Obstacles to optimal policy
Subtitle: the interplay of politics and economics in shaping bank supervision and regulation reforms
By: Randall S. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan.
Contributors: Strahan, Philip E. 1963-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 7582; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7582.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2000
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 35
Subjects: United States. -- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act.; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation -- Rules and procedures.; Banks and banking -- State supervision -- United States.; Deposit insurance -- Law and legislation -- United States.; Pressure groups -- Economic aspects -- United States.; Politics, Practical -- Economic aspects -- United States.
Other titles: Interplay of politics and economics in shaping bank supervision and regulation reforms
Notes: "March 2000."

JEL no. D72, D78, G21, G28, L51.

Includes bibliographical references (p. ([36-42]).

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