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## The intentionality of questions

## - a critique of Searle's analysis of speech acts

Simon Borchmann Roskilde University sub@ruc.dk

Abstract: Searle's analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts entails that one of the two components of a speech act is a proposition. Th e fi  rst part of the article demonstrates that the analysis and classifi  cation is misleading when applied to  three  authentic examples of questions embedded in an everyday activity. Considerations  concerning  the  situations  that  give  rise  to  the  questions suggest that the discrepancy is due to assumptions about intentionality and perception  implied  by  the  proposition-based  analysis  and  classifi  cation  of speech acts. In the second part of the article, Searle's theory of intentionality and perception is compared with cognitive ethnographic observations of the situations  that  give  rise  to  the  three  questions.  Th e  comparison  shows  that Searle's  theory  of  intentionality  and  perception  is  insuffi ciently  informative and partly misleading as regards human intentionality and perception in the performance of an everyday activity. Th e claim is that the assumptions about intentionality  and  perception  that  form  the  basis  of  the  proposition-based analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts are insuffi cient as a basis for a general theory of speech acts.

Keywords:  speech  acts,  classifi  cation,  questions,  intentionality,  perception, cognitive ethnography

## 1.  An  adequate  basis  for  a  general  theory  of  speech  acts:  purpose  and outline

In this article, I will identify and discuss a problem in speech act theory. Th e problem appears when Searle's analysis of the general form of speech acts, F(p), is applied to everyday language use. Searle's analysis implies that one of the two components of a simple speech act is a proposition, but many speech acts do not contain a proposition. Th is discrepancy is, of course, recognized by Searle, but it is treated as a semantic detail that poses no challenge to the analysis of the general form. However, if one considers what the propositionbased  analysis  entails  concerning  the  speech  situation,  it  appears  that  the discrepancy refl  ects a far more comprehensive and fundamental problem that has something to do with our relation to the world as humans, more specifi  cally with what we direct our attention to in the environment, what we perceive, and how we perceive. Hence, the primary aim of this article is to raise awareness of what the proposition-based analysis of speech acts entails concerning our relation to the world in terms of intentionality and perception. Th e claim is that the assumptions about intentionality and perception that form the basis of Searle's proposition-based analysis of speech acts are inadequate as a basis for a general theory of speech acts, and that an informative and accurate analysis of certain types of commonly used speech acts requires an alternative basis.

Th e idea that speech acts include a proposition is found in a wide range of linguistic descriptions, characteristics, classifi  cations, and typologies, both of speech acts in general and of specifi  c classes of speech acts. Th e reason for choosing Searle's theory as the subject of scrutiny is that the analysis, F(p), originates in Searle's (1969) theory of speech acts, that the theory has been pervasive, that it is explicit and quite precise with regard to the function of the proposition in a speech act, and fi  nally that it is, in fact, based on a theory of intentionality and perception. Th us, the criticism here is directed at Searle's analysis.  However,  the  fact  that  the  proposition-based  analysis  is  widely shared suggests that this criticism of Searle's analysis may be relevant to all of the descriptions of everyday language use that assume that the proposition is a component of speech acts in general - indeed to any direct and unrefl  ected use of the term 'proposition' in the analysis of everyday language use.

Th e  basis  for  the  identifi  cation  of  the  problem  can  be  found  in  three authentic examples of questions forming part of an activity of everyday life. Th e  examples derive from a cognitive ethnographic (Hutchins 1995) study with particular regard to the socio-cognitive tasks (Harder 2010) that language fulfi  lls  (Borchmann  2019,  2018,  2016).  Th e  advantage  of  this  method  with regard to the issues of intentionality and perception is that it provides access to ample information concerning the language users' knowledge and skills, the practical and cognitive tasks (Cook 1994, Vicente and Rasmussen 1992, Roth and Woods 1989, Rasmussen 1985) that the language users are confronted with and need to solve, the non-linguistic behavior that accompanies the linguistic behavior and serves as criteria for the understanding of the linguistic behavior (Wittgenstein 2009/1953), the goals and values (Hodges 2007, Hodges and Baron 1992) that guide the activity that the speech acts are part of, and the lawful constraints that set the boundary conditions on the space of possibilities (Flach and Rasmussen 2000, Rasmussen et al 1993).

First, I will outline Searle's analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts. Next, I will show that Searle's analysis and classifi  cation are misleading when applied to  three  simple,  ordinary  speech  acts  in  everyday  language  use.  In  section

4, I will consider the origin of the discrepancy between Searle's analysis and the speech acts, starting with the situations in which the speech acts arise. Th ese  considerations  point  to  Searle's  assumptions  about  the  cognitive basis of speech acts, i.e. the understanding of the world that motivates and guides the use of language. In Section 5, Searle's theory of intentionality and perception is outlined, and then, in section 6, I will show that some of the assumptions that characterize Searle's theory of intentionality and perception are in confl  ict with what one can observe in the situations that give rise to the three speech acts investigated. In section 7, I will compare the aforementioned situations with the situation that Searle's theory derives from and explain the discrepancy by pointing out that the subject of Searle's theory is intentionality and  perception  in  an  idle  state  whereas  the  subject  of  the  observations  of everyday life is intentionality and perception in operation. Following that line of thought, I will consider two internal discrepancies in Searle's presentation of the theory of intentionality and perception. Section 8 comprises some fi  nal considerations and a conclusion.

## 2. Searle's analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts 2.1. Th e analysis of speech acts

Searle's theory implies that speech acts can be analyzed in two components. Th e analysis is represented using the following symbolism, where F and p represent each of the two components (Searle 2010:7, 1996/1979:1, 1996/1969:31):

F(p)

p  stands  for  propositional  content.  In  'the  simple  cases' ,  the  propositional content is a combination of a reference, e.g. Sam , and a predicating expression, e.g. smoke (Searle 1996/1969:33). However, Searle considers other semantic structures to be p's, e.g. thetic structures like it  rains .  Th e reason is that the criterion of p is not the structure, but the function. Th e initial defi  nition of the function of p is that it 'raises the question of truth' (Searle 1996/1969:126). Th e combination of a reference to Sam and the predicating expression smoke , for example, raises the question of truth of smoke of Sam. Th e central point is that the combination only raises the question of truth; it does not provide any indication of the speaker's commitment with regard to the truth. Th is function is later described in terms of 'conditions of satisfaction' (Searle 1996/1979:126131). Conditions of satisfaction involve a more general notion than the notion of truth conditions. But as regards the function of the propositional content, it  is  basically the same, that is, to determine the conditions the world must meet if  p  is  to  be  true  or  -  as  Searle  prefers  -  satisfi  ed.  Th e  conditions  of satisfaction of the speech act Sam smokes , thus, are that Sam smokes. Searle's concept of conditions of satisfaction is applied to propositions that form a part of speech acts and is designed to cope with the fact that a proposition in a speech act may be related to the world in more ways than the way we describe with  the  distinction  true/false.  A  proposition  that  forms  part  of  a  speech act can, for example, be related to the world in such a way that the speaker wants the world to be changed so that it matches the proposition, e.g.: Sam, smoke! .  Th e conditions of satisfaction of this speech act are that Sam obeys the  order  and  smokes.  Certainly,  one  of  the  preparatory  conditions  of  this speech act is that the proposition is false at the time of speech, but in a theory of everyday language use, this is not a suffi ciently informative characterization of the relation between the proposition and the world. It is relations like these that the concept of conditions of satisfaction should be able to accommodate. Th us, p's  function in a speech act is to determine the conditions the world must meet if the speech act is to be satisfi  ed.

F  stands  for  illocutionary  force  indicating  device  and  indicates  the illocutionary force of the speech act. Th e initial defi  nition of the function of F is that it 'shows how the proposition is to be taken' (Searle 1996/1969:30). In Searle (1996/1979) this function is accounted for based on the terminology of 'direction of fi  t' invented by Austin (2019/1953). However, Searle refers to Anscombe's (1957) illustration of the distinction, and as Humberstone (1992) notes, this is quite diff  erent from Austin's. In Searle's account, direction of fi  t covers the possible ways in which a representation of a state of aff  airs  can be related to the world (Searle 1996/1983:7-13, 1996/1979:3-4). Th e starting point  is  that  p  -  in  so  far  as  it  determines  the  conditions  the  world  must meet - is a representation of a state of aff  airs, and, therefore, can match or not match the world. Th e symbolism F(p) indicates that F operates on p (Searle 1996/1969:122) and that the meaning of a speech act is p as a function of F. F operates on p by relating p to the world. Th e concept of direction of fi  t implies that F can relate p to the world in basically two ways: either F indicates that p matches the world, or F indicates that the world changes so that it matches p. Th e former relation is called word to world direction of fi  t, the latter world to word direction of fi  t. One can then distinguish between more specifi  c world to word relations, also called illocutionary points (Searle 1999:151, 1996/1979: 3). One subtype of the world to word relation is speaker-based and implies that the speaker must change the world so that it matches p. Another subtype is hearer-based and implies that the hearer must change the world so that it matches p (Searle 1999:151). Th e analysis can be illustrated by examples that include the same proposition in diff  erent directions of fi  t (revised version of Searle 1996/1969:22):

- (1)  Sam smokes
- (2)  Sam, smoke!
- (3)  I, Sam, promise to smoke

Th ese three speech acts include the same reference and the same predicating expression in the same relation of predication. Th e  diff  erence  is  that  in  (1) F indicates that p matches the world. In (2) F indicates that the hearer must change the world so that it matches p. In (3) F indicates that the speaker will change the world so that it matches p.

A crucial point in the theory of speech acts is that the proposition is not the  minimal unit of linguistic communication (Searle 2001/1965:80,85). In line with this, Searle presents his analysis in strong opposition to traditional semantic descriptions that assume that the proposition is the minimal unit of linguistic meaning. But the analysis is nevertheless based on the assumption that one of the two basic components of a simple speech act is a proposition. Searle does acknowledge that the propositional content of some speech acts is not a complete proposition and mentions exclamations such as Hurrah and questions such as How many people were at the party (Searle 1996/1969:30-31). Likewise, Searle notes that speech acts such as greetings have no propositional content (Searle 1996/1969:67). But these observations have no implications for the analysis of the general form; this analysis closely follows the simple case which, according to Searle, involves reference to a single object and the predication of simple expressions, and thus, a proposition. Accordingly, Searle presupposes that p is a proposition in the initial defi  nition of the function of F (see above) and refers to propositions as 'entire propositional contents' (Searle 2015:34). Furthermore, it is precisely the proposition's function as a specifi  cation of conditions of satisfaction in the sense of a representation of a state of aff  airs that forms the basis for the classifi  cation of speech acts.

