How offshore financial competition disciplines exit resistance by incentive-conflicted bank regulators
By: Edward J. Kane.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 7156; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7156.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 40
Subjects: Banks and banking -- Government policy.; Financial services industry.
Notes: "June 1999."

JEL no. G21, G28, L51.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-40).

Electronic access limited to Binghamton University faculty, staff and students for instructional and research purposes only.

Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).