Decentralization and accountability
Subtitle: are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections?
By: Stuti Khemani.
Contributors: World Bank. Development Research Group. Public Economics.
Series: Policy research working paper ;; 2557; Policy research working papers (Online) ;; 2557.
Publisher: World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economis
Published: 2001
Place of publication: Washington, D.C
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Subjects: Elections -- India.; State governments -- India -- Elections.; Local elections -- India.; Voting research -- India.; India -- Politics and government.
Description: Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-17).
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 17, 2002.
"February 2001"--Cover.
Also available in print.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.