## 2.2. Searle's classifi  cation of speech acts

Searle  distinguishes  between  classes  of  speech  acts  based  on  the  indicated relation between p and the world. Th e two basic directions of fi  t, word to world and world to word, form the basis of four classes. Th ere are assertives, i.e. F indicates that p matches the world, e.g. (1), directives, i.e. F indicates that the hearer must change the world so that it matches p, e.g. (2), commissives, i.e. F indicates that the speaker will change the world so that it matches p, e.g. (3), and declarations. Declarations are characterized by a double direction of fi  t, i.e. F implies that the world is changed so that it matches p in that F indicates that p matches the world, e.g. the chairperson of the meeting says Th e meeting is  adjourned .  A  special  kind  of  direction  of  fi  t  is  added,  which,  allegedly, consists of not having a relation to the world. Th is relation is called null and implies that the speaker associates an emotion with p and presupposes that p is true, e.g.: Cool that Sam smokes . Speech acts with null direction of fi  t are called expressives.

In  section  3,  the  analysis  and  classifi  cation  will  be  applied  to  three  questions. Th e consequence of Searle's classifi  cation is that questions are a subclass of directives (Searle 1996/1979:14, 1996/1969:69). Th e basis of this classifi  cation is  that  they  are  attempts  by  the  speaker to get the hearer to do something. According to the classifi  cation, directives are characterized by a hearer-based world to word direction of fi  t, that is: 'Th e  propositional content is always that the hearer H does some future action A ' (Searle 1996/1979:14). In Searle (1999), the illocutionary point of directives is described as: 'to get the hearer to behave in such a way as to make his behavior match the proposition' (Searle 1999:149). Th us, if we take the proposition-based analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts at its word, it means that a question is an attempt to get the hearer to behave in such a way as to make his behavior match the proposition.

## 3. Questions in everyday life

Searle (1999, 1996/1979, 1996/1969, 2001/1965) does not provide a thorough semantic and pragmatic analysis of questions (see Mortensen 2020, this issue, Nielsen 2020, this issue, for discussions). 2 All  in  all,  he  does  not  pay  much attention  to  them.  However,  if  you  apply  the  analysis  and  the  associated classifi  cation  to  a  small  set  of  authentic  examples  of  questions,  substantial problems arise. Examples (4), (5), and (6) below are authentic examples of ordinary, simple speech acts performed by humans in the pursuit of a daily life activity. Th e speech acts diff  er with regard to their semantic structure, and thereby they enable a nuanced examination of the proposition-based analysis and classifi  cation.

- (4)   hvad  er  skybasen  (Pilot  on  the  ground  to  pilot  in  the  air,  Hammer Airfi  eld 2018)

'what is the cloud base'

- (5)   hvem betalte (Pilot student to air fi  eld attendant, True Airfi  eld 2017) 'who paid'
- (6)   er  du  fastspændt  (Pilot  student  to  gliding  instructor,  True  Airfi  eld 2017)

'are you buckled up'

In  section  4  and  6,  I  will  present  analyses  of  (4),  (5),  and  (6) 3 that  involve the speakers' knowledge and abilities, the practical and cognitive tasks they are  confronted  with,  as  well  as  other  relevant  conditions  that  apply  in  the situations in which the speech acts arise. Th e following analyses are limited to the semantic structure with the objective of comparing an analysis of the structures with Searle's analysis and direction of fi  t-based classifi  cation.

Th e  semantic  content  of  (4)  is  not  a  proposition.  It  is  incomplete  both  as a  predication  (Strawson  1974,  Searle  1996/1969)  and  as  a  specifi  cation (Borchmann 2018). As a predication, the content is incomplete, since (4) does not include a predicating expression. As a specifi  cation, (4) is incomplete, since it  does not include an indication of the state of the identifi  ed variation the cloud base. One might argue that the speaker's use of the pronoun hvad 'what'

presupposes that the cloud base is something. But fi  rst of all, this presupposition is  trivial  and  irrelevant.  It  is  not  part  of  the  information  communicated, but a prerequisite for the communication. Secondly, presuppositions imply a  direction  of  fi  t  that  is  contrary  to  Searle's  characterization  of  directives. Presupposed propositions are assumed to match the world and, hence, have a word to world direction of fi  t - and it would be pointless to say that the illocutionary point of (4) is that the listener 4 must change the world so that the cloud base is something when the speaker presupposes that it is something. Indeed, saying that the listener must change the world so that the cloud base is something is a category mistake. Finally, the presupposition 'the cloudbase is something' is incomplete as a specifi  cation of conditions of satisfactions. (4), thus, does not include a proposition, and therefore, the content of (4) cannot be assigned to a direction of fi  t.

Referentially, (4) is characterized by the fact that the speaker, by means of  the  expression skybasen 'the  cloud  base' ,  identifi  es  a  variation  in  the environment. A variation is a limited set of mutually exclusive possible states, the current state of which is constantly changing within certain constraints (Borchmann 2018). Examples of variations are the wind direction, the wind speed, the speed of your car, the distance to the car in front of you, the presence of vehicles coming from behind, the temperature of your coff  ee, the price of petrol, the exchange rate, and the time of day. (4) can then be said to diff  er from a specifi  cation in that there is no indication of the state of the variation (Borchmann 2018). Instead, the pronoun hvad 'what' indicates that the state of the identifi  ed variation is undetermined, and as a fundament (Hansen & Heltoft   2011), i.e. fi  rst position in a verb-second clause, the pronoun serves as an F indicating that the speaker is asking for an indication of the state of the variation. If we try to apply the term direction of fi  t to this relation by saying that  the  listener  must  make  the  world  match the content by indicating the state of the variation, we use the term 'fi  t' to refer to a relation that diff  ers from the one Searle refers to in the characterisation of directives and elsewhere. Th e listener should not do anything to make the world match the propositional content. What the listener must do is to indicate the state of the variation that the speaker identifi  es. Th us, using the term fi  t to refer to this relation implies a  semantic  drift    from  denoting  a  relation  between  a  proposition  and  the world, to denoting a relation between an identifi  cation of a variation and an indication of the state of the variation. Th is relation is not a relation of match between  a  proposition  and  the  world.  Pragmatically,  it  is  an  interactional relation between two speech acts: a request and a response. Semantically, it is a relation of exclusion: the speaker identifi  es a set of possible states, and the listener indicates a state and thereby excludes all the other possible states.

(5) can be described semantically as an open proposition, or, with Searle's notion,  as  a  propositional  function  (Searle  1996/1969:31).  It  includes  a predicating expression, but instead of a reference to a referent that fulfi  lls the role 'agent' specifi  ed by the predicating expression betale 'pay' , the speaker uses the pronoun hvem 'who' ,  indicating an undetermined variable. Th is  implies that  the  determination  of  the  conditions  of  satisfaction  is  incomplete,  and therefore the content of (5) cannot be assigned to a direction of fi  t. In other words, the term open proposition is not a solution to the problem, but the name of the problem. Again, one can argue that the speaker presupposes that someone paid. But this presupposition is obvious and part of the meaning of the verb betale 'pay' at the semantic level of frames, and as such it is a prerequisite for the communication rather than a part of the information communicated. Surely, it makes no sense to say that the speaker wants the listener to change the world so that it matches the open proposition ' x paid'. If we try to adapt Searle's fi  t-based functional characteristics to the example by saying that the listener must make the world match the propositional content by completing the proposition, i.e. providing the reference that determines the undetermined variable, we use the term 'fi  t' in a way that diff  ers from the way Searle uses it elsewhere: What must be changed to match the content is not the world. Th us, the  listener  should  not  pay  anyone  anything.  Th e  listener  must  perform  a speech act that provides the speaker with the complement to the propositional function. Th is is not a relation between the world and a proposition. Th e use of  the  term  'fi  t'  for  this  relation  implies  a  drift    from  one  dimension  of  the communication, namely what the utterance is about, to another dimension of the communication, namely the interaction. Again, this relation is not a relation of match between the world and a proposition. Pragmatically, it is an interactional relation between a request for information and a response. Semantically, it is a relation between a variable and an expression that binds the variable.

Th at  is,  as  regards  speech  acts  that  do  not  include  a  proposition,  the analysis  and  the  related  direction  of  fi  t-based  classifi  cation  are  misleading. But, in fact, there is also a problem with questions that include a proposition. According to Searle's analysis of the 'simple case' , (6) can be said to include a  proposition.  Th us,  the  verb fastspændt 'buckled  up'  can  be  considered  a predicating expression, and the speaker's use of the deictic pronoun du 'you' is a reference to the listener. However, the point of the speech act is not that the listener should change the world so it matches the proposition. Th e listener should not buckle himself up. Th e term fastspændt 'buckled up' indicates one of two possible states that the back-seat harness system may be in, fastened or released, and the listener must confi  rm (or disconfi  rm) that the system is in the fastened state. Again, the application of Searle's direction of fi  t-based functional characteristics to such examples implies a drift   from what the speech act is about to the linguistic interaction: fi  t is no longer a relation between the world and a proposition. Instead, it is the illocutionary force indicating device that indicates what the listener must do, and what the listener must do is not to change world so that it matches the proposition, but to perform a speech act that completes the interaction as indicated by the illocutionary force indicating device and constrained by the verbal fastspændt 'buckled up' .

