Mining is a dangerous industry for its workers, from cold-ass inhalation, suffocation, explosions, and the obvious one, mine collapse. A collapse on the bed of the Seshkihana River in Pennsylvania, United States highlighted the risks to the industry posed by improper execution of safety precautions. The whole created would flood an entire mine complex, swelling up 10 billion US gallons of water and take the lives of 12 miners. But also would be the parting shot of the ending of the coal industry in the region. Northwestern Pennsylvania, for out its history, has been intertwined with coal mining operations. And isn't the first time this area has popped up in a plain difficult video. Of course I'm talking about Centralia, but today we're over in Columbia's next door neighbour, LaZern County. Our story starts back in 1762 with the first discovery of Amphorocyte coal in the region. This particular type of coal is sought after as it has the highest carbon content, the fewest impurities and the highest density of all types. The Wyoming Valley, also known as the Amphorocyte Valley, is canoe-shaped about 25 miles long, which extends from the counties of Seshkihana and Wayne in the north to Columbia County in the south. You guessed it, LaZern slap bang in the middle. When you see the township of Jenkins on the map, in relation to the Amphorocyte Valley, it's not hard to see why the town had such a strong coal industry focus. So much so, that a small unincorporated community would be given the name Port Griffiths, named after one of the original stockholders of the Pennsylvania coal company. Due to a number of mining disasters in the USA, but in the 1950s multiple safety regulations were enforced, in an effort to try and put disasters like the Avondale mine disaster in 1870 to the past. However, the economic forces of lower-income prices meant that the industry was in a slow decline. Long gone had the peak output of 100 million tonnes in 1917. As with most dying industries, companies tried to squeeze out the last few drops of profit available by willfully ignoring or bending safety regulations and using old life expired equipment. Aside a factor of this, was the safety of those the managers sent to work every day. In an around-aport Griffiths area, multiple mine owners and contractor companies operated an intricate connected maze of mine shafts along and under the Szechihanna River, incorporating winter moot and monochantic islands. The Knox coal company was one of these operations, cutting costs and responsibilities at every turn. The company was a contract mining operation. These organisations mined on behalf of the mine owner, which allowed, shall we say, streamlining of operations. The Knox coal company had begun leasing the river slope mine from the Pennsylvania coal company in May 1954. The company hired 174 men, 23 surface workers and 151 underground workers. The mining operations were to exploit the Pitsden and Marcy veins, which contained the juicy anthracite. Production from Knox coal was around 700 pounds per day, which was hand transferred to chain or shaking conveys. The main workings for the company was through two entrances to the mines, the river slope and the maze shaft. Three other shafts operated by other companies were available for emergency exit from the complex. The river slope was dug into the ground 240 feet long at an angle of around 25 degrees, where intersected the Pitsden vein. The maze shaft was 332 feet deep, and the other three emergency shafts were the Holt shaft at 528 feet deep, the schooly shaft at 579 feet, and the eagle air shaft at just 60 feet. The mining operations employed the Chamber and Pillar method, which looks like this. In order to get the sweet, sweet coal out of the pillars, a recovery method was used. This involved filling the gap with waste material and then mining the pillar, but this was only allowed when authorized by the landowners and can be very dangerous. The mines were rather close to the SESC and this necessitated some rules and regulations in regards to how close the miners could get to the riverbed. The maps of the mines had things called stop lines, where mining could not take place because of inadequate roof thickness. This not to be pass line gave a 50 feet safety margin between mine, wall and river. The Knox Coal Company requested a 35 foot margin, which government officials approved. This wouldn't be enough, and eventually the company would keep pushing the boundaries to chase the amphicite veins until the point of no return. Two illegally dug gangways were extended under the river, 125 feet past the officially and clearly designated stop lines. The workings then sharply turned up to follow the Pitsden vein. On January 22nd 1959, the Knox Coal Company's disregard for rules would finally come back to bite them. In the morning, a team of 81 miners descended down a river slope for another day's work in a dusty mine. Various teams split off along the various corridors to the different seams. Management, with the backing of the