CELEX ID: 32018L1972

--- ENGLISH ---

Document:
17.12.2018
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 321/36
DIRECTIVE (EU) 2018/1972 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 11 December 2018
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code
(Recast)
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee 
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,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions 
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,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure 
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,
Whereas:
(1)
Directives 2002/19/EC 
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, 2002/20/EC 
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, 2002/21/EC 
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 and 2002/22/EC 
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 of the European Parliament and of the Council have been substantially amended. Since further amendments are to be made, those Directives should be recast in the interests of clarity.
(2)
The functioning of the five Directives which are part of the existing regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, namely Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC, and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, is subject to periodic review by the Commission, with a view, in particular, to determining the need for modification in light of technological and market developments.
(3)
In its communication or 6 May 2015 setting out a Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, the Commission stated that its review of the telecommunications framework would focus on measures that aim to provide incentives for investment in high-speed broadband networks, bring a more consistent internal market approach to radio spectrum policy and management, deliver conditions for a true internal market by tackling regulatory fragmentation, ensure effective protection of consumers, a level playing field for all market players and consistent application of the rules, as well as provide a more effective regulatory institutional framework.
(4)
This Directive is part of a ‘Regulatory Fitness’ (REFIT) exercise, the scope of which includes four Directives, namely 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC, and Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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. Each of those Directives contains measures applicable to providers of electronic communications networks and of electronic communications services, consistently with the regulatory history of the sector under which undertakings were vertically integrated, namely, active in both the provision of networks and of services. The review offers an occasion to recast the four Directives in order to simplify the current structure with a view to reinforcing its consistency and accessibility in relation to the REFIT objective. It also offers the possibility to adapt the structure to the new market reality, where the provision of communications services is no longer necessarily bundled to the provision of a network. As provided in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal acts 
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, recasting consists in the adoption of a new legal act which incorporates in a single text both the substantive amendments which it makes to an earlier act and the unchanged provisions of that act. The proposal for recasting deals with the substantive amendments which it makes to an earlier act, and on a secondary level, includes the codification of the unchanged provisions of the earlier act with those substantive amendments.
(5)
This Directive creates a legal framework to ensure freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services, subject only to the conditions laid down in this Directive and to any restrictions in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular measures regarding public policy, public security and public health, and consistent with Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’).
(6)
This Directive is without prejudice to the possibility for each Member State to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of its essential security interests, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to permit the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, taking into account that any limitation to the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter, in particular in Articles 7, 8 and 11 thereof, such as limitations regarding the processing of data, are to be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and be subject to the principle of proportionality, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter.
(7)
The convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors means that all electronic communications networks and services should be covered to the extent possible by a single European electronic communications code established by means of a single Directive, with the exception of matters better dealt with through directly applicable rules established by means of regulations. It is necessary to separate the regulation of electronic communications networks and services from the regulation of content. Therefore, this Directive does not cover the content of services delivered over electronic communications networks using electronic communications services, such as broadcasting content, financial services and certain information society services, and is without prejudice to measures taken at Union or national level in respect of such services, in accordance with Union law, in order to promote cultural and linguistic diversity and to ensure the defence of media pluralism. The content of television programmes is covered by Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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. The regulation of audiovisual policy and content aims at achieving general interest objectives, such as freedom of expression, media pluralism, impartiality, cultural and linguistic diversity, social inclusion, consumer protection and the protection of minors. The separation between the regulation of electronic communications and the regulation of content does not affect the taking into account of the links existing between them, in particular in order to guarantee media pluralism, cultural diversity and consumer protection. Within the limits of their competences, competent authorities should contribute to ensuring the implementation of policies aiming to promote those objectives.
(8)
This Directive does not affect the application to radio equipment of Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, but does cover car radio and consumer radio receivers, and consumer digital television equipment.
(9)
In order to allow national regulatory and other competent authorities to meet the objectives set out in this Directive, in particular concerning end-to-end interoperability, the scope of the Directive should cover certain aspects of radio equipment as defined in Directive 2014/53/EU and consumer equipment used for digital television, in order to facilitate access for end-users with disabilities. It is important for national regulatory and other competent authorities to encourage network operators and equipment manufacturers to cooperate in order to facilitate access by end-users with disabilities to electronic communications services. The non-exclusive use of radio spectrum for the self-use of radio terminal equipment, although not related to an economic activity, should also be the subject of this Directive in order to ensure a coordinated approach with regard to their authorisation regime.
(10)
Certain electronic communications services under this Directive could also fall within the scope of the definition of ‘information society service’ set out in Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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. The provisions of that Directive that govern information society services apply to those electronic communications services to the extent that this Directive or other Union legal acts do not contain more specific provisions applicable to electronic communications services. However, electronic communications services such as voice telephony, messaging services and electronic mail services are covered by this Directive. The same undertaking, for example an internet service provider, can offer both an electronic communications service, such as access to the internet, and services not covered by this Directive, such as the provision of web-based and not communications-related content.
(11)
The same undertaking, for example a cable operator, can offer both an electronic communications service, such as the conveyance of television signals, and services not covered under this Directive, such as the commercialisation of an offer of sound or television broadcasting content services, and therefore additional obligations can be imposed on such an undertaking in relation to its activity as a content provider or distributor, in accordance with provisions other than those of this Directive, without prejudice to the conditions laid in an annex to this Directive.
(12)
The regulatory framework should cover the use of radio spectrum by all electronic communications networks, including the emerging self-use of radio spectrum by new types of networks consisting exclusively of autonomous systems of mobile radio equipment that is connected via wireless links without a central management or centralised network operator, and not necessarily within the exercise of any specific economic activity. In the developing 5G wireless communications environment, such networks are likely to develop in particular outside buildings and on the roads, for transport, energy, research and development, eHealth, public protection and disaster relief, the Internet of Things, machine-to-machine and connected cars. As a result, the application by Member States, based on Article 7 of Directive 2014/53/EU, of additional national requirements regarding the putting into service or use of such radio equipment, or both, in relation to the effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and avoidance of harmful interference should reflect the principles of the internal market.
(13)
The requirements concerning the capabilities of electronic communications networks are constantly increasing. While in the past the focus was mainly on growing bandwidth available overall and to each individual user, other parameters such as latency, availability and reliability are becoming increasingly important. The current response towards that demand is to bring optical fibre closer and closer to the user, and future ‘very high capacity networks’ require performance parameters which are equivalent to those that a network based on optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location can deliver. In the case of fixed-line connection, this corresponds to network performance equivalent to that achievable by an optical fibre installation up to a multi-dwelling building, considered to be the serving location. In the case of wireless connection, this corresponds to network performance similar to that achievable based on an optical fibre installation up to the base station, considered to be the serving location. Variations in end-users’ experience which are due to the different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point should not be taken into account for the purposes of establishing whether a wireless network could be considered as providing similar network performance. In accordance with the principle of technology neutrality, other technologies and transmission media should not be excluded, where they compare with that baseline scenario in terms of their capabilities. The roll-out of such ‘very high capacity networks’ is likely to further increase the capabilities of networks and pave the way for the roll-out of future wireless network generations based on enhanced air interfaces and a more densified network architecture.
(14)
Definitions need to be adjusted to ensure that they are in line with the principle of technology neutrality and to keep pace with technological development, including new forms of network management such as through software emulation or software-defined networks. Technological and market evolution has brought networks to move to internet protocol (IP) technology, and enabled end-users to choose between a range of competing voice service providers. Therefore, the term ‘publicly available telephone service’, which is exclusively used in Directive 2002/22/EC and widely perceived as referring to traditional analogue telephone services, should be replaced by the more current and technological neutral term ‘voice communications service’. Conditions for the provision of a service should be separated from the actual definitional elements of a voice communications service, namely, a publicly available electronic communications service for originating and receiving, directly or indirectly, national or national and international calls through a number or numbers in a national or international numbering plan, whether such a service is based on circuit switching or packet switching technology. It is the nature of such a service that it is bidirectional, enabling both parties to communicate. A service which does not fulfil all those conditions, such as for example a ‘click-through’ application on a customer service website, is not such a service. Voice communications services also include means of communication specifically intended for end-users with disabilities using text relay or total conversation services.
(15)
The services used for communications purposes, and the technical means of their delivery, have evolved considerably. End-users increasingly substitute traditional voice telephony, text messages (SMS) and electronic mail conveyance services by functionally equivalent online services such as Voice over IP, messaging services and web-based e-mail services. In order to ensure that end-users and their rights are effectively and equally protected when using functionally equivalent services, a future-oriented definition of electronic communications services should not be purely based on technical parameters but rather build on a functional approach. The scope of necessary regulation should be appropriate to achieve its public interest objectives. While ‘conveyance of signals’ remains an important parameter for determining the services falling into the scope of this Directive, the definition should cover also other services that enable communication. From an end-user’s perspective it is not relevant whether a provider conveys signals itself or whether the communication is delivered via an internet access service. The definition of electronic communications services should therefore contain three types of services which may partly overlap, that is to say internet access services as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, interpersonal communications services as defined in this Directive, and services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals. The definition of electronic communications service should eliminate ambiguities observed in the implementation of the definition as it existed prior to the adoption of this Directive and allow a calibrated provision-by-provision application of the specific rights and obligations contained in the framework to the different types of services. The processing of personal data by electronic communications services, whether as remuneration or otherwise, should comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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(16)
In order to fall within the scope of the definition of electronic communications service, a service needs to be provided normally in exchange for remuneration. In the digital economy, market participants increasingly consider information about users as having a monetary value. Electronic communications services are often supplied to the end-user not only for money, but increasingly and in particular for the provision of personal data or other data. The concept of remuneration should therefore encompass situations where the provider of a service requests and the end-user knowingly provides personal data within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 or other data directly or indirectly to the provider. It should also encompass situations where the end-user allows access to information without actively supplying it, such as personal data, including the IP address, or other automatically generated information, such as information collected and transmitted by a cookie. In line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) on Article 57 TFEU 
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, remuneration also exists within the meaning of the TFEU if the service provider is paid by a third party and not by the service recipient. The concept of remuneration should therefore also encompass situations in which the end-user is exposed to advertisements as a condition for gaining access to the service, or situations in which the service provider monetises personal data it has collected in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
(17)
Interpersonal communications services are services that enable interpersonal and interactive exchange of information, covering services like traditional voice calls between two individuals but also all types of emails, messaging services, or group chats. Interpersonal communications services only cover communications between a finite, that is to say not potentially unlimited, number of natural persons, which is determined by the sender of the communication. Communications involving legal persons should fall within the scope of the definition where natural persons act on behalf of those legal persons or are involved at least on one side of the communication. Interactive communication entails that the service allows the recipient of the information to respond. Services which do not meet those requirements, such as linear broadcasting, video on demand, websites, social networks, blogs, or exchange of information between machines, should not be considered to be interpersonal communications services. In exceptional circumstances a service should not be considered to be an interpersonal communications service if the interpersonal and interactive communication facility is a minor and purely ancillary feature to another service and for objective technical reasons cannot be used without that principal service, and its integration is not a means to circumvent the applicability of the rules governing electronic communications services. As elements of an exemption from the definition the terms ‘minor’ and ‘purely ancillary’ should be interpreted narrowly and from an objective end-user’s perspective. An interpersonal communications feature could be considered to be minor where its objective utility for an end-user is very limited and where it is in reality barely used by end-users. An example of a feature that could be considered to fall outside the scope of the definition of interpersonal communications services might be, in principle, a communication channel in online games, depending on the features of the communication facility of the service.
(18)
Interpersonal communications services using numbers from national and international numbering plans connect with publicly assigned numbering resources. Those number-based interpersonal communications services comprise both services to which end-users numbers are assigned for the purpose of ensuring end-to-end connectivity and services enabling end-users to reach persons to whom such numbers have been assigned. The mere use of a number as an identifier should not be considered to be equivalent to the use of a number to connect with publicly assigned numbers and should therefore, in itself, not be considered to be sufficient to qualify a service as a number-based interpersonal communications service. Number-independent interpersonal communications services should be subject to obligations only where public interests require that specific regulatory obligations apply to all types of interpersonal communications services, regardless of whether they use numbers for the provision of their service. It is justified to treat number-based interpersonal communications services differently, as they participate in, and hence also benefit from, a publicly assured interoperable ecosystem.
(19)
The network termination point represents a boundary for regulatory purposes between the regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services and the regulation of telecommunications terminal equipment. Defining the location of the network termination point is the responsibility of the national regulatory authority. In light of the practice of national regulatory authorities, and given the variety of fixed and wireless topologies, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (‘BEREC’) should, in close cooperation with the Commission, adopt guidelines on common approaches to the identification of the network termination point, in accordance with this Directive, in various concrete circumstances.
(20)
Technical developments make it possible for end-users to access emergency services not only by voice calls but also by other interpersonal communications services. The concept of emergency communication should therefore cover all interpersonal communications services that allow such emergency services access. It builds on the emergency system elements already enshrined in Union law, namely a public safety answering point (‘PSAP’) and a most appropriate PSAP as defined in Regulation (EU) 2015/758 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, and on emergency services as defined in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 305/2013 
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.
(21)
National regulatory and other competent authorities should have a harmonised set of objectives and principles to underpin their work, and should, where necessary, coordinate their actions with the authorities of other Member States and with BEREC in carrying out their tasks under this regulatory framework.
(22)
The tasks assigned to competent authorities by this Directive contribute to the fulfilment of broader policies in the areas of culture, employment, the environment, social cohesion and town and country planning.
(23)
The regulatory framework should, in addition to the existing three primary objectives of promoting competition, the internal market and end-user interests, pursue an additional connectivity objective, articulated in terms of outcomes: widespread access to and take-up of very high capacity networks for all citizens of the Union and Union businesses on the basis of reasonable price and choice, effective and fair competition, open innovation, efficient use of radio spectrum, common rules and predictable regulatory approaches in the internal market and the necessary sector-specific rules to safeguard the interests of citizens of the Union. For the Member States, the national regulatory and other competent authorities and the stakeholders, that connectivity objective translates, on the one hand, into aiming for the highest capacity networks and services economically sustainable in a given area, and, on the other, into pursuing territorial cohesion, in the sense of convergence in capacity available in different areas.
(24)
Progress towards the achievement of the general objectives of this Directive should be supported by a robust system of continuous assessment and benchmarking by the Commission of Member States with respect to the availability of very high capacity networks in all major socio-economic drivers such as schools, transport hubs and major providers of public services, and highly digitised businesses, the availability of uninterrupted 5G coverage for urban areas and major terrestrial transport paths, and the availability to all households in each Member State of electronic communications networks which are capable of providing at least 100 Mbps, and which are promptly upgradeable to gigabit speeds. To that end, the Commission should continue monitoring the performance of Member States, including, by way of an example, indexes that summarise relevant indicators on the Union’s digital performance and track the evolution of Member States in digital competitiveness, such as the Digital Economy and Society Index, and, where necessary, establish new methods and new objective, concrete and quantifiable criteria for benchmarking the effectiveness of Member States.
(25)
The principle that Member States should apply Union law in a technologically neutral fashion, that is to say that a national regulatory or other competent authority should neither impose nor discriminate in favour of the use of a particular type of technology, does not preclude the taking of proportionate steps to promote certain specific services where justified in order to attain the objectives of the regulatory framework, for example digital television as a means for increasing radio spectrum efficiency. Furthermore, that principle does not preclude taking into account that certain transmission media have physical characteristics and architectural features that can be superior in terms of quality of service, capacity, maintenance cost, energy efficiency, management flexibility, reliability, robustness and scalability, and, ultimately, performance, which can be reflected in actions taken with a view to pursuing the various regulatory objectives.
(26)
Both efficient investment and competition should be encouraged in tandem, in order to increase economic growth, innovation and consumer choice.
(27)
Competition can best be fostered through an economically efficient level of investment in new and existing infrastructure, complemented by regulation, where necessary, to achieve effective competition in retail services. An efficient level of infrastructure-based competition is the extent of infrastructure duplication at which investors can reasonably be expected to make a fair return based on reasonable expectations about the evolution of market shares.
(28)
It is necessary to give appropriate incentives for investment in new very high capacity networks that support innovation in content-rich internet services and strengthen the international competitiveness of the Union. Such networks have enormous potential to deliver benefits to consumers and businesses across the Union. It is therefore vital to promote sustainable investment in the development of those new networks, while safeguarding competition, as bottlenecks and barriers to entry remain at the infrastructure level, and boosting consumer choice through regulatory predictability and consistency.
(29)
This Directive aims to progressively reduce ex ante sector-specific rules as competition in the markets develops and, ultimately, to ensure that electronic communications are governed only by competition law. Considering that the markets for electronic communications have shown strong competitive dynamics in recent years, it is essential that ex ante regulatory obligations are imposed only where there is no effective and sustainable competition on the markets concerned. The objective of ex ante regulatory intervention is to produce benefits for end-users by making retail markets effectively competitive on a sustainable basis. Obligations at wholesale level should be imposed where otherwise one or more retail markets are not likely to become effectively competitive in the absence of those obligations. It is likely that national regulatory authorities are gradually, through the process of market analysis, able to find retail markets to be competitive even in the absence of wholesale regulation, especially taking into account expected improvements in innovation and competition. In such a case, the national regulatory authority should conclude that regulation is no longer needed at wholesale level, and assess the corresponding relevant wholesale market with a view to withdrawing ex ante regulation. In doing so, the national regulatory authority should take into account any leverage effects between wholesale and related retail markets which might require the removal of barriers to entry at the infrastructure level in order to ensure long-term competition at the retail level.
(30)
Electronic communications are becoming essential for an increasing number of sectors. The Internet of Things is an illustration of how the radio signal conveyance underpinning electronic communications continues to evolve and shape societal and business reality. To derive the greatest benefit from those developments, the introduction and accommodation of new wireless communications technologies and applications in radio spectrum management is essential. As other technologies and applications relying on radio spectrum are equally subject to growing demand, and can be enhanced by integrating or combining them with electronic communications, radio spectrum management should adopt, where appropriate, a cross-sectorial approach to improve the efficient use of radio spectrum.
(31)
Strategic planning, coordination and, where appropriate, harmonisation at Union level can help ensure that radio spectrum users derive the full benefits of the internal market and that Union interests can be effectively defended globally. For those purposes it should be possible to adopt multiannual radio spectrum policy programmes, where appropriate. The first such programme was established by Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, setting out policy orientations and objectives for the strategic planning and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum in the Union. It should be possible for those policy orientations and objectives to refer to the availability and efficient use of radio spectrum necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, in accordance with this Directive.
(32)
National borders are increasingly irrelevant in determining optimal radio spectrum use. Undue fragmentation amongst national policies result in increased costs and lost market opportunities for radio spectrum users and slows down innovation to the detriment of the proper functioning of the internal market and prejudice to consumers and the economy as a whole.
(33)
The radio spectrum management provisions of this Directive should be consistent with the work of international and regional organisations dealing with radio spectrum management, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), in order to ensure the effective management of and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum across the Union and between the Member States and other members of the ITU.
(34)
In accordance with the principle of the separation of regulatory and operational functions, Member States should guarantee the independence of the national regulatory and other competent authorities with a view to ensuring the impartiality of their decisions. This requirement of independence is without prejudice to the institutional autonomy and constitutional obligations of the Member States or to the principle of neutrality with regard to the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership laid down in Article 345 TFEU. National regulatory and other competent authorities should be in possession of all the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise, and financial means, for the performance of their tasks.
(35)
Certain tasks pursuant to the Directive, such as ex ante market regulation, including the imposition of obligations for access and interconnection, and the resolution of disputes between undertakings are tasks which should be undertaken only by national regulatory authorities, namely, bodies which are independent both from the sector and from any external intervention or political pressure. Unless otherwise provided, Member States should be able to assign other regulatory tasks provided for in this Directive either to the national regulatory authorities or to other competent authorities. In the course of transposition, Member States should promote the stability of competences of the national regulatory authorities with regard to the assignment of tasks which resulted from the transposition of the Union electronic communications regulatory framework as amended in 2009, in particular those related to market competition or market entry. Where tasks are assigned to other competent authorities, those other competent authorities should seek to consult the national regulatory authorities before taking a decision. Pursuant to the principle of good cooperation, national regulatory and other competent authorities should exchange information for the exercise of their tasks.
(36)
This Directive does not include substantive provisions on open internet access or roaming and is without prejudice to the allocation of competences to national regulatory authorities in Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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 and in Regulation (EU) 2015/2120. However, this Directive provides, in addition, for national regulatory authorities to be competent for assessing and monitoring closely market access and competition issues which potentially affect the rights of end-users to an open internet access.
(37)
The independence of the national regulatory authorities was strengthened in the review of the electronic communications regulatory framework completed in 2009 in order to ensure a more effective application of the regulatory framework and to increase their authority and the predictability of their decisions. To that end, express provision had to be made in national law to ensure that, in the exercise of its tasks, a national regulatory authority is protected against external intervention or political pressure liable to jeopardise its independent assessment of matters coming before it. Such outside influence makes a national legislative body unsuited to act as a national regulatory authority under the regulatory framework. For that purpose, rules had to be laid down at the outset regarding the grounds for the dismissal of the head of the national regulatory authority in order to remove any reasonable doubt as to the neutrality of that body and its imperviousness to external factors. In order to avoid arbitrary dismissals, dismissed members should have the right to request that the competent courts verify the existence of a valid reason to dismiss, among those provided for in this Directive. Such dismissals should relate only to the personal or professional qualifications of the head or member. It is important that national regulatory authorities have their own budget allowing them, in particular, to recruit a sufficient number of qualified staff. In order to ensure transparency, that budget should be published annually. Within the limits of their budget, they should have autonomy in managing their resources, human and financial. In order to ensure impartiality, Member States that retain ownership of, or control, undertakings contributing to the budget of the national regulatory or other competent authorities through administrative charges should ensure that there is effective structural separation of activities associated with the exercise of ownership or control from the exercise of control over the budget.
(38)
There is a need to further reinforce the independence of the national regulatory authorities to ensure the imperviousness of its head and members to external pressure, by providing minimum appointment qualifications, and a minimum duration for their mandate. Furthermore, to address the risk of regulatory capture, ensure continuity and enhance independence, Member States should consider limiting the possibility of renewing the mandates of the head or members of the board and set up an appropriate rotation scheme for the board and the top management. This could be arranged, for instance, by appointing the first members of the collegiate body for different periods in order for their mandates, as well as that of their successors, not to lapse at the same moment.
(39)
National regulatory authorities should be accountable for, and should be required to report on, the way in which they are exercising their tasks. That obligation should normally take the form of an annual reporting obligation rather than ad hoc reporting requests, which, if disproportionate, could limit their independence or hinder them in the exercise of their tasks. Indeed, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice 
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, extensive or unconditional reporting obligations may indirectly affect the independence of an authority.
(40)
Member States should notify the Commission of the identity of the national regulatory and other competent authorities. For authorities competent for granting rights of way, it should be possible to fulfil the notification requirement by a reference to the single information point established pursuant to Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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.
(41)
The least onerous authorisation system possible should be used to allow the provision of electronic communications networks and services in order to stimulate the development of new communications services and pan-European communications networks and services and to allow service providers and consumers to benefit from the economies of scale of the internal market.
(42)
The benefits of the internal market to service providers and end-users can be best achieved by general authorisation of electronic communications networks and of electronic communications services other than number-independent interpersonal communications services, without requiring any explicit decision or administrative act by the national regulatory authority and by limiting any procedural requirements to a declaratory notification only. Where Member States require notification by providers of electronic communications networks or services when they start their activities, such notification should not entail administrative cost for the providers and could be made available via an entry point at the website of the competent authorities. In order to support effective cross-border coordination, in particular for pan-European operators, BEREC should establish and maintain a database of such notifications. Competent authorities should transmit only complete notifications to BEREC. Member States should not impede the provision of networks or services in any way, including on grounds of incompleteness of a notification.
