Trần Ngọc Châu

Tran Ngoc Châu (1 Ferikgong 1924 – 17 Seetebosigo 2020) e ne e le lesole la Vietnam (Molefetenente Mokolonele), motsamaisi wa selegae (ratoropo wa toropo, kgosi ya porofense), radipolotiki (moeteledipele wa Ntlo e e kwa Tlase ya Kokoano Bosetšhaba), mme moragonyana 

legolegwa la sepolotiki la Fagoni ya Vietnam, kwa Rephaboliking ya Sagon i. 1975.

Pelenyana thata ka 1944, o ne a ikopantse le Việt Minh go lwela boipuso mo Baforeng. Lefa go ntse jalo jaaka Mobuda wa Mo-Vietnam ka 1949 o ne a setse a fetogile ka botlalo kgatlhanong le Bokomonisi kwa Vietnam. Go tswa foo o ne a kopanela le masole a masha a bosetšhaba a a neng a eteletswe pele ke Bafora. Fa Vietnam e ne e kgaoganngwa ka 1954, o ne a nna lepodise la Sesole sa Repaboliki ya Vietnam (ARVN).

Ka dingwaga di le dintsi o ne a dira dikabelo ka tlhamalalo ka fa tlase ga Moporesidente Ngô Đình Diệm (1954–1963). O ne a nna ratoropo wa Da Nang, mme moragonyana a nna kgosana ya porofense kwa Mekong Delta. Segolobogolo, Châu o ne a itsege ka mekgwa ya gagwe ya boitshimololedi ya kgopolo le tiriso ya go lwantsha botsuolodi: go tlamela ka tshireletsego ("go ritibatsa") go baagi ba ba sa tlhaselwang ka nako ya Ntwa ya Vietnam. Maikaelelo a bofelo a puso a go gapa dipelo le megopolo ya batho a ne a feleletsa a dirile gore a tsene mo dipolotiking.

Ka 1967, morago ga go rola tiro mo ARVN Châu o ne a tlhophiwa go nna leloko la Kokoano Bosetšhaba e e neng e sa tswa go tlhamiwa kwa Saigon. O ne a nna moeteledipele wa peomolao. Le fa go ntse jalo, mmogo le ba bangwe, o ne a palelwa ke go tlhotlheletsa tsala ya gagwe ya bogologolo Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, mojenerale wa pele yo o neng a fetogile Moporesidente (1967–1975), go retologela kwa kagisong e e neng e buisanwa ka yone. Ka jalo Châu o ne a amana le ditlhopha tsa Kokoano tse di neng di le kgatlhanong le melao e e neng e rena ya ntwa le bonweenwee jo bo neng bo le gongwe le gongwe.

Ka seipato sa gore o ne a bua le morwarraagwe wa mokomonisi, Châu o ne a latofadiwa ka go tsuologela puso ka 1970, ka nako ya fa puso e ne e gatelela batho ba ba neng ba sa dumalane le puso ka tsela e kgolo. Gareng ga ba bangwe, Daniel Ellsberg o ne a bua mo boemong jwa gagwe fa pele ga Khonkerese ya United States. Mo gare ga dikganetsano tse di bogale kwa Vietnam Borwa, tse di neng tsa begwa thata mo dimakasineng tsa boditšhabatšhaba, Châu o ne a sekisiwa mme a romelwa kwa kgolegelong dingwaga di le mmalwa. Go ne ga latela go tshwarwa mo ntlong. Ka bonako fela fa Saigon e sena go wa ka 1975, o ne a tshwarwa le go tshwarwa ke puso e ntšha ya bokomonisi, mo kampeng ya go rutwa gape. E ne ya gololwa ka 1978, ene le ba lelapa la gagwe ba ne ba tshaba ka mokoro, mme kgabagare ba goroga kwa Amerika ka 1979.See text below for source references

 Botshelo le tiro ya gagwe ya bogologolo 
Lelapa, thuto

Tran Ngoc Châu o tshotswe ka 1923 kgotsa 1924 mo lelapeng la badiredipuso ba Confucius–Babuda (ba mo hisitoring ba bidiwang mandarins, quan ka Se-Vietnam),Cf., Buttinger (1958) at pp. 289–290, 219 n23 & 24. A mandarin (quan) was a public official drawn from those who passed "the prescribed number of official tests" and thus a merit selection "based on a democratic principle". Such an "anti-colonial" view "became quite popular among Vietnamese nationalists" during the early independence struggle. Yet mandarins, although "not an economically anchored ruling class" nor "a closed group", had features of a social "elite".Phan Thi Dac (1966) p. 66. Traditionally Vietnam was a land of three religions (Tam Giáo): Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist.ba ba neng ba nna kwa toropong ya bogologolo ya Huế, e ka nako eo e neng e le motsemogolo wa mmusimogolo, kwa lotshitshing lwa Vietnam bogare. Ka direkoto tsa matsalo ka nako eo di ne di sa tlwaelega, lelapa la gagwe le ne la tlhoma Ferikgong 1, 1924, jaaka letsatsi la gagwe la matsalo "fela gore go nne motlhofo".Smith, Harrison (July 9, 2020). "Tran Ngoc Chau, Vietnamese counterinsurgency specialist, dies at 96 of coronavirus complications". The Washington Post. Retrieved July 10, 2020.Rraagwemogolo Tran Tram e ne e le moithuti yo o itsegeng thata le moruti mo kabineteng ya mmusimogolo, mme rraagwe Tran Dao Te e ne e le moatlhodi yo mogolo.Fermoyle (2009), p. 422 (photo of grandfather), p. 423 (photo of father). Jaaka maloko a setso a puso, lelapa la gagwe le ne le "ise le ko le itokolele puso ya Fora." Châu o ne a fetsa dingwaga di le supa tsa bosha e le moithuti wa moitlami kwa sekolong sa Sebuda le kwa seminareng. Mo godimo ga moo o ne a bona thuto ya Sefora kwa lycée. Le fa go ntse jalo mmogo le bomorwarraagwe le kgaitsadie, le go latela baeteledipele ba ba tlotlegang, Châu o ne a tlala ka "moya wa bosetšhaba wa Vietnam" mme a ikemisetsa go lwela boipuso jwa naga ya gagwe.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 4–5, 7 (family background); at 8, 25 (joins Việt Minh); 8–9 (Buddhist school, French lycée); 5 (two quotes). His mandarin grandfather (pp. 5, 79), and father (105). From a large family, Châu had three brothers and a sister who also joined the Việt Minh resistance (p. 109). Later Châu's own wife and six children, in addition to his small army pay, received income from family rental property (cf. p. 277).Grant (1991), re Tran Ngoc Châu: at 68–69 (family origins).Châu with Sturdevant (2001) p. 181. (brother joins Việt Minh), p. 182 (Châu).

Mo kganelong ya Việt Minh

Ka 1944, Châu o ne a kopanela le "kganetso" (khang chien) e e neng e le kgatlhanong le Fora le Japane, ke gore, Việt Minh. O ne a latela bomorwarraagwe ba babedi ba bagolo le kgaitsadie.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at p. 8 (family and Việt Minh); also p. 109. Grant (1991), pp. 69–70 (recruited for Việt Minh by a teacher and leader of Routiers, the French 'boy scouts'). "Châu and his brothers and sisters, all but the youngest boy, joined the Việt Minh" (p. 69).Chau with Sturdevant (2001) pp. 180–182Morago ga moo e ne e tsewa e le mokgatlho o o tlwaelegileng wa boratanaga, Việt Minh e ne ya gatelela bosetšhaba jwa Vietnam.Tucker (2000) pp. 441–442. Việt Minh translates "Vietnam Independence League". Founded in 1941 as a "communist front organization" by 1945 it had successfully become the leading Vietnamese independence party by championing nationalism and obscuring its founders' class struggle ideology. Cf. Ho Chi Minh (1970) re Việt Minh: p. 30 [1941] (founded by communist party members, to attract nationalists and people of all classes), p. 32 [1945] (celebrates its support "from all social strata"), p. 46 [1951] (calculated concealment of communist class warfare doctrine in order to "unite the entire people").Cf. Halberstam (1971). Ho Chi Minh in 1941 was adamant that communists create a front party (the Việt Minh) to conceal their Soviet links, otherwise they would be vulnerable to charges of being controlled by foreigners. This front party must be more Vietnamese nationalist than any rival party (p. 63). Ho himself had then not set foot in Vietnam in 30 years (p. 61). Since 1924, he had worked as a professional revolutionary whose activities and travels were directed by the Communist International in Moscow (pp. 37, 39; 42, 44, 45–46; 70).Châu o ne a tlhophiwa go tsenela "Khoso ya Sesole sa Sepolotiki" ya dikgwedi di le 3. Morago ga moo o ne a dirwa moeteledipele wa setlhopha sa masole.Châu, paper submitted to Congress, in US Senate (1970), p. 371.

Fano Châu o ne a tlhakana le balemi le badiri lekgetlo la ntlha, a itemogela "phatlha e kgolo fa gare ga ba ba nang le ditshiamelo... le ba ba tlhokang" le "seabe sa botlhokwa" se se tshamekiwang ke batho ba metseselegae mo isagweng ya Vietnam. O ne a tsaya karolo mo dithutong tse di gagametseng tsa Việt Minh, "dikopano tsa go tshwayatshwaya diphoso" le kotlhao ya lekoko, mme o ne a kgatlhwa ke boineelo jwa barati ba naga ba Vietnam. Sekao e ne e le mookamedi wa gagwe yo mmotlana Ho Ba, yo le ene a tswang mo lelapeng la Ba-mandarin. Châu o ne a tshela botshelo jo bo makgwakgwa e le lesole la di- guerrilla, a tsena mo ntweng makgetlo a le mantsi. Le fa go ntse jalo o ne a bona se a neng a akanya gore ke polao e e senang tlhaloganyo ya lekgarebe le le neng le siamisiwa jaaka "setlhogo sa phetogo". Gape o ne a bona bosupi jwa boitshwaro jo bo bogale jo bo tshwanang jwa masole a bokoloniale a Fora. Châu o ne a tlhophiwa go etelela pele setlhopha sengwe (masole a a fetang lekgolo) mme a etelela pele baagi ka ene go ya ntweng. E ne ya tlhatlhosiwa ka nako eo go nna "mokhomišenara wa sepolotiki wa mophato", Ho Ba o ne a mo kopile go tsenela Mokgatlho wa Bokomonisi wa Vietnam.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 12 ("great gap"); 33, 42–43, 54–55, 57–58 (Việt Minh doctrine); 87, 90–92, 101, 110 (yet Ho Ba opposed his father, pp. 91–92, because of his feudal privilege); 16–18 (senseless execution), 17 ("revolution is brutal" quote), cf. 37, [43], 58, 78, 80 (French brutality); 19, 23, 33, 117, 144 (leadership role in combat); 78–79 (commissar); 90–92, 113 (asked to join party by Ho Ba). About brutality, ironically it worked to increase support from the people (p. 78). Châu began in Việt Minh intelligence (p. 9), but soon switched to combat (p. 18). Years later, when Châu had changed sides and fought against the Viet Cong, he nonetheless used the "critiquing sessions" he'd learned from the Việt Minh (pp. 122, 162)Grant (1991). As a guerrilla Châu was wounded three times (p. 70), usually had little to eat, cut up rubber tires to make his sandals, "suffered malaria, and slept in a hammock in the rain and cold" (p. 72). Grant writes (at 70–71), contrary to Châu's memoirs (p. 78), that Châu was promoted to battalion commissar after the Việt Minh leadership dishonestly sentenced to death the prior commissar "for political reasons".Châu with Sturdevant (2001) p. 181. Many communist supporters within the Việt Minh were former political prisoners. During the Japanese occupation, communist party cadres had successfully recruited within the prisons.

Ngwaga morago ga gore Châu a tsene mo magaeng a Việt Minh, Japane e ne ya ineela go fedisa Ntwa ya Lefatshe II. Kwa godimo kwa bokone masole a a tlhometseng a Việt Minh a ne a gapa taolo ya Hanoi ka Phetogo ya August. Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) o ne a itsise boipuso jwa Vietnam, mme a nna Moporesidente wa ntlha.Halberstam (1971) pp. 75–78, 80–81 Tucker (2000) p. 446.Le fa go ntse jalo, go ise go ye kae Mafora a ne a boa mme ntwa ya simolola sesha. Bakwadi ba le mmalwa ba akgela ka gore ka 1945 Ho Chi Minh o ne a amana ka tsela e e sa phimogeng le boipuso jwa Vietnam, a mo naya Taolo ya Legodimo mo matlhong a Ba-Vietnam ba le bantsi, le gore phenyo ya gagwe ya bofelo kgatlhanong le Fora le moragonyana Amerika e ne ya latela ka tsela e e neng e ka bonelwa kwa pele.Robert Shaplen in his 1965 book The Lost Revolution presents a thesis that, in short, Ho's and the Việt Minh's national stature resulting from the independence achieved in 1945 already shaped the probable outcome of the Vietnam War. Cf. Shaplen (1970) p. xi.Karnow (1983) p. 146. In 1945 the Emperor Bảo Đại's abdication conferred on Ho traditional legitimacy and the mandate of heaven. Later, "even anti-Communists regarded [Ho] as a hero" (p. 213). Re Dewey's OSS report: p. 139.Prados (2009) pp. 18, 19. A. Peter Dewey, leader of an OSS team to Vietnam in 1945, wrote a report strongly advising the U.S. stay out. In agreement were the views of the State Department's Far Eastern Bureau of John Carter Vincent and its Southeast Asia desk of Abbot Low Moffat.Cf. Fitzgerald (1972) p. 224. By his national charisma Ho "promoted himself out of the political sphere to become the revered 'ancestor' of the revolution within his lifetime."Stephen B. Young, "The Mandate and Politics in Vietnam" pp. 13–34, in Donnell and Joiner (1974). "The central concept that runs through Vietnamese life is the ultimate power of heaven and its mandate over human affairs." Such is fundamental in local traditions and is held by Buddhists. The Mandate of Heaven (mang troi in Vietnamese) is destiny and "assigns all of us our particular fate" (p. 13). The charisma of Ho Chi Minh in 1945 conferred on him a new mandate to rule, so that Ho could "legitimately replace old village councils" because his mandate would ultimately free Vietnam from foreigners (p. 26).Phan Thi Dac (1966) p. 92: 'Heaven' as determining destiny, a widespread belief. Cf., pp. 70, 78.Halberstam (1971) p. 82: In August 1945 "the Việt Minh had in one quick stroke taken over the nationalism of the country [and] Ho had achieved the legitimacy of power." If the French "challenged him now they would only increase his authority." Ho had become the "arbiter of Vietnamese nationalism". Accordingly, the Americans worked to avoid the national election scheduled for 1956 (p. 108).J. William Fulbright, The Price of Empire (New York: Pantheon 1989) p. 110: US President Eisenhower stated later that if the 1956 Vietnam elections (specified in the Geneva accords of 1954) had been held, Ho Chi Minh would have won by 80%.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 294: The "honor and glory" from their war against the French still gave the Communists "an edge" into the late 1960s

Go tlhatlhosiwa ga ga Châu go nna motlhankedi wa sepolotiki wa mophatoAs is widely followed communist practice, Việt Minh units were led by both a political officer, who usually took priority, and a military officer. Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 78, 84.go ne ga dira gore a akanye ka tsela ya gagwe "go tswa mo botshelong jwa go akanya jwa ntlo ya baitlami ya Sebuda go ya kwa bonneteng jo bo setlhogo jwa ntwa". Việt Minh e ne e ikaegile ka tshegetso ya batho, e e neng e tlhofofadiwa ke komisara wa dipolotiki le go e anamisa. Mo maemong ao, Châu o ne a bidiwa go bontsha "go tlhomamisega ga gagwe ka namana" mo ntweng le mo "phetogong ya loago", le go tlhotlheletsa go rata batho. "Go ne go le botlhokwa ka go lekana gore mokomišenara wa sepolotiki a kgone go neela tumelo eo", go tlhoma "maemo a a kwa godimo a ba bangwe ba ka a etsisang". Go dira jalo, Châu a re, go ne go tshwana le "go sokologela mo bodumeding jo bosha". Ka ga kgopolo le mekgwa ya ga Việt Minh, ditumelo tsa gagwe tsa Sebuda di ne di kgaogane: o ne a rata "tshiamiso ya loago, kutlwelobotlhoko, le kgololesego ya motho ka bongwe" mme o ne a le kgatlhanong le "setlhogo se se tlhagoletsweng" le "letlhoo le le tseneletseng" la mmaba, le go kgala "setlhopha sotlhe sa loago". Châu o ne a iphitlhela a akanya gore baeteledipele ba bokomonisi ba ba tswang mo setlhopheng sa Ba-Mandarin ba ne ba dirisa balemirui ba bone ba ba neng ba ba thapile go tlhasela baganetsi ba bone ba sepolotiki ba Ba-Mandarin. "Moporesidente Ho le Mogenerale Giáp ... ba ne ba tswa mo ditlhopheng tseo" tseo thuto ya bokomonisi e neng e ruta masole go tlhoa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 78–79, 86–87; quotes: 78–79, 86 (re Ho and Giáp); pp. 58, 86–87, 99 (Châu observes political contradiction in Việt Minh leaders, e.g., Ho Chi Minh from the literate elite, who preached class hatred, and educated communist politicians in general who in pursuit of power manipulate rural peasants in order to eliminate their bourgeois mandarin rivals). Châu with Sturdevant (2001) p. 184. "It was the bourgeoisie, the mandarins, and the aristocrats ... who formed the backbone of Ho Chi Minh's [republic] in 1945."Halberstam (1971) pp. 70–71. Ho had a "hard and callous side rarely seen in public" and was proud of being a "tough old Bolshevik" even though he had seen the "crimes of Stalin". His lieutenants "liquidated rival nationalist elements", betraying "true Vietnamese patriots" because they were the competition. Ho's father was a mandarin (pp. 18, 43). In the 1920s Ho is said to have sold out Phan Bội Châu, a revered elder Vietnamese patriot and a friend of Ho's father, to the French for 150,000 piasters (pp. 21, 44–45).Le fa go ntse jalo ditiro tsa ga Châu, sekai, mo "dikopano tsa go tshwayatshwaya diphoso le go itshwayatshwaya diphoso" le go lwa ntwa ya digwerila, di ne tsa mo tlogelela nako e nnye ya go "filosofa ka namana". Fa a kopiwa go tsenela lekoko, Châu o ne a lemoga gore, jaaka bontsi jwa batho ba Vietnam kwa Việt Minh, "Ke ne ke itse go le gonnye ka bokomonisi."Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 79–80, 84–87; two quotes at 79–80, "about communism" quote p. 92. Châu settled on an army career (p. 116).

Morago ga dingwaga di le nne tse di feditsweng thata kwa magaeng le kwa sekgweng; lesole Châu, o ne a feleletsa a le mo seemong sa go sa dumalane le boeteledipele jwa kganetso fa a utlwa ka dipolotiki tsa yone tse di neng di fitlhegile ka sephatlo, le se a neng a se tsaya e le pono ya bokomonisi ya isagwe ya Vietnam. Le fa ka nako eo Việt Minh e ne e tsewa ke botlhe e le e e emelang bosetšhaba jo bo tlwaelegileng, Châu o ne a ganetsa kgopolo ya yone ya konokono ya bokomonisi e e neng e gana dingwao tse dintsi tsa Vietnam, dikgolagano tsa setso tsa lelapa, le bodumedi jwa Sebuda.E.g., Halberstam (1971) pp. 92–93. Peasants were advised by the Việt Minh that their political duties overrode the traditional duty of filial piety to their familyChâu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 98–100: Several experience turned Châu. For one, he witnessed a Việt Minh revolutionary trial of an older French governor of "honorable service" Ho Ngan (p. 91: "a mandarin of integrity"), whose son was a now communist leader (at 87, 90–92). The trial's guilty verdict and sentence of 20 years detention clarified Châu's own "change of heart". The mandarin official's son was Châu's former comrade Ho Ba.O ne a tlogela Việt Minh ka 1949. Le fa a ne a sa ntse a le motshegetsi wa bosetšhaba yo o neng a rata boipuso jwa kgato ka kgato, o ne a kgaola dikgolagano tsa gagwe, mme a simolola go nna kgatlhanong ka tlhamalalo le bokomonisi.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 102 (Buddhism vs. Communism quote). Grant (1991): Tran Ngoc Châu at 69–76 (Việt Minh defection, becomes anti-communist). Grant's 1991 account here differs in detail from Châu with Fermoyle (2012)."Ke ne ka lemoga gore boineelo jwa me mo Bobudeng bo ne jwa nkgaoganya le dikgopolo tsa Bokomonisi", Châu o ne a kwala jalo dingwaga di le masomesome moragonyana mo dikgopolong tsa gagwe.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 102 (Buddhism vs. Communism quote)Cf., Sheehan, (1988) at p. 609. Sheehan amply notes Châu's "winning qualities" stating that "Châu proved himself an able Việt Minh fighter, rising from squad leader to acting battalion commander." Yet Sheehan, often a harsh skeptic of political explanation, evidently thought he detected another, more ambiguous reason why Châu left the Việt Minh. Châu's "dilemma was that he was too temperamental to endure the self-effacement and group discipline the Vietnamese Communist Party demanded of its cadres". Sheehan records in his book (p. 796) his interview of Châu.Grant (1991) comments on Châu's defection (p. 84) from the Việt Minh.Châu and the United States shared the same dilemma. Neither liked French colonialism, but both were opposed to communism. In its way, Washington's decision was as tortured bureaucratically as Châu's was personally. The difference was that many of the communists were Châu's friends, including his brothers and sisters, and however misguided he considered their ideology, he knew them as patriots – not as faceless members of a Moscow-directed conspiracy, as Washington saw them.

— Ellsberg (2002, 2003) at pp. 116–117: meeting Châu in 1965; Châu's earlier decisive choice for Buddhism and nationalism versus his respect for some facets of Việt Minh ideology. "Like other [Americans] who knew him, I found his commitment reassuring."

 Mo sesoleng sa ga Bảo Đại 
Fora e ne ya tlhoma Bảo Đại gape, 1949–1955, mmusi wa bofelo wa losika lwa segosi lwa Nguyễn.Cf., Lansdale (1972; 1991). Then independent Vietnamese nationalists "risked both arrest by the French as subversives and murder by the rival Communists" (p. 146). Châu's precarious situation was not very unusual, e.g., "the legendary rebel guerrilla chief" Trình Minh Thế. He had fought both the French colonialists and the Việt Minh communists. Both then "wanted him dead" (p. 184, quote). Eventually, Thế did join his forces to the national army in 1955 (pp. 192, 199), but then a sniper killed him while fighting against the Bình Xuyên in Saigon (p. 308).

Le fa go ntse jalo seemo sa gagwe se sesha "magareng ga mela ya ntwa" se ne se sa tlhomama; e ka itshupa e le e e bolayang fa a ka tshwarwa ke Mafora kgotsa ke Việt Minh.Cf., Lansdale (1972; 1991). Then independent Vietnamese nationalists "risked both arrest by the French as subversives and murder by the rival Communists" (p. 146). Châu's precarious situation was not very unusual, e.g., "the legendary rebel guerrilla chief" Trình Minh Thế. He had fought both the French colonialists and the Việt Minh communists. Both then "wanted him dead" (p. 184, quote). Eventually, Thế did join his forces to the national army in 1955 (pp. 192, 199), but then a sniper killed him while fighting against the Bình Xuyên in Saigon (p. 308). Cf., Lansdale (1972; 1991). Then independent Vietnamese nationalists "risked both arrest by the French as subversives and murder by the rival Communists" (p. 146). Châu's precarious situation was not very unusual, e.g., "the legendary rebel guerrilla chief" Trình Minh Thế. He had fought both the French colonialists and the Việt Minh communists. Both then "wanted him dead" (p. 184, quote). Eventually, Thế did join his forces to the national army in 1955 (pp. 192, 199), but then a sniper killed him while fighting against the Bình Xuyên in Saigon (p. 308).Go ise go ye kae Châu, a sa tlhomela, a apere dikhaki le kepisi ya go lapa ya Việt Minh, o ne a atamela ntlokgolo ya porofense ya Hội An ka kelotlhoko kwa Vietnam e e laolwang ke Fora mme a lela a re, "Ke motlhankedi wa Việt Minh mme ke batla go bua". O ne a botsolodiwa ke batsamaisi ba puso, Sûreté, le sesole, e le baagi ba Fora le Ba-Vietnam. Moragonyana Châu o ne a abelana bosetšhaba jwa gagwe jwa setso le moeteledipele yo mogolo wa Vietnam, Mmusisi Phan Van Giao, yo leano la gagwe e neng e le go fenya Mafora mme morago a boelane le Việt MinhCf. Fall (1966) p. 148: 1954 letter of Cao Đài nationalist leader to Ho Chi Minh urging "reconciliation" with the emperor Bao-Dai, following the French defeat. Kwa khefing nngwe o ne a lemoga gore motlhokomedi wa dijo yo mmotlana yono e ne e le Việt Minh wa nako e e fetileng, kana wa gone jaanong. Rraagwe Châu wa Mobuda, e bong Tran Dao Te, o ne a akantsha gore a batle kaelo ya bodumedi ka thapelo le go tlhatlhanya gore e mo thuse go dira ditshwetso. Bakaulengwe ba babedi, le kgaitsadi le monna wa gagwe ba ne ba sala Việt Minh; le fa go ntse jalo Châu o ne a tla go tlhomamisa bosetšhaba jwa gagwe jwa setso, le tiro ya gagwe ya go nna lesole.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), at pp. 104–108 (danger crossing lines, "debriefing"); 108 (Việt Minh waitress); 108–109, 115 (inner conflict); 109–110, 115 (father's counsel), 110–111, 113–114, 114–115 (Phan Van Giao).

