Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences
Subtitle: redesigning the NYC high school match
By: Atila, Abdulkadiroǧlu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth
Contributors: Pathak, Parag A.; Roth, Alvin E., 1951-; Harvard Business School. Division of Research
Series: Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School -- 07-076; Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) -- 07-076
Publisher: Division of Research, Harvard Business School
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 28
Description: The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs between incentives and efficiency, because some schools are strategic players that rank students in order of preference, while others order students based on large priority classes. Therefore it is desirable for a mechanism to produce stable matchings (to avoid giving the strategic players incentives to circumvent the match), but is also necessary to use tie-breaking for schools whose capacity is sufficient to accommodate some but not all students of a given priority class. We analyze a model that encompasses one-sided and two-sided matching models.
Notes: "December 15, 2006"--Added t.p.

Includes bibliographical references.