Categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets
By: Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Glenn C. Loury.
Contributors: Loury, Glenn C.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 10104.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 10104.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2003
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Categorization (Psychology); Decision making; Markets -- Econometric models
Description: "This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF title screen (viewed on July 25, 2007).

"November 2003."

Includes bibliographical references.

Electronic monograph.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.