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## Non-spontaneous and communi  ca  tive emotive interjections

## - eco  lo  gical pragmatic observations

Simon Borchmann Roskilde University sub@ruc.dk

Abstract: Th e basic feature of emotive interjections is that they are spontaneous. Th is  feature  implies that they are not intentional and, hence, not communicative. Nevertheless, in  addition  to  spontaneous  and  non-communicative  emotive interjections one can observe emotive interjections that are non-spontaneous and  communicative  and  emotive  interjections  that  are  spontaneous  and communicative. Th is  heterogeneity  poses  a  fundamental  problem  for  the classifi  cation and description of interjections, and it is this problem that is the focus of this article. Th e article presents an ecological pragmatic analysis of emotive interjections with special regard to the evaluation of four accounts of the heterogeneity. Th e article's contribution consists of observation-based evidence  in  the  form  of  an  analysis  of  three  occurrences  of  interjections that diff  er with regard to their spontaneity and communicativity. Th e article suggests that the basic sign relation of emotive interjections is indexical, but it also shows that an iconic and a symbolic relation can be added to this basic relation.

## 1. Th e interjectional chaos

It is not unusual for an area of linguistic research to appear incoherent or even chaotic. Nevertheless, interjections are a remarkable one of a kind. In some descriptions,  interjections  are  not  integrated  into  grammatical  structures (Jespersen 1968/1922; Sapir 1970; Stange 2016; Trask 1993), in others, they constitute units in the grammar of speech (Norrick 2014). In some descriptions, they  are  non-communicative  (Fries  1952),  in  others,  they  are  devices  that constitute the essence of communication (Ameka 1992). In some descriptions, they are purely emotive words having no referential content (Quirk et al. 1972), in others, they are semantically rich and have a defi  nite conceptual structure (Ameka 1992; Evans 1992; Goddard 2014; Wierzbicka 1992; Wilkins 1992).

In  some  descriptions,  they  are  response  cries  (Goff  man  1978),  in  others, they contain a predicative relation (Meinard 2015; Wilkins 1992). In some descriptions, they are involuntary reactions (Fries 1952; Nübling 2004; Stange 2016), in others, they are items that encode communicative intentions (Ameka 1992; Wilkins 1992). In some descriptions, they are restricted to expressing emotions and sensations (Jespersen 1968/1922; Nübling 2004; Stange 2016), in others, they 'introduce and connect utterances to foregoing talk, they act as tags, they fi  ll pauses, they signal listener responses and assessments, all in addition to expressing emotions' (Norrick 2014:251).

A  contributing  factor  to  the  above  chaos  is  undoubtedly  a  tendency in recent research to extend the area covered by interjections. According to Norrick  (2014),  interjections  include:  directives  like sh! ,  attention  getters like pst ,  response  markers  like yeah ,  backchannels  like mhm , mm , uh-huh and hm, fi llers like um and routines like hello , bye-bye and thank you . What these  utterances  have  in  common  is  that  they  can  occur  in  isolation.  But this  poses  insoluble  problems if  we  try  to  identify  common functional, i.e. semiotic, pragmatic and semantic, features. Th is problem is characteristic of the approaches that use structural criteria, for example Evans (1992), Norrick (2014) and Wilkins (1992). Th us, when these approaches fi  nd that interjections are  a  heterogeneous  class,  it  is  a  consequence  of  basing  classifi  cation  on structural criteria.

To base the classifi  cation of interjections on structural criteria is a choice of  research strategy; it is not in any sense given by nature that expressions of  emotions and sensations, directives, attention getters, response markers, backchannels, fi  llers and routines belong to the same class. Another research strategy  is  to  combine  structural  and  functional  criteria,  taking  a  starting point  in  structural  criteria  and  adding  functional  criteria  (Ameka  1992; Meinard  2015;  Wierzbicka  1992;  Wilkins  1992).  Ameka  takes  a  starting point  in  the  structural  criteria  'little  words  or  non-words  which  in  terms of  their  distribution  can  constitute  an  utterance  by  themselves  and  do not normally enter into construction with other word classes' and 'do not normally take infl  ections or derivations' (Ameka 1992:105). Th ese criteria result  in  a  functionally  heterogeneous  set  of  utterances. Th is  heterogeneity is  then  handled  by  distinguishing  between  types  of  interjections  based  on their  function. Th us,  on  the  basis  of  Jakobson's  (1960)  distinction  between text  functions,  Ameka  (1992)  proposes  a  distinction  between  emotive, conative  and  phatic  interjections.  However,  the  structural  criteria  include a  number  of  utterances  the  functions  of  which  seem  to  diff  er  signifi  cantly from typical interjections  like  åh  ( oh ).  For  example,  routines  like undskyld ( sorry ) and tak ( thank you ) and onomatopoeias like vov ( bark ) and ding .  In order  to  distinguish  interjections  from  such  utterances,  Ameka  identifi  es specifi  c functional features of interjections. Unlike routines, interjections are 'spontaneous immediate responses to situations' and 'not addressed' (Ameka

1992:109). Th e  problem is  that  these  two  features  do  not  seem  to  apply  to conative  interjections  like sh! ,  and  phatic  interjections  like mm .  Similarly, unlike onomatopoeias, interjections are 'expressive of a mental state' (Ameka 1992:113). But it is not clear in what sense conative and phatic interjections are expressive. In fact, Ameka distinguishes between expressive interjections, on the one hand, and conative and phatic interjections, on the other (Ameka 1992:113-114). Th ese  maneuvers  reveal  that  emotive  interjections  diff  er fundamentally from the conative and phatic interjections in terms of their function. From a functional point of view, it is therefore unclear what can be gained by examining and describing these based on the same premises (see also Stange 2016).

An alternative to the above strategies is to combine formal and functional criteria  and  to  take  a  starting  point  in  functional  criteria  (Goff  man  1981; Jespersen  1968/1922;  Ries  1952;  Nübling  2004;  Stange  2016).  If  you  do  so and consider the functional features that Ameka identifi  es, i.e. spontaneous, not  addressed  and  expressive,  to  be  criteria  of  interjections,  interjections are  restricted  to  emotive  interjections,  i.e.  signs  of  sudden  emotions  and sensations. Th e  work  presented  here  adheres  to  this  strategy  and  is  thus confi  ned to emotive interjections.

What is interesting, however, is that even if we apply functional criteria and limit the research area to emotive interjections, the area still seems to be heterogeneous. Th us, one can observe both emotive interjections that are spontaneous  and  non-communicative,  and  emotive  interjections  that  are non-spontaneous and communicative (Goddard 2014; Goff  man 1981; Stange 2016; Wharton 2003; Wilkins 1992). Th is heterogeneity poses a fundamental problem for approaches that use functional  criteria,  and  it  is  this  problem that is the focus of this article. An ecological pragmatic analysis of emotive interjections with special regard to this heterogeneity will be presented here. Th e question to be answered is: How do we explain that emotive interjections can  be  spontaneous  and  non-communicative,  and  non-spontaneous  and communicative,  based  on  functional  criteria? Th e article's  contribution consists  of  observation-based  evidence  in  the  form  of  an  analysis  of  three occurrences of interjections that diff  er with regard to their spontaneity and communicativity.

Th e  article  is  structured  as  follows: Th e  second  section  outlines  a functional account of emotive interjections with a starting point in Jespersen's (1968/1922) defi  nition and (1965/1924) classifi  cation of interjections. Th e  third  section  describes  the  fundamental  heterogeneity  that  has  been observed within the area of emotive interjections and outlines four proposed accounts of this heterogeneity. In the fourth section, three cases are analyzed in order to investigate and describe this heterogeneity and evaluate the four aforementioned accounts. Th e last section provides a brief summary.

## 2. Emotive interjections as a basic function

## 2.1 Th e functional implication of Jespersen's defi  nition and classifi  cation

Jespersen (1968/1922:415) defi  nes the 'usual' interjections as 'abrupt expressions  for  sudden  sensations  and  emotions' ,  and  then  he  adds  'they are  therefore  isolated  in  relation  to  the  speech  material  used  in  the  rest  of the  language' . Th is  defi  nition  is  a  good  starting  point  for  a  comparison  of defi  nitions of interjections because it includes all the types of criteria used in linguistic descriptions of interjections: word-level structure ( abrupt ), semiotic ( expressions ),  semantic  ( sensations  and  emotions ),  pragmatic  ( sudden )  and sentence-level  structure  ( isolated ).  It  also  identifi  es  the  three  features  that have been associated with interjections across the more or less incompatible descriptions (Ameka 1992; Schourup 1982; Stange 2016), namely 1) they are spontaneous, 2) they express emotions and 3) they occur in isolation. What is special about Jespersen's defi  nition is that it implies a relation between these features. When references have been made to Jespersen's defi  nition in linguistic descriptions of interjections, the adverb therefore has, quite remarkably, been le ft out (e.g. Kryk 1992:194; O'Connel & Kowal 2008:136; Schourup 1982:13). But  this  adverb  entails  a  crucial  point. Th e  understanding  of  the  relation indicated by 'therefore' requires a selective inference since the assertion that explains  the  grammatical  feature  'isolated'  includes  four  possible  reasons: premise 1 'abrupt' , premise 2 'expressions' , premise 3 'sudden' and premise 4 ' emotions and sensations' . But it cannot be because expressions are abrupt that they are isolated. Nor can it be because they are signs of emotions or sensations; because the sentence I have pain is also a sign of emotions. Th e only plausible inference is that they are isolated because the emotions and sensations they indicate are sudden. Th is inference also suggests a specifi  c interpretation of the  semiotic  premise  'expressions' ,  namely  that  they  are symptoms (Bühler 1965/1934) or indexes (Bühler 1965/1934; Peirce 1986:169-177); i.e. there is a lawful or factual relation between sign and object. Th e point of Jespersen's defi  nition,  thus,  is  that  interjections  have  the  grammatical  properties  they have because of these pragmatic and semiotic features.

