Agency, liberty, autonomy
By: by Michael Garnett.
Published: 2006
Language: eng
Number of pages: 196
ISBN-13: 9780494158975
Description: I have two arguments against these views. The first is that neither can make proper sense of our interest in independence. This is because both understand restrictions on freedom in terms of reductions in one's option set, and it is possible to subject a person to one's will without restricting her options (for example, by altering her preference set). The second is that both rely on the coherence of the idea of deep agency, which I show to be incoherent. (The negative view of liberty does not rely on the idea directly, but is driven to it in an attempt to answer the first argument.) Deep agency theorists are unable, I argue, to explain what they mean by 'deep agency' in a non-circular way.There are two freedoms: liberty and  autonomy. Liberty pertains to an agent's range of options: the extent of an agent's liberty is a matter of the alternatives open to her. Autonomy pertains to an agent's independence from others: the extent of an agent's autonomy is a matter of his lack of subjection to the control of other agents. My dissertation defends the dual nature of freedom, provides accounts of its two parts, and gives reasons for rejecting two widely-held rival views.The first of these rivals is the negative view of liberty: the idea that freedom is reduced only by impediments to choice imposed by other agents. The second is the deep agency view of autonomy: the idea that freedom consists in having a 'real' self, consisting in one's 'true' or 'authentic' purposes and values, which rules over the rest of oneself and determines one's behaviour.The first of these arguments motivates my account of autonomy: if we are to capture properly our interest in independence, we require a concept devoted to it alone. The second motivates my account of liberty: if there is no deep agency, then the account must be shallow and simple. I argue that these two concepts exhaust our interest in freedom.
Notes: Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2606.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2006.

Electronic version licensed for access by U. of T. users.