Crisis stability and nuclear exchange risks on the subcontinent
Subtitle: major trends and the Iran factor
By: by Thomas F. Lynch III
Contributors: National Defense University. Center for Strategic Research
Series: Institute for national strategic studies strategic perspectives -- no. 14; Strategic perspectives (National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies) -- no. 14.
Publisher: National Defense University Press
Published: 2013
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Number of pages: 39
Subjects: Nuclear crisis stability; Nuclear weapons; Deterrence (Strategy); Foreign relations
Description: Crisis stability -- the probability that political tensions and low-level conflict will not erupt into a major war between India and Pakistan -- is less certain in 2013 than at any time since their sequential nuclear weapons tests of 1998. India's vast and growing spending on large conventional military forces, at least in part as a means to dissuade Pakistan's tolerance of (or support for) insurgent and terrorist activity against India, coupled with Pakistan's post-2006 accelerated pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as a means to offset this Indian initiative, have greatly increased the risk of a future Indo-Pakistani military clash or terrorist incident escalating to nuclear exchange. America's limited abilities to prevent the escalation of an Indo-Pakistani crisis toward major war are best served by continuing a significant military and political presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue with Pakistan well beyond 2014. Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability will not directly affect the ongoing erosion of crisis stability in South Asia. However, a declared or a declared and tested nuclear Iranian weapons capability almost certainly will inspire Saudi Arabia's acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent and involve Pakistan. If American efforts to halt Iran or to extend acceptable deterrence to Riyadh fail, then Washington must accept that Islamabad will transfer some form of nuclear weapons capability to Saudi Arabia as part of the Kingdom's pursuit of an autonomous nuclear deterrent versus Tehran. Washington's best policy option is to maintain sufficient diplomatic and military relevance in Islamabad and Riyadh to limit transfer impact upon Israel's threat calculus and to constrain Gulf-wide proliferation that could excite Indian fears for its nuclear deterrent in a manner that stokes a presently dormant nuclear arms race between India and China.
Notes: "November 2013."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 25-38).

Also available online in PDF format from Department of Defense web site.
Table of contents: title: Executive summary; title: Introduction; title: India and Pakistan : the dominant nuclear and security realities; title: Iran's nuclear program : a variable without direct impact on crisis and arms race stability on the subcontinent; title: Saudi Arabia's response to Iran's nuclear decisions : a variable with indirect impact on arms race stability on the subcontinent; title: Stability implications : regional and super-regional; title: Implications for U.S. policy.