A Visit To The Camp Of Beverloo
Publisher: NaBu Press
Published: April 22, 2010(reprint)
Place of publication: Charleston, South Carolina
Language: eng
Format: Paperback
Number of pages: 58
Copyright date: the book is in the public domain
First sentence: Acknowledgements
Description: During his visit to the camp, British Army Major Harvey  had observed a période de manoeuvres, which he described in great detail to his (presumably military) British audience. In his reports the Belgian army is depicted as a kind of laboratory for military training in Europe. Harvey considered the site of Beverloo the ideal place for British officers to make educational observations – not least because it was so easy to reach. British officers could, according to Harvey “at a very trifling expense, avail themselves of the means of improvement laid open to them by a friendly nation”. Moreover, because the Belgian army was so small, it was easier to observe and understand than those of the greater armies of Russia or Prussia. “Some of our officers are in the habit of plunging at once into the movements of immense masses of Troops, such as are assembled in Austria, Russia, and Prussia, but they err in so doing : for I maintain that with a ‘Corps d’Armée’ outnumbering 14,000 or 15,000 men, they will be unable satisfactorily to follow up the details of the different manoeuvres, and they will fail either to comprehend their application, the thorough combination of the three Arms, or the choice of ground”. 
The unfortunate composition of the Belgian army offered, furthermore, an exceptional example of what could be achieved by rigorous and steady practice. “When we consider the drawbacks under which the Belgian Army labours (…) it becomes a matter of surprise to see the precision with which such mere recruits are taught their Drill in so short a period”. In short, Harvey seems to have agreed with many of the optimistic notions of the triumph of the project of a national training camp and the practice of joint manoeuvres that prevailed in the Belgian military press, and with local criticism of the law of conscription. He considered the Belgian army and Beverloo Camp exemplary instances of military unification, to be contrasted with the “constantly dispersed state of our [British] Army”. He ended his report with a particularly explicit reference to the notions of political and military unity, which dovetailed with those in Belgian military discourse. Citing the Belgian motto “L’Union Fait la Force”, he stated that “the union of practical instruction, energy, and talent, constitutes the real strength of armies”. 
Harvey’s glowing report was probably at least partly motivated by the major’s twofold goal of encouraging reform in the British army and showing (possibly diplomatic) gratitude to his Belgian hosts, but it also suggests that the manoeuvres achieved some of their objectives. Between 1830 and 1880, the practice of manoeuvres in Belgium remained largely the same, and it was geared toward three main goals. First, the military manoeuvres were intended to make a unified force out of inexperienced recruits and unite the three branches of the armed forces. According to Belgique militaire, “[only] at the camp, where they live together, can the members of the great military family get to know, value and love each other”.
Second, they were designed to prepare this unified army for the protection of the nation’s independence (in the 1830s this mainly meant protection against the Netherlands; however, after 1839 the notion of independence became closely connected to the country’s forced neutrality and its position between Europe’s most powerful nations). Third, the manoeuvres were intended to create moments in which the armed forces could publicly present themselves, not only to the Belgian civilian (and political) population, but also to foreign observers.
