Mind-sets and missiles
Subtitle: a first hand account of the Cuban missile crisis
By: Kenneth Michael Absher
Contributors: Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Series: LeTort papers -- [no. 30]; Letort papers -- no. 30.
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Published: 2009
Place of publication: Carlisle, PA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 110
ISBN-13: 9781584874003
Description: This chronology provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure.
Notes: "August 2009."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-102).

Also available online in PDF format from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.