Asset accumulation and labor force participation of disability insurance applicants
By: Pian Shu
Contributors: Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 14-008; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 14-008
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2013
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 50
Description: Using panel data from the RAND Health and Retirement Study, I show that rejected applicants for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) possess significantly more assets immediately prior to their application and exhibit lower labor force attachment than accepted applicants. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that disability insurance may encourage individuals to save more in the present and plan to apply for disability benefits in the future, regardless of the state of their future health. Because the current empirical literature does not account for this intertemporal channel, it may underestimate the total work disincentive effect of SSDI.
Notes: "July 2013."--Publisher's Web site.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 32-33).