workers' union, had been asking the workers to dig well beyond the stop lines, eventually reaching just 19 inches of the icy coal-generated SESC HANA river. The number of workers in the Marcy vein were told to put down some loose roof material and put in some timber. At around 11.30am, a timber prop cracked, one of the workers informed the foreman who then went back to check the Pitsden vein. At 11.42, the roof gave in to the way to the river above. The assistant foreman, Telephone Decolory, who then in turn sent out the emergency warning for everyone to evacuate the mine. The call was also sent out to the adjacent mines who withdrew their workers. At 22, escaped through the May shaft, some by the time they had made their escape had to wade through the flooding tunnels. 11 men escaped via Hoitz shaft and 3 left via the river slope. 33 made it to safety via the abandoned Eagle Air shaft. In total, 12 were trapped behind in the icy cold water below. The breach had created a hole in the riverbed with millions of gallons gushing down. The power of the water swept away the timber supports of various workings, but the afternoon of the 22nd works were under way to fill the hole, as the western railway line of the Lee Valley was broken and diverted to near the breakthrough. This was rather strange as not only Rublin was to be poured into the hole, but the railway carriages themselves. Anything that could be thrown in was, including the aforementioned carriages, mine carts, boulders, hay and any other rubble available. A few days later, on the 25th of January, the water flow was stemmed somewhat, which allowed rocks and earth to be placed in a semicircle around the hole, two sinking pumps were installed in the mines to try and begin the drying process. These would later be joined by another 22 shaft pumps. The hookheads were placed inside the mine near the breach, and above ground two cofferdams were built, starting in March, completing in May the same year. The dams went from the shoreline to Wintermey Island on the eastern side, above and below the breach area. A third dam was built on the island to completely dive out the water away from the area. Tons of clay and rock were poured into the hole, and a concrete cap was placed on top of the opening. The water was pumped from the flooded mines, but none of the 12 missing men were ever found. But as with any disaster, like this we need to look at how the breach could have happened in the first place, and spoiler alert, it involved corruption. Federal mine inspections in 1958 had taken a look down the mines, but no sign of any wrong doing was found. Unfortunately this would be wrong. Inspections made by the Pennsylvania Coal Company during 1958 had actually highlighted Knox's coals passing up the stop line, but no remediation action was taken. It was found that Knox Coal had not only passed the line, but was also working in an area that needed permission from Pennsylvania Coal, which unsurprisingly was not given. There was another main factor for the failure, and that was the water itself. Due to the time of year, the Sesquihana River was partially frozen over, which contributed to an increased water level. The higher level increased the weight on the already weakened riverbed. During investigations, post-incident, it was found that one of the Labour Union leaders had shares in the company, which is obviously a conflict of interest, as well as a blatant violation of the American Labour Law. Waters' arster inquiries eventually led to charges against 11 top bosses at the Knox Coal Company, the Pennsylvania Coal Company, and the United Mine workers of America. The charges varied from manslaughter to bribery, but yet again, no one would actually serve prison time, after numerous trials and appeals. Free bosses at Knox Coal did eventually serve some time, but not for the deaths at the river slope, but instead for tax evasion. The disaster put a spotlight on the corruption and dodgy dealings with the coal industry in the region, resulting in probes into other company's operations, and it was found that Knox Coal was not unique, but it's also accelerated the end date of deep mining of coal in the Amphacite Valley. Not only did it cause significant damage to the mines, but attempts to plug the whole used up valuable equipment. I kind of imagine it similar to fixing a flat tire by throwing out the rim and replacing it with the steering wheel, which needless to say is a bad idea. Thanks for watching, I hope you enjoyed the video. This video is a plainly difficult production. All videos on the channel are creative comments, share, attribution, and like licensed. Played a crook videos are produced by me, John, in a sunny, south-east in Cornwall, London, UK. Help the channel grow by liking, commenting and subscribing. Check out my Twitter for all sorts of photos and odds and sods, as well as hints for future videos. I've got Patreon and YouTube membership as well, if you fancy, supporting the channel financially. Another set to say is thank you for watching.