Epistemolojia

Epistemolojia (kutoka Kigiriki ἐπιστήμη - episteme-, "maarifa, sayansi" + λόγος, "logos", "elimu") au nadharia ya maarifa ni tawi la falsafa linalojihusisha na hali na upana (vikwazo) vya maarifa Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 3, 1967, Macmillan, Inc. Inaangazia maswali yafuatayo:
 Maarifa ni nini?
 Maarifa yanapatikana vipi?
 Watu wanajua nini?
 Tunajua vipi kile tunachokijua?

Majadiliano mengi katika uwanja huu yameangazia uchambuzi wa hali ya maarifa na jinsi inavyohusiana na dhana sawa kama vile ukweli, imani na ushahidi. Pia inahusu mbinu za uzalishaji wa maarifa, na pia shaka kuhusu madai mbalimbali ya maarifa.

Neno lilitungwa na mwanafalsafa wa nchi ya Scotland, James Frederick Ferrier (1808–1864).Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2007

 Maarifa 
 Kutofautisha kujua kuwa nakujua jinsi 
Katikia makala haya, na katika epistemolojia kwa jumla, aina ya maarifa ambayo kawaida hujadiliwa ni maarifa yanayowakilisha madai fulani, ambayo pia hujulikana kama "maarifa-kuwa" ikitofautishwa na "maarifa jinsi". Kwa mfano: katika hisabati, inajulikana kuwa 2 + 2 = 4, lakini pia kuna kujua jinsi ya kuongeza nambari mbili. Kwa hivyo wanafalsafa wengi (lakini si wote) wanaamini kuna tofauti kubwa kati ya "kujua kuwa" na "kujua jinsi", huku epistemolojia ikijihusisha sana na aina ya maarifa ya kwanza. 

Tofauti hii inatambulika katika lugha nyingi, lakini si katika Kiingereza cha kawaida cha kisasa (tilia maanani kuwa lugha mbalimbali zinazohusiana na Kiingereza bado huwa na vitenzi hivi kama vile maneno ya Kiskoti: "wit" na "ken").In French, Portuguese and Spanish, to know (a person) is connaître, conhecer, and conocer, respectively, whereas to know (how to do something) is savoir, saber, and saber. In Modern Greek the verbs are γνωρίζω (gnorízo) and ξέρω (kséro). In Italian the verbs are conoscere and sapere and the nouns for knowledge are conoscenza and sapienza, respectively. In German, the verbs are kennen and wissen. Wissen implies knowing as a fact, kennen implies knowing in the sense of being acquainted with and having a working knowledge of; there is also a noun derived from kennen, namely erkennen, which roughly implies knowledge in the form of recognition or acknowledgment. The verb itself implies a process: you have to go from one state to another, from a state of "not-erkennen" to a state of true erkennen. This verb seems to be the most appropriate in terms of describing the "episteme" in one of the modern European languages, hence the German name "Erkenntnistheorie."

Katika kitabu chake Lugha ya Kibinafsi, Michael Polanyi anadokeza kuwa aina zote mbili za epistemojia ni muhimu; akitumia mfano wa urari katika kuendesha baiskeli. Anadokeza kuwa maarifa ya kidhana ya fizikia yanayotumika katika kuwezesha udumishaji wa urari hauwezi kutumika badala ya maarifa ya utendaji ya jinsi ya kuendesha baiskeli, na kuwa ni muhimu kuelewa asili na msingi ya aina zote mbili za epistemolojia.

Katika wakati wa hivi karibuni, wanaepistemolojia Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Jonathan Kvanvig, Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski wamedokeza kuwa hatufai kuwa na mtazamo kuhusu lugha. Epistemolojia inafaa kutazama vipengele vya watu (yaani, maadili ya kiakili) badala ya vipengele vinavyowakilisha madai fulani. Hili ni, kwa ufupi, kwa sababu aina za juu zaidi za ufanisi wa kuelewa unajumuisha vipengele ambavyo haviwezi kupatikana kutoka mtazamo wa maarifa unaotoa sababu na ambao ni wa kweli.

