Banker fees and acquisition premia for targets in cash tender offers
Subtitle: challenges to the popular wisdom on banker conflicts
By: Charles W. Calomiris, Donna M. Hitscherich.
Contributors: Hitscherich, Donna M.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11333; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11333.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Banks and banking -- Service charges.; Bank mergers.; Investment banking.
Description: "We analyze data on fees paid to investment bankers and acquisition premia paid for targets in cash tender offers.  Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets.  Fees to investment banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information.  The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant.  Variation in acquisition premia also can be explained by fundamental deal attributes.  Contrary to the jaundiced view of fairness opinions, greater fixity of fees is not associated with higher acquisition premia, and there is no evidence that investment banks are suborned by acquirors with whom they have had a prior banking relationship"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.