## Fortifying boundaries

## - The 'how and why' of the Finnish media and countermedia from 2014 to 2018

## OLLI SEURI

Tampere University

## PIHLA TOIVANEN

University of Helsinki

## Abstract

This  article  examines  how  recent  changes  in  the  hybrid  media environment have led media actors to define the 'how and why' of their  practices.  We  consider  the  discussion  on  the  differences  and similarities  surrounding  both  the  legacy  media,  and  newcomers such as countermedia, to be part of journalism's boundary work: the ongoing,  yet  temporally  fickle  process  of  marking  the  boundaries between journalism and non-journalism. We demonstrate how both legacy and countermedia actors drew boundaries through vocabulary, institutional reflection, demarcation practices, and ethos. While the Finnish media underlined its institutional autonomy and dominance by defending the social good of journalism and dubbing countermedia as fake media, countermedia actor MV-lehti drew its own boundaries  by  ridiculing  media  professionals,  media  institutions, and journalists. Our findings illustrate how these actors consistently asserted the flawed ideological foundations of 'the other," with the consequence  that  boundaries  have  become  fortified,  rather  than crossed or blurred.

## KEYWORDS

alternative media, boundary work, countermedia, fake news, hybrid media system, journalism, media work

## Preface

Problematic online sites, sometimes dismissively addressed as  purveyors  of  fake  news,  have  become  ubiquitous  in  the  Western  mediascape,  creating  a  backbone  of  fringe  media  ecosystems (Välimäki et al., 2021) largely coalescing around the right (see Haller et al., 2020; Holt, 2020). Whilst these countermedia websites or actors differ across the spectrum of media culture, they do share some common  characteristics.  Arguably,  they  can  be  described  as  pseudojournalism (see Schudson, 2020, p. 13; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014, p. 18) on the basis that they imitate the form and appearance of traditional journalistic media without conforming to its ethical standards and practices. The rise of these sites, and the mainstream interest in them, have occurred in conjunction with discussions on both fake news and disinformation, and have consequently been alleged, and found, to have disseminated false information (see Mourão & Robertson, 2019; Ylä-Anttila, 2017, p. 46).

These  changes  in  the  media  environment  have  led  journalistic ranks to strengthen their reputations by reaffirming their importance to the audience and society. Most notably in the US, The Washington Post introduced its  slogan  'Democracy Dies in Darkness' in 2017, and The New York Times launched a 'Truth is Essential' campaign in 2020. In Finland, the editors-in-chief of most legacy media outlets made a statement in March 2016 to promote 'reliable media," whilst two years later, the Finnish Council for Mass Media (CMM) launched a  campaign  for  'accountable  journalism."  These  initiatives  underline  how  the  discussion  on  fake  news  (including  the  emergence of  countermedia)  has  been  a  so-called  'critical  incident'  (Zelizer, 1992), which has led journalists to reconsider 'the hows and whys of journalistic practice." In so doing, they have been driven to reflect on their values by reasserting the normative boundaries of their profession and practices.

We argue that the conversation around insulating the differences between the legacy media and the newcomer is consistent with the recurring  fabrication  of  boundaries  within  and  between  journalism: in this case, the process of marking boundaries between journalism and non-journalism. Carlson (2016) writes that boundaries are powerful social constructions that affect the allotment of 'epistemic authority, ' denoting knowledge practices accepted by others as legitimate. The scholarship on journalism's boundary work often cites the work of Gieryn (1999; 1983) on the boundaries of science. Even though there are notable differences between science and journalism,  Gieryn  (1983)  persuasively  captures  the  discursive  means through which boundaries of social practices arise and face contestation (see Carlson, 2016). Gieryn (1983) notes how the construction of  boundaries  has  become  useful  for  scientist's  professional  goals such as the acquisition of intellectual authority and protecting the autonomy of scientific research. Following this,  we  will  show  how journalism's current boundary work is intrinsically related to a critical incident and embedded in journalism as a profession.

The research question in this article is: what kind of boundary work was stimulated by the fake news phenomenon and the new countermedia  websites  in  Finnish  media  between  2014  and  2018?  We address this question empirically, by analyzing how selected Finnish media reacted to the evolution of countermedia actors, and how the most prominent countermedia, MV-lehti 1 , positioned itself with regard to journalism and traditional mass media outlets. We focus on  a  five-year  period,  which  captures  the  period  before  and  after 2016, the year which saw the popularization of fake news (Quandt et al., 2019). Finland offers an intriguing perspective on this period, as the most important of the countermedia websites emerged before and during the European-wide refugee crisis in 2015. In particular, MV-lehti (MV being the equivalent of the expression 'WTF' in English)  gained  considerable  traction.  According  to  research  carried out by Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS 18.12.2018), they recorded 18 million views in January 2016 alone, beating the second biggest daily newspaper Aamulehti with its online reach.

The theoretical basis of our analysis is established below, before contextually  relating  it  to  the  temporal  and  qualitative  features  of boundary work and showing how fake news as a concept grew in popularity in the Finnish mediasphere within the chosen timespan. The 'hows and whys' of both legacy and countermedia are explored to  explain  the  similarities  and  differences  of  their  boundary  work. Finally, we outline the main findings of our empirical research, showing  its  relevance  to  the  extant  scholarship,  and  wider  discussions, on the boundaries of journalism, countermedia, and fake news in a hybridized media system.

