Corruption and bureaucratic structure in a developing economy
By: by John Bennett, Saul Estrin
Contributors: Estrin, Saul
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 2156; Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) -- no. 2156
Publisher: IZA
Published: 2006
Place of publication: Bonn, Germany
Language: eng
Format: [electronic resource] /
Subjects: Political corruption; Bureaucracy
Description: "We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results are explained in terms of the non-internalization, under decentralization, of the 'bribe externality' and the 'price externality.' In welfare terms, decentralization is favoured, relatively speaking, if the tax system is less inefficient, funding is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or compensation for expropriation is ungenerous"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 6/7/2006.

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