Contracting for government services
Subtitle: theory and evidence from U.S. cities
By: Jonathan Levin, Steven Tadelis.
Contributors: Tadelis, Steve.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 13350.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13350.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 29
Subjects: Letting of contracts -- United States -- Mathematical models
Description: Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services.
Notes: "August 2007"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 25-26).

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).