Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions
By: Kenneth Hendricks, Joris Pinkse, Robert H. Porter.
Contributors: Pinkse, Joris.; Porter, Robert H.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 8294; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 8294.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 35
Subjects: Government auctions -- United States.; Letting of contracts -- United States.; Oil and gas leases -- United States.
Notes: JEL no. C7, D4, L1.

"May 2001."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-32).

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