## Theoretical context

## Fake news and countermedia

This article explores the popular use of the concept fake news and how it was used to describe and analyze changes in the mediasphere, politics, and democracy in Finland. This means we are attentive to the use of particular Finnish terms related to the fake news phenomenon, and the ways they were attached to countermedia. While fake news is not in itself a new phenomenon - the term had already been used by the late 1800s to refer to made up or false news (Mohr, 2019) - it became a topic of global interest and debate with the increased reverberation of social  media,  especially  surrounding  the  2016  US presidential elections and Brexit (see Gelfert, 2018). More recently, the  range  of  phenomena  linked  to  fake  news  have  included, inter alia :  myriad  forms  of  junk  news  or  false  information  disguised  as news;  disinformation  campaigns  and  computational  propaganda; populist efforts to discredit legacy media by calling them fake news; and post-truth politics (see Aral, 2020, pp. 26-38; Howard, 2020, pp. 86-87; Bradshaw, 2019).

Notions of fake news then overlap markedly with other information disorders and, consequently, there is no singular definition for it (see Farkas & Schou, 2020, pp. 53-55; Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019; Tandoc et al., 2018). In mainstream discussions certain non-mainstream websites have also been clumsily categorized as fake news, prompting  scholars  to  generate  more  appropriate  formulations  to capture variant actors, whose content is not all fake, as in 'made up' (Ylä-Anttila et al., 2019). In contesting this narrative, these websites have  been  further  defined  as  countermedia  (see  Toivanen  et  al., 2021;  Hopp et al.,  2020;  Ylä-Anttila  et  al.,  2019),  alternative  media (see  Nygaard,  2020;  Schulze,  2020;  Holt,  2018),  and  hyperpartisan media (see Rae, 2020; Heft et al., 2020). These definitions also work as distinctions to more traditional partisan media (Levendusky, 2013) and populist media (Norocel et al., 2020).

We  note  that  the  term  'fake  news'  has  become  something  that people  increasingly  want  to  avoid  because  it  has  become  a  disputed, politicized, and even 'an infected concept' (Holt, 2020, p. 59). In spite of this, we understand the conjunction and importance of fake news and countermedia as reflective of three interrelated factors that shape our analysis. First, fake news as a phenomenon is a symptom of a wider systemic challenge around the value and credibility of information in society (Beckett, 2017). Secondly, fake news and countermedia actors have already intervened with journalism's privileged role as a mediator, analyst, watchdog of politics (Heikkilä & Väliverronen, 2019), or, as Holt (2020, p. 4) describes it, 'an expression of the vulnerability of journalism in a globalized and digitized world."  In  this  sense,  traditional  journalistic  media  has  received  a wake-up call and a test to show its worth and distinctiveness as a form of  knowledge  and  social  resource  (Schudson,  2003).  Thirdly, the fake news phenomenon writ large has been a relevant context in which to analyze the changes in the hybrid media environment during the period we are concerned with.

## Blurring boundaries as a feature of journalism and the hybrid media system

The  diffusion  and  rapid  evolution  of  new  communication  technologies have already reshaped the media: first with the switch from analog to digital, secondly the rise of the social web, and thirdly the dominance of mobile technologies  (Bell  et  al.,  2017).  Digital  platforms  have  taken  an  increasingly  important  role  in  journalism  by shaping  the  way  people  communicate  and  mediating  the  interaction between actors. It is certainly arguable, that the changes in both the  media  environment  and  the  landscape  of  news,  have  amplified reconsiderations and rearticulations of what journalism is, and what its role in a functioning democracy should be. As Deuze (2019) argues, we have found ourselves 'in a wonderful quagmire," where 'journalism remains the same yet the conditions under which it is practiced have not only changed considerably, they are in permanent flux. '

In attempting to bring order and clarity to this 'state of flux' , Chadwick (2017) articulates the notion of hybridity. He notes that boundary drawing, boundary blurring, and boundary crossing are qualities of the hybrid media system. For instance, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish some political reporting in blogs from political journalism  or  to  discern  the  contributions  of  various  interlopers  who populate newsrooms' digital practices. The journalistic community, and its challengers and adversaries, are in a constant discussion of what should be included inside the increasingly blurred journalistic boundaries. This is the primary puzzle. What counts as journalism and who counts as a journalist (Carlson, 2015)? However, below the surface there are many other related questions from ethics and practices to the means of interaction with stakeholders such as audiences, sources, and other non-journalistic actors.

