Tax policy design in the presence of social preferences
Subtitle: some experimental evidence
By: Lucy F. Ackert, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Mark Rider.
Contributors: Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge.; Rider, Mark.; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Series: Working paper series / Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ;; 2004-33; Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta : Online) ;; 2004-33.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Published: 2004
Place of publication: [Atlanta, Ga.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "This paper reports the results of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people's preferred tax structure.  Building on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures.  The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing among alternative tax structures.  However, concern for redistribution decreases when it leads to increasing deadweight losses.  Our findings have important implications for the design of optimal tax theory"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 2/25/2005.
Also available in print.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.