When  Jespersen,  as  a  grammarian,  classifi  es  the  usual  interjections based on grammatical criteria, they form a subclass of particles because they share the grammatical trait with the particles that they do not take infl  ections. But Jespersen is aware that words from other word classes can be used in the same way:

As a last part of speech, the usual lists give interjections ,  under which name are comprised both words which are never used otherwise (some containing sound not found in ordinary words e.g. an inhaled f produced by sudden pain, or the suction stop inadequately written tut and others formed by means of ordinary sound e.g. hullo , oh ),  and  on  the  other hand  words  from  the  ordinary  language  e.g. Well!  Why?  Nonsense!

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

Th e only thing that these elements have in common is their ability to stand alone as a complete utterance; otherwise they may be assigned to  various  word  classes. Th ey  should  not  therefore  be  isolated  from their  ordinary uses. Th ose interjections which cannot be used except as  interjection may most conveniently be classed with other particles (Jespersen 1965/1924:90).

When  Jespersen  determines  what  they  have  in  common,  this  should  be understood as syntactically and morphologically in common. Because when the list  of  interjections  includes syntactically and morphologically diff  erent words, this is precisely because at least some of these words have in common that they can be used in the same way. Th is functional overlap is decisive for the defi  nition of interjections. An example may be illustrative. Th e following two interjections are performed by two pilots on an airliner when they encounter a bird strike on fi  nal approach:

1 (00:00,00)

(00:00,58)

Captain(pilot monitoring):

(00:01,13)

First offi cer (pilot fl  ying):

(00:02,42)

Captain (pilot monitoring):

(00:02,84)     Captain (pilot monitoring): (747-400 fi  nal approach 2008)

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((a  loud  thud  indicating  a  bird strike))

oh

shit

ዲ஢

## h ǎ ole

((Captain li ft s his right hand in an unfl  appable way  indicating that there is no cause for concern))

just fl  y it then 1

Th e expression that the captain expresses in immediate continuation of the incident  is  'oh' .  According  to  Jespersen, oh belongs  to  the  class  particles because it cannot be used in other ways than defi  ned by the semiotic, semantic and pragmatic criteria for interjections. Th e expression that the fi  rst offi cer utters in the same circumstances is 'shit' . According to Jespersen, shit does not belong to the same word class as oh because it can be used in other ways with the structural criteria that the realization of these functions implies, among other  things  infl  ection  and  dependency  relations.  In  this  case,  both  words are nevertheless expressions of sudden emotions and sensations. Both words must be understood as occasioned by the incident and can be interpreted as an index on this basis; 'oh' is a sign of surprise, and 'shit' is a sign of surprise as well as concern. One can say that there is a diff  erence in response time, but it is very small (0.55 sec) and can be explained by a diff  erence in tasks and task load between the pilot monitoring and the pilot fl  ying. Th us, both 'oh' and 'shit' fulfi  ll Jespersen's semiotic, pragmatic and semantic criteria of interjections. Th ey diff  er structurally, but they have the same function.

According to Jespersen, a functional overlap is not a reason for classifying words  in  the  same  way.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  one-to-one  relation between the syntactical and morphological features of interjections and the function they serve. Th e crucial thing in Jespersen's defi  nition and handling of the grammatical classifi  cation problem is that it implies that interjections are not a word class but a function. Hence, to exclude 'therefore' from Jespersen's defi  nition is not trivial. Because this allows the description of interjections to take a starting point in the structural criteria with all the problems this implies for  a  coherent  description  (see  section  1).  A  solution  to  these  problems  is, therefore, to consider interjections as a function.

## 2.2 What is a function?

A function is defi  ned as the fulfi  llment of a task in the human niche by means of an utterance. Hence, a function is a relation between an utterance and a task. 'Niche' is an ecological concept; it covers the environment that human beings are adapted to through evolution. Th us, a function is not a language internal  relation  (Hjelmslev  1993/1943),  but  a  language  external  relation (Bühler 1965/1934). In other words, 'task' is a pragmatic category. Th e reason for the use of the term niche rather than the narrower term communication is  that  language  -  although  communication  is  undoubtedly  the  basic  and overriding purpose of language - apparently fulfi  lls tasks for us other than communicative tasks, for example thinking and aesthetic tasks. For a number of  tasks  in  the  human  niche  it  applies  that  they  can  be  fulfi  lled  by  other means than verbal signs, for example gestures, facial expressions, postures, laughter,  cries,  sneezes,  pictures  and  fi  gures. Th e  tasks  we  are  interested  in in this context, however, are the tasks that can also be fulfi  lled verbally. Th e concept of function is thus related to the concept of function we know from models of sign and text functions such as Bühler's (1965/1934) and Jakobson's (1960), i.e. a relation between a sign and a factor in a situation of language use. However, the factors suggested in these models, for example sender, receiver, context, are complex. Th is means that the function that relates to a factor may include tasks that diff  er signifi  cantly from each other. Th e function that relates to the sender can be realized by utterances like HAAH , åh ( oh ), lort ( shit ) and for satan ( fucking hell ),  attitudinal adverbials like desværre ( regrettably )  and heldigvis ( fortunately ), expressive speech acts like jeg har det ad helvede til ( I feel  like  hell )  and det er for galt! ( this is terrible! ). Th is  article  uses the term function for  more specifi  c,  subordinate functions. Th is  makes it possible to distinguish between the functions that the aforementioned expressions serve.

An important entailment of the outlined functional viewpoint is that there  is  no  one-to-one  relation  between  linguistic  structure  and  function. Signs  that  diff  er  grammatically  and  morphologically  can  be  recruited  to fulfi  ll  the  same  task  (Harder  2010:236-268),  for  example,  as  in  example  1. Conversely,  the  function  may  be  assumed  to  prefer  certain  morphological, syntactical and semantic characteristics. Th at is, the morphological, syntactical and semantic characteristics of the set of utterances we call interjections are motivated by the task (Bühler 1965/1934). It is this relation that can lead us to believe that interjections are a word class or that there are structural and/ or semantic criteria for defi  ning interjections. However, from the functional point of view, this would be putting the cart before the horse. At most you can say that the function is a constraint on the form of expression and that this constraint contributes to a regularity in the formal realization of the function. Determining which forms of expression can realize the function is, however, an empirical question.

## 2.3 Th e task of emotive interjections

Th e task of emotive interjections must be described with a starting point in one of the fundamental features of emotive interjections, namely that they are  spontaneous  (Ameka  1992;  Goddard  2014;  Goff  man  1981;  Jespersen 1968/1922; Nübling 2004; Ries 1952; Schourup 1982; Stange 2016; Wharton 2003;  Wilkins  1992). Spontaneous means  that  something  is  happening  or is  done  in  a  natural,  o ft en  sudden  way,  without  any  planning  (Cambridge Dictionary). It is this feature that Goff  man tries to capture with metaphors in the o ft en-cited passage: 'natural overfl  owing, a fl  ooding up of previously contained feeling, a bursting of normal restraints, a case of being caught off guard' (Goff  man 1978:800). Th at is, interjections are basically something that happens to us rather than something we do; they are not intentional (Caff  y & Janney 1994:329, Buck 1994:266).

Th is understanding of interjections has a biological, evolutionary basis. In Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals , Darwin describes expressions and gestures 'involuntarily used by man and the lower animals, under the  infl  uence  of  various  emotions  and  sensations'  (Darwin  2010/1890:28). Darwin considers expressions of emotions and sensations to be results of our attunement to the niche. Under certain circumstances, it has been useful to act in certain ways, for example when we are threatened. Our perceptual system is  adapted to the pickup of information about such circumstances (Gibson 1979), and our nervous system is adapted to transform this information into actions. Th e pickup of information about the above circumstances induces a state of mind, and when such states are induced, we react in certain ways:

Certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, de- sires,  &c.;  and  whenever  the  same  state  of  mind  is  induced,  however feebly, there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for the same movements to be performed. (Darwin 2010/1890:29).

Examples are elevation of the eyebrows, opening the mouth, protrusion of the lips, strong breath, blinking and trembling. Th ese actions are habitual and involuntary. Th is is indicated by the fact that we also perform them where they are of no use. Th e function of these actions is therefore not to solve the problem entailed by the circumstances that induce the emotion, but to relieve and gratify the emotions and sensations induced. However, it may be assumed that there has been and still is a functional relation so that the action that relieves and gratifi  es emotions and sensations, in one way or another, has contributed to solving the problem, for example coughing when we are choking. Hence the evolutionary edge, hence the habit.

Th e fact that these actions are basically beyond our control is essential to their function. According to Damasio, emotions, understood as the processes of performed activities and bodily reactions that happen to us when we encounter something in the world, are part of our evolutionally inherited autopilot (Damasio 1999). Th ey enable us to act appropriately without thinking. According to the biological, evolutionary description, these actions function as immediate reactions that relieve or gratify emotions or sensations that arise in circumstances where it has been benefi  cial to act in certain ways. Now, the point is that such actions following Darwin include interjections. Th us, in line with this description, the task of emotive interjections - in so far as they are spontaneous - is to relieve or gratify emotions and sensations.

