Rent-seeking and innovation
By: Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine.
Contributors: Levine, David K.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;; 347; Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;; 347.
Publisher: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Published: 2004
Place of publication: [Minneapolis, Minn.]
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Technological innovations.; Intellectual property.
Description: "Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development.  Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist.  For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations.  This paper examines the political economy of intellectual property, analyzing the trade-off between private and public rent-seeking.  While it is true in principle that public rent-seeking may be a substitute for private rent-seeking, it is not true that this results always either in less private rent-seeking or in a welfare improvement.  When the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally, we may experience the worst of public and private rent-seeking together"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/10/2004.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.