As the nation’s independence became more established, the presence of numerous foreign officers – who, as Harvey remarked, received a particularly ‘liberal’ welcome – offered opportunities for international communication and rapprochement in an area explicitly represented as neutral. In 1896, the following list of foreign officers permitted to observe the Belgian manoeuvres was published : “Colonel de Smaguine, Russian military attaché; Lieutenant-colonel Douglas Dawson, attaché of the British army; Captain Haillot, French military attaché; Captain count de Hacke, German military attaché; Captain Reichart of the federal Swiss army; Captain Petraru, Romanian military attaché; Captain Castendyck, envoy of Germany; Lieutenant Harris, military attaché of the United States of America. [Willem De Heusch, Les manœuvres en Flandre en 1890, Les grandes manœuvres en 1896, 1897, p. 13) [Source: Hoegaerts, J., & Dierckx, B. (2016). Exercising Neutrality: Maneuvering Practice in the Belgian Army before the Great War. Revue Belge d'Histoire Contemporaine, XLVI(2), 22-47].(See also: During his visit to the camp, British Army Major Harvey had observed a période de manoeuvres, which he described in great detail to his (presumably military) British audience. In his reports the Belgian army is depicted as a kind of laboratory for military training in Europe. Harvey considered the site of Beverloo the ideal place for British officers to make educational observations – not least because it was so easy to reach. British officers could, according to Harvey “at a very trifling expense, avail themselves of the means of improvement laid open to them by a friendly nation”. Moreover, because the Belgian army was so small, it was easier to observe and understand than those of the greater armies of Russia or Prussia. “Some of our officers are in the habit of plunging at once into the movements of immense masses of Troops, such as are assembled in Austria, Russia, and Prussia, but they err in so doing : for I maintain that with a ‘Corps d’Armée’ outnumbering 14,000 or 15,000 men, they will be unable satisfactorily to follow up the details of the different manoeuvres, and they will fail either to comprehend their application, the thorough combination of the three Arms, or the choice of ground”. 
The unfortunate composition of the Belgian army offered, furthermore, an exceptional example of what could be achieved by rigorous and steady practice. “When we consider the drawbacks under which the Belgian Army labours (…) it becomes a matter of surprise to see the precision with which such mere recruits are taught their Drill in so short a period”. In short, Harvey seems to have agreed with many of the optimistic notions of the triumph of the project of a national training camp and the practice of joint manoeuvres that prevailed in the Belgian military press, and with local criticism of the law of conscription. He considered the Belgian army and Beverloo Camp exemplary instances of military unification, to be contrasted with the “constantly dispersed state of our [British] Army”. He ended his report with a particularly explicit reference to the notions of political and military unity, which dovetailed with those in Belgian military discourse. Citing the Belgian motto “L’Union Fait la Force”, he stated that “the union of practical instruction, energy, and talent, constitutes the real strength of armies”. 
Harvey’s glowing report was probably at least partly motivated by the major’s twofold goal of encouraging reform in the British army and showing (possibly diplomatic) gratitude to his Belgian hosts, but it also suggests that the manoeuvres achieved some of their objectives. Between 1830 and 1880, the practice of manoeuvres in Belgium remained largely the same, and it was geared toward three main goals. First, the military manoeuvres were intended to make a unified force out of inexperienced recruits and unite the three branches of the armed forces. According to Belgique militaire, “[only] at the camp, where they live together, can the members of the great military family get to know, value and love each other”.
Second, they were designed to prepare this unified army for the protection of the nation’s independence (in the 1830s this mainly meant protection against the Netherlands; however, after 1839 the notion of independence became closely connected to the country’s forced neutrality and its position between Europe’s most powerful nations). Third, the manoeuvres were intended to create moments in which the armed forces could publicly present themselves, not only to the Belgian civilian (and political) population, but also to foreign observers.
