Term limits and electoral accountability
By: Michael Smart and Daniel M. Sturm.
Contributors: Sturm, Daniel M.; London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
Series: CEP discussion paper -- no. 770
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Published: 2006
Place of publication: London
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters' ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such "truthful" behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We show that the combination of these two effects can strictly increase the utility of voters.
Notes: Title from publisher's abstract page (viewed on June 22, 2007).

"December 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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