Search diversion, rent extraction and competition
By: Andrei Hagiu, Bruno Jullien
Contributors: Jullien, Bruno; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 11-124; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 11-124.
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2011
Place of publication: [Boston]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 29
Description: This paper studies search diversion by competing intermediaries connecting consumers with third-party stores. First, we show that endogenizing store entry leads to more search diversion when intermediaries cannot price discriminate among stores because the intermediaries' incentives are aligned with the marginal stores. Second, competition among intermediaries may lead to more or less search diversion relative to monopoly, depending on whether consumers multihome and stores singlehome or vice-versa.
Notes: "May 2011" -- Publisher's website.

"April 25th 2011" -- added t.p.

Includes bibliographical references.