Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
By: [by] Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov [and] Konstantin Sonin .
Contributors: Egorov, Georgy, 1979-; Sonin, Konstantin; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 09-26; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 09-26.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 26
Subjects: Political games; Political science; Mathematical models; Voting; Game theory; Power (Social sciences)
Description: We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in finite and infinite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation. Keywords: voting, agenda-setting games, Markov trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. JEL Classifications: D72, C73.
Notes: "October 16, 2009."

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 23-24).

Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.