When Darwin describes these actions as expressions of  emotions and sensations,  this  should  not  be  understood  as  a  communicative  function. Th ese  actions  are  not expressives in  the  sense  of  speech  act  theory  (Searle 1996/1979:15), according to which the action is intended, and the expression counts  as an  act  with  the  social  obligations  it  implies. Th ey  are  exclusively expressions in an observer's perspective; it is the person who observes the performer of the action who understands the action as a sign. Th us, interjections are not aimed at anyone, but solely at relieving or gratifying emotions and sensations. Th at is why Fries consider them to be non-communicative:

All these expressions seem to be spontaneous reactions to a situation suddenly  confronting  the  speaker.  (…) Th ey  may,  of  course,  be overheard by a listener and the hearer gains some impression of the kind of situation to which the speaker is reacting (…) Th ese forms (…) are not used to elicit regular responses from those who hear them. Th eir purpose is not communicative (Fries 1952:53).

It  is  clear  that  this  delimitation  depends  on  a  specifi  c  defi  nition  of  communication,  namely  that  communication  entails  that  the  speaker  not  only provides  information  to  a  listener,  but  also  does  it  with  an  informative intention  (Grice  1957;  Sperber  &  Wilson  1986).  It  is  therefore  a  narrower concept  than  what  we  fi  nd  in  some  theories  of  information,  for  example, Bateson's (2000/1972:283).

Th at  is,  interjections  -  insofar  as  they  are  spontaneous  -  are  not addressed and not carried by an informative intention, and, therefore, they are non-communicative. In semiotic terms, they are neither signals nor symbols, but symptoms (Bühler 1965/1934) or indexes (Peirce 1986). Th is is the basic implication of the feature spontaneous.

## 3. Th e heterogeneity of emotive interjections

Th e problem with the above description of the function of interjections is that you can observe emotive interjections that appear to be non-spontaneous and emotive interjections that appear to be communicative. Th is heterogeneity has been noticed in the research on interjections. For example, Goff  man observes that people who are being attended to by dentists use ow! or ouch! as a signal to the dentist that they are beginning to feel some pain. Furthermore ow! and ouch! can be used empathetically to signal the speaker's understanding of the listeners pain (Goff  man 1981:105-106). Wilkins refers to English informants having  observed  that  'when  their  children  say  'Ow!',  it  is  not  usually  the case that the children are experiencing any real or signifi  cant pain. Instead, children tend to use this interjection knowing that it will get their parents' attention, and knowing that it can be used to start a chain of events that will lead to their sibling getting into trouble' (Wilkins 1992:149-150). And, on the basis of a large corpus analysis of English emotive interjections, Stange fi  nds that '[o]ne and the same interjection can (…) vary in its degree (…) to which it is a spontaneous, refl  exlike expression' (Stange 2016:199).

Th is heterogeneity has been dealt with in various ways in the descriptions of  interjections.  Without  claiming  an  exhaustive  meta-analysis,  one  can distinguish  four  accounts:  semantic  (Wilkins  1992),  pragmatic  (Wharton 2003),  contextual,  typological  (Goddard  2014)  and  contextual,  parametric (Stange 2016). In the following these four accounts will be outlined.

Semantic: Th e semantic descriptions are based on the assumption that interjections are conventionalized and that they encode speaker attitudes and communicative intentions (Ameka 1992). In these descriptions the fact that interjections  can  occur  in  isolation,  i.e.  as  independent,  meaningful  expressions, plays an important role. Th is  means that if they are used communicatively, the  informative  intention  must  be  a  part  of  their  semantics.  In  line  with this,  Wilkins  (1992)  considers  interjections  to  be  speech  acts.  Hence,  they have an illocutionary purpose, namely 'to show how the speaker feels at the exact moment of speaking' (Wilkins 1992:152). Th erefore, Wilkins' Natural Semantic Metalanguage-based explication of the meaning of the expression wow comprises an informative intention in the form of the element: 'I say '[wow!]' because I want to show how surprised (and impressed) I am feeling right now' (Wilkins 1992:151 (my emphasis)).

Pragmatic: Th e  starting  point  for  Wharton's  account  is  that  'most primary interjections are under our conscious control' and that 'we should be  careful  not  to  overestimate  the  expressive,  instinctive  nature  of  these' (Wharton 2003:51). In continuation of this assumption, Wharton concentrates on  describing  interjections  as  communicative. Th e  description  is  based on  the  Grice-inspired  relevance  theoretical  concept  of ostensive-inferential communication (Sperber & Wilson 1986). Inferential communication implies that only some of the meaning included in the process of understanding is explicit. For example, I can say shit and mean 'I am really surprised by what you're telling me now' . Th e point is that it is possible for the listener to infer the meaning. Th e prerequisite for this form of communication is that the utterance includes two layers of meaning: ' Th e fi  rst, basic layer is the information being 'pointed out' , the second layer is the information that the fi  rst layer has been pointed out intentionally' (Wharton 2003:67). In other words, it's not suffi cient for me to say shit , I have to say it with the intention that you make the inference that I am surprised, and you have to recognize my intention. Hence the term ostensive . Interjections, then, are described based on Grice's (1957) distinction between natural meaning and non-natural (i.e. coded, conventional, symbolic) meaning. Wharton's point is that we can produce natural meaning with an informative intention, and that this is what we do with interjections in so far as they are communicative. According to Wharton, interjections are located somewhere between natural and non-natural meaning. To illustrate this status Wharton uses the distinction between showing and telling:

to show someone you are delighted with a gi ft you allow them to see your natural reaction, a smile; to tell them you are delighted you utter something like 'it's wonderful!'; to utter an interjection like wow is  to communicate  that  you  are  delighted  by  adding  a  certain  element  of coding which takes it beyond mere display, but falls short of language proper (Wharton 2003:51).

Wharton then describes interjections as ostensive-inferential communication as  follows: Th ey  are  located  on  'various  points  along  a  continuum  of communicative  behaviours,  ranging  from  those  in  which  relatively  direct evidence of the basic layer of information is provided - showing, to those where all the evidence provided is indirect - saying. ' (Wharton 2003:68-69).

Contextual, typological: Goddard (2014:54) distinguishes between four types of uses based on the relation between the interjections and the context: immediate (stimulus-bound) uses, didactic uses, discursive uses and ironic uses. Immediate uses are primary. Th ey approximate what we have described in  subsection  2.3. Th us,  it  is  characteristic  of  Goddard's  Natural  Semantic Metalanguage-based explications of the semantics of interjections that, unlike Wilkins' ,  they  do  not  include  an  informative  intention  component.  On  the other hand, they include components like 'I know' and 'I want' , and immediate uses also include conative interjections like sh! Th us, immediate uses do seem to be characterized by a degree of consciousness and intentionality. Didactic uses are to use an interjection 'to display or model a (purported) reaction for someone else'(Goddard 2014:54). Discursive uses cover 'situations where the  stimulus  is  not  something  in  the  immediate  context,  either  a  physicalsensory  stimulus  or  a  human  action  or  behavior,  but  rather  something the  speaker  is  thinking  about. '  (Goddard  2014:54-55).  Ironic  uses  are  not specifi  ed. Most importantly, Goddard notes that 'discursive usages depend on prior understanding of how the interjection is used in immediate contexts. ' (Goddard 2014:54-55).

Contextual, parametric: Th e starting point of Stange's description is that interjections  proper  are  spontaneous  in  the  sense  described  in  section  2.2. Th is status is characterized as 'semi-automatic' (Stange 2016:17-18). Th e term covers that they 'function as immediate verbal reactions to a certain event or stimulus, and their production is supposed to require less planning than that of 'well-formed' or 'normal' utterances' (Stange 2016:20). Th e reason for the use of the qualifi  er semi ,  is  that  interjections  may  'vary  with  regard  to how spontaneous their production actually is, depending on the automatic or  conscious  appraisal  processes  involved  in  the  emotional  experience' (Stange  2016:18).  To  account  for  interjections  that  appear  to  be  addressed and communicative, Stange distinguishes between degrees of interjectionality (Stange 2016:17). Interjections proper constitute one pole on the scale. For these, it applies that they are primarily emotive, produced semi-automatically, exclamatory, i.e. produced with increased volume, and that they do not require an  addressee.  Interjections  in  the  opposite  end  of  the  scale  are  primarily phatic,  non-exclamatory,  intentional,  and  an  addressee  is  required  (Stange 2016:17). According to Stange, the degree of interjectionality is contextually determined. In line with this, a number of factors determining the degree of interjectionality  are  investigated.  However,  Stange  doubts  that  it  will  prove benefi  cial  to  provide a grid of all possible combinations of factors. Instead, fi  ve  parameters  determining  the  degree  of  interjectionality  are  suggested: 'the  context  of  use;  the  variant  used  (if  alternatives  are  available):  simple vs. complex; physical absence vs. presence of the stimulus; the nature of the stimulus: concrete vs. abstract; focus on self vs. focus on the other. ' (Stange 2016:201).

As  is evident from  the  outlines above, these descriptions diff  er considerably. Perhaps one could question some of these descriptions based on  a  conceptual  analysis,  but  I  will  refrain  from  a  theoretical  discussion here. Instead, I will try to test and compare their ability to describe a small set of carefully selected authentic examples of interjections. Th e purpose is to determine how informative and accurate the descriptions are.

