Loan servicer heterogeneity and the termination of subprime mortgages
By: by Anthony Pennington-Cross and Giang Ho.
Contributors: Ho, Giang.; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Series: Working paper -- 2006-024A; Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis : Online) -- 2006-024A.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Published: 2006
Place of publication: [St. Louis, Mo.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Subprime mortgage loans -- United States.
Description: "After a mortgage is originated the borrower promises to make scheduled payments to repay the loan.  These payments are sent to the loan servicer, who may be the original lender or some other firm.  This firm collects the promised payments and distributes the cash flow (payments) to the appropriate investor/lender.  A large data set (loan-level) of securitized subprime mortgages is used to examine if individual servicers are associated with systematic differences in mortgage performance (termination).  While accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in a competing risk (default and prepay) proportional hazard framework, individual servicers are associated with substantial and economically meaningful impacts on loan termination"--Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/15/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.