Market discipline and financial safety net design
By: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga.
Contributors: Huizinga, Harry.; World Bank. Development Research Group. Finance.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2183; Policy research working papers ;; 2183.
Publisher: World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance
Published: 1999
Place of publication: Washington, DC
Language: eng
Number of pages: 44
Subjects: Banks and banking.; Deposit insurance.
Description: It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect.  The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29).
"September 1999"--Cover.
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