Exclusionary minimum resale price maintenance
By: John Asker, Heski Bar-Isaac
Contributors: Bar-Isaac, Heski; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16564; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16564.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "An upstream manufacturer can use minimum retail price maintenance (RPM) to exclude potential competitors.  RPM lets the incumbent manufacturer transfer profits to retailers.  If entry is accommodated, upstream competition leads to fierce down- stream competition and the breakdown of RPM.  Hence, via RPM, retailers internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits.  Retailers may prefer not to accommodate entry; and, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred.  We investigate when an incumbent would prefer to exclude, rather than collude with, the entrant and the effect of a retailer cartel.  We also consider the effect of imperfect competition.  Empirical and policy implications are discussed"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/29/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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