Executive compensation and shareholder value
Subtitle: theory and evidence
By: edited by Jennifer Carpenter and David  Yermack.
Contributors: Carpenter, Jennifer N., 1965-; Yermack, David L., 1962-; New York University. Salomon Center.
Series: New York University Salomon Center series on financial markets and institutions ;; v. 4
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Dordrecht; Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 159
Subjects: Executives -- Salaries, etc. -- United States -- Congresses; Chief executive officers -- Salaries, etc. -- United States -- Congresses; Directors of corporations -- United States -- Congresses; Conflict of interests -- United States -- Congresses; Corporate profits -- United States -- Congresses; Stockholders -- United States -- Congresses
Description: "Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels as compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance.

Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume."--Jacket.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
"Papers from a conference sponsored by the Salomon Center of New York University's Stern School of Business"--Introd.