Enforcement problems and secondary markets
By: Fernando A. Broner, Alberto Martin, Jaume Ventura
Contributors: Martin, Alberto; Ventura,Jaume; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13559; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13559.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance.  This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption.  The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies.  But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded.  This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/15/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.