Traveling agents
Subtitle: political change and bureaucratic turnover in India
By: Lakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani
Contributors: Mani, Anandi; Harvard Business School
Edition: 2nd rev.
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-006; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-006.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 44
Description: We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns as well as the consequences for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find evidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician's party base also helps secure important positions.
Notes: "July 2008, revised April 2009, November 2009"--Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.