T o  sum  up,  if  we  apply  Searle's  direction  of  fi  t-based  description  of directives to questions, it results in several diff  erent meanings of the notion 'world to word direction of fi  t':

- a) Sam, smoke!: world to word = to change the world so that it matches the proposition
- b) what is the cloud base: world to word = to indicate the state of a variation identifi  ed by the speaker
- c) who paid: world to word = to identify the referent that fulfi  lls the role that the speaker specifi  es
- d) are you buckled up: world to word = to confi  rm the state of a variation indicated by the speaker

b, c, and d do not conform to the way the concept direction of fi  t is defi  ned by  Searle  and  illustrated  by  Anscombe's  example.  It  is  true  that  in  some pragmatic descriptions, the term 'fi  t' is used to refer to the relation between a  speech  act  and  a  (rhetorical)  situation  (Bitzer  1992),  and  in  ecological psychology, perception of an aff  ordance 'fi  t' , i.e. a relation between an action and a possibility for action off  ered by the environment, is a major principle of selection and learning (Gibson 2000), but this is not how Searle uses the term. If we extend the concept to include relations like b, c, and d, we are left   with an extremely vague, eclectic notion of fi  t. We cannot base an informative analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts on such vagueness.

Within philosophy of language and linguistics it is not an unusual strategy to  circumvent  the  problems  of  such  discrepancies  between  a  postulated semantic  structure  and  the  linguistic  material  analyzed  by  altering  the material  and  then  claiming  that  the  result  of  the  alteration  is  what  the language user, in eff  ect, is saying. Within linguistics, there is even a name for the subject of such alterations. Th us, by classifying the material as an 'ellipsis' , the analyst is allowed to add words to the material so that it corresponds to a  postulated  structure.  Th e  strategy  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  speaker's psychological point of departure is a mental representation that corresponds to the postulated structure, and that the missing parts of the representation are omitted only in the articulation. In the case of (5), the analyst might, for example, alter the authentic utterance hvem betalte 'who paid' to sig mig hvem der betalte 'tell me who paid' (see, for example, Searle 1996/1969:69). Needless to  say,  I  am  embarrassed  on  behalf  of  language  sciences  when  I  encounter such manipulations. Because the limitations of the strategy in relation to a scientifi  c description of language and language use are obvious. First of all, you cannot claim that what you describe is language or language use. What you are doing is projecting a counterfactual ideal - what the speaker should have said according to a hypostatized norm. As if it took a logician to show people at last what a proper sentence looks like (Wittgenstein 2009/1953:43). Secondly, the description cannot be falsifi  ed empirically. It is self-affi rming and immune to observations. Th ese are general scientifi  c problems with this strategy. But when the strategy of ellipsis is applied to questions, it does not even solve the problem. As can be illustrated by the alteration of (5) to sig mig  hvem  der  betalte 'tell  me  who  paid' ,  the  alteration  reproduces  the  fl  aw as  regards  the  assumed  function  of  the  propositional  content  in  directives: the variable who is  still not bound. Hence, p is not a complete specifi  cation of how the hearer should behave to make his behavior match p; this would require a name of the payer. Here, it becomes clear that it is the very idea of   a proposition that is problematic in the description of questions. Th e proposition is, by defi  nition, a specifi  cation of conditions of satisfaction in the sense of a complete representation of a state of aff  airs. However, the psychological point of departure for the articulation of questions like (4) and (5) is precisely an inadequate specifi  cation, and this is refl  ected in the semantics of the questions by variables like hvad 'what' or hvem 'who' . Long story short: regardless of the way we approach the analysis and classifi  cation of the function of speech acts, it  is  a  mistake  to  ignore  the  particular  words  and  semantic  structures  that characterize them.

Searle' s  distinction between F and p is an important contribution to the analysis of speech acts, and the assumption that p specifi  es the conditions of satisfaction and that F indicates the relation between p and the world, holds remarkably well in the case of assertions and promises. But it does not hold in general. It should also be noted that Searle (1969:66-67) in describing diff  erent types of illocutionary acts actually formulates rules that are informative and accurate when applied to speech acts such as (4), (5), and (6). Th ese rules, on the other hand, are incompatible with the analysis of the general form and the direction of fi  t based characteristics of the class of directives. Th at is, the above application  of  Searle's  analysis  and  classifi  cation  to  three  simple,  ordinary speech  acts  results  in  discrepancies,  and  the  conclusion  is  clear:  Searle's analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts is misleading as regards questions.

## 4. Considerations on the situations in which the speech acts occur

As I have framed the comparison above, one can immediately pinpoint the cause of the discrepancies, namely the assumption that a simple speech act includes a proposition and an indication of the proposition's relation to the world. Th is implies that the psychological basis of language production is a proposition in some kind of relation to the world. Th at is, as the speaker opens the mouth, he or she has a mental content that is complete in the sense that it can be converted into a propositional format and, thus, assigned to a truth value. Th e problem with this assumption when applied to everyday language use is that we oft  en speak and write based on understandings of the world that are insuffi cient relative to the solution of the practical task we are confronted with. And most importantly, we are speaking and writing precisely to remedy this  defi  ciency.  Th is  basic  condition  can  be  illustrated  by  the  situations  of (4),  (5),  and  (6)  as  they  are  paradigmatic  examples  of  such  conditions.  (4) is performed by a glider pilot on the ground who has to decide whether he should take off   now or wait until later. One of the decision factors is the cloud base, i.e. the distance between the terrain and the underside of the clouds. If it is low, e.g. 700 meters, the pilot will wait to start on the assumption that it will rise within the next hour. If it has a suitable height, e.g. 900 meters, he will start now. Th e speaker has, in fact, immediate access to the information he requests. Th us, if he raises his head, he can see the distance between the terrain and the underside of the clouds, and, indeed, the speaker raises his head and looks toward the sky several times prior to (4) in order to determine the cloud base.

Figure 1. Th e cloud base relative to the speaker's visual attention in situation (4)

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However, the speaker cannot diff  erentiate the height with suffi cient precision to make a decision. Th e precision required is beyond the speaker's perceptual ability. Th us, the speaker's perception is insuffi cient in relation to the solution of the cognitive task he is confronted with. Th erefore, he radios the pilots of a glider that took off   a little while ago and that he can see is close to the cloud base and asks them what the cloud base is. 5 Th e pilots of this glider can look at their altimeter, and because they are close to the cloud base, they can estimate the vertical distance to it with reasonable accuracy and add the estimate to the value indicated by the altimeter. Th at is, (4) is an act to rectify a defi  ciency in the speaker's understanding of the world.

(5) is uttered by a student glider pilot who has just received a sandwich. He  now  wishes  to  pay  for  the  sandwich.  He  knows  there  have  been  two other  students  at  the  bakery  to  buy  sandwiches,  and  that  one  of  them  has paid,  but  he  doesn't  know  which  one,  and  therefore  he  doesn't  know  who to pay. Hence, he lacks information relative to the selection of an action he must perform. Th e  current defi  ciency  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  event  that provides  the  basis  for  obtaining  the  necessary  information,  precedes  the situation  in  which  the  speaker  fi  nds  himself,  and  that  the  speaker  was  not present at the event. Th erefore, he performs a speech act in order to obtain the necessary information. In the current situation, none of the people who were at the bakery are there with him, so the speaker then asks a person whom he presumes has spoken to those who were present at the event and thereby obtained the necessary information.

(6)  is  performed  by  a  student  glider  pilot  who  is  about  to  take  off    in  a two-seater with an instructor in the back seat. Th e training involves that the student behaves as if she were the commander. Before a commander takes off    with  a  passenger,  he  or  she  must  ensure  that  the  passenger's  harness  is fastened. However, the student sits in front of the passenger and cannot see the passenger's harness.

Figure 2. Th e speaker's perspective in situation (6)

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Th erefore, as part of a prefl  ight procedure, the student asks the instructor if he is buckled up.

In all three cases, the starting point for the language use is an insuffi ciency in the understanding of the world. Th e current defi  ciencies are due to various conditions. In situation (4), the speaker's ability to diff  erentiate is not good enough relative to the precision that his decision requires. In situation (5), the speaker is separated in time and place from the event that includes the information the speaker needs. In situation (6), the speaker has indirect access to the information required. She can open the hood, release her harness, get out of the airplane, turn around and face the passenger in the back seat and check for herself whether the passenger's harness is fastened. But this would be timeconsuming and resource intensive, and, hence, inconvenient. What is common to the three defi  ciencies is that they can be corrected by the use of language. Th e examples, thus, illustrate how unique and fantastic a tool language is. In situation (4), the speaker can use language to acquire information that exceeds his perceptual ability. Th e use of language in this situation even contributes to  the  perceptual  ability  of  the  speaker,  since  the  speaker  can  compare  the more precise answer with his own perception. In situation (5), the speaker can simply transcend time and place by using language; by asking, he can get information about a past event that took place miles away from him. In situation (6), the speaker can solve a cognitive problem quickly and effi ciently with  minimal  energy  exertion  by  means  of  language.  Th e  examples,  thus, show how language complements and expands our perceptual system, and, hence, also the evolutionary edge that language provides: language is a sociocognitive system that enhances our possibilities for coordination of attention and action enormously and thereby our possibilities for sharing information, cooperating and learning (Tomasello 2008, Deacon 1997). Th e crucial point in  relation  to  the  semantic  analysis  of  questions  is  that  defi  ciencies  in  our understanding of the world are not only the psychological starting point for language production, they are also the motive for language production. It is therefore plausible that defi  ciencies in our understanding of the world are one of the driving forces in the development of language. To put it another way, questions  tell  us  something  fundamental  about  our  species'  relation  to  the world, and if we want to base a description of language on a theory about that relation, it is fatal to ignore this.

Th e  above  analyses  of  the  situations  in  which  these  speech  acts  occur indicate  that  the  problem  that  arises  when  the  proposition-based  analysis and classifi  cation is applied to everyday language use is not merely a semantic problem. It arises, so to speak, prior to the language use and has something to do with the cognitive basis of language use. What is it that we direct our attention to in the environment, what is it we perceive, and why and how do we do it? For that reason, the second part of this article is about intentionality and  perception.  Taking  a  starting  point  in  an  account  of  the  theory  of intentionality  and  perception  that  provides  the  basis  for  the  analysis  and classifi  cation of speech acts presented in the fi  rst part of the article, I will argue that the problem is comprehensive and fundamental.

