Bargaining in legislatures
Subtitle: an empirical investigation
By: Brian Knight.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10530; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10530.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Transportation and state -- United States -- Case studies.; Legislative bodies -- United States -- Committees.
Genres: Case studies.
Description: "While the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative bargaining has grown voluminous, there is little empirical work attempting to test a key prediction in this literature: proposal power is valuable.  This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation      projects across U.S.  Congressional districts in 1991 and 1998.  The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of the Baron and Ferejohn legislative bargaining model: members with proposal power, those sitting on the transportation authorization committee, secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives.  Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power, which are more powerful than the qualitative restrictions, is more mixed.  I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisian models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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