In  light  of  this,  we  argue  that  new  digital  publishers  -  including countermedia - have challenged, and will challenge, journalism in the short to medium term. Changes already seen in the media system indicate that changes in the context of journalism do shape its understanding and social locus. The rise of social media and digitalization, resulting in more fluid, decentralized, flexible, networked, and individualized modes of work (Deuze & Witschge, 2018), as well as the development of virality-fueled newcomers such as Buzzfeed (Tandoc, 2018), is also linked to the myriad of algorithmically-induced countermedia  and  junk  news  (see  Bradshaw,  2019).  So,  blurring boundaries can be a feature of the hybrid media system, but it is also a feature of journalism itself. Deuze (2019) approaches hybridity by observing the messiness intrinsic to journalism and how its varied cultural practices are embedded within a complex social landscape; it  is  a  constantly  shifting  denotation applied differently depending on context (Carlson, 2015).

Our  interest  is  on  both  traditional  and  countermedia  and  the boundary  work  which  stems  from  their  engagement  and  dueling. The extant research shows how traditional media, in times of media instability,  commonly  uses  their  normative  standards  and  ethical principles  to  distinguish  between  insiders  and  outsiders  (Singer, 2015).  Therefore,  it  is  unsurprising  that  the  combination  of  fake news and new online publishers has witnessed the forced reconsideration, rearticulation, and reinforcement of boundaries in the form of new legislation and revised ethical standards (see Tandoc et al., 2019; Tandoc & Jenkins, 2018). Evidently there is an intrinsic tension between the ideological claims of journalists and how they live up to those ideals, or 'the spirit that is expressed in practice' (Carey, 1997). Arguably, this explains why transparency is seen as an emerging ideal that configures the boundaries of journalism, possibly surpassing its ideological commitment to control (Hermida, 2015; Singer, 2015).

## Research material and methods

The  research  material  employed  here  was  collected  both  from traditional Finnish legacy media outlets and MV-lehti . To get a comprehensive picture of the mass media discussion in Finland we have constructed datasets from four different media: 1) the Finnish news agency STT , 2) the main national daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 3) web-based articles in the Finnish public service broadcaster Yle , and 4) one of the two main Finnish daily tabloids Iltalehti (IL). Together, they represent major segments of the Finnish mass media system: a news agency, a daily newspaper, a public broadcaster, and a tabloid. The original datasets include all articles from each media from the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2018.

This was supplemented with 37 477 stories scraped from MV-lehti between  25.08.2014  and  03.03.2018  and  includes  all  stories  found on the website in March 2018. MV-lehti (MV) serves as a legitimate counterpart to the traditional media, publishing its original stories along with texts from other outlets. It also circulates social media and blog  posts  from  different  actors  inside  and  outside  the  right-wing media ecosystem. Throughout the research period, it functioned as a sort of 'alternative umbrella," although its radical right-wing and anti-immigrant tendencies became more pronounced over time.

In creating our dataset we downsampled the data with two rounds of  forming  search  keywords.  In  the  preparatory  search  in  the  first round, 28 search clauses for the legacy media outlets and 9 search clauses for MV-lehti were used. The keywords for the legacy media were related to  different  countermedia  actors  and  fake  news  phenomenon  in  addition  to  media  transparency  and  truthfulness  in journalism. The first set of keywords in MV-lehti were related to the terms  which MV-lehti used  in  referring  to  the  journalistic  media. After the preparatory search, we assessed samples of the resultant documents qualitatively and removed keywords that produced large amounts of irrelevant stories from the legacy media. For example, the word 'transparency' ( läpinäkyvyys in Finnish) produced articles about transparent clothes and transparency in many other professional fields like flight safety and business. In MV-lehti , we also found and added more words related to the mainstream media. The second round, which we refer to as the formation of the research material, nalism (n=411), of words referring to mainstream media (n=268), Total 984

articles

included 26 search clauses for the legacy media outlets and 10 for MV-lehti . Preparatory Formation of referring to

9 search clauses

search, research material, nainstream media

|   MV-lehti |   Yle |   Helsingin Sanomat |   Iltalehti |   STT |   Total |
|------------|-------|---------------------|-------------|-------|---------|
|        984 |   423 |                 434 |         526 |  1034 |    3401 |

10 search clauses of word Mentions journalism

Table 1: Article counts per media used in this study.

As Table 1 shows, we were left with 2 417 articles from the selected legacy media outlets and 984 from MV-lehti .  This material was further divided into five sub-categories for the legacy media (Figure 1) and three for MV-lehti (Figure 2). The categories were constructed qualitatively  on  the  grounds  of  our  pre-analysis  of  articles  during the preliminary round. We chose the sub-category called 'fake news phenomenon' (n=807) to serve as an analytical core for the legacy media. This included the stories, which mentioned the words 'fake news' ,  'fake  media' ,  'post-truth' ,  'post-fact' ,  'countermedia' ,  or  'alternative  media' .  This  dataset  was  supplemented  with  sub-categories identified by qualitative reading on the preliminary round, consisting of articulations of designated persons and countermedia outlets, together  with  mentions  of  Trump  and  fake  news,  Russia,  and  disinformation in the context of media. In our analysis, we focused on three sub-categories in MV-lehti ,  comprising any mentions of journalism  (n=411),  of  words  referring  to  mainstream  media  (n=268), and of the journalist Jessikka Aro (n=305).

Figure 1: Downsampling process for MV-lehti dataset.

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4 Legacy media

2014-2018

Total 2417

Persons

Figure 2: Downsampling process for the legacy media outlets.