As the nation’s independence became more established, the presence of numerous foreign officers – who, as Harvey remarked, received a particularly ‘liberal’ welcome – offered opportunities for international communication and rapprochement in an area explicitly represented as neutral. In 1896, the following list of foreign officers permitted to observe the Belgian manoeuvres was published : “Colonel de Smaguine, Russian military attaché; Lieutenant-colonel Douglas Dawson, attaché of the British army; Captain Haillot, French military attaché; Captain count de Hacke, German military attaché; Captain Reichart of the federal Swiss army; Captain Petraru, Romanian military attaché; Captain Castendyck, envoy of Germany; Lieutenant Harris, military attaché of the United States of America. [Willem De Heusch, Les manœuvres en Flandre en 1890, Les grandes manœuvres en 1896, 1897, p. 13) [Source: Hoegaerts, J., & Dierckx, B. (2016). Exercising Neutrality: Maneuvering Practice in the Belgian Army before the Great War. Revue Belge d'Histoire Contemporaine, XLVI(2), 22-47].During his visit to the camp, British Army Major Harvey hahd observed a période de manoeuvres, which he described in great detail to his (presumably military) British audience. In his reports the Belgian army is depicted as a kind of laboratory for military training in Europe. Harvey considered the site of Beverloo the ideal place for British officers to make educational observations – not least because it was so easy to reach. British officers could, according to Harvey “at a very trifling expense, avail themselves of the means of improvement laid open to them by a friendly nation”. Moreover, because the Belgian army was so small, it was easier to observe and understand than those of the greater armies of Russia or Prussia. “Some of our officers are in the habit of plunging at once into the movements of immense masses of Troops, such as are assembled in Austria, Russia, and Prussia, but they err in so doing : for I maintain that with a ‘Corps d’Armée’ outnumbering 14,000 or 15,000 men, they will be unable satisfactorily to follow up the details of the different manoeuvres, and they will fail either to comprehend their application, the thorough combination of the three Arms, or the choice of ground”. 
The unfortunate composition of the Belgian army offered, furthermore, an exceptional example of what could be achieved by rigorous and steady practice. “When we consider the drawbacks under which the Belgian Army labours (…) it becomes a matter of surprise to see the precision with which such mere recruits are taught their Drill in so short a period”. In short, Harvey seems to have agreed with many of the optimistic notions of the triumph of the project of a national training camp and the practice of joint manoeuvres that prevailed in the Belgian military press, and with local criticism of the law of conscription. He considered the Belgian army and Beverloo Camp exemplary instances of military unification, to be contrasted with the “constantly dispersed state of our [British] Army”. He ended his report with a particularly explicit reference to the notions of political and military unity, which dovetailed with those in Belgian military discourse. Citing the Belgian motto “L’Union Fait la Force”, he stated that “the union of practical instruction, energy, and talent, constitutes the real strength of armies”. 
Harvey’s glowing report was probably at least partly motivated by the major’s twofold goal of encouraging reform in the British army and showing (possibly diplomatic) gratitude to his Belgian hosts, but it also suggests that the manoeuvres achieved some of their objectives. Between 1830 and 1880, the practice of manoeuvres in Belgium remained largely the same, and it was geared toward three main goals. First, the military manoeuvres were intended to make a unified force out of inexperienced recruits and unite the three branches of the armed forces. According to Belgique militaire, “[only] at the camp, where they live together, can the members of the great military family get to know, value and love each other”.
Second, they were designed to prepare this unified army for the protection of the nation’s independence (in the 1830s this mainly meant protection against the Netherlands; however, after 1839 the notion of independence became closely connected to the country’s forced neutrality and its position between Europe’s most powerful nations). Third, the manoeuvres were intended to create moments in which the armed forces could publicly present themselves, not only to the Belgian civilian (and political) population, but also to foreign observers.
As the nation’s independence became more established, the presence of numerous foreign officers – who, as Harvey remarked, received a particularly ‘liberal’ welcome – offered opportunities for international communication and rapprochement in an area explicitly represented as neutral. In 1896, the following list of foreign officers permitted to observe the Belgian manoeuvres was published : “Colonel de Smaguine, Russian military attaché; Lieutenant-colonel Douglas Dawson, attaché of the British army; Captain Haillot, French military attaché; Captain count de Hacke, German military attaché; Captain Reichart of the federal Swiss army; Captain Petraru, Romanian military attaché; Captain Castendyck, envoy of Germany; Lieutenant Harris, military attaché of the United States of America. [Willem De Heusch, Les manœuvres en Flandre en 1890, Les grandes manœuvres en 1896, 1897, p. 13) [Source: Hoegaerts, J., & Dierckx, B. (2016). Exercising Neutrality: Maneuvering Practice in the Belgian Army before the Great War. Revue Belge d'Histoire Contemporaine, XLVI(2), 22-47].
