Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried.
Contributors: Fried, Jesse M.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10742; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10742.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Employee fringe benefits.; Executives -- Pensions.
Description: "This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies.  We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments.  Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements.  Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/11/2005.
Also available in print.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.