On the waterfront
Subtitle: an empirical study of corruption in ports
By: by Sandra Maria Sequeira
Contributors: John F. Kennedy School of Government
Published: 2009
Language: eng
Number of pages: 128
Subjects: Corruption; Political corruption
Description: This dissertation explores empirically the anatomy of corruption in ports. It combines different methods of inquiry and multiple sources of data to investigate four fundamental questions in the study of corruption: the magnitude of bribes ; how bribes are set ; why corruption varies across and within institutional contexts and the costs corruption imposes on the economy . I collect an unusually detailed dataset on directly observed bribe payments for a random sample of 1,350 shipments at two ports and a border post in Southern Africa. I then survey over 1,000 firms to study how this type of corruption affects firms. I find that bribes are frequent, different both across arid within port bureaucracies, and quantitatively significant for the parties involved in the illicit transaction--port officials and shippers. At the most corrupt port, bribes were paid in 53% of all the shipments tracked and the median bribe was equivalent to a 129% increase in total port costs and a 14% increase in total shipping costs for a standard 20ft container. Bribes also provide sizable rents to port officials. The median bribe is equivalent to approximately 24% of the monthly salary of a customs official, and to 4% of the monthly salary of a regular port operator. As a result, the monthly salary of a customs' official can grow by more than 600% and of a port operator by 144% due to corruption.

Corruption is highly correlated with the extent to which rules, organizational procedures and regulations give public officials the bargaining rights and the opportunities to extort bribe payments from shippers. In this study. I find that differences in the organizational structure of port bureaucracies that result from the political economy of transport policies in the region can provide more or less opportunities for different types of port officials to extract bribes. Finally, I find that corruption goes beyond just a transfer of resources between shippers and bureaucrats. Firms respond to corruption by changing decisions on the sourcing of inputs, on the optimal level of inventories to hold and on their shipping routes. By distorting behavior, bribe payments can therefore impose real costs on firms and on the broader economy.
Notes: "April 2009."

Granted by the Committee on Public Policy.

Dissertation Committee: Sendhil Mullainathan, Chair; Robert H. Bates; Jeffry Frieden; Dani Rodrik.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2009.

Includes bibliographical references.