Political entry, public policies, and the economy
By: Casey B. Mulligan, Kevin K. Tsui.
Contributors: Tsui, Kevin K.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13830; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13830.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper presents a theory of competition for political leadership between incumbent leaders and their challengers in which the possible equilibrium political market structures range from pure monopoly (unchallenged dictatorship) to perfectly competitive (ideal democracy).  Leaders are constrained by the threat of "entry" or their ability to tax (or both), so that regimes with no challengers may nonetheless implement policies in the public interest.  We offer economic interpretations of why democratic countries are associated with higher wages, why resource abundant countries tend to be nondemocratic, and how technological change affects political development.  By focusing on the incentives for political entry, we show how trade sanctions and other policies designed to promote democracy may actually have the unintended consequences of discouraging political competition"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/13/2008.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.