Local public good provision
Subtitle: voting, peer effects, and mobility
By: Stephen Calabrese ... [et al.].
Contributors: Calabrese, Stephen.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 11720.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11720.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 55
Subjects: Public goods -- Mathematical models; Community development -- Mathematical models; Migration, Internal -- Mathematical models; Voting -- Mathematical models
Description: "Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households.  The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects.  We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process.  We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data.  We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: "October 2005."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-48).

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).