Competitive equilibrium in markets for votes
By: Alessandra Casella, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Thomas R. Palfrey
Contributors: Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, Thomas R., 1953-; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16315; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16315.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes.  Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other.  We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium.  We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough.  We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/28/2010.

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