Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns
Subtitle: theory and evidence
By: Robert Gibbons, Kevin J. Murphy
Contributors: Murphy, Kevin James, 1957-; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper / Department of Economics -- Number 563; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 563.
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Published: 1990
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 48
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-42).

Research supported by the National Science Foundation. IST 86-09691 SES 88-09200

Research supported by the Industrial Relations Section at Princeton University, the John M. Olin Foundation and the Managerial Economics Research Center at the University of Rochester.