Disjointed ways, disunified means
Subtitle: learning from America's struggle to build an Afghan nation
By: Lewis G. Irwin
Contributors: Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Series: Strategic Studies Institute book; Strategic Studies Institute book
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Published: 2012
Place of publication: Carlisle, PA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 413
ISBN-13: 9781584875284
Subjects: Interagency coordination; Nation-building
Other titles: Learning from America's struggle to build an Afghan nation
Description: "Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO's irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan's history and culture, the region's contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government's strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government's structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats."--Publisher's website
Notes: "May 2012."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 395-411).
Table of contents: title: Introduction; title: Part I. The challenge of Afghanistan. Defining the Afghan problem; title: The scope of irregular warfare and "nation-building"; title: Evolving U.S. strategic interests, options, and risks; title: Part II. Disjointed policies and organizational structures. Disjointed policies, strategies, and objectives; title: A clash of organizational cultures and resources; title: Disunified interagency structures, processes, and effort; title: The unsurprising and uneven results; title: Part III. Potential solutions. Commonly proposed solutions and faulty assumptions; title: Essential elements of any feasible and effective solution; title: A way ahead : the NSC, Combatant Commands, and USRADCOM; title: A brief epilogue : contemplating the context and future of "nation-building".