Motivation and sorting in open source software innovation
By: Sharon Belenzon and Mark Schankerman.
Contributors: Schankerman, Mark.; London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
Series: CEP discussion paper -- no. 893
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Published: 2008
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: This paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation and reciprocity in driving open source software innovation. We exploit the observed pattern of contributions -- the 'revealed preference' of developers -- to infer the underlying incentives. Using detailed information on code contributions and project membership, we classify developers into distinct groups and study how contributions from each developer type vary by license (contract) type and other project characteristics. The central empirical finding is that developers strongly sort by license type, project size and corporate sponsorship. This evidence confirms the importance of heterogeneous motivations, specifically a key role for motivated agents and reputation, but less for reciprocity.
Notes: Title from PDF file (viewed on Dec. 5, 2008).

"October 2008."

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.