Bank governance, regulation, and risk taking
By: Luc Laeven, Ross Levine.
Contributors: Levine, Ross.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- working paper 14113; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 14113.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations.  We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank.  Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration.  These findings have important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/18/2008.

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