On-site inspection as an echancement to verification
By: by David L. Braford
Contributors: Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Dept. of National Security Affairs
Publisher: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service
Published: 1989
Place of publication: Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va
Language: eng
Number of pages: 49
Subjects: ARMS CONTROL; INSPECTION
Other titles: NPS-56-89-014.
Description: This paper rejects the notion that onsite inspection provisions, such as the 'historic' terms of      the INF treaty, necessarily insure verification. The principles and processes of verification are      examined, as are two failed post- World War I arms control measures that featured intrusive      inspection. The Treaty of Versailles was ignored by the Germans, while its replacement, the      Anglo- American Naval Treaty, fared no better; both were marked by Allied wishful      thinking. A review of post World-War II agreements relative to charges of Soviet      noncompliance reveal more ambiguities than actual violations, although the in famous radar      near Krasnovarsk fails to be explained away. Discussion of the INF Treaty centers on      on-site inspection provisions, that are described as being too costly and too complex to      properly implement, as well as offering the Soviet Union unreasonable opportunities for      collateral intelligence collection. The author suggests the United States rebuild its      counterintelligence assets, attempt to resolve compliance issues through such forums as the      Standing Consulting Committee, and form arms control policy in the contest of a      comprehensive international security policy--one driven only peripherally by the political      requirements of the moment. (SDW)
Notes: Cover title.

"NPS-56-89-014."

"August 1989."

AD A212 700.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-49).

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