There is much talk at present about space having become militarized and were weaponized in the past few years and there's a growing narrative about an emerging space arms race. These ideas overlook the realities that space has been militarized from the beginning of the space age and that both the United States and the Soviet Union developed and tested anti-satellite weapons during the Cold War. Examining military space competition during the Cold War reveals that US policy on anti-satellite weapons was influenced by a broad range of US national security considerations, especially divergent presidential views on arms control and differing presidential perspectives on the proper military uses of outer space. In the late 1950s and 1960s, American presidents exercised restraint in the development of weapons that could be used to destroy satellites out of fear that even the existence of such capabilities would provoke the Soviet Union to act aggressively against US reconnaissance satellites. By the late 1960s, intelligence satellites were the single largest source of US intelligence on the Soviet Union and preserving the ability to conduct reconnaissance from space was an overriding objective of the US government. Despite this emphasis on restraint, the United States did conduct the world's first anti-satellite weapons test in 1959 and it did deploy a nuclear anti-satellite weapons system in the Pacific in the 1960s. The latter was however a limited capability that was designed to defend against orbital nuclear weapons and was quickly moved into a mothballed status. US government commission studies from this period concluded that the United States was more dependent on satellites than the USSR, especially for reconnaissance and that US anti-satellite weapons would be a very limited deterrent value. Additionally, the United States had learned during the 1950s and 1960s that using nuclear anti-satellite weapons would not only produce harmful environmental effects but would also inadvertently destroy American and allied satellites as well. US officials have concluded therefore that anti-satellite weapons were a very limited military utility. These early efforts did nevertheless provide the Soviet Union justification to move forward with its own anti-satellite weapons program. By the early 1970s, US intelligence had learned that the Soviet Union was testing a co-orbital anti-satellite capability. President Richard Nixon did not however want to pursue a similar capability out of fear that it would undermine ongoing arms control negotiations. Satellites were identified as the primary means for verifying salt one in the 1972 ABM treaty. The latter precluded the development of new land, sea, air, and space-based missile defenses. The interpretation of this treaty would be especially contentious in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan sought to develop space-based missile defense. The 1970s was a time of transformation in both American thinking about space and the military uses of space by the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries had begun to use reconnaissance satellites to support tactical military forces. Consequently, because of Soviet space space and able tracking capabilities, along with Moscow's anti-satellite program, the White House commissioned a panel that had concluded that it was, quote, no longer tenable to think of space as a sanctuary, unquote. Notably, they taught between the superpowers was breaking down. In present-gerald Ford authorized the development of a new US anti-satellite weapons program, not to match the Soviet capability, but rather to be able to hold Soviet space reconnaissance systems at risk. Additionally, the Ford administration maintained that verification of an arms control agreement constraining anti-satellite weapons would be especially problematic. President Jimmy Carter sought to push forward with a new arms control agreement in the form of salt too, and wanted to prevent an arms competition in space. He believed that controls on anti-satellite weapons were essential because he saw them as being a very limited military utility, and he also saw them as a direct threat to the arms control regime, his administration was pursuing. The US and the USSR were making progress in anti-satellite weapons talks until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that significantly derailed the strategic arms dialogue. Notably, unlike Ford, Carter believed that verification of an arms treaty limiting anti-satellite weapons was indeed possible. Oftentimes alleged problems surrounding verification were used during the Cold War as a political argument against arms control. With any arms control agreement, verification mechanisms cannot be properly evaluated until the parties involved determine what they specifically want to limit. President Ronald Reagan pursued the most overtly militarized space agenda of any Cold War President. His 1982 space policy stated that the Soviets had initiated a campaign to capture the high ground of space, and he pushed forward with an air-launch anti-satellite capability, which he said would deter the Soviets from using their own anti-satellite weapons systems. The deterrence argument was not compelling due to the asymmetry in Soviet American space capabilities, and in particular, the United States was still more dependent on space systems than the USSR. In 1983, Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was a missile defense program to develop land, air, and space-based missile defense interceptors. Because limits on anti-satellite weapons would have constrained the development of SDI, Reagan rejected any proposal for limits on anti-satellite weapons. The administration used verification issues as a primary argument against constraints on anti-satellite weapons. Recently declassified US documents revealed that neither the president nor the joint chiefs believed that the US anti-satellite weapons program was especially useful, but they had concluded that it had to be preserved to move forward with the administration's missile defense agenda. The US conducted a debris-producing test of its air-launched anti-satellite weapons capability in 1985, but Congress prohibited further such tests, and the program was ultimately canceled due to technical difficulties. We also find from the archival record in allied countries to include the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, that many senior defense officials and diplomatic personnel believed that space arms competition could be constrained through arms control and that doing so was in the interest of the entire transatlantic alliance. Cold war military space activities can be best defined as a competition that edged and flowed based on geopolitical circumstances at specific points in time. Additionally, space security was inextricably linked with arms control and missile defense, especially in the 1980s. Rather than viewing the present situation as an unstoppable race, we must recognize that it is driven by a wide variety of geopolitical factors that are contingent and therefore subject to change. Characterizing the Cold War in present space security situations as a race can lead to reductive policy positions that waste precious resources and lead to further instability.