## 4.  An  analysis  of  spontaneous,  non-spontaneous  and  communicative emotive interjections

In this  section,  three  analyses  of  interjections  are  presented. Th e  methodological approach  used  in  these  analyses  diff  ers  from  those  previously  used  in  the studies of the semantics and pragmatics of interjections. Before these analyses are presented, the method is described briefl  y.

## 4.1 Method

All methods have their advantages and disadvantages. In previous studies of the semantics and pragmatics of interjections, mainly two methods have been used: 1) intuition-based approaches based on constructed examples, literary examples  or  examples  isolated  from  their  linguistic  and  extra-linguistic context (e.g., Ameka 1992; Kryk 1992; Meinard 2015; Wharton 2003; Wilkins 1992; Wierzbicka 1992) and 2) corpus-based observations (e.g. Norrick 2014; Stange 2016). A well-known weakness of the intuition-based approaches is that the assessment of acceptability and the comparison of variants requires a construction (or reconstruction) of the context of use, and this context is not necessarily generalizable. In other word, arguments like '[i]t seems a little odd to say (or to write)' (Wierzbicka 1992:161) are not very convincing, and you can almost always fi  nd so called 'odd' or 'less acceptable' utterances in natural contexts without indications of anomalies.

In corpus-based methods, the examples are natural language, the analyst has access to the co-text that can serve as support in the interpretation, and one can defi  ne the context of use by selecting types of exchanges, for example mother  child  communication. Th e  problem  with  corpus-based  methods  is that only structural criteria can be applied in searches, and the search results are separated from their extra-linguistic context. Th us, it may be diffi cult to determine whether a particular interjection is spontaneous and whether it is communicative.

Th e  method  used  in  the  three  analyses  below  is  based  on  ecological pragmatics  (Borchmann  2018;  Hodges  2009).  Ecological  pragmatics  implies  two overall methodological requirements: Th e object must be natural language, and it must occur in a well-defi  ned, well-established and specifi  able non-linguistic context.  An  ecological  pragmatic  analysis  meets  these  two  requirements by concentrating on language use embedded in practical activities, such as professional  road  cycling,  rifl  e  hunting,  spearfi  shing,  recreational  diving, beer brewing, scheduled air traffi c  and soaring. Such activities can serve as well-defi  ned,  well-established  and  specifi  able  contextual  frames. Th us,  they are constrained by specifi  c values   and goals; they are characterized by typical courses of actions, procedures, strategies, tools and aff  ordances; practitioners have specifi  c needs for information in order to control, select and coordinate actions,  and  there  are  norms  for  the  information  in  the  environment  that they should attend to, as well as well-established sources of information and standardizations  of  information;  the  eff  ects  on  the  body  and  the  emotions and sensations that the performance of the activity entails are  well-known and predictable; and communication is conventionalized and o ft en includes a  phraseology.  All  this  provides  us  with  good  indications  of  the  intentions and  of  the  understanding  of  intentions  of  language  users  and  thus  makes it  possible to determine what constitutes deviation and what does not. Th e downside is that the rich contextual description limits the number of available examples,  and  this  makes  it  questionable  to  generalize  from  the  examples. Th e  ecological  pragmatic  approach  tries  to  solve  this  problem  by  selecting and analyzing occurrences of language use that are archetypal with regard to particular aspects of language use. In the present case, the three examples are archetypal with regard to their spontaneity and communicativity.

All  three  examples  are  embedded  in  the  activity  of  soaring,  more specifi  cally  the  launch.  As  it  will  become  apparent  from  the  analyses,  the launch has a potential in relation to the description of interjections because it  involves  fi  erce  eff  ects  on  the  body  as  a  perceptual  system,  circumstances that induce emotions and sensations, demands for the suppression of actions that relieve and gratify emotions and clear indications of emotions as well as the suppression of actions that relieve and gratify emotions and sensations. Th e  analyses  are  based  on  the  author's  cognitive  ethnographic  studies  of the activity of soaring. Th e current examples are video recordings from the speaker's, i.e. the pilot's, perspective. Th e fi  rst case, example 2, is from a native speaker  of  English,  recorded  with  a  cockpit-mounted  camera.  It  originates from an English pilot's website. Th e second and third cases, examples 3 and 4, are from native speakers of Danish, recorded with a head-mounted camera. Th is material has been collected by the author as a part of studies of the activity of soaring in Denmark. Th e recordings are analyzed and transcribed using the program VideoPad.

In  the  following,  analyses  of  three  cases  that  include  one  or  more examples  of  interjections  are  presented. Th e  cases  have  been  selected  so that they comprise 1) spontaneous, non-communicative interjections, 2) non-spontaneous,  communicative  interjections and  3) spontaneous, communicative interjections. Th e three cases are analyzed separately in the order given.

## 4.2 Spontaneous, non-communicative interjections

Th e interjections below are uttered by a glider pilot during an aerotow launch. In an aerotow launch the glider is connected to a tow plane with a cable, and the tow plane pulls the glider up to a given height 2 (e.g.  800  m)  where the glider  pilot  releases  the  cable.  Both  the  glider  pilot  and  the  tug  pilot  have the possibility of releasing the cable if problems arise during the launch. In the current launch, the airbrakes of the glider open. Airbrakes are a device used to descend, and they are primarily used in landing. It is critical if they open during the launch, because they prevent the glider from climbing. Th e airbrakes  are  locked  when  the  pilot  isn't  using  them,  and  it  is  part  of  the cockpit check before the launch to ensure that they are locked. Should they accidentally open during the launch they should be closed immediately. In this launch, they open without the pilot noticing it. Th ere are, however, clear indications  that  the  pilot  notices  anomalies  caused  by  the  open  airbrakes. When a glider  pilot  detects  such  anomalies  during  a  launch,  (s)he  should immediately release the cable and land while still within the runway. But in this case the pilot is passive; he lets the situation evolve. At one point, the tow plane's situation becomes dangerous due to the glider's open airbrakes, and as a consequence, the tug pilot releases the cable. Th e glider pilot is le ft at a low height, outside the runway and with an obstacle 100 m in front of him. Th e pilot stalls 3 the glider in an attempt to avoid the obstacle, and the glider crashes. Th e pilot is not seriously injured. In this course of events, the glider pilot utters a sequence of interjections:

| 2    | (00:00,00)                          | (( Th e tug pilot gives full throttle. Th e glider accelerates. Th e glider on the cable release                                                        |
|------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|      | (00:17,25)                          | (( Th e glider's airbrake opens without the pilot noticing it.))                                                                                        |
|      | (00:25,70)                          | ((Airspeed 43 kt. Th e glider li ft s off.))                                                                                                            |
| A    | (00:39,00)                          | ((Climb rate is too low due to the open airbrake. It is still possible to release the cable and land within the runway.))                               |
| B    | (00:51,00) (00:52,34)               | ((End of runway approaches, height is too low.)) for fuck's sake                                                                                        |
| C    | (01:03,51)                          | ((Height app. 25 m, airspeed 54 kt. Tug pilot                                                                                                           |
| 2.   | Glider pilot:                       |                                                                                                                                                         |
|      | (01:04,24) Glider pilot:            | releases the cable.)) hh .hh                                                                                                                            |
| 3.   | (01:04,94) (01:05,25) Glider pilot: | ((Airspeed begins to drop.)) SHIT                                                                                                                       |
| 4.   | (01:05:65)                          | ((20 meter tall trees 100 meters ahead. Th e pilot pulls the control stick back and to the le ft .)) ((Airspeed drops rapidly below stall speed. 4 Th e |
| D 5. | (01:06,18)                          | glider stalls.))                                                                                                                                        |
|      | (01:07,81) Glider pilot:            | phhh                                                                                                                                                    |

## Simon Borchmann

## Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

6. (01:08,88)  Glider pilot:  oh my God (01:10,09) (( Th e glider touches the top of the trees. Th e

- sound is loud))

7. (01:11,23)  Glider pilot:  phruuh

8. (01:12,08)  Glider pilot:  fucki:ng

- E (01:12,71) (( Th e glider hits the ground, slides sideways and stops.))

9. (01:14,97)  Glider pilot:  fuck 5

- F (01:15,00) (( Th e glider has crashed.))

10. (01:15,90)  Glider pilot:  AARHH

(Airfi  eld in England, 2017)

Each of these utterances occurs under specifi  c circumstances that require an action and have the potential for inducing an emotion or sensation. In line with this, the utterances are indicators of certain emotional and sensational states. Th us, the lexical expressions used are o ft en used to express emotions and sensations, namely (2-1), (2-2), (2-4), (2-6), (2-8) and (2-9), and several of the utterances refl  ect emotional and sensational states: (2-3) and (2-5) are the result of a sudden powerful movement of the diaphragm; (2-7), (2-8) and (29) are uttered with excited abdominal muscles; and (2-8) and (2-9) are uttered with  excited  jaw  muscles. Th e  utterances  thus  appear  to  be  actions  related to  emotions and sensations. Th e  next  thing  to  be  noted  is  that  the  actions are of no use under the present circumstances; they may even be considered counterproductive in so far as they replace actions that could have been useful. Th e appropriate action under circumstance (A) is that the pilot releases the cable  and  lands  on  the  runway  or  at  least  checks  the  cockpit  or  the  wings to  see  if  there  are  anomalies  there.  But  the  pilot  does  not  release  the  cable and does not check the cockpit or the wings. Th e appropriate action under circumstance (B) is to locate a landing possibility outside the runway and, when a possibility is located, to release the cable and land the airplane there. But the pilot does not turn his head to locate such a possibility. What the pilot does under these circumstances is to express emotions and sensations. Th us, they appear to be actions that relieve and gratify emotions and sensations, and while such actions may be appropriate, and (2-1) and (2-2) enable the pilot to become aware of the situation and his inappropriate approach, they are not used in this way. Th us, the pilot's utterances appear to be involuntary. Finally, one can note that there is nobody else in the cockpit. Hence, there is nobody he can address, the utterances are not caused by other utterances nor can they generate a response. Admittedly, there is a camera in the cockpit, but since the utterances do not give a fl  attering impression of the pilot, one can assume that they are not directed at those who will watch the movie a ft erwards. Th at is, the utterances above are spontaneous in the sense described in section 2.2; they are not intentional, not addressed and not communicative.

