Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game
By: Julio J. Rotemberg
Contributors: Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 05-008; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 05-008
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 30
Description: I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. I show that, with heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it accounts for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split with parameter values that are more plausible than those that are required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickson (2000) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Notes: "July 16, 2004"--Added t.p.

Includes bibliographical references.