Screening disability insurance applications
By: by Philip de Jong, Maarten Lindeboom, Bas van der Klaauw.
Contributors: Lindeboom, Maarten
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 1981; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 1981
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Disability insurance -- Netherlands.
Description: "This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/21/2006.

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