Tax buyouts
By: Marco Del Negro, Fabrizio Perri, Fabiano Schivardi
Contributors: Perri, Fabrizio; Schivardi, Fabiano; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15847; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15847.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "The paper studies a fiscal policy instrument that can reduce fiscal distortions without affecting revenues, in a politically viable way.  The instrument is a private contract (tax buyout), offered by the government to each citizen, whereby the citizen can choose to pay a fixed price in exchange for a given reduction in her tax rate for a period of time.  We introduce the tax buyout in a dynamic overlapping generations economy, calibrated to match several features of the US income, taxes and wealth distributions.  Under simple pricing, the introduction of the buyout is revenue neutral but, by reducing distortions, it benefits a significant fraction of the population and leads to sizable increases in aggregate labor supply, income and consumption"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/1/2010.

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