Who pays for performance?
By: by Erling Barth ...[et al.].
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 2142; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2142
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Wages and labor productivity; Merit pay; Industrial relations
Description: "Using Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003, we show that performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organize their work. This observation supports an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated by agency problems. Performance-related pay is also more widespread in large firms. Traditionally, wage setting in the Norwegian labor market has been dominated by negotiations between trade unions and employer associations at the central and local levels, with a fixed hourly wage as a predominant element of the wage scheme. Our results show that performance-related pay is less common in highly unionized firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralized bargaining. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper reveals that performance pay is on the rise in Norway, even after accounting for changes in industry structure, bargaining regime, and union density. Finally, we find that the incidence of performance-related pay relates positively to product-market competition and foreign ownership"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/31/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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