Intellectual property and market size
By: Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine.
Contributors: Levine, David K.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;; 360; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 360.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 2005
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Intellectual property.; Market share.; Monopolies.
Description: "Intellectual property protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due either to economic and population growth or to the expansion of trade through treaties such as the World Trade Organization, this trade-off changes.We show that, generally speaking, the socially optimal amount of protection decreases as the scale of the market increases.We also provide simple empirical estimates of how much it should decrease"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/2/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.