Trade policy with heterogeneous traders
Subtitle: do quotas get a bum rap?
By: Kala Krishna, Ling H. Tan
Contributors: Ling, Tan H.; National Bureau of Economic Research
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13040; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13040.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Description: "This paper considers the effects of trade policy--tariffs and quotas--when importing is done by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but differ ex post.  We show that the standard equivalence results no longer hold and the conventional ranking of tariffs and quotas is turned on its head: quotas are not as bad for welfare as previously believed, while tariffs may restrict trade by more than originally intended.  Furthermore, the allocation of property rights (quota licenses) has real effects beyond the distribution of rents; this, in turn, has implications for the effects of corruption on welfare"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/3/2007.

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