Forbearance and prompt corrective action
By: by Narayana Kocherlakota and Ilhyock Shim.
Contributors: Shim, Ilhyock.; Bank for International Settlements. Monetary and Economic Dept.
Series: BIS working papers,; no. 177; BIS working papers (Online) ;; no. 177.
Publisher: Bank for International Settlements
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Basel, Switzerland
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: This paper investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time, that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but losing the collateral, and that depositors can withdraw deposits. We show that optimal regulation exhibits forbearance if the ex-ante probability of collapse in collateral value is sufficiently low, but exhibits prompt termination of problem banks if this probability is sufficiently high.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file (viewed on June 22, 2005).
"Monetary and Economic Department."
"May 2005."
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