Efficient kidney exchange
Subtitle: coincidence of wants in a structured market
By: Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez, M. Utku Unver.
Contributors: Sönmez, Tayfun.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11402; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11402.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Kidneys -- Transplantation -- Economic aspects.
Description: "Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility.  Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs.  The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means.  As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized.  We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange.  Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients.  Larger than 3-way exchanges have much smaller impact.  Larger populations of patient-donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/17/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.