On the optimality of search matching equilibrium when workers are risk averse
By: by Etienne Lehmann, Bruno Van der Linden.
Contributors: Van der Linden, Bruno.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1172; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1172
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper revisits the normative properties of search-matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable. To decentralize these optima, employees should be unable to extract a rent when information is perfect. An appropriate positive rent is however needed in the second case. To implement these optima, non-linear income taxation is a key complement to unemployment insurance. According to the level of the workers' bargaining power, taxation has to be progressive"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/16/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.