Th e next thing we can observe is that they vary. Th ere are both utterances that meet the criteria of so-called primary injections, i.e. words or non-words that cannot be used in other ways (Ameka 1992:105), namely hh .hh , phhh , phruuh and AARHH . And there are utterances that meet or are composed of words that meet the criteria of secondary interjections, i.e. words that can be used in other ways than interjections (Ameka 1992:111), namely: (2-1), (22), (2-3), (2-5), (2-7) and (2-8). Apparently, these grammatical and semantic diff  erences do not aff  ect their function as actions that relieve or gratify emotions and sensations. Th us, we can observe that words that diff  er grammatically and can  serve  diff  erent  communicative  functions  can  be  recruited  to  serve  the function as interjections.

Now, what it is interesting is that the variations in expression - although the utterances are involuntary - also appear to express variation in emotions and sensations. Th is  relation  can  be  uncovered  in  the  ecological  pragmatic analysis.  Circumstance  (A)  is  an  anomaly  that  must  be  perceived  and responded to according to the values, goals and procedures of the activity. In line with this, utterance (2-1) indicates that the speaker perceives an anomaly; thus, fucking hell can indicate surprise. Circumstance (B) is a development of circumstance (A) which has now become critical since the landing possibility aff  orded by circumstance (A) is no longer available, and the pilot must actively seek out alternative possibilities for action. Th e pilot's actions, and not least the absence of actions, are indications of the pilot's passivity, in the sense that he does not proactively take control of the situation and stop the development of  the  circumstances  by  acting  on  the  perceivable  anomalies.  Utterance (2-2)  indicates  that  he  perceives  circumstance  (B),  but  that  he  places  the responsibility for the situation outside himself. Th us, for fuck's sake is typically used as a regret or reproach of others. Circumstance (C) is a sudden change of circumstances implying that the pilot is alone to deal with a situation that has become critical. Utterances (2-3) and (2-4) indicate the shock that this can induce. Circumstance (D) entails that the pilot has run out of possibilities for action and that the situation can no longer be salvaged. Utterances (2-6), (2-7) and (2-8) indicate the fear and the muscular tensions induced under this circumstance. Circumstance (E) is the outcome of the course of events and actions, and (2-10) indicates the emotional state of the pilot under this circumstance. Th us,  if  we  compare  the  utterances  with  the  circumstances, there is a very close connection between 1) the circumstances, 2) the semantic constraints of the words and the physiological indications and 3) the emotions and sensations that the diff  erent circumstances can induce. Th ese  relations between circumstances, signs and objects can be illustrated in this way:

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

| Circumstance                    | Sign            | Object                                                                                                                                |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Climb rate is too low           | fucking hell    | surprise , wonder                                                                                                                     |
| Height is too low               | for fuck's sake | frustration , grievance Gloss: 'this could be different' 'this ought to be different' 'someone other than me is responsible for this' |
| Tug pilot releases the cable    | hh .hh          | shock ( strong movement of the diaphragm )                                                                                            |
| Low height, no runway           | SHIT            | disturbed surprise Gloss: 'this is real' 'this is dangerous'                                                                          |
| Tall trees ahead, low speed     | phh             | strain                                                                                                                                |
| Th e glider stalls              | oh my God       | fear , despair                                                                                                                        |
| Th e glider touches trees       | phruuh          | fear , strain                                                                                                                         |
| Th e glider falls to the ground | fucki:ng        | frustration , strain                                                                                                                  |
| Th e glider hits the ground     | fuck            | frustration , strain                                                                                                                  |
| Th e pilot has crashed          | AARHH           | rage                                                                                                                                  |

What  can  be  noted  here  is  the  variation  of  signs:  some  are  innate  bodily reactions, others are learned cultural, conventionally guided actions. Th e latter are particularly interesting. Because they show that the spontaneous actions of  the  speaker  are  not  only  learned  and  governed  by  conventions, but also involve some kind of selection of these conventions so that the action can be understood as information about specifi  c emotions and sensations. From the functional point of view, we can say that the niche makes an inventory of forms that diff  erentiate emotions and sensations available to language users, and that our body borrows from the inventory when it carries out the task of relieving and gratifying emotions and sensations. Just as the relief or gratifi  cation of a particular emotion prefers one natural sign over another, it also prefers one non-natural sign over another. Apparently, this selection takes place without the awareness of the speaker.

In  summary:  1) Th ere  are  spontaneous  interjections  in  the  original sense, i.e. not intended, not addressed and therefore not communicative, 2) these appear to serve the function of relieving and gratifying emotions and sensations,  3)  the  performance  of  this  function  is  independent  of  whether interjections  are  primary  or  secondary,  and  4)  interjections  -  although spontaneous  -  may  be  characterized  by  the  selection  of  conventional expressions that are informative with regard to the emotional and sensational state  of  the  speaker. Th ese  observations  can  now  be  compared  to  the  four accounts of the heterogeneity of interjections.

Wharton's  pragmatic  account  can  be  ignored  as  it  is  limited  to  the communicative  function  of  interjections.  And  it  is  not  meaningful  to  say that the glider pilot in example 2 intends to show something to someone by means of his utterances. Th is is not a weakness of Wharton's account, but a consequence of its relative precision as a description of how we communicate by means of interjections.

Wilkins' semantic account implies that the utterances - as illocutionary acts  count  as an  expression  of  the  speaker's  emotions  with  the  social obligations that this convention implies, and that this informative intention is coded. Th is is clearly a misleading description for examples such as the ones in example 2. Th e pilot's utterances do not count as anything, and the pilot does not commit himself to anything to anyone. Not even the basic input output conditions for a felicitous illocutionary act are satisfi  ed (Searle 1996/1969:57). As  for  the  semantics,  one  can  ask:  What  is  the  basis  for  claiming  that  the informative intention is coded in expressions such as aarh , oh or shit when they are used without informative intention and are interpretable as information about  the  speaker's  emotional  and  sensational  state  independently  of  an informative intention. If we were to prove that aarh , oh or shit are  uttered with an informative intention, we have to refer to something other than the expressions. It may be aspects of vocalizations, gaze, gestures, shi ft s in posture ( Th ibault 2011:225); it may be the timing relative to the circumstances, the co-text or the context. But it cannot be the expressions arrh , oh or shit . Such a description is therefore misleading.

Goddard's distinction between types of use (see section 3) enables us to distinguish the pilot's use of interjections from the uses that Wharton and Wilkins describe (see section 3). Th is is informative. One can say, however, that it seems misleading when Goddard identifi  es semantic elements like 'I know' and 'I want' in the explication of the semantics of a set of interjections. At least, it is not an accurate characteristic of the pilot's state of consciousness when he utters (2-1) and the subsequent utterances. But this might also be due to a vagueness in the semantic metalanguage.

Stange's  contextual  parameter  account  (see  section  3),  on  the  other hand,  appears  to  be  an  informative  and  accurate  description  of  the  pilot's language use. Th is is primarily because interjections are basically considered to be emotive, exclamatory, semi-automatic utterances that do not require an addressee. Th is applies to the pilot's utterances. Furthermore, it appears that all  the  values    of  the  fi  ve  parameters  for  the  degree  of  interjectionality  that can be determined by means of the ecological pragmatic analysis predict a high degree of interjectionality. Th us, the context of use is characterized by the absence of a listener; the variants used are mostly relatively simple; the stimulus is present; the stimulus is concrete; and the focus is on self. It can be argued that some of these parameters are vague and that Stange's corpusbased method does not enable us to determine the values of these parameters accurately.  However,  if  they  are  used  in  combination  with  the  ecological pragmatic analysis, they prove to be correct.

Hence, the analysis of the fi  rst  case  raises  doubts  about  the  semantic account  as  an  informative  and  accurate  description.  It  supports  Goddard's typological  account  as  an  informative  description  but  raises  doubts  as  to the semantic analysis associated with it. And it supports Stange's parameter account as an informative and accurate description.

## 4.3 Non-spontaneous emotive interjections

Th e interjection in example 3 below 'HAAH for satan' ( HAAH fucking hell ) is uttered by a student glider pilot during a training fl  ight with an instructor. Th e fl  ight includes an aborted winch launch. A winch launch is performed by connecting the glider to an engine-driven winch located at the opposite end of the runway. At the mediated request of the pilot, the winch driver opens the throttle and the glider is pulled up to a given height (typically 300-500 m in Denmark). Th e glider automatically disconnects. Th e pilot can also release the cable in the case of hazardous situations. A winch launch is the most critical phase of a fl  ight, partly because there are fi  erce forces at stake, partly because the glider is close to the ground with the limited maneuvering possibilities this entails. As the glider's construction can be overloaded, there is a weak link between the winch and the glider that brakes if the pull force exceeds a given value. Weak links brake now and then, the cable can break, and the winch can grind to a halt. In these cases, the glider loses speed rapidly and will stall within a few seconds if the pilot is passive. In these cases, the pilot must lower the nose to regain fl  ight speed, pull three times on the cable release knob, ensure that fl  ight speed is indicated, evaluate the situation, make a decision as to how to  land  and  land. Th is  procedure  is  part  of  the  training  program.  Aborted winch launches constitute several educational standards that must be met in order to get a certifi  cate,  and  they  are  trained  regularly. Th e  training  takes place in this way: Th e instructor sitting behind the student releases the cable. In some standards, the aborted launch is announced in advance, in others it is not. In some standards it is at high height, in others at low or medium height. Th e student must show that (s)he can handle the situation in order to meet the standard and be allowed to continue the training program.

