Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO
By: Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger.
Contributors: Staiger, Robert W.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10420; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10420.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: World Trade Organization.; Favored nation clause.
Description: "Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.  We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion.  We show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed.  We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems.  In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.