 Imani 

Mara nyingi, taarifa za "imani" humaanisha kuwa mzungumzaji anatabiri kuwa kitu fulani kitakuwa cha maana au kufanikiwa kwa njia fulani — labda mzungumzaji anaweza "kuamini katika" timu ya kandanda anayoipenda zaidi. Hii si aina ya imani ambayo kawaida huangaziwa katika epistemolojia. Aina ya imani ambayo huangaziwa ni ile ambapo "kuamini kitu fulani" kunamaanisha tu dhana zozote zinazoeleweka kuwa za kweli. Kwa mfano, kuamini kuwa "Anga ni rangi ya bluu" ni kweli.

Maarifa yanamaanisha kuwa na imani, kwa hivyo taarifa kuwa, "Najua kuwa anga ni rangi ya bluu, lakini siamini", ni ya kukanganya. Kwa upande mwingine, maarifa kuhusu imani haimaanishi kuwa wakati wote mtu anakubali ukweli huo. Kwa mfano taarifa kuwa, "Najua kuhusu astrolojia, lakini siiamini" haifuati mpangilio sawa. Pia kuna uwezekano kuwa mtu anaamini astrolojia lakini anajua kidogo sana kuihusu (inaweza kuwa kinaya kuamini kitu fulani ambacho mtu hajui chochote kukihusu).

Imani ni dhana binafsi ya kimsingi inayoweza kufanya mapendeleo kwa vitendo vya kibinafsi, huku ukweli ukiwa hali isiyofanya mapendelo ya mtu binafsi.

Wanafunzi wengi husoma kuhusu imani wakati wanaposoma kuhusu semina za Kisokrati.

 Ukweli 

Ikiwa imani ya mtu ni ya kweli si jambo linalotakiwa ili mtu aamini jambo hilo. Kwa upande mwingine, ikiwa kitu fulani kinajulikana dhahiri, kwa vyovyote hakiwezi kuwa uwongo. Kwa mfano, mtu anaamini kuwa daraja fulani ni salama na linaweza kupitika, na anajaribu kulivuka; kwa bahati mbaya, daraja hilo linavunjika kwa sababu ya uzito mwingi. Inaweza kusemekana kuwa aliamini kuwa daraja ni salama, kwa sababu ni wazi kwamba halikuwa salama. Kwa kutofautisha, ikiwa daraja kwa kweli liliweza kubeba uzito wake, basi mtu huyo anaweza kusema kwamba alijua daraja hilo ni salama, angalau wakati huo. Ili mtu aweze kuhesabu jambo fulani kama maarifa, lazima jambo hilo liwe la kweli. Kuna dhana inayotufanya tuhisi kuwa ukweli lazima uambatane na imani yetu.

Ufafanuzi wa Kiaristoteli wa ukweli unasema: "Kusema kuhusu jambo ambalo lipo kuwa halipo, au kusema kuhusu jambo ambalo halipo kuwa lipo, ni uwongo. Hata hivyo, kusema kuhusu jambo ambalo lipo kuwa lipo, au kuhusu jambo ambalo halipo kuwa halipo, ni ukweli."

 Sababu za kuunga mkono 
 Plato 
Katika majadiliano ya Plato yaliyoitwa Theaetetus, Sokrates anachunguza nadharia mbalimbali kuhusu kiini cha maarifa, ya mwisho ikiwa kuwa maarifa ni imani ya kweli "iliyofafanuliwa " — kumaanisha kuwa imeelezewa au kufafanuliwa kwa njia fulani. Kulingana na nadharia kuwa maarifa ni mtazamo unaotoa sababu na ambao ni wa kweli, ili kujua ikiwa madai fulani ni ya kweli, lazima mtu aamini madai yafaayo ya kweli, na pia awe na sababu nzuri ya kufanya hivyo. Matokeo ya hili ni kuwa hakuna mtu ambaye atapata maarifa kwa kuamini kuwa jambo lililofanyikia ni la kweli. Kwa mfano, mtu mgonjwa ambaye hana ujuzi wa matibabu. Lakini mwenye mtazamio mzuri wa maisha, huenda akaamini kuwa atapona ugonjwa alionao haraka. Hata hivyo, hata kama imani hii itakuwa ni ya kweli, mgonjwa yule  hatakuwa amejua kuwa angepona kwa sababu imani yake ilikosa sababu.

Ufafanuzi wa maarifa kama imani ya kweli yenye sababu ilikubalika na wengi hadi miaka ya 1960. Wakati huu, jarida liliandikwa na mwanafalsafa wa Marekani Edmund Gettier ambalo lilisababisha majadiliano mengi. Tazama nadharia za sababu kwa mitazamo zaidi kuhusu dhana hii.

