Analyzing the welfare impacts of full-line forcing contracts
By: Justin Ho, Katherine Ho, Julie Holland Mortimer
Contributors: Ho, Katherine; Mortimer, Julie Holland; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16318; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16318.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "Theoretical investigations have examined both anti-competitive and efficiency-inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications.  We use an extensive dataset on full-line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare.  We identify and measure three primary effects of fullline forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage, and efficiency.  We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor gaining leverage over another.  As a result, we estimate that full-line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/4/2010.

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