Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism
By: Katherine L. Milkman, James Burns, David C. Parkes, Gregory M. Barron, Kagan Tumer .
Contributors: Burns, James; Parkes, David C.; Barron, Greg, 1968-; Tumer, Kagan; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 08-064; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 08-064
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 37
Description: We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism.
Notes: "February 2008"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.