 Shida ya Gettier 
Mwaka wa 1963 Edmund Gettier aliuliza maswali mengi kuhusu nadharia ya maarifa iliyokuwa maarufu miongoni mwa wanafalsafa kwa maelfu ya miaka. Katika kurasa chache, Gettier alidokeza kuwa kuna wakati ambapo imani ya mtu huenda ikawa yenye sababu na ya kweli, lakini ikose kutazamwa kama maarifa. Yaani, Gettier alidai kuwa ingawa imani ya kweli katika madai ya kweli ni lazima ili madai hayo yajulikane, hayatoshi. Kama tu katika picha ya hapa juu, dai la kweli linaweza kuaminika na mtu binafsi (eneo la rangi ya purple) lakini bado lisiwe katika sehemu ya "maarifa" (eneo la rangi ya manjano).

Kulingana na Gettier, kuna wakati ambapo mtu hana maarifa, hata wakati hali zote ni sawa. Gettier alipendekeza majaribio mawili ya kifikira, ambayo wa leo hujulikana kama "Mifano ya Gettier," kama upinzani dhidi ya dhana ya kijadi ya maarifa.  Mojawapo ya mifani hiyo ilihusu Smith na Jones, wanaogojea matokeo yao ya maombi ya kazi moja wanayoitaka wote wawili. Wote wawili wana mapeni kumi mfukoni. Smith ana sababu nzuri sana za kuamini kuwa Jones atapata kazi ile na, isitoshe, anajua kuwa Jones ana peni kumi mfukoni (alizihesabu muda mfupi uliopita). Kutokana na hili Smith anahitimisha kuwa, "mtu atakayeipata kazi ile atakuwa na peni kumi mfukoni." Hata hivyo, Smith hajui kuwa hata yeye ana peni kumi mfukoni. Isitoshe, Smith, na si Jones, ndiye atakayepata kazi ile. Ingawa Smith ana ushahidi mzuri unaomfanya kuamini kuwa Jones atapata kazi ile, yeye amekosea. Smith ana imani yenye sababu nay a kweli kuwa mtu mwenye peni kumi mfukoni atapata kazi; hata hivyo, kulingana na Gettier, Smith hajui kuwa mtu mwenye peni kumi mfukoni atapata kazi, kwa sababu imani ya Smith ni kuwa "...ukweli kulingana na idadi ya peni katika mfuko wa Smith, ingawa Smith hajui ni peni ngapi zilizopo ndani ya ndani ya mfuko wa Smith, na anahusisha imani yake...na hesabu ya idadi ya peni katika mfuko wa Jones, ambaye anaamini akiwa amekosea kuwa ndiye atakayepata kazi ile." (see  p. 122.) 

 Majibu kwa Gettier 
Majibu ambayo yameibuka kuhusu mawazo ya Gettier ni mengi. Kawaida, yamehusisha majaribio mengi kutoa yanayotoa ufafanuzi kuhusu maarifa yanayotofautiana na ufafanuzi wa jadi, kwa kutazama maarifa kama imani ya kweli yenye sababu huku wakiongeza sababu Fulani ya nne, au kwa kuunda kuibua mbinu nyingine tofauti kabisa.

 Ukosefu wa kasoro, ukanaji wa kutowezekana 
Katika jibu moja kwa Gettier, mwanafalsafa wa Marekani Richard Kirkham pia amedokeza kuwa ufafanuzi wa kipekee wa maarifa ambao  hauwezi kamwe kukataliwa na mifano nyingine ni ule wa ukosefu wa kasoro. Ili kufuzu kama kipengele cha maarifa, nadharia inasema, imani lazima iwe si ya kweli tu bali lazima iwe na sababu, sababu ya imani inafaa kulazimisha ukweli wake. Kwa maneno mengine,  sababu ya imani lazima isiwe na kasoro.

