The appeals process and adjudicator incentives
By: Steven Shavell.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10754; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10754.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Appellate procedure -- United States.
Description: "The appeals process -- whereby litigants can have decisions of adjudicators reviewed by a higher authority -- is a general feature of formal legal systems (and of many private decisionmaking procedures).  It leads to the making of better decisions, because it constitutes a threat to adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially desirable ones.  Further, it yields this benefit without absorbing resources to the extent that adjudicators can anticipate when appeals would occur and would thus make decisions to forestall the actual occurrence of appeals"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.