## 5. Searle's theory of intentionality and perception

Th e basis for the assumption that the proposition is a fundamental component of a speech act is explicit in Searle's philosophy. Th us, Searle's theory of speech acts is based on a theory of intentionality (Searle 2010, 1996/1983) and a theory of  perception (Searle 2015). As the theory of perception is an extension of the theory of intentionality, I will deal with them jointly. Searle considers the philosophy of language to be a branch of the philosophy of mind, understood as a study of the capacities of the mind to relate the organism to the world, and whereas the theory of speech acts (1996/1969) was proposed before the theory of intentionality, Searle characterizes the theory of intentionality as a foundation for the theory of speech acts (Searle1996/1983:vii). Th e relation between language and intentionality is described, as closely as possible, as the following: 'Th e limits of meaning are the limits of intentionality, and it is a consequence of our analysis of intentionality that there is a limited number of things you can do with language' (Searle 1999:151). I believe that this is the right way to approach the relation between language, humans, and the world. Th e starting point of the study that has given rise to some of the observations presented here is that a theory of language must be founded on a theory of our relation to the world as a species, including a theory of intentionality and perception. However, my claim is that the problem we have encountered in the analysis and classifi  cation of questions is contingent on and can be located to  specifi  c  assumptions  of  intentionality  and  perception  that  characterize Searle's theory. More precisely, my claim is that the observed discrepancies are a consequence of misleading assumptions about what our attention is directed at in the environment, what we perceive, and how we do it. Th e main purpose of this article is to raise awareness of the inadequacies of these assumptions and thereby pave the way for informative and accurate analyses and classifi  cations of  questions  and  other  speech  acts.  In  this  section,  I  will  present  the  key assumptions in Searles theory of intentionality and perception.

Searle presents his theory  of  perception  in  opposition  to  theories characterized by the assumption that perception is not direct, but mediated by  representations  of  the  world,  be  it  conceptual  structures,  categories, impressions, sense data, propositions, or the like. Th is assumption has been dominant in Western philosophy since Descartes and has led to a number of philosophical problems, including skepticism and the mind-body problem. Searle proposes to solve these problems by simply abandoning the assumption of indirect perception. Th us, Searle's theory implies that we have direct access to the world, i.e. that we do not have to perceive anything before we perceive something in the world. I share this assumption. So, what is crucial in the current discussion of the basis of an analysis and classifi  cation of questions is not whether we perceive directly. What is crucial is what we perceive directly.

Searle's  theory  of  perception  is  based  on  a  theory  of  intentionality. Perception is considered a form of intentionality. Intentionality is that feature of the mind by which it is 'directed at or about or of object and states of aff  airs in the world' (Searle 2015, 1999, 1996/1983). Th is concept of intention must not be confused with intention in the sense of intending. Intending is just one of the ways in which our mind is directed at something or is about something in the world. A motorist on a highway may intend to change lanes, but the motorist may also hate to change lanes, hope to change lanes and see that another motorist is changing lanes. All these relations between the driver's mind and a lane change are examples of intentionality according to the above concept of intention. A theory of intentionality is fundamental to a theory of language use because it covers the aboutness aspect, i.e. the fact that when we talk, we talk about something. Virtually all analyses of a linguistically conveyed unit of information are based on an assumption of aboutness. Th at goes for the reference-predicate analysis and the topic-comment analysis. Th at is, when a theory of language use is based on a theory of intentionality, speaking/writing and listening to/reading about something is considered to be a more specifi  c case of directing one's attention to something.

According to Searle (2015), intentionality is a biological phenomenon. As a biological phenomenon, intentionality can be regarded as a result of evolution and thus something that provides an edge in the niches of humans and animals.

As the biologically primitive forms of intentionality, Searle mentions conscious perception,  intentional  action,  hunger,  thirst,  and  such  emotions  as  anger, lust, and fear. Belief, desire, and hope, on the other hand, are derivative (Searle 2015:33). Th e general term for all these forms of intentionality is 'intentional state' . Th e central assumption in Searle's theory of perception is that one can distinguish between intentional states, on the one hand, and what we perceive, on the other. Intentional states are our experiences of what we perceive, and they are ontologically subjective, i.e. they exist only as experienced by a human or an animal subject. What we perceive, on the other hand, is ontologically objective, i.e. it exists independent of any experience. According to Searle, what we direct our mind to and perceive directly are objects and states of aff  airs. Objects and states of aff  airs are not defi  ned, but they are characterized as something that, unlike experience, has a 'more or less permanent existence' (Searle 2015:67). Furthermore, they are something that can satisfy an intentional state, in other words, they are facts. Examples of objects include a computer screen, books, papers, a table, a chair, and a dog; examples of states of aff  airs include that a  blue  book is on top of a brown table and that it is raining. Th e  basis  for this  -  somewhat  unrefl  ective  -  assumption  of  what  we  perceive  directly  is something we will return to in Section 7. Th e theory of perception must solve the epistemological problems associated with the assumption that what we perceive, is merely an ontological subjective representation of the ontological objective. Searle deals with this by distinguishing between intentional states with objects and intentional states without objects. Th e intentional states that characterize perception are of the fi  rst type. For these states, it holds that they are causally dependent on their object. And the theory implies that awareness of this causal relationship is intrinsic to the intentional state. Th is  property of  intentional  states  is  called  causal  self-refl  exivity  (Searle  2015:58).  States without objects, on the other hand, are not causally conditioned by objects, but have internal causes (Searle 2015:19). Against this background a distinction is  made between representations and presentations. Searle writes: 'When I think about something, my thoughts are representations of whatever it is that I am thinking about. But when I directly perceive it - when, for example, I see it - then my visual experiences are actual presentations of the object and state of aff  airs seen' (Searle 2015:41). Presentation is a subspecies of representation (Searle 2015:75) that diff  ers from other representations by being causal selfrefl  exive.

Whereas intentional states diff  er as regards causal self-refl  exivity, Searle nonetheless assumes that they have the same structure. Th us, every intentional state consists of a content and a psychological mode (Searle 2015:33). Content covers  the  experiential  part  of  the  intentional  state.  It  is  described  as  'an impression that this is how things are' (Searle 2015:56). Content, however, is  a  metaphorical  term  for  thought  processes  that  are  fi  rst  and  foremost characterized  by  their  function,  namely  that  they  determine  conditions  of satisfaction,  i.e.  how  the  world  must  be  if  the  intentional  state  is  satisfi  ed. A  mode  is  a  psychological  state  that  relates  the  content  to  the  world.  It encompasses all the psychological states that are directed towards something, for example, belief, desire, fear, hope, and perception. Th e content can basically be related to the world in two ways as described using the concept of direction of fi  t  we  encountered in the analysis of speech acts in section 2. Either the content fi  ts the world, or the world must change so that it fi  ts the content. As to  perceptions,  beliefs,  and  event  memories,  they  are  'supposed  to  fi  t  how a  world  is.  Th ey  have  the  mind-to-world  direction  of  fi  t'  (Searle  2015:35). Hence, they are satisfi  ed. 'Desires and intentions are not supposed to fi  t how the world is, but how we would like it to be or how we intend to make it. Th ey have the world-to-mind direction of fi  t' (Searle 2015:35). Th ey are not satisfi  ed.

Th e last feature Searle associates with intentional states is that they never occur alone, but always come as part of a network of intentional states, and that the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state are determined in relation to the network. As an example, he mentions that in order to believe that  Obama  is  president,  you  must  believe  that  the  United  States  has  a government, that it is a republic, that there are presidential elections to elect the government's leader etc. To describe this relation between an intentional state and other states, Searle uses the term Network. In connection with this term, Searle notes that perception takes place on the background of abilities and  capacities  (Searle  2015:37,44),  and  that  the  same  visual  stimuli  will produce totally diff  erent reactions in people depending on these background capacities (Searle 2015:74). Some of these abilities are innate, others cultural.

It  is  evident  here  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  the  analysis  of intentional states and the analysis of speech acts. Just as a speech act includes a  determination  of  conditions  of  satisfaction,  namely  the  proposition,  and a feature that relates the conditions of satisfaction to the world, namely the force indicator, an intentional state includes a determination of conditions of satisfaction, namely the content, and a feature that relates the conditions of satisfaction to the world, namely the mode. Searle pulls no punches in pointing out this similarity. In several places Searle even writes that intentional states have propositions as content. Although some formulations give the impression that  intentional  states  with  a  proposition  as  content  are  merely  a  subset  of intentional states,  Searle  writes  that  it  applies  'in  general'  (Searle  2015:14) that intentional states are satisfi  ed or not satisfi  ed, and that the content of the intentional state determines its conditions of satisfaction. Th us, the content of an intentional state has the same function as a proposition of a speech act.

By  identifying  and  explaining  this  similarity  in  structure  and  function, Searle has grounded his theory of speech acts in a theory of intentionality and perception. Th is close relation may also be seen as a refl  ection of Searle's principle of expressibility (Searle 1996/1969:19-21), i.e. all that can be meant can be said.  Th e  correlation  between  content  and  mode,  on  the  one  hand, and the proposition and force indicator, on the other, means that we can not only express a state of aff  airs, but also how we relate to the state of aff  airs, whether we hope, want, believe, intend, or fear it, etc. If truth conditions are the starting point, this is certainly a major step forward towards an informative and accurate semantics and grammar of everyday languages.

