Performance responses to competition across sill-levels in rank order tournaments
Subtitle: field evidence and implications for tournament design
By: Kevin J. Boudreau, Karim R. Lakhani, Constance E. Helfat, Michael Menietti
Contributors: Lakhani, Karim R.; Helfat, Constance E.; Menietti, Michael; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 14-014; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 14-014
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2013
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 26
Description: Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual contestant-level data on 2796 contestants in 774 software algorithm design contests with random assignment. Precisely conforming to theory predictions, the performance response to added contestants varies non-monotonically across contestants of different abilities; most respond negatively to competition; highest-skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interpret a number of tournament design policies (number of competitors, prize allocation and structure, divisionalization, open entry) as a means of reconciling non-monotonic incentive responses to competition, effectively manipulating the number and skills distribution of contestants facing one another.
Notes: "August 2013."--Publisher's Web site.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-29).