Modern Microeconomics
Publisher: Bookboon.com
Published: 2013
ISBN-13: 9788740304190
Table of contents: title: Obsah; title: Preface; title: Acknowledgement; title: 1. Consumer preference and utility 1.1. Introduction; title: 1.2. Preference relations; title: 1.3. Utility function; title: 1.4. Lexicographic ordering; title: 1.5. Demand function; title: 1.6. Revealed Preference Theory; title: 1.7. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP); title: 1.8. Indirect utility function; title: 1.9. Expenditure function; title: 1.10. The expenditure minimization problem; title: 1.11. The Hicksian demand function; title: 1.12. The Von Neumann-Morganstern utility function; title: 1.13. Measures of Risk Aversion; title: 1.14. Questions; title: 2. The Production Function 2.1. Inputs to output function; title: 2.2. Technology specification; title: 2.3. Input requirement set; title: 2.4. The transformation function; title: 2.5. Monotonic technologies; title: 2.6. Convex technology; title: 2.7. Regular technology; title: 2.8. Cobb-Douglas technology; title: 2.9. Leontief technology; title: 2.10. The technical rate of substitution; title: 2.11. Elasticity of substitution; title: 2.12. Variation in scale; title: 2.13. Revised technical rate of substitution; title: 2.14. Homogenous and heterogeneous production function; title: 2.15. The Envelope theorem for constrained optimization; title: 2.16. Duality of cost and the production function; title: 2.17. Michael Kalechi’s theory; title: 2.18. Neo-Keynesian model of distribution (Kaldor Model); title: 2.19. Questions; title: 3. Game Theory 3.1. Introduction; title: 3.2. The rules of the Game; title: 3.3. The prisoner’s dilemma: A dominant strategy; title: 3.4. Equilibrium strategies; title: 3.5. The Cournot model; title: 3.6. Solution to the Cournot model by the Stackelberg equilibrium; title: 3.7. The Bertrand paradox; title: 3.8. Intertemporal dimensions; title: 3.9. The folk theorem; title: 3.10. Conclusion; title: 3.11. Questions; title: 4. Information Economics 4.1. Introduction; title: 4.2. The asymmetric information model; title: 4.3. The principal-agent model: The production game; title: 4.4. Optimal contracts: The Broadway game; title: 4.5. Moral hazard: Hidden information; title: 4.6. Pooling and separating equilibrium: the salesman game; title: 4.7. Efficiency wage hypothesis; title: 4.8. Adverse selection; title: 4.9. Lemon models; title: 4.10. Adverse selection under uncertainty: Insurance game III; title: 4.11. Signalling; title: 4.12. Screening; title: 4.13. Questions; title: 5. General equilibrium and welfare economics 5.1. Introduction; title: 5.2. The Walrasian equilibrium of a competitive economy; title: 5.3. Stability proposition; title: 5.4. Edgeworth’s exchange theory; title: 5.5. Welfare economics; title: 5.6. Pareto efficiency conditions; title: 5.7. The Edgeworth box diagram; title: 5.8. Welfare functions and the Pareto criterion; title: 5.9. First theorem of welfare economics; title: 5.10. The second theorem of welfare economics: (STWE); title: 5.11. Market failure and second best; title: 5.12. Instances of market failure; title: 5.13. The Coase theorem; title: 5.14. Questions; title: 6. Bibliography