Turkish Airlines flight TK1951 departs East Ambul at 25 past eight on the morning of the 25th of February 2009 for its flight to Amsterdam. At a quarter past ten, the aircraft enters Dutch airspace from the east and approaches Skipel Airport. Due to a fault, the left-hand radio altimeter, one of two on board, indicates an incorrect height of minus eight feet. This occurs whilst the aircraft is descending to a flight level 40 and subsequently to 2000 feet. The incorrect radio height causes a total of five audible warnings to be heard in the cockpit. The pilots have noticed these warnings. There are three pilots in the cockpit. The co-pilot who is flying the aircraft is seated to the right. He's receiving line training from the captain, also an instructor in the left-hand seat. A first officer acting as a safety pilot is seated in the observer's seat located in the centre behind them. The aircraft is now flying at 2000 feet on a course of 265 degrees as assigned by air traffic control. Air traffic control issues a new heading of 210 degrees in order to intercept what is referred to as the localizer before landing on the runway 18 right. The issued heading results in an interception of the localizer five and a half nautical miles before the runway threshold. A shorter line up with respect to the normal procedure which should line up the aircraft at a minimum of eight nautical miles from the runway threshold and under the glide slope. The consequence is that the final approach segment is shorter. No clearance for a further descent is issued so the glide slope to the landing runway is now being intercepted from above. Once the aircraft intercepts the localizer, the throttles must be closed to allow the aircraft to descent to the glide slope. Due to the incorrect height measurement by the left radio or altimeter, the auto-throttle prematurely switches to the retard flare mode. This mode is usually activated in the final stage during the flight in order to reduce speed when above the landing runway. The immediate effect is however the same as if the system had function correctly, the throttles close. Interception of the glide slope from above masks the faulty operation of the auto-throttle. At an altitude of 1,300 feet the glide slope is intercepted. At this point the speed of the aircraft is still above the landing speed of 144 knots. Once an altitude of 1,000 feet has been passed, the aircraft and crew must be fully prepared for landing according to Turkish Airlines company procedures. This however is not the case. The speed remains too high and the engine power too low and the final position of the flaps remains to be selected. Furthermore the crew are still engaged with the landing checklist. This may cause the speed to decrease unnoticed. The autopilot maintains the aircraft on the glide slope. In order to generate sufficient lift the nose rises to well above the normal level. The pilots are unaware of this. Once the speed reduced to 109 knots the stick shaker was activated. A warning that the aircraft is travelling too slowly and is at risk of losing all lift very quickly. The pilots respond to this but inediquately. The aircraft crashes. In the final seconds of the flight data recorder it can be seen that once the stick shaker is activated the co-pilot slides the throttle forwards and pushes the control column to lower the nose of the aircraft. The captain takes over control but the auto throttle is not deactivated which means that it almost immediately closes the throttle again. The auto throttle and automatic pilot are then deactivated. Seven seconds later full thrusters applied. By this point there is insufficient height remaining to recover from the stall. The aircraft crashes into a field located one mile from the runway. Due to the high nose position the tail strikes the ground first and the aircraft breaks into three pieces.