Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Harvard University, Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard Business School, Ross Rheingans-Yoo, Harvard University
Edition: Revised edition
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 18-016; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 18-016
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2017
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 20
Description: We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-αrm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new "Lone Wolf" theorem (Jagadeesan et al. (2017)) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers.
Notes: "August 2017. (Revised December 2017.)" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 15-20).