Employment efficiency and sticky wages
Subtitle: evidence from flows in the labor market
By: Robert E. Hall.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11183; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11183.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Labor market -- Mathematical models.; Employment (Economic theory) -- Mathematical models.; Wages -- Mathematical models.
Description: "I consider three views of the labor market.  In the first, wages are flexible and employment follows the principle of bilateral efficiency.  Workers never lose their jobs because of sticky wages.  In the second view, wages are sticky and inefficient layoffs do occur.  In the third, wages are also sticky, but employment governance is efficient.  I show that the behavior of flows in the labor market strongly favors the third view.  In the modern U.S.  economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs.  Unemployment rises because jobs are hard to find, not because an unusual number of people are thrown into unemployment"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/17/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.