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Qualitative and quantitative methods were both used in our analysis.  In  addressing the prevalence of the fake news phenomenon in the Finnish media between 2014 and 2018, we employed computational frequency analysis to extract the occurrences of relevant discussions. The results of the frequency analysis enabled us to identify qualitative similarities and differences in the discussions. We supplemented the  computational  analysis  with  qualitative  analysis  to specify our findings. Additionally, to analyze boundary work in the chosen media we used qualitative methods. Following Gieryn (1983) we looked at the media actors' attribution of selected characteristics to  their  own  publications  and  those  of  the  other  side.  We  focused on vocabulary, institutional  reflection,  demarcation  practices,  and ethos to make sense of the social boundaries between actors and to reconstruct  how  they  distinguish  between  activities  as  journalism and non-journalism. These are not dependent on fixed characteristics, rather they should be understood as intertwined and overlapping, as, for example, institutional reflection and demarcation practices permeate the vocabulary and carry ideological implications.

outlets, Preparatory Formation of

## Fake news phenomenon in Finnish media between 2014 and 2018

## Case Finnbay: a precursor or a curiosity?

In Finland, there were already traces of 'valeuutinen' (fake news) in the blogosphere, used in conjunction with false information circulating  in  the  media  and  the  social  web,  from  as  early  as  2011 (Järvinen,  2011).  In  our  data,  the  idea  of  fake  news  as  particularly problematic, surfaces in 2014. In April of that year, a site called Finnbay was called a 'fake news site' ( valeuutissivusto in Finnish) by the then Finnish Ambassador to Russia on Twitter (HS 6.4.2014). Finnbay was an English language site, which claimed to produce news on Finland. Interest in the site was triggered by a controversial story stating that Finland would cooperate with Russia no matter what the EU or the US would say. This occurred after the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the story was mostly based on Russian sources such as Itar-Tass (Finnbay 6.4.2014). After the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs  decided  to  investigate  the  site's  activities,  questions  were raised over the 'authenticity' of the site: the site reported a fictitious address and declared neither a corresponding editor, nor a business ID, as required in Finland (IL 6.4.2014; HS 7.4.2014). Later, the Finnish  authorities  declared  that Finnbay did  not  disseminate  harmful information on purpose (HS 10.4.2014). However, this encounter of 'fake news' as a concept in Finnish media demonstrated the political nature of discussions about new media in a hybrid media space.

Finnbay was not the first news-media-like site to be accused of disseminating problematic information in Finland. Before 'fake news' was articulated in a contemporary context, a site called Magneettimedia (Magnet Media) had gained media attention because of its conspiracist writing, vaccination criticism, and promotion of alternative medicine and pseudoscience (see Yle 8.12.2011; STT 27.3.2013). Initially, Magneettimedia was distributed only in print form, primarily in regions of Northwestern Finland, before going online in 2010. 2  It has a profile that is distinct from MV-lehti , although its stories have been  frequently  published  by  them;  they  are  commonly  regarded as the most prominent countermedia actors, and are described by Heikkilä and Väliverronen (2019) as 'the public enemies of institu- tional journalism in Finland." Compared to these actors, Finnbay is a curious case. It echoes elements found in later discussions, including the lack of transparency in publishing and its connections to Russia, but it is now somewhat forgotten as the site was later shut down.

## The triangle: Countermedia, Trump, and Russian disinformation

Our  research  indicates  that  domestic  countermedia  sites  were only one of three main facets to the media discussion on fake news between 2014 and 2018. The other two were stories related to Donald Trump and his relentless friction with the media, and the Russian spread  of  disinformation.  These  three  are  not  uniform.  They  each have their own particular characteristics, but they also represent different phases in Finnish media discourse on fake news. Qualitatively speaking, the cases of Russia and disinformation, as well as the one on countermedia actors, are more complex - and arguably more representative of the Finnish context - but quantitatively, Trump-related stories dominated the media discourse on fake news.

The timeline and prevalence of these phenomena can be seen in the three graphs below. They indicate how the so-called fake news phenomenon  (blue  line) 3   was  covered  or  made  reference  to,  in Finnish media texts. In addition, the graphs show how the volume of stories related to the three different contexts developed over the research period. For example, the appearance of Finnbay is  clearly visible from the first graph, as all the earliest fake news-related stories in 2014 were tied to this one affair. After Finnbay there are few mentions of Magneettimedia and MV-lehti until  the  second  half  of 2015.  Heikkilä  and  Väliverronen  (2019)  date  serious  journalistic interest  in MV-lehti to  early  Spring  2015  when MV had  published detailed stories on a (then alleged) case of rape, which pushed their readership up. Nevertheless, in our data, broader journalistic interest in MV-lehti only surfaced later, at the end of 2015, and stayed relatively stable until the end of 2016.

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Graph 1: Weekly article frequencies of legacy media outlet articles containing the fake news phenomena dataset (blue line) and a subset with search words 'MV-lehti' or 'Magneettimedia' or 'Finnbay' (orange line).

