Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting
By: Pravin Krishna, Devashish Mitra.
Contributors: Mitra, Devashish.; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series: NBER working paper series ;; working paper 10826; Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;; working paper no. 10826.
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Commercial policy.; Free trade.
Description: "This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country.  When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other.  Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references.
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