How communication links influence coalition bargaining
Subtitle: a laboratory investigation
By: Gary E. Bolton, Kalyan Chatterjee, Kathleen L. McGinn
Contributors: Chatterjee, Kalyan; McGinn, Kathleen L.; Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Edition: 2003 ed.
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 03-204; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 03-204
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2003
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 21
Description: Complexity of communication is one of the important factors that distinguishes multilateral negotiation from its bilateral cousin. We investigate how the communication configuration affects a three-person coalition negotiation. Restricting who can communicate with whom strongly influences outcomes, and not always in ways that current theory anticipates. Competitive frictions, including a tendency to communicate offers privately, appear to shape much of what we observe. Our results suggest that parties with weaker alternatives would benefit from a more constrained structure, especially if they can be the conduit of communication, while those endowed with stronger alternatives would do well to work within a more public communication structure that promotes competitive bidding.
Notes: Previous ed.: c2000. Gary E. Bolton, Kalyan Chatterjee, Kathleen L. Valley. 01-009.

"February 2003"--P. 1.

Includes bibliographical references.