Externalities and management regimes in fisheries exploitation
By: Yoav Wachsman.
Contributors: University of Hawaii (Honolulu). Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research.; United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.; Pelagic Fisheries Research Program.
Series: JIMAR contribution -- 02-346.; SOEST -- 02-03.; SOEST (Series) -- 02-03.
Publisher: University of Hawaii-NOAA, Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research
Published: 2002
Place of publication: [Honolulu, Hawaii
Language: eng
Number of pages: 19
Subjects: Fisheries -- Econometric models -- Evaluation.; Game theory.; Fishery management, International.; Fishery policy.
Description: "A large number of authors use game theory to model the strategic interaction amongst fishermen. This paper explains the different types of externalities that occur in fisheries exploitation and summarizes the game-theoretical models on each type. The paper also explains the different management regimes that fisheries fall under and how the management of fisheries has changed over time. Ultimately, the goal of the paper is to discuss the best management policy that should be adopted to deal with different types of externalities under different management regimes."
Notes: "Pelagic Fisheries Research Program"--Cover.

[F]unded by project number 653536 through cooperative agreement #NA67RJ0154 between the Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research (JIMAR) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)"--Acknowledgements, p. iii.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 17-19).