Th e training program is organized in two parts so that the student in the fi  rst part fl  ies with an instructor in a two-seat glider where both the student and the instructor have controls. Th is means that the instructor can give the student oral instructions and can take over the control if necessary. Once the student has completed a number of specifi  c standards with the instructor, the student passes on to the second part in which the student fl  ies alone. In the current situation, the student is just about to move to the second part of the program. One of the last fl  ights before a student is allowed to fl  y alone typically includes an unannounced aborted launch. In this fl  ight, the instructor gives

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

the student an unannounced aborted launch. Th e student knows that this can happen, but in the current situation the altimeter is covered in conjunction with the training of another standard, and therefore the student thinks that she will not get an aborted launch. As will be apparent, the student says what she perceives, what she intends to do and what she does. Th is is standard in training fl  ights, so that the instructor has access to the student's situational awareness and intentions.

- 3 (00:00,00)

(( Th e student gives thumbs-up to the airfi  eld attendant to signal that she is ready))

1. (00:04,69) Student: (00:11,11)

.hh hh

(( Th e glider accelerates, li ft s off   and begins to climb))

- A (00:31,51)             ->

- ((Height app. 170 meter. Th e instructor releases the cable))

Pic. 1: Th e deceleration causes the student's head to tilt forward so the head mounted camera points downwards

<!-- image -->

- B (00:32,23)

(00:35,38)

(( Th e student pushes the control stick slightly forward, pulls the cable release knob once, pulls the control stick a little backwards, pushes the control stick forward and then a little backwards. Th e negative g-force is negligible))

(( Th e glider regains fl  ight speed))

2. (00:35,65) Student:

og jeg har fl  yvefart I've got fl  ight speed

- C (00:36,35)

(( Th e  student  pulls  the  cable  release  knob  once, hesitates, and then pulls the knob twice))

3. (00:38,28) Student:

og jeg vil dreje rundt på en a fk ortet landingsrunde and I will turn for a shortened landing pattern

4. (00:48,14) Student:

ja yes

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

5. (00:49,76) Student:

og vi har

and we've got

6. (00:52:86) Student:

(00:53,56) Student:

øh hh

eh hh

(( Th e glider enters downwind leg and landing speed is indicated))

og jeg har landingsfart and I've got landing speed ((Student pushes the radio push-to-talk button, grabs the microphone with her le ft hand and moves it closer to her mouth))

7. (00:56,07) Student:

(02:23,50)

tango roneo-- tango romeo til bane syvogtyve tango roneo-- tango romeo for runway two seven

(( Th e student fl  ies a standard traffi c pattern and performs a round out. Th e glider touches down, rolls out and stops. Th e student and the instructor have a short exchange about the landing)) Th e actions and the communication in this part of the sequence are le ft out for the sake of space

(( Th e student unlocks and raises the cockpit hood))

8. (02:25,28) Student:     ->

HAAH for satan HAAH fucking hell

Pic. 2: Th e student utters (3-8) while opening the cockpit hood.

<!-- image -->

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

22. (02:27,14) Student:

den ((den a fb rudte start)) kom bag på mig

that ((the aborted launch)) caught me by surprise

23. (02:28,70) Student: selvom det står der så kom den bare bag på mig even if it is stated it did catch me by surprise

24. (02:30,66) Instructor: kom det virkelig bag på dig did it really surprise you

25. (02:31,34) Student: ja det gjorde det yes it did

26. (02:31,81) Instructor: (02:33,03) Student: så er det rigtig godt reageret [alligevel] well it is very well reacted [ anyway ] [ja] [ yes ]

27. (02:33,27) Instructor: og det er det jeg vil jeg se and that is what I want to see

28. (02:34,43) Student: godt ok

29. (02:34,75) Instructor: fl  ot

fi  ne

(Gesten Airfi  eld, 2017)

Th e subject of analysis is (3-8). (3-8) consists of a nonconventional expression haah and a conventional expression for satan ( fucking hell ). Haah is  uttered with increased volume. It has phonetic similarities with the word ha which according to Den Danske Ordbog can be used to express surprise. According to Den Danske Ordbog , for satan is used to express anger, contempt, pain or other strong emotion. In this case, the subsequent utterance (3-9) indicates what (38) expresses. Here the speaker communicates that (3-8) is to be understood as an expression of the surprise the speaker experiences in connection with the aborted launch (A). Th us, 'den' ( that ) is a deictic reference to the aborted launch (A). Th e aborted launch is the only relevant referent in the common ground  (Kri fk a  2008;  Stalnaker  1974;  Tomasello  2008)  of  the  participants, and as is evident in the subsequent exchange, it is the aborted launch they are talking about. Th e contrastive stress indicates a focus alternative set, and thus that there are other aborted launches that have not caught the speaker by surprise.

Now, the interesting observation from a functional view point is that the utterance indicates a surprise at something that happened almost two minutes prior to the utterance. Th e speaker herself communicates the psychological distance to the event and the emotion it allegedly induces by using past tense of the verb kom ( came ) in (3-9). And, indeed, the speaker has performed a number of cognitive  demanding  tasks  in  the  intermediate  period  that  can contribute  to  the  experience  of  psychological  distance.  As  to  this  emotive interjection, it therefore applies that it is not spontaneous.

Next, we can observe that the interjection is integrated in the sequence. Th e subsequent utterance (3-9) is related to (3-8), so that (3-9) is a specifi  cation of (3-8), while (3-8) serves both as an illustration of what is communicated with (3-9), and an argument for what is claimed by (3-9). Th erefore, one can also say that it has a communicative function, and the fact that it is uttered long a ft er the event that induces the emotion it expresses shows that it is under the control of the speaker and that it is intentional. Th us, we have encountered an emotive interjection that is non-spontaneous in every sense of the word. Th e  exigent  question  is:  How  do  we  account  for  this  occurrence  from  a functional point of view? What function does it have? And how does it serve this function?

In the following, I will try to answer these questions by means of the four accounts outlined in section 3, while continuing to utilize the potential of the ecological pragmatic analytical method. We have found that (3-8) is not spontaneous, but intentional and communicative. Th is raises doubts about its function as an action that relieves or gratifi  es emotions and sensations. Th e fi  rst question we need to ask is thus: What is the relation between the utterance and the emotion it signifi  es. As regards the utterance the fi  rst part is uttered with high volume, and it is relatively simple. According to Stange's parameter account, both these values   indicate a high degree of interjectionality. Hence, it supports the assumption that the utterance relieves emotions and that it is a window to the speaker's current emotional state. However, the stimuli are not present. Here we have a characteristic problem of a parameter account; we are le ft with confl  icting values. A hypothesis that could explain these seemingly incompatible  values,  however,    is  that  (3-8)  is  the  result  of  a  suppressed reaction that is triggered only a ft er the demands for controlled, appropriate actions  cease.  Darwin  (2010/1890:28)  points  out  that  a  large  number  of expressions of emotions and sensations are, in fact, the result of attempts to suppress actions that relieve and gratify emotions and sensations. It is also consistent  with  Wharton's  idea  that  interjections  are  under  our  conscious control (see section 3). Th e ecological pragmatic method of analysis can help clarify  whether  the  speaker  is  actually  emotionally  infl  uenced,  namely  by involving the extra-linguistic context as well as the co-text. Firstly, an aborted launch entails a direct bodily eff  ect that can induce emotions: Th e release of the  cable  produces  a  high  sound  and  a  mechanical  impact  that  is  felt  as  a blow against the bottom of the glider; the pull force that approximates the plane's weight (550 kg) disappears suddenly; the subsequent deceleration is registered by the archways in the inner ear and aff  ects the neck muscles (see picture 1); the appropriate action to push the elevator control stick forward implies  that  the  plane's  pitch  changes  40-70  degrees  downwards,  with  the negative g-force this movement implies. We can add that these stimuli are very concrete and thus, according to Stange, support the assumption of a high degree of interjectionality. Secondly, the circumstances have the potential to induce emotions and sensations because of the risks they entail. Statistically, winch  launch  is  the  most  dangerous  phase  of  the  fl  ight. Th ere  are  violent forces at stake; one is close to the ground; and one passes layers of air where wind speed and wind direction change and where there may be turbulence. Incorrect actions or a loss of attention can be fatal. Th ese risks generally have the potential to induce emotions such as nervousness, fear and tension. Th e current event also has the potential to induce surprise. It is the instructor's task to ensure that the aborted launch comes as a surprise to the student, and in the current situation, the covered altimeter is a contraindication of a simulation of an aborted launch. In summary, all the conditions for the inducement of emotions and sensation are fulfi  lled.