(43)
Notifications should entail a mere declaration of the provider’s intention to commence the provision of electronic communications networks and services. A provider should be required to complement that declaration only with the information set out in this Directive. Member States should not impose additional or separate notification requirements.
(44)
Contrary to the other categories of electronic communications networks and services as defined in this Directive, number-independent interpersonal communications services do not benefit from the use of public numbering resources and do not participate in a publicly assured interoperable ecosystem. It is therefore not appropriate to subject those types of services to the general authorisation regime.
(45)
When granting rights of use for radio spectrum, for numbering resources or rights to install facilities, the competent authorities should inform the undertakings to which they grant such rights of the relevant conditions. Member States should be able to lay down such conditions for the use of radio spectrum in individual rights of use or in the general authorisation.
(46)
General authorisations should contain only conditions which are specific to the electronic communications sector. They should not be made subject to conditions which are already applicable by virtue of other existing national law, in particular regarding consumer protection, which is not specific to the communications sector. For instance, competent authorities should be able to inform undertakings about the applicable environmental and town-and-country-planning requirements. Conditions imposed under the general authorisation do not affect the determination of applicable law pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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.
(47)
The conditions that could be attached to general authorisations should cover specific conditions governing accessibility for end-users with disabilities and the need of public authorities and emergency services to communicate between themselves and with the general public before, during and after major disasters.
(48)
It is necessary to include the rights and obligations of undertakings under general authorisations explicitly in such authorisations in order to ensure a level playing field throughout the Union and to facilitate cross-border negotiation of interconnection between public electronic communications networks.
(49)
General authorisations entitle undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services to the public to negotiate interconnection under the conditions of this Directive. Undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services other than to the public can negotiate interconnection on commercial terms.
(50)
Competent authorities should duly take into account, when attaching conditions to general authorisations and applying administrative charges, situations in which electronic communications networks or services are provided by natural persons on a not-for-profit basis. In the case of electronic communications networks and services not provided to the public it is appropriate to impose fewer and lighter conditions, if any, than are justified for electronic communications networks and services provided to the public.
(51)
Specific obligations imposed on undertakings providing electronic communications networks and electronic communications services in accordance with Union law by virtue of their designation as having significant market power as defined in this Directive should be imposed separately from the general rights and obligations under the general authorisation.
(52)
It is possible that undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services need confirmation of their rights under the general authorisation with respect to interconnection and rights of way, in particular to facilitate negotiations with other, regional or local, levels of government or with service providers in other Member States. To that end competent authorities should provide declarations to undertakings either upon request or alternatively as an automatic response to a notification under the general authorisation. Such declarations should not by themselves constitute entitlements to rights, nor should any rights under the general authorisation, rights of use or the exercise of such rights depend upon a declaration.
(53)
It should be possible to impose administrative charges on undertakings providing electronic communications services in order to finance the activities of the national regulatory or other competent authority in managing the general authorisation system and the granting of rights of use. Such charges should be limited to cover the actual administrative costs for those activities. To that end, transparency should be ensured in the income and expenditure of national regulatory and other competent authorities by means of annual reporting about the total sum of charges collected and the administrative costs incurred, in order to allow undertakings to verify that they are in balance.
(54)
Systems for administrative charges should not distort competition or create barriers to market entry. A general authorisation system renders it impossible to attribute administrative costs and hence charges to individual undertakings, except for the granting of rights of use for numbering resources, radio spectrum and for rights to install facilities. Any applicable administrative charges should be in line with the principles of a general authorisation system. An example of a fair, simple and transparent alternative for those charge attribution criteria could be a turnover related distribution key. Where administrative charges are very low, flat rate charges, or charges combining a flat rate basis with a turnover related element could also be appropriate. To the extent that the general authorisation system extends to undertakings with very small market shares, such as community-based network providers, or to service providers the business model of which generates very limited revenues even in the case of significant market penetration in terms of volumes, Member States should assess the possibility to establish an appropriate de minimis threshold for the imposition of administrative charges.
(55)
Member States might need to amend rights, conditions, procedures, charges and fees relating to general authorisations and rights of use where this is objectively justified. Such proposed amendments should be duly notified to all interested parties in good time, giving them adequate opportunity to express their views. Unnecessary procedures should be avoided in the case of minor amendments to existing rights to install facilities or rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources when such amendments do not have an impact on third parties’ interests. Minor amendments to rights and obligations are amendments which are mainly administrative, do not change the substantial nature of the general authorisations and the individual rights of use and thus cannot generate any competitive advantage over other undertakings.
(56)
Considering the importance of ensuring legal certainty and in order to promote regulatory predictability to provide a safe environment for investments, in particular for new wireless broadband communications, any restriction or withdrawal of any existing rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources or right to install facilities should be subject to predictable and transparent justifications and procedures. Hence, stricter requirements or a notification mechanism could be imposed in particular where rights of use have been assigned pursuant to competitive or comparative procedures and in the case of harmonised radio spectrum bands to be used for wireless broadband electronic communications services (‘wireless broadband services’). Justifications referring to effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and technological evolution could rely on technical implementing measures adopted under Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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. Furthermore, except where proposed amendments are minor, where general authorisations and individual rights of use for radio spectrum need to be restricted, withdrawn or amended without the consent of the holder of the right, this can take place after consulting interested parties. As restrictions or withdrawals of general authorisations or rights may have significant consequences for their holders, the competent authorities should take particular care and assess in advance the potential harm that such measures may cause before adopting such measures.
(57)
National regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC need to gather information from market players in order to carry out their tasks effectively, including assessing the compliance of general terms and conditions with this Directive without suspending the applicability of those terms and conditions during the assessment. It may, by way of exception, also be necessary to gather information from other undertakings active in sectors that are closely related to the electronic communications services sector, such as content providers, that hold information which could be necessary for them to exercise their tasks under Union law. It might also be necessary to gather such information on behalf of the Commission, to allow it to fulfil its respective obligations under Union law. Requests for information should be proportionate and not impose an undue burden on undertakings. Information gathered by national regulatory and other competent authorities should be publicly available, except in so far as it is confidential in accordance with national rules on public access to information and subject to Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality.
(58)
In order to ensure that national regulatory authorities carry out their regulatory tasks in an effective manner, the data which they gather should include accounting data on the retail markets that are associated with wholesale markets where an undertaking is designated as having significant market power and as such are regulated by the national regulatory authority. The data should also include data which enable the national regulatory authority to assess compliance with conditions attached to rights of use, the possible impact of planned upgrades or changes to network topology on the development of competition or on wholesale products made available to other parties. Information regarding compliance with coverage obligations attached to rights of use for radio spectrum is key to ensure completeness of the geographical surveys of network deployments. In that respect, the competent authority should be able to require that information is provided at disaggregated local level with a granularity adequate to conduct a geographical survey of networks.
(59)
To alleviate the burden of reporting and information obligations for network and service providers and the competent authority concerned, such obligations should be proportionate, objectively justified and limited to what is strictly necessary. In particular, duplication of requests for information by the competent authority and by BEREC, and the systematic and regular proof of compliance with all conditions under a general authorisation or a right of use, should be avoided. Undertakings should be aware of the intended use of the information sought. Provision of information should not be a condition for market access. For statistical purposes, a notification may be required from providers of electronic communications networks or services when they cease activities.
(60)
Member States’ obligations to provide information for the defence of Union interests under international agreements as well as reporting obligations under law that is not specific to the electronic communications sector such as competition law should not be affected.
(61)
It should be possible to exchange information that is considered to be confidential by a competent authority, in accordance with Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality and on the protection of personal data, with the Commission, BEREC and any other authorities where such exchange is necessary for the application of national law transposing this Directive. The information exchanged should be limited to that which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose of such an exchange.
(62)
Electronic communications broadband networks are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of technology, topology, medium used and ownership. Therefore, regulatory intervention must rely on detailed information regarding network roll-out in order to be effective and to target the areas where it is needed. That information is essential for the purpose of promoting investment, increasing connectivity across the Union and providing information to all relevant authorities and citizens. It should include surveys regarding both deployment of very high capacity networks, as well as significant upgrades or extensions of existing copper or other networks which might not match the performance characteristics of very high capacity networks in all respects, such as roll-out of fibre to the cabinet coupled with active technologies like vectoring. The relevant forecasts should concern periods of up to three years. The level of detail and territorial granularity of the information that competent authorities should gather should be guided by the specific regulatory objective, and should be adequate for the regulatory purposes that it serves. Therefore, the size of the territorial unit will also vary between Member States, depending on the regulatory needs in the specific national circumstances, and on the availability of local data. Level 3 in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is unlikely to be a sufficiently small territorial unit in most circumstances. National regulatory and other competent authorities should be guided by BEREC guidelines on best practice to approach such a task, and such guidelines will be able to rely on the existing experience of national regulatory and/or other competent authorities in conducting geographical surveys of networks roll-out. Without prejudice to commercial confidentiality requirements, competent authorities should, where the information is not already available on the market, make data directly accessible in an open format in accordance with Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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 and without restrictions on reuse the information gathered in such surveys and should make available tools to end-users as regards quality of service to contribute towards the improvement of their awareness of the available connectivity services. In gathering any of that information, all authorities concerned should respect the principle of confidentiality, and should avoid causing a competitive disadvantage to any undertaking.
(63)
Bridging the digital divide in the Union is essential to enable all citizens of the Union to have access to the internet and digital services. To that end, in the case of specific and well-defined areas, the relevant authorities should have the possibility to invite undertakings and public authorities to declare their intention to deploy very high capacity networks in these areas, allowing them sufficient time to provide a thoroughly considered response. The information included in the forecasts should reflect the economic prospects of the electronic communications networks sector and investment intentions of undertakings at the time when the data are gathered, in order to allow the identification of available connectivity in different areas. Where an undertaking or public authority declares an intention to deploy in an area, the national regulatory or other competent authority should be able to require other undertakings and public authorities to declare whether or not they intend to deploy very high capacity networks, or significantly upgrade or extend their network to a performance of at least 100 Mbps download speeds in this area. That procedure will create transparency for undertakings and public authorities that have expressed their interest in deploying in this area, so that, when designing their business plans, they can assess the likely competition that they will face from other networks. The positive effect of such transparency relies on market participants responding truthfully and in good faith.
(64)
While market participants can change their deployment plans for unforeseen, objective and justifiable reasons, competent authorities should intervene, including if public funding is affected, and, where appropriate, impose penalties if they have been provided, knowingly or due to gross negligence, by an undertaking or public authority with misleading erroneous or incomplete information. For the purpose of the relevant provisions on penalties, gross negligence should refer to a situation where an undertaking or a public authority provides misleading, erroneous or incomplete information due to its behaviour or internal organisation which falls significantly below due diligence regarding the information provided. Gross negligence should not require that the undertaking or public authority knows that the information provided is misleading, erroneous or incomplete, but, rather, that it would have known, had it acted or been organised with due diligence. It is important that the penalties are sufficiently dissuasive in light of the negative impact on competition and on publicly funded projects. The provisions on penalties should be without prejudice to any rights to claim compensation for damages in accordance with national law.
(65)
In the interests of predictable investment conditions, competent authorities should be able to share information with undertakings and public authorities expressing interest in deploying very high capacity networks on whether other types of network upgrades, including those below 100 Mbps download speed, are present or foreseen in the area in question.
(66)
It is important that national regulatory and other competent authorities consult all interested parties on proposed decisions, give them sufficient time to the complexity of the matter to provide their comments, and take account of their comments before adopting a final decision. In order to ensure that decisions at national level do not have an adverse effect on the functioning of the internal market or other TFEU objectives, national regulatory authorities should also notify certain draft decisions to the Commission and other national regulatory authorities to give them the opportunity to comment. It is appropriate for competent authorities to consult interested parties in the cases defined in this Directive on all draft measures which have an effect on trade between Member States.
(67)
In the context of a competitive environment, the views of interested parties, including users and consumers, should be taken into account. In order to appropriately address the interests of citizens, Member States should put in place an appropriate consultation mechanism. Such a mechanism could take the form of a body which would, independently of the national regulatory authority and service providers, carry out research into consumer-related issues, such as consumer behaviour and mechanisms for changing suppliers, and which would operate in a transparent manner and contribute to the existing mechanisms for stakeholder consultation. Furthermore, a mechanism could be established for the purpose of enabling appropriate cooperation on issues relating to the promotion of lawful content. Any cooperation procedures agreed pursuant to such a mechanism should, however, not allow for the systematic surveillance of internet use.
(68)
Out-of-court dispute resolution procedures may constitute a fast and cost-efficient way for end-users to enforce their rights, in particular for consumers and microenterprises and small enterprises as defined in the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC 
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. Member States should enable the national regulatory authority or another competent authority responsible for, or at least one independent body with proven expertise in dealing with, end-user rights to act as an alternative dispute resolution entity. With respect to such dispute resolutions, those authorities should not be subject to any instructions. As many Member States have established dispute resolution procedures also for end-users other than consumers, to whom Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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 does not apply, it is reasonable to maintain the sector-specific dispute resolution procedure for both consumers and, where Member States extend it, also for other end-users, in particular microenterprises and small enterprises. In relation to out-of-court dispute resolution, Member States should be able to maintain or introduce rules that go beyond those laid down by Directive 2013/11/EU in order to ensure a higher level of consumer protection.
(69)
In the event of a dispute between undertakings in the same Member State in an area covered by this Directive, for example relating to obligations for access and interconnection or to the means of transferring end-user lists, an aggrieved party that has negotiated in good faith but failed to reach agreement should be able to call on the national regulatory authority to resolve the dispute. National regulatory authorities should be able to impose a solution on the parties. The intervention of a national regulatory authority in the resolution of a dispute between providers of electronic communications networks or services or associated facilities in a Member State should seek to ensure compliance with the obligations arising under this Directive.
(70)
In addition to the rights of recourse granted under Union or national law, there is a need for a simple procedure to be initiated at the request of either party in a dispute, to resolve cross-border disputes between undertakings providing, or authorised to provide, electronic communications networks or services in different Member States.
(71)
One important task assigned to BEREC is to adopt, where appropriate, opinions in relation to cross-border disputes. National regulatory authorities should therefore fully reflect any opinion submitted by BEREC in their measures imposing any obligation on an undertaking or otherwise resolving the dispute in such cases.
(72)
Lack of coordination between Member States when organising the use of radio spectrum in their territory can, if not solved through bilateral Member States negotiations, create large-scale interference issues severely impacting on the development of the Digital Single Market. Member States should take all necessary measures to avoid cross-border and harmful interference between them. The Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) established by Commission Decision 2002/622/EC 
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 should be tasked with supporting the necessary cross-border coordination and be the designated forum for resolving disputes between Member States on cross border issues. Building on the RSPG’s proposed solution, an implementing measure is required in some circumstances to resolve cross-border interference definitively or to enforce under Union law a coordinated solution agreed by two or several Member States in bilateral negotiations. Lack of coordination between Member States and countries neighbouring the Union can also create large-scale interference issues. Member States should take appropriate measures to avoid cross-border and harmful interference with countries neighbouring the Union, and cooperate with each other to that end. Upon the request of Member States affected by cross-border interference from third countries, the Union should provide its full support for those Member States.
(73)
The RSPG is a Commission high-level advisory group which was created by Decision 2002/622/EC to contribute to the development of the internal market and to support the development of a Union-level radio spectrum policy, taking into account economic, political, cultural, strategic, health and social considerations, as well as technical parameters. It should be composed of the heads of the bodies that have overall political responsibility for strategic radio spectrum policy. It should assist and advise the Commission with respect to radio spectrum policy. This should further increase the visibility of radio spectrum policy in the various Union policy areas and help to ensure cross-sectorial consistency at Union and national and level. It should also provide advice to the European Parliament and to the Council upon their request. Moreover, the RSPG should also be the forum for the coordination of implementation by Member States of their obligations related to radio spectrum under this Directive and should play a central role in fields essential for the internal market such as cross-border coordination or standardisation. Technical or expert working groups could also be created to assist plenary meetings, at which strategic policy is framed through senior-level representatives of the Member States and the Commission. The Commission has indicated its intention to amend Decision 2002/622/EC within six months of the entry into force of this Directive, in order to reflect the new tasks conferred on the RSPG by this Directive.
(74)
Competent authorities should monitor and secure compliance with the terms and conditions of the general authorisation and rights of use, and in particular to ensure effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and compliance with coverage and quality of service obligations, through administrative penalties including financial penalties and injunctions and withdrawals of rights of use in the event of breaches of those terms and conditions. Undertakings should provide the most accurate and complete information possible to competent authorities to allow them to fulfil their surveillance tasks.
(75)
The conditions attached to general authorisations and individual rights of use should be limited to those strictly necessary to ensure compliance with requirements and obligations under national law and Union law.
(76)
Any party subject to a decision of a competent authority should have the right to appeal to a body that is independent of the parties involved and of any external intervention or political pressure which could jeopardise its independent assessment of matters coming before it. That body can be a court. Furthermore, any undertaking which considers that its applications for the granting of rights to install facilities have not been dealt with in accordance with the principles set out in this Directive should be entitled to appeal against such decisions. That appeal procedure should be without prejudice to the division of competences within national judicial systems and to the rights of legal entities or natural persons under national law. In any case, Member States should grant effective judicial review against such decisions.
(77)
In order to ensure legal certainty for market players, appeal bodies should carry out their functions effectively. In particular, appeal proceedings should not be unduly lengthy. Interim measures suspending the effect of the decision of a competent authority should be granted only in urgent cases in order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the party applying for those measures and if the balance of interests so requires.
(78)
There has been a wide divergence in the manner in which appeal bodies have applied interim measures to suspend the decisions of the national regulatory or other competent authorities. In order to achieve greater consistency of approach common standards should be applied in line with the case law of the Court of Justice. Appeal bodies should also be entitled to request available information published by BEREC. Given the importance of appeals for the overall operation of the regulatory framework, a mechanism should be set up, in all the Member States, for collecting information on appeals and decisions to suspend decisions taken by the competent authorities and for the reporting of that information to the Commission and to BEREC. That mechanism should ensure that the Commission or BEREC can retrieve from Member States the text of the decisions and judgments with a view to developing a database.
(79)
Transparency in the application of the Union mechanism for consolidating the internal market for electronic communications should be increased in the interest of citizens and stakeholders and to enable parties concerned to make their views known, including by way of requiring national regulatory authorities to publish any draft measure at the same time as it is communicated to the Commission, to BEREC, and to the national regulatory authorities in other Member States. Any such draft measure should be reasoned and should contain a detailed analysis.
(80)
The Commission should be able, after taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, to require a national regulatory authority to withdraw a draft measure where it concerns the definition of relevant markets or the designation of undertakings as having significant market power, and where such decisions would create a barrier to the internal market or would be incompatible with Union law and in particular the policy objectives that national regulatory authorities should follow. This procedure is without prejudice to the notification procedure provided for in Directive (EU) 2015/1535 and the Commission’s prerogatives under TFEU in respect of infringements of Union law.
(81)
The national consultation of interested parties should be conducted prior to the consultation at Union level for the purposes of consolidating the internal market for electronic communications and within the procedure for the consistent application of remedies, in order to allow the views of interested parties to be reflected in the consultation at Union level. This would also avoid the need for a second consultation at Union level in the event of changes to a planned measure as a result of the national consultation.
(82)
It is important that the regulatory framework is implemented in a timely manner. When the Commission has taken a decision requiring a national regulatory authority to withdraw a planned measure, national regulatory authorities should withdraw its draft measure or submit a revised measure to the Commission. A deadline should be laid down for the notification of the revised measure to the Commission in order to inform market players of the duration of the market review and in order to increase legal certainty.
(83)
The Union mechanism allowing the Commission to require national regulatory authorities to withdraw planned measures concerning market definition and the designation of undertakings as having significant market power has contributed significantly to a consistent approach in identifying the circumstances in which ex ante regulation may be applied and those in which the undertakings are subject to such regulation. The experience of the procedures under Articles 7 and 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC has shown that inconsistencies in the national regulatory authorities’ application of remedies under similar market conditions undermine the internal market in electronic communications. Therefore, the Commission and BEREC should participate in ensuring, within their respective responsibilities, a higher level of consistency in the application of remedies concerning draft measures proposed by national regulatory authorities. In addition, for draft measures relating to the extension of obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point, where needed to address high and non-transitory economic or physical barriers to replication, on undertakings irrespective of a designation as having significant market power, or to the regulatory treatment of new very high-capacity network elements where BEREC shares the Commission’s concerns, the Commission should be able to require a national regulatory authority to withdraw a draft measure. In order to benefit from the expertise of national regulatory authorities on the market analysis, the Commission should consult BEREC prior to adoption of its decisions or recommendations.
(84)
Having regard to the short time-limits in the consultation mechanism at Union level, powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt recommendations or guidelines to simplify the procedures for exchanging information between the Commission and national regulatory authorities, for example in cases concerning stable markets, or involving only minor changes to previously notified measures. Powers should also be conferred on the Commission in order to allow for the introduction of a notification exemption in order to streamline procedures in certain cases.
(85)
National regulatory authorities should be required to cooperate with each other, with BEREC and with the Commission, in a transparent manner, to ensure the consistent application, in all Member States, of this Directive.
(86)
The discretion of national regulatory authorities needs to be reconciled with the development of consistent regulatory practices and the consistent application of the regulatory framework in order to contribute effectively to the development and completion of the internal market. National regulatory authorities should therefore support the internal market activities of the Commission and of BEREC.
(87)
Measures that could affect trade between Member States are measures that could have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in a manner which might create a barrier to the internal market. They comprise measures that have a significant impact on undertakings or users in other Member States, which include: measures which affect prices for users in other Member States; measures which affect the ability of an undertaking established in another Member State to provide an electronic communications service, and in particular measures which affect the ability to offer services on a transnational basis; and measures which affect market structure or access, leading to repercussions for undertakings in other Member States.
(88)
A more convergent use and definition of elements of selection procedures and the conditions attached to the rights of use for radio spectrum which have a significant impact on market conditions and the competitive situation, including conditions for entry and expansion, would be enhanced by a coordination mechanism whereby the RSPG, at the request of the national regulatory or other competent authority or, exceptionally, on its own initiative, convenes a Peer Review Forum to examine draft measures in advance of the granting of rights of use by a given Member State with a view to exchanging best practices. The Peer Review Forum is an instrument of peer learning. It should contribute to a better exchange of best practices between Member States and increase the transparency of the competitive or comparative selection procedures. The Peer Review Process should not be a formal condition of national authorisation procedures. The exchange of views should be based on information provided by the national regulatory or other competent authority that requests the Peer Review Forum and should be a subset of a wider national measure, which may more broadly consist of the granting, trade and lease, duration, renewal or the amendment of rights of use. Therefore, the national regulatory or other competent authority should also be able to provide information on other draft national measures or aspects thereof related to the relevant selection procedure for limiting rights of use for radio spectrum which are not covered by the peer review mechanism. To reduce administrative burden, the national regulatory or other competent authority should be able to submit such information by way of a common reporting format, where available, for transmission to the RSPG members.
(89)
Where the harmonised assignment of radio spectrum to particular undertakings has been agreed at Union level, Member States should strictly implement such agreements in the granting of rights of use for radio spectrum from the National Frequency Allocation Plan.
