Profit neutrality in licensing
Subtitle: The boundary between antitrust law and patent law
By: Stephen M. Maurer, Suzanne Scotchmer.
Contributors: Scotchmer, Suzanne.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10546; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10546.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Antitrust law -- United States; Patent laws and legislation -- United States; License agreements -- United States
Description: "For over a century, courts and commentators have struggled to find principles that reconcile patent and antitrust law, especially as to patent licensing.  We interpret case law and commentary to arrive at three unifying principles for acceptable terms of license.  Profit neutrality' holds that patent rewards should not depend on the rightholder's ability to work the patent himself.  Derived reward' holds that the patent holder's profits should be earned, if at all, from the social value created by the invention.  Minimalism' holds that licensing contracts should not contain more restrictions than are necessary to achieve neutrality.  We argue that these principles largely rationalize important decisions of the twentieth century.  They also justify the Supreme Court's controversial General Electric decision, which holds that patentholders can set prices charged by their licensees"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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