A costly signaling theory of hard look review
By: Matthew Stephenson
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 539; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business) -- no. 539
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 52
Subjects: Judicial review; Judicial review of administrative acts; Econometric models
Description: A judge who must review a government agency decision may require the agency to submit a sufficient explanation or justification, usually written, of its actions; this is called a "hard look review." The author suggests that even if the judge is not an expert in a particular field, the quality of the agency's explanation may signal to the judge the agency's commitment to a certain policy.
Notes: "2/2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

Discussion papers published since September 1997 are available for downloading free of charge from the Olin Center web site.