(90)
Member States should be able to consider joint authorisation processes as an option when issuing rights of use where the expected usage covers cross-border situations.
(91)
Any Commission decision to ensure the harmonised application of this Directive should be limited to regulatory principles, approaches and methodologies. For the avoidance of doubt, it should not prescribe any detail normally required to reflect national circumstances, and it should not prohibit alternative approaches which can reasonably be expected to have equivalent effect. Such a decision should be proportionate and should not have an effect on decisions taken by national regulatory or other competent authorities that do not create a barrier to the internal market.
(92)
The Union and the Member States have entered into commitments in relation to standards and the regulatory framework of telecommunications networks and services in the World Trade Organization.
(93)
Standardisation should remain primarily a market-driven process. However there may still be situations where it is appropriate to require compliance with specified standards at Union level in order to improve interoperability, freedom of choice for users and encourage interconnectivity in the internal market. At national level, Member States are subject to Directive (EU) 2015/1535. Standardisation procedures under this Directive are without prejudice to Directives 2014/30/EU 
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 and 2014/35/EU 
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 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Directive 2014/53/EU.
(94)
Providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, or of both, should be required to take measures to safeguard the security of their networks and services, respectively, and to prevent or minimise the impact of security incidents. Having regard to the state of the art, those measures should ensure a level of security of networks and services appropriate to the risks posed. Security measures should take into account, as a minimum, all the relevant aspects of the following elements: as regards security of networks and facilities: physical and environmental security, security of supply, access control to networks and integrity of networks; as regards handling of security incidents: handling procedures, security incident detection capability, security incident reporting and communication; as regards business continuity management: service continuity strategy and contingency plans, disaster recovery capabilities; as regards monitoring, auditing and testing: monitoring and logging policies, exercise contingency plans, network and service testing, security assessments and compliance monitoring; and compliance with international standards.
(95)
Given the growing importance of number-independent interpersonal communications services, it is necessary to ensure that they are also subject to appropriate security requirements in accordance with their specific nature and economic importance. Providers of such services should thus also ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk posed. Given that providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services normally do not exercise actual control over the transmission of signals over networks, the degree of risk for such services can be considered in some respects to be lower than for traditional electronic communications services. Therefore, where justified on the basis of the actual assessment of the security risks involved, the measures taken by providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services should be lighter. The same approach should apply mutatis mutandis to interpersonal communications services which make use of numbers and which do not exercise actual control over signal transmission.
(96)
Providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services should inform users of particular and significant security threats and of measures they can take to protect the security of their communications, for instance by using specific types of software or encryption technologies. The requirement to inform users of such threats should not discharge a service provider from the obligation to take, at its own expense, appropriate and immediate measures to remedy any security threats and restore the normal security level of the service. The provision of such information about security threats to the user should be free of charge.
(97)
In order to safeguard security of networks and services, and without prejudice to the Member States’ powers to ensure the protection of their essential security interests and public security, and to permit the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, the use of encryption for example, end-to-end where appropriate, should be promoted and, where necessary, encryption should be mandatory in accordance with the principles of security and privacy by default and by design.
(98)
Competent authorities should ensure that the integrity and availability of public electronic communications networks are maintained. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (‘ENISA’) should contribute to an enhanced level of security of electronic communications by, inter alia, providing expertise and advice, and promoting the exchange of best practices. The competent authorities should have the necessary means to perform their duties, including powers to request the information necessary to assess the level of security of networks or services. They should also have the power to request comprehensive and reliable data about actual security incidents that have had a significant impact on the operation of networks or services. They should, where necessary, be assisted by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (‘CSIRTs’) established by Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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. In particular, CSIRTs may be required to provide competent authorities with information about risks and security incidents affecting public electronic communications networks and publicly available electronic communications services, and recommend ways to address them.
(99)
Where the provision of electronic communications relies on public resources the use of which is subject to specific authorisation, Member States should be able to grant the authority competent for issuance thereof the right to impose fees to ensure optimal use of those resources, in accordance with the procedures envisaged in this Directive. In line with the case-law of the Court of Justice, Member States cannot levy any charges or fees in relation to the provision of networks and electronic communications services other than those provided for by this Directive. In that regard, Member States should have a consistent approach in establishing those charges or fees in order not to provide an undue financial burden linked to the general authorisation procedure or rights of use for providers of electronic communications networks and services.
(100)
To ensure optimal use of resources, fees should reflect the economic and technical situation of the market concerned as well as any other significant factor determining their value. At the same time, fees should be set in a manner that ensures efficient assignment and use of radio spectrum. This Directive is without prejudice to the purpose for which fees for rights of use and rights to install facilities are employed. It should be possible, for example, to use such fees to finance activities of national regulatory and other competent authorities that cannot be covered by administrative charges. Where, in the case of competitive or comparative selection procedures, fees for rights of use for radio spectrum consist entirely or partly of a one-off amount, payment arrangements should ensure that such fees do not in practice lead to selection on the basis of criteria unrelated to the objective of ensuring optimal use of radio spectrum. The Commission should be able to publish, on a regular basis, benchmark studies and, as appropriate, other guidance with regard to best practices for the assignment of radio spectrum, the assignment of numbering resources or the granting of rights of way.
(101)
Fees imposed on undertakings for rights of use for radio spectrum can influence decisions about whether to seek such rights and put into use radio spectrum resources. With a view to ensuring optimal use of radio spectrum, Member States should therefore set reserve prices in a way that leads to the efficient assignment of those rights, irrespective of the type of selection procedure used. Member States could also take into account possible costs associated with the fulfilment of authorisation conditions imposed to further policy objectives. In doing so, regard should also be had to the competitive situation of the market concerned including the possible alternative uses of the resources.
(102)
Optimal use of radio spectrum resources depends on the availability of appropriate networks and associated facilities. In that regard, Member States should aim to ensure that, where national regulatory or other competent authorities apply fees for rights of use for radio spectrum and for rights to install facilities, they take into consideration the need to facilitate continuous infrastructure development with a view to achieving the most efficient use of the resources. Member States should seek to ensure the application, to the best extent possible, of arrangements for the payment of the fees for rights of use for radio spectrum linked with the actual availability of the resource in a manner that supports the investments necessary to promote such infrastructure development and the provision of related services. The payment arrangements should be specified in an objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory manner before opening procedures for the granting of rights of use for radio spectrum.
(103)
It should be ensured that procedures exist for the granting of rights to install facilities that are timely, non-discriminatory and transparent, in order to guarantee the conditions for fair and effective competition. This Directive is without prejudice to national provisions governing the expropriation or use of property, the normal exercise of property rights, the normal use of the public domain, or to the principle of neutrality with regard to the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.
(104)
Permits issued to providers of electronic communications networks and services allowing them to gain access to public or private property are essential factors for the establishment of electronic communications networks or new network elements. Unnecessary complexity and delay in the procedures for granting rights of way may therefore represent important obstacles to the development of competition. Consequently, the acquisition of rights of way by authorised undertakings should be simplified. Competent authorities should coordinate the acquisition of rights of way, making relevant information accessible on their websites.
(105)
It is necessary to strengthen the powers of the Member States as regards holders of rights of way to ensure the entry or roll-out of a new network in a fair, efficient and environmentally responsible way and independently of any obligation on an undertaking designated as having significant market power to grant access to its electronic communications network. Improving facility sharing can lower the environmental cost of deploying electronic communications infrastructure and serve public health, public security and meet town and country planning objectives. Competent authorities should be empowered to require that the undertakings which have benefitted from rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private property share such facilities or property, including physical co-location, after an appropriate period of public consultation, during which all interested parties should be given the opportunity to state their views, in the specific areas where such general interest reasons impose such sharing. That can be the case for instance where the subsoil is highly congested or where a natural barrier needs to be crossed. Competent authorities should in particular be able to impose the sharing of network elements and associated facilities, such as ducts, conduits, masts, manholes, cabinets, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, buildings or entries into buildings, and a better coordination of civil works on environmental or other public policy grounds. On the contrary, it should be for national regulatory authorities to define rules for apportioning the costs of the facility or property sharing, to ensure that there is an appropriate reward of risk for the undertakings concerned. In light of the obligations imposed by Directive 2014/61/EU, the competent authorities, in particular, local authorities, should also establish appropriate coordination procedures, in cooperation with national regulatory authorities, with respect to public works and other appropriate public facilities or property which should be able to include procedures that ensure that interested parties have information concerning appropriate public facilities or property and ongoing and planned public works, that they are notified in a timely manner of such works, and that sharing is facilitated to the maximum extent possible.
(106)
Where mobile operators are required to share towers or masts for environmental reasons, such mandated sharing could lead to a reduction in the maximum transmitted power levels allowed for each operator for reasons of public health, and this in turn could require operators to install more transmission sites to ensure national coverage. Competent authorities should seek to reconcile the environmental and public health considerations in question, taking due account of the precautionary approach set out in Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC 
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(107)
Radio spectrum is a scarce public resource with an important public and market value. It is an essential input for radio-based electronic communications networks and services and, insofar as it relates to such networks and services, should therefore be efficiently allocated and assigned by national regulatory or other competent authorities in accordance with harmonised objectives and principles governing their action as well as to objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, taking into account the democratic, social, linguistic and cultural interests related to the use of radio spectrum. Decision No 676/2002/EC establishes a framework for harmonisation of radio spectrum.
(108)
Radio spectrum policy activities in the Union should be without prejudice to measures taken, at Union or national level, in accordance with Union law, to pursue general interest objectives, in particular with regard to public governmental and defence networks, content regulation and audiovisual and media policies, and the right of Member States to organise and use their radio spectrum for public order, public security and defence.
(109)
Ensuring widespread connectivity in each Member State is essential for economic and social development, participation in public life and social and territorial cohesion. As connectivity and the use of electronic communications become an integral element to European society and welfare, Member States should strive to ensure Union-wide wireless broadband coverage. Such coverage should be achieved by relying on the imposition by Member States of appropriate coverage requirements, which should be adapted to each area served and limited to proportionate burdens in order not to hinder deployment by service providers. Given the major role systems such as radio local area networks (RLANs) play in providing high-speed wireless broadband indoors, measures should aim to ensure the release of sufficient radio spectrum in bands which are particularly valuable assets for the cost-efficient deployment of wireless networks with universal coverage, in particular indoors. Moreover, consistent and coordinated measures for high-quality terrestrial wireless coverage across the Union, building on best national practices for operators’ licence obligations, should aim to meet the radio spectrum policy programme objective that all citizens of the Union should have access both indoors and outdoors, to the fastest broadband speeds of not less than 30 Mbps by 2020, and should aim to achieve an ambitious vision for a gigabit society in the Union. Such measures will promote innovative digital services and ensure long-term socioeconomic benefits. Seamless coverage of the territory as well as connectivity across Member States should be maximised and reliable, with a view to promoting in-border and cross-border services and applications such as connected cars and e-health.
(110)
The need to ensure that citizens are not exposed to electromagnetic fields at a level harmful to public health is imperative. Member States should pursue consistency across the Union to address this issue, having particular regard to the precautionary approach taken in Recommendation 1999/519/EC, in order to work towards ensuring more consistent deployment conditions. Member States should apply the procedure set out in Directive (EU) 2015/1535, where relevant, with a view also to providing transparency to stakeholders and to allow other Member States and the Commission to react.
(111)
Radio spectrum harmonisation and coordination, and equipment regulation supported by standardisation, are complementary and need to be coordinated closely to meet their joint objectives effectively, with the support of the RSPG. Coordination between the content and timing of mandates to CEPT under Decision No 676/2002/EC and standardisation requests to standardisation bodies, such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, including with regard to radio receivers parameters, should facilitate the introduction of future systems, support radio spectrum sharing opportunities and ensure efficient radio spectrum management.
(112)
The demand for harmonised radio spectrum is not uniform in all parts of the Union. Where there is lack of demand for all or part of a harmonised band at regional or national level, Member States could, by way of exception, allow an alternative use of the band, for example to cover lack of market supply for certain uses, for as long as such lack of demand persists and provided that the alternative use does not prejudice the harmonised use of the band by other Member States and that it ceases when demand for the harmonised use materialises.
(113)
Flexibility in radio spectrum management and access to radio spectrum has been established through technology and service-neutral authorisations to allow radio spectrum users to choose the best technologies and services to apply in radio spectrum bands declared available for electronic communications services in the relevant National Frequency Allocation Plans in accordance with Union law (‘the principle of technology neutrality and the principle of service neutrality’). The administrative determination of technologies and services should apply only when general interest objectives are at stake and should be clearly justified and subject to regular review.
(114)
Restrictions to the principle of technology neutrality should be appropriate and justified by the need to avoid harmful interference, for example by imposing emission masks and power levels, to ensure the protection of public health by limiting public exposure to electromagnetic fields, to ensure the proper functioning of services through an adequate level of technical quality of service, while not necessarily precluding the possibility of using more than one service in the same radio spectrum band, to ensure proper sharing of radio spectrum, in particular where its use is subject only to general authorisations, to safeguard efficient use of radio spectrum, or to fulfil a general interest objective in accordance with Union law.
(115)
Radio spectrum users should also be able to choose freely the services they wish to offer over the radio spectrum. On the other hand, measures should be allowed which require the provision of a specific service to meet clearly defined general interest objectives such as safety of life, the need to promote social, regional and territorial cohesion, or the avoidance of the inefficient use of radio spectrum to be permitted where necessary and proportionate. Those objectives should include the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and media pluralism, as defined by Member States in accordance with Union law. Except where necessary to protect safety of life or, by way of exception, to fulfil other general interest objectives as defined by Member States in accordance with Union law, exceptions should not result in certain services having exclusive use, but should rather grant them priority so that, insofar as possible, other services or technologies could coexist in the same radio spectrum band. It lies within the competence of the Member States to define the scope and nature of any exception regarding the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and media pluralism.
(116)
As the allocation of radio spectrum to specific technologies or services is an exception to the principles of technology and service neutrality and reduces the freedom to choose the service provided or technology used, any proposal for such allocation should be transparent and subject to public consultation.
(117)
Where Member States decide, by way of exception, to limit the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services based on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, Member States should explain the reasons for such a limitation.
(118)
Radio spectrum should be managed in a manner that ensures the avoidance of harmful interference. The basic concept of harmful interference should therefore be properly defined to ensure that regulatory intervention is limited to the extent necessary to prevent such interference, having regard also to the need to take into consideration advanced methods for protection against harmful interference, with the aim of applying those technologies and radio spectrum management methods in order to avoid, to the extent possible, the application of the non-interference and non-protection principle. Transport has a strong cross-border element and its digitalisation brings challenges. Vehicles (such as metro, bus, cars, trucks, trains,) are becoming increasingly autonomous and connected. In the internal market, vehicles travel beyond national borders more easily. Reliable communications, and avoiding harmful interference, are critical for the safe and good operation of vehicles and their on-board communications systems.
(119)
With growing radio spectrum demand and new varying applications and technologies which necessitate more flexible access and use of radio spectrum, Member States should promote the shared use of radio spectrum by determining the most appropriate authorisation regimes for each scenario and by establishing appropriate and transparent rules and conditions therefor. Shared use of radio spectrum increasingly ensures its effective and efficient use by allowing several independent users or devices to access the same radio spectrum band under various types of legal regimes in order to make additional radio spectrum resources available, raise usage efficiency and facilitate radio spectrum access for new users. Shared use can be based on general authorisations or licence-exempt use allowing, under specific sharing conditions, several users to access and use the same radio spectrum in different geographic areas or at different moments in time. It can also be based on individual rights of use under arrangements such as licensed shared access where all users (with an existing user and new users) agree on the terms and conditions for shared access, under the supervision of the competent authorities, in such a way as to ensure a minimum guaranteed radio transmission quality. When allowing shared use under different authorisation regimes, Member States should not set widely diverging durations for such use under different authorisation regimes.
(120)
General authorisations for the use of radio spectrum may facilitate the most effective use of radio spectrum and foster innovation in some cases and are pro-competitive, whereas individual rights of use for radio spectrum in other cases may be the most appropriate authorisation regime in the presence of certain specific circumstances. Individual rights of use should be considered, for example, when favourable propagation characteristics of the radio spectrum or the envisaged power level of the transmission imply that general authorisations cannot address the interference concerns in light of the required quality of service. Technical measures such as solutions to improve receiver resilience might enable the use of general authorisations or radio spectrum sharing, and possibly avoid systematic recourse to the non-interference and non-protection principle.
(121)
In order to ensure predictability and preserve legal certainty and investment stability, Member States should establish, in advance, appropriate criteria to determine compliance with the objective of efficient use of radio spectrum by the holders of the rights when implementing the conditions attached to individual rights of use and general authorisations. Interested parties should be involved in the definition of such conditions and informed, in a transparent manner, about how the fulfilment of their obligations will be assessed.
(122)
In order to avoid the creation of barriers to market entry, namely through anti-competitive hoarding, enforcement of conditions attached to radio spectrum rights by Member States should be effective and all competent authorities should participate where necessary. Enforcement conditions should include the application of a ‘use it or lose it’ clause. In order to ensure legal certainty in respect of the possible exposure to any penalty for failure to use radio spectrum, thresholds of use, including in terms of time, quantity or identity of radio spectrum, should be established in advance. Trading and leasing of radio spectrum should ensure the effective use by the original holder of the right.
(123)
Where harmonised conditions for a radio spectrum band are established under Decision No 676/2002/EC, competent authorities are to decide on the most appropriate authorisation regime to be applied in that band or parts thereof. Where all Member States are likely to face similar problems for which diverging solutions could fragment the internal market in equipment, and thereby delay the rollout of 5G systems, it may be necessary for the Commission, taking utmost account of the opinion of the RSPG, to recommend common solutions, acknowledging technical harmonisation measures in force. This could provide a common toolbox for Member States which they could take into account when identifying appropriate consistent authorisation regimes to be applied to a band, or part of a band, depending on factors such as population density, propagation characteristics of the bands, divergence between urban and rural uses, the possible need to protect existing services and the resulting implications for economies of scale in manufacturing.
(124)
Network infrastructure sharing, and in some instances radio spectrum sharing, can allow for a more effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and ensure the rapid deployment of networks, especially in less densely populated areas. When establishing the conditions to be attached to rights of use for radio spectrum, competent authorities should also consider authorising forms of sharing or coordination between undertakings with a view to ensuring effective and efficient use of radio spectrum or compliance with coverage obligations, in accordance with competition law principles.
(125)
The requirement to respect the principles of technology and service neutrality in granting rights of use, together with the possibility to transfer rights between undertakings, underpin the freedom and means to deliver electronic communications services to the public, thereby also facilitating the achievement of general interest objectives. This Directive is without prejudice whether radio spectrum is assigned directly to providers of electronic communications networks or services or to entities that use those networks or services. Such entities may be radio or television broadcast content providers. The responsibility for compliance with the conditions attached to the right of use for radio spectrum and the relevant conditions attached to the general authorisation should in any case lie with the undertaking to which the right of use for radio spectrum has been granted. Certain obligations imposed on broadcasters for the delivery of audiovisual media services may require the use of specific criteria and procedures for the granting of radio spectrum usage rights to meet a specific general interest objective set out by Member States in accordance with Union law. However, the procedure for the granting of such right should in any event be objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate.
(126)
The case-law of the Court of Justice requires that any national restrictions to the rights guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU should be objectively justified and proportionate and should not exceed those necessary to achieve their objectives. Moreover, radio spectrum granted without following an open procedure should not be used for purposes other than the general interest objective for which they were granted. In such a case, the interested parties should be given the opportunity to comment within a reasonable period. As part of the application procedure for granting rights, Member States should verify whether the applicant is able to comply with the conditions to be attached to such rights. Those conditions should be reflected in eligibility criteria set out in objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory terms prior to the launch of any competitive selection procedure. For the purpose of applying such criteria, the applicant may be requested to submit the necessary information to prove his ability to comply with those conditions. Where such information is not provided, the application for the right of use for radio spectrum may be rejected.
(127)
Member States should, prior to the granting of the right, impose only the verification of elements that can reasonably be demonstrated by an applicant exercising ordinary care, taking due account of the important public and market value of radio spectrum as a scarce public resource. This is without prejudice to the possibility for subsequent verification of the fulfilment of eligibility criteria, for example through milestones, where criteria could not reasonably be met initially. To preserve effective and efficient use of radio spectrum, Member States should not grant rights where their review indicates applicants' inability to comply with the conditions, without prejudice to the possibility of facilitating time-limited experimental use. Sufficiently long duration of authorisations for the use of radio spectrum should increase investment predictability to contribute to faster network roll-out and better services, as well as stability to support radio spectrum trading and leasing. Unless use of radio spectrum is authorised for an unlimited period, such a duration should both take account of the objectives pursued and be sufficient to facilitate recoupment of the investments made. While a longer duration can ensure investment predictability, measures to ensure effective and efficient use of radio spectrum, such as the power of the competent authority to amend or withdraw the right in the case of non-compliance with the conditions attached to the rights of use, or the facilitation of radio spectrum tradability and leasing, will serve to prevent inappropriate accumulation of radio spectrum and support greater flexibility in distributing radio spectrum resources. Greater recourse to annualised fees is also a means to ensure a continuous assessment of the use of the radio spectrum by the holder of the right.
(128)
Considering the importance of technical innovation, Member States should be able to provide for rights to use radio spectrum for experimental purposes, subject to specific restrictions and conditions strictly justified by the experimental nature of such rights.
(129)
In deciding whether to renew already granted rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum, competent authorities should take into account the extent to which renewal would further the objectives of the regulatory framework and other objectives under Union and national law. Any such decision should be subject to an open, non-discriminatory and transparent procedure and based on a review of how the conditions attached to the rights concerned have been fulfilled. When assessing the need to renew rights of use, Member States should weigh the competitive impact of renewing assigned rights against the promotion of more efficient exploitation or of innovative new uses that might result if the band were opened to new users. Competent authorities should be able to make their determination in this regard by allowing for only a limited duration for renewal in order to prevent severe disruption of established use. While decisions on whether to renew rights assigned prior to the applicability of this Directive should respect any rules already applicable, Member States should also ensure that they do not prejudice the objectives of this Directive.
(130)
When renewing existing rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum, Member States should, together with the assessment of the need to renew the right, review the fees attached thereto with a view to ensuring that those fees continue to promote optimal use, taking account, inter alia, of market developments and technological evolution. For reasons of legal certainty, it is appropriate for any adjustments to the existing fees to be based on the same principles as those applicable to the award of new rights of use.
(131)
Effective management of radio spectrum can be ensured by facilitating the continued efficient use of radio spectrum that has already been assigned. In order to ensure legal certainty to holders of the rights, the possibility of renewal of rights of use should be considered within an appropriate time-span prior to the expiry of the rights concerned, for example, where rights have been assigned for 15 years or more, at least two years before expiry of those rights, unless the possibility of renewal was explicitly excluded at the time of assignment of the rights. In the interest of continuous resource management, competent authorities should be able to undertake such consideration at their own initiative as well as in response to a request from the assignee. The renewal of the right to use should not be granted contrary to the will of the assignee.
(132)
Transfer of rights of use for radio spectrum can be an effective means of increasing the efficient use of spectrum. For the sake of flexibility and efficiency, and to allow valuation of radio spectrum by the market, Member States should by default allow radio spectrum users to transfer or lease their rights of use for radio spectrum to third parties following a simple procedure and subject to the conditions attached to such rights and to competition rules, under the supervision of the national regulatory authorities responsible. In order to facilitate such transfers or leases, provided that technical implementing measures adopted under Decision No 676/2002/EC are respected, Member States should also consider requests to have radio spectrum rights partitioned or disaggregated and conditions for use reviewed.
