ELECTION TIMING.
Series: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
Published: 2004
Place of publication: NEW YORK
Language: und; eng
Number of pages: 259
Description: "Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections "when the time is right." Alastair Smith proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, an early election signals a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier that an election occurs relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British Parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to the timing of elections, electoral support, and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to preannouncement levels, have shorter campaigns, and experience worse postelectoral performance."--Jacket.