Perfect equilibria paths in repeated games
Subtitle: the unique maximal stationary stable standard of behavior
By: by Joseph Greenberg.
Series: Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 495; Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 495.; Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1986
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 24
Subjects: Social sciences -- Mathematical models.
Notes: "Prepared under National Science Foundation Grant SES-83-20464".

"November 1986".

Includes bibliographical references (p. 24).

Binghamton University Libraries' copy bound with: Reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly / Lawrence Ausubel and Raymond Deneckere.