## The (far-) right kind of feeling

How representations of emotional experiences perform discourses in Swedish far-right alternative news media

## MAGNUS DANIELSON

Stockholm University

## Abstract

The growth of far-right alternative news media and its influence on political debate highlights the need to understand the role of emotions in this type of media. Emotions are central to how ideologically motivated news gains persuasive power, yet few studies have shown in detail how descriptions of emotions help shape patterns of discourse. This article addresses that gap by analysing how emotions, as represented in language, perform discourse in Swedish far-right alternative news texts. The analysis shows how these texts construct a contrast: emotions tied to the far-right are legitimized and valued, while emotions tied to the left-wing are delegitimized and devalued. In doing so, the texts define which issues deserve emotional attention, shape how readers are expected to feel about them, and portray those who respond differently as ignorant or weak of character.

## KEYWORDS

alternative media, right-wing populism, emotions, discourse, fear, polarization

## Introduction

Research  shows  that  far-right  alternative  news  is  gaining  importance in Western politics (Haller, et al., 2019), and that its influence on the public agenda is increasing (Ihlebæk & Nygaard, 2021). Emotionality  is  identified  as  one  of  its  main  features  (Rae,  2021; Freistein, et al., 2022; Ruzza & Fella, 2011; Hameleers, et al., 2017), and as a factor contributing to an increased polarization in society (Lu & Lee, 2019; Garrett, et al., 2014; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016; Revers, 2023; Törnberg, 2022). Those developments motivate sustained scholarly efforts to 'furthering the empirical study of emotions in political and social life to understand the use of emotions in contentious politics' (Fullerton, et al., 2023, p. 295; Ihlebæk, et al., 2022).

Drawing on concepts identifying emotional expressions as discursive elements (Reddy, 2001; van Kleef, et al., 2015; Bericat, 2016; Barbalet, 2002), and news media as a key vehicle for the circulation of emotionality in society (Wahl-Jørgenssen, 2019; Beckett & Deuze, 2016; Lünenborg & Medeiros, 2022), this article contributes to that field of inquiry by answering the following research question:

How do emotional experiences represented in Swedish far-right alternative news texts construct ideology and perform discourse?

## Populism, far-right alternative news, and emotionality

Studying 'alternative right-wing media of the populist brand' (Holt, 2020b,  p.  202)  calls  for  some  theoretical  clarifications  as  to  the meaning of the concepts of populism and alternative media, as well as their relation to emotionality. Populism as a concept is described as  'elusive',  (Demertzis,  2019,  p.  31)  and  'contested'  (Mudde  & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). Canovan (1999) characterizes the concept as 'notoriously vague' and states 'there is a good deal of agreement on which  political  phenomena  fall  into  this  category  but  less  clarity about what it is that makes them populist' (p. 3).

Far-right populism has been conceptualized in terms of actors, organizations, consequences, and normative implications (Demertzis, 2019, p. 31). It has been defined as an ideology, a symptom, a mentality, a political movement, political discourse, and a political  style  (Mudde,  2004;  Moffit,  2016;  Tarchi,  2016;  Wodak, 2015). Researchers also define populism in a Western context as a communication phenomenon (de Vreese et.al., 2018) and claim that focusing particularly on the online aspects of the phenomenon is a key to understanding its role in contemporary politics.

## Right-wing populism

In this study far-right populism is understood as a combination of the 'ideational' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 5, Müller, 2020) phenomena composing far-right political ideology (Canovan, 1999, p. 3), and the rhetoric/political style used to 'articulate [that] ideology discursively' (Mannuci, 2017, p. 482) through 'repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance' (Moffit, 2016, p. 28). The term is applied to groups, politicians, and political parties who propagate a critical stance towards immigration, Islam, globalization, feminism, and environmentalism, and for whom nativism and protectionism are accentuated ideological positions. The main rhetoric style consists of an expressed ambition to champion the needs and aspirations of a pure and homogenous common people whose interests are purportedly circumvented by a corrupt and devious elite whose  characteristics  need  to  be  exposed  and  unmasked  (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2022; Wodak, 2015, p. 7).