(133)
Measures taken specifically to promote competition when granting or renewing rights of use for radio spectrum should be decided by national regulatory and other competent authorities, which have the necessary economic, technical and market knowledge. Radio spectrum assignment conditions can influence the competitive situation in electronic communications markets and conditions for entry. Limited access to radio spectrum, in particular when radio spectrum is scarce, can create a barrier to entry or hamper investment, network roll-out, the provision of new services or applications, innovation and competition. New rights of use, including those acquired through transfer or leasing, and the introduction of new flexible criteria for radio spectrum use can also influence existing competition. Where unduly applied, certain conditions used to promote competition, can have other effects; for example, radio spectrum caps and reservations can create artificial scarcity, wholesale access obligations can unduly constrain business models in the absence of market power, and limits on transfers can impede the development of secondary markets. Therefore, a consistent and objective competition test for the imposition of such conditions is necessary and should be applied consistently. The use of such measures should therefore be based on a thorough and objective assessment, by national regulatory and other competent authorities, of the market and the competitive conditions thereof. National competent authorities should, however, always ensure the effective and efficient use of radio spectrum and avoid distortion of competition through anti-competitive hoarding.
(134)
Building on opinions from the RSPG, the adoption of a common deadline for allowing the use of a radio spectrum band which has been harmonised under Decision No 676/2002/EC can be necessary to avoid cross-border interference and beneficial to ensure release of the full benefits of the related technical harmonisation measures for equipment markets and for the deployment of very high capacity networks and services. Allowing the use of a radio spectrum band entails assigning radio spectrum under a general authorisation regime or individual rights of use in order to permit the use of radio spectrum as soon as the assignment process is completed. In order to assign radio spectrum bands, it might be necessary to release a band occupied by other users and to compensate them. Implementation of a common deadline for allowing the use of harmonised bands for electronic communications services, including for 5G, might however be affected in a particular Member State by problems relating to unresolved cross-border coordination issues between Member States or with third countries, to the complexity of ensuring the technical migration of existing users of a band; a restriction to the use of the band based on a general interest objective, to the safeguarding of national security and defence or to force majeure. In any case, Member States should take all measures to reduce any delay to the minimum in terms of geographical coverage, timing and radio spectrum range. Moreover, Member States should be able, where appropriate in light of their assessment of the relevant circumstances, to request the Union to provide legal, political and technical support to resolve radio spectrum coordination issues with countries neighbouring the Union, including candidate and acceding countries, in such a way that the Member States concerned can observe their obligations under Union law.
(135)
In order to ensure increased coordinated availabilities of radio spectrum by 2020 to achieve very high speed fixed and wireless networks in the context of 5G, the 3,4-3,8 GHz and the 24,25-27,5 GHz bands have been identified by the RSPG as priority bands suitable to fulfil the objectives of the 5G Action Plan by 2020. The 40,5-43,5 GHz and 66-71 GHz bands have also been identified for further study. It is therefore necessary to ensure that, by 31 December 2020, the 3,4-3,8 GHz and the 24,25-27,5 GHz bands or parts thereof are available for terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband services under harmonised conditions established by technical implementing measures adopted in accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC, complementing Decision (EU) 2017/899 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, as those bands have specific qualities, in terms of coverage and data capacity, which allow them to be combined appropriately to meet 5G requirements. Member States could, however, be affected by interference likely to arise from third countries which, in accordance with the ITU Radio Regulations, have identified those bands for services other than international mobile telecommunications. This might have an effect on the obligation to meet a common implementation date. Future use of the 26 GHz band for 5G terrestrial wireless services is likely, inter alia, to target urban areas and sub-urban hotspot areas, while some deployment can be foreseen along major roads and railway tracks in rural areas. This provides the opportunity to use the 26 GHz band for services other than 5G wireless outside those geographic areas, for example, for business specific communications or indoor use, and therefore allows Member States to designate and make that band available on a non-exclusive basis.
(136)
Where demand for a radio spectrum band exceeds the availability and, as a result, a Member State concludes that the rights of use for radio spectrum is to be limited, appropriate and transparent procedures should apply for the granting of such rights to avoid any discrimination and optimise the use of the scarce resource. Such limitation should be justified, proportionate and based on a thorough assessment of market conditions, giving due weight to the overall benefits for users and to national and internal market objectives. The objectives governing any limitation procedure should be clearly established in advance. When considering the most appropriate selection procedure, and in accordance with coordination measures taken at Union level, Member States should, in a timely and transparent manner, consult all interested parties on the justification, objectives and conditions of the procedure. Member States should be able to use, inter alia, competitive or comparative selection procedures for the assignment of radio spectrum or of numbering resources with exceptional economic value. In administering such schemes, competent authorities should take into account the objectives of this Directive. If a Member State finds that further rights can be made available in a band, it should start the process therefor.
(137)
Massive growth in radio spectrum demand, and in end-user demand for wireless broadband capacity, calls for solutions allowing alternative, complementary, spectrally efficient access solutions, including low-power wireless access systems with a small-area operating range, such as RLANs and networks of low-power small-size cellular access points. Such complementary wireless access systems, in particular publicly accessible RLAN access points, increase access to the internet for end-users and mobile traffic off-loading for mobile operators. RLANs use harmonised radio spectrum without requiring an individual authorisation or a right of use for radio spectrum. To date, most RLAN access points are used by private users as local wireless extension of their fixed broadband connection. End-users, within the limits of their own internet subscription, should not be prevented from sharing access to their RLAN with others, in order to increase the number of available access points, in particular, in densely populated areas, maximise wireless data capacity through radio spectrum re-use and create a cost-effective complementary wireless broadband infrastructure accessible to other end-users. Therefore, unnecessary restrictions to the deployment and interlinkage of RLAN access points should also be removed.
(138)
Public authorities or public service providers that use RLANs in their premises for their personnel, visitors or clients, for example to facilitate access to e-Government services or for information on public transport or road traffic management, could also provide access to such access points for general use by citizens as an ancillary service to services they offer to the public on such premises, to the extent allowed by competition and public procurement rules. Moreover, the provider of such local access to electronic communications networks within or around a private property or a limited public area on a non-commercial basis or as an ancillary service to another activity that is not dependent on such access, such as RLAN hotspots made available to customers of other commercial activities or to the general public in that area, can be subject to compliance with general authorisations for rights of use for radio spectrum but should not be subject to any conditions or requirements attached to general authorisations applicable to providers of public electronic communications networks or services or to obligations regarding end-users or interconnection. However, such a provider should remain subject to the liability rules set out in Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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. Further technologies, such as LiFi, are emerging and will complement current radio spectrum capabilities of RLANs and wireless access point to include optical visible light-based access points and lead to hybrid local area networks allowing optical wireless communication.
(139)
Since low power small-area wireless access points, such as femtocells, picocells, metrocells or microcells, can be very small and make use of unobtrusive equipment similar to that of domestic RLAN routers, which do not require any permits beyond those necessary for the use of radio spectrum, and considering the positive impact of such access points on the use of radio spectrum and on the development of wireless communications, any restriction to their deployment should be limited to the greatest extent possible. As a result, in order to facilitate the deployment of small-area wireless access points, and without prejudice to any applicable requirement related to radio spectrum management, Member States should not subject to any individual permits the deployment of such devices on buildings which are not officially protected as part of a designated environment or because of their special architectural or historical merit, except for reasons of public safety. To that end, their characteristics, such as maximum size, weight and emission characteristics, should be specified at Union level in a proportionate way for local deployment and to ensure a high level of protection of public health, as laid down in Recommendation 1999/519/EC. For the operation of small-area wireless access points, Article 7 of Directive 2014/53/EU should apply. This is without prejudice to private property rights set out in Union or national law. The procedure for considering permit applications should be streamlined and without prejudice to any commercial agreements and any administrative charge involved should be limited to the administrative costs relating to the processing of the application. The process of assessing a request for a permit should take as little time as possible, and in principle no longer than four months.
(140)
Public buildings and other public infrastructure are visited and used daily by a significant number of end-users who need connectivity to consume eGovernment, eTransport and other services. Other public infrastructure, such as street lamps, traffic lights, offer very valuable sites for deploying small cells, for instance, due to their density. Without prejudice to the possibility for competent authorities to subject the deployment of small-area wireless access points to individual prior permits, operators should have the right to access to those public sites for the purpose of adequately serving demand. Member States should therefore ensure that such public buildings and other public infrastructure are made available on reasonable conditions for the deployment of small-cells with a view to complementing Directive 2014/61/EU and without prejudice to the principles set out in this Directive. Directive 2014/61/EU follows a functional approach and imposes obligations of access to physical infrastructure only when it is part of a network and only if it is owned or used by a network operator, thereby leaving many buildings owned or used by public authorities outside its scope. On the contrary, a specific obligation is not necessary for physical infrastructure, such as ducts or poles, used for intelligent transport systems, which are owned by network operators (providers of transport services or providers of public electronic communications networks), and host parts of a network, thus falling within the scope of Directive 2014/61/EU.
(141)
The provisions of this Directive as regards access and interconnection apply to public electronic communications networks. Providers of electronic communications networks other than to the public do not have access or interconnection obligations under this Directive except where, in benefiting from access to public networks, they may be subject to conditions laid down by Member States.
(142)
The term ‘access’ has a wide range of meanings, and it is therefore necessary to define precisely how that term is used in this Directive, without prejudice to how it is used in other Union measures. An operator may own the underlying network or facilities or may rent some or all of them.
(143)
In an open and competitive market, there should be no restrictions that prevent undertakings from negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves, in particular on cross-border agreements, subject to the competition rules laid down in the TFEU. In the context of achieving a more efficient, truly pan-European market, with effective competition, more choice and competitive services to end-users, undertakings which receive requests for access or interconnection from other undertakings that are subject to general authorisation in order to provide electronic communications networks or services to the public should in principle conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and negotiate in good faith.
(144)
In markets where there continue to be large differences in negotiating power between undertakings, and where some undertakings rely on infrastructure provided by others for delivery of their services, it is appropriate to establish a regulatory framework to ensure that the market functions effectively. National regulatory authorities should have the power to secure, where commercial negotiation fails, adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of end-users. In particular, they can ensure end-to-end connectivity by imposing proportionate obligations on undertakings that are subject to the general authorisation and that control access to end-users. Control of means of access may entail ownership or control of the physical link to the end-user (either fixed or mobile), or the ability to change or withdraw the national number or numbers needed to access an end-user’s network termination point. This would be the case for example if network operators were to restrict unreasonably end-user choice for access to internet portals and services.
(145)
In light of the principle of non-discrimination, national regulatory authorities should ensure that all undertakings, irrespective of their size and business model, whether vertically integrated or separated, can interconnect on reasonable terms and conditions, with a view to providing end-to-end connectivity and access to the internet.
(146)
National legal or administrative measures that link the terms and conditions for access or interconnection to the activities of the party seeking interconnection, and specifically to the degree of its investment in network infrastructure, and not to the interconnection or access services provided, may cause market distortion and may therefore not be compatible with competition rules.
(147)
Network operators who control access to their own customers do so on the basis of unique numbers or addresses from a published numbering or addressing range. Other network operators need to be able to deliver traffic to those customers, and so need to be able to interconnect directly or indirectly to each other. It is therefore appropriate to lay down rights and obligations to negotiate interconnection.
(148)
Interoperability is of benefit to end-users and is an important aim of that regulatory framework. Encouraging interoperability is one of the objectives for national regulatory and other competent authorities as set out in that framework. That framework also provides for the Commission to publish a list of standards or specifications covering the provision of services, technical interfaces or network functions, as the basis for encouraging harmonisation in electronic communications. Member States should encourage the use of published standards or specifications to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services and to improve freedom of choice for users.
(149)
Currently both end-to-end connectivity and access to emergency services depend on end-users using number-based interpersonal communications services. Future technological developments or an increased use of number-independent interpersonal communications services could entail a lack of sufficient interoperability between communications services. As a consequence, significant barriers to market entry and obstacles to further onward innovation could emerge and appreciably threaten effective end-to-end connectivity between end-users.
(150)
Where such interoperability issues arise, the Commission should be able to request a BEREC report which should provide a factual assessment of the market situation at Union and Member State level. Taking utmost account of the BEREC report and other available evidence and taking into account the effects on the internal market, the Commission should decide whether there is a need for regulatory intervention by national regulatory or other competent authorities. If the Commission considers that such regulatory intervention should be considered by national regulatory or other competent authorities, it should be able to adopt implementing measures specifying the nature and scope of possible regulatory interventions by national regulatory or other competent authorities, including in particular obligations to publish and allow the use, modification and redistribution of relevant information by the authorities and other providers and measures to impose the mandatory use of standards or specifications on all or specific providers.
(151)
National regulatory or other competent authorities should assess, in light of the specific national circumstances, whether any intervention is necessary and justified to ensure end-to-end-connectivity, and if so, impose proportionate obligations, in accordance with the Commission’s implementing measures, on those providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services with a significant level of coverage and user-uptake. The term significant should be interpreted in the sense that the geographic coverage and the number of end-users of the provider concerned represent a critical mass with a view to achieving the goal of ensuring end-to-end connectivity between end-users. Providers with a limited number of end-users or limited geographic coverage which would contribute only marginally to achieving that goal, should normally not be subject to such interoperability obligations.
(152)
In situations where undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives to non-replicable wiring, cables and associated facilities inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point and in order to promote competitive outcomes in the interest of end-users, national regulatory authorities should be empowered to impose access obligations on all undertakings, irrespective of a designation as having significant market power. In that regard, national regulatory authorities should take into consideration all technical and economic barriers to future replication of networks. However, as such obligations can in certain cases be intrusive, can undermine incentives for investments, and can have the effect of strengthening the position of dominant players, they should be imposed only where justified and proportionate to achieving sustainable competition in the relevant markets. The mere fact that more than one such infrastructure already exists should not necessarily be interpreted as showing that its assets are replicable. If necessary in combination with such access obligations, undertakings should also be able to rely on the obligations to provide access to physical infrastructure on the basis of Directive 2014/61/EU. Any obligations imposed by the national regulatory authority under this Directive and decisions taken by other competent authorities under Directive 2014/61/EU to ensure access to in-building physical infrastructure or to physical infrastructure up to the access point should be consistent.
(153)
National regulatory authorities should be able, to the extent necessary, to impose obligations on undertakings to provide access to the facilities referred to in an annex to this Directive, namely application programming interfaces (APIs) and electronic programme guides (EPGs), to ensure not only accessibility for end-users to digital radio and television broadcast services but also to related complementary services. Such complementary services should be able to include programme related services which are specifically designed to improve accessibility for end-users with disabilities, and programme related connected television services.
(154)
It is important that when national regulatory authorities assess the concentration or distribution point up to which they intend to impose access, they choose a point in accordance with BEREC guidelines. Selecting a point nearer to end-users will be more beneficial to infrastructure competition and the roll-out of very high capacity networks. In this way the national regulatory authority should first consider choosing a point in a building or just outside a building. It could be justified to extend access obligations to wiring and cables beyond the first concentration or distribution point while confining such obligations to points as close as possible to end-users capable of hosting a sufficient number of end-users, where it is demonstrated that replication faces high and non-transitory physical or economic barriers, leading to important competition problems or market failures at the retail level to the detriment of end-users. The assessment of the replicability of network elements requires a market review which is different from an analysis assessing significant market power, and so the national regulatory authority does not need to establish significant market power in order to impose these obligations. On the other hand, such review requires a sufficient economic assessment of market conditions, to establish whether the criteria necessary to impose obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point are met. Such extended access obligations are more likely to be necessary in geographical areas where the business case for alternative infrastructure rollout is more risky, for example because of low population density or because of the limited number of multi-dwelling buildings. Conversely, a high concentration of households might indicate that the imposition of such obligations is unnecessary. National regulatory authorities should also consider whether such obligations have the potential to strengthen the position of undertakings designated as having significant market power. National regulatory authorities should be able to impose access to active or virtual network elements used for service provision on such infrastructure if access to passive elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable, and if the national regulatory authority considers that, absent such an intervention, the purpose of the access obligation would be circumvented. In order to enhance consistent regulatory practice across the Union, the Commission should be able to require the national regulatory authority to withdraw its draft measures extending access obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point, where BEREC shares the Commission’s serious doubts as to the compatibility of the draft measure with Union law and in particular the regulatory objectives of this Directive.
(155)
In such cases, in order to comply with the principle of proportionality, it can be appropriate for national regulatory authorities to exempt certain categories of owners or undertakings, or both, from obligations going beyond the first concentration or distribution point, which should be determined by national regulatory authorities, on the grounds that an access obligation not based on an undertaking’s designation as having significant market power would risk compromising their business case for recently deployed network elements, in particular by small local projects. Wholesale-only undertakings should not be subject to such access obligations if they offer an effective alternative access on a commercial basis to a very high capacity network, on fair, non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions, including as regards price. It should be possible to extend that exemption to other providers on the same terms. The exemption may not be appropriate for providers that are in receipt of public funding.
(156)
Sharing of passive infrastructure used in the provision of wireless electronic communications services in compliance with competition law principles can be particularly useful to maximise very high capacity connectivity throughout the Union, especially in less dense areas where replication is impracticable and end-users risk being deprived of such connectivity. National regulatory or other competent authorities should, by way of exception, be able to impose such sharing or localised roaming access, in accordance with Union law, if that possibility has been clearly established in the original conditions for the granting of the right of use and they demonstrate the benefits of such sharing in terms of overcoming insurmountable economic or physical obstacles and access to networks or services is therefore severely deficient or absent, and taking into account several factors, including in particular the need for coverage along major transport paths, choice and a higher quality of service for end-users as well as the need to maintain infrastructure roll-out incentives. In circumstances where there is no access by end-users, and sharing of passive infrastructure alone does not suffice to address the situation, the national regulatory authorities should be able to impose obligations on the sharing of active infrastructure. In so doing, national regulatory or other competent authorities retain the flexibility to choose the most appropriate sharing or access obligation which should be proportionate and justified based on the nature of the problem identified.
(157)
While it is appropriate in some circumstances for a national regulatory or other competent authority to impose obligations on undertakings irrespective of a designation of significant market power in order to achieve goals such as end-to-end connectivity or interoperability of services, it is necessary to ensure that such obligations are imposed in accordance with the regulatory framework and, in particular, its notification procedures. Such obligations should be imposed only where justified in order to secure the objectives of this Directive, and where they are objectively justified, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory for the purpose of promoting efficiency, sustainable competition, efficient investment and innovation, and giving the maximum benefit to end-users, and imposed in accordance with the relevant notification procedures.
(158)
In order to overcome insurmountable economic or physical obstacles for providing end-users with services or networks which rely on the use of radio spectrum and where mobile coverage gaps persist, their closing may require the access and sharing of passive infrastructure, or, where this is not sufficient, the sharing of active infrastructure, or localised roaming access agreements. Without prejudice to sharing obligations attached to the rights of use on the basis of other provisions of this Directive, and in particular measures to promote competition, where national regulatory or other competent authorities intend to take measures to impose the sharing of passive infrastructure, or when passive access and sharing are not sufficient, active infrastructure sharing or localised roaming access agreements, they may, however, also be called to consider the possible risk for market participants in underserved areas.
(159)
Competition rules alone may not always be sufficient to ensure cultural diversity and media pluralism in the area of digital television. Technological and market developments make it necessary to review obligations to provide conditional access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms on a regular basis, by a Member State for its national market, in particular to determine whether it is justified to extend obligations to EPGs and APIs, to the extent necessary to ensure accessibility for end-users to specified digital broadcasting services. Member States should be able to specify the digital broadcasting services to which access by end-users is to be ensured by any legislative, regulatory or administrative means that they consider to be necessary.
(160)
Member States should also be able to permit their national regulatory authority to review obligations in relation to conditional access to digital broadcasting services in order to assess through a market analysis whether to withdraw or amend conditions for undertakings that do not have significant market power on the relevant market. Such a withdrawal or amendment should not adversely affect access for end-users to such services or the prospects for effective competition.
(161)
There is a need for ex ante obligations in certain circumstances in order to ensure the development of a competitive market, the conditions of which favour the deployment and take-up of very high capacity networks and services, and the maximisation of end-user benefits. The definition of significant market power used in this Directive is equivalent to the concept of dominance as defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice.
(162)
Two or more undertakings can be found to enjoy a joint dominant position not only where there exist structural or other links between them but also where the structure of the relevant market is conducive to coordinated effects, that is, it encourages parallel or aligned anti-competitive behaviour on the market.
(163)
It is essential that ex ante regulatory obligations should be imposed on a wholesale market only where there are one or more undertakings with significant market power, with a view to ensuring sustainable competition and where Union and national competition law remedies are not sufficient to address the problem. The Commission has drawn up guidelines at Union level in accordance with the principles of competition law for national regulatory authorities to follow in assessing whether competition is effective in a given market and in assessing significant market power. National regulatory authorities should analyse whether a given product or service market is effectively competitive in a given geographical area, which could be the whole or a part of the territory of the Member State concerned or neighbouring parts of territories of Member States considered together. An analysis of effective competition should include an analysis as to whether the market is prospectively competitive, and thus whether any lack of effective competition is durable. Those guidelines should also address the issue of newly emerging markets, where de facto the market leader is likely to have a substantial market share but should not be subjected to inappropriate obligations. The Commission should review the guidelines regularly, in particular on the occasion of a review of the existing law, taking into account the case-law of the Court of Justice, economic thinking and actual market experience and with a view to ensuring that they remain appropriate in a rapidly developing market. National regulatory authorities will need to cooperate with each other where the relevant market is found to be transnational.
(164)
In determining whether an undertaking has significant market power in a specific market, national regulatory authorities should act in accordance with Union law and take utmost account of the Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power.
(165)
National regulatory authorities should define relevant geographic markets within their territory taking into utmost account the Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets (the ‘Recommendation’) adopted pursuant to this Directive and taking into account national and local circumstances. Therefore, national regulatory authorities should at least analyse the markets that are contained in the Recommendation, including those markets that are listed but no longer regulated in the specific national or local context. National regulatory authorities should also analyse markets that are not contained in that Recommendation, but that are regulated within the territory of their jurisdiction on the basis of previous market analyses, or other markets, if they have sufficient grounds to consider that the three criteria provided in this Directive are met.
(166)
Transnational markets can be defined when it is justified by the geographic market definition, taking into account all supply-side and demand-side factors in accordance with competition law principles. BEREC is the most appropriate body to undertake such analysis, benefiting from the extensive collective experience of national regulatory authorities when defining markets on a national level. National circumstances should be taken into account when an analysis of potential transnational markets is undertaken. If transnational markets are defined and warrant regulatory intervention, concerned national regulatory authorities should cooperate to identify the appropriate regulatory response, including in the process of notification to the Commission. They can also cooperate in the same manner where transnational markets are not identified but on their territories market conditions are sufficiently homogeneous to benefit from a coordinated regulatory approach, such as for example in terms of similar costs, market structures or operators, or in the case of transnational or comparable end-user demand.
(167)
In some circumstances geographic markets are defined as national or sub-national, for example due to the national or local nature of network roll-out which determines the boundaries of undertakings’ potential market power in respect of wholesale supply, but there is still a significant transnational demand from one or more categories of end-users. That can in particular be the case for demand from business end-users with multisite facility operations in different Member States. If that transnational demand is not sufficiently met by suppliers, for example if they are fragmented along national borders or locally, a potential internal market barrier arises. Therefore, BEREC should be empowered to provide guidelines to national regulatory authorities on common regulatory approaches to ensure that transnational demand can be met in a satisfactory way, providing a basis for the interoperability of wholesale access products across the Union and permitting efficiencies and economies of scale despite the fragmented supply side. BEREC’s guidelines should shape the choices of national regulatory authorities in pursuing the internal market objective when imposing regulatory obligations on undertakings designated as having significant market power at national level while providing guidance for the harmonisation of technical specifications of wholesale access products capable of meeting such identified transnational demand, in the interest of the internal market.
