Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War
Subtitle: disentangling deception and distraction
By: Aryeh Shalev.
Publisher: Sussex Academic Press
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Brighton; Portland
Language: eng
ISBN-13: 9781845193706
Subjects: Israel-Arab War, 1973 -- Military intelligence -- Israel; Military intelligence -- Israel -- History -- 20th century; Intelligence service -- Israel -- History -- 20th century; National security -- Israel -- History -- 20th century; Deception -- Political aspects -- Israel -- History -- 20th century; Distraction (Psychology) -- Political aspects -- Israel -- History -- 20th century; Israel -- Military policy -- Decision making
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents: title: pt. 1. Israel's security concept and the intelligence concept; title: Israel's security concept and its limitations; title: The intelligence concept; title: pt. 2. Arab military preparations for war through the intelligence prism; title: Basic intelligence; title: Formulating the intelligence picture; title: The essence of warning; title: pt. 3. Intelligence assessments and the decision makers; title: Is Egypt starting a war?; title: Warning from a particular high placed source; title: Assessment of readiness and assessment of intentions; title: Meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of the general staff; title: pt. 4. The mistakes and the failures; title: Intelligence's mistaken assessment; title: The reasons for the intelligence failure; title: pt. 5. The difficulties of intelligence work; title: Basic issues in the Intelligence Branch; title: Problems with the intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War; title: pt. 6. Proposed lessons; title: Responsibility for assessment of intentions : the role of the leadership; title: Organizational lessons; title: Lessons on working methods; title: Conclusion; title: Appendix A: Israel and the Arab States : important dates between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War; title: Appendix B: Intelligence products in the period before the Yom Kippur War; title: Appendix C: Emerging lessons in a meeting with the Intelligence Branch director one month after the outbreak of the war; title: Appendix D: Personal letter from Intelligence Branch director Major General Aharon Yariv to the author, 27 September 1972; title: Appendix E: Letter in praise of this book by Lieutenant General (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, while serving as chief of general staff.