Arjun and I would also like to say thank you for everyone who's shown up today. We appreciate you taking your time out of your busy schedules to Dr. Hamrie and Miss Meacham for the kind of introductions, CSIS and especially Eli for putting this all together, the judges for donating their time and correcting whatever we say at the end. So in response, we believe the Department of Defense should not pursue a first-move rural in the development of SMRs for a number of reasons. First and foremost is that small modular reactors, especially in the context of a first-move rural, are extraordinarily expensive. No matter what benefits that they provide, those must be weighed against the inevitable costs associated with their development and their procurement. According to Marcus King, an associate research professor of international affairs at George Washington University, the first of a kind expense of developing small nuclear power plants would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Thomas Cochran, a member of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, states that even once developed, the materials cost per kilowatt of a reactor goes up as the size goes down. The reactor surface area, which dominates material costs, goes up, secondary containment, independent systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management all increases size decreases, since each modularized unit requires its own system. This means that both during the initial development and the later stages of use, SMRs might be even more expensive than current light-water reactors. In the current state of sequestration cuts, force budgetary trade-offs, and extreme demands on the military, the addition of an unnecessary and extremely expensive investment in new SMR technology is unmerited and dangerous. The second serious drawback to SMR procurement for the military is the potential waste and safety issues presented by SMRs. There is currently no federal repository for nuclear waste disposal, and while SMRs could be designed to minimize such byproducts, Nick Cunningham, a policy analyst for energy and climate at the American Security Project, supports at a large expansion of domestic SMR use will still run into the issue of disposal with no current solution. The safety drawbacks of SMRs also present a troubling issue. In particular, the presence of nuclear reactors on military bases massively amplifies the consequences of any meltdown. Daniel Nexon, an associate professor in the School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, points out that the presence of an SMR on a base makes an extremely attractive target for attack. While mitigated risks of meltdowns are extremely promising, the potential for an unpredictable collapse still presents an extreme danger when located so close to critical facilities. In particular, the NRC has no current licensing pathway for SMRs, which presents a major hurdle to safe and widespread development. With regards to the benefits that Georgetown has isolated, let us first say that in the status quo, there are major efforts being made to develop SMRs in conjunction with the DOE and the DOD. While the DOD might have market pull for widespread adoption of SMRs, the reactors themselves are still in its stage of technology development that is most effectively nurtured by the funding provided by the DOE. John E. Kelly, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies and the DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, testified before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and stated that the current programs will allow cost sharing components that will bring in a couple of years what the industry would be able to do with private investments. However, what is slowing the development is the regulatory process, which is a four to six-year effort that allows them to have confidence in the safety and security of those units. In particular, this is the approach that the DOD itself has recommended. According to Marcus King, Congress directed the DOD to assess the use of nuclear on military installations in a National Defense Authorization Act of 2010. And because of questions about economic feasibility as a first mover and the risks of being an early adopter of the technology, the DOD preferred not to undertake the project and instead supported the current framework for DOE and DOD partnership and risk sharing, cemented in a memorandum of understanding in 2010. With regards to non-proliferation, this is not a unique reason to pursue DOD SMR development. Obviously, commercial expansion of nuclear captures many of the advantages of proliferation leadership. We find it implausible that states choosing to pursue dangerous proliferation technologies will be influenced or dissuaded by the efforts of the United States to develop a more improved nuclear device. Georgetown has stated that 15 other countries are all expanding their investment in nuclear energy now and provide clear alternatives to nations to not wish to be influenced by the United States' norms of non-proliferation and technology. The long-time skill for developing and deploying SMRs domestically and the improbable link between the development of SMRs and non-proliferation objectives means this hardly appears to be sufficient reason for the massive investment. With regards to grid vulnerability, status quo efforts have resolved these issues. Their evidence is all in the context of 2008 report that identified the civilian grid as a critical vulnerability. According to Michael Amoney from the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, the DOD has since taken action, including a massive increase in backup generation capability linked to critical assets to ensure that power could last through an extended outage. Last microgrids are cost-effective approach being utilized to ensure islanding from civilian grids and steady supply under all circumstances. For all of the reasons outlined above, we believe the DOD should not pursue a first-mover role on small modular reactors. Thank you. Okay, Peyton. The first thing I want to chat about is this, you cite Professor Nixon, who as George Chatton students were big fans of, but his claim here seems a little outlandish. The presence of an SMR on a base makes an extremely attractive target for attack. How exactly does someone go about attacking a US military base? Well, our evidence says that that risks the potential, either for meltdown or for intentional attack. I personally do not make those plans. But I imagine is one that would sort of be incentivized by the presence of something that would mass meltdown, especially if you're right about sort of base vulnerability. You say that in the status quo, the DOD is already pursuing a policy to create advanced microgrids. What are those? So microgrids are systems that use backup power systems. They can use things like diesel, renewables, et cetera. And it's a way to monitor the interactions between those. It's a version of smart grid. Okay. Sorry, just to be clear, sorry, just to be clear though, they rely on diesel and renewable generation. In the status quo, I think they rely on conventional sources, right? They are not explicitly for nuclear right now for all the reasons we think. So coal or natural gas or? Or renewables or diesel, right? Okay. You made an argument about materials cost to say that the cost of SMR is extremely high. So we made an argument that as you continue to build out SMRs, you can build them in a factory and mass produce components. Why does it matter how much like the concrete costs? Yeah. So I agree that long term, you can make it cost less to produce them when you sort of manufacture them, but that's a relative cost comparison. Yes, that cost less than the first few that you build, which is also probably reason the DOD shouldn't fund the first few. But that's still a huge amount of cost because the basic materials component, which our evidence says, is a major part of nuclear cost. Those still increase because you're modularizing them. So instead of one big case, you have multiple little cases for the same amount of power. That makes sense. You made an illusion to a DOD, DOE memorandum of understanding. What does that lay out? In 2010, it's their cooperation and energy questions. So it was explicitly they were tasked with evaluating whether or not we should pursue nuclear on basis, right? What you think we should do? And the DOD said that because of first mover costs and because of the risks of being a new adopter of a technology that's yet unproven, that instead the DOE should pursue the research and investment that they're currently doing to develop those technologies before the DOD starts using them. So the DOD is currently not committed to purchasing an SMR? I don't believe so. Otherwise, I think your app is done. Right. Right. Makes sense. The last sort of question is about waste. Do you make an argument that when we build out more SMRs, there will be more waste? And I guess right now we store waste on-site, which seems to be at least in the medium term somewhat sustainable. Yeah, there are certainly regulatory concerns about whether or not that is an effective solution, but your advocacy is for a massive expansion of the amount of nuclear that we use to power every military base in the United States and spill over commercially. Which would be a lot. Thank you.