Far-right populist rhetoric has been analysed as a form of particularly emotional communication, the main modes being fear of immigration, Islam, and multiculturalism, derogatory out-group representations, nostalgic romantic folkloric affection for the nation, disdain for political and cultural elites, and suspicion towards environmentalist politics (Demertzis, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Wodak, 2015). Tarchi (2016) states that populistic thinking is 'based more on emotional inputs than on rational consideration' (p. 104), and he lists 'the use of a popular language, characterised by vulgarity, extreme simplifications, absence of doubts, and exaggerations; paternalistic  attitudes;  the  frequent  recourse  to  proverbs,  stereotypes, clichés and other expressions of 'popular wisdom'', as rhetorical  populist  strategies  employed  to  connect  emotionally  with target audiences (p. 102). Demertzis (2019) shows how such rhetoric has an emotionally polarizing effect as it develops feelings of 'antipathy', 'alienation', and 'frustration' on behalf of common people in relation to those elites (p. 33). The rhetorical identification of legacy media in general, and public service media in particular, as integrated parts of such elites is a main factor in understanding the reason for the establishment, development, and proliferation of farright alternative media.

## Far-right alternative media and the Swedish case

The expression Alternative Media has historically been used to characterize media that, from various ideological, social, or cultural positions,  challenge  the  dominant  or  hegemonic  media  discourse (Waisbord, 2022; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019 a; Guedes Baily, et al., 2007; Atton, 2002; Cushion, 2024). In recent years the term has been applied to a growing number of online platforms supporting farright populist ideology in a European context (Holt, 2018; Ihlebæk & Nygaard,  2021;  Frischlich,  et  al.,  2020)  by  harsh,  and  sometimes vulgar,  criticism  of  immigration,  Islam,  globalization,  and  gender politics.

Holt et. al (2019) defines alternative right-wing media as a 'proclaimed  and/or  (self-)  perceived  corrective,  opposing  the  overall tendency of public discourse emanating from what is perceived as the dominant mainstream media' (p. 862). Holt (2020b) describes it as 'relational' or 'reactive' in the sense that its reason for being is a strong notion that mainstream media is not representing issues, actors, and events fairly and accurately, and that it excludes certain perspectives, and fails to cater to important interests of the people (p. 202). Legacy news journalism is branded as 'biased, elitist, leftist, politically correct, and distanced from the people' (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019b, p. 903).

In Hallin & Mancini's (2004) classification of media systems, Sweden is classified as belonging to the Democratic Corporatist Model, which is characterized by high circulation rates, substantial journalistic autonomy, a developed professionalism, and a strong position of legacy media (p. 144). In comparison to the media in other Scandinavian countries, legacy media in Sweden has more critically covered the domestic populist party, the Sweden Democrats (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). According to Heft et. al. (2019) this may contribute to the strong position of alternative right-wing media in Sweden as their research shows that countries with a media ecology where farright and right-wing populist ideological positions are well-represented, like Austria and Great Britain, have a less vibrant far-right alternative news media presence. In contrast, countries where legacy media adopt a 'marginalization of right-wing views and positions in media and politics' (p. 20), like Sweden and Germany, alternative news becomes more prevalent and popular. Sweden is one of the countries in Europe where the demand for, and the reach and supply of, right-wing alternative media is the greatest considering population (Holt, 2020b). In 2019 around 10 % of Swedes read the news sites studied in this article (Ihlebæk & Nygaard, 2021).

## Far-right communication and emotionality

Scholars claim that the success of far-right populist movements is in part explained by their efficient use of messages that cater to negative  emotions  rather  than  rational  thought  (Wirz,  2018;  Betz  & Oswald, 2022; Nguyen, et al., 2022), and far-right alternative media has been associated with emotionalization for ideological purposes (Demertzis, 2019; Freistein, et al., 2022; Rae, 2021).

Several studies seem to substantiate those assumptions. Hameleers et al. (2017) argue that 'populist messages are characterized by assigning  blame  to  elites  in  an emotionalized  way'  (p.  870).  Wirz (2018) found that 'populist appeals elicit stronger emotions than non-populist appeals and that these emotions mediate the persuasiveness  of  the  appeals'  (p.  1114).  A  study  of  Kaati  et  al.  (2016) showed that Swedish far-right alternative news consistently features more negative emotion words than legacy journalism.

In a study based on interviews with far-right online commenters, Ihlebaek & Riborg Holter (2021) conclude that even though the informants consume a fair amount of both legacy and far-right alternative news, fear of political change, particularly related to immigration and Islam, influences them to endorse the emotional discourses and narratives in far-right alternative media, and to develop hostility towards, and disdain for, what they perceive as legacy media's unsubstantiated claims of factual and emotional objectivity (p. 1209). The results of a visual analysis show that Finnish far-right alternative  media use recontextualized images of people published elsewhere, to express negative emotions, such as fear, disgust, hate and distrust towards three groups in particular; ethnic minorities, young women who advocate multiculturalism, and elite politicians promoting  generous  immigration  policies  (Tuomola  &  WahlJørgensen, 2022). Freistein et al. (2022) demonstrate how this type of media is 'establishing alternative emotion norms that collectivize feelings  and  their  expressions'  in  line  with  ideological  goals,  and how this is done through storytelling and visual narratives that employ a complex cocktail of indignation, humour, compassion, and schadenfreude ,  and  not  necessarily by simply promoting negative emotions (pp. 1, 2).

