Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangements
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk.
Contributors: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10190; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10190.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2003
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Consolidation and merger of corporations.
Description: "Firms going public have increasingly been incorporating antitakeover provisions in their IPO charters, while shareholders of existing companies have increasingly been voting in opposition to such charter provisions.  This paper identifies possible explanations for this empirical pattern.  Specifically, I analyze explanations based on (1) the role of antitakeover arrangements in encouraging founders to break up their initial control blocks, (2) efficient private benefits of control, (3) agency problems among pre-IPO shareholders, (4) agency problems between pre-IPO shareholders and their IPO lawyers, (5) asymmetric information between founders and public investors about the firm's future growth prospects, and (6) bounded attention and imperfect pricing at the IPO stage"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Also available in print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/27/2005.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.