Strategic responses to parallel trade
By: Margaret K. Kyle.
Contributors: Kyle, Margaret K.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12968; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12968.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper examines how pharmaceutical firms have responded to changes in intellectual property rights and trade barriers that legalized "parallel imports" within the European Union.  The threat of arbitrage by parallel traders reduces the ability of firms to price discriminate across countries.  Due to regulations on price and antitrust law on rationing supply, pharmaceutical firms may rely on non-price responses.  Such responses include differentiation of products across countries and selective "culling" of product lines to reduce arbitrage opportunities, as well as raising arbitrageurs' costs through choice of packaging.  Using a dataset of drug prices and sales from 1993-2004 covering 30 countries, I find evidence that the behavior of pharmaceutical firms in the EU with respect to their product portfolios is consistent with attempts to reduce parallel trade.  This may at least partially explain why parallel trade has not yet resulted in significant price convergence across EU countries.  Accounting for non-price strategic responses may therefore be important in assessing the welfare effects of parallel imports"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/18/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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