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Notwithstanding  this,  the  drastic  increase  in  fake  news-related content  in  Finnish  legacy  media  occurred  from  approximately autumn 2016. This was almost entirely tied to the language used by the then presidential candidate Donald Trump and its subsequent reportage  by  the  media.  Graph  2  shows  how  Trump-related  stories dominated the discussion on fake news throughout our period of  research.  Trump's  frequent  use  of  the  labels  'fake  news'  and 'fake media' to address legacy media clearly permeated also Finnish  media  discourse.  Boczkowski & Papacharissi (2018) stress that despite  the  deep  historical  roots  of  the  tensions  between  Trumplike politics and the media, social media brought a new dimension to the equation. Our data also shows how stories covering the fake news  phenomenon  often  include  mentions  to  Twitter,  Facebook, and other social media outlets. This resulted, in the internet, social media, and the hybridization of the media system, functioning as a cross-cutting context in the coverage of the fake news phenomenon.

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Graph 2: Weekly article frequencies of legacy media outlet articles containing the fake news phenomena dataset (blue line) and a subset with the search word 'Trump' (orange line).

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The third facet, the case of Russia, is interesting because Russia's disinformation campaigns have been connected to both the 2016 US presidential  elections  and  Finnish  countermedia.  However,  in  our data, this case offers a distinct twirl to Finnish media's discourse on fake news, in the context of emerging stories on Russia's hybrid strategy and propaganda campaigns in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, escalating war in Ukraine, and the shooting down of the plane MH-17 (see Graph 3). Finnish legacy media were slow to react to the pace of events in Ukraine, as the media struggled to name and define  the  actors  and  dismantle  pre-formulated  Russian  metanarratives (Innola & Pynnöniemi, 2016, pp. 167-169). The peaks at the end of 2014 and early 2015 are related to the intensified reporting of Russian activities on different fronts, with the media using terms like 'information war' (HS 19.1.2015), 'hybrid warfare' (Yle 28.1.2015), and 'Putin's propaganda' (IL 27.1.2015). This gradual shift was akin to the 'scales falling from the media's eyes' as they tried to come to terms with Russia's conduct in a new media environment.

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Graph 3: Weekly article frequencies of legacy media outlet articles containing the fake news phenomena dataset (blue line) and a subset with search words 'Russia' and 'media' (orange line).

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The reporting on Russian actions in early 2015 was followed by a reportage series on a Russian 'troll factory," the IRA, and the extent of Russia's online propaganda on Yle (Yle 18.2.2015a; Yle 18.2.2015b; Yle  19.5.2015,  conducted  mainly  by  journalist  Jessikka  Aro.  In  retrospect,  this  series  became  symbolically  significant,  as  Aro  herself became a victim of a  systematic  smear  campaign  and  severe  harassment  (see  Heikkilä  &  Väliverronen,  2019;  Hiltunen,  2017).  The importance of her case was illustrated by the editors-in-chief's statement of 2016, which declared that journalists will not be silenced by abuse (Yle 1.3.2016). The founder of MV-lehti Ilja Janitskin was later accused - and found guilty in the district court before his death - of, amongst other charges, aggravated defamation (Yle 18.10.2018). We conducted a search with the name 'Jessikka Aro' in our MV-lehti data which resulted in with 305 hits, meaning she was mentioned approximately twice a week on MV between early 2015 and early 2018.

TRADITIONAL

MEDIA

Articulation of institutional BOUNDARY WORK

Articulation of counter position

## Boundary work in the Finnish mediasphere

Amplifying the voice of the BOUNDARY WORK

Smearing and ridicule of the

The content on Finnish legacy media and MV-lehti offers an interesting  juxtaposition,  as  the  extant  literature  suggests  that  these actors are in many ways incompatible yet intertwined. For instance, Toivanen et al.  (2021)  have  noted  how MV-lehti interacts  with  the legacy media through remediation of content. In addition, it is well documented  how  journalists  default  to  defensive  positions  and retreat to their enduring values in the face of outside or institutional threats to journalism (see Carlson, 2015; Lewis, 2012; Deuze, 2005). Our research material - composed of media and journalism related content - yields an additional perspective to those of earlier studies. As shown in Figure 3, a more concise picture of the boundary work emerges  through  vocabulary,  institutional  reflection,  demarcation practices,  and  ethos.  Through  an  analysis  that  is  divided  between the  two,  we  highlight  the  distinctive  features  and  characteristics of  boundary  work,  to  show  how  both  similarities  and  differences emerge. We begin with MV-lehti , because in our timeline it appears as a challenger which prompted a reaction from the media, which manifested  as  an  attempt  to  monopolize  the  field  and  protect  its autonomy (see Carlson, 2015; Gieryn, 1983).

Figure 3: Analysis of the boundary work between the Finnish traditional media and countermedia.

