Justice, unequal talents, and the market
By: by Kristi Ann Olson
Series: Collections of the Harvard University Archives
Published: 2010
Language: eng
Number of pages: 109
Description: People who are equally hard-working can command radically different wages, and hence different life prospects, merely because they possess different innate talents. Inequalities of this sort strike many people as unjust. Yet, the challenge is to characterize the injustice precisely and to explain what form of social institutions would target and eliminate the injustice. My thesis takes up this challenge by solving three related problems. Together, the three parts develop a comprehensive account of the just treatment of unequal talents in the market. First, after showing that the arguments put forward by John Rawls and by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel fail, I explain why individuals should not be taxed according to their ability to earn. I argue that a tax based on the individual's earning capacity is impermissible not because it forecloses more options but because of which options it forecloses. Thus, in order to explain the impermissibility of the endowment tax, we first need to distinguish the options to which individuals have a legitimate moral claim. I show how such a distinction can be made.

The second part concerns two justifications for income inequalities. According to responsibility-sensitive egalitarians, inequalities that arise from the distribution of talents should be eliminated but inequalities that arise from individuals' freely-made choices should be preserved. Although responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism captures some of our most closely-held judgments, it also is the subject of extensive criticism. In this essay, I develop an alternative account capable of capturing our most closely-held judgments, while avoiding the objections. Third, in response to G.A. Cohen, I show that we can in fact satisfy all three of freedom of occupational choice, equality, and Pareto and we do not need an egalitarian ethos to do it. In particular, I show that there are at least three plausible specifications of the conditions under which equality and freedom are satisfied in which the Cohen's trilemma does not arise.
Notes: "August 2010."

Thesis (Ph.D., Dept. of Philosophy)--Harvard University, 2010.

Includes bibliographical references.