Tet 1968
Subtitle: understanding the surprise
By: Ronnie E. Ford.
Series: Cass series--studies in intelligence
Publisher: F. Cass
Published: 1995
Place of publication: Ilford, Essex, England; Portland, Or
Language: eng
Number of pages: 218
Subjects: Tet Offensive, 1968.; Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 -- Military intelligence -- United States.
Description: Using information from newly translated Communist Vietnamese documents, combined with existing Western sources, Captain Ford explains and documents the actual significance of the offensive, which proves to be very different from that previously understood in America and the West.

The Vietnamese version of Tet reveals that while US forces achieved a tactical victory in the surprise battle, US intelligence misinterpreted the Communists' strategic intentions. For the North Vietnamese, a 'decisive victory' occurs when a superior force can be defeated not by military means but through external political or diplomatic developments that decide the outcome.

The North Vietnamese realized that, with the 1968 presidential elections approaching and world opinion in their favour, they would be able to demonstrate the legitimacy of their struggle and to convince the American public and policy-makers that a military victory would not be worth the cost. Their 'decisive victory' would be achieved with little risk.

Fundamentally, the Communists understood twenty-seven years ago the political and diplomatic nature of people's war, which many in the US military still find hard to comprehend. This book illustrates what the Americans missed and why they missed it.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references(p. 195-201) and index.