Simple proposal to halve litigation costs
By: David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A.
Contributors: Shavell, Steven A .; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 513; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 513.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This article discusses a simple proposal that could reduce litigation costs in the country by about half, yet without compromising the functioning of the liability system in a significant way.  Under the proposal (1) only half the cases brought before a court would be randomly chosen for litigation, and (2) damages would be doubled in cases accepted for litigation.  The first element of the proposal saves litigation costs and the second preserves deterrence of undesirable behavior.  The effect of the proposal on settlement is emphasized, one important implication of which is that settlement is likely to occur before cases are filed (and possibly randomly eliminated), in which event plaintiffs will definitely be compensated"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/19/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.