Two papers on sequential bargaining
Subtitle: paper I, sequential bargaining mechanisms, paper II, bargaining with incomplete information, an infinite-horizon model with continuous uncertainty
By: by Peter C. Cramton.
Series: Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University; Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 444; Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 444.; Economic series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)
Publisher: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University
Published: 1984
Place of publication: Stanford, Calif
Language: eng
Number of pages: 111
Subjects: Negotiation -- Mathematical models.
Notes: "A report of the Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency, Stanford University, Contract ONR-N0014-79-C-0685, United States Office of Naval Research."

Includes bibliographies.