Mutual monitoring in teams
Subtitle: theory and experimental evidence on the importance of reciprocity
By: by Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Contributors: Bowles, Samuel
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 2106; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2106
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Subjects: Teams in the workplace; Peer review
Description: "Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/1/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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