Minimum wage or negative income tax
Subtitle: why skilled workers may favor wage rigidities
By: by Maya Bacache-Beauvallet, Etienne Lehmann.
Contributors: Lehmann, Etienne
Series: Discussion paper ;; no. 1570; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;; no. 1570
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Minimum wage.; Skilled labor.; Income distribution.
Description: "This article studies the political choice over the extent and the means of income redistribution between high and low skilled workers. Redistributive tools encompass fiscal transfers with negative income tax and minimum wage. Using fiscal instruments only is assumed optimal. We show that high skilled workers may favor a second-best minimum wage requirement. This is because minimum wage increases unemployment, hence the marginal cost of redistribution is higher which gives a pretext for high skilled workers to moderate low skilled workers claim for income redistribution"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/28/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.