Economic backwardness in political perspective
By: Daron Acemoglu [and] James Robinson
Contributors: Robinson, James A., 1960-; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
Series: Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 02-13; Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 02-13.
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics
Published: 2002
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Number of pages: 49
Description: We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a "political replacement effect." Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. Keywords: Political Economy, Institutions, Development, Industrialization. JEL Classification: H2, N10, N40, O1, O3, O4.
Notes: "February 2002."; "First version: December 2000. Current version: February 2002"--Abstract.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-49).

Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.