Tena hali ya nne ya maarifa inaweza kuwa ni ukanaji wa kutowezekana. Nadharia ya uwezekanaji inadokeza kuwa lazima pasiwe na ukweli mkuu au ukweli unaoshinda sababu zinazotoa ushahidi kwa kwa ukweli wa mtu. Kwa mfano, ikiwa mtu fulani anayeitwa S anaamini kuwa alimuona Tom Grabit akiiba kitabu kutoka maktabani na anatumia hili kama ushahidi wa dai kuwa Tom Grabit alikiiba kitabu kutoka maktabani. Pingamizi kwa dai kama hilo huenda likawa, "Pacha wa Tom Grabit  anayeitwa Sam anaishi katika mji mmoja na Tom."  Ikiwa hakuna pingamizi zilizopo kuhusu dai la mtu Fulani, mada fulani inaweza kupewa sababu au ushahidi wa kiepistemolojia.

Mwanafalsafa wa Kihindi, B K Matilal, ametumia mapokeo ya Navya-Nyaya ya kuwa na kasoro kama jibu kwa mtanziko wa Gettier.

Nadharia ya Nyaya inatofautisha kati ya jua p na kujua kuwa fulani anajua p – haya ni matukio tofauti, yenye hali tofauti zinazoyasababisha.

Kiwango cha pili ni aina ya kuashiria ambao si wazi ambao kawaida hufuata baada ya kipindi cha kujua p (maarifa simpliciter).  Mfano wa Gettier unachambuliwa kwa kuashiria mtazamo wa Gangesha (karne ya 13), ambaye anatazama imani yoyote ya kweli kama maarifa;  kwa hivyo imani ya kweli iliyotokana na njia mbaya huenda ikatambulika kama maarifa simpliciter kupitia mtazamo huu. Swali la ushahidi linaibuka katika kiwango cha pili, wakati ambapo mtu anatafakari kuhusu maarifa yanayozingira imani mtu aliyonayo. Mwanzoni, kuna ukosefu wa kutokuwa na uhakika, kwa hivyo inakuwa imani ya ukweli. Lakini kipindi kinachofuata, wakati ambapo msikizaji anakaribia kuanza kazi ya kujua ikiwa yeye anajua p, shaka huenda zikaibuka.  "Ikiwa katika baadhi ya kesi za kama za Gettier, mimi nimekosa katika hitimisho langu kuhusu maarifa ambayo ninayo ya imani fulani (kwani ushahidi huenda ukawa si wa ukweli kamili), basi nimekosa kuhusu ukweli wa imani yangu – na hili linawiana na dhana ya kuwa na kasoro ya Nyaya: si madai yote ya maarifa yanayoweza kubaki imara dhidi ya utetezi."The Gettier problem is dealt with in Chapter 4, Knowledge as a mental episode. The thread continues in the next chapter
Knowing that one knows.  It is also discussed in Matilal's Word and the World p. 71-72.

 Utegemeaji 
Utegemeaji ni nadharia inayodokeza kuwa imani ni ushahidi wake katika (au vingenevyo inapewa ushahidi kwa njia ambayo inatazamwa kama maarifa) ikiwa tu inazalishwa na michakato ambayo kawaida inatoa idadi kubwa ya mpango imani za kweli na za uwongo zinapolinganishwa.

Matumizi mengine ya epistemolojia ni kama:
 Hesabu na sayansi
 Matibabu
 Neurolojia
 Elimunafsia
 Falsafa
 Fasihi

