Political and technical verification issues of limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles
By: by Robin Keith Myers
Contributors: Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Publisher: NavalPostgraduate School
Published: 1989
Place of publication: Monterey, California
Language: eng
Number of pages: 102
Description: This paper examines the political and technical verification issues associated with proposals to place quantitative and/or qualitative limits on the deployment of nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Overviews of the arms control relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the development of the SLCM, and Soviet and American concepts of verification are presented. The views of the American arms control and defense communities regarding the SLCM is discussed in depth, accompanied by a detailed examination of the various methods which have been proposed to verify a SLCM limitation agreement. The conclusion is that there are no technological barriers, per se, to SLCM verification, but as the decision on an agreement's verifiability is a political one, the U.S. Navy should concentrate its arguments against SLCM limitations on the weapon's operational utility rather than argue that such an agreement is unverifiable. Keywords: Theses. (FR)
Notes: Thesis advisor: Breemer, Jan S.

"March 1989".

Thesis (M.S. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 1989.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 98).

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

US Navy (USN) author.

ymk. 7/20/06 mh.4/18/2008.