Cognitive radio networking and security
Subtitle: a game-theoretic view
By: K. J. Ray Liu, Beibei Wang
Contributors: Wang, Beibei
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge; New York
Language: eng
Number of pages: 601
ISBN-13: 9780521762311
Description: "Recent increases in demand for cognitive radio technology have driven researchers and technologists to rethink the implications of the traditional engineering designs and approaches to communications and networking. One issue is that the traditional thinking is that one should try to have more bandwidth, more resources, and more of everything, while we have come to the realization that the problem is not that we don't have enough bandwidth or resources. It is rather that the bandwidth/resource utilization rates in many cases are too low. For examples, the TV bandwidth utilization nowadays in the USA is less than 6%, which is quite similar to that in most developed countries"--
Table of contents: title: Machine generated contents note: Part I. Cognitive Radio Communications and Cooperation: 1. Introduction to cognitive radios; 2. Game theory for cognitive radio networks; 3. Markov models for dynamic spectrum allocation; 4. Repeated open spectrum sharing game; 5. Pricing game for dynamic spectrum allocation; 6. A multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction game; 7. Evolutionary cooperative spectrum sensing game; 8. Anti-jamming stochastic game; 9. Opportunistic multiple access for cognitive networks; Part II. Resource Awareness and Learning: 10. Reinforcement learning for energy-aware communications; 11. Repeated game and learning for packet forwarding; 12. Dynamic pricing games for routing; 13. Connectivity-aware network lifetime optimization; 14. Connectivity-aware network maintenance and repair; Part III. Securing Mechanism and Strategies: 15. Trust modeling and evaluation; 16. Defense against routing disruptions; 17. Defense against injecting traffic attacks; 18. Attack-resistant cooperation stimulation; 19. Optimal strategies for cooperation stimulation; 20. Belief evaluation for cooperation enforcement; 21. Defense against insider attacks; 22. Secure cooperation stimulation under noise and imperfect monitoring.