Platform competition in two-sided markets
Subtitle: the case of payment networks
By: Sujit  Chakravorti and Roberto Roson.
Contributors: Roson, Roberto.
Series: Working paper series ;; WP-2004-09; Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Research Dept. : Online) ;; WP-2004-09.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Published: 2004
Place of publication: [Chicago, Ill.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "In this article, we construct a model to study competing payment networks, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of benefits to consumers and merchants.  We study market equilibria for a variety of market structures: duopolistic competition and cartel, symmetric and asymmetric networks, and alternative assumptions about multihoming and consumer preferences.  We find that competition unambiguously increases consumer and merchant welfare.  We extend this analysis to competition among payment networks providing different payment instruments and find similar results"--Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/29/2004.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.