Operation Torch

Operation Torch (initially Operation Gymnast) was the attack of the United States–United Kingdom coalition (the Allies) during the North African campaign on the Vichy French territories in the Second World War. It began on 8 November 1942 and ended a week later.

The Soviet Union had requested several times to the United States and the United Kingdom to immediately act in Europe and open a second front to share the burden with the Red Army in the fight against Nazi Germany. While many American commanders supported Operation Sledgehammer to directly land in the occupied European continent, the British believed it would end in disaster so they proposed an attack on the Vichy French territories in North Africa to clean up the Axis forces out of North Africa, increasing control of the Mediterranean Sea and preparing for an invasion of Southern France in 1943 (in reality it was in 1944). US President Franklin D. Roosevelt suspected that activities in Africa would affect the European advancement in 1943 but still supported the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

 Background 
The Allies had planned for an attack led by the US-UK coalition in North Africa/French Maghreb – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the Vichy French territories in name only. With the British entering from Egypt, the Allies can execute an operation to surround the Axis troops in North Africa. Vichy France had around 125,000 troops in the territorial areas and also coastal artillery, 210 usable tanks but outdated and around 500 aircrafts, half of which were fighter aircrafts Dewoitine D520 with strength near equal to many British and American fighter aircrafts. These forces were split, which include 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia and 50,000 in Algeria with coastal artillery and a small number of aircrafts and tanks. Aditionally, there were around 10 warships and 11 submarines in Casablanca.

 Political reasons 
The Allies believed the Vichy French would not resist, partly because of information provided by American consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algeria. France was a former member of the Allies so the US Army prohibited firing first unless they shoot. However, they were still feared about the French still angrying about the United Kingdom's actions in June 1940 to prevent Germany from taking warships from France's hands. The attack on Mers-el-Kébir killed around 1,300 French sailors.

Rating the good altitudes of the French military was also important and many plans have been executed to ensure their cooperation instead of resistance. The Germans' help for France was mainly by air, many Luftwaffe's aircraft bombers were used to attack the Allies' aid to North Africa, targeting Allied ports in Algeria and along the North African coast.

 Commanders 
Lieutenant general Dwight D. Eisenhower was given the command of the operation, the headquarters were based in Gibraltar. The Allied Naval Expeditionary Force commander was Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham along with Vice Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, who planned the landing.

 Stragetic controversies 
Long-serving American commanders remained highly opposed, after the Allied High Command met in London on 30 July 1942, General George Marshall and Admiral Ernest King did not approve the plan. Marshall and other American generals wanted a landing on northern Europe in the final year, but the British disapproved. After Prime Minister Winston Churchill urged a landing of French North Africa in 1942, Marshall suggested to President Franklin D. Roosevelt about cancelling the priorities on Germany and focusing on the Pacific War. Roosevelt said it would not help the Soviets, with Marshall failed to change the British opinion about it, Roosevelt requested that Operation Torch should be more prioritised than any other activities and should be executed as soon as possible, this was Roosevelt's one of two direct orders to generals in the war.

When executing the plan, Allied military stragetists had to consider the political situations in North Africa, which were complex and also many aspects of political and diplomatic factions. The US had recognized Pétain and the Vichy government in 1940, while Britain did not and instead recognized the Free French government-in-exile of General Charles de Gaulle and agreed to finance them. North Africa was a part of France's colonial system and had supported the Vichy France in name only, but that support was not popular among the public.

The United States' strageties when planning the attack were to calculate the complexity on the ground. Planners assumed that if leaders were aided by the Allies then they would liberate themselves and the United States had embarked on detailed negotiations under US Consul General Robert Murphy in Rabat with the Free French movement. Because the British had committed to Charles de Gaulle financially and diplomatically, so it was obvious that the Americans would have to begin a series of negotiations with the Free French and also the attack itself. Due to many competitions of many factions in North Africa, their supports were uncertain and because the need of secrecy so detailed plans were not able to be shared with the French.

 Allied plans 
Oran, Algiers and Casablanca were selected to be the main targets. The most ideal stragety was to landing in Tunis to ensure the security for Tunisia and create an convenient opportunity to prevent/cut supply lines that go through Tripoli to Rommel's forces in Libya. However, Tunis was too near to the Axis' airfields in Sicily and Sardiniaso there were no hope of victory. The Allies would land in Bône in eastern Algeria, near Tunis than Alger about 300 mi (480 km). Limited resources made the Allies could only land in three beaches and Eisenhower – who believed any plans should include the landings in Oran and Algiers – had two main options: choose the west, land in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then quickly move to Tunis which is about 500 mi (800 km) to Algiers from the east once the Vichy opposition is surpressed; or choose the east, land in Oran, Algiers and Bône then proceeding overland to Casablanca which is about 500 mi (800 km) to Oran from the west. Eisenhower supported to the east's plan because of the advantages it brought to take Tunis early and a Casablanca landing near the Atlantic Ocean would be more dangerous than the Mediterranean Sea.

However, there were concerns that the operation would end Spain's neutral status. If Spain joins the Axis powers then the Strait of Gibraltar might be closed fully, cutting the Allies' communication lines so the Casablanca landing was chosen to reduce the risk because many forces in Algeria and Tunisia might be aided by land from Casablanca (although there were significant difficulties) in case if many straits are closed.

Marshall's opposition to the plan delayed the plan for a month, and his opposition to the landing in Algeria questioned some British military leaders about Marshall's stragetic capability; the Royal Navy had controlled the Strait of Gibraltar and Spain could not intervene because Francisco Franco needed to take care of his nation and himself after the Spanish Civil War ended rather than joining World War II. The landing in Morocco removed control with Tunisia. Eisenhower told Patton that the past six weeks were his hardest time in his life. When Eisenhower approved the landings in Algeria and Morocco, he pointed that the decision had increased the chance to take Tunis early because the Axis forces would take more time to send troops to Tunisia.
Category:World War II
Category:Invasions of World War II
Category:North African battles of World War II
Category:1940s conflicts