Ke ne ke tlogetse Việt Minh ka gonne ke ne ke batla gore naga ya gaetsho e bone boipuso, mme e seng ka setšhaba sa yone sa setso le medi ya yone e sentswe gotlhelele, e leng mokgele wa Makomonisi. Ke ne ke batla go somarela boleng jwa setso sa rona le bodumedi jwa me, go bona kagiso le tshiamiso ya loago mo go mongwe le mongwe, mme kwantle ga kgaratlho ya maemo e e sa tlhokegeng.Châu with Fermoyle at 115 (quote); cf., 85–87, 113. Nonetheless, Châu's family had divided loyalties. Two brothers, and a sister with her husband, remained with the communist side throughout the war; Châu and a younger brother chose to serve South Vietnam. Chau (2012) at pp. 109, 317–318.Grant (1991) p. 74: After leaving the Việt Minh, Châu started the short-lived magazine Fatherland to promote reconciliation.

Ka 1950, Châu o ne a tsena sekolo sa sesole sa Dalat se se neng se tlhomilwe ke Bafora go katisa batlhankedi ba Sesole sa Setšhaba sa Vietnam, se ka leina fela se neng se laolwa ke mmusimogolo Bảo Đại. Ka nako eo US, Borithane, le Thailand di ne di amogela 'boipuso' jwa Vietnam. Fa a aloga e le molefothenente o ne a abelwa go ruta kwa sekolong seo. Morago ga moo Châu o ne a nyala Bich Nhan yo a neng a kopane le ene kwa Huế. Banyalani bano ba ne ba nna mo ntlong nngwe mme ba nna ditsala le banyalani ba bangwe ba basha ba ba neng ba le mo sesoleng, e bong Nguyễn Văn Thiệu le mosadi wa gagwe. Thiệu le ene o ne a diretse kwa Việt Minh, ka 1945–46, pele a kgabaganyetsa kwa letlhakoreng le lengwe.Prados (2009) p. 343. Later Thiệu became President (1967–1975) of the Republic of VietnamKa 1953 Châu o ne a ya kwa Hanoi (Vietnam e ne e ise e kgaogane) go ya go ithuta sesole ka tsela e e tseneletseng. Mo kabelong ya gagwe e e latelang gaufi le Hội An mophato wa gagwe o ne wa gakgamadiwa ke go lalela ga Việt Minh. Go falola ga yuniti ya gagwe go ne go belaetsa. Ka ntlha ya boitshwaro jwa gagwe mo ntweng Châu o ne a newa mmentlele o o kwa godimo. Gape o ne a tlhatlhosiwa go nna mokapotene. Morago ga go fenngwa ke Fora ka 1954, boipuso jo bo feletseng, le go kgaoganngwa ga Vietnam go nna bokone le borwa, Châu o ne a direla mo sesoleng sa puso ya borwa, Sesole sa Rephaboliki ya Vietnam (ARVN).Châu with Fermoyle (2012), at pp. 114 (Vietnamese Army, Vietnam as independent 1950); 112–113, 116–117 (military academy, army career [& p. 278]); 118 (his marriage, and Thiệu); 130–131 (Hanoi); 131–135 (Hội An: battle, commendation and promotion).Grant (1991) at 21, 75, 133–135 (Châu's early army career).Lansdale (1972) pp. 129–130, 143–146 (political status of Vietnam 1945–1954).Halberstam (1971) 104. The journalist author comments: by the victory of 1954, Ho became a "national hero" and his army of "tough Communist peasants" had worked not just a defeat of the French, but of "the mandarin order".

Kgaogano ya naga e ne ya felela ka diphetogo tse dikgolo tsa batho, ka bontsi jwa masole a Việt Minh le masole (90,000) ba lebile kwa bokone,Fitzgerald (1972) p. 69 (soldiers and cadres to the north). le Mabuda mangwe (300,000) le Bakatoliki ba le bantsi (800,000) ba lebile borwa.Venerable Giac Duc, "Buddhists and Catholics, the beginning" pp. 38–42, at 39 (Buddhists going south), in Chanoff and Toai (1986). Tucker (2000) p. 360. Northern Catholics going south, with 600,000 remaining in the north.Gheddo (1968; 1970) pp. 58 (Catholics [and Buddhists] going south), 66 (many prevented from leaving the north).Huntington (1968) pp. 310–311. Forcing "unassimilable elements" into exile creates in those remaining a "new homogenous community" and hence strengthens the ruling party, e.g., Turkey, North Vietnam, Cuba, and East Germany.Masalela a Việt Minh le 'go nna kwa morago' kwa borwa a ne a dirisa "propanganda e e tlhometseng" go thapa balatedi ba bašwa.Duncanson (1978) pp. 11–17. The quoted phrase (p. 14) is attributed to writings of their party leader Trường Chinh and General Võ Nguyên Giáp. Duncanson comments that "if propaganda is armed its cogency is more likely to repose in the weapon than in the argument" (p. 14). The pre-1954 conflict was "fought mainly in North Vietnam" (p. 11). Cf., Warner (1964) pp. 142–144, 191–192: 'speech only' tactics of Việt Minh/Viet Cong in the south after 1954, often centered on talking to peasant farmers about the control of the land.Kgabagare ba ne ba tlhama Mokgatlho wa Kgololesego ya Bosetšhaba (NLF), o go ise go ye kae o neng wa itsege jaaka Viet Cong (VC). E ne ya lwantsha Rephaboliki ya Vietnam (motsemogolo: Saigon), mo tsweledisong ya kgaratlho ya yone ya bosetšhaba ya phetogo ya bokomonisi le taolo. Ka 1960 tiriso ya tirisodikgoka e e tlhometseng e ne ya nna pholisi e e mosola ya lekoko la bokomonisi le le neng le laola NLF, ka bobedi di ne di engwe nokeng ke Rephaboliki ya Temokerasi ya Vietnam kwa Hanoi.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 132, 399 note 10 (re Việt Minh and NLF or Viet Cong).Tucker (2000), "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" at 284–285. The Viet Cong was supplied and reinforced by the North.Truong Nhu Tang (1985) pp. 128–129: COSVN was run by the North's Lao Dong Party; it worked to coordinate the communist-directed efforts in the south; pp. 146–147: the NLF founded its Provisional Revolutionary Government in 1969.

Tirelo mo pusong ya ga Diệm

Ka nako ya phetogo go tswa mo pusong ya Fora go ya kwa boipusong jo bo tletseng Ngô Đình Diệm,Warner (1963) pp. 84–92 (Diệm s background). In 1933 Diem, then Interior Minister, had resigned because of French restrictions on his authority, thus gaining stature as a nationalist. In 1945 he declined the office of prime minister offered by the Japanese.Moporesidente wa Rephaboliki, le fa a ne a dira diphoso tse di turang o ne a kgona go etelela puso ya borwa pele mo kgatong e e sa tlhomamang mo go tlhomeng puso ya yona.Cf., Karnow (1983) at pp. 213–239, e.g., blocking a coup, disarming the militant sects (Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo), and defeat of criminal syndicate (Bình Xuyên), pp. 219–223; Diem's character and background, pp. 213–218. Go ntse go le jalo, Châu ka 1955 o ne a nna molaodi wa batlhabani ba sesole, mokaedi wa thuto, kwa alma mater ya gagwe e leng sekolo sa sesole sa Vietnam kwa Dalat. O ne a akantsha diphetogo tsa kharikhulamo, sk., go akaretsa hisitori ya Vietnam le ntwa ya di-guerrilla, le fa go ntse jalo mogakolodi wa Amerika o ne a gana. Ka nako nngwe o ne a lwa le lekoko la sepolotiki la sephiri la Cần Lao, le le neng le tshegetsa puso ya ga Diệm thata.Tucker (2000), "Cần Lao... " at pp. 59–60 Joiner (1974) pp. 41–44: Cần Lao.Sesole sa Amerika se ne sa tshegetsa katiso e e kgethegileng kwa Fort Benning, kwa Georgia, ya setlhopha sa batlhankedi ba Sesole sa Vietnam go akaretsa le Châu. Moragonyana, fa a sena go fuduga go tswa kwa Lephateng la Bone la Masole a a Tsamayang ka Dinao, o ne a nna mookamedi wa badiri kwa Lefelong la Katiso la Bosetšhaba la Quang Trung, e leng lefelo le legolo la Sesole sa Vietnam. Koo Châu o ne a lemoga bonweenwee mo batlameding.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 142–144 (Fort Benning); pp. 140, 145–150 (Dalat); pp. 148–150, 151 (Cần Lao); 151–155 (Quang Trung); cf., 231 (positions).Grant (1991) at pp. 131, 133–134 (Dalet military academy); 132 (Fort Benning).Cf. Valentine (1990) at 49–50. Châu is described as a "graduate of Fort Bragg" where he roomed with future President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Valentine also states that in 1962 Châu completed "a six year tour as chief of the GSV's Psychological Warfare Service". These descriptions differ somewhat from Grant (1991) and Châu with Fermoyle (2012). Valentine here mentions Châu in connection with several USG agents in Vietnam in 1962 and, without more, denominates Châu as "a CIA asset".

Ka 1959, ka kopo ya molaodi wa gagwe, Châu o ne a baakanyetsa pego e e neng e tla bonwa ke poresidente. Go sa lebelelwa, Moporesidente Diệm o ne a rulaganyetsa pokano le Châu go lebega e le go tlotla ka pego ya gagwe e e neng e baakantswe sentle. Go na le moo Diệm o ne a bua ka boleele ka tlotlo e e kwa godimo mo go rraagwemogolo wa ga Châu wa momandarin tona ya puso Tran Tram, mo go rraagwe le lelapa la gagwe le le nang le bokgoni kwa Huế, motsemogolo wa pele wa Vietnam.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 156–157 (report for Diệm, interview); at p. 278:"When President Diệm called on me to work in his government, I felt I owed him both respect and gratitude for selecting me, though I knew his esteem for my family was at least partially responsible for my appointment."Châu's grandfather, the scholar and imperial minister, was Tran Tram (p. 79). Cf., Châu with Sturdevant (2001) p. 195.Moporesidente, ka boene wa lelapa la Mandarin, o ne a tlhagolela setaele se se tlhomameng sa Bo-Confucius.Cf., Warner (1963; 1964) at p. 87, on Diệm's family's mandarin status and his father Ngô Đình Khả. "The Ngô Dinhs were one of the great families of Vietnam." Grant (1991) at 69: Grant reports that Châu's father thought his Buddhist family enjoyed superior status to Diệm's which, although also mandarin, had become Catholic.Joiner (1974) p. 36. Diem was seen as a "scholar-patriot" with the two prized political virtues of the Vietnamese, "virtue and ability". His "personal incorruptibility" allowed him to appear "the recipient of the Mandate of Heaven".Go farologana le seo, Ho Chi Minh, yo le ene a tswang mo lelapeng la Ba-Mandarin, o ne a rata go nna moagi wa motse, a itsege thata jaaka "Malome Ho" [Bac Ho ka Se-Vietnam].Trương Như Tảng (1985) pp. 10–17, at 12 (Bac Ho or "uncle Ho"). In Paris in 1946 the youthful author met President Ho who wore native clothes and sandals. Ho communicated "wisdom and caring" like the author's Confucian grandfather.FitzGerald (1972): Ho Chi Minh's father was a mandarin of Nghệ An (p. 60). Yet the austere Ho, in adopting a western social ideology (communism), consciously discarded the mandarin's formal leadership image, adopting instead the more inviting public persona of a village uncle (224–225).Woodside (1976) pp. 234–239: "The Triumph of the Mandarin Proletatrians" wherein the author describes "the determination of a part of the old elite to change its own 'class' postures in order to salvage its leadership mission."Cf., Joiner (1974) pp. 62–63: The mandarin figure in Vietnam also had "unfavorable characteristics", e.g., officials concerned with their "prestige and authority" rather than "the people's needs and wants", and civil servants who were obsequious toward superiors and harsh to subordinates. It was said, "In every Vietnamese there is a mandarin."

Filosofi ya ga Confucius e e tlotliwang ka nako e teleleIn Vietnamese: "Nho Giao" e e neng e le ka fa morago ga maitsholo a setso a Semandarin, e sa ntse e le mo setsong sa Vietnam le kwa mafelong a mangwe.Duiker (1989), pp. 36–37.Le fa go ntse jalo e ne e gwetlhilwe kwa Asia Botlhaba, ka mokgwa le ka tshwetso, fa e sa le setso sa bophirima se goroga.Cf., Furth (in Goldman and Lee 2002) pp. 15–16, 41–42; Schwartz, ibid., pp. 113–118. Confucian social philosophy in China passed through a severe iconoclastic crisis in the late 19th century. By 1905 its imperial examination system sponsored by the government for millennia had come to a halt (Schwartz, p. 112). During this crisis its historical and natural orientations were thoroughly transformed, in various ways, by those neo-traditionalists who still maintained their confucian allegiance (e.g., Furth, 48–50, 63–65). Nonetheless many Chinese, including in particular the communists, abandoned Confucius altogether for a more radical philosophic change, in order to better acculturate to modernism and western science and technology (cf., Furth, 40–41, 65, 70–71, and 92–96). de Bary (1991) pp. 103–104. During the May Fourth Movement of 1919, "Confucianism was made to stand for all that was backward and benighted in China. ...policital corruption and repression, the suppression of women, concubinage, female infanticide, illiteracy, etcetera, etcetera."Pham Van Minh (2002) pp. 156–161. A similar cultural process occurred in Vietnam, where Confucian exams were also halted (p. 159). According to Pham Van Minh, a Vietnamese Buddhist, "Confucianism collapsed at the beginning of the twentieth century" (p. 238).Mokgatlho wa Bokomonisi wa China o o neng o fetoga o ne o o nyatsitse.Cf., Yang Jung-kuo, "Confucius--a thinker who stubbornly supported the slave system" pp. 1–24, and Feng Yu-lan, "A criticism of Confucius... " pp. 88–106, in Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1974). Here the celebrated exemplar of Confucian virtue is unmasked to be an ideology sourced in ruling class privilege, which it effectly propagates and enforces. Cf., Schram (in Goldman and Lee 2002): Although "Mao Tse-tung also found positive elements in Confucian philosophy" (p. 327), from the beginning "Mao saw China's ancient and rigid thought-patterns as an obstacle to progress" (p. 272).Mao, "Beat back the attack of the bourgeois rightists" (1957) in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 5 vols. (Peking 1960–1965, 1970) cited in Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (Cambridge University 1989, 1999) p. 125. Mao lumped together "Confucian classics and capitalist rubbish" (5.469–470) and saw "ghosts and monsters opposed to the Communist Party and the people" (5.444).Dithuto tse di fetotsweng tsa motlhalefi wa bogologolo di tswelela, le fa go ntse jalo, mme go ralala Asia Botlhaba tlhotlheletso ya ga Confucius e oketsegile thata mo lekgolong la bo21 la dingwaga.Confucian traditions subsist today, e.g., in Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, and Japan, and ironically are resurgent in the PRC. Cf., de Bary ( 1991) pp. x–xi.Pankaj Mishra (2012), p. 257 (quote): Until 1980 "the Chinese Communists tried to root out Confucianism from China... . But as the appeal of communism has declined, party officials have returned to upholding Confucianism." Recently, the Chinese government has founded hundreds of Confucius Institutes throughout the world.Pankaj Mishra (2012), p. 257 (quote): Until 1980 "the Chinese Communists tried to root out Confucianism from China... . But as the appeal of communism has declined, party officials have returned to upholding Confucianism." Recently, the Chinese government has founded hundreds of Confucius Institutes throughout the world.Pankaj Mishra (2012), p. 257 (quote): Until 1980 "the Chinese Communists tried to root out Confucianism from China... . But as the appeal of communism has declined, party officials have returned to upholding Confucianism." Recently, the Chinese government has founded hundreds of Confucius Institutes throughout the world.

Mo go Diệm le Châu, ditekanyetso tsa yone di ne di dira jaaka tshupiso e kgolo e e neng e tshwana.Pankaj Mishra (2012), p. 257 (quote): Until 1980 "the Chinese Communists tried to root out Confucianism from China... . But as the appeal of communism has declined, party officials have returned to upholding Confucianism." Recently, the Chinese government has founded hundreds of Confucius Institutes throughout the world.

Go Batlisisa Batlhankedi ba Selegae

Ka bonako morago ga gore Diệm a abele Châu go nna mo Setlhopheng sa Badisa ba Setšhaba le sa go Iphemela jaaka motlhatlhobi wa 'maemo a tlhaloganyo le a loago'. Go latela ditaelo tsa ga Diệm Châu o ne a batlisisa tirisanommogo ya Balebedi le batho le bokgoni jwa yone jwa sesole.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 158–159 (Civil Guard). Diệm o ne a boleletse Châu gore tiro ya gagwe e ne e le botlhokwa thata ka gonne leina le le tlwaelegileng la Civil Guard kwa magaeng le ne le tlhotlheletsa thata kafa bontsi jwa batho ba neng ba akanya ka gone ka sesole sotlhe.Grant (1991) at pp. 134 (job importance, different version of Châu's interview with Diệm).Andradé (1990) at 35. Under the Interior Ministry, the Civil Guard "consisted of forty thousand lightly armed soldiers organized into mobile companies" to counter Communist violence. "A hamlet militia called the Self-Defense Corps was also formed and dispersed in ten man squads."

Civil Guard (Bao An) e ne e sa sebetse hantle, e sa lefellwe hantle mme e sa rupelwa hantle. Mo godimo ga moo, ba ne ba bolaya balemi ba ba neng ba tshwanetse go ba sireletsa. Baokamedi ba sepolotiki ba Balebedi, badiredi ba porofense le ba selegae, e ne e le "batho ba ba tshwerweng ke Mafora". Mo go bone, mongwe le mongwe yo o neng a nnile le seabe mo ntweng ya boipuso kgatlhanong le Fora o ne a belaelwa gore ke Viet Cong. Châu o ne a akantsha gore go dirwe diphetogo ka kakaretso: go fedisiwa ga pipamolomo le bonweenwee, go fetolwa ga lefatshe, thuto le go tlhagolela moya wa bosetšhaba mo bathong. Châu o lemogile gore Maamerika a ne a thusa fela sesole, a itlhokomolosa Batlhankedi ba Selegae le fa ba ne ba kopana letsatsi le letsatsi le batho ba kwa magaeng le Viet Cong.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 158–167 (as Civil Guard inspector); p. 159 (quote).Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 158–167 (as Civil Guard inspector); p. 159 (quote).Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 158–167 (as Civil Guard inspector); p. 159 (quote).

Diệm o ne a laela Châu go tlhama "thuto ya go lapolosa" ya Balebedi. Ka go dira jalo Châu o ne a bua ka diteng tse di jaaka: go oketsa tlhotlheletso, maiteko a go "bona tshepo" ya batho, go kokoanya tshedimosetso e e botoka, "dikopano tsa go itshekatsheka tse di dirisanang", le tshireletso ya baagi. Morago ga moo, Diệm o ne a tlhoma Châu go nna molaodi wa kgaolo wa Batlhankedi ba Selegae mo diporofenseng di le supa tsa Mekong Delta. Badiredibagolo ba Amerika, ba sesole le ba CIA, ba ne ba simolola go bontsha kgatlhego mo tirong ya ga Châu.[99] Mmegadikgang Grant o kwala gore kwa Mekong "tiro ya ga Châu e ne e le go tlhoma sekao se se ka latelwang mo nageng yotlhe.Grant (1991) at p. 135 (quote). American visitors were taken to see Châu's project by William Colby, then CIA station chief in Saigon."[ Le fa go ntse jalo le fa go ne go dirilwe maiteko, Châu o ne a lemoga gore "tšhono e kgolo" e ne e fosiwa: go aga élan ya bosetšhaba mo gare ga batho ba naga ya Fora le Vietnam Borwa e e neng e tla tshegetsa pele Việt Minh gore a kgone go ba kokoanya go ema le puso.Châu with Fermoyle (2012): here Diệm, his regime, and American advisors, being too rigid in their anti-communist aims, "missed a great opportunity" to reconcile with former Việt Minh and to convert rural villagers to the national cause (p. 161).Châu with Sturdevant (2001) p. 189. "Instead, Diem's police persecuted [former Việt Minh] and drove them back into the arms of the communists."Trương Như Tảng (1985): Diem's attempt to eliminate rivals by attacking the "anti-French guerrilla fighters" was a "disastrous tactic". It resulted in his "irrevocably alienating himself from the emotional nationalism that had been the most potent force in Vietnam for a decade" (p. 38). Also "the established nationalist parties were furious" when the 1959 assembly elections were completely taken by Diem candidates; later decrees "shut off the possibility of a loyal opposition" (p. 40).Trương Như Tảng (1985): Diem's attempt to eliminate rivals by attacking the "anti-French guerrilla fighters" was a "disastrous tactic". It resulted in his "irrevocably alienating himself from the emotional nationalism that had been the most potent force in Vietnam for a decade" (p. 38). Also "the established nationalist parties were furious" when the 1959 assembly elections were completely taken by Diem candidates; later decrees "shut off the possibility of a loyal opposition" (p. 40).Cf., Karnow (1983) pp. 224–226. In the north, the communist regime also moved to silence opposition. A land reform program based on class warfare, with liquidation quotas for village landlords, "touched off atrocities throughout the country." Party cadres themselves "seized the property of the condemned". Facing province-wide peasant uprisings, Ho stepped in, and communist rule survived. Trường Chinh was removed as head of the p

Fa a latela maitemogelo a ga Châu a Civil Guard, Diệm o ne a mo romela kwa Malaysia e e neng e na le mathata go ya go ithuta dithulaganyo tsa go ritibatsa batho koo. Gareng ga dilo tse dingwe, Châu o ne a fitlhela gore, go farologana le Vietnam, kwa Malaysia (a) badiredibagolo ba ba sa tlhakaneng le sesole ba ne ba laola go ritibatsa go na le go laola sesole, (b) fa go ne go tshwarwa di- quasi-guerrilla go ne go latelwa ditsamaiso dingwe tsa semolao, le (c) gantsi dikgaso tsa puso di ne di le boammaaruri go na le gore di se nne boammaaruri. Fa a ne a boela kwa Saigon ka 1962, pokano ya gagwe ka namana le poresidente e ne ya tsaya letsatsi lotlhe. Le fa go ntse jalo pokano e e neng ya latela morago ga moo le morwarraagwe poresidente e bong Ngô Đình Nhu e ne ya swabisa tsholofelo ya ga Châu. Morago ga moo Diệm o ne a tlhoma Châu go nna mmusi wa porofenseChâu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 167–170.See "Kiến Hòa" subsection below.

Đà Nẵng: Mathata a Sebuda

Folaga ya Sebuda

Fa nako e ntse e ile, puso ya ga Diệm mo masimologong a 1963 e ne ya ntsha taelo e e neng e thibela go bontshiwa difolaga tsotlhe tse e seng tsa puso go ralala Vietnam Borwa. Ka nako ya yone taelo eno e ne e tla dira pele mo folaga ya Sebuda ka nako ya go keteka Letsatsi la Matsalo la ga Buda (Le Phát Dan) ka May. Châu le Babuda ba le bantsi ba ne ba galefa mme a leletsa ofisi ya ga Moporesidente mogala. Lelapa la gaabo Diệm e ne e le la Katoliki. Châu o ne a sa tshware Diệm ka boene, mme o ne a tshwara bomorwarraagwe ba ba nang le tlhotlheletso, ba ba ikarabelang ka dipholisi tsa puso tse di gatelelang Babuda.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at 203 (Diệm's brothers).Châu with Sturdevant (2001) pp. 196–198. It was a "monumental blunder". Diem later considered dismissing his brother Nhu and Madame Nhu, yet he resisted American pressure.Mo mosong o o latelang sefofane se sennye se ne sa goroga kwa Porofenseng ya Kiến Hòa go isa Châu kwa Saigon go ya go kopana le Diệm. Morago ga motlotlo, tota Diệm o ne a naya Châu botlhale jo bo feletseng jwa go nna kgosana ya porofense kwa Kiến Hòa. Mme go ise go ye kae kwa Huế, go ne ga runya thubakanyo: go ne ga bolawa Babuda ba le robongwe. Mme "go ipolaya ga molelo" ga baitlami ba Sebuda go ne ga nna ditlhogo tsa dikgang mme ga tlhotlheletsa Ba-Vietnam.Fitzgerald (1972) pp. 74, 129–130.Halberstam (1972) at 307. The Diem regime had been "tainted by the foreign touch". The Buddhists in 1963 appeared to champion a thoroughly independent Vietnamese nationalism "which had no contact with the Americans, did not take their money... or visit their ambassador." Neither was it communist.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 185–188 (quotes); 199 (Diệm meetings).Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 185–188 (quotes); 199 (Diệm meetings).

