Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction
By: Patrick Bajari, Jeremy T. Fox.
Contributors: Fox, Jeremy T.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 11671; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 11671.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2005
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: United States. Federal Communications Commission; Cellular telephone systems -- United States; Auctions -- United States
Description: "We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions.  Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities.  While this auction design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient equilibrium.  In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained through threats of bidding wars.  We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence of complementarities and implicit collusion.  The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially important forms of unobserved heterogeneity.  We make suggestions about the design of future spectrum auctions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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