Th e  fact  that  the  student  is  emotionally  infl  uenced  is  evident  from the  subsequent  course  of  actions.  Here,  she  deviates  from  procedures  and phraseology. Th us,  she  only  pulls  once  on  the  cable  release  knob  (3-B) under circumstance (3-A). And as she pulls the cable release she also pulls the elevator control stick slightly backwards (3-B) instead of keeping it in a forward position  until  fl  ight  speed  is  regained.  Only  a ft er  she  has  ensured indicated fl  ight speed does she pull three times on the release knob (3-C), and here she pulls once, hesitates and pulls twice. With (3-5) the student begins an utterance without fi  nishing it. (3-6) expresses hesitation and doubt. Utterance (3-7) diff  ers from radio phraseology. Although the student does not yet have a radio certifi  cate, she knows and has previously used the local phraseology. It implies that the recipient, the sender, the position and the intention must be stated. Likewise, roneo is not a part of the radiotelephonic alphabet. All these deviations indicate that the student was surprised and that she is tense. And in  so  far  as  the  student  nevertheless  refrains  from  uttering  the  interjection immediately when the stimuli occur, it seems that interjections may be under our conscious control.

Th ese facts support the hypothesis that the interjection is the result of a suppressed action that is only performed when the demands for controlled, appropriate actions cease. An interesting comparison can be made with example 2: In this case the speaker relieves and gratifi  es emotions spontaneously and uninhibited. But he also crashes.

Th e problem with this hypothesis, however, is that it cannot explain the fact that the expression - as the co-text indicates - is intentional and has a communicative function. Here, Stange's parameter account is of no help. And, surely, it would be misleading to say that the utterance is phatic. Wharton's account, on the other hand, seems to have an explanatory value. According to Wharton, the speaker must produce (3-8) with the intention of showing her  emotional  state. Th e  expression  is  direct  evidence  of  the  basic  layer  of information, namely that she was surprised. Most importantly, the function of showing is not restricted to the current emotional state; emotional states with a temporal displacement can also be shown. Note also that this account does not rule out that she is still aff  ected by the inhibited action. Th is would only make the basic layer of information all the more convincing. Th is account seems to be both informative and accurate in relation to the current use. Here the cotext indicates that (3-8) can be assigned a rhetorical function as an illustration of and as an argument for what is claimed with the subsequent utterance (39). Indeed, the speaker has a motivation to convince the listener that she was surprised. Because - as it appears in the subsequent exchange - this contributes to  the  positive  evaluation of her performance. Th is  interpretation seems to explain all the values   of Stange's parameters. Th erefore, Wharton's account is supported, and consequently, we can say that the function of utterances like (3-8) is to show an emotional or sensational state.

Th e fact that (3-8) is uttered with an informative intention also makes it possible to analyze it as a speech act. But here it becomes clear that it does not fulfi  l the sincerity condition as an expressive speech act: Th e speaker is not in the emotional state that she shows she is in. Rather, we must regard (3-8) as an imitation of a speech act, and as such, it is not an independent act, but assigned to a subordinate rhetorical function as an illustration and argument for the assertive speech act (3-9). Note, thus, that (3-8) cannot be understood isolated from (3-9).

According  to  Goddard  (3-8)  must  be  an  example  of  discursive  use, i.e.  'situations  in  which  the  stimulus  is  not  something  in  the  immediate context,  either  a  physical-sensory  stimulus  or  a  human  action  or  behavior, but rather something the speaker is thinking about' (Goddard 2014:55). One can discuss whether the speaker is 'thinking' about stimuli, or whether it is rather the tension that remains and contributes to the persuasiveness of the basic  layer  information.  Goddard  does  not  specify  the  use  further.  On  the other hand, his claim that discursive uses depend on prior understanding of how the interjection is used in immediate contexts is vital. If the utterance is to serve the function as ostensive-inferential communication, the listener must understand how the interjection is used in immediate contexts. Th is is what makes the utterance persuasive: She was as surprised as the imitated interjection would have indicated in an immediate context. Th at is what she wants to show. It also points to a decisive fl  aw in the semantic account: If the informative intention is part of the semantics of the interjection, it blocks this use. In other words, the semantic account is functionally inconsistent.

Finally, we can - by virtue of the ethnographic aspect of the ecological pragmatic  method  -  ask  the  informant  why  she  said  what  she  said.  She answered:

Jeg ville sige til ham at den kom som en overraskelse. Jeg ved godt at den står i mine normer, men ikke med afdækket højdemåler. Han klarede det meget godt at give mig den.

I wanted to say to him that it came as a surprise. I know it is stated in the educational standards, but not with a covered altimeter. He did a god job giving it to me. (Interview with informant)

Th is  supports  the  interpretation  of  the  utterance's  function  as  showing  an emotion or sensation.

Th e above thus supports Wharton's description as the most informative and accurate as regards utterances like (3-8), i.e. utterances where the context is characterized by the speaker having to suppress his/her reactions to stimuli at the time they occur, where the expressions are simple, where stimuli are concrete, where stimuli are absent and where the focus is not only on self. One  can  also  say  that  Goddard's  description  is  informative  insofar  as  it distinguishes this use from immediate uses. But more importantly, it supports Goddard's claim that all other types of use are based on the primary, immediate use.  Goddard's  description  therefore  simultaneously  points  to  a  functional inconsistency in the semantic descriptions: Th e informative intention cannot be part of the semantics of interjections if they are to be used to show emotions and sensations; it must be a part of their pragmatics.

In section 2.1, we have described the sign relation of the basic interjection as a symptom/index, i.e. a lawful or factual relation between sign and object. Should we characterize the sign relation that characterizes the use of (3-8), we can say that an iconic relation is added to the indexical relation: Th ere is a similarity relation between (3-8) and the index that the speaker imitates by means of (3-8).

## 4.4. Spontaneous, communicative emotive interjections

Th e last example is a spontaneous, communicative interjection. Th is type is probably the most frequent in the linguistic corpora and also the one that most linguistic descriptions have concentrated on. According to the functional implications of the spontaneity described in subsection 2.2, it is actually the most  complicated  and  problematic  one:  How  can  an  interjection  be  both spontaneous and communicative? Th is is basically a contradiction.

Like (3-8) the example occurs in a winch launch in a training fl  ight. Th e student sits in the front seat, and the instructor sits behind the student. Th is student is not as far along in the training program as the student in example 3. A special contextual circumstance is that the student has had a series of bad experiences in which the instructor has intervened in the fl  ight. Because of this, the student has lost confi  dence and motivation. Th e instructor has been made aware of this by another student, and the goal of this fl  ight is to give the student a good experience that can help her regain confi  dence and motivation.

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

|   4 | (00:00,00) (00:07,45)             | (( Th e cable tightens, and the glider accelerates)) (( Th e glider li ft s off. Airspeed is 70 km/h and rapidly increasing))   |
|-----|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  1. | (00:08,68) Instructor:            | og opad opad and upwards upwards                                                                                                |
|  2. | (00:09,75) Instructor:            | der er flyvefart there is flight speed 'we've got flight speed'                                                                 |
|  3. | (00:11,92) Instructor:            | opad upwards                                                                                                                    |
|  4. | (00:12,64) Instructor:            | op up                                                                                                                           |
|  5. | (00:15,26) (00:18,99) Instructor: | (( Th e student turns her head to the right to check her course)) træk lidt mere                                                |
|     | (00:36,20) (00:38,33)             | pull a little more (( Th e student levels off nicely)) (( Th e cable releases automatically))                                   |
|  6. | (00:39,44) Instructor:            | super super                                                                                                                     |
|     |                                   | [åhh]                                                                                                                           |
|  7. | (00:41,32) Student: ->            |                                                                                                                                 |

[ ohh ]

Pic. 3: Airspeed is ok, the glider is stable, task load is low.

<!-- image -->

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

8. (00:41,41) Instructor:

[og så] ind over betonpladsen

[ and then ] across the concrete plant

9. (00:43,03) Student: (00:43,31) Instructor:

yes

bagom bagved

around behind

10. (00:44,06) Student: ja

yes

11. (00:45,17) Instructor:

ligesom de andre

like the others

12. (00:45,23) Student:

ja jeg skal lige ha (0.8) ro på

yes I just need to (0.8) calm down

13. (00:47,81) Instructor:

400 meter

400 meters

(True Airfi  eld, 2017)

In  a  winch  launch,  the  pilot  must  pull  the  elevator  control  stick  slowly backwards when the glider has gained fl  ight speed. If the pilot pulls too much too quickly, there is a risk that the weak link brakes, and this will leave the pilot in a situation that is virtually impossible to salvage. Th e  pull  must be slight in the beginning, and then, when the glider gains height and the angle to the winch changes, the pilot can pull more and more. In the fi  nal phase immediately before the cable releases, the pilot must push the stick slightly forward and level off  .

In this launch, the student is too passive in the fi  rst phases. Each of the instructor's utterances (4-1), (4-2), (4-3), (4-4) and (4-5) are uttered because the student does not pull suffi ciently on the elevator control stick. As height is gained, however, the student acts appropriately; she checks her course, pulls suffi ciently on the elevator control stick, levels off   nicely, pulls three times on the cable release knob, and they also achieve a good height (4-13). For this reason, and perhaps also considering the student's general psychological condition, the instructor praises the student with the utterance (4-6). Immediately a ft er this, the interjection that we are going to analyze occurs.

Utterance (4-7) is a so-called primary interjection. According to Den Danske Ordbog , åh is  used to express many diff  erent emotions, for example enthusiasm, pleasure, surprise and disappointment. In this context it can be understood as a sign of relief and joy because the start went relatively well and because the speaker was praised by the instructor. Th is interpretation is supported by an interview with the informant. Th e  answer to the question 'why did you say åh ? ' she answered: 'det var rart at det lykkedes, og det var rart med anerkendelsen' ( It was nice that I succeeded, and it was nice to get recognition ).

