protectionist bias in majoritarian politics
By: Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman.
Contributors: Helpman, Elhanan.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series -- no. 11014.; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11014.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, Mass
Language: eng
Number of pages: 35
Subjects: Protectionism -- Political aspects; Economic policy -- Political aspects
Description: "We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policymaking in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policymaking process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: "December 2004."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 23).

Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).