Sharing the risk of settlement failure
By: Hiroshi Fujiki, Edward J. Green, and Akira Yamazaki.
Contributors: Green, Edward J.; Yamazaki, Akira, 1942-; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.
Series: Working paper / Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept. ;; 594; Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis : Online) ;; 594.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 1999
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Risk -- Econometric models.; Payment -- Econometric models.
Description: "Two policies toward payments-system risk are common, but superficially appear to be contradictory.  One policy is to restrict the exposure to risk generated by one participant to other participants who are, by one measure or another, directly concerned with the risky participant.  The other policy is to provide a "safety net," typically provided by government and funded by taxes collected from all participants and even from non-participants, to share losses due to "systemic risk." In this paper, we provide a model in which both of these policies can be constituents of an economically efficient regime of payments-risk management"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from abstract page as viewed on 1/5/2005.
"February 1999."
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.