Manipulability in matching markets
Subtitle: conflict and coincidence of interests
By: Itai Ashlagi, Flip Klijn
Contributors: Klijn, Flip; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 10-111; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 10-111.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2010
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 10
Description: We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.
Notes: "June 2010"--Publisher's website.

"June 14, 2010"--added t.p.

Includes bibliographical references.