(168)
The objective of any ex ante regulatory intervention is ultimately to produce benefits for end-users in terms of price, quality and choice by making retail markets effectively competitive on a sustainable basis. It is likely that national regulatory authorities will gradually be able to find many retail markets to be competitive even in the absence of wholesale regulation, especially taking into account expected improvements in innovation and competition.
(169)
For national regulatory authorities, the starting point for the identification of wholesale markets susceptible to ex ante regulation is the analysis of corresponding retail markets. The analysis of effective competition at the retail and at the wholesale level is conducted from a forward-looking perspective over a given time horizon, and is guided by competition law, including, as appropriate, the relevant case law of the Court of Justice. If it is concluded that a retail market would be effectively competitive in the absence of ex ante wholesale regulation on the corresponding relevant markets, this should lead the national regulatory authority to conclude that regulation is no longer needed at the relevant wholesale level.
(170)
During the gradual transition to deregulated markets, commercial agreements, including for co-investment and access between operators will gradually become more common, and if they are sustainable and improve competitive dynamics, they can contribute to the conclusion that a particular wholesale market does not warrant ex ante regulation. A similar logic would apply in reverse, to the unforeseeable termination of commercial agreements on a deregulated market. The analysis of such agreements should take into account that the prospect of regulation can be a motive for network owners to enter into commercial negotiations. With a view to ensuring adequate consideration of the impact of regulation imposed on related markets when determining whether a given market warrants ex ante regulation, national regulatory authorities should ensure markets are analysed in a consistent manner and where possible, at the same time or as close as possible to each other in time.
(171)
When assessing wholesale regulation to solve problems at the retail level, national regulatory authorities should take into account the fact that several wholesale markets can provide wholesale upstream inputs for a particular retail market, and, conversely, that a single wholesale market can provide wholesale upstream inputs for a variety of retail markets. Furthermore, competitive dynamics in a particular market can be influenced by markets that are contiguous but not in a vertical relationship, such as can be the case between certain fixed and mobile markets. National regulatory authorities should conduct that assessment for each individual wholesale market considered for regulation, starting with remedies for access to civil infrastructure, as such remedies are usually conducive to more sustainable competition including infrastructure competition, and thereafter analysing any wholesale markets considered susceptible to ex ante regulation in order of their likely suitability to address identified competition problems at retail level. When deciding on the specific remedy to be imposed, national regulatory authorities should assess its technical feasibility and carry out a cost-benefit analysis, having regard to its degree of suitability to address the identified competition problems at retail level, and enabling competition based on differentiation and technology neutrality. National regulatory authorities should consider the consequences of imposing any specific remedy which, if feasible only on certain network topologies, could constitute a disincentive for the deployment of very high capacity networks in the interest of end-users.
(172)
Without prejudice to the principle of technology neutrality, the national regulatory authorities should provide incentives through the remedies imposed, and, where possible, before the roll-out of infrastructure, for the development of flexible and open network architecture, which would reduce eventually the burden and complexity of remedies imposed at a later stage. At each stage of the assessment, before the national regulatory authority determines whether any additional, more burdensome, remedy should be imposed on the undertaking designated as having significant market power, it should seek to determine whether the retail market concerned would be effectively competitive, also taking into account any relevant commercial arrangements or other wholesale market circumstances, including other types of regulation already in force, such as for example general access obligations to non-replicable assets or obligations imposed pursuant to Directive 2014/61/EU, and of any regulation already considered to be appropriate by the national regulatory authority for an undertaking designated as having significant market power. Such an assessment, aiming to ensure that only the most appropriate remedies necessary to effectively address any problems identified in the market analysis are imposed, does not preclude a national regulatory authority from finding that a mix of such remedies together, even if of differing intensity, in line with the proportionality principle, offers the least intrusive way of addressing the problem. Even if such differences do not result in the definition of distinct geographic markets, they should be able to justify differentiation in the appropriate remedies imposed in light of the differing intensity of competitive constraints.
(173)
Ex ante regulation imposed at the wholesale level, which is in principle less intrusive than retail regulation, is considered to be sufficient to tackle potential competition problems on the related downstream retail market or markets. The advances in the functioning of competition since the regulatory framework for electronic communications has been in place are demonstrated by the progressive deregulation of retail markets across the Union. Furthermore, the rules relating to the imposition of ex ante remedies on undertakings designated as having significant market power should, where possible, be simplified and be made more predictable. Therefore, the imposition of ex ante regulatory controls based on an undertaking’s designation as having significant market power in wholesale markets should prevail.
(174)
When a national regulatory authority withdraws wholesale regulation, it should define an appropriate notice period to ensure a sustainable transition to a de-regulated market. In defining such a notice period, the national regulatory authority should take into account the existing agreements between access providers and access seekers that have been entered into on the basis of the imposed regulatory obligations. In particular, such agreements can provide a contractual legal protection to access seekers for a determined period. The national regulatory authority should also take into account the effective possibility for market participants to take up any commercial wholesale access or co-investment offers which can be present in the market and the need to avoid an extended period of possible regulatory arbitrage. Transition arrangements established by the national regulatory authority should consider the extent and timing of regulatory oversight of pre-existing agreements, once the notice period starts.
(175)
In order to provide market players with certainty as to regulatory conditions, a time limit for market reviews is necessary. It is important to conduct a market analysis on a regular basis and within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame. There is a risk that failure by a national regulatory authority to analyse a market within the time-limit jeopardises the internal market, and normal infringement proceedings do not produce their desired effect on time. Alternatively, the national regulatory authority concerned should be able to request the assistance of BEREC to complete the market analysis. Such assistance could, for example, take the form of a specific task force composed of representatives of other national regulatory authorities.
(176)
Due to the high level of technological innovation and highly dynamic markets in the electronic communications sector, there is a need to adapt regulation rapidly in a coordinated and harmonised way at Union level, as experience has shown that divergence among the national regulatory authorities in the implementation of the regulatory framework may create a barrier to the internal market.
(177)
However, in the interest of greater stability and predictability of regulatory measures, the maximum period allowed between market analyses should be extended from three to five years, provided market changes in the intervening period do not require a new analysis. In determining whether a national regulatory authority has complied with its obligation to analyse markets and notified the corresponding draft measure at a minimum every five years, only a notification including a new assessment of the market definition and of significant market power will be considered to be starting a new five-year market cycle. A mere notification of new or amended regulatory remedies, imposed on the basis of a previous and unrevised market analysis will not be considered to have satisfied that obligation. Non-compliance by a national regulatory authority with the obligation to conduct market analysis at regular intervals laid down in this Directive should not be considered, in itself, to be a ground for the invalidity or inapplicability of existing obligations imposed by that national regulatory authority in the market in question.
(178)
The imposition of a specific obligation on an undertaking designated as having significant market power does not require an additional market analysis but rather a justification that the obligation in question is appropriate and proportionate in relation to the nature of the problem identified on the market in question, and on the related retail market.
(179)
When assessing the proportionality of the obligations and conditions to be imposed, national regulatory authorities should take into account the different competitive conditions existing in the different areas within their Member States having regard in particular to the results of the geographical survey conducted in accordance with this Directive.
(180)
When considering whether to impose remedies to control prices, and if so in what form, national regulatory authorities should seek to allow a fair return for the investor on a particular new investment project. In particular, there are risks associated with investment projects specific to new access networks which support products for which demand is uncertain at the time the investment is made.
(181)
Reviews of obligations imposed on undertakings designated as having significant market power during the timeframe of a market analysis should allow national regulatory authorities to take into account the impact on competitive conditions of new developments, for instance of newly concluded voluntary agreements between undertakings, such as access and co-investment agreements, thus providing the flexibility which is particularly necessary in the context of longer regulatory cycles. A similar logic should apply in the case of an unforeseeable breach or termination of a commercial agreement, or if such an agreement has effects diverging from the market analysis. If the termination of an existing agreement occurs in a deregulated market, it is possible that a new market analysis is required. In the absence of a single important change in the market but in the case of dynamic markets, it may be necessary to conduct a market analysis more often than every five years, for example not earlier than every three years as was the case until the date of application of this Directive. Markets should be considered to be dynamic if the technological evolution and end-user demand patterns are likely to evolve in such a way that the conclusions of the analysis would be superseded within the medium term for a significant group of geographic areas or of end-users within the geographic and product market defined by the national regulatory authority.
(182)
Transparency of terms and conditions for access and interconnection, including prices, serve to speed up negotiation, avoid disputes and give confidence to market players that a service is not being provided on discriminatory terms. Openness and transparency of technical interfaces can be particularly important in ensuring interoperability. Where a national regulatory authority imposes obligations to make information public, it should also be able to specify the manner in which the information is to be made available, and whether it is free of charge, taking into account the nature and purpose of the information concerned.
(183)
In light of the variety of network topologies, access products and market circumstance that have arisen since 2002, the objectives of Annex II to Directive 2002/19/EC, concerning local loop unbundling, and access products for providers of digital television and radio services, can be better achieved and in a more flexible manner, by providing guidelines on the minimum criteria for a reference offer to be developed by and periodically updated by BEREC. That Annex should therefore be deleted.
(184)
The principle of non-discrimination ensures that undertakings with significant market power do not distort competition, in particular where they are vertically integrated undertakings that supply services to undertakings with whom they compete on downstream markets.
(185)
In order to address and prevent non-price related discriminatory behaviour, equivalence of inputs (EoI) is in principle the surest way of achieving effective protection from discrimination. On the other hand, providing regulated wholesale inputs on an EoI basis is likely to trigger higher compliance costs than other forms of non-discrimination obligations. Those higher compliance costs should be measured against the benefits of more vigorous competition downstream, and of the relevance of non-discrimination guarantees in circumstances where the undertaking designated as having significant market power is not subject to direct price controls. In particular, national regulatory authorities might consider that the provision of wholesale inputs over new systems on an EoI basis is more likely to create sufficient net benefits, and thus be proportionate, given the comparatively lower incremental compliance costs to ensure that newly built systems are EoI-compliant. On the other hand, national regulatory authorities should also consider whether obligations are proportionate for affected undertakings, for example, by taking into account implementation costs and weigh up possible disincentives to the deployment of new systems, relative to more incremental upgrades, in the event that the former would be subject to more restrictive regulatory obligations. In Member States with a high number of small-scale undertakings designated as having significant market power, the imposition of EoI on each of those undertakings can be disproportionate.
(186)
Accounting separation allows internal price transfers to be rendered visible, and allows national regulatory authorities to check compliance with obligations for non-discrimination where applicable. In this regard the Commission published Recommendation 2005/698/EC 
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(187)
Civil engineering assets that can host an electronic communications network are crucial for the successful roll-out of new networks because of the high cost of duplicating them, and the significant savings that can be made when they can be reused. Therefore, in addition to the rules on physical infrastructure laid down in Directive 2014/61/EU, a specific remedy is necessary in those circumstances where civil engineering assets are owned by an undertaking designated as having significant market power. Where civil engineering assets exist and are reusable, the positive effect of achieving effective access to them on the roll-out of competing infrastructure is very high, and it is therefore necessary to ensure that access to such assets can be used as a self-standing remedy for the improvement of competitive and deployment dynamics in any downstream market, to be considered before assessing the need to impose any other potential remedies, and not just as an ancillary remedy to other wholesale products or services or as a remedy limited to undertakings availing themselves of such other wholesale products or services. National regulatory authorities should value reusable legacy civil engineering assets on the basis of the regulatory accounting value net of the accumulated depreciation at the time of calculation, indexed by an appropriate price index, such as the retail price index, and excluding those assets which are fully depreciated, over a period of not less than 40 years, but still in use.
(188)
National regulatory authorities should, when imposing obligations for access to new and enhanced infrastructures, ensure that access conditions reflect the circumstances underlying the investment decision, taking into account, inter alia, the roll-out costs, the expected rate of take up of the new products and services and the expected retail price levels. Moreover, in order to provide planning certainty to investors, national regulatory authorities should be able to set, if applicable, terms and conditions for access which are consistent over appropriate review periods. In the event that price controls are considered to be appropriate, such terms and conditions can include pricing arrangements which depend on volumes or length of contract in accordance with Union law and provided they have no discriminatory effect. Any access conditions imposed should respect the need to preserve effective competition in services to consumers and businesses.
(189)
Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of competing services.
(190)
In markets where an increased number of access networks can be expected on a forward-looking basis, end-users are more likely to benefit from improvements in network quality, by virtue of infrastructure-based competition, compared to markets where only one network persists. The adequacy of competition on other parameters, such as price and choice, is likely to depend on the national and local competitive circumstances. In assessing the adequacy of competition on such parameters and the need for regulatory intervention, national regulatory authorities should also take into account whether wholesale access is available to any interested undertaking on reasonable commercial terms permitting sustainable competitive outcomes for end-users on the retail market. The application of general competition rules in markets characterised by sustainable and effective infrastructure-based competition should be sufficient.
(191)
Where obligations are imposed on undertakings that require them to meet reasonable requests for access to and use of networks elements and associated facilities, such requests should be refused only on the basis of objective criteria such as technical feasibility or the need to maintain network integrity. Where access is refused, the aggrieved party should be able to submit the case to the dispute resolutions procedures under this Directive. An undertaking with mandated access obligations cannot be required to provide types of access which it is not within its power to provide. The imposition by national regulatory authorities of mandated access that increases competition in the short term should not reduce incentives for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will secure more sustainable competition or higher performance and end-user benefits in the long term. When choosing the least intrusive regulatory intervention, and in line with the principle of proportionality, national regulatory authorities could, for example, decide to review the obligations imposed on undertakings designated as having significant market power and amend any previous decision, including by withdrawing obligations, imposing or not imposing new access obligations if this is in the interests of users and sustainable service competition. National regulatory authorities should be able to impose technical and operational conditions on the provider or beneficiaries of mandated access in accordance with Union law. In particular the imposition of technical standards should comply with Directive (EU) 2015/1535.
(192)
Price control may be necessary when market analysis in a particular market reveals inefficient competition. In particular, undertakings designated as having significant market power should avoid a price squeeze whereby the difference between their retail prices and the interconnection or access prices charged to competitors who provide similar retail services is not adequate to ensure sustainable competition. When a national regulatory authority calculates costs incurred in establishing a service mandated under this Directive, it is appropriate to allow a reasonable return on the capital employed including appropriate labour and building costs, with the value of capital adjusted where necessary to reflect the current valuation of assets and efficiency of operations. The method of cost recovery should be appropriate to the circumstances taking account of the need to promote efficiency, sustainable competition and deployment of very high capacity networks and thereby maximise end-user benefits, and should take in account the need to have predictable and stable wholesale prices for the benefit of all operators seeking to deploy new and enhanced networks, in accordance with Commission Recommendation 2013/466/EU 
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(193)
Due to uncertainty regarding the rate of materialisation of demand for the provision of next-generation broadband services, it is important in order to promote efficient investment and innovation to allow those operators investing in new or upgraded networks a certain degree of pricing flexibility. National regulatory authorities should be able to decide to maintain or not to impose regulated wholesale access prices on next-generation networks if sufficient competition safeguards are present. More specifically, to prevent excessive prices in markets where there are undertakings designated as having significant market power, pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional safeguards to protect competition and end-user interests, such as strict non-discrimination obligations, measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of downstream products, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access products, or both. Those competitive safeguards do not prejudice the identification by national regulatory authorities of other circumstances under which it would be appropriate not to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs, such as where high price elasticity of end-user demand makes it unprofitable for the undertaking designated as having significant market power to charge prices appreciably above the competitive level or where lower population density reduces the incentives for the development of very high capacity networks and the national regulatory authority establishes that effective and non-discriminatory access is ensured through obligations imposed in accordance with this Directive.
(194)
Where a national regulatory authority imposes obligations to implement a cost-accounting system in order to support price controls, it should be able to undertake an annual audit to ensure compliance with that cost-accounting system, provided that it has the necessary qualified staff, or to require such an audit to be carried out by another qualified body, independent of the undertaking concerned.
(195)
The charging system in the Union for wholesale voice call termination is based on Calling Party Network Pays. An analysis of demand and supply substitutability shows that currently or in the foreseeable future, there are no substitutes at wholesale level which might constrain the setting of charges for termination in a given network. Taking into account the two-way access nature of termination markets, further potential competition problems include cross-subsidisation between operators. Those potential competition problems are common to both fixed and mobile voice call termination markets. Therefore, in light of the ability and incentives of terminating operators to raise prices substantially above cost, cost orientation is considered to be the most appropriate intervention to address this concern over the medium term. Future market developments may alter the dynamics of those markets to the extent that regulation would no longer be necessary.
(196)
In order to reduce the regulatory burden in addressing the competition problems relating to wholesale voice call termination consistently across the Union, the Commission should establish, by means of a delegated act, a single maximum voice termination rate for mobile services and a single maximum voice termination rate for fixed services that apply Union-wide.
(197)
This Directive should lay down the detailed criteria and parameters on the basis of which the values of voice call termination rates are set. Termination rates across the Union have decreased consistently and are expected to continue to do so. When the Commission determines the maximum termination rates in the first delegated act that it adopts pursuant to this Directive, it should disregard any unjustified exceptional national deviation from that trend.
(198)
Due to current uncertainty regarding the rate of materialisation of demand for very high capacity broadband services as well as general economies of scale and density, co-investment agreements offer significant benefits in terms of pooling of costs and risks, enabling smaller-scale undertakings to invest on economically rational terms and thus promoting sustainable, long-term competition, including in areas where infrastructure-based competition might not be efficient. Such co-investments can take different forms, including co-ownership of network assets or long-term risk sharing through co-financing or through purchase agreements. In that context, purchase agreements which constitute co-investments entail the acquisition of specific rights to capacity of a structural character, involving a degree of co-determination and enabling co-investors to compete effectively and sustainably in the long term in downstream markets in which the undertaking designated as having significant market power is active. By contrast, commercial access agreements that are limited to the rental of capacity do not give rise to such rights and therefore should not be considered to be co-investments.
(199)
Where an undertaking designated as having significant market power makes an offer for co-investment on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms in very high capacity networks that consist of optical fibre elements up to the end-user premises or the base station, providing an opportunity to undertakings of different sizes and financial capacity to become infrastructure co-investors, the national regulatory authority should be able to refrain from imposing obligations pursuant to this Directive on the new very high capacity network if at least one potential co-investor has entered into a co-investment agreement with that undertaking. Where a national regulatory authority decides to make binding a co-investment offer that has not resulted in an agreement, and decides, not to impose additional regulatory obligations, it can do so, subject to the condition that such an agreement is to be concluded before the deregulatory measure takes effect. Where it is technically impracticable to deploy optical fibre elements up to the end-user’s premises, very high capacity networks consisting of optical fibre elements up to the immediate proximity of, meaning just outside, such premises should also be able to benefit from the same regulatory treatment.
(200)
When making a determination to refrain from imposing obligations, the national regulatory authority should take such steps after ensuring that the co-investment offers comply with the necessary criteria and are made in good faith. The differential regulatory treatment of new very high capacity networks should be subject to review in subsequent market analyses which, in particular after some time has elapsed, may require adjustments to the regulatory treatment. In duly justified circumstances, national regulatory authorities should be able to impose obligations on such new network elements when they establish that certain markets would, in the absence of regulatory intervention, face significant competition problems. In particular, when there are multiple downstream markets that have not reached the same degree of competition, national regulatory authorities could require specific asymmetric remedies to promote effective competition, for instance, but not limited to, niche retail markets, such as electronic communications products for business end-users. To maintain the competitiveness of the markets, national regulatory authorities should also safeguard the rights of access seekers who do not participate in a given co-investment. This should be achieved through the maintenance of existing access products or, where legacy network elements are dismantled in due course, through the imposition of access products with at least comparable functionality and quality to those previously available on the legacy infrastructure, in both cases subject to an appropriate adaptable mechanism validated by the national regulatory authority that does not undermine the incentives for co-investors.
(201)
In order to enhance the consistent regulatory practice across the Union, where national regulatory authorities conclude that the conditions of the co-investment offer are met, the Commission should be able to require the national regulatory authority to withdraw its draft measures either refraining from imposing obligations or intervening with regulatory obligations in order to address significant competition problems, where BEREC shares the Commission’s serious doubts as to the compatibility of the draft measure with Union law and in particular the regulatory objectives of this Directive. In the interest of efficiency, a national regulatory authority should be able to submit a single notification to the Commission of a draft measure that relates to a co-investment scheme that meets the relevant conditions. Where the Commission does not exercise its powers to require the withdrawal of the draft measure, it would be disproportionate for subsequent simplified notifications of individual draft decisions of the national regulatory authority on the basis of the same scheme, including in addition evidence of actual conclusion of an agreement with at least one co-investor, to be subject to a decision requiring withdrawal in the absence of a change in circumstances. Furthermore, obligations imposed on undertakings, irrespective of whether they are designated as having significant market power, pursuant to this Directive or to Directive 2014/61/EU continue to apply. Obligations in relation to co-investment agreements are without prejudice to the application of Union law.
(202)
The purpose of functional separation, whereby the vertically integrated undertaking is required to establish operationally separate business entities, is to ensure the provision of fully equivalent access products to all downstream operators, including the operator’s own vertically integrated downstream divisions. Functional separation has the capacity to improve competition in several relevant markets by significantly reducing the incentive for discrimination and by making it easier to verify and enforce compliance with non-discrimination obligations. In exceptional cases, it should be possible for functional separation to be justified as a remedy where there has been persistent failure to achieve effective non-discrimination in several of the markets concerned, and where there is little or no prospect of infrastructure competition within a reasonable time-frame after recourse to one or more remedies previously considered to be appropriate. However, it is very important to ensure that its imposition preserves the incentives of the undertaking concerned to invest in its network and that it does not entail any potential negative effects on consumer welfare. Its imposition requires a coordinated analysis of different relevant markets related to the access network, in accordance with the market analysis procedure. When undertaking the market analysis and designing the details of that remedy, national regulatory authorities should pay particular attention to the products to be managed by the separate business entities, taking into account the extent of network roll-out and the degree of technological progress, which may affect the substitutability of fixed and wireless services. In order to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, proposals for functional separation should be approved in advance by the Commission.
(203)
The implementation of functional separation should not prevent appropriate coordination mechanisms between the different separate business entities in order to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company are protected.
(204)
Where a vertically integrated undertaking chooses to transfer a substantial part or all of its local access network assets to a separate legal entity under different ownership or by establishing a separate business entity for dealing with access products, the national regulatory authority should assess the effect of the intended transaction, including any access commitments offered by this undertaking, on all existing regulatory obligations imposed on the vertically integrated undertaking in order to ensure the compatibility of any new arrangements with this Directive. The national regulatory authority concerned should undertake a new analysis of the markets in which the segregated entity operates, and impose, maintain, amend or withdraw obligations accordingly. To that end, the national regulatory authority should be able to request information from the undertaking.
