Crime and the labor market
Subtitle: a search model with optimal contracts
By: by Bryan Engelhardt, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Peter Rupert
Contributors: Rocheteau, Guillaume; Rupert, Peter Charles, 1952-; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Series: Working paper -- WP07-15; Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland : Online) -- WP07-15.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Published: 2007
Place of publication: Cleveland, Ohio]
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] :
Subjects: Unemployment and crime; Crime; Economic aspects
Description: "This paper extends the Pissarides (2000) model of the labor market to include crime and punishment   ̀a la Becker (1968).  All workers, irrespective of their labor force status can commit crimes and the employment contract is determined optimally.  The model is used to study, analytically and quantitatively, the effects of various labor market and crime policies.  For instance, a more generous unemployment insurance system reduces the crime rate of the unemployed but its effect on the crime rate of the employed depends on job duration and jail sentences.  When the model is calibrated to U.S.  data, the overall effect on crime is positive but quantitatively small.  Wage subsidies reduce unemployment and crime rates of employed and unemployed workers, and improve society's welfare.  Hiring subsidies reduce unemployment but they can raise the crime rate of employed workers.  Crime policies (police technology and jail sentences) affect crime rates signifi cantly but have only negligible effects on the labor market"--Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 10/25/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

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