Competing for attention in financial markets
By: Bruce Ian Carlin ... [et al.].
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 16085; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16085.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2010
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "Competition for positive attention in financial markets frequently resembles a tournament, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs.  We present a rational expectations model in which firms compete for such positive attention and show that higher competition for this prize makes discretionary disclosure less likely.  In the limit when the market is perfectly competitive, transparency is minimized.  We show that this effect persists when considering general prize structures, prizes that change in size as a result of competition, endogenous prizes, prizes granted on the basis of percentile, product market competition, and alternative game theoretic formulations.  The analysis implies that competition is unreliable as a driver of market transparency and should not be viewed as a panacea that assures self-regulation in financial markets"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/24/2010.

Includes bibliographical references.

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