Constraining managers without owners
Subtitle: governance of the not-for-profit enterprise
By: Mihir A. Desai, Robert J. Yetman.
Contributors: Yetman, Robert J.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11140; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11140.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Nonprofit organizations -- Management.; Nonprofit organizations -- Law and legislation.; Corporate governance.
Description: "In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior.  Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation.  The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance %uF818 the provision of social insurance.  Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/23/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.