How do staggered boards affect shareholder value?
Subtitle: evidence from a natural experiment
By: Alma Cohen, Charles C.Y. Wang
Contributors: Harvard Business School
Edition: Revised edition
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 13-068; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 13-068
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2013
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 44
Description: The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court rulings--separated by several weeks and going in opposite directions--that affected the antitakeover force of SBs. We contribute to the long-standing debate on staggered boards by documenting empirical evidence consistent with the market viewing SBs as leading to lower firm value for the affected firms.
Notes: "February 2013. (Revised May 2013.)"--Publisher's Web site.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 31-33).