Owners of developed land versus owners of undeveloped land
Subtitle: why land use is more constrained in the Bay Area than in Pittsburgh
By: Christian Hilber, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud
Contributors: Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric; London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance
Series: CEP discussion paper -- no. 760
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Published: 2006
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Description: We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints are interpreted as shadow taxes that increase the land rent of already developed plots and reduce the amount of new housing developments. In general equilibrium, locations with nicer amenities are more developed and, as a consequence, more regulated. We test our model predictions by geographically matching amenity, land use, and historical Census data to metropolitan area level survey data on regulatory restrictiveness. Following the predictions of the model, we use amenities as instrumental variables and demonstrate that metropolitan areas with better amenities are more developed and more tightly regulated than other areas. Consistent with theory, metropolitan areas that are more regulated also grow more slowly.
Notes: Title from publisher's abstract page (viewed on Jan. 5, 2007).

"November 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

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