Bank supervision, regulation, and instability during the Great Depression
By: Kris James Mitchener.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10475; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10475.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Depressions -- 1929 -- United States.; Banks and banking -- State supervision -- History.; Banks and banking -- United States -- States -- History.
Description: "Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in state bank supervision and regulation contribute toward explaining the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S.  counties during the Great Depression.  More stringent capital requirements lowered suspension rates while laws prohibiting branch banking and imposing high reserve requirements had the opposite effect.  States that endowed bank supervisors with the authority to liquidate banks minimized contagion and credit-channel dislocations and experienced lower suspension rates.  Those that gave their supervisors sole authority to issue bank charters and that granted their supervisors long terms strengthened the incentives for bank lobbyists to influence supervisory decisions and consequently experienced higher rates of suspension"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.