Integrating independent power producers into emerging wholesale power markets
By: Fiona Woolf, Jonathan Halpern.
Contributors: Halpern, Jonathan.; World Bank. Energy and Water Dept. Water Sanitation Unit.; World Bank. Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2703; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 2703.
Publisher: World Bank, Energy and Water Department, Water Sanitation Unit, and Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Electric utilities.; Competition.; Privatization.; Independent power producers.; Contracts.
Description: Policymakers wishing to introduce wholesale competition into the electricity industry must often reconcile existing independent power producer contracts with new market structures and trading arrangements. For the new market arrangements to bring the benefits of competition to consumers, enough participants must be willing to take market risk. A combination of measures (adaptation of specific market rule, contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity, contract buyout provisions, transitional mechanisms) offer promise for reconciling existing contracts with new market structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market costs associated with the contracts.
Notes: Also available in print.
Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002.
"November 2001."
Mode of access: World Wide Web.