(205)
It is already possible today in some markets that as part of the market analysis the undertakings designated as having significant market power are able to offer commitments which aim to address competition problems identified by the national regulatory authority and which the national regulatory authority then takes into account in deciding on the appropriate regulatory obligations. Any new market developments should be taken into account in deciding on the most appropriate remedies. However, and without prejudice to the provisions on regulatory treatment of co-investments, the nature of the commitments offered as such does not limit the discretion accorded to the national regulatory authority to impose remedies on undertakings designated as having significant market power. In order to enhance transparency and to provide legal certainty across the Union, the procedure for undertakings to offer commitments and for the national regulatory authorities to assess them, taking into account the views of market participants by means of a market test, and if appropriate to make them binding on the committing undertaking and enforceable by the national regulatory authority, should be laid down in this Directive. Unless the national regulatory authority has made commitments on co-investments binding and decided not to impose obligations, that procedure is without prejudice to the application of the market analysis procedure and the obligation to impose appropriate and proportionate remedies to address the identified market failure.
(206)
National regulatory authorities should be able to make the commitments binding, wholly or in part, for a specific period which should not exceed the period for which they are offered, after having conducted a market test by means of a public consultation of interested parties. Where the commitments have been made binding, the national regulatory authority should consider the consequences of this decision in its market analysis and take them into account when choosing the most appropriate regulatory measures. National regulatory authorities should consider the commitments made from a forward-looking perspective of sustainability, in particular when choosing the period for which they are made binding, and should have regard to the value placed by stakeholders in the public consultation on stable and predictable market conditions. Binding commitments related to voluntary separation by a vertically integrated undertaking which has been designated as having significant market power in one or more relevant markets can add predictability and transparency to the process, by setting out the process of implementation of the planned separation, for example by providing a roadmap for implementation with clear milestones and predictable consequences if certain milestones are not met.
(207)
The commitments can include the appointment of a monitoring trustee, whose identity and mandate should be approved by the national regulatory authority, and the obligation on the undertaking offering them to provide periodic implementation reports.
(208)
Network owners whose business model is limited to the provision of wholesale services to others, can be beneficial to the creation of a thriving wholesale market, with positive effects on retail competition downstream. Furthermore, their business model can be attractive to potential financial investors in less volatile infrastructure assets and with longer term perspectives on deployment of very high capacity networks. Nevertheless, the presence of a wholesale-only undertaking does not necessarily lead to effectively competitive retail markets, and wholesale-only undertakings can be designated as having significant market power in particular product and geographic markets. Certain competition risks arising from the behaviour of undertakings following wholesale-only business models might be lower than for vertically integrated undertakings, provided the wholesale-only model is genuine and no incentives to discriminate between downstream providers exist. The regulatory response should therefore be commensurately less intrusive, but should preserve in particular the possibility to introduce obligations in relation to fair and reasonable pricing. On the other hand, national regulatory authorities should be able to intervene if competition problems have arisen to the detriment of end-users. An undertaking active on a wholesale market that supplies retail services solely to business users larger than small and medium-sized enterprises should be regarded as a wholesale-only undertaking.
(209)
To facilitate the migration from legacy copper networks to next-generation networks, which is in the interests of end-users, national regulatory authorities should be able to monitor network operators’ own initiatives in this respect and to establish, where necessary, the conditions for an appropriate migration process, for example by means of prior notice, transparency and availability of alternative access products of at least comparable quality, once the network owner has demonstrated the intent and readiness to switch to upgraded networks. In order to avoid unjustified delays to the migration, national regulatory authorities should be empowered to withdraw access obligations relating to the copper network once an adequate migration process has been established and compliance with conditions and process for migration from legacy infrastructure is ensured. However, network owners should be able to decommission legacy networks. Access seekers migrating from an access product based on legacy infrastructure to an access product based on a more advanced technology or medium should be able to upgrade their access to any regulated product with higher capacity, but should not be required to do so. In the case of an upgrade, access seekers should adhere to the regulatory conditions for access to the higher capacity access product, as determined by the national regulatory authority in its market analysis.
(210)
The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and increasing competition and choice for communications services go hand in hand with parallel action to create a harmonised regulatory framework which secures the delivery of universal service. The concept of universal service should evolve to reflect advances in technology, market developments and changes in user demand.
(211)
Under Article 169 TFEU, the Union is to contribute to the protection of consumers.
(212)
Universal service is a safety net to ensure that a set of at least the minimum services is available to all end-users and at an affordable price to consumers, where a risk of social exclusion arising from the lack of such access prevents citizens from full social and economic participation in society.
(213)
Basic broadband internet access is virtually universally available across the Union and very widely used for a broad range of activities. However, the overall take-up rate is lower than availability as there are still those who are disconnected due to reasons related to awareness, cost, skills and due to choice. Affordable adequate broadband internet access has become of crucial importance to society and the wider economy. It provides the basis for participation in the digital economy and society through essential online internet services.
(214)
A fundamental requirement of universal service is to ensure that all consumers have access at an affordable price to an available adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services, at a fixed location. Member States should also have the possibility to ensure affordability of adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services other than at a fixed location to citizens on the move, where they consider that this is necessary to ensure consumers' full social and economic participation in society. Particular attention should be paid in that context to ensuring that end-users with disabilities have equivalent access. There should be no limitations on the technical means by which the connection is provided, allowing for wired or wireless technologies, nor any limitations on the category of providers which provide part or all of universal service obligations.
(215)
The speed of internet access experienced by a given user depends on a number of factors, including the providers of internet connectivity as well as the given application for which a connection is being used. It is for the Member States, taking into account BEREC’s report on best practices, to define adequate broadband internet access in light of national conditions and the minimum bandwidth enjoyed by the majority of consumers within a Member State’s territory in order to allow an adequate level of social inclusion and participation in the digital economy and society in their territory. The affordable adequate broadband internet access service should have sufficient bandwidth to support access to and use of at least a minimum set of basic services that reflect the services used by the majority of end-users. To that end, the Commission should monitor the development in the use of the internet to identify those online services used by a majority of end-users across the Union and necessary for social and economic participation in society and update the list accordingly. The requirements of Union law on open internet access, in particular of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, should apply to any adequate broadband internet access service.
(216)
Consumers should not be obliged to access services they do not want and it should therefore be possible for eligible consumers to restrict, on request, the affordable universal service to voice communications services.
(217)
Member States should be able to extend measures related to affordability and control of expenditure measures to microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises and not-for-profit organisations, provided they fulfil the relevant conditions.
(218)
National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities should be able to monitor the evolution and level of retail tariffs for services that fall within the scope of universal service obligations. Such monitoring should be carried out in such a way that it would not represent an excessive administrative burden for either national regulatory and other competent authorities or providers of such services.
(219)
An affordable price means a price defined by Member States at national level in light of specific national conditions. Where Member States establish that retail prices for adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services are not affordable to consumers with low-income or special social needs, including older people, end-users with disabilities and consumers living in rural or geographically isolated areas, they should take appropriate measures. To that end, Member States could provide those consumers with direct support for communication purposes, which could be part of social allowances or vouchers for, or direct payments to, those consumers. This can be an appropriate alternative having regard to the need to minimise market distortions. Alternatively, or in addition, Member States could require providers of such services to offer basic tariff options or packages to those consumers.
(220)
Ensuring affordability may involve special tariff options or packages to deal with the needs of low-income users or users with special social needs. Such offers should be provided with basic features, in order to avoid distortion of the functioning of the market. Affordability for individual consumers should be founded upon their right to contract with a provider, availability of a number, continued connection of service and their ability to monitor and control their expenditure.
(221)
Where a Member State requires providers to offer to consumers with a low-income or special social needs tariff options or packages different from those provided under normal commercial conditions, those tariff options or packages should be provided by all providers of internet access and voice communication services. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, requiring all providers of internet access and voice communication services to offer tariff options or packages should not result in excessive administrative or financial burden for those providers or Member States. Where a Member State demonstrates such an excessive administrative or financial burden, on the basis of an objective assessment, it might exceptionally decide to impose the obligation to offer specific tariff options or packages only on designated providers. The objective assessment should also consider the benefits arising for consumers with a low-income or special social needs from a choice of providers and the benefits for all providers being able to benefit from being a universal service provider. Where a Member State exceptionally decides to impose the obligation to offer specific tariff options or packages only on designated providers, they should ensure that consumers with low income or special needs have a choice of providers offering social tariffs. However, in certain situations Member States might not be able to guarantee a choice of providers, for example where only one undertaking provides services in the area of residence of the beneficiary, or if providing a choice would put an excessive additional organisational and financial burden on the Member State.
(222)
Affordability should no longer be a barrier to consumers’ access to the minimum set of connectivity services. A right to contract with a provider should mean that consumers who might face refusal, in particular those with a low-income or special social needs, should have the possibility to enter into a contract for the provision of affordable adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services at least at a fixed location with any provider of such services in that location or a designated provider, where a Member State has exceptionally decided to designate one or more providers to offer those tariff options or packages. In order to minimise the financial risks such as non-payment of bills, providers should be free to provide the contract under pre-payment terms, on the basis of affordable individual pre-paid units.
(223)
In order to ensure that citizens are reachable by voice communications services, Member States should ensure the availability of a number for a reasonable period also during periods of non-use of voice communications services. Providers should be able to put in place mechanisms to check the continued interest of the consumer in keeping the availability of the number.
(224)
Compensating providers of such services in such circumstances need not result in the distortion of competition, provided that such providers are compensated for the specific net cost involved and provided that the net cost burden is recovered in a competitively neutral way.
(225)
In order to assess the need for affordability measures, national regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities should be able to monitor the evolution and details of offers of tariff options or packages for consumers with a low-income or special social needs.
(226)
Member States should introduce measures to promote the creation of a market for affordable products and services incorporating facilities for consumers with disabilities, including equipment with assistive technologies. This can be achieved, inter alia, by referring to European standards, or by supporting the implementation of requirements under Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services. Member States should introduce appropriate measures in accordance with national circumstances, which gives flexibility for Member States to take specific measures for instance if the market is not delivering affordable products and services incorporating facilities for consumers with disabilities under normal economic conditions. Those measures could include direct financial support to end-users. The cost to consumers with disabilities of relay services should be equivalent to the average cost of voice communications services.
(227)
Relay services refer to services which enable two-way communication between remote end-users of different modes of communication (for example text, sign, speech) by providing conversion between those modes of communication, normally by a human operator. Real time text is defined in accordance with Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services and refers to form of text conversation in point to point situations or in multipoint conferencing where the text being entered is sent in such a way that the communication is perceived by the user as being continuous on a character-by-character basis.
(228)
For data communications at data rates that are sufficient to permit an adequate broadband internet access, fixed-line connections are nearly universally available and used by a majority of citizens of the Union. The standard fixed broadband coverage and availability in the Union stood at 97 % of homes in 2015, with an average take-up rate of 72 %, and services based on wireless technologies have even greater reach. However, there are differences between Member States as regards availability and affordability of fixed broadband across urban and rural areas.
(229)
The market has a leading role to play in ensuring availability of broadband internet access with constantly growing capacity. In areas where the market would not deliver, other public policy tools to support availability of adequate broadband internet access connections appear, in principle, more cost-effective and less market-distortive than universal service obligations, for example recourse to financial instruments such as those available under the European Fund for Strategic Investments and Connecting Europe Facility, the use of public funding from the European structural and investment funds, attaching coverage obligations to rights of use for radio spectrum to support the deployment of broadband networks in less densely populated areas and public investment in accordance with Union State aid rules.
(230)
If, after carrying out a due assessment, taking into account the results of the geographical survey of networks deployment conducted by the competent authority, or the latest information available to the Member States before the results of the first geographical survey are available, it is shown that neither the market nor public intervention mechanisms are likely to provide end-users in certain areas with a connection capable of delivering adequate broadband internet access service as defined by Member States and voice communications services at a fixed location, the Member State should be able to exceptionally designate different providers or sets of providers of those services in the different relevant parts of the national territory. In addition to the geographical survey, Member States should be able to use, where necessary, any additional evidence to establish to what extent adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services are available at a fixed location. That additional evidence could include data available to the national regulatory authorities through the market analysis procedure and data collected from users. Member States should be able to restrict universal service obligations in support of availability of adequate broadband internet access services to the end-user’s primary location or residence. There should be no constraints on the technical means by which the adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services at a fixed location are provided, allowing for wired or wireless technologies, nor any constraints on which undertakings provide part or all of universal service obligations.
(231)
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is for the Member States to decide on the basis of objective criteria which undertakings are designated as universal service providers, where appropriate taking into account the ability and the willingness of undertakings to accept all or part of the universal service obligations. This does not preclude Member States from including, in the designation process, specific conditions justified on grounds of efficiency, including grouping geographical areas or components or setting minimum periods for the designation.
(232)
The costs of ensuring the availability of a connection capable of delivering an adequate broadband internet access service as identified in accordance with this Directive and voice communications services at a fixed location at an affordable price within the universal service obligations should be estimated, in particular by assessing the expected financial burden for providers and users in the electronic communications sector.
(233)
A priori, requirements to ensure nation-wide territorial coverage imposed in the designation procedure are likely to exclude or dissuade certain undertakings from applying for being designated as universal service providers. Designating providers with universal service obligations for an excessive or indefinite period might also lead to an a priori exclusion of certain providers. Where a Member State decides to designate one or more providers for affordability purposes, it should be possible for those providers to be different from those designated for the availability element of universal service.
(234)
When a provider that is, on an exceptional basis, designated to provide tariff options or packages different from those provided under normal commercial conditions, as identified in accordance with this Directive or to ensure the availability at a fixed location of an adequate broadband internet access service or voice communications services, as identified in accordance with this Directive, chooses to dispose of a substantial part, viewed in light of its universal service obligations, or all, of its local access network assets in the national territory to a separate legal entity under different ultimate ownership, the competent authority should assess the effects of the transaction in order to ensure the continuity of universal service obligations in all or parts of the national territory. To that end, the competent authority which imposed the universal service obligations should be informed by the provider in advance of the disposal. The assessment of the competent authority should not prejudice the completion of the transaction.
(235)
In order to provide stability and support a gradual transition, Member States should be able to continue to ensure the provision of universal service in their territory, other than adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services at a fixed location, that are included in the scope of their universal service obligations on the basis of Directive 2002/22/EC on the date of entry into force of this Directive, provided the services or comparable services are not available under normal commercial circumstances. Allowing the continuation of the provision of public payphones to the general public by use of coins, credit or debit cards, or pre-payment cards, including cards for use with dialling codes, directories and directory enquiry services under the universal service regime, for as long as the need is demonstrated, would give Member States the flexibility necessary to duly take into account the varying national circumstances. This can include providing public pay telephones in the main entry points of the country, such as airports or train and bus stations, as well as places used by people in the case of an emergency, such as hospitals, police stations and highway emergency areas, to meet the reasonable needs of end-users, including in particular end-users with disabilities.
(236)
Member States should monitor the situation of consumers with respect to their use of adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services and in particular with respect to affordability. The affordability of adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services is related to the information which users receive regarding usage expenses as well as the relative cost of usage compared to other services, and is also related to their ability to control expenditure. Affordability therefore means giving power to consumers through obligations imposed on providers. Those obligations include a specified level of itemised billing, the possibility for consumers selectively to block certain calls, such as high-priced calls to premium services, to control expenditure via pre-payment means, and to offset up-front connection fees. Such measures may need to be reviewed and changed in light of market developments. Itemised bills on the usage of internet access should indicate only the time, duration and amount of consumption during a usage session but not indicate the websites or internet end-points connected to during such a usage session.
(237)
Except in cases of persistent late payment or non-payment of bills, consumers entitled to affordable tariffs should, pending resolution of the dispute, be protected from immediate disconnection from the network on the grounds of an unpaid bill and, in particular, in the case of disputes over high bills for premium-rate services, continue to have access to essential voice communications services and a minimum service level of internet access as defined by Member States. It should be possible for Member States to decide that such access is to continue to be provided only if the subscriber continues to pay line rental or basic internet access charges.
(238)
Where the provision of adequate broadband internet access and voice communications services or the provision of other services in accordance with this Directive result in an unfair burden on a provider, taking due account of the costs and revenues as well as the intangible benefits resulting from the provision of the services concerned, that unfair burden can be included in any net cost calculation of universal service obligations.
(239)
Member States should, where necessary, establish mechanisms for financing the net cost of universal service obligations where it is demonstrated that the obligations can only be provided at a loss or at a net cost which falls outside normal commercial standards. It is important to ensure that the net cost of universal service obligations is properly calculated and that any financing is undertaken with minimum distortion to the market and to undertakings, and is compatible with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
(240)
Any calculation of the net cost of universal service obligations should take due account of costs and revenues, as well as the intangible benefits resulting from providing universal service, but should not hinder the general aim of ensuring that pricing structures reflect costs. Any net costs of universal service obligations should be calculated on the basis of transparent procedures.
(241)
Taking into account intangible benefits means that an estimate in monetary terms, of the indirect benefits that an undertaking derives by virtue of its position as universal service provider, should be deducted from the direct net cost of universal service obligations in order to determine the overall cost burden.
(242)
When a universal service obligation represents an unfair burden on a provider, it is appropriate to allow Member States to establish mechanisms for efficiently recovering net costs. Recovery via public funds constitutes one method of recovering the net costs of universal service obligations. Sharing the net costs of universal service obligations between providers of electronic communications networks and services is another method. Member States should be able to finance the net costs of different elements of universal service through different mechanisms, or to finance the net costs of some or all elements from either of the mechanisms or a combination of both. Adequate broadband internet access brings benefits not only to the electronic communications sector but also to the wider online economy and to society as a whole. Providing a connection which supports broadband speeds to an increased number of end-users enables them to use online services and so actively to participate in the digital society. Ensuring such connections on the basis of universal service obligations serves both the public interest and the interests of electronic communications providers. Those facts should be taken into account by Member States when choosing and designing mechanisms for recovering net costs.
(243)
In the case of cost recovery by means of sharing the net cost of universal service obligations between providers of electronic communications networks and services, Member States should ensure that the method of allocation amongst providers is based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria and is in accordance with the principle of proportionality. This principle does not prevent Member States from exempting new entrants which have not achieved any significant market presence. Any funding mechanism should ensure that market participants only contribute to the financing of universal service obligations and not to other activities which are not directly linked to the provision of the universal service obligations. Recovery mechanisms should respect the principles of Union law, and in particular in the case of sharing mechanisms those of non-discrimination and proportionality. Any funding mechanism should ensure that users in one Member State do not contribute to the costs of providing universal service in another Member State. It should be possible to share the net cost of universal service obligations between all or certain specified classes of providers. Member States should ensure that the sharing mechanism respects the principles of transparency, least market distortion, non-discrimination and proportionality. Least market distortion means that contributions should be recovered in a way that as far as possible minimises the impact of the financial burden falling on end-users, for example by spreading contributions as widely as possible.
(244)
Providers benefiting from universal service funding should provide national regulatory authorities with a sufficient level of detail of the specific elements requiring such funding in order to justify their request. Member States’ schemes for the costing and financing of universal service obligations should be communicated to the Commission for verification of compatibility with the TFEU. Member States should ensure effective transparency and control of amounts charged to finance universal service obligations. Calculation of the net costs of providing universal service should be based on an objective and transparent methodology to ensure the most cost-effective provision of universal service and promote a level playing field for market participants. Making the methodology intended to be used to calculate the net costs of individual universal service elements known in advance before implementing the calculation could help to achieve increased transparency.
(245)
Member States are not permitted to impose on market participants financial contributions which relate to measures which are not part of the universal service obligations. Individual Member States remain free to impose special measures (outside the scope of universal service obligations) and finance them in accordance with Union law but not by means of contributions from market participants.
(246)
In order to effectively support the free movement of goods, services and persons within the Union, it should be possible to use certain national numbering resources, in particular certain non-geographic numbers, in an extraterritorial manner, that is to say outside the territory of the assigning Member State. In light of the considerable risk of fraud with respect to interpersonal communications, such extraterritorial use should be allowed only for the provision of electronic communications services other than interpersonal communications services. Enforcement of relevant national laws, in particular consumer protection rules and other rules related to the use of numbering resources should be ensured by Member States independently of where the rights of use have been granted and where the numbering resources are used within the Union. Member States remain competent to apply their national law to numbering resources used in their territory, including where rights have been granted in another Member State.
(247)
The national regulatory or other competent authorities of the Member States where numbering resources from another Member State are used, do not have control over those numbering resources. It is therefore essential that the national regulatory or other competent authority of the Member State which grants the rights of extraterritorial use should also ensure the effective protection of the end-users in the Member States where those numbers are used. In order to achieve effective protection, national regulatory or other competent authority granting rights of extraterritorial use should attach conditions in accordance with this Directive regarding the respect by the provider of consumer protection rules and other rules related to the use of numbering resources in those Member States where those resources will be used.
(248)
The national regulatory or other competent authorities of those Member States where numbering resources are used should be able to request the support of the national regulatory or other competent authorities that granted the rights of use for the numbering resources to assist in enforcing its rules. Enforcement measures by the national regulatory or other competent authorities that granted the rights of use should include dissuasive penalties, in particular in the case of a serious breach the withdrawal of the right of extraterritorial use for the numbering resources assigned to the undertaking concerned. The requirements on extraterritorial use should be without prejudice to Member States’ powers to block, on a case-by-case basis, access to numbers or services where that is justified by reasons of fraud or misuse. The extraterritorial use of numbering resources should be without prejudice to Union rules related to the provision of roaming services, including those relative to preventing anomalous or abusive use of roaming services which are subject to retail price regulation and which benefit from regulated wholesale roaming rates. Member States should continue to be able to enter into specific agreements on extraterritorial use of numbering resources with third countries.
(249)
Member States should promote over-the-air provisioning of numbering resources to facilitate switching of electronic communications providers. Over-the-air provisioning of numbering resources enables the reprogramming of communications equipment identifiers without physical access to the devices concerned. This feature is particularly relevant for machine-to-machine services, that is to say services involving an automated transfer of data and information between devices or software-based applications with limited or no human interaction. Providers of such machine-to-machine services might not have recourse to physical access to their devices due to their use in remote conditions, or to the large number of devices deployed or to their usage patterns. In light of the emerging machine-to-machine market and new technologies, Member States should strive to ensure technology neutrality in promoting over-the-air provisioning.
(250)
Access to numbering resources on the basis of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria is essential for undertakings to compete in the electronic communications sector. Member States should be able to grant rights of use for numbering resources to undertakings other than providers of electronic communications networks or services in light of the increasing relevance of numbers for various Internet of Things services. All elements of national numbering plans should be managed by national regulatory or other competent authorities, including point codes used in network addressing. Where there is a need for harmonisation of numbering resources in the Union to support the development of pan-European services or cross-border services, in particular new machine-to-machine-based services such as connected cars, and where the demand could not be met on the basis of the existing numbering resources in place, the Commission can take implementing measures with the assistance of BEREC.
(251)
It should be possible to fulfil the requirement to publish decisions on the granting of rights of use for numbering resources by making those decisions publicly accessible via a website.
(252)
Considering the particular aspects related to the reporting of missing children, Member States should maintain their commitment to ensure that a well-functioning service for reporting missing children is actually available in their territories under the number ‘116000’. Member States should take appropriate measures to ensure that a sufficient level of service quality in operating the ‘116000’ number is achieved.
(253)
In parallel with the missing children hotline number ‘116000’, many Member States also ensure that children have access to a child-friendly service operating a helpline that helps children in need of care and protection through the use of the ‘116111’ number. Such Member States and the Commission should ensure that awareness is raised among citizens, and in particular among children and among national child protection systems, about the existence of the ‘116111’ helpline.
