Do sentencing guidelines raise the cost of punishment?
By: Jose Meade, Joel Waldfogel.
Contributors: Waldfogel, Joel, 1962-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 6361; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 6361.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 1998
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 24
Subjects: Sentences (Criminal procedure) -- Economic aspects -- United States -- Econometric models.; Imprisonment -- United States -- Costs -- Econometric models.
Description: When judges have discretion over fines and prison terms, sentencing exhibits a tendency toward efficiency: fines are larger, and prison terms shorter, for offenders with greater ability to pay. Sentencing guidelines place fairly rigid upper and lower limits on fines and prison terms and may inhibit the achievement of efficiency in sentencing. Preventing judges from substituting fines for prison terms may raise the cost of imposing punishment. The objective of this paper is to measure the efficiency cost of sentencing guidelines using data on federal offenders sentenced" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. We find evidence that the guidelines raise the cost of punishment by nearly 5 percent of the total imprisonment cost of federal offenders. Not surprisingly, constraints on cost minimization raise costs.
Notes: "January 1998."

JEL no. K14, K40.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 17-18).

Electronic access limited to Binghamton University faculty, staff and students for instructional and research purposes only.

Electronic version available via the Internet at the NBER World Wide Web site.