Second opinions
By: Adrian Vermeule
Contributors: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 673; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 673.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Abstract: There is a burgeoning literature on second opinions in professional contexts, as when patients or clients seek advice from a second doctor or lawyer.  My aim, by contrast, is to analyze second opinions as a central feature of public law.  I will try to show that many institutional structures, rules and practices have been justified as mechanisms for requiring or permitting decisionmakers to obtain second opinions; examples include judicial review of statutes or of agency action, bicameralism, the separation of powers, and the law of legislative procedure.  I attempt to identify the main costs and benefits of these second-opinion mechanisms, to identify conditions under which they prove more or less successful, and to consider how the lawmaking system might employ such mechanisms to greater effect.  I claim, among other things, that Alexander Bickel's justification of judicial review as a "sober second thought" is untenable, and that the Supreme Court should adopt a norm that two successive decisions, not merely one, are necessary to create binding law"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/20/2010.

Includes bibliographical references.

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