(254)
An internal market implies that end-users are able to access all numbers included in the national numbering plans of other Member States and to access services using non-geographic numbers, including freephone and premium-rate numbers, within the Union, except where the called end-user has chosen, for commercial reasons, to limit access from certain geographical areas. End-users should also be able to access numbers from the Universal International Freephone Numbers (UIFN). Cross-border access to numbering resources and associated services should not be prevented, except in objectively justified cases, for example to combat fraud or abuse (for example, in connection with certain premium-rate services), when the number is defined as having a national scope only (for example, a national short code) or when it is economically unfeasible. Tariffs charged to parties calling from outside the Member State concerned need not be the same as for those parties calling from inside that Member State. Users should be fully informed in advance and in a clear manner of any charges applicable to freephone numbers, such as international call charges for numbers accessible through standard international dialling codes. Where interconnection or other service revenues are withheld by providers of electronic communications services for reasons of fraud or misuse, Member States should ensure that retained service revenues are refunded to the end-users affected by the relevant fraud or misuse where possible.
(255)
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, a number of provisions on end-user rights in this Directive should not apply to microenterprises which provide only number-independent interpersonal communications services. According to the case law of the Court of Justice, the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises, which includes microenterprises, is to be interpreted strictly. In order to include only enterprises that are genuinely independent microenterprises, it is necessary to examine the structure of microenterprises which form an economic group, the power of which exceeds the power of a microenterprise, and to ensure that the definition of microenterprise is not circumvented by purely formal means.
(256)
The completion of the single market for electronic communications requires the removal of barriers for end-users to have cross-border access to electronic communications services across the Union. Providers of electronic communications to the public should not deny or restrict access or discriminate against end-users on the basis of their nationality, or Member State of residence or of establishment. Differentiation should, however, be possible on the basis of objectively justifiable differences in costs and risks, not limited to the measures provided for in Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 in respect of abusive or anomalous use of regulated retail roaming services.
(257)
Divergent implementation of the rules on end-user protection has created significant internal market barriers affecting both providers of electronic communications services and end-users. Those barriers should be reduced by the applicability of the same rules ensuring a high common level of protection across the Union. A calibrated full harmonisation of the end-user rights covered by this Directive should considerably increase legal certainty for both end-users and providers of electronic communications services, and should significantly lower entry barriers and unnecessary compliance burden stemming from the fragmentation of the rules. Full harmonisation helps to overcome barriers to the functioning of the internal market resulting from such national provisions concerning end-user rights which at the same time protect national providers against competition from other Member States. In order to achieve a high common level of protection, several provisions concerning end-user rights should be reasonably enhanced in this Directive in light of best practices in Member States. Full harmonisation of their rights increases the trust of end-users in the internal market as they benefit from an equally high level of protection when using electronic communications services, not only in their Member State but also while living, working or travelling in other Member States. Full harmonisation should extend only to the subject matters covered by the provisions on end-user rights in this Directive. Therefore, it should not affect national law with respect to those aspects of end-user protection, including some aspects of transparency measures which are not covered by those provisions. For example, measures relating to transparency obligations which are not covered by this Directive should be considered to be compatible with the principle of full harmonisation whereas additional requirements regarding transparency issues covered by this Directive, such as publication of information, should be considered to be incompatible. Moreover, Member States should be able to maintain or introduce national provisions on issues not specifically addressed in this Directive, in particular in order to address newly emerging issues.
(258)
Contracts are an important tool for end- users to ensure transparency of information and legal certainty. Most service providers in a competitive environment will conclude contracts with their customers for reasons of commercial desirability. In addition to this Directive, the requirements of existing Union consumer protection law relating to contracts, in particular Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
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 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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, apply to consumer transactions relating to electronic communications networks and services. The inclusion of information requirements in this Directive, which might also be required pursuant to Directive 2011/83/EU, should not lead to duplication of the information within pre-contractual and contractual documents. Relevant information provided in respect of this Directive, including any more prescriptive and more detailed informational requirements, should be considered to fulfil the corresponding requirements pursuant to Directive 2011/83/EU.
(259)
Some of those end-user protection provisions which a priori apply only to consumers, namely those on contract information, maximum contract duration and bundles, should benefit not only consumers, but also microenterprises and small enterprises, and not-for-profit organisations as defined in national law. The bargaining position of those categories of enterprises and organisations is comparable to that of consumers and they should therefore benefit from the same level of protection unless they explicitly waive those rights. Obligations on contract information in this Directive, including those of Directive 2011/83/EU that are referred to in this Directive, should apply irrespective of whether any payment is made and of the amount of the payment to be made by the customer. The obligations on contract information, including those contained in Directive 2011/83/EU, should apply automatically to microenterprises, small enterprises and not-for-profit organisations unless they prefer negotiating individualised contract terms with providers of electronic communications services. As opposed to microenterprises, small enterprises and not-for-profit organisations, larger enterprises usually have stronger bargaining power and do, therefore, not depend on the same contractual information requirements as consumers. Other provisions, such as number portability, which are important also for larger enterprises should continue to apply to all end-users. Not-for-profit organisations are legal entities that do not earn a profit for their owners or members. Typically, not-for-profit organisations are charities or other types of public interest organisations. Hence, in light of the comparable situation, it is legitimate to treat such organisations in the same way as microenterprises or small enterprises under this Directive, insofar as end-user rights are concerned.
(260)
The specificities of the electronic communications sector require, beyond horizontal contract rules, a limited number of additional end-user protection provisions. End-users should be informed, inter alia, of any quality of service levels offered, conditions for promotions and termination of contracts, applicable tariff plans and tariffs for services subject to particular pricing conditions. That information is relevant for providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services. Without prejudice to the applicable rules on the protection of personal data, a provider of publicly available electronic communications services should not be subject to the obligations on information requirements for contracts where that provider, and affiliated companies or persons, do not receive any remuneration directly or indirectly linked to the provision of electronic communications services, such as where a university gives visitors free access to its Wi-Fi network on campus without receiving any remuneration, whether through payment from the users or through advertising revenues.
(261)
In order to enable the end-user to make a well-informed choice, it is essential that the required relevant information is provided prior to the conclusion of the contract and in clear and understandable language and on a durable medium or, where not feasible and without prejudice to the definition of durable medium set out in Directive 2011/83/EU, in a document, made available by the provider and notified to the user, that is easy to download, open and consult on devices commonly used by consumers. In order to facilitate choice, providers should also present a summary of the essential contract terms. In order to facilitate comparability and reduce compliance cost, the Commission should, after consulting BEREC, adopt a template for such contract summaries. The pre-contractually provided information as well as the summary template should constitute an integral part of the final contract. The contract summary should be concise and easily readable, ideally no longer than the equivalent of one single-sided A4 page or, where a number of different services are bundled into a single contract, the equivalent of up to three single-sided A4 pages.
(262)
Following the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, the provisions in this Directive regarding information on conditions limiting access to, or the use of, services and applications as well as information on traffic shaping became obsolete and should be repealed.
(263)
With respect to terminal equipment, the customer contract should specify any conditions imposed by the provider on the use of the equipment, such as by way of ‘SIM-locking’ mobile devices, if such conditions are not prohibited under national law, and any charges due on termination of the contract, whether before or on the agreed expiry date, including any cost imposed in order to retain the equipment. Where the end-user chooses to retain terminal equipment bundled at the moment of the contract conclusion, any compensation due should not exceed its pro rata temporis value calculated on the basis of the value at the moment of the contract conclusion, or on the remaining part of the service fee until the end of the contract, whichever amount is smaller. Member States should be able to choose other methods of calculating the compensation rate, where such a rate is equal to or less than that compensation calculated. Any restriction to the usage of terminal equipment on other networks should be lifted, free of charge, by the provider at the latest upon payment of such compensation.
(264)
Without prejudice to the substantive obligation on the provider related to security by virtue of this Directive, the contract should specify the type of action the provider might take in the case of security incidents, threats or vulnerabilities. In addition, the contract should also specify any compensation and refund arrangements available if a provider responds inadequately to a security incident, including if a security incident, notified to the provider, takes place due to known software or hardware vulnerabilities, for which patches have been issued by the manufacturer or developer and the service provider has not applied those patches or taken any other appropriate counter-measure.
(265)
The availability of transparent, up-to-date and comparable information on offers and services is a key element for consumers in competitive markets where several providers offer services. End-users should be able to compare the prices of various services offered on the market easily on the basis of information published in an easily accessible form. In order to allow them to make price and service comparisons easily, competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities should be able to require from providers of internet access services or publicly available interpersonal communication services greater transparency as regards information, including tariffs, quality of service, conditions on terminal equipment supplied, and other relevant statistics. Any such requirements should take due account of the characteristics of those networks or services. They should also ensure that third parties have the right to use, without charge, publicly available information published by such undertakings, with a view to providing comparison tools.
(266)
End-users are often not aware of the cost of their consumption behaviour or have difficulties in estimating their time or data consumption when using electronic communications services. In order to increase transparency and to allow for better control of their communications budget, it is important to provide end-users with facilities that enable them to track their consumption in a timely manner. In addition, Member States should be able to maintain or introduce provisions on consumption limits protecting end-users against ‘bill-shocks’, including in relation to premium rate services and other services subject to particular pricing conditions. This allows competent authorities to require information about such prices to be provided prior to providing the service and does not prejudice the possibility of Member States to maintain or introduce general obligations for premium rate services to ensure the effective protection of end-users.
(267)
Independent comparison tools, such as websites, are an effective means for end-users to assess the merits of different providers of internet access services and interpersonal communications services, where provided against recurring or consumption-based direct monetary payments, and to obtain impartial information, in particular by comparing prices, tariffs, and quality parameters in one place. Such tools should be operationally independent from service providers and no service provider should be given favourable treatment in search results. Such tools should aim to provide information that is both clear and concise, and complete and comprehensive. They should also aim to include the broadest possible range of offers, in order to give a representative overview and cover a significant part of the market. The information given on such tools should be trustworthy, impartial and transparent. End-users should be informed of the availability of such tools. Member States should ensure that end-users have free access to at least one such tool in their respective territories. Where there is only one tool in a Member State and that tool ceases to operate or ceases to comply with the quality criteria, the Member State should ensure that end-users have access within a reasonable time to another comparison tool at national level.
(268)
Independent comparison tools can be operated by private undertakings, or by or on behalf of competent authorities, however they should be operated in accordance with specified quality criteria including the requirement to provide details of their owners, provide accurate and up-to-date information, state the time of the last update, set out clear, objective criteria on which the comparison will be based, and include a broad range of offers covering a significant part of the market. Member States should be able to determine how often comparison tools are required to review and update the information they provide to end-users, taking into account the frequency with which providers of internet access services and of publicly available interpersonal communications services, generally update their tariff and quality information.
(269)
In order to address public interest issues with respect to the use of internet access services and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services and to encourage protection of the rights and freedoms of others, Member States should be able to produce and disseminate or have disseminated, with the aid of providers of such services, public-interest information related to the use of such services. It should be possible for such information to include public-interest information regarding the most common infringements and their legal consequences, for instance regarding copyright infringement, other unlawful uses and the dissemination of harmful content, and advice and means of protection against risks to personal security, for example those arising from disclosure of personal information in certain circumstances, as well as risks to privacy and personal data, and the availability of easy-to-use and configurable software or software options allowing protection for children or vulnerable persons. The information could be coordinated by way of the cooperation procedure established in this Directive. Such public-interest information should be updated where necessary and should be presented in easily comprehensible formats, as determined by each Member State, and on national public authority websites. Member States should be able to oblige providers of internet access services and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services to disseminate this standardised information to all of their customers in a manner considered to be appropriate by the national public authorities. Dissemination of such information should, however, not impose an excessive burden on providers. If it does so, Member States should require such dissemination by the means used by providers in communications with end-users made in the ordinary course of business.
(270)
In the absence of relevant rules of Union law, content, applications and services are considered to be lawful or harmful in accordance with national substantive and procedural law. It is a task for the Member States, not for providers of electronic communications networks or services, to decide, in accordance with due process, whether content, applications or services are lawful or harmful. This Directive and Directive 2002/58/EC are without prejudice to Directive 2000/31/EC, which, inter alia, contains a ‘mere conduit’ rule for intermediary service providers, as defined therein.
(271)
National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities, or where relevant, other competent authorities in co-ordination with national regulatory authorities should be empowered to monitor the quality of services and to collect systematically information on the quality of services offered by providers of internet access services and of publicly available interpersonal communications services, to the extent that the latter are able to offer minimum levels of service quality either through control of at least some elements of the network or by virtue of a service level agreement to that end, including the quality related to the provision of services to end-users with disabilities. That information should be collected on the basis of criteria which allow comparability between service providers and between Member States. Providers of such electronic communications services, operating in a competitive environment, are likely to make adequate and up-to-date information on their services publicly available for reasons of commercial advantage. National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities, or where relevant, other competent authorities in co-ordination with national regulatory authorities should nonetheless be able to require publication of such information where it is demonstrated that such information is not effectively available to the public. Where the quality of services of publicly available interpersonal communication services depends on any external factors, such as control of signal transmission or network connectivity, national regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities should be able to require providers of such services to inform their consumers accordingly.
(272)
National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities should also set out the measurement methods to be applied by the service providers in order to improve the comparability of the data provided. In order to facilitate comparability across the Union and to reduce compliance cost, BEREC should adopt guidelines on relevant quality of service parameters which national regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities should take into utmost account.
(273)
In order to take full advantage of the competitive environment, consumers should be able to make informed choices and to change providers when it is in their best interest to do so. It is essential to ensure that they are able to do so without being hindered by legal, technical or practical obstacles, including contractual conditions, procedures and charges. That does not preclude providers from setting reasonable minimum contractual periods of up to 24 months in consumer contracts. However, Member States should have the possibility to maintain or introduce provisions for a shorter maximum duration and to permit consumers to change tariff plans or terminate the contract within the contract period without incurring additional costs in light of national conditions, such as levels of competition and stability of network investments. Independently from the electronic communications service contract, consumers might prefer and benefit from a longer reimbursement period for physical connections. Such consumer commitments can be an important factor in facilitating deployment of very high capacity networks up to or very close to end-user premises, including through demand aggregation schemes which enable network investors to reduce initial take-up risks. However, the rights of consumers to switch between providers of electronic communications services, as established in this Directive, should not be restricted by such reimbursement periods in contracts on physical connections and such contracts should not cover terminal or internet access equipment, such as handsets, routers or modems. Member States should ensure the equal treatment of entities, including operators, financing the deployment of a very high capacity physical connection to the premises of an end-user, including where such financing is by way of an instalment contract.
(274)
Automatic prolongation of contracts for electronic communications services is also possible. In those cases, end-users should be able to terminate their contract without incurring any costs after the expiry of the contract term.
(275)
Any changes to the contractual conditions proposed by providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than number-independent interpersonal communications services, which are not to the benefit of the end-user, for example in relation to charges, tariffs, data volume limitations, data speeds, coverage, or the processing of personal data, should give rise to the right of the end-user to terminate the contract without incurring any costs, even if they are combined with some beneficial changes. Any change to the contractual conditions by the provider should therefore entitle the end-user to terminate the contract unless each change is in itself beneficial to the end-user, or the changes are of a purely administrative nature, such as a change in the provider’s address, and have no negative effect on the end-user, or the changes are strictly imposed by legislative or regulatory changes, such as new contract information requirements imposed by Union or national law. Whether a change is exclusively to the benefit of the end-user should be assessed on the basis of objective criteria. The end-user’s right to terminate the contract should be excluded only if the provider is able to demonstrate that all contract changes are exclusively to the benefit of the end-user or are of a purely administrative nature without any negative effect on the end-user.
(276)
End-users should be notified of any changes to the contractual conditions by means of a durable medium. End-users other than consumers, microenterprises or small enterprises, or not-for-profit organisations should not benefit from the termination rights in the case of contract modification, insofar as transmission services used for machine-to-machine services are concerned. Member States should be able to provide for specific end-user protections regarding contract termination where the end-users change their place of residence. The provisions on contract termination should be without prejudice to other provisions of Union or national law concerning the grounds on which contracts can be terminated or on which contractual terms and conditions can be changed by the service provider or by the end-user.
(277)
The possibility of switching between providers is key for effective competition in a competitive environment. The availability of transparent, accurate and timely information on switching should increase the end-users’ confidence in switching and make them more willing to engage actively in the competitive process. Service providers should ensure continuity of service so that end-users are able to switch providers without being hindered by the risk of a loss of service and, where technically possible, allow for switching on the date requested by end-users.
(278)
Number portability is a key facilitator of consumer choice and effective competition in competitive electronic communications markets. End-users who so request should be able to retain their numbers independently of the provider of service and for a limited time between the switching of providers of service. The provision of this facility between connections to the public telephone network at fixed and non-fixed locations is not covered by this Directive. However, Member States should be able to apply provisions for porting numbers between networks providing services at a fixed location and mobile networks.
(279)
The impact of number portability is considerably strengthened when there is transparent tariff information, both for end-users who port their numbers and for end-users who call those who have ported their numbers. National regulatory authorities should, where feasible, facilitate appropriate tariff transparency as part of the implementation of number portability.
(280)
When ensuring that pricing for interconnection related to the provision of number portability is cost-oriented, national regulatory authorities should also be able to take account of prices available in comparable markets.
(281)
Number portability is a key facilitator of consumer choice and effective competition in competitive markets for electronic communications and should be implemented with the minimum delay, so that the number is functionally activated within one working day and the end-user does not experience a loss of service lasting longer than one working day from the agreed date. The right to port the number should be attributed to the end-user who has the relevant (pre- or post-paid) contract with the provider. In order to facilitate a one-stop-shop enabling a seamless switching experience for end- users, the switching process should be led by the receiving provider of electronic communications to the public. National regulatory or, where relevant, other competent authorities should be able to prescribe the global process of the switching and of the porting of numbers, taking into account national provisions on contracts and technological developments. This should include, where available, a requirement for the porting to be completed though over-the-air provisioning, unless an end-user requests otherwise. Experience in certain Member States has shown that there is a risk of end-users being switched to another provider without having given their consent. While that is a matter that should primarily be addressed by law enforcement authorities, Member States should be able to impose such minimum proportionate measures regarding the switching process, including appropriate penalties, as are necessary to minimise such risks, and to ensure that end-users are protected throughout the switching process without making the process less attractive for them. The right to port numbers should not be restricted by contractual conditions.
(282)
In order to ensure that switching and porting take place within the time-limits provided for in this Directive, Member States should provide for the compensation of end-users by providers in an easy and timely manner where an agreement between a provider and an end-user is not respected. Such measures should be proportionate to the length of the delay in complying with the agreement. End-users should at least be compensated for delays exceeding one working day in activation of service, porting of a number, or loss of service, and where providers miss agreed service or installation appointments. Additional compensation could also be in the form of an automatic reduction of the remuneration where the transferring provider is to continue providing its services until the services of the receiving provider are activated.
(283)
Bundles comprising at least either an internet access service or a publicly available number-based interpersonal communications service, as well as other services, such as publicly available number-independent interpersonal communications services, linear broadcasting and machine-to-machine services, or terminal equipment, have become increasingly widespread and are an important element of competition. For the purposes of this Directive, a bundle should be considered to exist in situations where the elements of the bundle are provided or sold by the same provider under the same or a closely related or linked contract. While bundles often bring about benefits for consumers, they can make switching more difficult or costly and raise risks of contractual ‘lock-in’. Where different services and terminal equipment within a bundle are subject to divergent rules on contract termination and switching or on contractual commitments regarding the acquisition of terminal equipment, consumers are effectively hampered in their rights under this Directive to switch to competitive offers for the entire bundle or parts of it. Certain essential provisions of this Directive regarding contract summary information, transparency, contract duration and termination and switching should, therefore, apply to all elements of a bundle, including terminal equipment, other services such as digital content or digital services, and electronic communications services which are not directly covered by the scope of those provisions. All end-user obligations applicable under this Directive to a given electronic communications service when provided or sold as a stand-alone service should also be applicable when it is part of a bundle with at least an internet access service or a publicly available number-based interpersonal communications service. Other contractual issues, such as the remedies applicable in the event of non-conformity with the contract, should be governed by the rules applicable to the respective element of the bundle, for instance by the rules of contracts for the sales of goods or for the supply of digital content. However, a right to terminate any element of a bundle comprising at least an internet access service or a publicly available number-based interpersonal communications service before the end of the agreed contract term because of a lack of conformity or a failure to supply should give a consumer the right to terminate all elements of the bundle. Also, in order to maintain their capacity to switch easily providers, consumers should not be locked in with a provider by means of a contractual de facto extension of the initial contract period.
(284)
Providers of number-based interpersonal communications services have an obligation to provide access to emergency services through emergency communications. In exceptional circumstances, namely due to a lack of technical feasibility, they might not be able to provide access to emergency services or caller location, or to both. In such cases, they should inform their customers adequately in the contract. Such providers should provide their customers with clear and transparent information in the initial contract and update it in the event of any change in the provision of access to emergency services, for example in invoices. That information should include any limitations on territorial coverage, on the basis of the planned technical operating parameters of the communications service and the available infrastructure. Where the service is not provided over a connection which is managed to give a specified quality of service, the information should also include the level of reliability of the access and of caller location information compared to a service that is provided over such a connection, taking into account current technology and quality standards, as well as any quality of service parameters specified under this Directive.
(285)
End-users should be able to access emergency services through emergency communications free of charge and without having to use any means of payment, from any device which enables number-based interpersonal communications services, including when using roaming services in a Member State. Emergency communications are a means of communication that includes not only voice communications services, but also SMS, messaging, video or other types of communications, for example real time text, total conversation and relay services. Member States, taking into account the capabilities and technical equipment of the PSAPs, should be able to determine which number-based interpersonal communications services are appropriate for emergency services, including the possibility to limit those options to voice communications services and their equivalent for end-users with disabilities, or to add additional options as agreed with national PSAPs. Emergency communication can be triggered on behalf of a person by an in-vehicle emergency call or an eCall as defined in Regulation (EU) 2015/758.
(286)
Member States should ensure that providers of number-based interpersonal communications services provide reliable and accurate access to emergency services, taking into account national specifications and criteria and the capabilities of national PSAPs. Member States should consider the PSAP’s ability to handle emergency communications in more than one language. Where the number-based interpersonal communications service is not provided over a connection which is managed to give a specified quality of service, the service provider might not be able to ensure that emergency calls made through their service are routed to the most appropriate PSAP with the same reliability. For such network-independent providers, namely providers which are not integrated with a provider of public electronic communications networks, providing caller location information may not always be technically feasible. Member States should ensure that standards ensuring accurate and reliable routing and connection to the emergency services are implemented as soon as possible in order to allow network-independent providers of number-based interpersonal communications services to fulfil the obligations related to access to emergency services and caller location information provision at a level comparable to that required of other providers of such communications services. Where such standards and the related PSAP systems have not been implemented, network-independent number-based interpersonal communications services should not be required to provide access to emergency services except in a manner that is technically feasible or economically viable. This may, for example, include the designation by a Member State of a single, central PSAP for receiving emergency communications. Nonetheless, such providers should inform end-users when access to the single European emergency number ‘112’ or to caller location information is not supported.
(287)
In order to improve the reporting and performance measurement by Member States with respect to the answering and handling of emergency calls, the Commission should, every two years, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effectiveness of the implementation of the single European emergency number ‘112’.
(288)
Member States should take specific measures to ensure that emergency services, including the single European emergency number ‘112’, are equally accessible to end-users with disabilities, in particular deaf, hearing-impaired, speech-impaired and deaf-blind end-users and in accordance with Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services. This could involve the provision of special terminal devices for end-users with disabilities when other ways of communication are not suitable for them.
