Tangled Governance
Subtitle: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2017
Language: eng
Number of pages: 336
ISBN-13: 9780198801801
Subjects: International monetary fund; Financial crises; European union countries, economic conditions
Description: 'Tangled Governance' addresses the institutions that were deployed to fight the Euro Crisis, re-establish financial stability, and prevent contagion beyond Europe. The author addresses why European leaders chose to include the IMF and provides a detailed account of the decisions of the institutions that make up the 'Troika' (the European Commission, ECB, and IMF). He explains the institutions' negotiating strategies, the outcomes of their interaction, and the effectiveness of their cooperation. The book also explores the strategies of the member states, including Germany and the United States, with respect to the institutions and the advantages they sought in directing them to work together. The book locates the analysis within the framework of regime complexity and clusters of overlapping and intersecting regional and multilateral institutions. It tests conjectures spawned by that literature against the seven cases of financial rescues of Euro-area countries that were stricken by crisis during 2010-2015. 'Tangled Governance' concludes that regime complexity is the consequence of a strategy by key states to control 'agency drift'. States mediate conflicts among institutions, through informal as well as formal mechanisms, and thereby limit fragmentation of the regime complex and underpin substantive efficacy. In so doing, the book answers several key puzzles, including why (a) Germany and other northern European countries supported IMF inclusion despite substantive positions opposed to their economic preferences, (b) crisis-fighting arrangements endured intense conflicts among the institutions, and (c) the United States and the IMF promoted further steps to 'complete' the monetary union.