## Represented emotional experiences as discourse

This study uses the term 'discourse' as 'language use as a form of social practice' (Fairclough, 2002, p. 63). Descriptions of emotional experience  in  news  texts  are  analysed  as  such  practices.  Potter (2007)  states  that  'discourse  is  constructive  of  (…)  psychological characteristics and phenomenological experiences' and 'descriptions of how social actions [such as representing emotional experience]  build  character  and  group  affiliation  when  embedded  in broader ideological contexts and practices'. He also explains that 'discourse is situated rhetorically, such that any description can be inspected  for  how  it  counters  relevant  alternative  descriptions' (Potter, 2007). Descriptions and contextualization of emotional experiences in media texts are not just readouts of internal emotional states, they are also given discursive value as they position the feeling subjects politically, socially and culturally, and in the process, perform  identity,  ideology,  and  political  antagonism  (Döveling  & Konijn, 2022; Farkas, 2023).

Emotional experiences may constitute elements of discourse in several ways. Firstly, they identify and provide understanding of values  of  communities  and  ideological  groups  (Rosenwein,  2002,  p. 842; Smith & Mackie, 2018). Rosenwein & Cristiani (2018) describe how emotional  communities develop  systems  of  displaying  emotional  expressions  and  assessing  them  as  valuable  or  abject;  and structure  them according to what is expected, encouraged, tolerated, deplored, and derided (p. 42). Those expressions emotionally communicate the ideological values of the group (Greer, 2022) and are  used  to  construct  and  characterize  the  ideological  'other' (Koschut, 2018, p. 334). Representations of such expressions perform what Döveling (2009) calls 'the cohesive power of the media' (p. 315), which refers to how media environments constitute emotional  rallying  points  pivotal  to  the  creation  and  maintenance  of emotional cultures significant for ideological groups. Eksner (2015) explains  that  textual  displays  of  emotion  enact  specific  'affective identities' and constitute 'a site in which the relationship between emotions and social structure is enacted' (p. 193). A specific media environment may also constitute an emotional refuge (Reddy, 2001), where the influence of the prevalent emotional culture is relaxed.

Secondly, displays of emotionality are social and moral 'learning cues'  (Harris,  2018,  p.  260)  identifying  acceptable  emotions  and teaching  how  to  express  emotional  experiences  in  an  acceptable way (Marinetti, et al., 2011), and thus grooming those exposed to fit into a particular social milieu (Freistein, et al., 2022; Reddy, 2001). Smith & Mackie (2018) show that 'people's perceptions of typical emotions in their group as a whole (…) influence their self-reported emotions,  appraisals,  and  collective  action  tendencies',  and  that members of an emotional group-culture tend to emotionally 'converge toward the group profile' (p. 418).

Thirdly, expressed emotions have motivating properties (Harris, 2018,  p.  259),  as  they  accentuate  the  importance,  urgency,  and meaning attributed to specific events and societal issues, and could be used to 'manipulate the internal states and behaviours of others, in service of social goals' (Harris, 2018, p. 257). Reddy (2001) categorizes emotional expressions as 'a dynamic tool that can be seized by attention in the service of various high-level goals' (p. 105).

Fourthly,  displayed  emotionality  performs  morality,  character, and personality. Displays of emotion are normative indications of appropriate, or inappropriate, conceptualizations of morality and justice  (Rosenwein & Cristiani, 2018, p. 46; Turner & Stets, 2006).

Emotional responses and the way in which they are expressed indicate  personality  characteristics,  social  status,  dominance,  affiliativeness, likability, and since emotional expressions are culturally gender-coded,  degrees  of  masculinity/femininity  are  associated with how emotions are expressed (Hess, 2018; Sabini, 1995, p. 273). Koschut (2018) discusses how verbally expressed emotional experiences perform 'self-validation' (p. 334), when they either are presented as a reasonable and sound positive reaction to the moral excellence of self, or the unavoidable negative emotional response to the failure of adversaries.

