurs under the FVT scheme.  Interestingly, conditional on having an FVT carry scheme, fund managers' incremental gains from inflating the reported values of the funds' un- exited portfolio companies would be negligible"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2012.

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