Do works councils inhibit investment?
By: by John T. Addison ... [et al.].
Contributors: Addison, John T.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1473; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1473
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Works councils -- Germany.; Capital investments -- Germany.; Labor unions -- United States.; Capital investments -- United States.
Description: "Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/26/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.