Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court
By: edited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.
Contributors: Rogers, James R., 1960-; Flemming, Roy B.; Bond, Jon R.
Series: Constitutionalism and democracy
Publisher: University of Virginia Press
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Charlottesville
Language: eng
Number of pages: 335
Subjects: United States. Supreme Court.; United States. Congress -- Powers and duties.; Separation of powers -- United States.; Political questions and judicial power -- United States.
Other titles: Institutional games and the US Supreme Court
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Strategic games with Congress and the states; title: Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Drew D. Martin; title: Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers; title: Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn; title: "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation; title: Transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg; title: Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers; title: Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy; title: A court of appeals in a rational choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan; title: Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser; title: Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson; title: Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire; title: Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum; title: Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.