Agency problems and the fate of capitalism
By: Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung
Contributors: Yeung, Bernard, 1953-; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16490; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16490.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people.  Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism.  Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need constitutions and independent judiciaries to restrain those entrusted with government.  Agency problems distort capital allocation if corporate insiders are inefficiently selected or incentivized, and this hampers economic growth absent a legal system with appropriate constraints.  However, political economy problems and agency problems in corporations may reinforce each other, compromising the quality of both corporate governance and government"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/15/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.