Is legal reasoning irrational?
Subtitle: an introduction to the epistemology of law
By: John Woods
Series: Law and society -- 2; Law and society -- 2.
Publisher: College Publications
Published: 2015
Place of publication: United Kingdom]
Language: eng
Number of pages: 295
ISBN-13: 9781848901629
Copyright date: 2015
Subjects: Law; Methodology; Philosophy
Other titles: Introduction to the epistemology of law
Description: "Philosophy and the law share an interest in a good many of the same concepts. Some of these are moral and political ideas, such as justice, rights and freedoms, duties and responsibilities, guilt and innocence. Others are of a more epistemological and logical character-- for example, proof, truth, evidence, reasoning and decision-making, argument, certainty, probability, relevance, and others. Most undergraduate texts in the philosophy of law focus on the moral and political concepts, and have little to say about the epistemological ones. Is Legal Reasoning Irrational? is a significant departure from that norm. While far from stinting on moral and political notions, it gives sustained attention to the epistemological and logical isses that arise in all legal contexts, but especially in trial courts. It is only natural to ask how will legal reasoning and decision-making measure up to the performance standards mandated by mainstream epistemologists and logicians. As the title of the book indicates, the law doesn't measure up at all well. When a theory says that human beings are acting irrationally, two things are possible. One is that teh fault lies with us humans. The other is that theory has got the standards of human rationality wrong. In the case of legal reasoning and jdugement, I argue that the established phoilosophical standards of rationality are the culprit, not the legal system itself. The book is suitable for undergraduate use in introductions to the philosophy of law, either as the main text or supplementary reading"--Back cover
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (pages 283-286) and index.
Table of contents: title: Conceptual commonalities; title: Rights and freedoms; title: Getting out of the frame; title: Learning to live without definitions; title: The common law; title: Unwritten law; title: The commonness of common law; title: Judicial activism; title: Players, parts, and proofs; title: Adversarial engagement; title: Neutrality and expertise; title: Argument and confrontation; title: Hidden bias; title: Probability; title: Relevance; title: Closing the world; title: Theories of the evidence; title: The criminal proof dilemma; title: The judge's charge to the jury; title: Jury deliberation; title: An epistemology for law; title: Appendices: Justificationism fights back ; Analogy and precedent