Warrant and Proper Function [e-book]
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 1993
Place of publication: New York
Language: eng
Format: e-book
ISBN-13: 9780198024057
Table of contents: title: Warrant: A First Approximation; title: Proper Function; title: The Design Plan; title: Reliability; title: Warrant: Objections and Refinements; title: The Design Plan; title: Two Concluding Comments; title: Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past; title: Knowledge of Myself; title: Memory; title: Other Persons and Testimony; title: Other Persons; title: Testimony; title: Perception; title: Perceptual Belief as Knowledge; title: Perceptual Experience; title: Perceptual Beliefs as Basic; title: Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience; title: Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments; title: A Priori Knowledge; title: A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized; title: A Priori Knowledge Is Knowledge; title: Fallibilistic A Priorism; title: A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements; title: Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete; title: Back to the Causal Requirement; title: Induction; title: The Old Riddle of Induction; title: The New Riddle of Induction; title: Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views; title: Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability; title: Theories of Epistemic Probability; title: Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth; title: The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability; title: An Account of the Normative Component; title: Replies and Comments; title: Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence; title: Coherence and Foundations; title: Evidentialism; title: Naturalism versus Proper Function?; title: Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function; title: So What's a Poor Naturalist to Do?; title: Is Naturalism Irrational?; title: The Problem; title: Darwin's Doubt; title: A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism; title: The Main Argument Against Naturalism