Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problem
By: Steven Shavell.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10341; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10341.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Insurance, Liability; Liability (Law)
Description: "Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities.  Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk.  However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities.  Liability insurance requirements tend to improve parties' incentives to reduce risk when insurers can observe levels of care, but dilute incentives to reduce risk when insurers cannot observe levels of care.  In the latter case, compulsory liability insurance may be inferior to minimum asset requirements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/19/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.