 Tazama pia 
 Mbinu ya kisayansi

 Tanbihi 

 Marejeo na masomo zaidi 
 The London Philosophy Study Guide  offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Epistemology & Methodology 
 Annis, David. 1978. "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification", in American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 213-219.
 Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1936. Language, Truth, and Logic.
 BonJour, Laurence. 2002. Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
 Boufoy-Bastick, Z. 2005. "Introducing 'Applicable Knowledge' as a Challenge to the Attainment of Absolute Knowledge", Sophia Journal of Philosophy, 8: 39-51.
 Bovens, Luc & Hartmann, Stephan. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 Butchvarov, Panayot. 1970. The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
 Cohen, Stewart. 1998. "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 289-306.
 Cohen, Stewart. 1999. "Contextualism, Skepticism, and Reasons", in Tomberlin 1999.
 Dancy, Jonathan. 1991. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Second Edition). John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-631-13622-3
 DeRose, Keith. 1992. "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15: 213-19.
 DeRose, Keith. 1999. "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense", in Greco and Sosa 1999.
 Descartes, Rene. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy
 Feldman, Richard. 1999. "Contextualism and Skepticism", in Tomberlin 1999, pp. 91–114.
 Gettier, Edmund. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Analysis, Vol. 23, pp. 121–23. Online text.
 Greco, J. & Sosa, E. 1999. Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell Publishing.
 Harris, Errol E. 1970. Hypothesis And Perception, George Allen and Unwin, London, Reprinted 2002 Routledge, London.
 Harwood, Sterling. 1989. "Taking Skepticism Seriously -- And In Context", Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 12.
 Hay, Clare. 2008. The Theory of Knowledge: A Coursebook , The Lutterworth Press, Cambridge.
 Hawthorne, John. 2005. "The Case for Closure", Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Peter Sosa and Matthias Steup (ed.): 26-43.
 Hendricks, Vincent F. 2006. Mainstream and Formal Epistemology, New York: Cambridge University Press.
 Kant, Immanuel. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason.
 Keeton, Morris T. 1962. "Empiricism", in Dictionary of Philosophy, Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, pp. 89–90.
 Kierkegaard, Søren. 1844. Philosophical Fragments.
 Kirkham, Richard. 1984. "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 93.
 Klein, Peter. 1981. Certainty: a Refutation of Skepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
 Kyburg, H.E. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
 Korzybski, Alfred. 1994 (1933). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, Fifth Edition. Ft. Worth, TX: Institute of General Semantics.
 Lewis, David. 1996. "Elusive Knowledge." Australian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549-67.
 Morin, Edgar. 1986. La Méthode, Tome 3, La Connaissance de la connaissance (Method, 3rd volume : The knowledge of knowledge)
 Morton, Adam. 2002. A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge (Third Edition) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 1-4051-0012-5
 Nelson, Quee. 2007. The Slightest Philosophy, Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing, 296 pages.
 Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 2002. Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
 Plato. Meno.
 Popper, Karl R. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
 Preyer, G./Siebelt, F./Ulfig, A. 1994. Language, Mind and Epistemology, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
 Rand, Ayn. 1979. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, New York: Meridian.
 Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
 Santayana, George. 1923. Scepticism and Animal Faith, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons - London: Constable and Co.
 Spir, African. 1877. Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie (Thought and Reality: Attempt at a Renewal of Critical Philosophy) , (Second Edition) Leipzig: J. G. Findel.
 Schiffer, Stephen. 1996. "Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96:317-33.
 Steup, Matthias. 2005. "Knowledge and Skepticism", Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Peter Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds.): 1-13.
 Tomberlin, James (ed.). 1999. Philosophical Perspectives 13, Epistemology, Blackwell Publishing.
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, C.K. Ogden (trns.), Dover. Online text.

 Viungo vya nje 

Makala katika Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
 Bayesian Epistemology by William Talbott.
 Epistemology by Matthias Steup.
 Evolutionary Epistemology by Michael Bradie & William Harms.
 Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science by Elizabeth Anderson.
 Naturalized Epistemology by Richard Feldman.
 Social Epistemology by Alvin Goldman.
 Virtue Epistemology by John Greco.

Viungo vingine:
 Synthese, An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
 Research articles in Epistemology - PhilPapers
 What Is Epistemology? — a brief introduction to the topic by Keith DeRose.
 Certain Doubts  — a group blog run by Jonathan Kvanvig, with many leading epistemologists as contributors.
 The Epistemological Lifeboat  by Birger Hjørland &  Jeppe Nicolaisen (eds.)
 The Epistemology Page by Keith DeRose.
 Justified True Belief and Critical Rationalism by Mathew Toll
 Epistemology Papers a collection of Michael Huemer's.
 Epistemology Introduction, Part 1  and Part 2  by Paul Newall at the Galilean Library.
 Teaching Theory of Knowledge (1986) — Marjorie Clay (ed.), an electronic publication from The Council for Philosophical Studies.
 Epistemology: The Philosophy of Knowledge  — an introduction at Groovyweb.
 Introduction to Theory of Knowledge  — from PhilosophyOnline.
 The Peripatetic  A practical introduction to the theory of knowledge
 Theory of Knowledge  — an introduction to epistemology, exploring the various theories of knowledge, justification, and belief.
 A Theory of Knowledge by Clóvis Juarez Kemmerich, on the Social Science Research Network, 2006.
 An Introduction to Epistemology  by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
 Knowledge is the eye of all - Knowledge in the Upanishads 
 On a Critical Epistemology
 Language Perception and Action: Philosophical Issues 

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