Bureaucratic rents and life satisfaction
By: by Simon Luechinger, Stephan Meier, Alois Stutzer.
Contributors: Meier, Stephan, 1972-
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 1964; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 1964
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Civil service -- Case studies.; Bureaucracy -- Case studies.; Employee fringe benefits -- Case studies.
Genres: Case studies.
Description: "The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services allows government employees to acquire rents. Those rents can involve higher wages, monetary and non-monetary fringe benefits (e.g. pensions and staffing), and/or bribes. We propose a direct measure to capture the total of these rents: the difference in reported subjective well-being between bureaucrats and people working in the private sector. In a sample of 38 countries, we find large variations in the extent of rents in the public bureaucracy. The extent of rents is determined by differences in institutional constraints and correlates with perceptions of corruption. We find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/15/2006.

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