I'm not gonna repeat the facts, but I've paid and kind of already said it all. So we believe the downsides of the Department of Defense leading in the development of small modular nuclear reactors outweigh the potential benefits that Georgetown has discussed in this debate. The primary issue is cost. Georgetown correctly points out that current military purchases from the civilian grid do put pressure on DOD budgets. But that is insignificant when compared to the price of massive SMR development in the short term. Also, given the long time frame for SMR development, the cross-ex of the first speech indicated decades, the DOD would be stuck footing the bill for both civilian electricity now. In addition to new reactors at the expense of other important programs. While Cochran may discuss concrete costs, he is by no means equating concrete with total cost. He also discusses cost from things like emergency management and being a first mover and the unique expenses that come with that, which Georgetown has conveniently disregarded in their last speech. Taking on the first mover role requires things like extra testing and demonstration costs in addition to the typical safety licensing and waste management overhead that we've discussed previously. Even if SMR seem economically reasonable on their own, Georgetown has failed to take into account the current economic environment where cost minimization is necessary to ensure military effectiveness due to sequestration. You should ask yourself, do we actually need a few new possibly unnecessary reactors if they come at the expense of our troops readiness abroad? The impact of this tradeoff should outweigh the marginal benefits that SMR is providing the long term. In terms of waste, they too quickly dismiss a very serious issue. The belief that SMR development could alter political gridlock seems unlikely and could be achieved by civilian development. Similarly, it is definitely too early to start discussing a waste-consuming SMR given the time frame for a light water version maybe decades, as they say. Our point is not centered upon the need for a separate waste storage facility, but rather the necessity to avoid furthering waste buildup and absent some plan for future generations. Yes, we agree that drycast storage is temporary in a solution, but given massive SMR expansion and commercialization as they advocate, we have to be ready for the potential problems that arise and not jump into SMR development without a plan. Additionally, they misunderstand our safety argument. It isn't about others acquiring nuclear material, but rather unknown actors creating catastrophic damage through reactor attacks and meltdowns. While attacks haven't happened in the past, the new high impact location placement could make these SMR's targets. While historically the military has worked with SMR's, our argument is that there is not much recent experience in terms of what the military has done with SMR's. Their evidence and arguments discussed the 1970s naval program, and we think that this situation is different from the past. Marcus King, cited by Payton in the first speech, said, quote, regulating power plants as a function that lies beyond DOD's core mission. The military services are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise. This combined with licensing hurdles, such as institutional bias towards large reactors, mean that even if the pathway is cleared, the projects could take decades to come online. Even their own Medea evidence that is cited in the 2AC concludes by saying the NRC will quote, still need to address the number of reactor modules any one reactor operator can safely operate and the size of the emergency planning zone, issues that you create doubt in the affirmative's position. With the military already recommending against taking a leading role in SMR development, it seems like this is a time where we should listen to the experts. The DOE DOD risk sharing program provides a slower but safer development route for SMR's that reduces cost and safety issues while still creating benefits down the line. I'll now address Georgetown's benefits. In terms of non-polliferation, they have yet to prove the necessity of military action in this area. The status quo DOE civilian SMR program can be sufficient in achieving the same benefits regarding alternatives to E&R and international influence, especially if it's about the signal we send in terms of commercial development. Also, if SMR based nuclear leadership can't stop states that are going to nuclearize, then their non-polliferation purpose seems limited in the face of threats like Iran, North Korea, and future adversaries. Regarding E&R, Sherryman Lockman, a senior analyst in foreign policy and security studies at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies said quote, the overwhelming majority of countries have demonstrated little interest in establishing their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Optimism about the U.S. ability to dissuade these countries is also questionable given our previous record of other priorities getting in the way, and in the cross-ex, the idea that the U.S. can enrich and reprocess for all these countries seems unfeasible. Given these points, it seems unlikely that SMR development will provide a significant non-polliferation benefit anytime soon. In terms of the grid, those concerns are also overstated. There are microgrid evidence is outdated. It's all from 2008. R says quote, according to a new report from Pike Research in 2013, the total capacity of DOD microgrids will surpass 600 megawatts by 2018, a 50% increase over 2012. Microgrids are proven to work on 40 military installations today with a unique combination of inputs that prevent intermittency and combined with new backup generators, the grid is more resilient than ever, and SMRs are unnecessary. Thank you. If I understand you correctly, your argument about the DOE taking the lead assumes that DOD eventually purchases the reactors that are being tested. Am I correct in that? We think that they could possibly do that. Our evidence indicates that if the DOE DOD cost-sharing program is successful, the reason they're doing that is for slower, safer, less costly development in the future, so the DOD could possibly buy. I understand that. I'm wondering what difference that slower development makes for any of your cost arguments. So our evidence says that one of the main issues with cost is taking a first mover role. We believe that the first mover role would create issues such as extra testing, extra demonstration that could more safely and securely be done by a gradual development by the Department of Energy. I guess the place where I'm confused is that your Cochranevidence, we both agree, makes arguments about concrete scaling and distribution of emergency response units. I don't understand how the Department of Energy program, causing slower development later, changes that cost structure. You're right. There are still going to be costs. Our argument as the degree of cost would be mitigated by not taking a first mover role. I think you know, your Cochranevidence, the card that says there's a waste problem with SMRs, says that the Blue Ribbon Commissions recommendations are the best way forward on this issue. Are there any indications that any of their recommendations are moving forward on the Hill? I mean, probably not. I'm based on what's happening on the Hill, but our point is more simple than just do we need to do that specific recommendation. It's rather we should have a plan before a massive expansion of SMRs. It's not we're not sure exactly what the right recommendation is or if the Hill or people on the Hill will accept the Blue Ribbon, but it's a question of should we just start continuing the pile up waste in a temporary solution that we're not sure will last 15, 20 years down the line? That makes some sense. So you're emphasizing the meltdowns component of the next in evidence now rather than the terrorism component if I understood you correctly. I'm wondering if you can give me an example of a deleterious impact to anyone that resulted from a meltdown in the US. There might not have been a meltdown in the US that has had a large impact. Our point is a broad expansion and a rushed expansion possibly through the DOD can have problems in terms of safety. Your A-mone evidence, the micro grids report, a pike research. Correct me if I'm wrong, but he's the individual in charge of that program, right? I would have to look up, but I may be that was in the first speech though. Yeah, yeah. My only concern is that it seems like he's announcing the micro grids program to the press. Is there a count of the number of bases on which this has been successfully identified in terms of 40 bases in the US having it successful? That's really important.