Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining
Subtitle: an experimental investigation
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Katherine L. Milkman, Markus Nöth
Contributors: Milkman, Katherine L.; Nöth, Markus; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 10-039; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 10-039.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2009
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 25
Description: We study the framing effects of communication in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two experiments, we find that non-binding talk of fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on competitive reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that spontaneous within-game dialogue and manipulated pre-game talk lead to the same results.
Notes: "November 2009"--Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references.