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## Boundary work in MV-lehti : Exposure of political bias and betrayal of the media elite

The various names and descriptions conferred upon journalistic media in MV-lehti's vocabulary can clearly be interpreted as boundary work that illuminated different aspects of their opposition to, or contempt for, their 'adversary' . There are several renditions of mainstream media, with the term prefixed by terms such as lying, deceitful,  and  distorting  (MV  29.11.2015;  MV  27.9.2016;  MV  7.12.2017). The media itself is reduced to simpleton media, agenda media, and a fairly Finnish version of social justice warrior media, suvakkimedia (MV 2.8.2015; MV 11.5.2016; MV 21.1.2017). In a rhetorical move reminiscent of Trump, the term fake media was turned against traditional media. In this sense, the verb use was critically important. For example, when searches such as 'mainstream media AND lies," and 'mainstream media AND falls silent' were used, they produced 97 and 52 hits respectively in our data.

In  terms  of  boundary  work,  the  language  in MV-lehti was  constructed  to  articulate  its  counter  position  and  to  challenge  traditional  media's  rationale  and  authority.  This  was  done  by  depreciating,  ridiculing,  and  smearing the media, media work and media professionals  (echoing  the  case  of  Jessikka  Aro).  The  practice  was evident  in  cases  where  writers  denounced  journalists  in  affective terms: there were references to fanaticism (MV 2.5.2016) and hystericism (MV 16.3.2016) as well as fussing (MV 14.2.2018) and crying (MV 30.3.2016). Despite this, a significant portion of journalism and media-related statements were targeted on journalism as an institution. The Finnish Council on Mass Media, journalism's ethical codes and the Finnish editors-in-chief statement of 2016, all serve in MVlehti as symbols for the legacy media's biased foundations.

In  our  analysis, MV-lehti not  only  built  boundaries  as  a  counter actor, but also fashioned a secondary seam in which writers articulated the site as an alternative, a supplement, or a corrective to traditional mainstream news media (Holt et al., 2019). The writers 4  themselves underlined the independence of MV-lehti as a publisher when they called it independent media, or independent citizen media (see MV 24.2.2016; MV 5.3.2016.). The emphasis on independence here is suggestive that the legacy media are non-independent, or biased. There are strong suggestions of political bias, which is seen in the media's tendencies to lean left  (also  radical  left  and  green-left)  or to promote cultural liberalism and multiculturalism (MV 9.10.2015; MV 2.3.2016a; MV 27.9.2016). There was also the alleged bias of practices.  The  whole new media ecosystem they represented, was suggested to have grown because the media has failed the people, by ignoring themes such as immigration-related problems which they suggested were left unreported by the mainstream media (see MV 12.1.2016; MV 15.2.2016; MV 2.3.2016b). For instance, Finnish media do not traditionally publish the names of people who are suspected of  crimes,  so  when MV-lehti publishes  names  and  details  of  these alleged crimes, they offer an alternative channel of information.

The aspiration to build an alternative realm of information can be depicted as a demarcation practice, although the borders with the media remained somewhat blurred. MV 's  ambiguity to journalism is  palpable  in  the  case  of  investigative  journalism.  Three  distinct speech repertoires  addressed  investigative  journalism  in  our  data. First, there was the ridicule which typically referred to bad or trivial journalism or just the stupidity of journalists and their institutions (MV 20.9.2016). Secondly, the investigative journalism that the traditional media ought to be doing, but they were not (MV 31.5.2016), and thirdly, the investigative reporting MV-lehti was doing by exposing the so-called truths of immigration (MV 1.3.2016). While journalism as an institution is mostly deprecated, journalism was not argued to be completely corrupt. There were two cases in which journalists are thanked by name for doing proper investigative reporting in covering cases of Finnish corruption. These were certainly outliers, but it is nonetheless interesting how a departed journalist is generously thanked for her earlier award-winning work when the site expressed condolences to her family and relatives (MV 2.6.2016).

Nevertheless,  there  are  strands  of  conspiracist  thinking  in MVlehti 's opposition to the media, and it is evident in the ethos of MV 's boundary work that it stems from a desire to expose the betrayal of the media elite. MV-lehti, and its counterparts, suggest that they are lifting the veil of lies woven by corrupt elites (see Pyrhönen & Beauvois, 2020), which can be seen as a strategy to give the impression that they represent the legitimate power and moral authority of the people (see Norris & Inglehart, 2019). As Ylä-Anttila (2018) writes, conspiracist framing 'should be understood as an absolutist orientation to power and democracy, one which divides the world into good and evil." In this sense, MV-lehti 's conspiracism is tribalist; it stands against all knowledge-producing institutions like the free press, academia, and expert communities within government (see Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2019). Hence it is not surprising that MV-lehti and its writers lambasted traditional media for a smear campaign - even a 'war' (MV 23.11.2016) and a 'witch hunt' (MV 25.10.2017) - which they perceived in journalists' repeated use of the term 'fake media' as well as in journalistic coverage of the background and activities of those behind countermedia.

