Tipping climate negotiations
By: Geoffrey Heal, Howard Kunreuther
Contributors: Kunreuther, Howard; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16954; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16954.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2011
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.  Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same.  We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set.  This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/23/2011.

Includes bibliographical references.

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