Learning from the law
Subtitle: democratic education and the requirement for public reason
By: Robert P. Alcala
Contributors: Harvard University. Graduate School of Education
Published: 2011
Language: eng
Number of pages: 123
Subjects: Education; Philosophy; Law; Discrimination in education
Description: This dissertation examines the nature of public legal discourse in light of the interchange between citizens and the courts that takes place in constitutional disputes. It develops and defends a philosophical explanation for various legal practices that routinely invite and respond to civic participation, including the submission of both advocacy briefs and the full range of judicial opinions in appellate cases. The author argues that the function of those activities is, in large measure, educative. Highlighting the public contributions to the Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 case on racial integration in public schools, the author seeks a more substantial and definable educational role for legal discourse than has been recognized in much of the existing literature in legal, political, or educational philosophy. Chapter 1 draws on John Dewey's theory of democratic education and Frank Michelman's model of dialogic constitutionalism to promote law's educative function in the context of judicial practices aimed at public persuasion and justification. Chapter 2 examines two major theories of legal reasoning, the first advanced by H.L.A. Hart and the second by Ronald Dworkin, as possible models for justifying legal judgments. The author identifies the conventionalist and absolutist underpinnings of the respective models, and finds each model wanting on those grounds.

Seeking a via media between the problems of conventionalism and absolutism, Chapter 3 revisits Dworkin's model of interpretation, arguing that the incorporation of a central educational role for legal interpretation provides a viable alternative understanding of his model. Chapter 4 examines John Rawls' conception of public reason as a standard for public legal justification, arguing that a notion of legal interpretation as educative could embrace public reason because public reason, when properly exercised, can help to foster an engaged citizenry open to the mutual accommodation of overlapping, non-public interests. Drawing on the wide array of friend of the court briefs submitted in Parents Involved, the author claims that public reason can and should accommodate a fairly expansive space for reasons, paying dividends not only in the development of legal doctrine but also by enriching both public and non-public institutions.
Notes: Vita.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2011.

Includes bibliographical references.