Morago ga moo Diệm o ne a tlhoma Châu go nna ratoropo wa toropo e kgolo ya Đà Nẵng gaufi le Huế ka tshoganyetso fela. Ka nako eo Da Nang le yone e ne e tsene mo mathateng a a masisi a selegae a a neng a akaretsa ntwa e e tseneletseng, ya lefelo leo fa gare ga Babuda le Bakatoliki. Maemo ano a tshoganyetso e ne e le karolo e e botlhokwa thata ya se se neng sa nna mathata a naga yotlhe a Sebuda. Go tswa mo ditaelong tsa ga Diệm, Châu o ne a tlhaloganya gore jaaka ratoropo o ne a tla nna le "taolo e e feletseng ya go dira se [a] akanyang gore se siame". Ka nako ya mathata kwa Da Nang, Châu o ne a kopana le Diệm kwa Saigon mo e ka nnang beke le beke.

Pagoda kwa Huế

Fa a goroga kwa Da Nang, Châu o ne a buisana ka go kgaogana pele le baitlami ba Sebuda, mme moragonyana a buisana le diyuniti tsa sesole tse di neng di le kwa Da Nang (tse bontsi jwa masole a tsone Châu a di tlhalosang e le Bakatoliki ba ba tswang kwa bokone jwa VietnazChâu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 185–188 (quotes); 199 (Diệm meetings).Karnow (1983) at pp. 279–281 (Buddhists; Buddha's Birthday in 1963).Warner (1964) at pp. 225–234. le ba ba neng ba le kgatlhanong le Sebuda). Mogolwane mongwe wa Mobuda yo o neng a goroga a tswa kwa Huế o ne a ema Châu nokeng mo bathong ba ba neng ba le mo bodumeding ka ene gore ke Mobuda yo o ikanyegang. Jaaka ratoropo wa Da Nang o ne a laela gore Babuda ba ba neng ba tshwerwe ke sesole ba gololwe. Fa mokolonele mongwe wa sesole a ne a gana go ikobela Châu, o ne a bitsa Diệm yo o neng a emisetsa mokolonele wa motsuolodi ka bonako.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 190–191, 192–193; quote at 193.

Le fa go ntse jalo ka kgwedi eo ya Phatwe, e e neng e tlhotlheleditswe ke morwarraagwe Diệm e bong Nhu, masole a a tlhometseng a puso a ne a dira diphuduso tsa di-pagoda go ralala Vietnam, mme seno sa tlogela baitlami ba le bantsi ba Sebuda kwa kgolegelong.Colby (1978) at 208–210. Nhu was "the devil behind the pagoda raids" (p. 209). Colby had been the CIA's station chief in Saigon until 1962; in 1963 he headed the CIA's "Far East Division".Cf., Karnow (1983) at pp. 285–286 (temple raids).Kwa Da Nang, Châu o ne a namola moitlami mongwe yo o godileng mo diatleng tsa mapodise. Morago ga moo Châu o ne a kopana le Mabuda a a bogale mo "thulaganyong e e neng e le setsuatsue". Mobuda o ne a batla go dira pontsho e kgolo kwa Da Nang, e Châu a neng a e dumela, mme o ne a bona tsela e e tlhomameng, tshireletsego le ditlhomamisetso. Le fa go ntse jalo, ka nako ya phareiti, Kereke e Kgolo ya Katoliki kwa Da Nang e ne ya kgobotlediwa ka maje. Châu o ne a kopana le Bakatoliki ba Vietnam ba ba neng ba ipelaetsa, segolobogolo le Rre An. O ne a ba gakolola gore Diệm o ne a mo tlhomile go nna ratoropo wa Da Nang. Go ya ka seno, e ne e le tiro ya gagwe go nna tshiamo le go sa rate ope. Dikeletso di ne tsa kokobela ka iketlo, mme go ritibetse go ne go boetse kwa Da Nang kwa bokhutlong jwa Diphalane.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 193–197. Quotes: at p. 194, two at 197.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 193–197. Quotes: at p. 194, two at 197.

Malatsi a le mmalwa moragonyana Châu o ne a utlwa magatwe a masha a leano la sesole kgatlhanong le Diệm.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 197–198 (rumors). Karnow (1983) at pp. 304–311 (coup).Batho ba bagolo mo sesoleng, ba ba neng ba rotloediwa ke boemedi jwa Amerika (le fa go ntse jalo tshegetso ya Amerika e ne e sa tlhomama), ba ne ba ntse ba kopana. Ba ne ba simolola go rulaganya go menola puso ga 1963, go go neng ga diragala ka Ngwanatsele Karnow (1983) at pp. 304–311 (coup)

Go wa ga ga Diệm, ditlamorago

Fa Châu a goroga kwa boemelafofaneng jwa Saigon go tswa kwa Da Nang go ya go tshwara pokano e nngwe e e tlwaelegileng le Diệm, go ne go utlwala go thuntshiwa ga ditlhobolo. Go ne go fopholediwa thata ka go menola puso ga sesole, mme seno se ne sa baka tlhakatlhakano e e anameng le go tshoga ga batho ba ditoropo. Fa radio e e laolwang ke sesole e ntse e rwala dikgang ka ga go menola puso go go neng go tsweletse, Châu o ne a leletsa ofisi ya ga poresidente mogala ("mola o ne wa swa ka tshoganyetso"), mme morago ga moo badirimmogo le ene batlhankedi—mo tsamaisong eo Châu o ne a gana taletso ya go nna le seabe mo go menoleng puso. Kwa legaeng la tsala ya gagwe o ne a leta, a tshogile ka phelelo. Diệm le morwarraagwe Nhu ka bobedi ba ne ba bolawa mo mosong o o latelang, Ngwanaitseele 2, 1963.Bui Diem (1987), p. 105: Diem was killed "on personal order of Big Minh"Trần Văn Đôn (1978) pp. 110–113. Dương Văn Minh [aka 'Big Minh'], a general and coup leader, was responsible for the murders, according to author Don (also a top coup leader, and later a leading Senator).Accord: Colby (1978) p. 215: Dương Văn Minh, known as "Big Minh", ordered the killings. Colby had been the CIA's COS in Saigon, was then head of its Far East division.Sheehan (1988), p. 371: Minh ordered Diem's murder.Topmiller (2002), p. 4, says merely "executed by rebellious troops". The author describes General Minh, the new head of state, as political Buddhism's point man to end the war (pp. 15–16; cf., 21, 150).

E ne e le tshekatsheko e e tlhamaletseng ya ga Châu ya bajenerale ba ba neng ba loga leano, sekai, Dương Văn Minh, gore babusi bano ba basha ba ba neng ba tla nna teng e ne e le ba ba kwa tlase ga ga Diệm, ka maitsholo, thuto, boemo jwa boratanaga, le bokgoni jwa boeteledipele.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 199–204 (telephone at 201; Minh at 201, cf., 208). Diệm "was a true nationalist and resisted U.S. efforts to turn his administration into a puppet regime" (p. 203). Diệm provided "incorruptible, highly moral leadership" (p. 295). About the 1963 coup leaders, Châu at times could express harsh views. He observed:Unlike Diệm, who had confidence in himself, our current opportunistic Vietnamese generals in power are insecure men. They fear... that they are not capable of or qualified for their positions." Châu with Fermoyle at p. 278. The Americans staged the coup "with a group of generals who would welcome any power that could provide them with more opportunity for higher positions and material gains. They are the same opportunists who dealt with the French... ." (Châu at p. 261.)Châu also wrote of the generals (at 271), "Many, if not most, of our leaders are sincere, honest, and patriotic, but... ." They did not have president Diệm's "training and background" and were prone to taking "the path of least resistance". Career military then often had started as N.C.O.s for the French (cf., p. 116). Go menola puso go sa ntse go tsosa kganetsano.Nguyen Cong Luan (2012) p. 280. "After President Ngô Đình Diệm was slain, no political leader of his caliber could restore the central power... ."Sheehan (1988), p. 610: the author critically comments that Châu had been "an ardent Diemist". At p. 502: American ambassador Lodge, who had pushed hard for the anti-Diem coup, soon "had despaired of the lackadaisical junta that had overthrown Diem and permitted them to be overthrown in turn... ".FitzGerald (1972). The overthrow of Diệm by ARVN generals resulted in "the replacement of bad leadership with no leadership at all. The generals stepped into a vacuum of power they could not fill". For the next decade the American military would complain about Vietnamese "lack of leadership" (p. 263, quotes). Ironically, after the 1966 Buddhist crisis, a Vietnamese explained dryly, "The Americans don't like the Buddhists for the same reasons they did not like Ngô Đình Diệm. The Buddhists are too Vietnamese for them" (p. 285, quote).Colby (1978) pp. 206–207, 216. Before the coup, several top American leaders, e.g., John McCone and Maxwell Taylor, supported President Diệm, some considering him "better than anyone on the horizon"Nguyen Duy Hinh & Tran Dinh Tho (1984) pp. 134, 139–140; "finding a better national leader than Diem proved to be totally illusive" (quote at 140).Warner (1963) at p. 307 makes the admittedly inexact comparison of Ngô Đình Diệm and Chiang Kai-shek: "both Christians and Confucians".Yet Prados (2009) p. 60, discusses anti-Diệm sentiment, quoting a Vietnamese army general, who joined no coup, but whose "original excitement and hope for Mr. Diệm vanished." General Lâm Quang Thi continued,The problem was, he acted like an emperor. He tolerated no organized opposition; his critics were harassed or arrested. His decrees became laws. He gradually transformed South Vietnam into a quasi-police state.Yet Prados (2009) p. 60, discusses anti-Diệm sentiment, quoting a Vietnamese army general, who joined no coup, but whose "original excitement and hope for Mr. Diệm vanished." General Lâm Quang Thi continued,The problem was, he acted like an emperor. He tolerated no organized opposition; his critics were harassed or arrested. His decrees became laws. He gradually transformed South Vietnam into a quasi-police state.Yet Prados (2009) p. 60, discusses anti-Diệm sentiment, quoting a Vietnamese army general, who joined no coup, but whose "original excitement and hope for Mr. Diệm vanished." General Lâm Quang Thi continued,The problem was, he acted like an emperor. He tolerated no organized opposition; his critics were harassed or arrested. His decrees became laws. He gradually transformed South Vietnam into a quasi-police state.

Châu o ne a rulaganya go boela kwa Da Nang ka sefofane ka bonako, e e neng ya nna e ritibetse. Le fa go ntse jalo go ikutlwa a na le tlotlo go ne ga dira gore a tswelele a ikanyega mo go poresidente yo o bolailweng. Boikutlo jwa gagwe bo ne bo sa amogelwe ke bajenerale bangwe ba ba kwa godimo ba ba neng ba etelela pele go menola puso. Ka ntlha ya kgatelelo ya sepolotiki Châu o ne a rola tiro ya go nna ratoropo wa Da Nang. Le fa go ntse jalo, Châu ka nako e telele o ne a nna mo maemong ka fa tlase ga tona e ntšhwa ya tsa ka fa gare (le moeteledipele wa menolopuso), Tôn Thất Đính, le ka fa tlase ga ratoropo yo mošwa wa Saigon, Duong Ngoc Lam.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 204–213, Da Nang (204–209), Dinh (207–211), Lam (211–212). Châu (p. 209) told Dinh, "I don't want to appear a turncoat [to Diệm], someone who shifts with the wind to save his own hide. That seems shameful to me."Cf., U.S. Dept. of Defense (1971; The New York Times 1971, reprint) at pp. 188, 189, re General Trần Văn Đôn's late recruitment of General Tôn Thất Đính for the coupGo sa le jalo, menolopuso ya bobedi ya Ferikgong 29, 1964, e e neng ya dirwa ke Mogenerale Nguyễn Khánh, e ne ya atlega go pateletsa phetogo e nngwe ya pusoFitzGerald (1972) p. 247. Joining in the second coup was a younger group of army officers (p. 249). Yet a year later, by February 1965, the "end of the Khánh regime left the political situation more confused than ever" (p. 260).Trần Văn Đôn (1978) pp. 121–141. For months Khánh held the leading generals of the first coup under arrest, then forced their military retirement.

Mabapi le ntwa, bagakolodi ba Amerika ka nako eo ba ne ba "amegile thata ka tshireletsego mo diporofenseng" mme ka 1964 Châu o ne a busediwa kwa Kiến Hòa jaaka kgosi ya porofense. Fa a boela kwa lefelong le le tlwaelegileng, ‘go boela gae’ ga gagwe go ne ga tsamaya sentle. Châu o ne a gomodiwa ke go tswa kwa Saigon, motsemogolo wa "sesole se sesha se se 'kgweediwang ke menolopuso', ka maano otlhe a sone le dipolotiki." Morago ga moo bajenerale ba Vietnam ba ne ba sa mo ele tlhoko thata, mme CIA e ne ya nna e kgatlhegela tiro ya ga Châu. Morago ga moo, Tona ya Tlhabololo ya Magae kwa Saigon, Nguyen Đức Thang, o ne a tlhoma Châu go nna mokaedi wa bosetšhaba wa Lenaneo la Badiri ba Kagiso ka 1965.Châu with Fermoyle (2012): Châu's return to Kiến Hòa (213–225), Saigon quote (213), as national director (225).Grant (1991) pp. 287 (national director).Cf., Trần Văn Đôn (1978) p. 159 re Thang as pacification minister, and Phoenix.

 Kganetso ya boitshimololedi jwa go lwantsha botsuolodi 
Mo Ntweng ya Vietnam pacification, lereo la setegeniki la botaki,Cf., Grant (1991) p. 113: "Pacification was a term the Americans were never happy with... ." Alternatives were rural construction and revolutionary development, or simply the other war.Ellsberg (2003) pp. 105–106. Originally a French term, pacification was still used by the Vietnamese military. Some Americans preferred "revolutionary development" which term was anathema to local "landowning elites". So the ministry in Vietnamese was called "Rural Construction" but translated for Americans as RD.le ne la nna motswedi o o tlhobaetsang wa go sa dumalane ga pholisi mo pusong ya Amerika fa gare ga go tlhongwa ga yone ga sesole le boeteledipele jwa baagi. Kwa tshimologong e ne ya tilwa ke sesole, moragonyana, jaaka kgang fela ya seporofešenale ya maemo a a kwa tlase, Sesole se ne sa ganetsana ka boleng jwa yone jo bo mosola, ke gore, dipholo tsa papiso tse di bonweng ka (a) go dirisa mekgwa ya go lwantsha botsuolodi go ritibatsa ka tlhamalalo lefelo le le nang le batho ba bantsi, kgatlhanong le (b) mokgwa wa ntwa o o tlwaelegileng thata wa Yuropa. morago ga moo kwa Korea. Leano la moragonyana le ne le batla fela go fedisa sesole sa ka metlha sa mmaba jaaka sesole se se lwang, morago ga moo go ne go solofetswe gore tshireletsego ya baagi mo metseng le mo ditoropong e tla nna phelelo e e tlwaelegileng. Go bonala go ne go sa akanyediwe go nyelela ka tshoganyetso ga batlhabani ba di-guerrilla, ba morago ga moo ba neng ba falola kwa magaeng ba engwe nokeng ke batho ba lefelo leo. moragonyana a simolola go lalela. Go tloga mo bogareng jwa dingwaga tsa bo 1950 leano la Amerika la tlhopho kwa Vietnam e ne e le ntwa e e tlwaelegileng, tshwetso e e neng e ganetsanwa, e e neng e tsewa fa e leba kwa morago e le phoso e e bolayang.Krepinevich (1986), pp. 7–16, 19–26; 66, 75. About the mid-1950s U.S. Army, Krepinevich states (at p. 21):It was easier for the [American] military to envision a Korea-type threat in [South] Vietnam – a cross-border invasion of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by North Vietnam – than the insurgency threat which posed a dramatically different conflict environment than the Army was used to and which it was unprepared to address.In Vietnam, conventional warfare remained the primary focus of the Army into the mid 1960s (cf., 138, 260).Phillips (2008) pp. xiii, xiv–xv; 151–153. The Defense Department and the Army misunderstood the Vietnamese situation, and from the start failed to focus on pacification.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 229. If the "nature of the insurgency" had been understood by the early 1960s "the war would not have escalated to the scale it reached in 1965."

CIDG mo katisong, maiteko a ntlha a Sesole sa U.S. le CIA mo dikgaolong tse di kgakala.

Sesole se ne sa gana maiteko a ga Moporesitente Kennedy a go tlhama bokgoni jo bo nonofileng jwa Amerika jwa go lwantsha botsuolodi ka kakaretso.Krepinevich (1986), pp. 27–37 (JFK rebuffed)Sesole le sona se ne sa fokotsega mabapi le Vietnam segolobogolo.Cf., Ricks (2012) pp. 219–220 (in 1961 U.S. Army rejects counterinsurgency and pacification, in favor of conventional warfare), 261 (U.S. Army's earlier misuse as a 'conventional warfare' tactic of the CIA's "village defense" pacification program in Vietnam), 267–274 (Marines successfully used small teams in counterinsurgency, occupied villages, and built intelligence networks, but Army in 1965 "objected vigorously to the Marine programs" at 268–269, yet both methods criticized at 272).Cassidy (2006) p. 116. Focused on conventional warfare in Europoe, the Army considered the Vietnam War to be an "aberration" and "irrelevant" to the Army as an "institution".Le fa go ntse jalo, Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak wa kwa Vietnam o ne a rata gore go nne le kagiso kwa tshimologong mme a le kgatlhanong le leano le le tlwaelegileng la go tlhotlhora. Le fa go ntse jalo Krulak o ne a paletswe ke go tlhatswa pelo pele ga Mojenerale Westmoreland, morago ga moo McNamara kwa Tshireletsong, mme kwa bofelong Moporesidente Johnson. Sheehan (1988), pp. 629–631, 634 (Krulak strategy); 632–633,636 (failed to convince Westmoreland and Johnson).Cf., Ricks (2012) pp. 267–274. Krulak and Johnson (268). Marine Lt.Gen. John Cushman twice briefed Westmoreland, without result (p. 267).Châu le ene o ne a bua le Westmoreland, mme a se ka a atlega.Châu with Sturdevant (2001) pp. 199–200. General Westmoreland was one of several VIP military officers to visit Châu during his second term as governor of Kiến Hòa. See section below.

Viet Cong ka kakaretso e ne e tila go tsenya diyuniti tsa sesole tsa ka metlha go fitlha morago ga ntwa. Viet Cong (e e neng e tshegediwa ke puso ya Vietnam Bokone), e ne ya tswelela go fitlha ka dingwaga tsa bo 1960 go dirisa ntwa ya digwerila mo botsuoloding jwa bone go bona taolo ya sepolotiki ya Vietnam Borwa.Cf., Summers ([1981]) at pp. 47–48, 54–55. Summers describes the changing conflict: the communists began the war against South Vietnam mostly with the tactics of an insurgency using guerrilla forces (1950s, 1960s), yet gained the strategic victory in 1974–1975 with a conventional attack using regular Army units invading from North Vietnam.Maano a Viet Cong a ne a akaretsa ditlhaselo tse di bolayang kgatlhanong le badiredibagolo ba Puso ya Vietnam Borwa.Pike (1966), pp. 102, 246–249: targets included village leaders, religious figures, and school teachers (p. 248).Hunt (1995) p. 41, opines that "communist terror in the early 1960s had nearly wiped out a generation of local officials."FitzGerald (1972) at 174, writes: "Political assassination, after all, formed a basic ingredient of Front strategy... . It "did not kill indiscriminately, but carefully calculated... for maximum political effect."Maiteko a ntlha a go ritibatsa a ga Diệm moragonyana a ne a fetwa ke leano la ntwa ya Amerika ya go tlhotlhora, fa masole a diketekete tse di makgolokgolo a Amerika a a nang le dibetsa tsa maemo a a kwa godimo a ne a goroga ka 1965 mme a laola lefelo la ntwa. Le fa go ntse jalo morago ga dingwaga di le mmalwa "ntwa e nngwe" (pacification) e ne ya tsosolosiwa ka go simololwa ga CORDS. Ka 1967 boleng jwa sesole, jaaka bathusi, ba ditlhopha tsa kagiso tse di eteletsweng pele ke Amerika, bo ne jwa amogelwa ke MACV.Hunt (1995) pp. 31–35 (war of attrition), 35–42 (GSV pacification efforts), 82–98 (Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and early CORDS). Earlier under Diem the GSV itself worked at counterinsurgency. Yet pacification sometimes prompted the return of landlords to former Viet Cong-held villages. Then the demand for past rent from resistant peasants could defeat the program's purpose. Hunt (1995) pp. 14–15. Tucker (2000), "Pacification", pp. 313–316; "Counterinsurgency Warfare", pp. 85–87.Moyar (1997), pp. 3–8 (guerrilla and conventional warfare), 35–46 (pre-Phoenix, e.g., at 36: agrovilles and strategic hamlets); 47–55 CORDS and IBEX [Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation], Phoenix Program. "Diệm's successors showed that they could not fight the insurgents as well as he had" (p. 39).Batshwayadiphoso bangwe ba leba go palelwa ga ntlha ga taolo ya Sesole sa U.S. go sekaseka sentle leano la go ritibatsa e le letshwao la maemo a yone a lefatshe lotlhe le go itshepa go feta selekanyo ka kakaretso.E.g., Sheehan (1988) pp. 285–287. Sheehan compares unfavorably the hungry and humble U.S. Army of World War II with that of the Vietnam War. By then "the dominant characteristics of the senior leadership of the American armed forces had become professional arrogance, lack of imagination, and moral and intellectual insensitivity."Cf., Ricks (2012) pp. 252–284, 325–326. President Johnson himself was suspicious of his military's advice. "They're so narrow in their appraisal of everything", Ricks at 252 quoting from Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (1976) p. 252. Ricks at pp. 253–254 writes that after the war many American Army generals considered the early strategy of "attrition, body count, and 'search and destroy'" was mistaken. Yet Ricks also narrates events showing that the Army brass in Vietnam fought a war circumscribed by politicians, in which mutual communication could break down (pp. 215, 253, 257–259).Cf., Fulbright (1966), pp. 15–18, 106–108, 132–138, 185–186. Civilian direction of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia has also been pointedly criticized.

Fa nako e ntse e ile, la ntlha ka fa tlase ga Diệm, puso ya Vietnam Borwa ka go tsaya karolo ga CIA e ne e dirile go itlhamela le go ntsha dikarabo tse di farologaneng tsa ditlhaselo tsa Viet Cong. Dikabelo tsa ga Châu tsa go lwantsha botsuolodi ka nako eo e ne e le tsa ntlhantlha e bile di le botlhokwa. Moragonyana, go ne ga nna le kganetsano e e tseneletseng ya sepolotiki ka ga maitsholo a loago le go nna semolao ga mekgwa e e neng ya tlhamiwa go "ritibatsa" naga.See section below: "CIA and CORDS: redesign" re political controversy.

Mo Porofenseng ya Kiến Hòa

Porofense ya Kiến Hòa (e gape e bidiwang Porofense ya Bến Tre) gompieno.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), Chapter 14 "In Kien Hoa province, the VC 'Cradle of Revolution' (1962)" at pp. 170–184; Châu's Consensus Grievance (CG) program (179–183

Châu o ne a direla jaaka kgosana ya porofense (mmusi) wa Porofense ya Kiến Hòa kwa Legodimong la Mekong kwa borwa jwa Saigon, ka 1962–1963 le ka 1964–1965. Châu o ne a tsepamisitse "maiteko a gagwe a go tlhama mananeo a go fenya makomonisi mo motshamekong wa bone", mo tlhalosong ya mmegadikgang Zalin Grant. Ka nako eo Porofense ya Kiến Hòa e ne e tsewa e le "nngwe ya tse di laolwang thata ke bokomonisi" kwa Vietnam Borwa. Mo tiragalong eo, maiteko a gagwe a ne a nna le matswela a a gakgamatsang. Mekgwa le mekgwa ya ga Châu ya boitshimololedi e ne ya itshupa e kgona go gapa dipelo le megopolo ya batho, mme kgabagare ya fetola seemo kgatlhanong le tiro ya Viet Cong kwa Kiến Hòa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), Chapter 14 "In Kien Hoa province, the VC 'Cradle of Revolution' (1962)" at pp. 170–184; Châu's Consensus Grievance (CG) program (179–183).Grant (1991) p. 25 (quotes: "his efforts" and "communist-dominated").Cf. Fall (1966) pp. 142 n2, 143 (map). Three provinces of the Mekong delta (Bến Tre, Vĩnh Long, Trà Vinh) were considered in 1955 by the journalist Fall to be semi-autonomous "Catholic bishoprics".

