Paternalism and psychology
By: Edward L. Glaeser.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11789; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11789.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Economics -- Psychological aspects.; Paternalism.
Description: "Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth.  These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality will often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decisionmaking, because consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decisionmakers, consumers have stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when they are voting and it is more costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful of bureaucrats.  As such, recognizing the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for limited government"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/13/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.