Traveling agents
Subtitle: political change and bureaucratic turnover in India
By: Lakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani
Contributors: Mani, Anandi; Harvard Business School
Edition: Rev.
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-006; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-006.
Publisher: Harvard Business School]
Published: 2008
Place of publication: [Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 36
Description: We develop a framework to examine how politicians with short-term electoral pressures control bureaucrats with long-term career concerns. Empirical analysis using a unique data set on the career histories of Indian bureaucrats supports the key predictions of our framework. We find that politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance as a means of control. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent transfers and a lower variability in the importance of their posts. There are alternative routes to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in developing expertise, but officers who belong to the same caste as the politician are also able to obtain important posts. Bureaucrats are less likely to be transferred if politicians have alternative means of control through subordinate politicians. Districts with higher rates of politically induced bureaucrat transfers are somewhat less successful in poverty reduction over the long run.
Notes: "March 2009"--added t.p.

"July 2008, revised April 2009"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.