## 6. Intentionality and perception in everyday life

We can now compare Searle's theory of intentionality and perception with the intentional states that the utterances (4), (5), and (6) are indications of. Th e basis  for  determining  what  the  speakers  direct  their  attention  to  and  what they perceive is a cognitive ethnographic (Hutchins 1995) study of the activity of soaring in two Danish soaring clubs, with particular regard to the role of language in the pursuit of this activity. Th e study is motivated by systematic discrepancies between the established descriptions of information structure, on  the  one  hand,  and  the  use  of  language  in  everyday  life,  on  the  other (Borchmann 2019). Th e purpose of the study is to discover and describe the socio-cognitive tasks that language serves. Th e theoretical foundation is that human communication relies on a common ground and an ability for shared intentionality,  originally  evolved  in  the  context  of  collaborative  activities, providing  for  an  especially  salient  and  solid  common  ground  (Tomasello 2008). In line with this, it is assumed that language evolves in and is embedded in non-communicative  activities (Linell 2004, Wittgenstein 2009/1953, Vygotsky  1978,  Malinowski  1969/1923).  It  is  through  the  contribution  of language to life-sustaining activities that a selection pressure is exerted on the ability to acquire a language (Deacon 1997). Th e methodological implication of  this  theoretical  foundation  is  that  the  language  must  be  studied  as  part of  an  activity.  Th is  linguistic  approach  can  be  called  ecological  pragmatics (Borchmann  2018,  Hodges  2009).  Th is  study  extends  over  three  years  of participatory observations and includes participation in tuition, exams, ground staff   work, aircraft   maintenance, 200 hours of fl  ight, and data collection in the form of audio recordings, video recordings with head mounted camera, texts, observations, interviews, diaries and fi  eld notes. In the cognitive analysis of the situations,  I  rely  on  the  speech  acts  that  are  included  in  the  situations, the non-linguistic actions and events that precede, accompany, and follow the speech acts, and on observations of what comprises important information for glider pilots, what sources of information they use, their procedures for gathering and sharing information, and the search strategies they use. Th e cognitive analysis is supplemented and supported by studies of visual attention in everyday activities. In the comparison, I will concentrate on situation (4) and use situation (5) and situation (6) exclusively to provide perspective. Th e reason for this is that it is situation (4) that questions the foundations of Searle's CET/CEST (+1/+2)

* Pot. VFR-flight hours

* PFD (18m, 46kg/m') [km]

*PFD (Std, 41kg/m?) [km]

* PFD (hang-glider) [km]

* PFD (paraglider) [km]

* PFD downwind (paraglider) [km]

* Solar radiation [Watt / m2]

* High clouds

* Midlevel clouds

* Spread tendency

* Octas of Cumulus

* Cumulus tops MSL [m]

* Cumulus base MSL [m]

* Usable height GND [m]

* Usable height MSL [m]

* Thermal strength [m/s]

* Thermal strength (Balloon) [m/s]

* Dist. between thermals [km]

* Weather conditions

8

0%

60

9

0%

10

100%

11

100%

50

45

12

13

12

theory of intentionality and perception. If what Searle calls 'the content of our intentional states' could be insuffi ciently specifi  c, even when the ontologically objective part of the world we direct our attention to is immediately available, the content of our intentional states could be inadequate in every conceivable situation. In this case, Searle's theory could be misleading in general.

As a preliminary point I will establish what the speaker directs his attention to in situation (4) and show that Searle's distinction between the ontological objective  entities  and  our  ontological  subjective  experiences  has  decisive explanatory value. What the speaker directs his attention to in situation (4) is present, and thus directly available to perception. Th e speaker's attention is directed to the cloud base. Th e cloud base is both the subject of attention in the speaker's non-linguistic acts of lift  ing his head and looking up, performed immediately prior to the speech act (4), and in the speaker's speech act (4), motivated  by  the  inadequate  result  of  the  non-linguistic  act.  Furthermore, the  speaker,  along  with  the  other  pilots,  has  directed  his  attention  to  the cloud base several times in the minutes prior to situation (4) as well as at the pre-fl  ight  briefi  ng  an  hour and a half prior to (4). In fact, even in the days leading up to the fl  ight, the speaker has directed his attention to the cloud base several times by reading weather forecasts. Th e reason why the speaker pays so much attention to the cloud base is that it is one of the lawful constraints that determine his action possibilities as a glider pilot. Among other things, the cloud base determines the usable height in the upcoming fl  ight. Th e cloud base is  generally  important  in  aviation  because  it  determines  visibility.  For these  reasons,  the  cloud  base  is  a  well-established  topic  of  communication in aviation: there are precise, standardized instruments to measure the cloud base, common terms, phraseology, and units to communicate about the cloud base, and well-established channels for sharing information about the cloud base and related factors. Th e aviation-specifi  c weather forecasts the speaker checks in the days before the fl  ight, thus, comprise specifi  c information about the cloud base and related factors, for example:

Figure 3. Weather forecast for pilots provided by an independent publisher.

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18

19

Cloud  bases  are  ontologically  objective  properties  of  the  world.  Th ey  are parts of the weather system, conditioned by the sun's eff  ect on the earth and the earth's rotation, and they exist independently of our experience of them. One can argue that the perception of cloud bases depends on the perceptual system of humans and on the perceptual ability of the individual, that we as humans select the cloud base as the property we direct our attention to among an infi  nite set of properties of the environment, that this selection is guided by human interests, and that these interests are a result of the alteration of the  environment  by  humans,  including  the  construction  of  aircraft    and the  possibilities  they  provide.  But  that  does  not  change  the  fact  that  there is also a cloud base if we do not direct our attention to it, nor that it varies independently of our experience of it. Th is ontological status is crucial for the understanding of the speaker's relation to the world. A change in the speaker's experience of the cloud base will not change the action possibilities the cloud base provides in a given situation, since these are lawfully determined (Turvey 1992, Turvey et al 1981, Gibson 1986/1979) and vary independently of his experience. Th is is precisely why the speaker could consider the information he picks up by means of the non-linguistic action to be insuffi cient,  this  is precisely why he seeks another more reliable source of information than his own perception, and this is precisely why he continuously seeks to update his experience of the cloud base. Th us, Searle's distinction between ontologically objective  and  ontologically  subjective  has  decisive  explanatory  value  for the speaker's behavior in situation (4). Situation (5) diff  ers from (4) in that the  subject  of  attention  is  not  available  to  perception.  Th e  payment  of  the sandwich is a past event. Furthermore, to pay is an institutional fact (Searle 1995:27, 1996/1969:50); pay designates a status function that humans impose on  physical  acts  (Searle  1995:41),  and  it  is  thus  not  something  that  exists independently of any human experience. However, the physical act that we impose a status function on can be considered ontologically objective, and it is a prerequisite for imposing the status function and for the explanation of why the speaker acts as he does in situation (5): he must believe that someone has performed the physical act that counts as paying. Situation (6) is similar to (4) in that the subject of attention is available for perception, albeit the speaker would have to make a time-consuming physiological eff  ort to perceive it (see section 4). However, the state of the harness system diff  ers from entities like the cloud base in that it is a property of a human-engineered, controllable system. As Gibson (1986/1979) puts it, it is a property of the environment that man has converted to change what it aff  ords him. In that respect, it may be considered to be ontological objective, i.e. something that exists independently of the speaker's experience of it, and this status helps to explain why the speaker acts like she does with language. So, Searle's distinction between ontologically objective and subjective also has an explanatory value as regards situations like situation (5) and situation (6). Th at is, as regards Searle's basic naïve realistic assumption, I believe it is the right basis for an analysis of these situations.

However,  when  we  compare  Searle's  description  of  what  we  direct  our attention to with situation (4), there is a discrepancy. Th e cloud base is not an object. Th e  cloud  base  is  the  vertical  distance  between  a  level  on  the  ground  (fi  eld elevation or mean sea level) and the level where air reaches 100% saturation, condenses, and the water in the air becomes visible to the human eye. It is thus a spatial relation between diff  erent substances in diff  erent forms, and it can be specifi  ed mathematically. Th e cloud base is also not a state of aff  airs - at least not if the state of aff  airs has a 'more or less permanent existence' (see section 5), since the cloud base varies continuously. Since it involves a constrained and structured variation, it may be considered a (permanent) property of the world. However, when the speaker directs his attention to the cloud base, he does so precisely due to its capacity to change. It is the present state of the variation that determines the speaker's action possibilities and to which he adapts his actions, and the state is changing continuously. Th is  relation not only applies to the cloud base, but to a number of other variations in the pilot's environment: the wind direction, the windspeed, the wind gradient, the dew point, the color of the cloud base, the shape of the cloud base, the shape of the edge of the cloud top, the height of the cloud, the cloud cover, the solar radiation, the airspeed, the ground speed, the altitude, the height, the course, the distance to terminal areas, the distance to the next waypoint, the distance to the nearest airfi  eld, the vertical speed, the thermal strength, the bank angle, the pitch, the yaw, the distance between thermals, etc. Indeed, what the glider pilot in situation (4) directs his attention to in general is variations.

Once  you  realize  that  what  the  speaker  is  directing  his  attention  to  in situation (4) is a variation, it becomes clear that the same applies to situations (5) and (6). Th e individual who paid for the sandwich may well be considered an object; but it is not that particular individual that the speaker directs his attention to. He cannot do so, because he doesn't know who it is. What he knows is that someone has paid, and that he has to pay whoever has paid. Th is knowledge is part of his ability to participate in a social system that enables the exchange of goods and services. Th is part of his knowledge corresponds to  what  has  been  described  in  schema  theory  as  a  slot  or  a  terminal  in  a memory structure (Minsky 1975, 1985). Th e  essential  point is  that  the  one who pays varies from situation to situation. Hence, what the speaker directs his attention to is a variation - not in a weather system, but in a social system of  status  functions.  And  unlike  the  cloud  base,  the  variation  of  which  is lawfully  determined,  this  variation  is  controllable  and  regulated  by  social norms and conventions. Furthermore, this variation diff  ers from the cloud base in that there is not the same set of possibilities from situation to situation. In the current situation, there are two possibilities. But next time the speaker has to pay someone who has paid for something, there will be a new set of possibilities. Th e practical task the speaker is faced with is to pay the one who has paid. To solve that task, he has to solve the cognitive task of fi  nding out who has paid. Th is implies that he directs his attention to the variation. In situation (6),  the  speaker's  attention  is  directed  at  the  state  of  the  back-seat  harness system. Th e harness is a small system attached to a seat in an aircraft   and can be  in  two  states:  fastened  or  released.  Sometimes  it  is  fastened,  sometimes released. Unlike the cloud base, this system is controllable. It varies with the harness operator's actions. Unlike the payer variation, the set of possibilities is the same in each situation, and unlike the cloud base, which includes a large set of possible states, it only includes two possible states. Th is is exactly why it can be handled and is handled with the binary yes/no question. Th us, the state of the harness system is also a variation. And for reasons of safety, the speaker must direct her attention to this variation and determine its state. Th at is, for all the situations of (4), (5), and (6) it applies that the speaker directs his or her attention to a variation. Th us, judging from the situations of (4), (5), and (6), Searle's assumption as to which ontologically objective entities we direct our attention to is misleading.

