On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union
By: V.V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe.
Contributors: Kehoe, Patrick J.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10232; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10232.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Monetary unions.; Fiscal policy.
Description: "The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies.  If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs.  If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable.  This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/21/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.