"Mphe tekanyetsokabo e e lekanang le ditshenyegelo tsa helikopotara e le nngwe fela ya Amerika", Châu o ne a tla rialo, "mme ke tla go naya porofense e e ritibetseng. Ka madi a mantsi jalo nka tlhatlosa maemo a botshelo a balemirui ba raese, mme badiredipuso mo porofenseng ba ka duelwa mo go lekaneng gore ba se ka ba akanya gore go botlhokwa go utswa.Grant (1991) p. 25 (quote: "Give me a budget").Cf., O'Donnell (2001) pp. 219–223 in Kiến Hòa: Châu's personal involvement in the selection and training of small teams (221), interviewing villagers, complaint-and-action techniques to weed out abusive officials, social-economic projects to improve farming, schools, and health (221–222, 223).

Go tswa mo maitemogelong a gagwe ka maano le leano la di-guerrilla, le go dirisa dipatlisiso tsa gagwe tsa bosheng tsa Civil Guard, Châu o ne a tlhama motswako o mošwa wa ditsamaiso tsa ntwa ya go lwantsha botsuolodi. Diệm o ne a rotloetsa le go tshegetsa mekgwa ya gagwe ya go dira diteko mo ditlhopheng tsa go ritibatsa le maiteko a gagwe a go di diragatsa mo tshimong.Valentine (1990) pp. 71–72.

Kwa Porofenseng ya Kiến Hòa, Châu o ne a simolola go katisa ka boene mefuta e le mmalwa e e farologaneng ya ditlhopha tsa sesole sa baagi ka bokgoni jo bo neng bo tlhokega go dirisa dithulaganyo tseno. Boikaelelo jwa ditlhopha tseno e ne e le go lemoga pele le go lwantsha masole ao a lekoko la bokomonisi kwa metseng a a neng a thusa di-guerrilla tse di tlhometseng kwa magaeng. Ka jalo, sedirisiwa sa lekoko sa masole a a sa tlhakanelang le sesole se ne sa tlhofofatsa 'metsi' a "tlhapi ya Viet Cong" e neng e ka thuma mo go one. Ditlhopha tsa ga Châu di ne tsa laelwa go ithuta go tswa mo bathong ba motse ka dintlha le boitshupo jwa matshwenyego a bone a tshireletsego, mme morago ga moo ba dire go fetola boikanyegi kgotsa go fokotsa maatla a sediriswa sa lekoko la bokomonisi, se se neng se na le batlhabani ba VC.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 170–175 (Châu's first survey of Kiến Hòa); 166, 228, 270 (fish and water). Cf., re fish analogy, Griffith (1940; 1961), pp. 1–34 at 8.Dinetweke tseno tse di batlang di le tsa baagi, tse di ka nnang tsa ditoropo mmogo le tsa magae, di ne tsa bidiwa ke basekaseki ba ba lwantshanang le botsuolodi Mafaratlhatlha a Viet Cong (VCI), a a neng a bopa "puso ya moriti" kwa Vietnam Borwa.Moyar (1997) at pp. 9–34 (Viet Cong's shadow government).Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 166 (VCI), 174 ("shadow government").Cf., Pike (1966) at pp. 77–84 (NLF organized as "communist-front"), 99–104 (violent attacks), 114–118 (farmer associations, People's Revolutionary Party). The Viet Cong apparatus was constructed slowly, year by year, village by village, so that by the mid-1960s it permeated the entire countryside of South Vietnam

Fa a ne a bereka e le morutisi wa Civil Guard, dilo tse Châu a neng a di tlhama di ne di setse di kgatlhilwe ke batlhankedi ba le mmalwa ba maemo a a kwa godimo ba sesole sa Amerika. Gareng ga ba ntlha go mo etela fano kwa Kiến Hòa e ne e le moitseanape wa go lwantsha botsuolodi, Mokolonele Edward Lansdale.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), prior American interest (p. 166), Lansdale's visit (p. 183). Visitors included the Robert Thompson, an expert on guerrilla warfare.Grant (1991), pp. 111–113 (Lansdale); 26 (Châu and Lansdale).Cf., Lansdale (1972; 1991), e.g., Lansdale's 1954 arrival in Vietnam at pp. 128–142. Lansdale, ostensibly an Air Force officer, often doubled as a CIA agent. Cecil B. Currey, "Introduction" p. xi."Prados (2003, 2009), pp. 64–65: Lansdale in the 1950s headed the Saigon Military Mission (psywar and political action), which functioned as a second CIA station in Vietnam. Karnow (1986), at pp. 220–221, gives an ambivalent introduction to Lansdale, indicating why the conventional Army would remain skeptical of him.motlhankedi Stewart Methven o ne a simolola go dira ka tlhamalalo le Châu Châu with Sturdevant (2001) pp. 199–200. Châu here comments that regarding pacification Westmoreland "seemed to lack a basic understanding of what the war in South Vietnam was all about" nor learning it.MPhillips (2008) p. 256 re Westmoreland's visit to Châu.ekgwa ya go ritibatsa e ne ya amogelwa ke mookamedi wa seteišene sa CIA Saigon Peer De Silva, mme ya engwa nokeng ke mookamedi wa gagwe William Colby yo ka nako eo a neng a etelela pele Lephata la Botlhaba jo bo Kgakala la CIA.Grant (1991), re Methven and Châu: pp. 171–172, 173, 174.Prados (2003, 2009). Châu's innovations, CIA station chief De Salvo and officer Methven: pp. 139–140. The CIA's Colby as earlier chief of station in Saigon (p. 69), later division chief (p. 128). Colby and early pacification: e.g., pp. 144–145, 179–180.Cf., Valentine (1990) at 49–50: American "Lansdale disciples" and John Paul Vann, a friend of Châu.O'Donnell (2001) pp. 212, 213, 219 re United States Operations Mission (USOM) and Châu in Kiến Hòa.

Lenaneo la Dingongorego tsa Palobatho

Châu o ne a simolola go lekeletsa mekgwa ya go lwantsha botsuolodi la ntlha fa a ne a le molaodi wa Masole a Badisa ba Setšhaba le a go Iphemela kwa botlhaba jwa lewatle la Mekong. Diệm fano o ne a tshegetsa tiro ya gagwe.Valentine (1990) pp. 71–72.Selo se segolo se se neng sa dira gore a simolole go dirisa mokgwa o mosha e ne e le boemo jo bo utlwisang botlhoko jwa botlhale jwa Vietnam Borwa ka Viet Cong. Go bonala masole a bokomonisi a ne a setse a itse bontsi jwa baemedi ba Vietnam Borwa ba ba neng ba leka go ba tlhola. VC e ne ya ba fepa ka tshedimosetso e e fosagetseng, ya ba fetola go nna baemedi ba babedi, kgotsa ya tsenya mo kotsing kgotsa ya bolaya baemedi bao ba le mmalwa ba Vietnam Borwa ba ba neng ba dira sentle. Châu o ne a tshwanelwa ke go simolola gape, ka go ikatisa ka go leka le go dira diphoso, go aga botlhale jo bo botoka jwa motse. E seng fela, mme gape le tiriso e e botoka ya tshedimosetso go tlisa tshireletsego e e atlegileng mo baaging ba motse ba balemirui.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), p. 179. Yet cf. Moyar (1997), who at p. 35 credits Diệm's Cong An, a "direct descendant of the colonial-era secret police", with the elimination of "most of the communist infrastructure" existing in the South during the mid-1950sKa go dira jalo Châu o ne a kopanya kakanyo ya gagwe ya batho ba ba balang batho mo metseng (botlhale jo bo botoka le tiriso e e botoka ya jone) le ya "ditlhopha tsa tiro tsa batho" (PAT) go bopa lenaneo le le feletseng la go ritibatsaChâu with Fermoyle (2012), p. 235 re disagreement with CIA over composition of PATs."Go bonala Châu a ne a na le se Maamerika ka mananeo a bone a a kgaoganeng a neng a se tlhoka: leano ka kakaretso."Grant (1991), p. 26, p. 172 (quote).

Kwa Porofenseng ya Kiến Hòa, Châu o simolola go katisa mefuta e le metlhano ya ditlhopha tse di kgethegileng: dingongorego tsa palobatho (dipotsolotso), tlhabololo ya loago, go bulega matsogo (go thapa ga Viet Cong), tshireletsego le go lwantsha borukhutlhi. Sa ntlha, ditlhopha tsa "ngongorego ya palobatho" di ne tsa kokoanya go tswa mo baaging ba motse tshedimosetso ya selegae, ya sepolotiki le ya loago; ditiro tse di ntseng jalo tsa botlhodi di ne di le "botlhokwa mo katlegong ya thulaganyo" mme di ne di akaretsa dikgang tsa tshiamiso ya loago. Go tlhama ditlhopha tsa ‘dingongorego tsa palobatho’, o ne a tlhopha ka kelotlhoko go tswa mo bathong ba Batlhankedi ba Setšhaba go nna ditlhopha tse dinnye tsa batho ba le bararo go ya go ba le batlhano. "Ba ne ba botsolotsa leloko lengwe le lengwe la motse kgotsa motsana o ba neng ba dira mo go one letsatsi le letsatsi kwantle ga go kgetholola." Sa bobedi, mo dikarabong tsa tatediso tse di dirisitseng tshedimosetso e, ditlhopha tsa "tlhabololo ya loago" di ne tsa baya ditlapele mme tsa dira go fitlhelela ditokafatso tsa motse: maborogo, didiba, dikolo, ditleliniki. Sa boraro, e ne e le ditlhopha tsa "matsogo a a bulegileng" [Se-Vietnam: Chieu Hoi],Nguyen Cong Luan (2012), p. 304. Chieu Hoi is a Sino-Viet term that means "calling the enemy to return to the right cause". Starting on January 1, 1967, the author Luan was ranking commander of the national Chieu Hoi program, in charge of the Reception Directorate (p. 305, cf., 434). 160,000 communists 'defected' to Chieu Hoi-type programs from 1962 to 1975; included were hundreds of army officers (p. 342). tse di neng tsa dirisa botlhale jwa motse go lwantsha thuto ya Viet Cong, di tlhotlheletsa ba ba neng ba tshegetsa Viet Cong, jaaka maloko a lelapa le masole a nakwana, gore "go ne go le mo dikgatlhegelong tsa bone go tsenela puso." Sa bone, setlhopha sa "tshireletso" se se bopilweng ka "banna ba le barataro go ya go ba le lesomepedi ba ba tlhometseng" se ka dira le metse e le lesome ka nako e le nngwe, gore se kgone go tlamela ka tshireletso go ditlhopha tse dingwe tsa kagiso le maiteko a tsona. Sa botlhano, ditlhopha tsa "go lwantsha borukhutlhi" e ne e le "sebetsa sa bofelo."Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 180–181 (quotes)Cf., Andradé (1990) at 44. Andradé discusses the CIA's incorporation by 1966 of a "new touch", i.e., the "Census/Grievance" program. Here the author does not mention Tran Ngoc Châu. A merit of the interview procedure was said to be that, as every villager was regularly interviewed, the Viet Cong could not easily determine who might be 'fingering' them.Valentine (1990) at pp. 55 (Châu's "innovative census grievance teams" in Kiến Hòa), 71–72 (Châu's "pet project" the "Census Grievance"), 73–74 (Châu may have adopted elements of the "Family Census program" used by Thompson against the insurgency in Malaya).Phillips (2008) pp. 131–132: Châu's innovative Census Grievance program described.Cf. Moyar (1997), p. 36 re the "open arms" teams. Moyar states, "In early 1963, at the suggestion of the CIA, Diệm created the Chieu Hoi program, which offered amnesty to members of the Viet Cong... ." Without mention of Châu, Moyar also writes (at p. 37):One innovation of the CIA was the Static Census Grievance program, which sent people into the villages to survey one member of each family in order to identify the villagers' grievances against the government and to gather intelligence.Moyar continues (at 37–38) with other "CIA initiatives" which follow pacification techniques similar or parallel to Châu's, e.g., the "Armed Propaganda Team", the "Province Interrogation Center", and the highly touted "Revolutionary Development (RD) cadres program, which imitated the Viet Cong" as well as "Counter-Terror Teams".

Go tswa mo tshedimosetsong e e neng ya bonwa go tswa mo thulaganyong yotlhe ya Dingongorego tsa Palobatho, "re ne ra kgona go aga setshwantsho se se bonalang sentle sa tlhotlheletso ya Viet Cong mo lefelong le le rileng." Go ne ga supiwa batho kgotsa malapa otlhe a a neng a tshegetsa Viet Cong ka ntlha ya letshogo kgotsa go patelediwa, mmogo le kwa ntlheng e nngwe "VC e e thata e e neng ya tsaya karolo le go kaela ditiro tse di bogale thata." Bosupi ka ga VC e e thata bo ne jwa tlhatlhobiwa ka botlalo mme jwa "tlhomamisiwa kwa maemong a porofense." Ke fela fa go na le "dirukhutlhi" tse di matlhagatlhaga setlhopha sa 'lwantsha-borukhutlhi' se neng se tla goroga go "tshwara" mmelaelwa go botsolodiwa, le fa "go sa kgonegeng... kotlhao ya bofelo [e ne ya] dirisiwa: polao." Châu o ne a gatelela tlhokomelo le bokgoni jo bo tshwanetseng go newa kgato nngwe le nngwe gore a kgone go atlega mo tirong e e botlhokwa jalo ya sepolotiki. O ela tlhoko kakanyo ya gagwe e e sa siamang ka ga Lenaneo la Phoenix le le neng la tlhongwa moragonyana, a swetsa ka gore diphoso, le se se maswe le go feta, di ne tsa feleletsa di senye tiro ya lone, e e neng ya itsege bosula mo batshwayadiphosong ba lone.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at p. 181 (quotes); at p. 408 n11; cf., p. 332 (Phoenix distinguished and disapproved).Tucker (2000), "Phoenix Program", p. 329. Phoenix was directed by CORDS and included police and other forces of the Republic of Vietnam, the CIA and the American military.

Balemirui ka tlhago ba ne ba belaela thata kwa tshimologong, mme ba okaoka go araba dipotso dipe tse di bodiwang ke ditlhopha tsa "ngongorego ya palobatho". Puisano nngwe le nngwe e ne e rulaganyeditswe go tsaya metsotso e le metlhano. Ka iketlo, le fa go ntse jalo, batho "ba ne ba simolola go bona gore re ne re tlhoafetse go emisa tirisobotlhaswa e seng fela ke Viet Cong mme le ke badiredipuso le sesole." Banni ba motse ba ne ba ngongorega ka dikgang di tshwana le kgokgontsho ya tlhakanelo dikobo le bogodu. Ditatofatso di ne di batlisisiwa, mme fa go ne go supiwa gore di boammaaruri, modiredimogolo kgotsa kgosi ya morafe o ne a otlhaiwa ka go latlhegelwa ke tiro kgotsa ka go tsenngwa mo kgolegelong. Nako nngwe mo motseng mongwe go ne ga fitlhelwa gore Civil Guard e ne e dira diphuduso tsa maaka tsa Viet Cong gore e kgone go utswa ditlhapi mo letangwaneng la lelapa. Lelapa le ne la busediwa madi. Batho ba ne ba tlhomamisega ka iketlo ka boammaaruri jwa ditlhopha tsa kagiso mme morago ga moo ba "kopanela letlhakore la puso."Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 181–183 (quotes). Châu earlier had noted that local politicians can negatively interfere (p. 165).Cf., Grant (1991), pp. 22–23, 171, 172–173, 286.

Katlego e e ntseng jalo e ne e na le kotsi, ka "ditlhopha tsa dingongorego tsa palobatho di ne tsa nna dintlha tse dikgolo tsa polao ke Viet Cong." Tshedimosetso e ne e le selotlolo. "Jaaka fa botlhale jwa rona bo ntse bo gola ka bontsi le go nepagala, maloko a Viet Cong a ne a sa tlhole a fitlhela go le bonolo go kopana le batho ka kakaretso motshegare le go dira ditiro tsa borukhutlhi bosigo." Ditlhopha tsa 'matsogo a a bulegileng' di ne di simolotse go gapa baemanokeng ba Viet Cong, ba ba ka nnang ba "tlhotlheletsa maloko a lelapa go tlogela maemo a VC." Batlhabani ba bangwe ba Viet Cong ba ne ba simolola go tshaba go tshwarwa kgotsa go bolawa ke ditlhopha tsa ‘go lwantsha borukhutlhi’. Mo ngwageng wa ntlha wa ga Châu "batlhabani ba Viet Cong ba ba matlhagatlhaga ba le sekete ba ne ba tshaba" Porofense ya Kiến Hòa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 183 (quotes); cf., 165 (local politicians). Bangwe ba ne ba ganetsa katlego ya papiso ya ga Châu le mekgwa ya gagwe,Sheehan (1988) at p. 610. "While he was no more successful when the results were counted than other province chiefs..., Châu was the exception in that he seriously tried to pacify his province." mme leina la gagwe le ne la anama jaaka motlhami yo o neng a ka bona dipholo.Phillips (2008) p. 140: In Kien Hoa, despite historical Communist Party entrenchment, Colonel Châu was gradually winning support."Valentine (1990) at 55. "[D]eveloped in Kien Hoa Province by Tran Ngoc Chau [the] innovative census grievance programs were proving quite successful."Prados (2003, 2009), pp. 139–140: counterinsurgency innovations by "a dynamic Vietnamese officer, Tran Ngoc Chau".

Jaaka mokaedi wa bosetšhaba

Lenaneo la tshebetso la Châu la ho lwantsha botsuolodi, 'Dingongoreho tsa Palo ya Batho', le ile la hlokomelwa le ho ithutwa ke bahlanka ba Vietnam Borwa le ba Amerika ba nang le thahasello. Bontsi jwa dikarolo tsa gagwe tsa boferefere di ne tsa amogelwa ke CIA mme moragonyana tsa dirisiwa ke CORDS mo go tlhameng Lenaneo la Phoenix le le neng le tsosa kganetsano. Pele e ne e le wa CIA mme morago ga moo e le tlhogo ya CORDS e e neng e okametse Phoenix, William Colby "o ne a itse gore Châu gongwe o ne a thusa thata mo go ritibatseng go feta Mo-Vietnam ope fela."Grant (1991) at p. 302 (quote re Colby on Châu). Grant opines at p. 161:William Colby was the most effective American political action operative to serve in Vietnam. ... Like Châu, Colby also realized that the most important target in the country was not the guerrillas fighters but the political and administrative apparatus of the Viet Cong... which he called the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).Cf., [Thich] Nhat Hanh (1967), "The war has consistently seen more civilians killed than Viet Cong." Cited by Buttinger (1977), p. 84.

Folaga ya Rephaboliki ya Vietnam

Châu o ne a sa batle go bolaya digweri tsa Viet Cong. O ne a batla go ba gapa gore ba tsene mo letlhakoreng la puso. Kana bontsi jwa bone e ne e le makau, gantsi e le basha, ba sa rutega sentle, mme e se makomonisi tota....Cf., Krepinevich (1986) pp. 27–37. Most Army leaders were then convinced that a war of attrition using regular army units would win in Vietnam. In the early 1960s counterinsurgency, although pushed by President Kennedy, was often approached by the Army brass as a paper controversy initiated by ill-informed, civilian politicians.Grant (1991) pp. 26, 332 (Lansdale); at p. 129:Instead of preparing the South Vietnamese to face a communist-inspired guerrilla war inside their country at the village level, the Americans trained them to oppose an invasion of conventional forces from North Vietnam.Compare: United States Dept. of the Army (2006; 2007).

Châu o ne a tlhama dikakanyo, e.g., ka ga go menola Mafaratlhatlha a Viet Cong, tse di neng di sa tlhaloganngwe thata ke masole a le mantsi a Amerika. Le fa go ntse jalo, setlhotshwana sa batlhankedi ba ba neng ba sa dumalane le puso, se gantsi se neng se eteletswe pele ke Mokolonele Lansdale, se ne sa anaanela tiro ya ga Châu ya go ritibatsa batho. Batlhankedi bano, mmogo le baemedi ba CIA, ba ne ba le kgatlhanong le leano le le tlwaelegileng la Pentagon la Vietnam la ntwa ya go tlhotlhora mme go na le moo ba ne ba tswelela ba buelela mekgwa ya go lwantsha botsuolodi.Cf., Krepinevich (1986) pp. 27–37. Most Army leaders were then convinced that a war of attrition using regular army units would win in Vietnam. In the early 1960s counterinsurgency, although pushed by President Kennedy, was often approached by the Army brass as a paper controversy initiated by ill-informed, civilian politicians.Grant (1991) pp. 26, 332 (Lansdale); at p. 129:Instead of preparing the South Vietnamese to face a communist-inspired guerrilla war inside their country at the village level, the Americans trained them to oppose an invasion of conventional forces from North Vietnam.Compare: United States Dept. of the Army (2006; 2007).

Baganetsi ba ne ba tlhaloganya botlhokwa jwa boikuelo jwa ga Châu mo bathong ba kwa magaeng ba Vietnam. Ka ntlha ya seo, fa nako e ntse e tsamaya "mananeo a le mmalwa a Châu a neng a a tlhamile mo porofenseng ya gagwe a ne a simololwa naga ka bophara."Grant (1991) at p. 26 (quote re Châu's programs countrywide).

Selo se segolo se se neng se tlhotlheletsa Châu go lwantsha botsuolodi e ne e le go rata bosetšhaba ga gagwe. O ne a rata mekgwa ya botshelo ya Vietnam, e e neng e ka tlhotlheletsa maiteko a puso a go ritibatsa le go dira gore balemirui le batho ba motse ba mo ikanyege. Go dumalana le seno, Châu o ne a tshwayatshwaya diphoso dingwe ‘go tsewa’ ga Ntwa ya Vietnam ka 1965 ke sesole se se maatla thata sa Amerika. O ne a gakologelwa ka kamogelo gore Diệm o ne a mo tlhagisitse gore ke Ba-Vietnam ka bobone ba ba neng ba tshwanetse go kwadisa batho ba bone le go laola ntwa ya bone go fitlha ba fenya.Cf., "Interview with Tran Ngoc Chau" circa 1981–1982, WGBH Open Vault Archived 2014-01-01 at the Wayback Machine, transcript of video interview.Cf., Karnow (1984): In 1964 the Johnson administration "took over the management of the war" (p. 378), choosing to "Americanize" it (p. 386); cf., p. 342 (America's "strategic goals" redefined in 1964).Cf., Komer (1986) at 14, who describes another view. The original American policy was the employment of the French, and later of the South Vietnamese, as proxies against the communists. Only when North Vietnam by the mid 1960s, substantially infiltrated its forces south to seize control, did America directly intervene with massive military "as a last resort" because South Vietnam was on the "brink of collapse". Yet American policy sought to avoid "any risk of a direct confrontation with Peking or Moscow". Later Komer (at p. 24) describes "the 1965–1968 period of direct U.S. intervention and escalation, in which we largely pushed the South Vietnamese to one side and tried to win the war for them."Go gatelela ga ga Châu gore batlhankedi le baemedi ba Vietnam ba tseye maemo a boeteledipele mo tshimong, le gore Maamerika a nne a le kwa morago, go ne go dumalana le pono ya ga Lansdale ya go tsaya karolo ga Vietnam.Cf., Lansdale (1972; 1991), e.g., pp. 191, 233–234.Prados (2003, 2009) at 223: "Châu believed [the pacification program] could not succeed if identified as a CIA, or even an American, program."