Th ere is also a discrepancy when we compare Searle's description of the intentional  states  of  perception  with  the  speaker's  perception  in  situation (4). What the speaker must perceive in order to determine the cloud base by means of visual perception is a structure in stimuli (see fi  gure 1). Th e speaker's problem in situation (4) is that his perception is insuffi cient  relative  to  the solution  of  the  task  that  motivates  the  allocation  of  attention  to  the  cloud base, namely to decide whether to start now or wait. Th at's why he radios the pilots in the air. Th us, the experiential component of the speaker's intentional state  of  perception  cannot  be  said  to  determine  conditions  of  satisfaction. On  the  contrary,  it  is  characterized  by  an  inadequate  specifi  cation.  If  we attempt to defend Searle's theory by claiming that what the pilot perceives is a defi  ciency, and that the defi  ciency represents the conditions of satisfaction, we are back in the solipsistic prison Searle is trying to free us from, namely the assumption that what we perceive is not the ontological objective entities, but  our  ontologically  subjective  experience  of  the  ontological  objective entities, i.e. the assumption of indirect perception. Hence, the theory cannot be saved by such ad hoc adjustments. It is also misleading as a description of the speakers' intentional state in situation (5) and situation (6), i.e. situations where  the  speaker  has  no  access  or  no  immediate  access  to  the  necessary information. Th ese intentional states are also insuffi cient as determinations of conditions of satisfaction. One can argue that the speaker in situation (6) could have a complete determination of conditions of satisfaction in the form of a representation of the harness system in one of the two possible states. But even if the variation only includes two possible states, it is of no benefi  t to the speaker to form a representation of the variation in either of the two states. I  have no evidence that the speaker did not form a representation, but it is implausible, since the cognitive load of pilots - and not least pilot students in the prefl  ight check gives an incentive to avoid any unnecessary cognitive eff  ort. And anyway, the representation is of no use to the pilot. She can just ask. In any case, Searle's assumption that intentional states are representations or  presentations  that  determine  conditions  of  satisfaction  is  misleading  as regards situations like (4) and (5).

Th e  above  analyses  also  demonstrate  that  directing  one's  attention  to something is not the same as perceiving it. Not even if what we direct our attention to is present and immediately available to perception as in situation (4).  Directing  one's  attention  to  something  is  an  act,  and  perception  is  the possible result of directing one's attention to something. What is crucial in describing situations such as (4) is that the act of directing one's attention to something can be completed without it resulting in an intentional state that determines conditions of satisfaction. When Searle categorizes perception as a form of intentionality, he does not distinguish between the act of directing one's  attention  to  something  and  perceiving.  Th ere  are  two  problems  with this. First, he does not take into account that perception for a large part must be learned. Although Searle emphasizes that perception must be learned, the analysis of intentional states assumes that the perceptual ability is complete. In situation (4), however, the speaker has not yet learned to diff  erentiate the cloud base well enough by means of perceiving. He can perform the act of directing his attention to the cloud base, but the result of the act is inadequate. To be sure, Searle notes that every perception takes place on a background of abilities and capacities (Searle 2015:37), but what this does to perception, how the background is established, and the role played by perception in establishing this  background  is  not  clear.  In  any  case,  the  assumption  of  background has no consequences for Searle's analysis of intentional states. Secondly, the temporal aspect is ignored, the fact that directing one's attention to something is something that takes place in time, and hence, that there is something that precedes, happens simultaneously with, and follows attentional acts. Searle does  note  that  intentional  states  are  processes  and  that  they  are  parts  of networks that determine an intentional state's conditions of satisfaction. But this has no consequences for the analysis of intentional states. In other words, background and network appear to be two cogs in the theoretical machinery that can turn without anything else moving.

Regarding  the  use  of  situation  (4)  as  a  basis  for  evaluating  a  theory of  perception,  it  can  be  objected  that  perception  should  be  described  on the basis of successful cases and not by means of errors or deviations. But the  inadequacy of  the  perception  in  situation  (4)  is  neither  an  error  nor  a deviation. Th e pilot must solve the cognitive task of selecting a future action. Appropriate selection requires information. Th e information he can pick up here and now is insuffi cient relative to the solution of the cognitive task of selecting a future action. Th erefore, he performs an act to provide the required information. First, he raises his head and looks towards the sky, and then he asks the pilots in the air. Both these acts are motivated by the inadequacy of the perception relative to the specifi  c requirements of the cognitive task, and guided by the requirements. Indeed, it may be argued that the inadequacy of intentional states is a general condition in the skillful practitioner's pursuit of  activities  in  a  dynamic  environment.  Studies  of  the  visual  attention  of humans engaged in activities show that their gaze shift  s from one region of the environment to another continuously. For example, the gaze of a driver steering through dense traffi c will shift   at approximately half-second intervals from the car in front, to oncoming traffi c,  to  the  car  in  front,  to  the  open roadway, to the near-side off  road etc. (Land & Tatler 2012 7:20). In trying to answer the question of what drives such sequences, studies with head-mounted eye trackers have established an intimate link between visual attention and the current action goals (see Tatler & Land 2015 for a review). Fixations are highly constrained to task-relevant information (Land & Tatler 2012 3, Rothkopf et al 2007, Hayhoe & Balard 2005), and the temporal patterns of fi  xations are largely determined by the action sequences (Land & Tatler 2012 3:29). Th us, vision leads action by about 0.5-1 second in a number of diff  erent activities (Tatler & Land 2015). Th at is, where we attend is not determined top-down by saliency, but guided top-down by tasks. Visual attention does more than support the immediate task. Some fi  xations are look-aheads, i.e. fi  xations on information not relevant to the immediate task, but relevant for a future task (Pelz & Canosa 2001:3593). In line with these observations, Tatler and Land (2015) suggest that it is appropriate to consider attention 'not as an isolated system, but as part of a broader network of vision, action, planning during interactions with the environment' (Tatler & Land 2015:391). Th e greater lead time by the eyes over action is specifi  c to experienced practitioners (Hayhoe et al 2012, Land 2006, Land & McLeod 2000), and more generally it could be argued that the perception of skillful practitioners is oriented towards future actions (Tatler & Land 2015, Foulsham 2014, Th omas & Riley 2014, Land & Tatler 2012, Buckley et al. 2011, Pelz & Canosa 2001, Land et al 1999, Patla & Vickers 1997, Land & Lee 1994). As to the adequacy of intentional states, the point is this: it may be that the perception of the driver who, 0.1 second ago, has directed his attention to the oncoming traffi c, is adequate. However, in a few tenths of a second, the perception will be inadequate relative to the task the driver is engaged in. Th at is, because practitioners engaged in activities needs to control the ongoing action and select future actions, because the conditions for the practitioners' control and selection of actions are constantly changing, and because they cannot pay attention to all these changes at once (Neumann

1990,  Allport  1989,  van  der  Heijden  1986),  the  inadequacy  of  perceptions is  a  general  condition  in  the  skillful  practitioner's  pursuit  of  activities  in  a dynamic environment. Th is is exactly why their gaze shift  s from one region of the environment to another continuously. Th ese movement are what Land & Tatler (2012 3:1) quite fi  ttingly describe as 'how our eyes question the world' .

Th e  inclusion  of  the  temporal  aspect  also  invites  refl  ection  on  Searle's description of the causal relation between ontologically objective entities and ontologically subjective intentional states. Th e speaker's perception in situation (4)  is  causally  conditioned  by  the  light's  infl  uence  on  the  retina  according to  optical  laws.  Th e  observations give us no reason to doubt that, nor that this causal relation is in some sense intrinsic to the speaker's perception. All the speaker's actions indicate that he believes that reliable information can be collected from the environment - that there is a lawful relation between the  structures  in  stimuli  he  can  perceive  and  the  opportunities  for  action the  environment  off  ers  him  as  a  pilot.  Indeed,  the  whole  activity,  e.g.  the training of the pilots, the sources of information about the weather used by the  pilots,  the  design  of  instruments  and  information  systems,  is  based  on this assumption. In that regard, Searle's description of the relation is accurate. But it is a one-sided description compared to the speaker's possibilities for choosing,  delimiting,  and  changing  the  visual  fi  eld,  i.e.  by  lift  ing  his  head, turning his head, walking backwards, squinting his eyes, etc., and for choosing what his attention is directed at in the visual fi  eld - whether it is the cloud base, the shape of the cloud base, the color of the cloud base, the shape of the edge of the cloud top, the height of the cloud top, the cloud cover, the layer of clouds etc. Th ese possibilities suggest that the perceiver's relation to the stimuli that surround him may be regarded as a mutual causal relation. Directing attention to  something  is  an  act  that  has  a  certain  informative  eff  ect,  given  that  the environment is as it is. In other words, the speaker is manipulating his relation to  the  environment,  and  the  environment  is  responding  with  information. Th us, it is a feedback loop of action and perception. Note that this does not mean that the speaker can determine what he perceives when he has chosen his visual fi  eld and chosen to direct his attention to one particular variation rather than another. Th e state of the variation is independent of the perceptual act. So, we might say that the mutual causal relation is between a perceptual act and a variation, i.e. a set of possible states. Th e same applies to (5) and (6), although here the manipulation is based on a linguistic, conventionally mediated  relation  to  the  environment  (Borchmann  2018,  Golonka  2015, Harder 2010).

For  the  above  reasons,  Searle's  description  of  the  relation  between  the content of intentional states and the world is insuffi ciently informative. Th e actions in the situations of (4), (5), and (6) do not consist in making the world fi  t the content of the intentional states of the perceiver. Th ey consist in engaging with the world. Th e starting point of the speech acts in these situations is an inadequate specifi  cation. Th e inadequacy motivates the speaker's intentional action, and the result of the intentional action is a specifi  cation. Th e speakers manipulate  their  relation  to  the  world  in  order  for  the  world  to  respond with information. Hence, it is not a relation of fi  t between the content of an intentional state and the world, but a dynamic relation of acquiring information. When we compare Searle's idea of   direction of fi  t with the situations of (4), (5), and (6), its limitations become obvious. Th e idea implies that what we need is already specifi  ed. Th ereby, it ignores the encounters with the world through which we acquire specifi  cations.