## Boundary work in the Finnish media: The institution sending a message

MV-lehti 's suggestion of a smear campaign was not entirely without  foundation.  The  primary  reaction  to  the  rise  of MV and  the whole fake news phenomenon in Finland has been reminiscent of the media's tendency to raise its guard in the face of opposition (see Heikkilä & Väliverronen, 2019). This kind of general reaction can be seen in our data, and in its most quintessential form, it is very ceremonial. From the perspective of vocabulary, the central feature of this type of writing was to assert that MV-lehti and its counterparts were unequivocally 'fake news' ( valeuutinen ) or 'fake media' ( valemedia ).  There was little or no room for conceptual contingency or leeway on the nature of these antagonistic actors, and the term fake news was deployed here as 'a baseball bat to undermine the opponent's descriptions of reality' (Holt, 2020, p. 59). Furthermore, countermedia  actors  were  depicted  as  profit-making  and  click-baiting cynics, who posed a threat to both public discourse and the civility of politics (see IL 1.11.2015).

In  particular,  the  media's  articulation  of  institutional  autonomy and dominance emerged in two kinds of instances. The first was the statement from the editors-in-chief, which broadly covered all four examined media - each of them published at least three stories on it  (including  the  original  text).  The  second  instance  was  the  news written at the time of the appointment, or nomination, of prominent media figures such as the heads of the Council of Mass Media and public broadcaster Yle . These news stories, or interviews, were used as an opportunity to raise the institutional importance of journalism for society at large, with a tone of ceremonial speech that sought to (re)affirm the importance of journalism to democracy and to fun- damentally distinguish it from antagonistic outsiders. The language is uniform regardless of the speaker, which makes it safe to assume their  basic  stance  to  countermedia  is  widely  shared  amongst  the journalistic community. Journalists writing the stories did not confront this stance, rather they amplified the voice of the legitimized actors. The basic attitude was, these 'fake sites' ( valesivustot ) exploit journalistic credibility, yet publish unverified, or false, information without 'seeking truth." It was noted, however, that some interviewees did ponder journalistic practices when they spoke of the media's self-regulation along with the importance of accountability and corrections. (See HS 2.11.2015; HS 4.11.2015; Yle 22.4.2016; Yle 6.2.2017; STT 17.4.2018.)

While the designation 'fake media' in the context of countermedia actors was frequent, and its use rarely explained (HS 1.3.2016), not all the stories in traditional media described MV-lehti as  being fake. Countermedia actors tended to be covered with greater nuance when research and polls were being reported (STT 14.11.2017), journalists' own analysis was published (Yle 1.11.2015d), or interviews with experts or researchers (Yle 1.11.2015a) as well as countermedia readers and actors were explored. In these stories, the concept of fake news  was  usually  unpronounced  or  problematized,  which  meant both  expressions  'countermedia'  ( vastamedia )  and  'alternative media' ( vaihtoehtomedia )  were used. The media did interview the so-called other side whilst seeking to understand the logic behind the  consumption  (Yle  1.11.2015b;  IL  24.9.2016)  and  production (Yle 1.11.2015c; Yle 5.2.2016) of countermedia content. This kind of reporting is linked to the professional core of journalism, but much like  other  examples  we  have  pointed  to,  can  also  be  described  as boundary work. This resembles Gieryn's (1983) idea of the monopolization of professional authority and resources by excluding rivals. In this instance, journalists probed and explained the boundaries of different kinds of content production to the audience, and conspicuously depicted countermedia actors as 'the other."

The ethos in Finnish media's boundary work stems from a defense of journalism as 'the social good' as part of a wider media assertion of their own importance to democracy. Simultaneously, the media suggests to the audience that this social good, protected by ethical standards and practices, stands in opposition to the 'social bad' of distributing false information. This is also present in media reports of the court cases centered on countermedia actors, the media institutions, and reporter Jessikka Aro. Although not all of these stories represented MV as fake media, there was an emphasis on the transgressions of the defendants and the harmfulness of their activities. In the context of the household reporting of a judicial case, there was special interest in MV-lehti and its founder Ilja Janitskin as 'the other."

## Discussion

We considered a period when the media landscape has been in turmoil.  From  2014  to  2018  countermedia  website MV-lehti was  a thorn in the side of Finland's legacy media. It was frequently berated for  disseminating  false  information  and  commonly  designated, rather  simplistically,  as  fake  media.  Because  of  the  strong  institutional and societal position of legacy media in Finland, there was a certain asymmetry to the relationship between them. While MV had a relentless interest in the media - representing itself as David to the legacy media's Goliath - for journalists, the countermedia was part of a bigger change in the information environment. We have shown how the fake news discourse in Finnish media has been dominated by  three  partially  separate  realms:  countermedia,  Donald  Trump and his accusations about the media, and Russia and disinformation.

After conceptualizing boundary work, we considered the ways in which writers defined 'the hows and whys' of their own work and how they described the other. According to Gieryn (1983) boundary work should be seen as a practical problem with ideological implications. What is common to both the legacy media and countermedia, is the representation of the other as an ideological or a cynical actor, whereas one's own work, its core ethos, is presented as that which arises more from noble ideals and practices or the needs of the people. This, of course, is one way to fortify one's own boundaries whilst simultaneously using reductive vocabulary to define the other.