Ka 1966 kwa Saigon tona e ntšhwa ya ka fa gare e e neng e okametse kagiso, Mojenerale Nguyen Đức Thang, yo mogakolodi wa gagwe wa Moamerika e neng e le Lansdale, o ne a tlhoma Châu go nna mokaedi wa bosetšhaba wa Lenaneo la Badiri ba Kagiso kwa Saigon. Châu o ne a amogela kabelo eno e e gwetlhang ka kelotlhoko. O ne a lemoga gore Lansdale, Lt. Colonel Vann, le ba bangwe (ba ba neng ba sa dumalane le CIA) ba ne ba mo kgarameletsa kwa pele gore a tlhophiwe mme ba batla gore a atlege mo tirong eo. Châu o ne a feleletsa a sa newa botlhale le bogolo jwa taolo e a neng a e batla gore a kgone go etelela pele sentle maiteko a bosetšhaba a go ritibatsa ka tsela e a neng a e buelela. O ne a kopana le kganetso go tswa go Maamerika, ke gore, boeteledipele jwa CIA Saigon, le go tswa go puso ya gagwe.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), at p. 225 (help from Lansdale, Vann); at pp. 234, 237, 244, 266 (difficulty re Thang); 244 (CIA troubles). Châu laments (at p. 228): "Little did I realize that it wasn't just the enemy that was capable of sabotage. I had no inkling of the political infighting and backstabbing that would complicate my new job." Grant (1991), p. 287 (Lansdale as the General Thang's senior advisor).Hunt (1995) pp. 36–37. Maj. Gen. Thang was an ally of Kỳ. "No single South Vietnamese official since Diệm's brother Nhu had exercised such broad authority over pacification." In January 1968 Thang, frustrated by President Thiệu, resigned from the Joint General Staff.Tumalano ya gagwe e e bonalang le kgosi ya seteishene sa CIA ka "dikarolo tsa setegeniki" e ne ya tlhaelaChâu with Fermoyle (2012), at p. 225 (help from Lansdale, Vann); at pp. 234, 237, 244, 266 (difficulty re Thang); 244 (CIA troubles). Châu laments (at p. 228): "Little did I realize that it wasn't just the enemy that was capable of sabotage. I had no inkling of the political infighting and backstabbing that would complicate my new job.". Moragonyana Châu o ne a kwala jaana:

Ga re ise re ko re fitlhe kwa ntlheng ya konokono e ke neng ke e tsaya e le botlhokwa thata: go ineela mo setshwantshong sa bosetšhaba le tlhotlheletso e e tlholang ya masole. ... Tlhotlheletso e e ntseng jalo ya bosetšhaba e ne e ka atlega fela fa thulaganyo e ne e lebega e tsamaisiwa ke Ba-Vietnam; CIA e ne e tla tshwanelwa ke go dira e le kgakala, mo sephiring, le ka kelotlhoko, gore porojeke e tle e bonwe le go utlwiwa e le thulaganyo ya Vietnam gotlhelele, kwantle ga tlhotlheletso ya dinaga di sele.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 232 (quote). The CIA station chief Gordon Jorgenson "obviously did not grasp that point" (p. 233), rather he had wanted Châu "to work more closely with the military" and "to coordinate with other U.S. agencies" (p. 231). Châu's discussions with Jorgenson's assistant, Tom Donohue, also failed to reach agreement (pp. 234–235).

Kwa lefelong la CIA kwa Saigon boeteledipele jwa yone, jo bo neng bo kopantswe koo ke badiredibagolo ba bangwe ba Amerika go tswa kwa ditheong tse di farologaneng tsa puso, go lebega ba ne ba setse ba kgotsofetse ka tsela ya bone ya go tsamaisa ditiro tsa kagiso kwa Vietnam.Valentine (1991) pp. 71–72. Valentine relies here on CIA agent Tom Donohue, who characterized as "forced" Châu's appointment to be national director. Donohue later became deputy to George Carver as SAVA (special assistant for Vietnamese affairs) within the CIA (p. 159).Grant (1991) opines at p. 287, "With Châu in charge, the CIA men knew they would have to salute him, not vice versa." Châu o ne a lebega a tlhoka tshegetso ya birokerasi go diragatsa dipopontshwa tsa gagwe.Cf., Sheehan (1988), p. 612: e.g., Lansdale's current mission to Vietnam had been undermined in a bureaucratic shuffle.Cf., Ellsberg (2003) p. 105. The CIA's Saigon station chief felt threatened by Lansdale's mystique. Lansdale was then "outmaneuvered bureaucratically".Ricks (2012): the U.S. Army then generally opposed a counterinsurgency focus, at pp. 261–262 (per CIA, and Lt.Col. Vann), 262–266, 269–271, 273–274 (General Westmoreland, and U.S. Marines).

Châu e ne ya fudugela kwa Vũng Tàu (setlhaketlhake se se kwa borwa jwa Saigon) gore e kgone go laola Lefelo la yone la Katiso la Bosetšhaba. Setheo se segolo (bakatisiwa ba le 5 000 ba mananeo a a farologaneng a go ritibatsa), go fitlha ka 1966 se ne se tsamaisiwa ke Mokapotene Le Xuan Mai. Mai le ene o ne a berekela CIA mme e ne e le motshegetsi wa Đại Việt. Châu o ne a batla go fetola thulaganyo ya sekolo, mme mathata a a neng a na le one le Mai a ne a dira gore a lwa ka lobaka lo loleele e bile e le botlhoko pele ga Mai a tsamaya. Kganetsano eno e ne ya simolola go akaretsa Vann, Moemedi William J. Porter, mookamedi wa seteishene sa CIA e bong Gordon Jorgenson, tona ya kagiso e bong Thang le Tonakgolo Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. Ka nako ya kganetsano ya botho le sepolotiki, e e neng ya gola ka go raraana, Châu o ne a lemoga gore o ne a "latlhegetswe ke tshegetso ya CIA."Châu with Fermoyle (2012), at Vũng Tàu (239–247); Mai (241–244, 246); Kỳ (244); Châu quote (244).Grant (1991) pp. 286–289 (Vũng Tàu).Prados (2003, 2009) at 184–185 (Châu and CIA control of National Training Center at Vũng Tàu, and Vietnamese demands)Sheehan (1988) pp. 611–613 (Mai, Châu, Vann, Porter, Jorgenson).Prados (2003, 2009) at 184–185 (Châu and CIA control of National Training Center at Vũng Tàu, and Vietnamese demands).

Kwa bofelong, Châu o ne a tlogela tiro ya sesole go tsena mo dipolotiking, tse di neng di fetotswe sešwa go ya ka melawana ya molaotheo o mošwa.Valentine, The Phoenix Program (1990), re Châu: at pp. 71–72 (Vũng Tàu), p. 159 (National Assembly)CIA e ne e tlisitse "motlhankedi yo mongwe wa Vietnam yo o nang le talente, Nguyen Be" yo, morago ga go dira mmogo le Châu, "a neng a tsaya lefelo la Vũng Tàu" morago ga gore Châu a tsamaye. Go ya ka mmegadikgang Zalin Grant, Be moragonyana o ne a akgolwa ke badiredi ba CIA (sekao, ke Colby) mo dipegelong tse di kwadilweng jaaka "maatla a a akanyang" boemong jwa ga Châu, yo o neng a "lebalwa bonolo".Grant (1991) p. 289 (quotes). Lansdale encouraged Châu to enter politics. Buka ya ga Colby ya 1986 e ne ya tlhomolola "kgosi ya porofense e e nang le dikakanyo" kwa Delta, mme ya palelwa ke go mo umaka ka leina.Cf., Colby (1986) pp. 232–233, 262 (re Nguyen Be). Colby went to state:The chief "started a program of sending teams to the area's villages to interview the inhabitants about their grievances and used the information to correct local abuses and failings. Once the villagers were convinced that the process produced results, the teams proceeded to [ask] about local Communist activities and identities to help the province's intelligence service to combat the Viet Cong infrastructure. This program too spread gradually to other areas, thanks to CIA's support." Colby (1986) pp. 32–33.

CIA & CORDS: go tlhamiwa sešwa

Lenaneo la Phoenix, lefelo la Se-Vietnam

CORDS, e leng setheo sa Amerika, se ne sa akanyediwa ka 1967 ke Robert Komer, yo o neng a tlhophiwa ke Moporesidente Johnson gore a okamele maiteko a go ritibatsa kwa Vietnam. Komer o ne a sweditse ka gore maemo a bobusaesi a CORDS a tshwanetse go nna mo teng ga "ketane ya taolo" ya Amerika ya MACV, e e tla tlamelang ka tshegetso ya Sesole sa U.S., phitlhelelo ya matlole, le tlhokomelo ya batlhami ba dipholisi. Jaaka "mokgatlho o o akaretsang maiteko a go ritibatsa a U.S. kwa Repaboliking ya Vietnam" CORDS e ne ya tla go laola popego le tsamaiso ya go lwantsha botsuolodi.Tucker (2000) at pp. 75–76 (quotes at 75). Krepinevich (1986) 216–218.Cf., Valentine (1990), Appendix at pp. 431–437: a "psyops" (psychological operations) publication of a 21-page comic book. Entitled Gia dinh ong Ba va Chien Dich Phung Hoang [Mr. Ba's Family and the Phoenix Operation], the Vietnamese text (often in bubble quotes, comic-book style) accompanies the pen-and-ink illustrations. Valentine provides an English translation of the story, which tells of how two murderous Viet Cong cadres hiding in the village were stopped by locals with help from Phung Hoang, and how another VC cadre returned to his family on the government side.E ne ya tshegetsa go tswelela ga maiteko a pele a go ritibatsa Vietnam le Amerika mme, gareng ga ditiro tse dingwe, ya simolola thulaganyo e ntšhwa e e bidiwang Phoenix, Phung Hoáng ka Se-Vietnam.Andradé (1990) at pp. 47–75 (CORDS and MACV, ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) and origin of Phoenix).Moyar (1997) p. 54 (Phoenix and Phung Hoang). Both names referred to mythological birds with extraordinary powers.Cf., Valentine (1990), Appendix at pp. 431–437: a "psyops" (psychological operations) publication of a 21-page comic book. Entitled Gia dinh ong Ba va Chien Dich Phung Hoang [Mr. Ba's Family and the Phoenix Operation], the Vietnamese text (often in bubble quotes, comic-book style) accompanies the pen-and-ink illustrations. Valentine provides an English translation of the story, which tells of how two murderous Viet Cong cadres hiding in the village were stopped by locals with help from Phung Hoang, and how another VC cadre returned to his family on the government side.

Dikganetsano di ne di dikologile Lenaneo la Phoenix mo dintlheng tse di farologaneng, sekai, go nna semolao ga lone (fa go tsewa kgato e e tlhamaletseng kgatlhanong le masole a bokomonisi a a sa aparang yunifomo a a dirang tiro ya tshegetso ya loago le ikonomi), bonweenwee jwa lone ka maikaelelo a a ntseng jalo a kwa ntle a go bona dipoelo kgotsa go ipusolosetsa (e e neng ya dira gore go dirisiwe tirisodikgoka e e sa tshwanelang kgatlhanong le batho ba ba tswang kwa ntle go akaretsa le go bolawa ga batlhabani ba kwa ntle). mafaratlhatlha. Colby, yo ka nako eo e neng e le tlhogo ya CORDS, o ne a neela bosupi fa pele ga Senate a sireletsa Phoenix le ka go baakanya ditiro tse di sa siamang tse di neng di amogelwa.Andradé (1990) at pp. 171–199 ("Dirty Work: the PRUs and SEALs"); 12–13 (Army discounts its importance), 255–279 ("Enemy Strikes Back: Communist Reaction to Phoenix"); 201–228 ("Long Arm of the Law: Courts and Detention Systems").Valentine (1990), quoting informant at pp. 9–11 & 63: graphic violence of "hunter-killer teams"; and at p. 170, describing PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit) personnel as "by and large" convicts: "The CIA would bail them out of jail under the condition that they would work in these mercenary units." Re "Legalities" at pp. 376–388, Valentine cites 1971 House subcommittee hearings in Washington, e.g., regarding Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which prohibits imprisonment or execution of civilians "without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court" (pp. 377, 382).Valentine (1990), quoting informant at pp. 9–11 & 63: graphic violence of "hunter-killer teams"; and at p. 170, describing PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit) personnel as "by and large" convicts: "The CIA would bail them out of jail under the condition that they would work in these mercenary units." Re "Legalities" at pp. 376–388, Valentine cites 1971 House subcommittee hearings in Washington, e.g., regarding Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which prohibits imprisonment or execution of civilians "without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court" (pp. 377, 382).Valentine (1990), quoting informant at pp. 9–11 & 63: graphic violence of "hunter-killer teams"; and at p. 170, describing PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit) personnel as "by and large" convicts: "The CIA would bail them out of jail under the condition that they would work in these mercenary units." Re "Legalities" at pp. 376–388, Valentine cites 1971 House subcommittee hearings in Washington, e.g., regarding Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which prohibits imprisonment or execution of civilians "without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court" (pp. 377, 382).Châu, ka ntlha ya tirisodikgoka ya yone e e neng e itsege bosula, e ne ya swaba mme ka jalo kgabagare gantsi ya nna baba mo Thulaganyong ya Phoenix.Cf., Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at 332, where an irritated Colonel Châu comments on Phoenix and "the arrest of innocent civilians caught up in [it]":[T]he Phoenix Program [was] the infamous perversion of a portion of the Census Grievance pacification program I had instituted in Kiến Hòa province. The Phoenix Program was aimed at kidnapping or eliminating enemy leaders, not true pacification—as I had envisioned it.Cf., Grant (1991), p. 26. Châu's ideas that were put into Phoenix had been "taken out of context". Phoenix itself was "little understood and enveloped in notorious publicity" so that it was labeled an "assassination program" by antiwar critics. "It was of the highest irony" that Châu's pacification program, which sought first to convert Viet Cong sympathizers, became eventually transformed into a symbol to some of "all that was wrong and immoral about the Vietnam War."

Go ya ka pono ya ga Châu, se se neng se diragetse e ne e le gore Amerika e ne ya gapa ntwa, mme morago ga moo ba ne ba simolola go laola maiteko a go ritibatsa lefatshe. E re ka tota e ne e timeditswe, e ne ya dirisa dingwao, maikutlo le boikgogomoso jwa Ba-Vietnam ka tsela e e sa siamang. E ne e sa tlhaloganye maatla a bosetšhaba jwa Vietnam. Go nna teng ga sesole se se boitshegang sa Amerika mo nageng go ne ga dira moriti o moleele. Ntwa e ne ya gakala. Matsholo a magolo a go boma le ditiro tse di tswelelang tsa go batla le go senya di ne tsa senya batho ba Vietnam, baagi ba bone, le magae.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), at pp. 248–253, 271–275 (destruction to communities of modern instruments of war, refugees crowd the cities). Karnow (1983) pp. 437–440. "The United States... did indeed rip South Vietnam's social fabric to shreds" and the "bombing, shelling, and defoliation of rural areas" drove out peasants, creating an estimated four million refugees (p. 439). American bombing led an American army officer in 1968 to explain, "we had to destroy the town in order to save it." (p. 438–439). Ironically, Bến Tre capital of former Kiến Hòa Province was the town being saved.Gruening (1968), p. 357, quoting journalist Neil Sheehan: "Moral degeneration cause by GI culture... mushroomed... . Bars and bordellos... bar girls and prostitutes, gangs of hoodlums and beggars and children selling their older sisters, and picking pocket have become ubiquitous features of urban life."Corruption of business and government: see subsection "In the Legislature" below.Go nna teng ga masole a mašwa a Amerika a le dikete di le makgolokgolo go ne ga baka bonweenwee mo setšhabeng.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 145–148, 232, 235, 236–237, 240, 245–246, 255, 267 (Vietnamese nationalism); 226–227, 241, 248–253, 263, 267–268, 272–275 (MACV & army control). See also Châu's remarks in above section "Census Grievance program". Cf. Prados (2009) pp. 273–276: racial discord, and drug use.Gruening (1968), p. 357, quoting journalist Neil Sheehan: "Moral degeneration cause by GI culture... mushroomed... . Bars and bordellos... bar girls and prostitutes, gangs of hoodlums and beggars and children selling their older sisters, and picking pocket have become ubiquitous features of urban life."Corruption of business and government: see subsection "In the Legislature" below.Ditheo tsa baagi tsa Amerika ka khumo ya tsone e e neng e lebega e le ntsi thata, di ne tsa tsweletsa pele kgopolo ya batho ba motse ya gore ntwa ya puso ya bone e ne e laolwa ke batswakwa. Malebana le Phoenix, boeteledipele jwa yone jo bo tlhageletseng jwa Amerika bo ne jwa baya badiredibagolo ba Vietnam mo maemong a a kwa tlase. Ka jalo, go ne go le thata gore Lenaneo la Phoenix le bitse mo bathong ba motse moya wa bosetšhaba wa Vietnam go rotloetsa maiteko a bone a go ritibatsa, go ne go le thata go rotloetsa kutlwano ya loago e e neng e tlhokega go thibela bonweenwee mo maemongChâu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 145–148, 232, 235, 236–237, 240, 245–246, 255, 267 (Vietnamese nationalism); 226–227, 241, 248–253, 263, 267–268, 272–275 (MACV & army control). See also Châu's remarks in above section "Census Grievance program".Grant (1991) at 172 (Châu's "overall plan"); 284 (DeSilva and Methven at CIA in a pre-CORDS plan to take over various pacification programs in 1964, then "expanding it countrywide"); 297–298 ("the problem with Phoenix was that it had been taken out of the context of Châu's original intentions").Châu's idea to use counterterror units as a last resort for eliminating the Viet Cong shadow government as an integrated part of his political action program in Kiến Hòa, was converted by the CIA into a separate operation to stand by itself." Grant (1991) p. 285. "The CIA adopted [Châu's] idea for a census grievance team, but again converted it into a separate program and took it out of the context of his original intentions" (p. 286). "Phoenix was, in effect, another bureaucratic reorganization" pushed through by Komer at CORDS (p. 293)Nonetheless, Grant calls Châu "the father of Phoenix, even if it had grown into the kind of organization he had never dreamed of" (p. 293, cf. p. 26).Valentine (1990) at p. 63 (DeSilva, the CIA station chief in Saigon, supervised the "job of standardizing the political action teams, along with the counterterrorists and Châu's Census Grievance Program..."); p. 72 (the CIA "took [Châu's] Census Grievance and expanded it"); p. 99 ("Phoenix eventually arose as the ultimate synthesis" of "conflicting" programs of a half-dozen American and Vietnamese agencies)Cf. McGehee (1983), p. 111, where the author, a CIA officer in rural Thailand, found "it was extremely bad public relations for Americans to be seen associated with he operation" as it played into the Communist narration of "American imperialists".

Mo godimo ga moo, Châu o ne a tsaya gore go ritibatsa go ne go dira sentle thata jaaka thulaganyo e e neng e dirisiwa thata ke baagi, go dirisiwa fela maano a bobedi, a bofelo a go thusa sesole. Châu o ne a tlhamile ditsamaiso tsa gagwe tsa ‘Dingongorego tsa Palobatho’ gore di dire jaaka setlhopha se se kopaneng. Mo go ageng Phoenix, CIA ka nako eo CORDS e ne e kokoantse dikarolo go tswa mo maitekong a a farologaneng a go ritibatsa a a neng a tswelela kwa Vietnam, morago ga moo ya di kopanya gape go nna thulaganyo e e farologaneng e e neng ya se ka ya fitlhelela go tshwaragana go go botlhokwa, go go kopaneng go go neng go tlhokega go kokoanya batho ba Vietnam. Ke ka moo bontsi jwa bonweenwee le tirisodikgoka e e senang molao e e neng ya tshwenya thulaganyo eno le go senya leina la yone le tiriso ya yone.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 242, 243 (coherence, motivation); 217, 235, 239, 240–241, 258 (civilian vs. paramilitary).Grant (1991) at 172 (Châu's "overall plan"); 284 (DeSilva and Methven at CIA in a pre-CORDS plan to take over various pacification programs in 1964, then "expanding it countrywide"); 297–298 ("the problem with Phoenix was that it had been taken out of the context of Châu's original intentions").Châu's idea to use counterterror units as a last resort for eliminating the Viet Cong shadow government as an integrated part of his political action program in Kiến Hòa, was converted by the CIA into a separate operation to stand by itself." Grant (1991) p. 285. "The CIA adopted [Châu's] idea for a census grievance team, but again converted it into a separate program and took it out of the context of his original intentions" (p. 286). "Phoenix was, in effect, another bureaucratic reorganization" pushed through by Komer at CORDS (p. 293)Nonetheless, Grant calls Châu "the father of Phoenix, even if it had grown into the kind of organization he had never dreamed of" (p. 293, cf. p. 26).Valentine (1990) at p. 63 (DeSilva, the CIA station chief in Saigon, supervised the "job of standardizing the political action teams, along with the counterterrorists and Châu's Census Grievance Program..."); p. 72 (the CIA "took [Châu's] Census Grievance and expanded it"); p. 99 ("Phoenix eventually arose as the ultimate synthesis" of "conflicting" programs of a half-dozen American and Vietnamese agencies).Phillips (2008) p. 132. Châu's counter-terror teams renamed provincial reconnaissance teams "became the heart of the Phoenix Program". Yet "too much of the necessary close supervision and control that Châu had exercised was lost" leading to notorious incidents of "indiscriminate killing" which "while relatively few" fed the antiwar movement. "The census-grievance approach changed as well, eventually becoming more of a conventional intelligence gathering operation, losing the important complaint and action emphasis" whose social justice results might earn the population's support

Tshwaelo le kgopolo

Dibuka tse di buang ka Ntwa ya Vietnam di dintsi e bile di raraane, segolobogolo mabapi le go ritibatsa le go lwantsha botsuolodi.Cf., Bibliography below Go amana ga yona le "Ntwa ya Borukhutlhi" morago ga 9/11/2001 gantsi go a tlhomamisiwa.Phillips (2008) pp. xvi, 308 Mo batshwaeding bao ba ba tlotlang ka Châu le mekgwa ya gagwe, ba le bantsi mme e seng botlhe ba dumalana kgotsa ba tshwana le dipono tsa ga Châu tsa moragonyana ka Thulaganyo ya Phoenix e e neng ya latela: gore maano a gagwe a a bofitlha, a a feletseng a go lwantsha botsuolodi le leano le le neng le le mo diatleng tsa batho ba bangwe le ne la bona, kgotsa la tla go bonala, dikarolo tse di ferosang dibete, tsa go itlhalosa. Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 332Châu o kwadile mo dikgopolong tsa gagwe gore Lenaneo la Phoenix, le le neng la tlhagelela mo dithulaganyong tsa gagwe tsa Dingongorego tsa Palobatho, le ne la nna "go sokamisa go go sa itsegeng sentle" ga lone. Le fa go ntse jalo, dikgang di ne di raraane; Châu ka boene o ne a ka lebega a sa tlhaloganyesege. Ee, pako ka kakaretso ya dineelo tsa Amerika mo go ritibatseng e ne ya neelwa ke motlhankedi yo mogolo wa ARVN.Tran Dinh Tho [1983], pp. 85–88, CORDS at 85. Cf., re the Phoenix Program, pp. 66–74.Cf., Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 290–291.