Th e utterance must  be considered spontaneous  as it is uttered in  immediate  continuation  of  the  instructor's super (4-7)  signaling  the acknowledgment that induces the emotion that the speaker's åhh is  a  sign  of.  On the other hand, it can be considered communicative because it 1) is integrated into an exchange as a response to another utterance, 2) can be understood as an appropriate response to this utterance; 3) can be considered intentional as it is not inappropriate in the situation and does not replace an appropriate action and 4) is relevant in the current context where the student's general psychological state has been thematized and forms the basis for the purpose of the fl  ight. Th us, the utterance appears both spontaneous and communicative. Th is  means  that  accounts  that  assume  the  original  and  basic  function  of interjections such as Darwin's (2010/1890) and Ries' (1952) are insuffi cient. Again, we have to turn to accounts of interjections as communicative.

In  this  case,  Wilkins'  proposal  that  interjections  are  speech  acts  with an  illocutionary  purpose  seems  to  have  explanatory  value. Th us,  for  (4-7) the following applies: Normal input and output conditions (Searle 1996/1969) obtain; the propositional content rule (ibid.) is satisfi  ed (an expressive speech act does not need to have a propositional content); the preparatory rules (ibid.) are satisfi  ed since there are stimuli in the situation that can induce an emotion and since the listener is not aware of the speaker's emotions; the sincerity rule (ibid.) of an expression of relief and joy appears to be fulfi  lled based on what the analysis has revealed about the context. It is also supported by utterance (412) indicating that the speaker has been tense. As to the essential rule (ibid.), the question arises: In what sense can we say that (4-7) counts as an expression of the emotional state of the speaker?

Th e  count-as-relation is Searle's account of the informative intention. It is a conventional relation and, thus, an example of non-natural meaning. Now,  the  problem  is  this:  How  is  the  informative  intention  (ostensively) expressed, and in what sense does it commit the speaker. Again, we can reject the semantic account implying that the informative intention is coded in the expression. Th is is also clear in the speech act analytical perspective: Th e fact that the sign is a spontaneous expression of emotions and sensations and thus does not in itself  carry  an  informative  intention  is  the  prerequisite  for  the sincerity condition to be satisfi  ed.

According  to  Wharton  (see  section  3),  the  communicative  function of  interjections  is  that  the  speaker  produces  a  more  or  less  natural  sign  of emotional or sensational states with the informative intention that the listener infers the emotional state of the speaker based on the utterance as a natural sign of an emotional state. Th is is an informative and accurate description of (3-8). But there seems to be a diff  erence between (3-8) and (4-7). Th e speaker does not show her emotional state. Rather the speaker lets her  body  show her  emotional  state. Th at  is,  it  is  an  absence  of  suppression  or  inhibition. And this  absence  can  be  considered  intentional  insofar  as  it  is  possible  to suppress or inhibit such actions. Based on Wilkins' idea of interjections as speech acts and Wharton's description of interjections as ostensive-inferential communication, we can say that the illocutionary purpose is that the speaker lets her emotional state manifest itself and that the manifestation counts as a  sincere  expression of the emotion in that the speaker commits herself to the  absence  of  suppression  or  inhibition.  It  is  vital  that  the  expression  has a dual function: it functions non-communicatively as an action that relieves or gratifi  es  emotions,  and  it  functions  communicatively by refraining from suppressing  or  inhibiting  the  action. Th ere  is,  thus,  a  special  focus  on  the sincerity condition; the expression counts as an expression of the emotional state of the speaker because the sincerity condition is satisfi  ed. Th e sincerity condition and the essential condition 'overlap' (Searle 1996/1969:66-67). Th e convention is, therefore, that the speaker lets the body show. Th at is what the speaker commits herself to, and not the emotional state.

Th e problem with Goddard's typology is that we cannot distinguish the utterances in example 2 from the utterance (4-7). And there is an important diff  erence. In the fi  rst case, there is no informative intention; in the second, there  is  an  informative  intention.  Stange's  characterization  of  interjections proper as semi-automatic, on the other hand, points to this possible diff  erence as  it  indicates  that  interjections  may  vary  with  regard  to  how  spontaneous their production actually is. According to Stange, it depends on the automatic or conscious appraisal processes involved in the emotional experience. As far as the parameters are concerned, they require a method to determine their values,   and once again they leave us with apparently incompatible values. On the other hand, by determining the values of the proposed parameters, we can actually distinguish between degrees of interjectionality. Th us, the values that apply to (4-7) diff  er from the values that apply to the utterances in example 2 and from the values that apply to (3-8). Th erefore, Stange's parameter account is informative.

Finally, we can determine the sign relation that characterizes (4-7). It diff  ers both from the lawful relation of the index we saw in example 2, and from the similarity relation of the icon we saw in example 3. As Wilkins' and Wharton's accounts (see section 3) indicate, the sign relation that characterizes (4-7) is a conventional relation. Above, this convention has been described as follows: the speaker commits herself to letting her body show the emotional state she is in. By virtue of this convention we can characterize the relation as a symbolic relation. A symbolic relation is added to the basic indexical relation. Th us, there is a conventional relation between (4-7) and the index the speaker lets her body show with (4-7).

## 5. Conclusion

Th e  starting  point  for  these  analyses  was  that  emotive  interjections  are  a function  and  that  the  function  is  a  spontaneous  and  non-communicative relief and gratifi  cation of emotions and sensations. Th is raised the question: How can we explain the  fact  that  some  interjections  are  non-spontaneous and/or communicative? Based on an ecological pragmatic analysis of three carefully selected examples, the article has answered this question by applying and evaluating four accounts of this heterogeneity.

Th e  result  is  clear  in  several  respects. Th e  semantic  account,  which implies that the informative intention is part of the semantics of interjections, can  be  rejected. Th e  analyses  here  show  that  this  account  is  misleading  as regards  spontaneous,  non-communicative  interjections  and  that  it  blocks the description of the rhetorical function of interjections as illustrations and arguments and the description of interjections as felicitous speech acts.

As  for  the  assumption  that  interjections  are  speech  acts,  it  appears that only some emotive interjections are speech acts. For these acts it applies that  the  essential  condition  and  the  sincerity  condition  coincide.  In  order to  satisfy  the  sincerity  condition,  the  act  that  indicates  the  emotional  state must be spontaneous. Th is description is informative as regards some emotive interjections.

Th e pragmatic account is limited to interjections with a communicative function. However, it provides an accurate description of such interjections: Speakers  can  produce  an  index  that  shows  an  emotional  state,  with  an informative  intention.  However,  as  regards  spontaneous,  communicative interjections,  the  term  appears  to  be  inadequately  specifi  ed.  Rather,  the speaker lets her body show her emotional state.

Goddard's  contextual  typology  appeared  to  be  informative  insofar as it could distinguish between immediate and discursive uses. But it is not suffi ciently informative to distinguish immediate uses without an informative intention from immediate uses with an informative intention. On the other hand, Goddard's claim that the immediate use is the basis for discursive uses and other types of use proved informative and accurate.

Stange's contextual parameter account proved to be the only one capable of  both  embracing  and  distinguishing  between  all  the  presented  examples of  interjections:  1)  spontaneous,  non-communicative,  2)  non-spontaneous, communicative  and  3)  spontaneous,  communicative. Th e  identifi  ed  parameters appeared to be too general, and a corpus analysis is insuffi cient as a method to precisely  determine  the  values    of  the  parameters.  However,  the proposed ecological pragmatic method of analysis enabled the parameters to be assigned a value, and the parameters showed that they are informative with regard to diff  erences in the spontaneity and communicativity of interjections.

Th e  ecological  pragmatic  method  of  analysis  and  the  associated selection of paradigmatic examples made it possible to distinguish between three possible interjectional sign functions:

## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

|                             | Spontaneous, non- communicative            | Non-spontaneous, communicative                                                                    | Spontaneous, communicative                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Temporal relation to object | Immediate                                  | Displaced                                                                                         | Immediate                                                                                                   |
| Function                    | Relieve and gratify emotion and sensations | Show emotions and sensations by imitating the relief and gratification of emotions and sensations | Show emotions and sensations by conventionally letting the body relieve and gratify emotions and sensations |
| Sign relation               | Indexical                                  | Iconic                                                                                            | Symbolic                                                                                                    |

Th ese three Peircean sign functions are basic. Whether they are exhaustive with regard to the sign functions of interjections in general, and whether the descriptions of the three functions are generally informative and accurate, is an empirical question.

## Notes

- 1 Notice that the pilots alternate between English and Chinese. A large fraction of fl  ight operations in the global commercial aviation system are conducted using a mixture of English and some other language(s) (Hutchins et al 2006). Contributing factors are that the ICAO standard radiotelephony phraseology is in English and that indexes, checklists, procedures and concepts in a very large part of the aircra ft fl  eet are in English.
- 2 Height is above fi  eld elevation; altitude is above mean sea level.
- 3 A stall occurs when the pilot pulls so much on the elevator control stick that the angle between the aerofoil and the airfl  ow becomes so large that the airfl  ow no longer creates li ft and therefore cannot carry the plane. Th e plane is helplessly le ft to gravity and falls to the ground.
- 4 As specifi  ed in PZL-Bielsko's fl  ight manual for SZD-50-3 'Pucazc' .
- 5 Th e  emphasis by the letter k signals  a  particularly  distinct  pronunciation of the k -sound.

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## Simon Borchmann Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)

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