අර්ථය

භාෂා බාවිතයේදී 
කිසියම් වදනක තේරුම හෙවත් අදහස අර්ථය යනුවෙන් භාෂා බාවිතයේදී යෙදේ.

‘ගොයම් කැපීම‘ හා ‘පතල් කැපීම‘ ආදී අවස්තාවන්හිදී  එකම “කැපිම“ යන වචනයට දෙන අරුත, යෙදෙන සංදර්භය අනුව වෙනස් වේ. තවද එකම වදන වුවද දීගුකලක් බාවිතයේදී 
 අර්ථ විපරීත වීම
 රූපය(අක්ෂර) වෙනස්වීම
 කටවහර අනුව පරිවර්‍තනයවීම

ඒ ඒ සමයන් හෝ දර්ශනයන් හි යෙදෙන සංකල්ප වටහාගැනීමට නම්, එම දර්ශන පද්ධතිය ඇසුරෙන්ම, වදන යෙදී ඇති අන්දම (අර්ථය) හඳුනාගත යුතුවේ.

විශේෂයෙන් ආගමික සංකල්ප සැසඳීමේදී මෙම වරද නිතර සිදුවනු දැකිය හැක. 

 දාර්ශනික භාවිතයේදී 
මෙම වරද දාර්ශනික විටින්ග්ස්ටෛන් විසින් යන්ත්‍රය නිකන් තිබීම ලෙස හඳුන්වයි.

තවද  අර්ථය යන්න ප්ලේටෝ ගේ සංවාදයක් From Plato By R. M Hare
We
 may illustrate this point…from his treatment of the Socratic search for
 definitions. When Socrates asked questions like 'What is justice?' or 
'What is The Just?', there are at least three things which we might take
 him as wanting. Does he want a definition of a word or of a thing; and 
if of a thing, of what kind of thing—of something we might come across 
in this world, or of something which is only available to thought? Let 
us try constructing a little dialogue to shed light on this question, 
without making Plato say anything which will not go into Greek.
ENGLISH STRANGER: When Socrates says in the Theaetetus that
 mud (or clay) is earth mixed with water, is he saying what the word 
'mud' means?
PLATO: Yes, of course. And what the word 
means, the thing mud, is what one has to be able to define if one is to 
show that one knows what mud is. As Socrates says, 'Do you think anybody
 understands the word for anything, if he doesn't know the thing, what 
it is?'.
E.S.: But what is this mud he has to know? Is it what one gets on one's boots?
Plato: How can you expect me to think that? One only gets 
particular bits of mud on one's boots, and one can touch and see them, 
but not know them in the sense I'm after. I am after what Mud is in 
itself, not after particular bits of mud. In the Parmenides I made 
Socrates reluctantly aware that, even with so down-to-earth a thing as 
mud, there is this Mud-in-itself that one has to know if one is to have 
knowledge what mud is.
E.S.: So when Socrates says mud is earth mixed with water, is he defining a word or a thing?
Plato: I don't see the difference. To define the word is to
 say what the thing is that it means. But this thing isn't what one gets
 on one's boots; it is what the mind has before it when one thinks of 
mud.
E.S.: Perhaps we could make the matter clearer if I asked 
you whether Socrates' definition is the sort of thing that would go into
 a dictionary. A dictionary is a collection of definitions rather like 
that first one you or your students compiled and which got into your 
works under the name Definitions. We have very big dictionaries now; the
 biggest is produced in Oxford and it defines 'mud' as 'a mixture of 
finely comminuted particles of rock with water' (you see, we like to be 
more exact nowadays). Other definitions in it which are very like those 
to be found in your Definitions are ‘even: the latter part or close of 
the day'; 'wind: air in motion…usually parallel to the surface of the 
ground'. And you might find the following familiar: 'circle: a plane 
figure…bounded by a…circumference, which is everywhere equally distant 
from a point within, called the centre'; at least there is something 
very like this in that famous Seventh Letter attributed to you.
Plato: Your dictionary does sound as if it were after the 
same sort of things as I am after, namely statements in words of what 
other words mean; and of course what they mean are Ideas.
Without prolonging the dialogue, I think we can claim that 
it is simply not profitable to ask Plato the question 'Are you defining 
words or things?', because he would not understand what we were asking. 
In general it is very unclear, and contentious even among philosophers 
today, whether metaphysics, logic and linguistics are separate 
disciplines (we would not get a straight answer from either a logical 
positivist like Rudolf Carnap or an idealist like F. H. Bradley); and 
therefore it is not surprising that Plato cannot tell us which he is 
doing…
    Source: Hare, R. M. Plato. Past Masters series. © 1982. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.අනුව දාර්ශනික ගැටලුවක්  ලෙස විමසුමට ලක්වේ.උදාහරණයක් ලෙස ඔහුගේ සංවාදයක දැක්වෙන "මඩ" පිළිබද විග්‍රහය සලකමු.මෙහිදී “මඩ“ යනුවෙන් කුමක් සැලකිය යුත්තේද? යන්න විමසා බැලේ.මඩ යනු ජලයද නොවේ. මඩ යනු පස් ද නොවේ. මඩ යනු ජලය හා පස් යන දෙකමද නොවේ.මඩ යනු  කුමක්දැයි(සංකල්පීයව) නොහඳුනන්නෙකුට, මඩ ස්පර්ශ කලද, ඒ පිලිබඳ වැටහීමක් වේද? ( මැණික් නොහඳුනන්නාට තිරිවානා මෙන්)

 මේ පිළිබඳ විග්‍රහයක් සඳහා බලන්න - පෙනීම හා තථ්‍යතාව Appearance and Reality 

 ආශ්‍රය