The evolution of precedent
By: Nicola Gannaioli, Andrei Shleifer.
Contributors: Shleifer, Andrei.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11265; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11265.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Stare decisis.
Description: "We evaluate Richard Posner's famous hypothesis that common law converges to efficient legal rules using a model of precedent setting by appellate judges.  Following legal realists, we assume that judicial decisions are subject to personal biases, and that changing precedent is costly to judges.  We consider separately the evolution of precedent under judicial overruling of previous decisions, as well as under distinguishing cases based on new material dimensions.  Convergence to efficient legal rules occurs only under very special circumstances, but the evolution of precedent over time is on average beneficial under more plausible conditions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.