The effect of automobile insurance and accident liability laws on traffic fatalities
By: Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia.
Contributors: Dehejia, Rajeev.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 479; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 479.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper investigates the incentive effects of automobile insurance, compulsory insurance laws, and no-fault liability laws on driver behavior and traffic fatalities.  We analyze a panel of 50 U.S.  states and the District of Columbia from 1970-1998, a period in which many states adopted compulsory insurance regulations and/or no-fault laws.  Using an instrumental variables approach, we find evidence that automobile insurance has moral hazard costs, leading to an increase in traffic fatalities.  We also find that reductions in accident liability produced by no-fault liability laws have led to an increase in traffic fatalities (estimated to be on the order of 6%).  Overall, our results indicate that, whatever other benefits they might produce, increases in the incidence of automobile insurance and moves to no-fault liabilitysystems have significant negative effects on traffic fatalities"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/28/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.