The moral economy
Subtitle: why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
By: Samuel Bowles
Series: The castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics; Castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2016
Language: eng
Number of pages: 272
ISBN-13: 9780300163803
Subjects: Moral and ethical aspects; Anreiz; Economics; Homo oeconomicus; Gemeinwohl; Wirtschaftliches Verhalten; Law and economics; Arbeitsmotivation
Other titles: Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
Description: Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index.
Table of contents: title: The problem with homo economicus --; title: A constitution for knaves --; title: Moral sentiments and material interests --; title: Incentives as information --; title: A liberal civic culture --; title: The legislator's dilemma --; title: A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.