The Tet Offensive
Subtitle: Intelligence Failure in War
Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: July 1994
Language: eng
Format: Paperback
Number of pages: 304
ISBN-13: 9780801482090; 9780801424861
Subjects: Asian / Middle Eastern history; Military intelligence; Military - Vietnam War; History - Military / War; Military; ASIA; Asia - Southeast Asia
First sentence: On 31 January 1968, during the Tet holiday, communist forces simultaneously attacked urban areas, military installations, and government facilities throughout South Vietnam.
Description: In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.
Notes: Includes illustrations.
Table of contents: label: Introduction; label: PART I
title: THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK; label: 1
title: The Communist Debate over Strategy; label: 2
title: Preparations, and Objectives of the Tet Offensive; label: PART II
title: THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE; label: 3
title: The Sources of American Biases; label: 4
title: Missing the Signals: July-November 1967; label: 5
title: Missing the Signals: December 1967-30 January 1968; label: 6
title: Reacting to the Tet Offensive; label: Conclusion
title: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence; label: Bibliography; label: Index