Saddam Hussein's nuclear vision
Subtitle: an atomic shield and sword for conquest
By: Norman Cigar
Contributors: Marine Corps University (U.S.). Marine Corps War College
Series: Middle East studies occasional papers -- no. 1
Publisher: Marine Corps University Press
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Quantico, VA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 89
Subjects: Political and social views; Nuclear weapons; Government policy; History; Nuclear nonproliferation; Military policy; Foreign relations
Description: This study examines why Saddam Hussein pursued nuclear weapons and, as a basic aspect of that question, how he might have employed that capability had he acquired it, whether for deterrence, warfighting, or something else. As the key decision maker in Iraq, Saddam's own thinking was central. His perception of regional threats, primarily from Iran and Israel,were a prime motivator. In addition, Saddam viewed acquiring nuclear weapons as a potent vehicle to help legitimize his regime and burnish his personal image as leader both at home and in the Arab World, as a modernizer and defender of national interests. A better understanding of the Iraqi case can also clarify the enduring issues related to how regional leaders may view nuclear weapons in this world of looming proliferation.
Notes: "June 2011."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-87).

Also available online in PDF format from Marine Corps War College web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
Table of contents: title: Introduction. The terms of reference; title: Saddam Hussein's nuclear vision. The historical database; title: Nuclear weapons and the threat environment; title: Saddam and Iraq's enemies; title: Iran; title: Israel; title: Did the Osirak airstrike trigger the military nuclear program?; title: The United States as a threat?; title: Nuclear weapons as a legitimizing vehicle; title: Reaching the domestic audience; title: Iraq's military; title: The Ba'ath Party; title: Iraq's scientists; title: Iraq's public and students; title: Nuclear weapons and the defense of the Arab nation; title: Nuclear weapons and modernity; title: To hide or reveal?; title: Were there any skeptics?; title: Iraqi perspectives on nuclear deterrence; title: Contrasting western academic frameworks; title: What is nuclear deterrence : the Iraqi view; title: Would deterrence of Saddam have worked?; title: Saddam's brinksmanship; title: Deterring the United States; title: Saddam's attempts at deterrence; title: A more aggressive Iraqi perspective : "offensive deterrence"; title: Offensive deterrence and changing the status quo; title: Wielding political clout through offensive deterrence; title: Changing the balance of power; title: The potential impact of aggressive deterrence; title: Nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool; title: The linkage between deterrence and warfighting; title: Iraq's concept of nuclear war; title: Iraq doctrine; title: Doomsday weapons or warfighting tool?; title: Saddam's mirror imaging of adversaries; title: The combat use of nuclear weapons : how likely?; title: Saddam as decision maker; title: Saddam's calculus; title: The size of the arsenal : how much is enough?; title: Goals and possibilities; title: Numerical parity does not matter : Iraq's assessment of other cases; title: Delivery and credibility; title: A maturing of Iraq's perspective?; title: Maturation and the superpowers; title: Iraqi thinking : a different trajectory? Preparing to be a nuclear power; title: Waiting for nuclear weapons : Iraq's window of vulnerability; title: Creating a nuclear-free zone; title: Interim WMD : binary chemical weapons; title: No substitute for nuclear weapons; title: Would Saddam have revived the nuclear program?; title: Conclusions. Avoiding mirror-imaging : leadership matters; title: Nuclear deterrence may be uncertain and unstable; title: Nuclear warfighting may be an option; title: Even smaller nuclear arsenals can be destabilizing; title: Modifying the threat environment can help.