Essays in organizational economics
By: by Robert Akerlof
Published: 2009
Language: eng
Number of pages: 329
Description: This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of organizations. The first two chapters consider the importance of social norms for organizational economics and for economics more generally. The third chapter considers a longstanding question in organization theory: the optimal way to structure rewards and punishments in a moral hazard setting. The first chapter develops a theory of social norms--what they are, how they form, and how they change and considers numerous implications of the theory. In particular, the theory accounts for the existence of "oppositional culture," where minority groups disparage the majority and are disparaged in turn. An explanation is suggested for the rise of an African-American oppositional culture of this sort in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The second chapter builds on the first to develop a theory of authority. Followers of an individual with authority are viewed as holding the norm that they should do what the individual tells them to do.

The chapter suggests that authority is a valuable tool for a principal incentivizing agents but will be lost unless an authority maintenance (AM) constraint is satisfied. The AM constraint explains many important economic phenomena: above-market--i.e., efficiency--wages; failure to hire overqualified workers; the nature of organizational bureaucracy; and attempts by bosses/leaders to live up to the values of their workers/followers. The AM constraint also has implications for the theory of the firm. The third chapter characterizes the optimal way for a principal to structure a rank-order tournament in a moral hazard setting. It is often optimal to give rewards to top performers that are smaller in magnitude than corresponding punishments to poor performers. The paper identifies four reasons why the principal might prefer to give larger rewards than punishments: (i) agents' risk aversion is low relative to agents' absolute prudence; (ii) the distribution of shocks to output is asymmetric and the asymmetry takes a particular form; (iii) the principal faces a limited liability constraint; and (iv) there is agent heterogeneity of a particular form.
Notes: "May 2009."

Thesis (Ph.D., Dept. of Economics)--Harvard University, 2009.

Includes bibliographical references.