Income tax design and the desirability of subsidies to secondary workers in a household model with joint and non-joint time
By: Edgar Cudmore, John Piggott, John Whalley.
Contributors: Piggott, John; Whalley, John.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13503.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13503.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 13
Subjects: Dual-career families -- Taxation -- Econometric models; Income tax
Description: In this paper we analyze income tax design in a two member household labor supply model where time spent on consumption together by the two household members is valued differently from time spent apart. We treat consumption as a non excludable public good to members of the household; one example would be where all household members or one alone can watch TV. When jointly consumed, however, TV services are valued more highly than the same consumption undertaken separately. We use this model to numerically investigate the welfare implications of different tax structures. In sharp contrast to existing literature, our results suggest the desirability of subsidizing secondary worker's labor supply. We also relate our discussion to existing individual-household tax unit literature.
Notes: "October 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 12-13).

Also available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).