Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Steven Shavell.
Contributors: Shavell, Steven, 1946-; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 7106; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7106.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Subjects: Contracts.; Liability (Law); Disclosure of information.
Other titles: Contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information
Notes: "May 1999."

Includes bibliographical references.

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