Mo metsweding ya dikgang, Thulaganyo ya Phoenix e e neng e eteletswe pele ke Komer le Colby e ne ya itsege thata ka ntlha ya boitshwaro jwa yone jwa bokebekwa jo go neng go twe bo dirilwe, go akaretsa le polao e e neng e akanngwa ka boithatelo. Batshwayadiphoso ba ntwa gantsi ba ne ba bitsa Phoenix e le sekai sa go sa dire sentle ga Amerika. Mmegadikgang Zalin Grant o kwala jaana:Tran Dinh Tho [1983], pp. 85–88, CORDS at 85. Cf., re the Phoenix Program, pp. 66–74.f., Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 290–291

Go tloga kwa tshimologong Phoenix e ne e tsosa dikganetsano e bile e le makenete wa go gogela ditshupetso tse di kgatlhanong le ntwa kwa United States. Dipelaelo dingwe ka thulaganyo eno di ne tsa gola go tswa mo leineng la yone. ... [¶] [Selo se sengwe se se bakileng seno e ne e le] go gatelela ga ga Colby le Komer go tlhalosa Phoenix ka mafoko a puso a a neng a tlhaloganyesega sentle mo go bone fela. ... [Seno] se ne sa dira gore go nne le tumelo e e neng e aname ya gore ba ne ba ya go bolaya baganetsi ba puso ya Saigon ba bontsi jwa bone ba neng ba se na molato le go leka go bipa ditiro tsa bone tsa boitsholo jo bo sa siamang ka dilo tse di tlhakanyang tlhogo.Grant (1991) pp. 294–295

Frances FitzGerald o ne a e bitsa sediriswa sa botshosetsi, se mo bokaong jwa ntwa "se neng sa fedisa setlhopha se se bokete sa 'baagi'."Phoenix e ne ya nna nota bene ya batshwayadiphoso, le bête noire ya baitshwarelo.FitzGerald (1972) 411–414. Ditshwaelo fa di ne di tlhomilwe mo Lenaneong la Phoenix gantsi di ne di fetoga go nna tse di sa siamang, mme di ne di ka nna botlhoko le go nna bogale. Grant (1991) pp. 294–297 (media and critics)`.Cf., Lawlor (1981, 1982) at pp. 199–202 (abuses of Phoenix).Harris (1996) pp. 100–106 (notorious abuses).Valentine (1990) pp. 240–250 (atrocities).Cf., Helms (2003) at pp. 336–338 (later abuses negated the Phoenix Program).Trần Văn Đôn (1978) pp. 158–159, opines that the Phoenix was corrupt, and a failure, "in the end there were more NFL cadres that before it started."Truong Nhu Tang (1985)at 201–202 [from the Viet Cong (NLF) view]: "dangerously effective" in some locations, but the "abuse and extortion that accompanied the program inevitably generated additional sympathy for the Front."Ba bangwe ba ne ba e bona ka tsela e e farologaneng, ka botlalo kgotsa ka bontlhabongwe, ba sekaseka maiteko a a tlhamilweng sešwa a go ritibatsa ka botlalo jaaka tiriso ya maano a a kafa molaong mo ntweng, mme ba tlhoma mogopolo mo go se ba neng ba se tsaya e le dipholo tsa yone tse di siameng. Tucker (2000) p. 329 ("Despite negative media reports... a success").Colby (1978) at pp. 241–265 ("Fighting the People's War"), 266–288 ("Phoenix and 'Peace'").Colby (1978) at pp. 241–265 ("Fighting the People's War"), 266–288 ("Phoenix and 'Peace'").Colby (1989), pp. 269, 319, 320, 331–334. Long after the war, Colby continued to propound the effectiveness of CORDS and Phoenix. Komer left CORDS in 1968 and Colby his deputy then had taken over.Cf., Andradé (1990) at pp. 255 (Phoenix "destroyed the effectiveness" of the Viet Cong's 'shadow government' in villages); 263, 266, 270 (VC concern over Phoenix shown in captured documents); 264–265, 272 (VC campaign to assassinate Phoenix personnel).United States Dept. of the Army (2006; 2007), pp. 73–75 [¶ 2–52] re CORDS, a p. 75: "By 1972, pacification had largely uprooted the insurgency from among the South Vietnamese population and forced the communists to rely more heavily on infiltrating conventional forces from North Vietnam and employing them in irregular and conventional operations."Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002) pp. 237–238.[W]hen the United States and its puppets began to carry out their "clear and hold" strategy our battlefronts were too slow... in attacking [their] "pacification" program. [In late 1968] our offensive posture began to weaken and our... forces suffered attrition. The political and military struggle in the rural areas declined and our liberated areas shrank.Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002) pp. 237–238.[W]hen the United States and its puppets began to carry out their "clear and hold" strategy our battlefronts were too slow... in attacking [their] "pacification" program. [In late 1968] our offensive posture began to weaken and our... forces suffered attrition. The political and military struggle in the rural areas declined and our liberated areas shrank.Bùi Tín (2002) pp. 88–89 re Marine Lt. Gen. Cushman's 1965 proposal: if pacification had been adopted by the USG and the GSV, "the result of the war might have been different, even drastically different."

Le fa go ntse jalo dilo tse di bofitlha tsa bosetlha di lebega di tsenelela mo bontshong le mo bosweung jwa yone, di thibela diphetso tsa tlhakore le le lengwe.E.g., Ricks (2012) at pp. 319–326 (1968 change in Army strategy). Phoenix Program effective (p. 324, cf. 321–324: North Vietnam admits success of South's "pacification" efforts after 1968), but the new strategy came too late for South Vietnam to win the war (pp. 321, 325–326). Earlier Ricks p. 272 approvingly quotes Hunt (1995) at p. 279 who, given the asymmetric, divergent politics of the war, doubts the ultimate success of a pacification strategy in Vietnam.Cf., Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 290–291. Châu, despite his uneasiness and apprehension, could understand the official American view of their leadership of the war during the pre-Tet post–1965 build-up: actual military progress (however dear in its cost, with its "body counts"), which came to include apparently their "well-coordinated pacification program engineered by the CIA". Yet by 1967 Châu had intuited the ongoing conflict as endless mayhem, destructive of his nation's civil society, provoking his strong dissent (pp. 267, 274–276).Cf., Hunt (1995) at pp. 250–251, notes the pro and con arguments and finds "indecisive results". While disrupting the Viet Cong Infrastructure, Phoenix "scored no knockout". Clearly it hurt the enemy, but its notorious abuses (e.g., emergency imprisonment [an tri] p. 236, reports of killings and torture p. 239) also hurt the Saigon government and "practically invited censure from American critics on legal and moral grounds". U.S. Army officers then would avoid becoming Phoenix advisors (p. 244). From the start the GSV support was inadequate. "Given the iron determination of the communists to unite Vietnam", and "the systematic problems of the Saigon government" the potential long-term success of pacification would first probably have exhausted American resolve (Hunt p. 279 [quoted by Ricks (2012) p. 272]).

 Jaaka radipolotiki 
Morago ga go ema tsi ga go tsenngwa tirisong ga thulaganyo ya gagwe ya go ritibatsa, le kgotlhang le CIA, Châu o ne a akanyetsa ditsela tse dingwe. Fa a ne a le mo loetong go ya kwa Huế, o ne a bua le rraagwe. O ne a tlotla le mosadi wa gagwe ka tiro e a ka e tlhophang.[citation needed] Seemo sa dipolotiki kwa Vietnam Borwa se ne se fetoga. Ka ntlha ya dikopo tse di dirilweng ka nako ya mathata a bobedi a Sebuda a mathomong a 1966,The 1966 civil protests by Buddhist radicals are to be distinguished from the 1963 Buddhist crisis which led to the coup against Diệm. Cf., Keesing's (1970), "Continued Buddhist resistance to Military government", chap. VIII, pp. 89–108.go ne ga rulaganngwa ditlhopho tsa bosetšhaba. Ka nako ya fa a ne a le motlhankedi wa sesole, Châu o ne a diretse mo maemong a le mmalwa a magolo a baagi: e le mmusi wa Porofense ya Kiến Hòa (makgetlo a le mabedi), le e le ratoropo wa Da Nang toropo ya bobedi e kgolo. Châu o ne a swetsa ka 1966 gore a tlogele ARVN. O ne a tsenela ditlhopho ka katlego mo ngwageng o o latelang. Morago ga moo Châu o ne a tlhagelela e le radipolotiki yo o itsegeng thata kwa motsemogolong wa Saigon. Le fa go ntse jalo, moragonyana o ne a tlola setheo sa sepolotiki, a latofadiwa ka ditlolomolao tse di masisi ka 1970, mme morago a golegwa dingwaga di le nne.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 247, 277 (leaves Army); 259–264 (conversation with his father about his career and upcoming elections); 277–278 (talks with wife); p. 170 (Kiến Hòa); p. 188 (Da Nang); pp. xvii–xviii, 231 (political career overview). His father, after mentioning his communist son, Trần Ngọc Hiền (Châu's brother), made the harmonizing suggestion to Châu "to mix the best of Western democracy with a social revolution for a new and reunified Vietnam" (pp. 263–264).Grant (1991), re Châu's political career (pp. 21–22); Lansdale's role in the new constitution, encourages Châu to run (p. 289, also p. 267).Huntington (1978) pp. 438–440. The author continues here addressing political "mobilization" of the populace of developing countries, in the context of a profound rural-urban (traditional-modern) divide. He mentions South Vietnam and North Vietnam, and presents a comparative discussion of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, and Tunisia and the Neo Destour party (under Bourguiba). Huntington earlier (p. 402) commented, "Elections without parties reproduce the status quo".Huntington (1978) pp. 438–440. The author continues here addressing political "mobilization" of the populace of developing countries, in the context of a profound rural-urban (traditional-modern) divide. He mentions South Vietnam and North Vietnam, and presents a comparative discussion of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, and Tunisia and the Neo Destour party (under Bourguiba). Huntington earlier (p. 402) commented, "Elections without parties reproduce the status quo".Moyar (1997) pp. 315–316. Moyar then opined that in much of East Asia "political and cultural traditions are authoritarian and not democratic, ... people view the destruction of one's opposition by any means as a sign of a leader's strength, not weakness... ."

Vietnam Borwa e ne e sa tlwaela go tshwara ditlhopho tsa temokerasi tse di siameng le tse di gololesegileng. Puso ya Diệm (1954–63) e ne e dirile ditlhopho pele kwa Vietnam Borwa, mme e ne ya bona tiriso ya tsone go tswa mo ponong ya setso. Jaaka go ne go dirwa mo dinageng tse di mo maemong a a tshwanang, ditlhopho di ne di tsewa jaaka tiragalo ya "malatsi a boikhutso a bosetšhaba" gore lekoko le le busang le kgone go kokoanya tshegetso ya lone ya batho le go kokoanya baagi. Gore puso e bontshe bokgoni jwa yone, e ne ya dira go laola dipholo tsa ditlhopho le go tshosa baganetsi ba yone.Warner (1964) p. 111: elections held "to demonstrate collective loyalty". An "immensely popular" medical doctor, Phan Quang Đán, an anti-Communist and a nationalist, but an opponent of Diệm, in 1959 was elected to the National Assembly, but was not allowed to take his seat (pp. 112–113).Lansdale (1972), p. 334: in the October 1955 election, the vote was: Diệm 5,721,735; and Bảo Đại 63,017. Lansdale was an active organizer for DiệmButtinger (1977), cf., pp. 47–49. With American support Diệm cancelled the July 1956 national elections mandated by the 1954 Geneva Agreement (pp. 32, 46–47). Diệm then also cancelled local elections allowed by the French (p. 36). Yet Diệm asserted he favored democracy in the long run (p. 70).

Mme ka dikgakologo tsa 1966, mokgatlho wa kgaratlho wa Sebuda o o neng o eteletswe pele ke Thích Trí QuangJoiner (1974) p. 234: Tri Quang was considered by the ruling Armed Forces Council as the "symbol of the overthrow of Diem" in the 1963 Buddhist crisis, and as a "government-toppling" force of instability. Although gaining some tactical aims (elections), his 1966 efforts would end in "bitter failure". His Buddhist faction lost its national leadership role due to the alienation of allies, and subsequent rivalries and infighting (pp. 235–237).o ne wa pateletsa puso ya sesole go dumalana le ditlhopho tsa bosetšhaba tsa temokerasi, ka mokgwa wa Amerika, ka 1966 le 1967. Huế le Da Nang, e e neng ya utlwala kwa Saigon le go ralala naga. Kgabagare Babuda ba ne ba bewa fa fatshe ke sesole, mme ba ne ba batla gore ba boele mo pusong ya baagi ka ditlhopho. Embasi ya Amerika e ne ya tlhagisa poifo ya tiragalo e e ntseng jalo mo sephiring. Mo tiragalong eo, matsholo a ditlhopho a ne a gaisanwa ka tshiamo go feta pele kwa Vietnam, mme a ne a sa bapisiwe le ditlhopho tse di neng di tshwerwe mo dinageng tse di godileng tsa temokerasi.Penniman (1972) pp. 75–89 (1967 elections evaluated).Cf., Ellsberg (2003) pp. 106–108: American Embassy about the elections advised that "Vietnam should not be judged by American standards." Yet at a pre-election meeting at the Saigon embassy, former V.P. Richard Nixon expressed an open cynicism about democratic elections.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 287 (Lansdale re Nixon's comment about Vietnamese elections being honest provided we win).

Go tlhoka thulaganyo ya selegae le tshireletsego, ka ntlha ya ntwa e e neng e tsweletse, go ne ga thibela go bouta mo dikgaolong tse di ka nnang halofo. Mokgwa wa go latlhela ditlhopho le go di bala ka kakaretso o ne o laolwa ke badiredibagolo ba puso ya Saigon ba ba neng ba ka nna ba dirisa dipholo ka boferefere, go ikaegile ka gore ke eng. Bontlhopheng ba ne ba tlhatlhobiwa pele ga nako go fedisa boradipolotiki ba ba nang le maikutlo a a sa amogelesegeng.Gruening (1968), pp. 345, 358–367 (1966, 1967 South Vietnam elections). American Senator Gruening expresses dissatisfaction, quoting Robert F. Kennedy from Senate debate, "Candidates have been barred, some because their views were 'unacceptable,' though they were loyal citizens." (pp. 361, 363).Ba ba neng ba thibetswe go taboga e ne e le ba-bokomonisi, mme gape le "ba ba sa tseyeng letlhakore" (ka tlhamalalo, "ba ba sa tseyeng letlhakore" ba ne ba akaretsa balweladitshwanelo ba Mabuda ba ba neng ba rata dipuisano ka bonako le VC go fedisa ntwa).Donnell and Joiner (1974) p. 152 ("neutralist" excluded from 1967 election). Penniman (1972), p. 35 ("'person who work directly or indirectly for communism or neutralism' were excluded from candidacy."Goodman (1973) p. 42. Of the Buddhists who ran in the elections, including many Army officers, most disavowed association with Buddhist leaders to avoid government suspicion.Pham Van Minh (2002) p. 300: "the Buddhist movement became increasingly identified with 'neutralism' (the refusal to take side with North or South) and a negotiated political, as opposed to military, solution to end the war."Sheehan (1988) p. 669: Barred were "'neutralists', a category that covered pro-Communists and anyone else suspected of serious opposition to the American presence and the Saigon system."Shaplen (1971) pp. 211–212: An NLF strategy was to use unwitting "neutralists" to form a pseudo coalition government. The NLF would then blindside it and seize power.Bontsi jwa Ba-Vietnam gongwe e ne e le batho ba ba sa tseyeng letlhakore.Taylor (2013) p. 600. "The government was a civilian-military hybrid" which established "military authority... that required ongoing negotiation and compromise with civilian constituents."Nhat Hanh (1967), pp. 66, 82 (most Vietnamese wanted peace); cf., pp. 76ff (neutrals).Go dira letsholo ka bogone go ne ga bewa ka fa tlase ga dithibelo.Karnow (1983), pp. 451 re manipulation, screening, restrictions. In the September 1967 presidential election, the American-backed General Thiệu was elected, but with only 35 percent of the votes; his V.P. General Kỳ in his memoirs wrote that if nominated for president he'd have won 60% or 70% as he controlled the election results, but that he refused to rig it for Thiệu (451–452).Sheehan (1988) pp. 668–669Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (2000) "Elections [RVN]" pp. 117–119; 1967 elections at p. 118.ono e e siameng e ne e tshotse gore ditlhopho e ne e le "phitlhelelo mo tseleng ya go aga tsamaiso ya sepolotiki ya temokerasi ka nako ya ntwa."Taylor (2013) p. 600. "The government was a civilian-military hybrid" which established "military authority... that required ongoing negotiation and compromise with civilian constituents."Bui Diem (1987) pp. 206–208. "American and international election observers" and "the American Embassy" found "an overall fairness". Yet some antiwar critics in the American media vilified the elections, e.g., as a "prefabricated farce" of military dictators.The New York Times, however, reported that few contests were without irregularities. Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 290. Châu notes election "cheating" (p. 286).Châu ka boene o ne a na le tsholofelo ka batho ba ba neng ba latlhela ditlhopho tsa bone.E.g., Ellsberg (2003) p. 106, who quotes Châu in the context of local elections: "Give villagers a way to get rid of a corrupt or abusive district chief other than having him killed by the VC, and they'll take to it very quickly."

 O tlhophilwe go tsena mo Kokoanong 
Châu o ne a tlhophiwa go tsena mo Ntlong ya Batlatsi ba Kokoano Bosetšhaba go tswa kwa Porofenseng ya Kiến Hòa e bontsi jwa yone e neng e le kwa magaeng. Matsholo a a neng a lebisa kwa boutung ya Diphalane 1967 e ne e le ditiragalo tse di sa tlwaelegang kwa Vietnam Borwa, mme a ne a kopa Châu go dira ditshwetso tse di thata ka ga leano le mabapi le boitshimololedi mo lephateng leo. O ne a batla go tsweletsa pele tiro ya Vietnam e ntšha, setšhaba sa segompieno se se neng se tla fetoga go tswa mo setsong le dingwaong tsa sone. Ka dithuto tse a neng a di ithutile mo maitemogelong a gagwe mo ntweng ya go lwantsha botsuolodi, o ne a ikemiseditse gape go fetola maiteko a go ritibatsa, go tokafatsa botshelo mo metseng, le go kokoanya batho ba kwa magaeng go ema le puso. Go tlhalosa thulaganyo e e ntseng jalo Châu o ne a kwala buka ka Se-Vietnam, e e neng ya gatisiwa ka 1967, e setlhogo sa yone fa se ranolwa e neng e le Go tswa mo Ntweng go ya kwa Kagisong: Go Tsosolosa Motse.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 263, 310 (his causes); pp. 237, 310 (Châu's book);See above section "Service in Diệm regime" and subsection "In Kien Hoa province" regarding Châu as governor.

Mo letsholong la dibeke di le thataro Châu o ne a kgabaganya porofense, kwa a neng a diretse teng gabedi e le mmusi, a ikgolaganya le baagi go kokoanya tshegetso. O ne a gaisana le bontlhopheng ba le lesomerobongwe go bona diphatlha tse pedi mo Ntlong ya Batlatsi. Châu o ne a bolela gore o itumelela "tshegetso e e feletseng, e ka tswa e le ka tidimalo kgotsa phatlalatsa, go tswa mo baeteledipeleng botlhe ba bodumedi ba ga Kiến Hòa", go akaretsa le Babuda le Bakatoliki. Mo go bone o ne a sobokanya letsholo la gagwe: la ntlha, go reetsa, go utlwa mantswe a bone le go batlisisa dingongorego tsa bone; sa bobedi, "go dira go ya kwa bokhutlong jwa ntwa jo bo tla kgotsofatsang tlotlo le seriti sa matlhakore ka bobedi."Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 263, 310 (his causes); pp. 237, 310 (Châu's book);Grant (1991) p. 26 (Châu on the war in Vietnam).

Fa Châu a sena go tlogela tiro ya bosole, fa a ne a ipaakanyetsa go tsenela ditlhopho, morwarraagwe wa mokomonisi e bong Trần Ngọc Hiền o ne a mo etela kwa Saigon a sa lebelela. Morago ga moo Hien ga a ka a senola maitlhomo a gagwe a a fitlhegileng, mme moragonyana Châu o ne a lemoga gore Hien o ne a rometswe ke .baokamedi ba gagwe ba VC gore a kgone go leka go fetola Châu. Châu jaaka gale o ne a boloka morwarraagwe a le kgakala le ene, le fa gape a ne a tshwenyegile ka pabalesego ya gagwe jaaka bokaulengwe. Bakaulengwe bano ka bobedi, Châu le Hien, ba ne ba gana gape ka botlalo mabaka a sepolotiki a a neng a tlhamilwe a yo mongwe. Hien o ne a sotla Châu ka go tabogela maemo; Châu o ne a bolelela morwarraagwe ka bokhutshwane gore a se ka a nna le seabe mo ditlhophong. Dingwaga di le mmalwa pelenyana ka 1964 kana 1965 Hien o ne a etetse Châu kwa Porofenseng ya Kien Hoa. Ba ne ba na le dingwaga di le 16 ba sa kopane. Hien o ne a kopa gore Châu a rulaganye kopano le moemedi wa Amerika Lodge. Ka bonako fela Châu o ne a itsisitse CIA ka ketelo ya ga morwarraagwe. Embasi ka CIA e ne e batla go dirisa kgolagano ya "kanale ya morago", mabapi le dipuisano tse di ka nnang teng le Hanoi. Mme moragonyana Hien o ne a kgaotsa puisano e nngwe.Châu with Fermoyle 2012) pp. 219–221 (1964 visits); 281–283 (1967 visit), 349–350 (purpose to turn Châu). Hien's 1964 visit had followed an attempted assassination of Chau (pp. 218–219, 221).Grant (1991) at 232–237 (Tran Ngoc Hien).

Ka nako ya letsholo mekgwa e mentle ya ga Châu le tiro ya gagwe e e kgabisitsweng ya sesole di ne tsa ngoka tlhokomelo nngwe ya bobegadikgang jwa boditšhabatšhaba. Bosha jwa gagwe kwa Việt Minh a lwantshana le Bafora, jo bo neng jwa latelwa ke tshwetso ya gagwe ya go kgaogana le makomonisi, le jone bo ne jwa oketsa kgatlhego. Mmegadikgang Neil Sheehan moragonyana o ne a kwalela ditsala tsa gagwe tsa Amerika gore, "Châu e ne e le sekai sa Mo-Vietnam yo o 'molemo'." Sheehan o bolela jaana:

Saigon Opera House, kwa Kokoano ya Bosetšhaba ya Repaboliki e neng e kopanela gone.

[Châu] o ne a ka kgona go bua boammaaruri ka tsela e e gakgamatsang fa a ne a sa leke go dirisa batho ka tsela e e sa siamang. O ne a ikanyega go ya ka ditekanyetso tsa Saigon, ka gonne le mororo kgatelopele le go itsege di ne di mo kgatlha, madi a ne a sa mo kgatlhegele. O ne a le peloephepa mo keletsong ya gagwe ya go tokafatsa matshelo a balemirui, le fa tsamaiso e a neng a e direla e ne e sa mo letle go latela ka tiro, mme dingwaga tsa gagwe tse nnè kwa Việt Minh le tlhaloganyo ya gagwe e e botlhale thata le e e raraaneng di ne tsa mo kgontsha go tlotla ka ntwa ya di-guerrilla, go ritibatsa, boikutlo jwa Sagon le insight le Sheehan (1988) at p. 609.

Go bonala mo batswakwang bangwe Châu a ne a lebega a tlhotlheletsa kgopolo e e sa siamang ya mercurial. Michael Dunn, yo e leng mookamedi wa badiri kwa Embasing ya Amerika e e neng e le ka fa tlase ga Lodge, o ne a gakgamadiwa ke Châu. O ne a bolela gore ga a kgone go bolela gore "ke Châu efe e e neng e le Châu wa mmatota. O ne a na le botho jo bo mararo." Dunn o ne a tlhalosa mme a tswelela jaana:

Go ne go na le Maamerika a mantsi thata a a neng a kgatlhegela Vietnam mme go ne go na le Ba-Vietnam ba le mmalwa fela ba ba kgatlhang. Mme Châu e ne e le motho yo o sa tlwaelegang. ... Batho ba le bantsi ba ne ba akanya gore Châu e ne e le monna yo o kotsi thata, jaaka eleruri a ne a le. Mo lefelong la ntlha, mongwe le mongwe yo o nang le dikakanyo o kotsi. Mme dikgolagano tse a neng a na le tsone di ne di gakgamatsa.Grant (1991) at p. 330. Grant comments, "The problem that many American military men had with Châu was that he acted—well, he acted truly equal. That was so rare in Vietnamese-American relationships as to be disconcerting" (pp. 24–25).

Malatsi a le mararo pele ga go bouta Châu o ne a utlwa ka taelo ya sephiri e e neng ya dirwa ke mmusi wa porofense Huynh Van Du ya gore go tsietse boutu kwa Kiến Hòa. Châu o ne a ya kwa Saigon ka bonako go ya go bona tsala ya gagwe ya nako e telele Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, mopresidente yo o sa tswang go tlhophiwa.Presidential elections had preceded the elections for the National Assembly.Thiệu o boletse fa a ka se tsenelele ka Motlatsamopresidente Nguyễn Cao Kỳ a na le taolo mo go yone. Fa a tswa Châu o ne a bolelela Mogenerale Huỳnh Văn Cao gore ga a kitla a "amogela ditlhopho tse di tsieditsweng." Cao o ne a tlhotlheleditse Thiệu–Kỳ ka tsela e e tlhageletseng, mme ene ka boene o ne a eteletse pele thekethe ya Senate ya phenyo. Ka tsela nngwe, mmusi o ne a phimola taelo ya gagwe ya sephiri. "O [Châu] o fentse setulo mo ditlhophong tsa Kokoano Bosetšhaba ka 1967 mo go nngwe ya dikgaisano di le mmalwa tse di sa tsiediwang mo hisitoring ya naga", go boletse jalo The New York Times. Châu o bone 42% mo gare ga bontlhopheng ba le 17, bontsi jwa bone e ne e le batho ba lefelo leo. "E ne e le tlotla e kgolo mo tirelong ya gagwe jaaka kgosi ya porofense", go kwadile Rufus Phillips, motlhankedi wa Amerika mo go lwantsheng botsuolodi. Phenyo e ne e kaya paka ya dingwaga di le nne jaaka moemedi mo lekgotleng la peomolao la bosetšhaba le le tlhamilweng sešwa, kwa a neng a tla buelela batlhophi ba le 700 000 ba porofense ya Kiến Hòa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 288–290 (election: vote rigging order, New York Times quote); pp. 285, 287 (Gen. Cao in campaign). Châu considered that some of the vote was rigged (p. 286, 290). Six weeks earlier Châu had gone to the Thiệu home to congratulate the new President and his wife (p. 287).Grant (1991), p. 291 (1967 election).Phillips (2008) p. 283 (election results, quote).Sheehan (1988) p. 736 (National Assembly).Châu re Fulbright (1970), p. 359 (38,000 votes for Châu out of 90,000 cast in field of 19).