T o  summarize,  when  we  compare  the  theory  of  intentionality  and perception  that  forms  the  basis  for  Searle's  theory  of  speech  acts  with observations of people's relations to the world in an everyday activity, several discrepancies appear. Th us, the problems with Searle's theory of speech acts that we identifi  ed in section 2 are not merely semantic details. Th ey are related to  assumptions of intentionality and perception that confl  ict with what we can observe in the situations that give rise to the speech acts. And it is these discrepancies that cause the problems. Th e assumptions that cause problems are: a) what we direct our attention to are objects and more or less permanent states of aff  airs, b) the content of our intentional states determines conditions of satisfaction, c) there is a one-sided causal relation between ontologically objective entities and our intentional states, and d) the relation between our intentional states and the world is a relation of fi  t. Th ese assumptions ignore the  active,  the  interactive,  and  the  dynamic  aspects  of  intentionality  and perception. In the next section, I will consider the origin of the discrepancies, and on the basis of these considerations I will explain why Searle's theory of intentionality and perception is insuffi cient as a basis for a general theory of speech acts.

## 7. Intentionality and perception in idle and intentionality and perception in operation

## 7.1. Two diff  erent phenomena

It is surprising that some quite simple observations of ordinary situations in daily life can challenge a carefully conceived, nuanced, coherent philosophical theory - a theory that is an extension of and relates to a long philosophical tradition of other carefully conceived, nuanced and coherent philosophical theories.  Th is  holds  especially  when  the  theory  considers  perception  to  be a  biological  phenomenon.  How  can  the  assumptions  about  our  relation  to the world as humans diff  er so signifi  cantly from the relation we can observe in an activity of everyday life? Surely, the question we are trying to answer is  whether Searle's  theory  of  intentionality  and  perception  is  suffi cient  as  a basis for a general theory of speech acts. But answering the question about the causes of the discrepancies helps to clarify whether or not the theory is suffi cient.

## Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (20-55)

When trying to understand why there are discrepancies between Searle's theory  and  what  we  can  observe,  it  is  informative  to  compare  the  three situations with the situation Searle uses as a starting point for the analysis of intentionality and perception. Th is situation is described in the following:

Let us describe a more realistic scene: I am now looking at San Francisco Bay out of the  upstairs  study  of  my  house  in  Berkeley.  I  see  the  city  of Berkeley in the foreground, the Bay in the background, and on the distant horizon the city of San Francisco, the Golden Gate Bridge, and the hills of the Peninsula. In the immediate foreground, I also see the table on which I am working, the computer with its illuminated screen, various books and papers on the table, and my dog, Tarski, sitting on the fl  oor at my feet. Th is is a continuous visual experience and I can shift   my attention at will. I can even shift   my attention without shift  ing my eyes. I can focus my attention on diff  erent aspects of the scene. Sometimes, for the sake of simplicity, in this discussion I will concentrate on certain elements, for example, seeing the table, but we should keep the complexity of this scene in mind as we proceed. (Searle 2015:53)

In introducing this example, Searle criticizes the philosophical tradition for presenting overly simple examples of perception such as seeing a lump of wax or a tomato. As set out above, Searle considers it important that the example is realistic. Nevertheless, there are a number of very notable diff  erences between the situation Searle describes and the three real situations we have compared his theory to in section 6. Th e fi  rst thing immediately noticeable is that the intentionality in Searle's example appears to be random. First, he directs his attention to Berkeley (no pun intended), then the Bay, then San Francisco, then the Golden Gate Bridge, then the hills of the Peninsula, then his table, then  his  computer,  then  various  books  and  papers,  and  then  his  dog.  It  is unclear why he directs his attention to these things, and why he does it in that order. Th ere is no clear pattern or guiding principle. Th e only organization of the sequence is 'fi  rst something far away, then something close by' , and the only delimitation of the set of subjects of attention is 'what can be seen from this place' . In contrast, the intentionality in the situations of (4), (5), and (6) is targeted and systematic. Th e speakers direct their attention to variations in the environment, the states of which are relevant to the solution of tasks they are confronted with, and the sequences are determined by the requirements of the tasks and the results of directing attention to a variation. In situation (6), for example, the allocation of attention to the state of the harness system in the rear seat is part of a procedure for allocating attention to a set of variables in the overall fl  ight system. Th e guiding principle is relevance with regard to the realization of the values that   guide   the solutions of the tasks, in situation (6) fi  rst and foremost safety and effi ciency. Another characteristic diff  erence is  that  Searle's  situation  is  static.  Nothing  happens,  and  the  perceiver  does nothing except move his gaze. In contrast, the situations of (4), (5), and (6) are dynamic. Everything that is relevant to the speaker is changing, and the speakers are actively seeking information as they solve practical tasks based on the information they pick up through their intentional acts. In situation (4), for example, the speaker lift  s his head in order to pick up information about the continuously changing cloud base, because he needs to decide when to perform the practical task of taking off  . A third characteristic diff  erence is that each intentional state in Searle's situation appears fragmented and isolated. Th e only relation between them is that they belong to a presentation of the same 'scene' - whatever the meaning of that metaphor is. Searle does write that we focus our attention on certain aspects, but which aspects he focusses on, and how these aspects are related to each other, is not clear in the example. Likewise, the sequence of intentional states from Berkeley to the dog is not related to prior states or states that follow. In contrast, the speakers' intentional states in the situations of (4), (5), and (6), respectively, are all related to each other in that the ontologically objective variations they direct their attention to are variables in a dynamic system characterized by complex feedback relations between  variables.  And  the  fact  that  the  speakers  direct  their  attention  to precisely these variables in the system is a result of their attunement to the system and a prerequisite for solving the tasks they are confronted with. In situation (4), for example, there is a complex reciprocal relation between the cloud base and the start time: on the one hand, the start time is determined by the cloud base, on the other hand, the requirement for the cloud base is determined by the distance of the planned task, which is determined by the start time. Th at is, if the value of one variable in the system changes, so do the values of all the other variables. And the set of intentional states of the situation is delimited by the actions and events that precede it and infl  uences the actions and events that follow. In situation (4), the set of intentional states is delimited, among other things, by the night temperature, the waypoints in the scheduled task and the planned fl  ight distance. And the set infl  uences the start time, the speed, the strength of the thermals, the distance between the clouds, and the landing time. Th us, these intentional states are not isolated or fragmented, but are all embedded in a complex, dynamic system.

As  noted  in  section  5,  Searle  emphasizes  that  intentional  states  only determine  their  conditions  of  satisfaction  within  a  network  of  intentional states.  However,  in  the  example  above,  it  is  unclear  what  other  intentional states  determine  the  conditions  of  satisfaction.  Th erefore,  it  is  also  unclear what the conditions of satisfaction are: How, for example, can we know that he  perceives  the  city  of  Berkeley?  What  are  the  criteria  for  perceiving  the city of Berkeley? In fact, the only criterion for perception in the example is that he uses the names of the cities, the bridge, the hills, and the objects he claims to perceive. But in a context where the aim is to base a theory of speech acts on a theory of intentionality and perception, this is not a criterion, but circular reasoning. By contrast, the criteria are clear in the situations of (4), (5), and (6); there are simple concrete external criteria to which the respective speakers direct their attention, namely the cloud base, the person who paid for the sandwich, and the state of the back-seat harness system, and the criteria regarding whether or not they experience the ontologically objective states of these variations, namely the non-linguistic acts that follow the speech acts: in situation (4) that the speaker waits to start until the cloud base is 900 meters, in situation (5) that the speaker pays the person who paid for his sandwich, and in situation (6) that the speaker only takes off   if the passenger's harness is fastened. Hence, a fourth characteristic diff  erence between the situations of (4), (5), and (6) and Searle's situation is that there are clear external criteria for intentionality and perception in the former, whereas there are no clear criteria for intentionality and perception in the latter.

Th e  abovementioned  four  diff  erences  all  express  one  and  the  same fundamental diff  erence: the intentionality in the situations of (4), (5), and (6) is embedded in an activity governed by certain goals and values, determining what is  relevant  to  pay  attention  to  and  setting  the  criteria  for  perception, whereas  the  intentionality  in  Searle's  situation  is  arbitrary  and  constitutes an  activity  in  itself.  Th e  diff  erence  between  what  we  can  observe  in  the situations  of  (4),  (5),  and  (6)  and  what  Searle  describes  is  clearly  so  great that  we  must  conclude  that  we  are  dealing  with  two  diff  erent  phenomena. Th e  intentionality  and  perception  that  can  be  observed  in  the  situations of (4), (5), and (6) are embedded in an activity, which means that they are targeted, systematic, dynamically oriented, adapted to a system characterized by complex feedback relations, and have clear external criteria for perception. Th is  is  intentionality  and  perception  in  operation.  Th e  subject  of  Searle's description is intentionality and perception that are arbitrary, that is, random, statically  oriented,  fragmented,  isolated,  and  without  clear  criteria,  i.e. independent of practical life. I will call this intentionality and perception in idle. It may be that Searle's concepts of network and background are designed precisely to account for the embeddedness of intentionality and perception, but the network and background do not appear to have any consequences for the perceptual activity in his example or the analysis of intentionality and perception. Th us, when Searle's philosophical theory of consciousness diff  ers from what can be observed in a cognitive ethnographic study, the reason for this is that the theory and the observations have diff  erent scientifi  c objects.

It  is  very  interesting  to  compare the example Searle uses with examples from  everyday  life  such  as  the  situations  of  (4),  (5),  and  (6).  For  whereas Searle's example appears to be realistic and compelling when you read it in the context of other philosophical works, it is suddenly disclosed as a bizarre activity: the perceiver is in his study alone, and then he starts mentioning the names of some of the cities, bridges, hills he can see from the window, and some of the objects he can see in the room. It is possibly only philosophers, poets, and daydreamers that engage in such an activity (although it resembles certain name games played by children and adults that may serve diff  erent meaningful purposes). One can only guess how Searle's theory would have been developed if it had been based on an example of an ordinary activity where intentional acts and perception are subject to requirements, and where there  is  immediate,  unambiguous,  and  concrete  feedback  if  the  person's intentional acts and perceptions do not meet these requirements, e.g. driving a car, walking down a fl  ight of stairs, making tea, feeding an infant, or whipping cream.  But  there  are  good  reasons  to  believe  that  the  theory  would  (and should) have been developed diff  erently.

