The politics of positive incentives in arms control
By: edited by Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff.
Contributors: Bernauer, Thomas.; Ruloff, Dieter.
Series: Studies in international relations; Studies in international relations (Columbia, S.C.)
Publisher: University of South Carolina Press
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Columbia, S.C
Language: eng
Number of pages: 202
Subjects: Nuclear arms control.
Description: "The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control poses the question of whether or not it is sensible to "buy" cooperation from critical states and examines various recent cases of nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, including experiences with Ukraine and North Korea.

In exploring the conditions under which positive incentives are effective and efficient in resolving international collaboration problems, editors Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff and four other contributors draw on a wide range of social science theories and results of empirical research.

They define positive incentives as transfers of positively valued resources, such as money, technology, or know-how, from one actor to another with the aim of driving the behavior of the recipient in a direction that is desirable from the viewpoint of the provider."--BOOK JACKET.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Introduction and analytical framework / Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff; title: Incentives provided for in major multilateral arms control agreements / Jozef Goldblat; title: North Korea : a case in progress / Amy E. Smithson; title: The denuclearization of Ukraine / Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter; title: Positive incentives in nuclear nonproliferation and beyond / Thomas Bernauer.