Voluntary public goods provision, coalition formation, and uncertainty
By: Nicholas E. Burger, Charles D. Kolstad.
Contributors: Kolstad, Charles D.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper  15543; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no.  2009.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "LIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty var djConfig = { parseOnLoad: true, isDebug: false };NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH HOME PAGE Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and UncertaintyUse a mirror (359 K)Nicholas E.  Burger, Charles D.  Kolstad NBER Working Paper No.  15543*Issued in November 2009NBER Program(s): EEEThe literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods.  Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates.  We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size.  We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good.  Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher.  Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/1/2009.

Includes bibliographical references.

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