Incentives in obesity and health insurance
By: Inas Rashad, Sara Markowitz.
Contributors: Markowitz, Sara.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13113.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13113.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 26
Subjects: Medically uninsured persons -- United States; Insurance, Health -- United States; Obesity -- United States -- Econometric models
Description: The percentage of those uninsured in the U.S. has risen in recent years, although out-of-pocket expenditures have declined. At the same time, the obesity rate has significantly risen. We look at obesity in the context of a model in which the status of health insurance might play a role in influencing body weights. In this context, adverse selection is likely to be an issue, as those with ailments are more likely to sort themselves into being covered by insurance, or to be shut out of the health insurance market. At the same time, those who are insured might be more likely to be negligent when it comes to their health, or to be more careful due to the services they are receiving. Using 1993-2002 BRFSS data, we aim to isolate these opposing factors in determining the potential effect of health insurance status on obesity. We control for a variety of confounding factors that may influence obesity prevalence and address the endogenous nature of health insurance. We focus on isolating the effect of ex ante moral hazard rather than ex post moral hazard, and find little evidence of moral hazard in this context.
Notes: "May 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 17-19).

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