Trust and bribery
Subtitle: the role of the quid pro quo and the link with crime
By: by Jennifer Hunt.
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1179; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1179
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Bribery.; Political corruption.
Description: "I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/16/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.