Fifthly,  emotional  expressions  make  sense  of  social  reality  and forge an understanding of cognitive experience. Reddy (2001) suggests that expressions of emotional experience have an 'exploratory and self-altering effect', which means that expressing an emotion, or being exposed to an emotional expression, may define, and intensify that emotion, bringing it from the domain of diffuse circulation of thought material into an articulated and activated emotion to which focused attention is paid and importance is attributed (p. 100). Basic emotional needs are catered to by the exposure to emotional  expressions  with  which  one  sympathize  and  identify  -  but there is also a more complex and elaborate multi-level intellectual and emotional pleasure to be gained by the impression of having gained deeper insight and understanding. Konjin, et al. (2022) describe how a processing of exposure to expressed emotions engenders  potentially  'rewarding  experiences  of  insight,  and  reflexiveness' (p. 34).

The theoretical understanding of how certain properties of emotional expressions construct social surfaces of emergence through which discourse appears, is pivotal when systematically researching the discursive, ideological, and cultural implications of the circulation of emotions in a particular ideologically confined media space.

## Method and material

The method used is a qualitative content analysis conducted in the following  sequence  (1)  identification  of  textually  described  emotional  experiences,  (2)  a  systematic  coding  and  categorization  of those  expressions  according  to  a  theoretically  determined  set  of properties (Bertrand & Hughes, 2018, p. 268; Schreier, 2012), and (3) a subsequent analysis of how they construct ideology and discourse. The unit of analysis is: an emotional experience represented by language, either expressed/quoted, or attributed to a feeling subject . Expressed or attributed emotions refer to how emotional experiences are represented in the texts. Either 'I am so angry'

(expressed/quoted), or 'He was very angry' (attributed).

The method follows three steps. The first step is to establish the experiences as emotional profiles by identifying, structuring, and coding them according to the following set of properties.

Feeling  subject. Bericat  states  that  'the  feeling  subject,  constitutes  the central reference upon which emotions turn' (Bericat, 2016, p. 493). The subject may be an individual or a group (Bednarek & Caple, 2012, p. 54).

Type of emotion. The expressions are labelled and coded according to the characterization, classification, and identification of emotions described in Plutchnik's (1980) 'Wheel of Emotions', where he proposes eight primary emotions that serve as the foundation for all others, and group them in polar opposites, joy/sadness, acceptance/disgust, fear/anger, surprise/ anticipation. For a detailed presentation of the taxonomy see (Williams, et al., 2019, p. 622).

Object. An emotional experience is elicited by an object, or stimuli (Sabini, 1995).

Valence. The expressed emotion may be pleasant or unpleasant (Kagan, 2007).

Intensity. High, medium, or low. Example: Furious - high. Angry - medium. Irritated - low (Kagan, 2007).

Context. How is the expression contextualized? In what socio-cultural environment is the emotion expressed. What is the topic at hand? Is it commented on in an ironic sense? Is it legitimized or delegitimized? Does it have discursive or ideological implications? Is it performative (Reddy, 2001)?

Complexity. Simple, or complex. By complex I mean an expressed emotion that may be multi-facetted. If someone claims to be angry, but also scared, or  disgusted,  but  also  fascinated  -  the  expression  is  coded  as  complex (Harris, 2018).

Motivated action/goal. Emotions disposes their subject towards certain actions (Frijda, et al., 1989), which means that emotional expressions suggest, implicitly or explicitly, some sort of action with some sort of goal, either the prolongation or amplification of a pleasant state, or a change of the state of affairs to alleviate or extinguish the negative emotion expressed (Bericat, 2016, p. 493).

In the second step, the profiles are entered into a descriptive matrix (See Table 1). Using the matrix, the profiles are then subjected to an iterative sorting according to properties to get a holistic overview and to identify patterns and clusters (Averill, 2002; Braun & Clarke, 2022; Terry & Hayfield, 2021). Firstly, the profiles are sorted and analyzed according to Subject ,  secondly, according to Emotion type , thirdly, according to Object , etc.

Table 9: Descriptive matrix of the properties making-up emotional profiles

| Properties      | Description                                                                  | Example from the data [SN230716]                                                    |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Subject         | Who is expressing, or being attributed the emotional ex- perience?           | The Swedish minister of mi- gration                                                 |
| Emotion         | Type of emotion?                                                             | Disgust                                                                             |
| Object          | Towards what, or whom, is the emotion directed?                              | A critical stance towards Is- lam                                                   |
| Valence         | Negative or positive?                                                        | Negative                                                                            |
| Intensity       | High, low, or medium?                                                        | High                                                                                |
| Desired outcome | What action,outcome,or change of affairs, does the feeling subject desire?   | An end to critical comments of Islam and Islamophobic ac- tions                     |
| Complexity      | Simpleor complex?                                                            | Simple                                                                              |
| Context         | What contextual factors in- fluence the meaning of the emotional experience? | The expression is presented and commented on in an ironic and exaggerated man- ner. |

