Welfare work requirements with paternalistic government preferences
By: Robert Moffitt
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 12366; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 12366.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Description: "Work requirements in means-tested transfer programs have grown in importance in the U.S.  and in some other countries.  The theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is maximized.  Here we consider a case where society is paternalistic and instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients.  With this social welfare function, optimality of work requirements is possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which assigns work requirements to some benefit recipients and not others.  Numerical simulations show that the accuracy must be high for such optimality to occur.  The simulations also show that earnings subsidies can be justified with the type of social welfare function used here"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/26/2006.

Includes bibliographical references.

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