Federal institutions and the democratic transition
Subtitle: learning from South Africa
By: Robert P. Inman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld.
Contributors: Rubinfeld, Daniel L.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13733; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13733.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "We present a model of a peaceful transition in South Africa from white, elite rule under apartheid to a multi-racial democracy.  We ask how can the emerging majority credibly promise not to exploit the once ruling elite? Under South Africa's "democratic federalism" the constitution creates an annual policy game where the new majority and the elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other.  The game has a stable, stationary democratic equilibrium that the elite prefer to autocratic rule.  For the elite, the move to democracy means higher tax rates, but also higher economic growth; democracy is preferred to apartheid if the elite's rate of time preference is less than the transition's rate of return"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/10/2008.

Includes bibliographical references.

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