The third phase is an analysis of how the emotional profiles construct discursive meaning at an aggregated level. To guide the analysis, the five performative characteristics of emotional expressions described in the literature review are employed to analyse how represented emotional experiences are: a) indicating the emotional and ideological composition and values of communities and ideological groups, (b) identifying and demonstrating distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate emotions, (c) motivating action, (d) constructing morality and character, and (e) stimulating the exploration and understanding of our own emotions and those of others. Attention is given to how the representations of emotional experience are woven into the discursive fabric of the texts, and how they 'build character and group affiliation when embedded in broader ideological contexts and practices' (Potter, 2007). The profiles are thematized according to similarities and variation in discursive meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2022).

## Material and sampling

The  empirical  material  in  this  study  consists  of  articles  from  the three largest Swedish far-right alternative online news sites ( Samhällsnytt, Fria Tider and Nyheter idag )  (Holt, 2020a, p. 58). A 2018 survey showed that they reach between 8-11 % of the Swedish online population, that their readers mainly are positioned on the far-right political scale, and that regular users have a low level of trust in legacy media (Levy, et. al, 2019). Samhällsnytt has close connections to the Swedish far-right populist party Sweden Democrats (Heft, et. al., 2019), and one of its expressed purposes is to study and map antidemocratic, left-wing  extremist,  and  anti-nationalistic  tendencies in society (Freje Simonsson, 2020). Fria Tider is also reckoned to be a part of the Swedish 'radical right-wing populistic digital ecology' [my translation] by the Swedish Media Counsel (Statens medieråd, 2013).  It  describes  its  own  ideology  as  paleo-conservative  (Holt, 2016, p. 129). Nyheter Idag is defined as libertarian-conservative but has no direct ties to a political party, it has some professional journalistic ambitions, and is a part of the Swedish self-regulatory system of the press and thus professes to abide to its ethical codes of conduct  (Holt,  2016;  Ihlebæk  &  Nygaard,  2021,  pp.  275,  276).  All three  sites  promote  anti-immigration  sentiments,  disdain  for  the political  and  cultural  elite,  and  critique  of  legacy  media,  'mainly through a descriptive news-genre style' (Ihlebæk & Nygaard, 2021, p. 271). Scholars have identified those three news outlets as the major mouth-pieces of the Swedish far-right populist movement (Holt, 2016; Ihlebæk & Nygaard, 2021, p. 274). The study treats the material as one single set of data, and does not analyse differences between the sites.

The articles were retrieved from the sites' general news flows, and were sampled in chronological order as they appeared in the main news flows (the news flows produced a mixed stream of chronicles, editorials, and various types of news articles), until 25 articles containing emotional expressions from each media outlet and sampling period were sampled. The first sampling started on March 14, 2023 and the second sampling started on August 8, 2023. A total of 150 articles  containing  some  334  expressions  or  attributions  of  emotional experience were sampled. The sampling was purposive, 'on a substantial, concrete level' (Flick, 2009, p. 126), with the purpose to sample articles that met readers directly as they accessed the sites in that particular temporal and local setting. When citing sampled articles,  I  use  the  abbreviations: Samhällsnytt (SN), Fria Tider (FT), and Nyheter idag (NiD), using the following format [ NewssiteYearMonthDay ].

## Quality criteria

Yardley's (2000) criteria of sensitivity to context, commitment, and rigor; transparency and coherence were employed as guiding principles when assessing the quality of the study. The context sensitivity criterion was addressed by sampling data from far-right alternative news organizations identified as representative and relevant by previous research (Ihlebæk & Nygaard, 2020), and by an analytical engagement with theoretical aspects close to the empirical material (Atton, 2001; Holt, 2020; Ihlebæk et. al., 2022; Waisbord, 2022). Rigor and transparency were pursued by following a standardized analytical  process  informed  by  established  methods  of  qualitative  research (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Bryman, 2016, p. 387; Terry & Hayfield, 2021), and further endeavored by providing a description of the steps of the research method as clearly and detailed as possible, and making detailed references to its theoretical foundations (Bertrand & Hughes, 2018; Bryman, 2016; Braun & Clarke, 2022).

