Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations
Subtitle: evidence from the top 25 ballots of NCAA football coaches
By: Matthew Kotchen, Matthew Potoski
Contributors: Potoski, Matthew, 1969-; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 17628; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17628.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper provides a study on conflicts of interest among college football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of top 25 teams.  The Poll provides a unique empirical setting that overcomes many of the challenges inherent in conflict of interest studies, because many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives to distort evaluations are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free.  Using individual coach ballots between 2005 and 2010, we find that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own team's reputation and financial interests.  On average, coaches rank teams from their own athletic conference nearly a full position more favorably and boost their own team's ranking more than two full positions.  Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better.  When it comes to ranking teams contending for one of the high-profile Bowl Championship Series (BCS) games, coaches favor those teams that generate higher financial payoffs for their own team.  Reflecting the structure of payoff disbursements, coaches from non-BCS conferences band together, while those from BCS conferences more narrowly favor teams in their own conference.  Among all coaches an additional payoff between $3.3 and $5 million induces a more favorable ranking of one position.  Moreover, for each increase in a contending team's payoff equal to 10 percent of a coach's football budget, coaches respond with more favorable rankings of half a position, and this effect is more than twice as large when coaches rank teams outside the top 10"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/9/2012.

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