Information disclosure and unraveling in matching markets
By: Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz.
Contributors: Schwarz, Michael, 1970-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 13766; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 13766.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities.  We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria.  We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/12/2008.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

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Mode of access: World Wide Web.