A lot of people have criticized the video that I made on the ontological argument because I addressed and Selms version of it rather than the version favored by Alvin planting it and William Lane Craig. For those of you who haven't seen that video, check it out so you know what I'm talking about. I'll put an annotation or if annotations aren't working, I'll put a link in the box. A criticism that I repeatedly got was that William Lane Craig's version of the argument doesn't simply add existence to the definition of God. My detractors argue that William Lane Craig doesn't say that existing is part of what it means to be the greatest conceivable being. Well, let's listen to what exactly Craig says. If a being of that nature exists in even one possible world, then it exists in all of them because that's part of what it means to be the greatest conceivable being. Can you say that again, Billy? Because that's part of what it means to be the greatest conceivable being. Existing in all possible worlds is part of what it means to be the greatest conceivable being. He does in fact say that existence is part of or at the very least implied by the very definition of God. So we even Craig's version of the ontological argument tries to commit the same silly trick of simply defining God into existence. Now you may be able to formulate a concept of God that requires you to think of God as existing, but whether you think of God as existing has nothing to do with whether God actually exists. All ontological arguments make the same mistake. Now Craig's version of the argument does add the caveat that if it is possible for God to exist, then God does exist. In this formulation, God's existence is at least contingent upon God's existence being possible. Without that, the argument is simply a meaningless totology. But even with this caveat, the argument still tries to conjure God into existence using only a definition and it still fails. Craig and Planting is version of the argument says that a maximally great being if it exists in any possible world, it exists in all possible worlds. What he means when he says possible worlds is conceivable scenarios. If a maximally great being exists in one conceivable scenario, it exists in all conceivable scenarios, which includes your conception of reality. Maximal greatness has to exist in all conceivable scenarios because if it only existed in one or a few hypothetical scenarios, it would not be maximally great. To be maximally great, something must, by definition, exist in all conceivable scenarios. So if you say that it is hypothetically possible for maximal greatness to exist, you are placing it in a conceivable scenario. Since if you place it in one hypothetical scenario, you are placing it in all conceivable scenarios, then to say that maximal greatness is possible is equivalent to saying that maximal greatness is actual. If you accept this argument and you accept that maximal greatness is possible, it requires you to think of maximal greatness and by extension God as existing, not just in hypothetical conceptions of reality, but also when you're conception of actual reality. The problem is that your conception of actual reality is still just a conception. It is not reality itself. That's why the real-acorn argument doesn't work and that's why for the same reason none of the ontological arguments works.