取消唯物主义

取消唯物主义（），又称取消主义，观点是人们常识中的“心灵”是虚假的，大多数人相信的精神状态中特定的部分也不存在。这个立场属于唯物主义（materialism）。一些取消主义的支持者认为，很多日常中的心理学概念，比如信念和欲望，是没有对应的神经基础的，因为这些概念没有确切的定义。相反，他们认为，行为和经验心理学概念应该以这样一个标准评定，即它们被还原到生物学层面还原得有多好。Lycan, W. G. & Pappas, G. (1972) "What is eliminative materialism?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149-59.还有其他取消主义者认为，类似痛苦、视觉感知等精神状态都是不存在的。Rey, G. (1983). "A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness", in R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation Vol 3. New York, Plenum: 1-39.

 参考文献 

 扩展阅读 

 Baker, L. (1987). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. .
 Broad, C. D. (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. London, Routledge & Kegan.  (2001 Reprint Ed.).
 Churchland, P.M. (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. New York, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. .
 Churchland, P.M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness, revised Ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. .
 Rorty, Richard. "Mind-body Identity, Privacy and Categories"  in The Review of Metaphysics XIX:24-54. Reprinted Rosenthal, D.M. (ed.) 1971.
 Stich, S. (1996). Deconstructing the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. .

 外部链接 

 Bibliography on Eliminative Materialismat 
 Eliminative and Multiplicative Materialism by Albert P. Carpenter
 Eliminative Materialism at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy




Category:形而上學概念