International outsourcing and incomplete contracts
By: Barbara J. Spencer.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11418; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11418.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Offshore assembly industry.; Contracting out.
Description: "International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the vertical organization of production.  The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research.  This survey paper provides a perspective on this new literature so as to gain insights into the forces driving international outsourcing.  The paper focuses on relationship-specific investment, incomplete contracts, and also search and matching, as fundamental concepts that explain outsourcing decisions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/11/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.