Does shareholder proxy access improve firm value
Subtitle: evidence from the business roundtable challenge
By: Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser, and Guhan Subramanian
Contributors: Bergstresser, Daniel; Subramanian, Guhan; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 685; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 685.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Subjects: Investor relations; Stockholder wealth; Stockholders' voting; Corporations; Law and legislation; Proxy
Description: "Abstract: We measure the value of shareholder proxy access by using a recent development in the ability of shareholders to nominate candidates for board seats.  We use the SEC's October 4, 2010 announcement that it would significantly delay implementation of its August 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment.  Because firms with substantial institutional ownership would have been most affected by the SEC's now-delayed changes, we use the share and composition of institutional investors to sort firms into those more and less affected by the October 4 news.  Firms that would have been most affected by proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership, lost value on that day.  The value drop was 55 basis points for a 10 percentage point change in activist institution ownership.  These results suggest that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC's August 2010 Rule"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/16/2010.

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