Notes: This book adds to our understanding of military culture and military life in peacetime in the nineteenth century.
Table of contents: title: During his visit to the camp, British Army Major Harvey  had observed a période de manoeuvres, which he described in great detail to his (presumably military) British audience. In his reports the Belgian army is depicted as a kind of laboratory for military training in Europe. Harvey considered the site of Beverloo the ideal place for British officers to make educational observations – not least because it was so easy to reach. British officers could, according to Harvey “at a very trifling expense, avail themselves of the means of improvement laid open to them by a friendly nation”. Moreover, because the Belgian army was so small, it was easier to observe and understand than those of the greater armies of Russia or Prussia. “Some of our officers are in the habit of plunging at once into the movements of immense masses of Troops, such as are assembled in Austria, Russia, and Prussia, but they err in so doing : for I maintain that with a ‘Corps d’Armée’ outnumbering 14,000 or 15,000 men, they will be unable satisfactorily to follow up the details of the different manoeuvres, and they will fail either to comprehend their application, the thorough combination of the three Arms, or the choice of ground”.; title: The unfortunate composition of the Belgian army offered, furthermore, an exceptional example of what could be achieved by rigorous and steady practice. “When we consider the drawbacks under which the Belgian Army labours (…) it becomes a matter of surprise to see the precision with which such mere recruits are taught their Drill in so short a period”. In short, Harvey seems to have agreed with many of the optimistic notions of the triumph of the project of a national training camp and the practice of joint manoeuvres that prevailed in the Belgian military press, and with local criticism of the law of conscription. He considered the Belgian army and Beverloo Camp exemplary instances of military unification, to be contrasted with the “constantly dispersed state of our [British] Army”. He ended his report with a particularly explicit reference to the notions of political and military unity, which dovetailed with those in Belgian military discourse. Citing the Belgian motto “L’Union Fait la Force”, he stated that “the union of practical instruction, energy, and talent, constitutes the real strength of armies”.; title: Harvey’s glowing report was probably at least partly motivated by the major’s twofold goal of encouraging reform in the British army and showing (possibly diplomatic) gratitude to his Belgian hosts, but it also suggests that the manoeuvres achieved some of their objectives. Between 1830 and 1880, the practice of manoeuvres in Belgium remained largely the same, and it was geared toward three main goals. First, the military manoeuvres were intended to make a unified force out of inexperienced recruits and unite the three branches of the armed forces. According to Belgique militaire, “[only] at the camp, where they live together, can the members of the great military family get to know, value and love each other”.; title: Second, they were designed to prepare this unified army for the protection of the nation’s independence (in the 1830s this mainly meant protection against the Netherlands; however, after 1839 the notion of independence became closely connected to the country’s forced neutrality and its position between Europe’s most powerful nations). Third, the manoeuvres were intended to create moments in which the armed forces could publicly present themselves, not only to the Belgian civilian (and political) population, but also to foreign observers.; title: As the nation’s independence became more established, the presence of numerous foreign officers – who, as Harvey remarked, received a particularly ‘liberal’ welcome – offered opportunities for international communication and rapprochement in an area explicitly represented as neutral. In 1896, the following list of foreign officers permitted to observe the Belgian manoeuvres was published : “Colonel de Smaguine, Russian military attaché; Lieutenant-colonel Douglas Dawson, attaché of the British army; Captain Haillot, French military attaché; Captain count de Hacke, German military attaché; Captain Reichart of the federal Swiss army; Captain Petraru, Romanian military attaché; Captain Castendyck, envoy of Germany; Lieutenant Harris, military attaché of the United States of America. [Willem De Heusch, Les manœuvres en Flandre en 1890, Les grandes manœuvres en 1896, 1897, p. 13) [Source: Hoegaerts, J., & Dierckx, B. (2016). Exercising Neutrality: Maneuvering Practice in the Belgian Army before the Great War. Revue Belge d'Histoire Contemporaine, XLVI(2), 22-47].
