Handshake with the Dragon
Subtitle: engaging China in the biological weapons convention
By: James H. Lewis, III
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1998
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 157
Description: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) currently lacks procedures for verifying      compliance of signatories; this shortcoming, in combination with advances in biotechnology and a changing      global security environment have resulted in the continued proliferation of biological and toxin weapons      (BTW). Efforts to strengthen the BWC with an inspection protocol have been hampered by disagreement      over intrusive inspection and the threat it poses to national security and industrial competitiveness. Debate      within the United States, however, fails to consider the impact of U.S. involvement in the inspection regime on      the behavior of signatories such as China which are suspected to be violating the treaty. Michael Swaine's      model of Chinese government decision making is used to evaluate reactions to three U.S. policies toward      BWC inspections. Research suggests that responsibility for BWC verification overlaps institutional interests      and that U.S. participation in the protocol may have a positive effect in the Chinese cost-benefit calculation of      accepting inspections. Findings suggest that one way of encouraging nations such as China in nonproliferation      efforts may be to push forward and accept intrusive inspections, with an understanding of their limitations and      costs.
Notes: Thesis advisor(s): Peter R. Lavoy, James J. Wirtz.

"June 1998."

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, June 1998.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-110).

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

US Navy (USN) author.

dk/dk cc:9116 9/17/98.