Matching and price competition
By: Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin.
Contributors: Levin, Jonathan.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11506; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11506.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Salaries -- Mathematical models.; Wages -- Mathematical models.; Profit -- Mathematical models.
Description: "We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers.Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency.  Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed.  We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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