## 7.2. Internal discrepancies in Searle's presentation of the theory

Th e  comparison  above  also  points  to  two  internal  discrepancies  in  Searle's presentation  of  the  theory.  Searle  claims  that  perception  is  a  biological phenomenon  and  compares  the  perception  he  describes  with  hunger.  But whereas hunger clearly has a biological function, it is not clear what biological function the perceptual activity of looking out of his study window has. For example, what biological function is involved in looking at entities of the kind referred to by the words Berkeley , computer, and book , and why look at them in the order he does? If we apply an evolutionary perspective, it is also clear that hunger provides an edge, and that organisms with motivations to seek food are selected for. On the other hand, it is unclear how the perceptual ability Searle illustrates in his example provides an edge, and why and how the perceptual activity  he  describes  exerts  a  selection  pressure  on  perceptual  systems.  In other words, if we ask what we need to direct our attention to and perceive in  order  to  survive,  Berkeley  and  a  book  are  not  very  convincing  answers. To put Searle's  examples  into  perspective,  the  cloud  base  specifi  es  human's possibilities for visual perception, and perceiving the cloud base is crucial to a number of life-sustaining activities, e.g. hunting, farming, and protecting our off  spring against the cold. On the whole, we must assume that our perceptual system, including our ability to direct our attention to specifi  c properties of the environment and perceive them, is hardly developed for the purpose of idling,  i.e.  for  being  random,  statically  oriented,  fragmented,  isolated,  and independent of practical life. Th e perceptual system selected for is most likely the system that enables life-sustaining activities. Once this perceptual system has evolved, it is, of course, possible to perform the particular activity Searle illustrates. But this is not something the system has evolved for, and it is not an activity that characterizes perception as a biological phenomenon. When we consider what Searle describes as perception in a biological and evolutionary perspective, it appears to be an epiphenomenon of perception.

Another discrepancy emerges if we try to consider what Searle is doing in the example above, relative to the assumption of direct perception. What he is doing is mentioning the names of some towns, a bridge, some hills, and a small number of objects in his offi ce. Th e words he uses are not words that indicate which aspect you should direct your attention to, e.g. what it can be used for, how it relates to something else, or other concrete sensory properties that make it relevant for the perceiver to direct attention to it and provide clear criteria for perception. Th e terms are abstract; they are constructed or derived categories of places and things, and they can only be learned once we have acquired a language. A child in the prelinguistic phase cannot direct his or her attention to and perceive Berkeley, San Francisco, Golden Gate Bridge, the Hills of the Peninsula, a table, a computer, a book, or an article. What it  can  perceive  is  if  something  aff  ords  sucking,  drinking,  warmth, burning, overturning, walking, seating, throwing, pushing, moving, pressing, tearing, curling, bumping into, seeing through etc. In other words, a child does not diff  erentiate the environment in the categories Searle uses in the example. To put Searle's  examples  into  perspective,  a  child  in  the  pre-linguistic  age  can perceive the cloud base. Clearly though, a child cannot diff  erentiate the cloud base well enough relative to the pursuit of a range of activities, but the child can perceive whether the air's saturation of water is above or below 100%, and it can perceive the diff  erence between a cloud base of 1000 meters and 0 meters. Th is is not something to be acquired through language. Most of the ways of diff  erentiating the environment that Searle illustrates in the example are abstract, more or less constructed, and can only be acquired linguistically. With Searle's own distinctions, words such as Berkeley , San Francisco , computer , book, and article are used to refer to status functions, and thus ontologically subjective,  observer-dependent,  institutional  facts  rather  than  ontologically objective, observer-independent, brute facts. Th is means that the experience of  them  is  mediated.  Contrary  to  Searle's  intention,  his  own  example  casts doubt on whether we perceive directly. In any case, it is very diffi cult to argue that  what  Searle  illustrates  in  his  example  is  direct  perception.  More  than anything else,  it  appears  to  be  categorization.  On  this  point,  I  cannot  help having the impression that it is the theory of intentionality and perception that is based on the theory of speech acts, including predication, rather than the other way around.

In summary, if one wants to base a theory of speech acts on a theory of intentionality and perception in operation, Searle's theory is not an obvious candidate. Furthermore, if the theory we are looking for is a theory of direct perception, Searle's theory is not a very convincing proposal.

## 8. Conclusion

In section 3, I have shown that Searle's analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts is misleading when applied to three common, simple, semantic variants of questions in everyday language use. I have traced this inadequacy back to the theory of intentionality and perception that forms the basis of the theory of  speech  acts.  In  section  6,  I  have  shown  that  the  theory  of  intentionality and  perception  is  insuffi ciently  informative  and  misleading  in  relation  to the intentionality and perception we can observe in the situations in which these three questions arise. In section 7, I have explained these discrepancies between Searle's theory, on the one hand, and observations of everyday life's intentionality and perception, on the other, by the fact that the theory and the observations have diff  erent objects: Th e intentionality and perception we can observe in everyday life are intentionality and perception in operation. What Searle describes are intentionality and perception in idle.

In assessing Searle's theory of intentionality and perception as a basis for an analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts, one must take into account the knowledge interests by which it is driven. Here, it may be relevant to note that Searle's theory is a philosophical theory, and that it relates to philosophical issues.  When  the  theory  concentrates  on  objects  and  permanent  states of  aff  airs,  describes  intentional  states  as  conditions  of  satisfaction,  and determines the relation between intentional states and the world as a onesided causal relation, it is most likely a consequence of the fact that it deals with epistemological questions such as 'what is knowledge?' , and 'how do we know that we know what we know?' . Furthermore, as the theory of intentionality and perception is to form the basis of a philosophical theory of language, it must enable the theory of language to answer epistemological questions such as 'what do we mean when we say that something is true?' and 'what have we committed ourselves to when we have made a scientifi  c claim?' . Th erefore, references to objects and specifi  cations of truth conditions (whatever we call them) are fundamental both in the theory of intentionality and perception and in the theory of speech acts. Th at is, Searle's theories are primarily driven by an epistemological interest. Against this background, one might ask why I compare such theories with situations in everyday life. Th ere are two reasons for this. First of all, Searle claims that what he describes is everyday language use and perception and that his examples are realistic. Secondly, a wide range of  linguistic  descriptions  rely  on  Searle's  analysis  and  classifi  cation  in  the description of everyday language use. Th erefore, it is legitimate and relevant to compare Searle's theories with situations in everyday life and to draw attention to what one subscribes to if one bases a description of language and language use on Searle's analysis and classifi  cation of speech acts.

Of  course, this does not mean that the above epistemological questions are  not  important.  However,  it  is  not  given  that  a  linguistic  description  of everyday language use should answer such questions. Th is article is written from the point of view that a description of everyday language use should be informative and accurate, i.e. it must identify the tasks that language fulfi  lls in everyday life and provide a basis for accurate predictions of how, including by means of which structures, in which situations, and with which eff  ects, it fulfi  lls  these tasks. It could be argued that, in principle, a description could serve  both  an  epistemological  purpose  and  the  aforementioned  purpose. But what the observations of intentionality and perception in daily life have shown is precisely that there is a diff  erence between the ideal situation we are in when we make a scientifi  c claim and the actual situation we are in when we solve the practical tasks that we are confronted with in daily life. Judging from the situations of (4), (5), and (6), people's psychological basis for a speech act in the activities of daily life is not necessarily a specifi  cation of how the world must be if the speaker's intentional state is satisfi  ed, but oft  en an inadequate specifi  cation. Th e relation between intentional states and the world is not a one-sided causal relation in daily life, but rather a feedback loop of action and perception. People do not seek truth values, but specifi  c action-guiding information.  Th e  question  of  truth  does  not  seem  to  play  a  particularly important role in the language use of everyday activities, but is settled prior to language use by the choice of the source of information. People do not pay attention to objects and more or less permanent states of aff  airs in the pursuit of  daily  activities,  but  to  variations.  People's  requirements  for  linguistically conveyed information are not that this information fi  ts the world, but that it is  suffi ciently specifi  c to allow the selection of an action that contributes to the solution of a practical task. Th erefore, the tasks that language fulfi  lls in daily life are also diff  erent from the ones it ideally fulfi  lls in scientifi  c work. Th erefore, we must expect that the speech acts we perform in everyday life are diff  erent from those performed as part of a scientifi  c work. And therefore, we must also expect that the semantic structures of these speech acts diff  er from those assumed and focused on in an epistemologically oriented description of  language.  Th us,  Searle's  theory  of  intentionality  and  perception  is  not  a suffi cient basis for a general theory of speech acts of everyday life.

If  we  want  to  make  an  accurate and informative analysis and provide a functional  characteristic  of  speech  acts  of  the  type  I  have  analyzed  in  the examples in this article - three simple common, semantic variants of questions - we need to base our analysis and characteristics on an alternative theory of intentionality and perception. In Borchmann (2018, 2016), I have proposed Gibson's  theory  of  perception,  including  his  theory  of  aff  ordances  and information, as such a foundation. Using this theory as a basis for a study of language, we will discover a) a number of socio-cognitive tasks that language serves in addition to referring to objects, categorizing objects and representing state of aff  airs, b) an alternative to the semantic structure of predication, and c) alternatives to the semantic functions of reference and predication. Th ese discoveries are vital to an accurate and informative semantic and grammatical description of a given language.

## Notes

- 1 Searle ' s argument for basing the analysis on the so-called simple case is: 'Until we can get clear about the simple cases we are hardly likely to get clear about the more complicated ones' (Searle 1996/1969:33). Thus, Searle simply presupposes that F(referring and predicating) is the simple case.
- 2 Searle (1996/1969) does provide representations of the semantic form of questions. For example, 'How many people were at the party' is represented as '?(X number of people were at the party)', and 'Why did he do it?' is represented as '?(He did it because ...)' (Searle 1996/1969:31). However, as will be shown in this section, these representations raise a number of issues, and these issues are not addressed by Searle.
- 3 In the article I will use the numerals (4) , (5) and (6) to refer to the speech acts and situation (4) , situation (5) , and situation (6) to refer to the situations in which the speech acts occur.
- 4 I  prefer  the  notion  'listener'  because  it  emphasizes  that  this  party  of  the communication is motivated and active and participates intentionally.
- 5 The wording of the complete transmission is: 'hotel delta november ni hvad er skybasen' ( hotel delta November nine what is the cloud base ). Hotel delta identifi  es the receiver, november ni identifi  es the sender.

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