Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, Markus Walzl
Contributors: Walzl, Markus; Harvard Business School
Series: Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 09-046; Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 09-046
Publisher: Harvard Business School
Published: 2008
Place of publication: Boston
Language: eng
Number of pages: 25
Description: We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining "set inclusion results" on all three domains, we introduce weak setwise stability as a new stability concept and prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings.
Notes: "September 2008"--Publisher's web site.

Includes bibliographical references.