Robust mechanism design
Subtitle: the role of private information and higher order beliefs
By: by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris
Contributors: Morris, Stephen
Edition: 1st ed.
Series: World scientific series in economic theory -- 2
Publisher: World Scientific Pub.
Published: 2012
Place of publication: Hackensack, NJ
Language: eng
ISBN-13: 9789814374583; 9789814374590
Subjects: Prices; Robust control
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: Foreword; title: Introduction; title: Robust mechanism design; title: Ex post implementation; title: Robust implementation in direct mechanisms; title: Robust implementation in general mechanisms; title: The role of the common prior in robust implementation; title: An ascending auction for interdependent values : uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty; title: Robust virtual implementation; title: Multidimensional private value auctions; title: The robustness of robust implementation; title: Rationalizable implementation; title: Pricing without priors.