Mental reality
By: Galen Strawson.
Edition: 2nd ed., with a new appendix.
Series: Representation and mind series
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 373
ISBN-13: 9780262513104
Subjects: Consciousness; Behaviorism (Psychology); Mind and body; Materialism; Philosophy of mind
Notes: "A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: A default position; title: Experience; title: The character of experience; title: Understanding-experience; title: A note about dispositional mental states; title: Purely experiential content; title: An account of four seconds of thought; title: Questions; title: The mental and the nonmental; title: The mental and the publicly observable; title: The mental and the behavioral; title: Neobehaviorism and reductionism; title: Naturalism in the philosophy of mind; title: Conclusion: The three questions; title: Agnostic materialism, part 1; title: Monism; title: The linguistic argument; title: Materialism and monism; title: A comment on reduction; title: The impossibility of an objective phenomenology; title: Asymmetry and reduction; title: Equal-status monism; title: Panpsychism; title: The inescapability of metaphysics; title: Agnostic materialism, part 2; title: Ignorance; title: Sensory spaces; title: Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration; title: The hard part of the mind-body problem; title: Neutral monism and agnostic monism; title: A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on; title: Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism; title: Mentalism; title: Strict or pure process idealism; title: Active-principle idealism; title: Stuff idealism; title: Immaterialism; title: The positions restated; title: The dualist options; title: Frege's thesis; title: Objections to pure process idealism; title: The problem of mental dispositions; title: Mental; title: Shared abilities; title: The sorting ability; title: The definition of mental being; title: Mental phenomena; title: The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena; title: Natural intentionality; title: E/c intentionality; title: The experienceless; title: Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects; title: Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality; title: Concepts in nature; title: Intentionality and experience; title: Summary with problem; title: Pain and pain; title: The neo-behaviorist view; title: A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior; title: A challenge; title: The Sirians; title: N.N. Novel; title: An objection to the Sirians; title: The Betelgeuzians; title: The point of the Sirians; title: Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain; title: Unpleasantness and qualitative character; title: The weather watchers; title: The rooting story; title: What is it like to be a weather watcher?; title: The aptitudes of mental states; title: The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space; title: The argument from the conditions for language ability; title: The argument from the nature of desire; title: Desire and affect; title: The argument from the phenomenology of desire; title: Behavior; title: A hopeless definition; title: Difficulties; title: Other-observability; title: Neo-behaviorism; title: The concept of mind.