 Mo kgotlapeomolaong 
Mmogo le maloko a Kokoano a a neng a na le mogopolo o o tshwanang, Châu kwa tshimologong o ne a rata setlhopha sa batlhami ba melao se, le fa se ne se ntse se ikemetse ka nosi mo go Thiệu, ka kakaretso se neng se tla mo ema nokeng jaaka moeteledipele wa bosetšhaba. Go ikaegilwe ka botsalano jwa gagwe jwa nako e telele jwa sesole, Châu o ne a buile le tsala ya gagwe e bong Thiệu ka bonako fela morago ga ditlhopho tsa Kokoano. O rotloeditse mopresidente yo mošwa wa setšhaba go "atolosa motheo wa gagwe ka tshegetso ya setšhaba go tswa kwa maemong a a kwa tlase". O ne a akantsha gore Thiệu a fitlhelele kutlwano le setlhopha se se neng se sa ntse se simolola sa go dira melao. Châu o ne a solofela gore Thiệu o tla akanyetsa kafa a ka fedisang ka gone botlhoko le thubakanyo e e neng e aname ya ntwa e e neng e koafatsa. Kgabagare, puso ya ga Thiệu e ka nna ya tlhoma kagiso ya leruri ka go buisana ka tlhamalalo le VC le bokone. Ka a ne a akantse ka maano a gagwe, Thiệu o ne a tlola maano a a ntseng jalo. Châu, le ene, o ne a nna kwa ntle ga setlhopha se se neng se ema Thiệu nokeng, ka jalo a sa tsenye tshegetso ya gagwe mo kotsing go tswa go "Bakatoliki le Babuda ba borwa".Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 263, 310 (his causes); pp. 237, 310 (Châu's book);Keesing's (1970), p. 131: The Assembly after the 1967 election was variously estimated, here a rough composite: pro-government 19%, moderates 18%, Buddhist 22%, Catholics 15%, secular left 12%, the sects (two) 8%, nationalist (two) 6%.

Fa go ntse jalo, mo ditlhophong tsa sephiri Châu o ne a tlhophiwa ke balekane ba gagwe ba peomolao jaaka moeteledipele wa bona wa semmuso, ke gore, jaaka Mokwaledikakaretso mo Ntlong ya Batlatsa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), p. 326 (secretary general). Châu also became one of eleven members of the Special Court which had impeachment-like powers (p. 321).Ofisi e e ntseng jalo e ka bapisiwa gongwe le Sebui sa Ntlo sa Amerika.Phillips (2008) p. 299 (Secretary General Châu). Morutegi mongwe wa Moamerika, yo ka nako eo a neng a latela thata dipolotiki tsa Vietnam Borwa, o ne a tlhalosa radipolotiki Châu jaana:

Tran Ngoc Chau e ne e le Mokwaledikakaretso wa Ntlo. O ne a tlotliwa lefatshe ka bophara jaaka motho yo o siameng le yo, ka nako ya fa a ne a le motlhankedi wa Ntlo, a neng a bolokile tekatekano magareng ga go tshwayatshwaya le go tshegetsa puso ya ga [Thiệu] go ikaegilwe ka temogo ya gagwe ya dikgatlhego tsa bosetšhaba.Goodman (1973) p. 119

Kopano kwa Saigon, lenaneo la Kokoano kwa bokhutlong jwa 1967 le ne le akaretsa go tlhoma ditheo le ditiro tsa puso, jaaka go laetswe ke molaotheo wa 1966. Ditheo tse dišwa tsa puso di ne di akaretsa: boatlhodi jo bo ikemetseng, Lefapha la Batlhatlhobi, Lekgotla la Masole, le dipeelo tsa go okamela pusoselegae, le ditshwanelo tsa baagi. Go ise go ye kae Ntlo e ne ya retologa go sekaseka karabo ya yone e e siameng mo maatleng a a nonofileng a ga Moporesidente. "Bolaodi jo bo ntseng jalo jwa khuduthamaga" bo ne jwa dirwa karolo ya molaotheo o mošwa ka tlhamalalo. Mo go laoleng kgwebo ya yone le go lebana le dikgang, ditlhopha tsa ntlha tsa Kokoano, ditlhopha, le ditlhopha (tse bogolo jang di tswa mo dipolotiking tsa ditlhopho) di ne tsa gwetlhiwa. Ba ne ba rulaganngwa sešwa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 292. At the end of 1967, of 137 deputies, Châu appraised the blocs as follows: Thiệu 60, Ký 15, Socialisits 20, Buddhists 30, Misc. 12 (p. 292).Goodman (1973) pp. 121–127 (first legislation), pp. 119–120, 43 ("executive dominance:" quote); pp. 141–187 (blocs), 152 (blocs in the Lower House). The legislature later challenged the executive's de facto ability to make laws, but lost (pp. 132–136). Goodman (pp. 59–63) presents the major political parties, blocs, and factions of the Assembly following the 1967 election: three political organizations, including the Farmer Worker Soldier Movement (FWSM); two Catholic groups, Greater Solidarity Force (GSF) and the Catholic Citizens Bloc (CCB); the Buddhists, who were "deeply split" but had the An Quang faction; the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo religious cults; and two secular nationalist parties, the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDĐ) and the Đại Việt.

Châu o ne a tsamaisa tsela ya sepolotiki ka kelotlhoko, a tsamaya ka mekgwa ya gagwe e e itekanetseng ya Sebuda.Cf., Pham Van Minh (2002) pp. 161–162, 167. Since the eclipse of the Confucian mandarins during the early 20th century, many Buddhists considered themselves to be the primary historical source of Vietnamese spiritual values and traditions, and able to guide the nation. O ne a nna a tshegetsa Katoliki ya gagwe ya kwa borwa, e leng karolo ya kgaolo ya gagwe ya kwa magaeng; o ne a ikuela gape le mo bathong ba ba ratang bosetšhaba ba kwa ditoropong.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) p. 322. As well: intellectuals and students.Maatla a mo mebileng a mokgatlho wa kgaratlho wa Sebuda, o baeteledipele ba one ba neng ba rulagantse ka katlego balwela-kgololesego mo ditshupetsong tse dikgolo tsa 1963 le 1966, a ne a phutlhame.Topmiller (2002). The bitter "personal rivalry" between two "engaged" Buddhist leaders, the radical Thích Trí Quang and the moderate Thich Tam Chau, reached its climax during the Buddhist Crisis of 1966". It "hurt the movement badly". Tam Chau was an anti-communist refugee from the north. (P. 8, quote). Yet the engaged Buddhists formed only a minority of Vietnamese. The "well-known arrogance... or extreme self-confidence" of Tri Quang "turned off" followers, and "repelled many Americans". Buddhist radicals argued that "the GVN and the CIA" stoked the split in the movement. Tri Quang, though against communism, thought the corrupt GVN and the destructive USG intervention helped the NLF's popularity, which would weaken if the USG withdrew. The Buddhist's benevolent social agenda was blocked, Tri Quang thought, by the brutal violence caused by both the USG foreigners and the NLF. (pp. 47–48, quotes). Cf., p. 128.Goodman (1973): Buddhist struggle movements ("struggle six") pp. 38–46. Buddhist "distrust of the government" remained because of its "arrest and repression" of many Buddhists (pp. 42–43).Cf., Kahin (1986) pp. 414–417: discussion here of neutralist positions of the Buddhist struggle movement draws on author's 1966 interview with two participating monks, leaders at the Buddhist Institute [Vien Hoa Dao).Prados (2009) pp. 156–159, 330–331 (Buddhist Struggle Movement).Re collapse of Buddhist radicals in mid-1966: introduction to section "As Civilian Politician".Le fa go ntse jalo Mabuda a mangwe a le mantsi a ne a tlhophiwa ka 1967,Goodman (1973) pp. 61–62. To the senate and house: 38 Buddhists of various blocs and cliques, plus 15 militant Buddhists of An Quang (pp. 61–62); re An Quang, cf. 165–166mme Mabuda a a tlhageletseng a ne a tshegetsa seabe sa ga Châu sa go dira melao.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), p. 341 (support for Châu). But "there were few Buddhist representatives relative to the percentage of Buddhists in the country" (p. 292). Gareng ga ditlhopha tse di farologaneng tsa batlatsi, Châu o ne a feleletsa e le leloko la Thống Nhất ("Setlhopha sa kopano"). Moporofesara Goodman o e tlhalositse jaaka "molemeng wa bogare" mme e le ya bosetšhaba, e e amanang le dikgang tsa Sebuda, le "e e itekanetseng mo dikgopolong". Le fa go ntse jalo, ditlhopha tsa peomolao di ne di le diedi; "bokgoni jwa diboloko, jaaka bo lekanngwa ka go tshwaragana ga tsone, bo ne bo lebega bo sa amane le go gagamala ga tsone mme bo amana le maemo a tirisanommogo e e fitlheletsweng mo gare ga tsone."Goodman (1973): Assembly political group Thống Nhất (pp. 160–161, quotes: 160, 162–163); Châu as member (176–177); blocs as fluid (quote 177, cf. 154). Regarding the Thống Nhất bloc:This bloc underwent the greatest internal change. Originally it was a coalition of deputies from various VNQDĐ [nationalists], Cao Đài, and Hòa Hảo [two sects] factions... . From its initial membership of fifteen deputies, the Thống Nhất bloc had grown to a peak of twenty-nine in October 1968, when [it supported] the Hương cabinet. A year later membership declined to fifteen. ... Six of its eight new members reported ties with the militant Buddhists. This change [reduced the VNQDĐ and Hòa Hảo membership]. ... The impact of the Thống Nhất bloc's transformation, was, by the end of 1969, unclear, as were its intentions to use the bloc to introduce a formal, secular An Quang [Buddhist] interest group into national politics." Goodman, pp. 160–161.It is not clear when Châu joined the Thống Nhất bloc, but he was a member in mid-1969 (p. 177).

Tlhaselo e e bogale ya Tet ya Ferikgong 1968 e ne ya kgaotsa dipolotiki tsa Vietnam Borwa ka tshoganyetso.FitzGerald (1972) pp. 388–400. (Tet)Karnow (1983), pp. 523–545 (Tet); pp. 545–566 (Johnson's reactions).Thiệu o ne a kopa lekgotla la semolao go mo naya dithata tsa tshoganyetso, mme Châu a buelela batlatsi ba le bantsi "o ne a bolela gore khuduthamaga e setse e na le dithata tse di lekaneng go lepalepana le maemo... mme a tshitshinya gore morwalo wa ga jaana o abelanwe magareng ga makala ka bobedi". Kokoano e ne ya bouta ka 85 go ya go 10 kgatlhanong le thebolelo.Goodman (1973) p. 131 (quote).Keesing's (1970) p. 139.

Tet gape e ne ya tsosa dipitso tse disha tsa gore go kwadisiwe mo sesoleng sa bosetšhaba. Mo go boeleng kwa morago le kwa pele le babeamelao, puso e e neng e ema nokeng Sesole ya bajenerale ba pele e ne ya kgala baganetsi ba yone ba sepolotiki ba ba sa tlhaselwang ka ntlha ya go tila tirelo ya bosole. Ba-liberal bano ba ne ba bo ba ganetsa ka go latofatsa gore barwa ba batlhankedi ba bagolo ba Sesole ga jaanong jaana ka bobone ba ne ba tila tirelo; go ne ga bidiwa maina. Châu o ne a reetsa, kwa tshimologong o ne a galefela thata batho ba ba gololesegileng ba kwa ditoropong ba ba jaaka Ngô Cong Đức. Mme lefa go ntse jalo, fa a ntse a utlwa batshwayadiphoso ba latofatsa Sesole se se neng se tsentswe thata mo dipolotiking, se se neng se rata go menola puso ka gore se ne se dira dilo tse di sa siamang, se ne sa dumalana le maitemogelo a gagwe. Ka bontlha bongwe sesole se ne se "bodile e bile se se na bokgoni". Gantsi e ne e ikaegile ka "ditlhatloso mo go tlhopheng go na le mo bokgoning" se se neng se koafatsa Sesole le "go dira gore go nne bonolo gore Makomonisi a anamise molaetsa wa bona". Ka bonya Châu o ne a lemoga gore boradipolotiki bano ba ba sa tlhakaneng le sesole "ba ne ba bopa setlhopha se se matlhagatlhaga thata sa batho ba Borwa ba ba neng ba le kgatlhanong le tirisobotlhaswa ya maatla ke puso" le gore o ne a abelana le bone "ntwa ya diphetogo".Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 319–321, quotes.Joiner (1974) p. 264: The National Assembly elected in 1967 "showed more independence from the executive than had any parliamentary group in Vietnam's history."

Bonweenwee bo ne bo setse bo le gongwe le gongwe; e ne ya senya ditsholofelo tsa Vietnam Borwa. Ikonomi ya ntwa e e neng e phatlogile, mo gare ga tshenyo le loso, le infoleišene, e ne ya tlhola kgatelelo mo baaging, le fa go ntse jalo e ne ya tlhagisa ditšhono tse dišwa tsa kgwebo, e seng tsotlhe tse di kafa molaong.Nguyen Duy Hinh & Tran Dinh Tho (1984) pp. 111–114, at 111 (corruption of society by war economy of foreigners). Thuso ya ntwa ya Amerika e e neng e tla e ne ya menagana gantsi, fela jaaka thuso ya Amerika e e neng ya newa batshabi ba dimilionemilione ba Vietnam e e neng ya bakwa ke .go gakala ga ntwa. Ka jalo, motswedi o mogolo wa khumo e ne e le go reka dithoto tse dintsintsi tsa Amerika go tswa kwa ntle: go tshegetsa ditiro tsa sesole, go tlamela ka masole a le dikete di le makgolokgolo, le go fokotsa 'tshenyo ya peeletso'. Go dirisa dithoto tseno tse di tswang kwa dinageng tse dingwe ka tsela e e sa siamang go rekisiwa gape ka kgwebo go ne ga nna tiro e e seng kafa molaong e e neng ya anama. Batsayakarolo ba yone ba maemo a a kwa godimo gantsi e ne e le badiredibagolo ba Vietnam, batlhankedi ba sesole le basadi ba bone.Hosmer, Kellen, Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam (NY: Crane, Russak 1980) pp. 74–76 (types of corruption).Keesing's (1970) pp. 136–138 (corruption).Nguyen Duy Hinh & Tran Dinh Tho (1980) pp. 111 (by business), 112 (office buying), 113 (by powerful wives).FitzGerald (1972) pp. 345–347 (refugees, aid); 348–353 (corruption).FitzGerald (1972) pp. 345–347 (refugees, aid); 348–353 (corruption).Gruening (1968), pp. 352–357 (corruption). AP report quoted: "up to 40 percent of United States' assistance funds and goods... [is lost through]... theft, bribery, blackmarketing, currency manipulation, and waste." (p. 354).

Mefuta e mengwe ya bonweenwee e ne e tlwaelegile. Mo pusong, go rekisiwa ga diboutu tsa bone mo sephiring ke batlatsi bangwe ba ba tlhophilweng go ne ga tlhabisa thulaganyo eno ditlhong. Rakhemisi mongwe, Nguyen Cao Thang, e ne e le modirisani wa ga Thiệu le lekgotla la semolao. Go lebega karolo ya ditiro tsa gagwe e ne e akaretsa go isa dituelo tsa madi kwa batlatsa-tona. Châu o ne a simolola letsholo la sepolotiki kgatlhanong le bonweenwee ka kakaretso le kgatlhanong le "monna wa kgetsana" Thang ka tlhamalalo.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 293, 337. Cf., Joiner (1974), p. 291: "Legislators have been bribed and browbeaten (and worse) by the Thiệu administration."Mo Kokoanong Bosetšhaba Châu "o ne a ngokile setlhopha sa balatedi ba diboutu tsa bone di neng di ka se rekwe. Gape o ne a tsositse bogale jwa ga Thiệu ka go tlhasela bonweenwee jwa puso."Phillips (2004) p. 299: quote.

Fa maitemogelo a gagwe a go dira melao a ntse a kokoana, Châu o ne a akanya go simolola "lekoko la sepolotiki le le nang le mafaratlhatlha a naga ka bophara". O ne a ntshitse mabaka a gore batlatsi ka ene ba le bantsi ka maswabi ba ne ba sa golagane le batho ba ba neng ba tlhopha, mme ba ne ba golagane thata le dineteweke tsa sepolotiki tsa maitirelo, tse di tsetsweng. Boradipolotiki ba ba ntseng jalo, ka tsholofelo, ba ne ba tla ganwa go tlhophiwa gape. Ka 1968 Châu o ne a bua le baemedi ba babedi ba CIA; mongwe o ne a ntsha madi a sephiri go tlhoma le go rulaganya lekoko le lesha la sepolotiki, mme le ne le tshwanetse go ema Moporesidente Thiệu nokeng le ntwa. Porojeke e ntšhwa ya lekoko e ne ya kgatlha Chau, mme tumalano ya sephiri ya CIA ga e a ka ya dira jalo. Go na le moo Châu o ne a akantsha gore go tlhokege lekoko la bosetšhaba le le mo gare, le le ikemetseng ka nosi mo sesoleng, le "lenaneo le lešwa la bosetšhaba le dipholisi tse di ka gapang tshegetso ya bontsi jwa batho." CIA, le fa go ntse jalo, e ne e batla gore baamogedi ba yone ba rate Thiệu, le go dumalana le pholisi ya U.S. ka ntwa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 326–328: Châu's grassroots, CIA offer; Châu quotes at 326 and 328.Valentine (1990) at 304–305 (CIA's new party proposal to Châu). Valentine writes that CIA money was offered Châu in exchange for dropping his anti-corruption campaign against Nguyen Cao Thang the "bag man".Keesing's (1970) p. 145. President Thiệu on May 25, 1969, formed "a pro-Government alliance" called the National Social Democratic Front, composed of six major parties of the right.

Mo pakeng e Moemedi Ellsworth Bunker o ne a dirisana mmogo mabapi le puso ya bobusaesi ya ga Thiệu.Bui Diem (1987) pp. 276–277: "Thiệu's dilatory instincts [were] a perfect foil to Bunker's low-key" style.Phillips (2008) p. 286Châu o ne a utlwa a kopana le dikarolo tse di maatla tsa setheo sa Saigon.Prados (2009) p. 344. President Thiệu was intensely suspicious of and hostile "toward the Buddhists" and he persecuted "Trương Đình Dzu and Trần Ngọc Châu". Dzu, a liberal lawyer and Buddhist, ran for President in 1967; in a crowded field he came in second with 17% to Thiệu's 34% (p. 210). In mid-1968 Dzu "was condemned to five years' hard labor for advocating a coalition government" with the NLF (p. 336). Keesing's (1970) pp. 134–135 (Dzu trials).FitzGerald (1972) pp. 337–338. Besides Dzu, Thiệu jailed Thich Thien Minh "the only bonze who remained politically active" and a score of other political candidates.

Dipuisano tsa kagiso

Morago ga ditlamorago tsa go tlhophiwa ga gagwe mo Kokoanong ya Bosetšhaba ka Diphalane 1967, Châu o ne a ya kwa Amerika. O ne a bona dikgato tsa ntlha tsa ditlhopho tsa bone tsa 1968 le go tlhatloga ga maikutlo a a kgatlhanong le ntwa ka Vietnam. Kwa Amerika, go ne ga akanyediwa go tsena ka tlhamalalo mo dipuisanong tsa go fedisa ntwa.Tucker (2000) pp. 18–19: "Antiwar Movement, United States". Grant (1991) 351: "In 1968 books, like much of the country, turned antiwar."Kwa Washington Châu o ne a neela dithuto ka ntwa, mme a tlotla le baitseanape le badiredibagolo (ba le bantsi ba a neng a kopane le bone kwa Vietnam), le le maloko a Khonkerese. Le fa go ntse jalo Tlhaselo ya Tet e ne ya simolola ka letsatsi la tshono ya ga Châu ya go bua le Moporesidente Johnson, mme kopano e ne ya phimolwa.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 299–313 (trip to America); Tet caused cancelation of meeting (304–305). Dikgwedi di le mmalwa morago ga loeto lwa ga Châu, dipuisano magareng ga Vietnam Bokone le Maamerika di ne tsa simolola kwa Paris (10 Motsheganong 1968).Tucker (2000) p. 317, "Paris Negotiations".

Châu le ba bangwe ba ne ba kgala dipuisano tsa kagiso ka bogale: mo boemong jwa Repaboliki ya Vietnam go ne go eme Maamerika. Seriti sa Vietnam se ne sa ganetsanwa. Go ne go lebega e tlhomamisa boemo jwa Repaboliki jaaka moreki fela wa maatla a Amerika. Go na le moo, Châu o ne a gatelela gore Saigon e tshwanetse go bula dipuisano le makomonisi, bobedi VC le puso ya Vietnam Bokone. Go sa le jalo, Maamerika a tshwanetse go nna kwa ntle ga serala jaaka molebeledi, yo o tla tshegetsang Saigon.Châu with Fermoyle (2012),

Ka tsela eno go ne go ka nna ga rulaganngwa gore ntwa e emisiwe mme ntwa e e mogote (e ka nako eo e neng ya tswelela e senya Borwa le go bolaya palo e ntsi thata ya baagi ba yone) e ne ya emisiwa, mme seno sa dira gore batlhabani ba kgone go ritibala. Go ya ka seno, ntwa eno e ne e ka tsenngwa mo dipolotiking mme ka jalo ya boela e laolwa ke batho ba Vietnam. Kagiso e ne e ka boela kwa magaeng, kwa metseng, kwa ditoropong. Morago ga moo boradipolotiki ba bosetšhaba ba Vietnam Borwa, gongwe le mo pusong ya kopano, le fa go ntse jalo ba ne ba ka lwa ntwa ya temokerasi kgatlhanong le VC. Batho ba ba ratang bosetšhaba ba ka nna ba gogela tshegetso ya batho ka go baya mekgwa ya botshelo ya Vietnam kgatlhanong le dikgopolo tsa bokomonisi. Le fa go ntse jalo pholisi ya puso ya ga Thiệu e ne ya kgala ka tlhamalalo dipuisano dipe le VC, jaaka di ne di tlhotlheleditswe ke bokomonisi kgotsa bokomonisi.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 325, 328, 330–331 (views on peace negotiations); 299, 325–326 (Thiệu against negotiations).Grant (1991) at 318 (Châu and negotiations); pp. 311–312 (Thiệu's commitment to war and hostility to negotiations in November, 1967).Puso ya Thiệu kwa Saigon e ne e thibetse semolao go buelela phatlalatsa dipuisano tsa kagiso kgotsa go dira ditumalano tse di tshwanang le tseo le makomonisi.Gruening and Beaser (1968)."Châu o ne a batla dipuisano tse di utlwalang le tumalano fa Saigon e santse e na le maatla a go buisana. Gone ke boammaaruri gore pholisi ya ga Nguyễn Văn Thiệu e ne e ikaeletse go thibela tumalano epe e e ntseng jalo."Prados (2009), p. 223. Cf, pp. 175–179 re Nguyễn Khánh's 1964–1965 "peace feelers' regarding an NLF letter, and the CIA's 1966–1967 NLF contacts

Tsheko ya sepolotiki, kgolegelo

Ka 1970, Châu o ne a tshwarelwa go tsuologela Rephaboliki ka ntlha ya kopano ya gagwe le morwarraagwe Hien, yo go tloga ka dingwaga tsa bo 1940 a neng a ntse a le kwa Việt Minh le mekgatlho ya bokomonisi e e latelang jaaka modiredi wa lekoko. Go ne ga tlhaga ditlhogo tse di neng di bua ka go tswalelwa ga ga Châu mo metsweding ya dikgang ya boditšhabatšhaba. Ditatofatso di ne di tsewa di tlhotlhelediwa thata ke sepolotiki, go na le dipotso tsa boikanyegi mo nageng.Châu with Firmly (2012) at pp. 332–365. Cf., Pond (2009), cited in Vietnam Labyrinth (2013), p. 407 n5.Cf., "The Statement of Tran Ngoc Chau" in The Antioch Review at 30: 299–301 (1970–71)].Tran Ngoc Hien, Châu's brother, was an intelligence officer for the Viet Cong. In 1969, Hien privately spoke with the editor of the Saigon Dailey News. Thereafter, both were arrested, along with 26 other political opponents of the regime of Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Grant (1991) at 313 (Saigon Press); Châu (2012) at 232–235 (1965 meeting with his brother); at 324–325 (1970 trial, arrest); at 331, 334 (in prison).Le fa go ntse jalo ka Tlhakole 1970 Châu o ne a atlholelwa dingwaga di le masome a mabedi kwa kgolegelong. Ka Motsheganong oo Kgotlatshekelokgolo ya Vietnam e ne ya tsaya gore go tshwarwa le go bonwa molato ga ga Châu ga go dumalane le molaotheo, mme Thiệu o ne a gana gore a sekisiwe gape.Valentine (1990) at p. 320.

