Plea bargains only for the guilty
By: Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal.
Contributors: Gazal, Oren.; John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
Series: Discussion paper -- no. 481; Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 481.
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Published: 2004
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Language: eng
Format: Electronic resource
Description: "A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants will be induced to plead guilty.  This paper argues that the law can address this concern by providing prosecutors with incentives to select cases in which the probability of guilt is high.  By restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can preclude plea bargains in cases where the probability of conviction is low (L cases).  The prosecutor will therefore be forced to -- (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases; or (2) select more cases with a higher probability of conviction (H cases) that can be concluded via a less-costly plea bargain.  As long as the probability of conviction is positively correlated with the probability of guilt, this selection-of-cases effect implies a reduced number of innocent defendants that accept plea bargains.  We argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in fact achieve, albeit inadvertently, this socially desirable selection effect.  We further argue that more limited discretion in sentencing facilitates the selection-of-cases effect.  In this respect, the Federal Guidelines are superior to the state-level guidelines that leave considerable room for discretion in sentencing"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Notes: Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/28/2007.

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