Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter
By: Marco Bassetto, Jess Benhabib
Contributors: Benhabib, Jess, 1948-; Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Research Department
Series: Working paper series -- WP-2006-2; Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Research Department : Online) -- WP-2006-2.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Chicago, Ill.]
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Taxation; Econometric models
Description: "We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang- bang" property."--Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/12/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.