When for-profits and not-for-profits compete
Subtitle: theory and empirical evidence from retail banking
By: by William R. Emmons and Frank A. Schmid.
Contributors: Schmid, Frank A., 1962-
Series: Working paper ;; 2004-004A; Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis : Online) ;; 2004-004A.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Published: 2004
Place of publication: [St. Louis, Mo.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Nonprofit organizations -- Econometric models.; Competition -- Econometric models.; Credit unions -- Econometric models.; Banks and banking -- Econometric models.
Description: "We model competition in local deposit markets between for-profit and not-for-profit financial institutions.  For-profit retail banks may offer a superior bundle of financial services, but not-for-profit (occupational) credit unions enjoy sponsor subsidies that allow them to capture a share of the local market.  The model predicts that greater participation in credit unions in a given county will be associated with higher levels of retail-bank concentration.  We find empirical evidence of this association.  The ability of credit unions to affect local banking market structure supports the presumption of current banking antitrust analysis that retail banking markets remain local.  We identify local economic factors that modulate the nature of competition between banks and credit unions, including income per capita and population density"--Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/27/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.