## Results and analysis

The representations of emotional experience are related to immigration, Islam, gender studies, left-wing political elite, climate activism, multi-culturalism, 'political correctness', and mainstream media (Holt, 2020a; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019 a; Greven, 2016). The feeling subjects are not only far-right sympathizers. Representatives of  political  and  cultural  elites,  are  also  given  emotional  agency. However, the experiences are strictly organized into a dichotomy between a constructed legitimacy of far-right feelings and a de-legitimization of left-wing feelings. A dichotomy illustrated by contrasting a quote expressing far-right feelings: 'What feels right is almost always also rationally right. (…) The most efficient way to get rid of parasites and criminals just happens to be what our gut-feeling tells us: Kick them out!' [FT230809], with this comment on leftwing emotionality. 'Every single one of those reality-denying convictions have been so entrenched that they border religious obsession. Logic, empirical data from the surrounding world - yes, everything  that  would  have  made  normal  persons  revise  their  standpoints, does not affect those people. On the contrary, emotions rule' [SN230401]. The results section will analyse how this dichotomy is discursively constructed and contextualized.

## The delegitimization of left-wing emotions

Left-wing sympathizers are represented as irrational, overly sensitive and easily offended. The intensity of their emotional expressions is generally high. The left is 'raging', or 'hitting the ceiling' [NiD230529], filled with 'great anger' [FT230606], or characterized  as  'the  screaming  left'  (FT230602].  High-pitched  offended emotional  reactions,  and  moping  and  sulking  when  not  getting things their way, connote immaturity, and a sense of entitlement. Their  emotional  reactions  are  presented  as  preventing  left-wing elite persons from rational thinking. When a former Swedish Centre Party  leader  was  said  to  despise  those  claiming  a  correlation  between  immigration  and  crime,  that  emotional  expression  was branded as a dangerous, 'total, almost absurd, refusal to accept reality' [NiD230511]. Recurringly, articles attribute, interpret, and impersonate emotions of political opponents in an apparently exaggerated way. One article claimed that liberals 'dislike real democracy (…), calling it populism when the voice of the people is given political  significance.  Arrogantly  they  frown  upon  the  man  and woman on the street, lecturing them by explaining that they are too stupid  to  understand  (…)  how  society  should  be  governed' [SN230804].

Left-wing fear is delegitimized as cowardice. Support for measures against discrimination of Muslims is represented as an anxious subjection to Islam. Left-wing sympathizers are qualified as 'Quislings', or 'traitors', who 'in fear of threats, violence, or terror, or as a result of a misguided postcolonial guilt complex, succumb to an invasion of a Medieval Islam, at the expense of the democracy and the civil rights our forefathers sacrificed their blood, sweat, and tears,  to  conquer  and  defend'  [SN230709].  Expressed  left-wing emotions are repeatedly placed within a discourse of weakness and feminization. Left-wing politicians (and sometimes right-wing politicians who express sympathy for any of the objects of discontent) are constructed as too weak and too fearful to take necessary measurements. One news article stated: 'Our elected representatives are too much cowards to oppose a loud and screaming left-wing minority' [FT230510].

An editorial explained why women sympathize less with far-right politics than men by claiming that they are more prone to succumb to Islamic threats and to 'believe in the establishment's theories of a climate crisis' due to 'a fundamental inner fear of events beyond their control, due to their physical weakness'. The article continued:

But that being said, there are also a lot of Swedish male wimps. Social media is filled with beta-males, snowflakes, and soy-boys who declare their wish to succumb to Muslim threats and violence [SN230722].

Attributed left-wing expressions of emotional experience are branded as 'hypocritical' in the sense of being deliberate misunderstandings, misinterpretations, and exaggerations, to fuel and justify strong emotional reactions against far-right political positions. Leftwing reactions to controversial statements made by far-right politicians are said to be 'deliberately misunderstood (…) otherwise the Left had not been able to act indignant and upset to the point of demanding their resignation' [SN230806].

The valence of left-wing emotions is mostly negative, but there are also instances of constructed ironic positive valence. Left-wing representatives are quoted expressing joy over political failure, and satisfaction over disastrous effects of their own political actions. A representative of the workers' union commenting on his role in an economic hospital reform, was said to be ''extremely satisfied' that patients  now  are  given  even  worse  care'  [SN230405].  Expressed emotions of joy and contentment are represented as tokens of irresponsible behaviour, bad judgement, a stubborn overriding of public will, or a violation of common sense.

## Legitimized far-right emotions

Far-right emotions are represented as rational, logical, and wellfounded. Feeling subjects are given the status of concerned citizens, experts,  and  knowledgeable  officials  with  first-hand  experience, thus reinforcing the legitimacy and accuracy of the emotional experience. This status, together with a low to moderate intensity of the expressions,  connote  reflection  and  reliability  and  construct  the subjects as initiated and level-headed. When commenting on how far-right  representatives  are  labelled  Islamophobes,  one  editor wrote that fear of Islam:

Is  however  not  more  unfounded  than  fearing  Nazism  or  Communism,  at least not for anyone who considers freedom and democracy as inalienable parts of a dignified life [SN230730].

