Valuing identity
By: Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Glenn Loury
Contributors: Loury, Glenn C.; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16568; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16568.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Affirmative action policies are practiced around the world.  This paper explores the welfare economics of such policies.  A model is proposed where heterogeneous agents, distinguished by skill level and social identity, compete for positions in a hierarchy.  The problem of designing an efficient policy to raise the status in this competition of a disadvantaged identity group is considered.  We show that: (i) when agent identity is fully visible and contractible (sightedness), efficient policy grants preferred access to positions, but offers no direct assistance for acquiring skills; and, (ii) when identity is not contractible (blindness), efficient policy provides universal subsidies when the fraction of the disadvantaged group at the development margin is larger then their mean (across positions) share at the assignment margin"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/29/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.