Information and incentives in online affiliate marketing
By: Ben Edelman, Wesley Brandi
Contributors: Brandi, Wesley, author; Harvard Business School
Edition: Revised edition
Series: Working paper / Havard Business School -- 14-041; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 14-041.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2014
Place of publication: Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 32
Description: We examine online affiliate marketing programs in which merchants oversee thousands of affiliates they have never met. Some merchants hire outside specialists to set and enforce policies for affiliates, while other merchants ask their ordinary marketing staff to perform these functions. For clear violations of applicable rules, we find that outside specialists are most effective at excluding the responsible affiliates, which we interpret as a benefit of specialization. However, in-house staff are more successful at identifying and excluding affiliates whose practices are viewed as "borderline" (albeit still contrary to merchants' interests), foregoing the efficiencies of specialization in favor of the better incentives of a company's staff. We consider the implications for marketing of online affiliate programs and for online marketing more generally.
Notes: "November 2013. (Revised March 2014.)"--Publisher's Web site.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 29-30).