pagenum: See salso:During his visit to the camp, British Army Major Harvey hahd observed a période de manoeuvres, which he described in great detail to his (presumably military) British audience. In his reports the Belgian army is depicted as a kind of laboratory for military training in Europe. Harvey considered the site of Beverloo the ideal place for British officers to make educational observations – not least because it was so easy to reach. British officers could, according to Harvey “at a very trifling expense, avail themselves of the means of improvement laid open to them by a friendly nation”. Moreover, because the Belgian army was so small, it was easier to observe and understand than those of the greater armies of Russia or Prussia. “Some of our officers are in the habit of plunging at once into the movements of immense masses of Troops, such as are assembled in Austria, Russia, and Prussia, but they err in so doing : for I maintain that with a ‘Corps d’Armée’ outnumbering 14,000 or 15,000 men, they will be unable satisfactorily to follow up the details of the different manoeuvres, and they will fail either to comprehend their application, the thorough combination of the three Arms, or the choice of ground”.; title: The unfortunate composition of the Belgian army offered, furthermore, an exceptional example of what could be achieved by rigorous and steady practice. “When we consider the drawbacks under which the Belgian Army labours (…) it becomes a matter of surprise to see the precision with which such mere recruits are taught their Drill in so short a period”. In short, Harvey seems to have agreed with many of the optimistic notions of the triumph of the project of a national training camp and the practice of joint manoeuvres that prevailed in the Belgian military press, and with local criticism of the law of conscription. He considered the Belgian army and Beverloo Camp exemplary instances of military unification, to be contrasted with the “constantly dispersed state of our [British] Army”. He ended his report with a particularly explicit reference to the notions of political and military unity, which dovetailed with those in Belgian military discourse. Citing the Belgian motto “L’Union Fait la Force”, he stated that “the union of practical instruction, energy, and talent, constitutes the real strength of armies”.; title: Harvey’s glowing report was probably at least partly motivated by the major’s twofold goal of encouraging reform in the British army and showing (possibly diplomatic) gratitude to his Belgian hosts, but it also suggests that the manoeuvres achieved some of their objectives. Between 1830 and 1880, the practice of manoeuvres in Belgium remained largely the same, and it was geared toward three main goals. First, the military manoeuvres were intended to make a unified force out of inexperienced recruits and unite the three branches of the armed forces. According to Belgique militaire, “[only] at the camp, where they live together, can the members of the great military family get to know, value and love each other”.; title: Second, they were designed to prepare this unified army for the protection of the nation’s independence (in the 1830s this mainly meant protection against the Netherlands; however, after 1839 the notion of independence became closely connected to the country’s forced neutrality and its position between Europe’s most powerful nations). Third, the manoeuvres were intended to create moments in which the armed forces could publicly present themselves, not only to the Belgian civilian (and political) population, but also to foreign observers.; title: As the nation’s independence became more established, the presence of numerous foreign officers – who, as Harvey remarked, received a particularly ‘liberal’ welcome – offered opportunities for international communication and rapprochement in an area explicitly represented as neutral. In 1896, the following list of foreign officers permitted to observe the Belgian manoeuvres was published : “Colonel de Smaguine, Russian military attaché; Lieutenant-colonel Douglas Dawson, attaché of the British army; Captain Haillot, French military attaché; Captain count de Hacke, German military attaché; Captain Reichart of the federal Swiss army; Captain Petraru, Romanian military attaché; Captain Castendyck, envoy of Germany; Lieutenant Harris, military attaché of the United States of America. [Willem De Heusch, Les manœuvres en Flandre en 1890, Les grandes manœuvres en 1896, 1897, p. 13) [Source: Hoegaerts, J., & Dierckx, B. (2016). Exercising Neutrality: Maneuvering Practice in the Belgian Army before the Great War. Revue Belge d'Histoire Contemporaine, XLVI(2), 22-47].