Explaining the evolution of pension structure and job tenure
By: Leora Friedberg, Michael Owyang.
Contributors: Owyang, Michael T.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10714; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10714.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Pensions -- United States -- History.
Description: "Current and expected job tenure have fallen significantly over the last two decades.  Over the same period, traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common.  This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to explain changes in pension structure and job tenure.  In our model, a decline in the value of existing jobs relative to new jobs reduces expected match duration and thus the appeal of DB pensions.  We show that this explanation is consistent with observed trends and suggests an additional consequence of technological change that has not been closely studied"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.