Markets for reputation
Subtitle: evidence on quality and quantity in academe
By: Daniel S. Hamermesh, Gerard A. Pfann.
Contributors: Pfann, Gerard A., 1959-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 15527.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no.  15527.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one's peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual's most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary."--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/1/2009.

Includes bibliographical references.

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