Thus, we found that qualitative differences to actors' ideological positioning were nested within general boundary work. For example, journalists in traditional media defended the institution of journalism almost uniformly: it's not about certain media, but the media, its institutions, and the commonly recognized journalistic practices and media ethics. In both Gieryn's (1983) and Carlson's (2015) terms, professional journalists both demarcated the monopoly of the institution  in  news  publishing  as  well  as  defended  the  autonomy  and professional activities of journalism whilst excluding MV-lehti as  a non-professional troublemaker. While the media were keen on the manifest importance of journalism to democracy, they paid minimal attention to the ambiguousness, historically changing, contextually variable, internally inconsistent, and sometimes disputed nature of it. Arguably, this could be representative of the Northern European democratic-corporatist media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), characterized by a particularly strong formal organization of the profession of journalism. In Finland, trust in legacy media is comparatively high (Newman et al. 2020, 14), and polarization (in connection with media use) is relatively weak in Scandinavia (see Dahlgren 2021). It may be that this strong societal adhesion to traditional media thwarts more open and nuanced public discussion on issues like transparency, accuracy, and ideology in its institutions and actors.

We argue that our findings on the nature of MV 's boundary work are a significant contribution to the extant scholarship and wider public discussions on the nature of countermedia, or alternative, media (see Tuomola, 2021; Holt et al., 2019; Nygaard, 2019; Ylä-Anttila et al., 2019; Brinkschulte & Frischlich, 2018). We have shown, how MV-lehti had the qualities of both a counter actor (to that dominated by the so-called elite) and a constructor of an alternative realm of information. Therefore, both countermedia and alternative media are valid terms, yet they remain imperfect in describing an actor like MV-lehti . In our reading, MV-lehti and its writers have a complicated relationship with journalism. For the most part, they denounced journalistic institutions and ridiculed journalists, which can be seen as a feature of an antagonistic challenger to the legacy media (see Harcup, 2005; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019; Mayerhöffer, 2021). Still, they exploited the journalistic form, and in some cases referred to their own work as investigative journalism. More attention should be given to this relationship, on the basis that countermedia work in MV-lehti can in our reading be seen as much as a kind of pseudo-journalistic publishing, as it is - at least partly - a form of non-journalism (see also Schudson, 2020, p. 13; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014, p. 18). This is reminiscent of the deliberation about demarcation problems in science (see  Hansson,  2011).  Similar  to  pseudo-scientific  ventures  in  relation to science, countermedia actors have sought to distort the tradi- tional perceptions of journalism and the ideals related to it. This is a timely and ongoing discussion, as the boundaries are more complex in journalism than in science, and many scholars want to move past binary distinctions between the legacy media and its interlopers or alternatives (see Eldridge II, 2019; Harcup, 2013, p. 9; Rauch, 2016).

Finally,  academic  studies  on  fake  news  and  the  disinformation conundrum have seen a marked emphasis on problematizing the designation of the phenomena, as well as the criticism of the political and journalistic treatment of the problem (see Farkas & Schou, 2020; Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019; Tandoc et al., 2018). This strand of research is singularly important, but, as we have pointed out, themes like  countermedia, Trump's accusations on the media, and Russia and  disinformation  are  deeply  connected  or  intertwined  in  public  discussions. Consequently, studying these connections remains more than pertinent. Drawing directly on our findings, we strongly suggest that greater attention be given to the nature of the boundary work, and the positioning of the Finnish media with respect to international politics in the future. An in-depth qualitative analysis of  stories  mentioning  Trump  and  Russian  hybrid  campaigns  may not only broaden the view of boundary work and the media's fake news discourses but also account for Finnish media's understanding of Finland's geopolitical position. Likewise, from a comparative perspective, this article opens options for different research compositions to understand our findings relative to other media systems and time frames. A historical perspective - a broader view of the demarcation of journalism in the way our analytical framework draws from the work of Gieryn (1983) - might be worthwhile. Our results could then be juxtaposed with other 'critical incidents' in media history - and in different countries - such as discussions on citizen journalism in the 1990s or the changes in the public sphere in the 1960s to understand journalists' ongoing struggle for authority.

## NOTES

- 1 Most researchers have used the concept countermedia to describe MVlehti , so we follow this tradition without undermining the importance of other conceptualizations. What is relevant is that sites like MV-lehti combine facts with fiction and rumors, oftentimes intentionally blurring the lines or spreading lies, other times cherry-picking, coloring and framing

- information to promote a right-wing or radical anti-immigrant agenda. (Tuomola et al. 2021; Ylä-Anttila et al. 2019; Ylä-Anttila 2017.)
- 2 To get a concise picture of the emergence of fake news phenomenon we included all mentions of Magneettimedia in the researched legacy media outlets from years 2010-2013 to the research material.
- 3 The mentions of fake news phenomena in four researched media with the words fake news, fake media, post-truth, post-fact, countermedia, alternative media.
- 4 Only a proportion of the news stream is written by MV 's own writers, as they also circulate texts from other sites as well as bloggers, forum writers, readers and social media users postings.

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## OLLI SEURI

Postdoctoral Researcher Faculty of Social Sciences Tampere University olli.seuri@tuni.fi

## PIHLA TOIVANEN

Doctoral Student Department of Digital Humanities University of Helsinki pihla.toivanen@helsinki.fi

DOI: 10.7146/journalistica.v15i1.125038