Technology and the Law on the Use of Force
            
                Routledge Research in International Law
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2015
Number of pages: 111
ISBN-13: 9780415694339
Description: "In recent years military technology and strategy have developed apace particularly in regards to cyber and space warfare. In 2007 Estonia suffered a month long cyber assault to its digital infrastructure which it is presumed came from Russia in retaliation for the removal of a World War II-era statue of a Soviet soldier from its capital. This was described as some as the first war in cyberspace Web War I. Since then there have been several more cyber attacks on a State and its digital environment, in particular in Iran in 2010 when a worm Stuxnet was identified as having infected and damaged Iran's uranium enrichment plant presumably in an attempt to set back Iran's nuclear programme. This book takes a detailed look at these new theatres of war and considers their relation to international law on the use of force. The use of force, except in cases of self-defence or with the authorisation of a Security Council Resolution, is prohibited under the UN charter and customary international law however, the law of jus ad bellum was developed in a pre-digital era where current technological capabilities could not be conceived of. This book asks whether the law on the use of force is able to deal with legal disputes likely to arise from modern warfare. Among the questions it considers are : What amounts to an armed attack in an age of anti-satellite weaponry and lasers that can cripple satellites? Does the destruction of a State's vital digital eco-system or the "blinding" or jamming of military communication satellites constitute a threat? If so what is the threshold that would enliven the right of self-defence or retaliatory action? The book argues that while technology has leapt ahead the legal framework has failed to adapt, and as a result the ability of States to legally defend themselves has been impaired"--

"In recent years, threats to governmental, economic, and military interests via the information infrastructure have increased as governmental and non-governmental operations have become progressively supported by vast automated systems and electronic data. In 2007 Estonia suffered a month long cyber assault to its digital infrastructure, described in cyberspace as 'Web War I'. In 2010, a worm Stuxnet was identified as having infected and damaged Iran's uranium enrichment plant, presumably in an attempt to set back Iran's nuclear programme. This book takes a detailed look at these new theatres of war and considers their relation to international law on the use of force. Except in cases of self-defence or with the authorisation of a Security Council Resolution, the use of force is prohibited under the UN charter and customary international law. However, the law of jus ad bellum was developed in a pre-digital era where current technological capabilities could not be conceived. Jackson Maogoto asks whether the law on the use of force is able to deal with legal disputes likely to arise from modern warfare. Key queries include, how one defines an armed attack in an age of anti-satellite weaponry, whether the destruction of a State's vital digital eco-system or the "blinding" of military communication satellites constitutes a threat, and how one delimits the threshold that would enliven the right of self-defence or retaliatory action. The book argues that while technology has leapt ahead, the legal framework has failed to adapt, rendering States unable to legally defend themselves effectively. This book will be of great interest and use to researchers and students of international law, the law of armed conflict, Information Technology and the law, and counter-terrorism"--