Insider trading preceding goodwill impairments
By: Karl A. Muller, III, Monica Neamtiu, Edward J. Riedl
Contributors: Neamtiu, Monica; Riedl, Edward J.; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 10-007; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 10-007.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 50
Description: We investigate whether insiders strategically sell shares prior to the disclosure of goodwill impairment losses. We provide evidence that insiders of goodwill impairment firms engage in abnormal selling of their shares quarters prior to the announcement of such losses. In addition, of firms recording goodwill impairments, we provide evidence that those firms with insiders selling prior to the announcement of the loss face significantly more negative abnormal returns. Our findings are robust to subsample analysis examining firms reporting goodwill impairments and having low quality information environments (i.e., delayed price discovery). This isolates a setting wherein observed strategic trading behavior more likely reflects insiders' private information regarding goodwill, as opposed to other (non-goodwill related) economic performance. Overall, the results are consistent with corporate insiders being able to profit from their private information relating to a specific financial reporting element, goodwill impairments, prior to its incorporation by the equity market or recognition by the firm's accounting system.
Notes: "July 2009"--Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.