Finite horizons, political economy, and growth
By: James A. Kahn, Jong-Soo Lim.
Contributors: Lim, Jong-Soo.; Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Series: Staff reports ;; no. 102; Staff reports (Federal Reserve Bank of New York : Online) ;; no. 102.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Published: 2000
Place of publication: [New York, N.Y.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Policy sciences -- Decision making.; Economic development -- Mathematical models.
Description: "This paper analyzes the political economy of growth when agents and the government have finite horizons and equilibrium growth is inefficient.  A "representative" government (that is, one whose preferences reflect those of its constituents) endowed merely with the ability to tax and transfer can improve somewhat on market allocation but cannot achieve first-best growth.  Efficiency requires in addition bind future governments.  We argue that this is related political stability, provide empirical evidence stability growth-related policies (namely education) are meaningfully related"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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