Expressed emotional experiences are predominantly negative and situated along the whole spectrum of far-right objects of discontent, immigration being the dominant theme. In Swedish far-right alternative news media, responsible citizens are not outraged by heartbreaking deportations, but by criminal immigrants remaining in the country. They fear multiculturalism, Islam, and the feminisation of politics,  but  neither  climate  change,  nor  xenophobic  violence. Those who feel differently are portrayed as misled, misinformed, or weak. Objects of indignation, or fear, are constructed as caused by a societal failure due to mismanagement of the ruling elite.

Some emotional expressions are constructed as encompassing an obviously wider range of objects than intended. A report on why many urban Swedes want to move to the countryside, had the headline 'Swedes Abandon Immigrant-Infested Inner Cities.' [ The article discussed an article in the Swedish legacy newspaper Sydsvenskan [230403] in which urban residents who had moved from innercity areas discussed their decision to move. The far-right alternative news article argued that immigration is making life in inner-cities unbearable, and thus causing people to want to leave. However, in the in Sydsvenskan none of the feelings expressed, or the rationales provided, were linked to immigration [SN230404]. A report from a press  conference  where  a  Police  Officer  expressed  her  concern about how criminal gangs in problem areas are recruiting children, there  was  an  interjection  explaining  how  the  purported  tax-financed support of gangster rap by Swedish Public Service Media incites  young  immigrants  to  pursue  a  criminal  career.  The  spokeswoman's subsequent quotes thus appeared to indicate that the purported  Swedish  Public  Service's  support  of  gangster  rap  was  the main object of her concerns [SN230120].

Some subjects are constructed as formerly left-wing sympathizers having  undergone  self-altering  'conversion  experiences'  (Reddy, 2001, p. 128), now expressing emotions reinforcing far-right ideology. A columnist working for the legacy tabloid Expressen , who previously declared measures against immigration 'insane', is quoted expressing sadness over a migration policy that 'has been more of a failure  than  I  wanted  to  realize'  [NiD230627].  Former  Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt is presented as someone who previously supported a generous immigration policy, but now 'seems to finally be fed up with immigrants' [NiD230802].

The feelings of indignation and fear have both a predictive, present, and retrospective discursive value. Some are represented as a 'predictive affective experience' (Harris, 2018, p. 259) in the sense of being expressed in anticipation of a negative development culminating in the future. Others express imminent fear of present conditions, and some are retrospect in the sense that they point to an undefined moment in the past when something could have been done to  prevent  the  current  situation.  One  article  emphasizes  that  the party-leader  of  the  Sweden  Democrats  identified  Islam  as  'the greatest threat against Sweden since the Second World War' already 15  years  ago  and  adds  'and  the  threat  has  only  increased  since' [SN230730].  The  emotions  perform  a  discursive  'self-validation' (Koschut, 2018, p. 334) by a 'told you so!' and 'if they only had listened'-rhetoric.  Emotions,  past,  present,  and  predictive,  are  circumstantially validated by references to a tragic political development that  could  have  been  avoided  if  far-right  politics  had  been given more attention at an earlier stage. One editorial is looking forward to a future day when applied far-right politics 'create a much better society than we have today'. It concludes: 'However, that day feels long in coming, and it may be so far away, that when it finally comes,  it  will  be  too  late,  and  Sweden  will  be  beyond  rescue' [SN230804].

Far-right

## Left-wing

Table 10:  Characteristics  of  representations  of  far-right  and  left-wing  emotional experiences in Swedish far-right alternative news media

| Rational           | Irrational           |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| Appropriate        | Inappropriate        |
| Balanced           | Exaggerated          |
| National interest  | Ideological interest |
| Masculine          | Feminine/Childish    |
| Earnest            | Hypocritical         |
| Moderate intensity | High intensity       |
| Reflected          | Spontaneous          |
| Important          | Ridiculous           |

## Conclusions

Representations of emotional experience in Swedish far-right alternative  media  perform  discourse  primarily  by  adding  an  emotional  dimension to the construction of a qualitative division between ''the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite'' symptomatic for far-right populist rhetoric (Mudde, 2004). They are drawn into that divide by being sorted, not only according to how they express differences  in  political  affiliation,  but  more  outstandingly  along  the lines of character-indicating opposites. The left-wing feeling subject is constructed as 'a psychological type, with sensitivity, intolerance, sense  of  entitlement  and  immaturity  being  the  dominant  traits' (Alyeksyeyeva, 2017, p. 10) corroborating Törnberg's (2022) characterization of contemporary ideological polarization.

