Strategic patenting and software innovation
By: Michael Noel, Mark Schankerman
Contributors: Schankerman, Mark; London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance
Series: CEP discussion paper -- no. 740
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Published: 2006
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
Notes: Title from PDF file (viewed on Sept. 27, 2006).

"August 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

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