Le fa a ne a gololwa mo seleng ya kgolegelo ke puso ya ga Thiệu ka 1974, Châu o ne a tswelela go tswalelwa, a bewa ka fa tlase ga kgolegelo ya mo ntlong kwa Saigon.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 362–363 (house arrest). Ka Moranang 1975, ka nako ya tlhakatlhakano e e neng e le teng mo go wa ga Saigon ka bonako go go neng go sa lebelelwa, le go ikgogela morago ga Amerika go tswa kwa Vietnam ka tsela e e sa rulaganngwang sentle, Châu le ba lelapa la gagwe ba ne ba tlogelwa kwa morago.Prados (2003) p. 289. Prados states that Ted Shackley at CIA declined to evacuate Châu, which decision Colby did not countermand.Phillips (2008), p. 303: report that "CIA's division chief Ted Shackley vetoed a field request to have [Châu] put on the evacuation list".Maamerika a mararo, mmegadikgang le motlhankedi wa boemedi, le mojenerale yo o rotseng tiro le MAAG, mongwe le mongwe wa bone o ne a leka go dira gore Châu le lelapa la gagwe ba fudusiwe mo malatsing a le mmalwa a bofelo. Le fa go ntse jalo se se neng se thibela maiteko a bone e ne e le tlhakatlhakano e e neng ya nna teng ka tshoganyetso, digopa tsa batho, le tlhakatlhakano ka kakaretso le kotsi kwa Saigon. Go pitlagana le pharakano e e tlhakatlhakaneng go ne ga kgoreletsa ditsela tsotlhe tsa go tswa le go feta. Ene le mosadi wa gagwe ba ne ba tlhobaela ka morwadiabone yo o tletseng le yo o imileng, se se neng sa dira gore lelapa la ga Châu "le ineele mo go sengwe le sengwe se rona, jaaka bafenyi ba ntwa, re tshwanetseng go lebana le sone mo isagong."Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 363–365: three Americans at 363–364, Châu's quote at 365

 Ka fa tlase ga puso ya Bokomonisi 
Ntwa e ne ya khutla ka Moranang 30, 1975, fa Vietnam Borwa e ne e ineela mo Sesoleng sa Batho sa Vietnam Bokone sa Vietnam (PAVN). "Moletlo o mogolo wa phenyo" o ne o rulagantswe kwa Saigon ka Motsheganong 15, o o neng o na le mopresidente wa Vietnam Bokone Tôn Đức Thắng.Truong Nhu Tang (1985) pp. 258–265, quotes at 259, and 264 (NLF troops).Cf., Chanoff and Toai (1985) p. 178: Viet Cong nationalists and other southerners disappointed with "Tonkinese" domination from Hanoi.Nguyen Cong Hoan, "The Communist Assembly" pp. 187–194, at 192, in Chanoff and Toai (1985): the northern DRV flag later adopted for unified Vietnam.

Trương Như Tảng, yo ka nako eo e neng e le Tona ya Bosiamisi ya NLF, o ne a bitsa malatsi a a latelang phenyo "paka ya go kgobega marapo ka bonako". Kwa borwa jwa Vietnam, kgang e kgolo ya go kopanngwa gape e ne ya nna gore go ka akarediwa jang baba ba pele ba ba tswang mo ntweng e telele ya selegae. Ka Motsheganong, maloko a puso ya ga Thiệu e e neng ya fenngwa a ne a laelwa go bega ka nako ya go rutwa gape go tsaya malatsi a le mararo, a le lesome kgotsa a le 30 go ikaegile ka maemo a bone. Leano le le ntseng jalo le le neng le lebega le le legolo le ne la amogelwa ke batho. Ba le dikete di le makgolokgolo ba ne ba bega. Le fa go ntse jalo, go ne ga feta dikgwedi di le mmalwa go sa tlhalosiwe; ba le mmalwa ba ne ba gololwa. Tảng o ne a lemoga ka go okaoka gore nako ya go tswalelwa e e neng ya itsisiwe kwa tshimologong e ne e le boferefere jwa go dira gore tiro ya puso ya go tshwara le go golega e nne borethe. O ne a lebana le Moporesidente wa NLF Huỳnh Tấn Phát ka ga go tlola go tshepana gono ga batho ka tsela e e sa siamang. Tảng o ne a tlhatswiwa. Morago ga moo go ne ga tla lekhubu la go tshwarwa ka boithatelo le le neng la "tlhotlhora ditoropo le metse". Tảng o ne a dira go baakanya dikgatako tseno tsa ditshwanelo tsa batho ka go kwala melao e mesha, mme o ne a nna a sa tlhomamisege gore a e tla diragadiwa. "Mo ngwageng wa ntlha morago ga kgololesego, batho ba ka nna dikete di le makgolo a mararo ba ne ba tshwarwa", bontsi jwa bone ba ne ba tshwarwa ntle le tsheko dingwaga di le dintsi. Poso ya ga Tảng e ne e tla tloga e fedisiwa mo thulaganyong ya go kopanngwa gape, mme ditiro tsa gagwe tsa pele di ne di dirwa ke motho wa bokone yo o neng a tlhomilwe ke Mokgatlho wa Bokomonisi wa Vietnam kwa Hanoi.Truong Nhu Tang (1985) pp. 271–282; quote at 271, re-education at 271–277, President at 274–276, arbitrary quote at 279, new laws at 280–282, arrested quote at 282. Tảng personally had driven two of his brothers to their "re-education" induction points (p. 273). Nine years later one brother was still incarcerated, for being a "consultant" to a Saigon political party (p. 279).Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 366–367.Cf., Metzner et al. (2001): reeducation camps.

Kampa ya thutosešwa

Ka June fa Châu a ne a le kwa gae le mosadi wa gagwe le bana, masole a mararo a a tlhometseng a ne a tla kwa legaeng leo, morago ga moo a bofa Châu ka dithapo mme a mo isa go ya go botsolodiwa. Morago ga moo a romelwa "ka nakwana" kwa kampeng ya thutosešwa, o ne a rutiwa ka ga phetogo. Ka go sa letlelelwe baeng kgotsa go bolelelwa nako e e solofetsweng, Châu o ne a tla nna a tswaletswe mo mafelong a a farologaneng dingwaga di ka nna tharo.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) at pp. 362 (house arrest), 363–364 (Fall of Saigon), 366 (arrest), 366–378 (prisoner).Grant (1991), at 342–346, 358–359 (reeducation camp).Cf., Zalin Grant, "The True Phoenix. Vietnam's big misunderstanding", (Pythia Press website 2011).

Kwa go se Châu a neng a se bitsa "khamphase ya go tlhatswa boboko" o ne a ithuta dikgopolo tsa Bokomonisi. O ne a iphitlhela a na le badiredibagolo ba le bantsi ba pele ba puso ya Saigon e e neng e sa tlhole e le teng. Gareng ga dikete di le mmalwa mo kgolegelong eno o ne a fitlhela "Moatlhodimogolo wa Kgotlatshekelokgolo Trần Minh Tiết le makgolokgolo a baatlhodi ba bangwe ba bagolo, maloko a kabinete, basenate, maloko a khonkerese, babusi ba diporofense, dikgosi tsa dikgaolo, ditlhogo tsa mafapha a a farologaneng a tsamaiso le a setegeniki, le". Moragonyana Châu o ne a fopholetsa gore palogotlhe ya magolegwa a a ntseng jalo mo nageng yotlhe e ne e le dikete di le makgolokgolo. Gape go ne go akarediwa batlhankedi ba sesole, batlhankedi ba mapodisi, badiredibagolo ba ba botlana, le barutabana ba sekolo.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), p. 367 (quote re other prisoners), 380 (his estimate).Metzner, et al. (2001), "Preface" p. xiii: such prisoners "conservatively estimated at 250,000."Cf., Tucker (2000) p. 348. The estimate cited here states one million were held, half for only three months, with 40,000 to 60,000 still imprisoned eight years later. These figures accord with those given by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Camp conditions varied widely. Common criminals were also held.

Difolaga tse pedi tsa SRV: lekoko & puso.

Ba le nosi, mo maemong a a makgwakgwa, magolegwa a ne a tshwaregile go tloga ka 5 a.m. go ya go 10 p.m. ka letsatsi. Dikgwedi tsa ntlha tse tharo magolegwa a ne a bereka go aga le go baakanya kampa ka boyone: "marulelo a tshipi, mabota a tshipi e e nang le masenke, le bodilo jwa samente", tsotlhe di dikologilwe ke thapo ya concertina le matsholo a tshireletso. Kwa khamphaseng eno go ne go neelwa dithuto, gantsi ke batlhankedi ba bagolo ba sesole ba ba tswang kwa bokone, ba tlhagisa hisitori ya Vietnam ya Bokomonisi. Ba ne ba bua ka ditlolomolao tse di dirilweng ke Maamerika le dipopae tsa bona, isagwe e e phatsimang ya bokomonisi e e kwa pele, le tšhono jaanong ya gore magolegwa a baakanye "boferefere le ditlolomolao" tsa bona. Dibuka tsa dikgopolo di ne di le teng. Puisano ya setlhopha

dithuto di ne di tlamega; mo batsayakarolong di ne di lebega di tla nnela ruri. ‘Thuto’ ya bone e ne e tsewa ke magolegwa a le mantsi e le tsela ya go ba otlhaya. Châu o ne a akanya gore batlhankedi ba sesole sa bokone "ba ne ba dumela thata mo dithutong tsa bone le fa ba ne ba sa itse se ba buang ka sone."Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 367–369, quote at 368.Châu (2003) 476–477, quote at 477

Magolegwa a ka nna a lwala, a nna bokoa jo bo sa foleng kgotsa ka tsela e nngwe a latlhegelwa ke botsogo jwa one mme a senyega. "Magolegwa mangwe a ne a tsenwa. Go ne go nna le go ipolaya le dintsho kgapetsakgapetsa." Mogolegwa mongwe le mongwe o ne a patelesega go kwala buka ya botshelo jwa gagwe e e neng e bua thata ka dikgopolo tsa gagwe tsa sepolotiki le e e neng e ipolela diphoso tsa gagwe. Morago ga moo, mongwe le mongwe o ne a botsolodiwa ka go kgaogana malebana le dintlha tsa gagwe mme a kopiwa go kwala dikarolo gape. Châu o ne a bodiwa dipotso segolobogolo ka dikgolagano tsa gagwe le CIA mme a dirwa gore a kwale gape buka ya gagwe ya botshelo makgetlo a le matlhano. Morago ga dikgwedi di le 14, baeng ba ba tswang kwa ntle ba ne ba letlwa go tsena mo kampeng, mme gantsi malapa a ne a tshosiwa ke tebego e e koafetseng ya ba losika lwa bone. Mosadi wa ga Châu le bana ba gagwe "ba ne ba sa ntemoge kwa tshimologong ka gonne ke ne ke latlhegetswe ke dikilogerama di le masome a mane." Gape go ne ga bonala sentle mo magolegweng gore maloko a lelapa a a gaufi 'a a kwa ntle' a ne a otlhaelwa 'ditlolomolao' tsa sepolotiki tsa ba ba tshwerweng mo teng.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 368–371, quote at 368; at 371 (Châu's son denied entry to school). Châu (2003) p. 477 crazy quote, p. 478 forty pounds quote. Grant (1991) p. 343 (questioned about CIA, lost 44 pounds in 14 months).Neil Sheehan, "Ex-Saigon Official Tells of 'Re-education' by Hanoi", The New York Times, January 14, 1980, pp. A1, A8. Sheehan interviewed Châu after his escape to America. Châu then sought to give Sheehan a consciously evenhanded appraisal of post-war south Vietnam and the communist regime. See 'America' section below.Mosadi wa ga Châu o ne a rulaganya gore maloko a le 25 a lelapa la gagwe a a nnang kwa bokone a saene boikuelo jo bo kopang go itshwarelwa.Châu (2003) p. 478: his wife Bich Nhan.

Morago ga dingwaga di le pedi le sephatlo, magolegwa a le 150 go akaretsa le Châu a ne a fudusediwa kwa kgolegelong ya Thủ Đức gaufi le Saigon. Boemo jwa bone jo bosha le lefelo la bone di ne di tshwanetse go fudusediwa kwa bokone jwa Vietnam, kwa go neng go tlwaelegile go dira tiro e e bokete ka nako e telele.Cf., Nguyen Cing Hoan, "The Communist Assembly" (1985) pp. 187–194, at 193, in Chanoff and Toai. Ba ne ba kopanela le ba bangwe ba ba neng ba tshwerwe mo thutong ya go ruta gape, ba ba neng ba tsewa e le "dikebekwa tse di maswe go gaisa". Bangwe ba bone go ne go na le baitlami ba Sebuda le baruti ba Katoliki. Fa go sena go tlhomamisiwa gore ke mang, Châu o ne a tshaba gore o tla bolawa mo nakong e khutshwane. Go na le moo, fa a ne a fudusediwa kwa ntlokgolong ya bogologolo ya mapodise kwa Saigon, o ne a tsenngwa mo kgolegelong a le esi. O ne a dira yoga le go tlhatlhanya.Châu with Fermoyle (2012), pp. 371–373, quote at 372 (worst criminals). Châu (2003) p. 478.Morago ga dibeke di le tharo a le esi o ne a isiwa kwa Bakomonising ba babedi ba bagolwane mme a botsolodiwa. Mongwe o ne a bolelela Châu gore ditlolomolao tsa gagwe di feletse ka "go bolawa ga batho ba le dikete di le masomesome mo nageng yotlhe" mme a batla gore go arabiwe. Châu o ne a araba ka gore "Ke fentswe, ke a dumela. Ntshware ditlolomolao dipe fela tse o di batlang." Fa a laelwa go kwala gape buka ya gagwe ya botshelo, mo dikgweding tse pedi tse di latelang, a newa dijo tse di botoka le tafole le setulo, Châu o ne a kwala ditsebe di le 800, a akaretsa "ditlolomolao tse ke neng ke di dirile kgatlhanong le batho le phetogo".Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 373, 374 (quote: interrogator re killings), 375 (quote: Châu re defeated), 375–376 (autobiography).Châu (2003) p. 478: "I wrote in a manner I knew the Communists would agree with--showing my prosecution of all the crimes I had committed."

Châu o ne a lemoga gore magolegwa a mangwe a mane a a neng a tshwarwa ka tsela e e tshwanang le ya gagwe e ne e le "batho ba ba tlhomologileng ba Hòa Hảo, bodumedi jo bo neng bo ikaegile ka Sebuda jo bo neng bo tlhomilwe kwa Mekong Delta [mme] bo itsege e le jo bo kgatlhanong thata le Bokomonisi." go nna teng ka letsatsi le Maamerika a neng a emisa go tlamela ka dithuso tsa madi ka lone." Mme ba ba kgatlhanong le Bokomonisi ba ba nang le melaometheo ba ka nna ba fitlha ditumelo tsa bona mme ba nna "matshosetsi a a ka nnang teng". Modiredimogolo mongwe wa Bokomonisi o ne a itshwara ka botsalano mo mogolegweng Châu ka tsela e e sa tlwaelegang. Le fa go ntse jalo modiredi yono o ne a bolelela Châu gore "e ne e le motswasetlhabelo wa thetso ya maaka" e e neng ya dira gore e nne "moganetsi wa Bokomonisi ka go tlhomamisega" mme ka jalo "e ne e le matshosetsi a magolo mo phetogelong go feta batho ba ba neng ba le kgatlhanong le Bokomonisi fela ka ntlha ya go ikgatlhegela".Châu (2003) p. 479.

Go tswa foo Châu o ne a bodiwa dipotso di le tharo: mabaka a gagwe ka namana a go bo a ne a le kgatlhanong le phetogo ya bokomonisi; tlhotlheletso ya gagwe ya go thusa Maamerika; le, kgang e e neng e le ka fa morago ga tshitshinyo ya gagwe ya kagiso ya 1968. Badiredibagolo ba ne ba batla tshedimosetso e e tlhomameng gore ba kgone go tlhaloganya botoka mefuta ya "mmaba wa batho" jaaka Châu. Châu o ne a ikutlwa a lebisitswe ka tsela e e kgethegileng ka ntlha ya dilo tse a neng a di dumela ka namana jaaka Mobuda le wa bosetšhaba, mme seno se ne sa mo tlhotlheletsa go direla batho. Seno e ne e le selotlolo sa dikarabo tsa gagwe tse tharo. Thulaganyo e ne ya nna kgang, Châu o ne a akanya, e seng ka bopelokgale mme e le ka maikutlo a gagwe a "tlotlo ya botho". Mobotsolotsi yo mogolo o ne a mmolelela gore bosetšhaba jwa gagwe jwa sepolotiki bo ne bo le phoso, mme gore Châu o ne a newa "tshono ya go tsosolosa boineelo jwa gago jwa go direla batho." Go tswa foo o ne a gakgamatsa Châu ka go mo itsise ka go gololwa ga gagwe. Châu "o ne a sa ntse a belaela" o ne a kwala lekwalo "a solofetsa go dira bojotlhe jwa me go direla naga". Malatsi a le mmalwa moragonyana, mosadi wa gagwe le morwadie yo mogolo ba ne ba goroga go mo isa gae.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 376–378, 376 (three questions, enemy quote), 377 (quotes: Châu re honor, interrogator re opportunity), 378 (quotes: Châu as suspicious, and letter). Châu "would be an object lesson of the revolution's humanitarian reconciliation" (p. 378)Châu (2003) p. 479. The Communist official told him: Americans consider Vietnamese nationalists as throw away commodities, but "the revolution is different".Cf., Nguyen Cong Luan (2012), re reeducation camps: pp. 469–513, e.g., 472–476 (escape attempts: death), 487 (prisoner autobiographies), 489–490 (interrogation), 491 (dark cell), 503 (criminal abuse by guards), 506–507 (numbers held), 509–510 (execution of defectors), 515 (author held 61⁄2) years).

Golola, tshaba ka mokoro

Fa Châu a sena go gololwa mo kgolegelong a sa lebelela ka 1978, o ne a ya go nna le mosadi wa gagwe le bana ba gagwe. O ne a amogela baeng ba lelapa, go akaretsa le morwarraagwe wa mokomonisi e bong Trần Ngọc Hiền. Dingwaga di le robedi pele ga foo go tshwarwa ga ga Hien kwa Saigon ke puso ya ga Thiệu go ne go dirile gore Chau a tsenngwe mo kgolegelong lekgetlo la ntlha. Hien e kile ya bo e le motlhankedi wa matlhale wa Bokomonisi yo o nang le maemo a a kwa godimo, mme o ne a swabisitswe ke puso e e setlhogo e e neng e tlhomilwe ke Hanoi e e neng ya fenya. Morago ga moo, go buelela ga ga Hien dilo tsa Sebuda go ne go dirile gore a otlhaiwe mme morago ga moo a tsenngwe mo kgolegelong ke Mokgatlho wa Bokomonisi wa Vietnam. Kgaitsadie Châu le monna wa gagwe yo e neng e le moenjenere wa dikago, le bone ba ne ba etela Châu. Ba ne ba fologile go tswa kwa bokone jwa Vietnam, kwa ba neng ba ntse ba nna teng dingwaga di le masome a mabedi le botlhano.Châu with Fermoyle (2012). Brother Hien: intelligence officer (p. 107), visit (379), troubles after war (pp. 418 n2, 379, and 422 n24); visit of sister Hong Lien and her husband Le Van Kinh (pp. 379–380, cf. 93–94); Chau's brothers and sisters (p. 109). His sister and another brother had remained loyal communists since the 1940s, yet had "sent a petition to the Communist hierarchy seeking clemency" for Châu and his release (pp. 370–371).Châu (2003) p. 480.About his brother Hien's arrest, see above section "Political trial, prison".

Mo bofelong jwa dingwaga tsa bo 1970 baeteledipele ba ba kwa godimo ba Bokomonisi kwa bokone ba ne ba lebega ba tlhaloganya phenyo mo ntweng e e lapisang jaaka leungo la maiteko a bona, pogiso ya bona, e e neng ya naya maloko a lekoko la bokone tshwanelo ya ditshiamelo jaaka badiredipuso ba leruri kwa borwa.Troung Nhu Tang (1985) pp. 284 (Hanoi "annexing the South"); 288–290. The "thousands of northern cadres who had come south to govern" the relatively prosperous south were offensive. "They fought each other over houses, cars, prostitutes, and bribes." (p. 289)Châu o ne a leba Bokomonisi ka tsela e e sa siamang, mme e seng ka tsela e e feletseng. Fa a ne a direla kwa Việt Minh kwa bofelong jwa dingwaga tsa bo 1940, Chau o ne a kgatlhegela boineelo le go intsha setlhabelo ga ditsala tsa gagwe, le thulaganyo ya go itshwayatshwaya diphoso ya Bokomonisi; go kgaogana ga gagwe le bone go ne go bakilwe ke go sa dumalane ga gagwe le kgopolo ya bone ya Bo-Marxist–Leninist. Le fa go ntse jalo jaanong, a golotswe mo kampeng ya thuto gape le go boela kwa Saigon e e neng e 'gapilwe', Châu o ne a tlhomamisega gore ka kakaretso Makomonisi a a busang a ne a latlhegetswe ke bontle jwa one jwa sepolotiki mme a ne a "sentswe" ke puso.Châu (2003) p. 477 ("corrupted"). Châu was "from the privileged class" and felt guilt, yet was honored to serve "like brothers" with the mostly peasant Việt Minh forces in the late 1940s. Grant (1991) p. 343: The northern Army officers at the reeducation camps had in victory become "braggarts, practically strutting before Châu and his group."Fa naga eno e ne e kgaoganngwa ka 1954, batho ba le dikete di le makgolokgolo ba ne ba tswa mo kgaolong e e kwa bokone e e neng e abetswe puso ya Bokomonisi, ba tsaya loeto go ya kwa borwa. Morago ga phenyo ya sesole sa Bokomonisi ya 1975 e sena go kopanya Vietnam gape, makgolokgolo a diketekete a ne a tla tshaba ka mokoro.Karnow (1983) p. 222.

Fa Châu a sena go gololwa, modiredimogolo yo o botsalano yo o tswang kwa kgolegelong o ne a mo etela. O ne a bolelela Châu gore o golotswe gore a kgone go itsise ditsala tsa gagwe le batho ba a ba itseng. Châu o ne a newa maemo kwa Setheong sa Dithuto tsa Loago kwa Saigon, setheo sa maemo a a kwa godimo se se neng se golagantswe le mokgatlho wa kgaitsadi kwa Moscow.Grant (1991) p. 346 (official's visit, elite center, required to be state informant). Chau o ne a abelwa faele ya baeteledipele ba pele ba puso ya Vietnam Borwa e e sa tlholeng e le teng. Go tswa mo ditshupong kwa tirong o ne a tlhaloganya gore seabe sa gagwe se ne se tla akaretsa gape le go kwala dipegelo ka ga dikgolagano tsa gagwe tse di farologaneng le Ba-Vietnam ka ene, tse a neng a swetsa ka tsone ka tidimalo go di tila.Châu with Fermoyle (2012) 378–379.Châu (2003) pp. 479–480.

Ka 1979, Châu le lelapa la gagwe (mosadi le bana ba gagwe ba le batlhano) ba ne ba kgona go fuduga mo sephiring go tswa kwa Vietnam e se ka fa molaong ka mokoro. Ba ne ba rulaganya go kopanela le setlhopha sa Ba-China ba ba tswang kwa Cholon le bone ba ikaeletse go tshaba kwa Vietnam. Pholisi e e seng ya semmuso e ne ya dira gore Ba-China ba tsamaye fa ba ka duela mapodisi $2500 ka gauta motho ka bongwe.Trinh Duc, The Purge (1986) pp. 201–202, in Chanoff and Toai. Also, the exiles had to forfeit any property in Vietnam. Cf., Châu with Fermoyle (2012) pp. 382. Châu paid over $25,000 for his wife and children, and had to borrow the money (repaid in 1991).Mo mawatleng a a bulegileng, sekepe sa Soviet Russia se se neng se bonwe ka tshoganyetso se ne sa ba naya dilwana. Leeto le ne le le kotsi, mokoro o ne o tletse thata. Fa ba goroga kwa Malaysia mokoro o ne wa nwela mo lekhubung la lewatle. Malaysia e ne ya ba romela kwa setlhaketlhakeng se se kwa thoko kwa Indonesia. Go tswa foo Châu ka pipamolomo o ne a bona thelekerama e e yang kwa Keyes Beech, mmegadikgang wa Los Angeles Times kwa Bangkok. La bofelo, ka thuso ya ga Beech, ba ne ba ya kwa Singapore mme ba tsamaya ka sefofane go ya kwa Los Angeles. Go goroga ga bone kwa Amerika go ne ga latelwa ke dingwaga di le mmalwa lekhubu la ntlha la batho ba dikepe ba Vietnam.Trinh Duc, The Purge (1986) pp. 201–202, in Chanoff and Toai. Also, the exiles had to forfeit any property in Vietnam.

 Metswedi