Polarization on digital media is driven by conflict rather than isolation, affording a form of politics rooted in identity rather than opinion. Digital media intensify polarization not as echo chambers but as a sorting machine, fueling a runaway social process that destabilizes plural societies by drawing more and more issues into a single expanding social and cultural divide (Törnberg, 2022, p. 10).

Müller (2022) states that populists 'assert that all other contenders for  office  are  illegitimate'  based  more  on  flaws  in  character  than policy (p. 14). Swedish far-right alternative media elaborates on that assertion by declaring representatives of left-wing elites unfit to govern by portraying them as putting sentimentality, misguided emotions, and ideological affiliation ahead of rational thinking and national interests.

Scholars argue that emotionality in general, and fear in particular, are  main  elements  of  the  political  rhetoric  of  far-right  populists (Tarchi,  2016;  Wodak,  2015).  Swedish  far-right  alternative  media adopts the populist strategy to produce and reproduce fear, provide simple solutions by identifying scapegoats and enemies responsible for those fears, and thus legitimizing exclusion as a proposed policy (Wodak, 2015). But this study shows that it also discursively constructs  a  dichotomy  of  two  types  of  fear.  Left-wing  fear  is  constructed as naïve, short-sighted, feminine, hysterical, and hypocritical, whereas rational and insightful thinking is attributed to the fear felt by far-right populists. Research indicates that populist messages cater  to  negative  emotions  instead  of  logical  reasoning  (Betz  & Oswald, 2022; Wirz, 2018). The news sites studied use representations of emotional experiences in news reporting as a way to discursively counteract that notion.

The  represented  feelings  create  a  political  'identity  of  shared grievance' (Nguyen, et al., 2022) over an illusory society that was, and could have been, but has been ruined by immigration, leftist elites, public service media, etc., thus playing a role in the formation and reinforcement of a particular emotional community (Rosenwein, 2016; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016). Swedish far-right alternative media constructs an intersubjective communality where far-right minded audiences are given the opportunity to feel comfortable  and  reassured  as  emotionally  likeminded  and  discreet, since  the  emotional  experiences  with  which  they  sympathize  are constructed as appropriate, and justified, conceptualizations of morality  and  justice  (Rosenwein  &  Cristiani,  2018,  p.  46).  That  performative process also turns the news platforms into an emotional refuge (Reddy, 2001), or emotional incubator, where a specific set of emotions,  that  may  have  a  negative  moral  connotation  in  other parts of the political landscape, are nourished, and allowed to thrive and grow without being directly censored. The accumulated discursive value of the expressions soothes internal goal-conflicts between humanitarian concerns and a nationalistic outlook by articulating emotional  acceptance  of  the  non-humanitarian  aspects  of  rightwing  politics  and  identifying  humanitarian  reflections  and  empathic  reactions  as  misguided  and  naïve.  The  representations thereby suggest and facilitate a cognitive change (Konijn, et al., 2022, p.  35),  which  means  an  emotional  reinterpretation  of  events, pictures, and utterances that demobilises potentially empathetic reactions towards the objects of far-right populist discontent. Converts who used to feel 'wrongly', but now feel the right way, are personalizing and idealizing that cognitive change.

Far-right alternativie media audiences are offered emotional gratification as both reinforcement of ideology (we are right), emotional intersubjectivity (we are united), and experienced cognitive prowess  (now  I  understand).  The  discursive  value  of  constructions  of emotional expressions offers potentially 'rewarding experiences of insight, and reflexiveness' (Konijn, et al., 2022, p. 34) as to the makeup of  social  reality,  and  thus  generates  'collective  effervescence' (Collins, 2004) - a collectively generated emotional flow that is the result of a socially shared pleasure informed by values and ideology (Freistein, et al., 2022, p. 6).

## Limits of the study and suggestion for further research

The method used does not capture all dimensions of emotionality in the texts examined. Represented emotional experiences are not the only elements contributing to discursive patterns of news texts. The temporal and local setting, as well as the limited sample, make for  a  low  degree  of  generalizability  and  allows  for  only  a  limited scope of conclusions to be drawn concerning the role emotional expressions play in the construction of societal discourse. Further research into how a wider range of emotional elements concur in forging far-right populist discourse, as well as into how such elements are perceived and interpreted by audiences over a longer period of time, may therefore be a of value when testing temporal generalizability. A comparison with constructions of emotional expressions in legacy media and radical left media would also put the findings of this study in a wider context.

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## MAGNUS DANIELSON

Associate professor Department Stockholm University

magnus.danielson@ims.su.se