Paying for long-term performance
By: Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.
Contributors: Fried, Jesse M.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 658; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 658.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Executives -- Salaries, etc. -- Law and legislation -- United States; Executives -- Salaries, etc. -- United States -- Mathematical models; Financial risk; Risk-taking (Psychology) -- Economic aspects
Other titles: Paying for long term performance
Description: "Abstract: Firms and regulators around the world are now seeking to ensure that the compensation of public company executives is tied to long-term results to avoid creating incentives for excessive risk-taking.  This paper analyzes how this objective can be best achieved.  Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of executive pay packages, we identify how such compensation could be best structured to tie remuneration to long-term results rather than short-term gains that might turn out to be illusory.  We also analyze how equity compensation could be best designed to prevent the gaming of equity grants at either the front-end or the back-end"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/14/2010.

Includes bibliographical references.

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