Social value of public information
Subtitle: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro transparency, not con
By: Lars E.O. Svensson.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11537; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11537.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Disclosure of information -- Mathematical models.; Information theory in economics -- Mathematical models.; Social values -- Mathematical models.
Description: "The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad.  However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good.  Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.