(289)
It is important to increase awareness of the single European emergency number ‘112’ in order to improve the level of protection and security of citizens travelling in the Union. To that end, citizens should be made fully aware, when travelling in any Member State, in particular through information provided in international bus terminals, train stations, ports or airports and in telephone directories, end-user and billing material, that the single European emergency number ‘112’ can be used as a single emergency number throughout the Union. This is primarily the responsibility of the Member States, but the Commission should continue both to support and to supplement initiatives of the Member States to heighten awareness of the single European emergency number ‘112’ and periodically to evaluate the public’s awareness of it.
(290)
Caller location information, which applies to all emergency communications, improves the level of protection and the security of end-users and assists the emergency services in the discharge of their duties, provided that the transfer of emergency communication and associated data to the emergency services concerned is guaranteed by the national system of PSAPs. The reception and use of caller location information, which includes both network-based location information and where available, enhanced handset caller location information, should comply with relevant Union law on the processing of personal data and security measures. Undertakings that provide network-based location should make caller location information available to emergency services as soon as the call reaches that service, independently of the technology used. However, handset-based location technologies have proven to be significantly more accurate and cost effective due to the availability of data provided by the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service and Galileo Satellite system and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems and Wi-Fi data. Therefore, handset-derived caller location information should complement network-based location information even if the handset-derived location becomes available only after the emergency communication is set up. Member States should ensure that, where available, the handset-derived caller location information is made available to the most appropriate PSAP. This might not be always possible, for example when the location is not available on the handset or through the interpersonal communications service used, or when it is not technically feasible to obtain that information. Furthermore, Member States should ensure that the PSAPs are able to retrieve and manage the caller location information available, where feasible. The establishment and transmission of caller location information should be free of charge for both the end-user and the authority handling the emergency communication irrespective of the means of establishment, for example through the handset or the network, or the means of transmission, for example through voice channel, SMS or IP-based.
(291)
In order to respond to technological developments concerning accurate caller location information, equivalent access for end-users with disabilities and call routing to the most appropriate PSAP, the Commission should be empowered to adopt by means of a delegated act measures necessary to ensure the compatibility, interoperability, quality, reliability and continuity of emergency communications in the Union, such as functional provisions determining the role of various parties within the communications chain, for example number-based interpersonal communications service providers, network operators and PSAPs, as well as technical provisions determining the technical means to fulfil the functional provisions. Such measures should be without prejudice to the organisation of emergency services of Member States.
(292)
A citizen in one Member State who needs to contact the emergency services in another Member State cannot do so because the emergency services may not have any contact information for emergency services in other Member States. A Union-wide, secure database of numbers for a lead emergency service in each country should therefore be introduced. To that end, BEREC should maintain a secure database of E.164 numbers of Member State emergency service numbers, if such a database is not maintained by another organisation, in order to ensure that the emergency services in one Member State can be contacted by the emergency services in another.
(293)
Diverging national law has developed in relation to the transmission by electronic communications services of public warnings regarding imminent or developing major emergencies and disasters. In order to approximate law in that area, this Directive should therefore provide that, when public warning systems are in place, public warnings should be transmitted by providers of mobile number-based interpersonal communication services to all end-users concerned. The end-users concerned should be considered to be those who are located in the geographic areas potentially being affected by imminent or developing major emergencies and disasters during the warning period, as determined by the competent authorities.
(294)
Where the effective reach of all end-users concerned, independently of their place or Member State of residence, is ensured and fulfils the highest level of data security, Member States should be able to provide for the transmission of public warnings by publicly available electronic communications services other than mobile number-based interpersonal communications services and other than transmission services used for broadcasting or by mobile application transmitted via internet access services. In order to inform end-users entering a Member State of the existence of such a public warning system, that Member State should ensure that those end-users receive, automatically by means of SMS, without undue delay and free of charge, easily understandable information on how to receive public warnings, including by means of mobile terminal equipment not enabled for internet access services. Public warnings other than those relying on mobile number-based interpersonal communications services should be transmitted to end-users in an easily receivable manner. Where a public warning system relies on an application, it should not require end-users to log in or register with the authorities or the application provider. End-users’ location data should be used in accordance with Directive 2002/58/EC. The transmission of public warnings should be free of charge for end-users. In its review of the implementation of this Directive, the Commission could also assess whether it is possible in accordance with Union law, and feasible to set up a single Union-wide public warning system in order to alert the public in the event of an imminent or developing disaster or major state of emergency across different Member States.
(295)
Member States should be able to determine if proposals for alternative systems, other than through mobile number-based interpersonal communication services, are truly equivalent to such services, taking utmost account of the corresponding BEREC guidelines. Such guidelines should be developed after consulting national authorities in charge of PSAPs in order to ensure that emergency experts have a role in their development and that there is a common understanding between different Member State authorities as to what is needed to ensure full implementation of such public warning systems within the Member States while ensuring that the citizens of the Union are effectively protected while travelling in another Member State.
(296)
In line with the objectives of the Charter and the obligations enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the regulatory framework should ensure that all end-users, including end-users with disabilities, older people, and users with special social needs, have easy and equivalent access to affordable high quality services regardless of their place of residence within the Union. Declaration 22 annexed to the final Act of Amsterdam provides that the institutions of the Union are to take account of the needs of persons with disabilities in drawing up measures under Article 114 TFEU.
(297)
In order to ensure that end-users with disabilities benefit from competition and the choice of service providers enjoyed by the majority of end-users, competent authorities should specify, where appropriate and in light of national conditions, and after consulting end-users with disabilities, consumer protection requirements for end-users with disabilities to be met by providers of publicly available electronic communications services. Such requirements can include, in particular, that providers ensure that end-users with disabilities take advantage of their services on equivalent terms and conditions, including prices, tariffs and quality, as those offered to their other end-users, irrespective of any additional costs incurred by those providers. Other requirements can relate to wholesale arrangements between providers. In order to avoid creating an excessive burden on service providers competent authorities should verify, whether the objectives of equivalent access and choice can be achieved without such measures.
(298)
In addition to Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services, this Directive sets out new enhanced affordability and availability requirements on related terminal equipment and specific equipment and specific services for end-users with disabilities. Therefore, the corresponding obligation in Directive 2002/22/EC that required Member States to encourage the availability of terminal equipment for end-users with disabilities has become obsolete and should be repealed.
(299)
Effective competition has developed in the provision of directory enquiry services and directories pursuant, inter alia, to Article 5 of Commission Directive 2002/77/EC 
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. In order to maintain that effective competition, all providers of number-based interpersonal communications services which attribute numbers from a numbering plan to their end-users should continue to be obliged to make relevant information available in a fair, cost-oriented and non-discriminatory manner.
(300)
End-users should be informed about their right to determine whether they want to be included in a directory. Providers of number-based interpersonal communications services should respect the end-users’ decision when making data available to directory service providers. Article 12 of Directive 2002/58/EC ensures the end-users’ right to privacy with regard to the inclusion of their personal information in a public directory.
(301)
Measures at wholesale level ensuring the inclusion of end-user data in databases should comply with the safeguards for the protection of personal data under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Article 12 of Directive 2002/58/EC. The cost-oriented supply of that data to service providers, with the possibility for Member States to establish a centralised mechanism for providing comprehensive aggregated information to directory providers, and the provision of network access under reasonable and transparent conditions, should be put in place in order to ensure that end-users benefit fully from competition, which has largely allowed the enabling of the removal of retail regulation from these services and the provision of offers of directory services under reasonable and transparent conditions.
(302)
Following the abolition of the universal service obligation for directory services and given the existence of a functioning market for such services, the right to access directory enquiry services is no longer necessary. However, the national regulatory authorities should still be able to impose obligations and conditions on undertakings that control access to end-users in order to maintain access and competition in that market.
(303)
End-users should be able to enjoy a guarantee of interoperability in respect of all equipment sold in the Union for the reception of radio in new vehicles of category M and of digital television. Member States should be able to require minimum harmonised standards in respect of such equipment. Such standards could be adapted from time to time in light of technological and market developments.
(304)
Where Member States decide to adopt measures in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/1535 for the interoperability of consumer radio receivers, they should be capable of receiving and reproducing radio services provided via digital terrestrial radio broadcasting or via IP networks, in order to ensure that interoperability is maintained. This may also improve public safety, by enabling users to rely on a wider set of technologies for accessing and receiving emergency information in the Member States.
(305)
It is desirable to enable consumers to achieve the fullest connectivity possible to digital television sets. Interoperability is an evolving concept in dynamic markets. Standardisation bodies should do their utmost to ensure that appropriate standards evolve along with the technologies concerned. It is likewise important to ensure that connectors are available on digital television sets that are capable of passing all the necessary elements of a digital signal, including the audio and video streams, conditional access information, service information, API information and copy protection information. This Directive should therefore ensure that the functionality associated to or implemented in connectors is not limited by network operators, service providers or equipment manufacturers and continues to evolve in line with technological developments. For display and presentation of connected television services, the realisation of a common standard through a market-driven mechanism is recognised as a consumer benefit. Member States and the Commission should be able to take policy initiatives, consistent with the Treaties, to encourage this development.
(306)
The provisions on interoperability of consumer radio and television equipment do not prevent car radio receivers in new vehicles of category M from being capable of receiving and reproducing radio services provided via analogue terrestrial radio broadcasting and those provisions do not prevent Member States from imposing obligations to ensure that digital radio receivers are capable of receiving and reproducing analogue terrestrial radio broadcasts.
(307)
Without prejudice to Union law, this Directive does not prevent Member States from adopting technical regulations related to digital terrestrial television equipment, to prepare the migration of consumers to new terrestrial broadcasting standards, and avoid the supply of equipment that would not be compliant with the standards to be rolled out.
(308)
Member States should be able to lay down proportionate ‘must carry’ obligations on undertakings under their jurisdiction, in the interest of legitimate public policy considerations, but such obligations should only be imposed where they are necessary to meet general interest objectives clearly defined by Member States in accordance with Union law and should be proportionate and transparent. It should be possible to apply ‘must carry’ obligations to specified radio and television broadcast channels and complementary services supplied by a specified media service provider. Obligations imposed by Member States should be reasonable, that is they should be proportionate and transparent in light of clearly defined general interest objectives. Member States should provide an objective justification for the ‘must carry’ obligations that they impose in their national law in order to ensure that such obligations are transparent, proportionate and clearly defined. The obligations should be designed in a way which provides sufficient incentives for efficient investment in infrastructure.
(309)
‘Must carry’ obligations should be subject to periodic review at least every five years in order to keep them up-to-date with technological and market evolution and in order to ensure that they continue to be proportionate to the objectives to be achieved. Such obligations could, where appropriate, entail a provision for proportionate remuneration which should be set out in national law. Where that is the case, national law should also determine the applicable methodology for calculating appropriate remuneration. That methodology should avoid inconsistency with access remedies that may be imposed by national regulatory authorities on providers of transmission services used for broadcasting which have been designated as having significant market power. However, where a fixed-term contract signed before 20 December 2018 provides for a different methodology, it should be possible to continue to apply that methodology for the duration of the contract. In the absence of a national provision on remuneration, providers of radio or television broadcast channels and providers of electronic communications networks used for the transmission of those radio or television broadcast channels should be able to agree contractually on a proportionate remuneration.
(310)
Electronic communications networks and services used for the distribution of radio or television broadcasts to the public include cable, IPTV, satellite and terrestrial broadcasting networks. They might also include other networks to the extent that a significant number of end-users use such networks as their principal means to receive radio and television broadcasts. ‘Must carry’ obligations related to analogue television broadcast transmissions should be considered only where the lack of such an obligation would cause significant disruption for a significant number of end-users or where there are no other means of transmission for specified television broadcast channels. ‘Must carry’ obligations can include the transmission of services specifically designed to enable equivalent access by end-users with disabilities. Accordingly complementary services include services designed to improve accessibility for end-users with disabilities, such as videotext, subtitling for end-users who are deaf or hard of hearing, audio description, spoken subtitles and sign language interpretation, and could include access to the related raw-data where necessary. In light of the growing provision and reception of connected television services and the continued importance of EPGs for end-user choice the transmission of programme-related data necessary to support connected television and EPG functionalities can be included in ‘must carry’ obligations. It should be possible for such programme-related data to include information about the programme content and how to access it, but not the programme content itself.
(311)
Calling line identification facilities are normally available on modern telephone exchanges and can therefore increasingly be provided at little or no expense. Member States are not required to impose obligations to provide these facilities when they are already available. Directive 2002/58/EC safeguards the privacy of users with regard to itemised billing, by giving them the means to protect their right to privacy when calling line identification is implemented. The development of those services on a pan-European basis would benefit consumers and is encouraged by this Directive. A common practice by providers of internet access services is to provide customers with an e-mail address using their commercial name or trade mark. In order to ensure end-users do not suffer lock-in effects related to the risk of losing access to e-mails when changing internet access services, Member States should be able to impose obligations on providers of such services, on request, either to provide access to their e-mails, or to transfer e-mails sent to the relevant e-mail account(s). The facility should be provided free of charge and for a duration that is considered to be appropriate by the national regulatory authority.
(312)
The publication of information by Member States will ensure that market players and potential market entrants understand their rights and obligations, and know where to find the relevant detailed information. Publication in the national gazette helps interested parties in other Member States to find the relevant information.
(313)
In order to ensure that the pan-European electronic communications market is effective and efficient, the Commission should monitor and publish information on charges which contribute to determining prices to end-users.
(314)
In order to determine the correct application of Union law, the Commission needs to know which undertakings have been designated as having significant market power and which obligations have been placed upon market players by national regulatory authorities. In addition to publication of that information at national level, it is therefore necessary for Member States to submit that information to the Commission. Where Member States are required to send information to the Commission, they should be able to do so by electronic means, subject to agreement on appropriate authentication procedures.
(315)
In order to take account of market, social and technological developments, including evolution of technical standards, to manage the risks posed to security of networks and services and to ensure effective access to emergency services through emergency communications, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of setting a single maximum Union-wide voice termination rate in fixed and mobile markets; adopting measures related to emergency communications in the Union; and adapting the annexes to this Directive. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making 
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. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
(316)
In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to adopt decisions to resolve cross-border harmful interference between Member States; to identify a harmonised or coordinated approach for the purpose of addressing inconsistent implementation of general regulatory approaches by national regulatory authorities on the regulation of electronic communications markets, as well as numbering, including number ranges, portability of numbers and identifiers, number and address translation systems, and access to emergency services through the single European emergency number ‘112’; to make the implementation of standards or specifications compulsory, or remove standards or specifications from the compulsory part of the list of standards; to adopt the technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services, as well as the circumstances, format and procedures applicable to notification of security incidents; to specify relevant details relating to tradable individual rights publicly available in a standardised electronic format when the rights of use for radio spectrum are created to specify the physical and technical characteristics of small-area wireless access points; to authorise or prevent a national regulatory authority from imposing on undertakings designated as having significant market power certain obligations for access or interconnection; to harmonise specific numbers or numbering ranges to address unmet cross-border or pan-European demand for numbering resources; and to specify the contract summary template to be provided to consumers. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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.
(317)
Finally, the Commission should be able to adopt, as necessary, having taken utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, recommendations in relation to the identification of the relevant product and service markets, the notifications under the procedure for consolidating the internal market and the harmonised application of the provisions of the regulatory framework.
(318)
The Commission should review the functioning of this Directive periodically, in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of changing technological or market conditions.
(319)
In carrying out its review of the functioning of this Directive, the Commission should assess whether, in light of developments in the market and with regard to both competition and consumer protection, there is a continued need for the provisions on sector-specific ex ante regulation or whether those provisions should be amended or repealed. As this Directive introduces novel approaches to the regulation of electronic communications sectors, such as the possibility to extend the application of symmetric obligations beyond the first concentration or distribution point and the regulatory treatment of co-investments, a particular regard should be given in assessing their functioning.
(320)
Future technological and market developments, in particular changes in the use of different electronic communications services and their ability to ensure effective access to emergency services, might jeopardise the achievement of the objectives of this Directive on end-users’ rights. BEREC should therefore monitor those developments in Member States and regularly publish an opinion including an assessment of the impact of such developments on the application in practice of the provisions of this Directive relating to end-users. The Commission, taking outmost account of BEREC’s opinion, should publish a report and submit a legislative proposal where it considers it to be necessary to ensure that the objectives of this Directive are achieved.
(321)
Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC and Article 5 of Decision No 243/2012/EU should be repealed.
(322)
The Commission should monitor the transition from the existing framework to the new framework.
(323)
Since the objective of this Directive, namely achieving a harmonised and simplified framework for the regulation of electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, associated facilities and associated services, of the conditions for the authorisation of networks and services, of radio spectrum use and of numbering resources, of access to and interconnection of electronic communications networks and associated facilities and of end-user protection cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(324)
In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents 
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, Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified.
(325)
The obligation to transpose this Directive into national law should be confined to those provisions which represent a substantive amendment as compared to the repealed Directives. The obligation to transpose the provisions which are unchanged arises under the repealed Directives.
(326)
This Directive should be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States relating to the time-limits for the transposition into national law and the dates of application of the Directives set out in Annex XII, Part B,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
PART I
FRAMEWORK (GENERAL RULES FOR THE ORGANISATION OF THE SECTOR)
TITLE I
SCOPE, AIM AND OBJECTIVES, DEFINITIONS
CHAPTER I
Subject matter, aim and definitions
Article 1
Subject matter, scope and aims
1.   This Directive establishes a harmonised framework for the regulation of electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, associated facilities and associated services, and certain aspects of terminal equipment. It lays down tasks of national regulatory authorities and, where applicable, of other competent authorities, and establishes a set of procedures to ensure the harmonised application of the regulatory framework throughout the Union.
2.   The aims of this Directive are to:
(a)
implement an internal market in electronic communications networks and services that results in the deployment and take-up of very high capacity networks, sustainable competition, interoperability of electronic communications services, accessibility, security of networks and services and end-user benefits; and
(b)
ensure the provision throughout the Union of good quality, affordable, publicly available services through effective competition and choice, to deal with circumstances in which the needs of end-users, including those with disabilities in order to access the services on an equal basis with others, are not satisfactorily met by the market and to lay down the necessary end-user rights.
3.   This Directive is without prejudice to:
(a)
obligations imposed by national law in accordance with Union law or by Union law in respect of services provided using electronic communications networks and services;
(b)
measures taken at Union or national level, in accordance with Union law, to pursue general interest objectives, in particular relating to the protection of personal data and privacy, content regulation and audiovisual policy;
(c)
actions taken by Member States for public order and public security purposes and for defence;
(d)
Regulations (EU) No 531/2012 and (EU) 2015/2120 and Directive 2014/53/EU.
4.   The Commission, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (‘BEREC’) and the authorities concerned shall ensure compliance of their processing of personal data with Union data protection rules.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply:
(1)
‘electronic communications network’ means transmission systems, whether or not based on a permanent infrastructure or centralised administration capacity, and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, including internet) and mobile networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed;
(2)
‘very high capacity network’ means either an electronic communications network which consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location, or an electronic communications network which is capable of delivering, under usual peak-time conditions, similar network performance in terms of available downlink and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation; network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point;
(3)
‘transnational markets’ means markets identified in accordance with Article 65, which cover the Union or a substantial part thereof located in more than one Member State;
(4)
‘electronic communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration via electronic communications networks, which encompasses, with the exception of services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services, the following types of services:
(a)
‘internet access service’ as defined in point (2) of the second paragraph of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120;
(b)
interpersonal communications service; and
(c)
services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals such as transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and for broadcasting;
(5)
‘interpersonal communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration that enables direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s) and does not include services which enable interpersonal and interactive communication merely as a minor ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service;
(6)
‘number-based interpersonal communications service’ means an interpersonal communications service which connects with publicly assigned numbering resources, namely, a number or numbers in national or international numbering plans, or which enables communication with a number or numbers in national or international numbering plans;
(7)
‘number-independent interpersonal communications service’ means an interpersonal communications service which does not connect with publicly assigned numbering resources, namely, a number or numbers in national or international numbering plans, or which does not enable communication with a number or numbers in national or international numbering plans;
(8)
‘public electronic communications network’ means an electronic communications network used wholly or mainly for the provision of publicly available electronic communications services which support the transfer of information between network termination points;
(9)
‘network termination point’ means the physical point at which an end-user is provided with access to a public electronic communications network, and which, in the case of networks involving switching or routing, is identified by means of a specific network address, which may be linked to an end-user’s number or name;
(10)
‘associated facilities’ means associated services, physical infrastructures and other facilities or elements associated with an electronic communications network or an electronic communications service which enable or support the provision of services via that network or service, or have the potential to do so, and include buildings or entries to buildings, building wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, ducts, conduits, masts, manholes, and cabinets;
(11)
‘associated service’ means a service associated with an electronic communications network or an electronic communications service which enables or supports the provision, self-provision or automated-provision of services via that network or service, or has the potential to do so, and includes number translation or systems offering equivalent functionality, conditional access systems and electronic programme guides (EPGs), as well as other services such as identity, location and presence service;
(12)
‘conditional access system’ means any technical measure, authentication system and/or arrangement whereby access to a protected radio or television broadcasting service in intelligible form is made conditional upon subscription or another form of prior individual authorisation;
(13)
‘user’ means a natural or legal person using or requesting a publicly available electronic communications service;
(14)
‘end-user’ means a user not providing public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services;
(15)
‘consumer’ means any natural person who uses or requests a publicly available electronic communications service for purposes which are outside his or her trade, business, craft or profession;
(16)
‘provision of an electronic communications network’ means the establishment, operation, control or making available of such a network;
(17)
‘enhanced digital television equipment’ means set-top boxes intended for connection to television sets or integrated digital television sets, able to receive digital interactive television services;
(18)
‘application programming interface’ or ‘API’ means the software interface between applications, made available by broadcasters or service providers, and the resources in the enhanced digital television equipment for digital television and radio services;
(19)
‘radio spectrum allocation’ means the designation of a given radio spectrum band for use by one or more types of radio communications services, where appropriate, under specified conditions;
(20)
‘harmful interference’ means interference which endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or which otherwise seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communications service operating in accordance with the applicable international, Union or national regulations;
(21)
‘security of networks and services’ means the ability of electronic communications networks and services to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of those networks and services, of stored or transmitted or processed data, or of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those electronic communications networks or services;
(22)
‘general authorisation’ means a legal framework established by a Member State ensuring rights for the provision of electronic communications networks or services and laying down sector-specific obligations that may apply to all or to specific types of electronic communications networks and services, in accordance with this Directive;
(23)
‘small-area wireless access point’ means low-power wireless network access equipment of a small size operating within a small range, using licenced radio spectrum or licence-exempt radio spectrum or a combination thereof, which may be used as part of a public electronic communications network, which may be equipped with one or more low visual impact antennae, and which allows wireless access by users to electronic communications networks regardless of the underlying network topology, be it mobile or fixed;
(24)
‘radio local area network’ or ‘RLAN’ means low-power wireless access system, operating within a small range, with a low risk of interference with other such systems deployed in close proximity by other users, using, on a non-exclusive basis, harmonised radio spectrum;
(25)
‘harmonised radio spectrum’ means radio spectrum for which harmonised conditions relating to its availability and efficient use have been established by way of technical implementing measures in accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC;
(26)
‘shared use of radio spectrum’ means access by two or more users to use the same radio spectrum bands under a defined sharing arrangement, authorised on the basis of a general authorisation, individual rights of use for radio spectrum or a combination thereof, including regulatory approaches such as licensed shared access aiming to facilitate the shared use of a radio spectrum band, subject to a binding agreement of all parties involved, in accordance with sharing rules as included in their rights of use for radio spectrum in order to guarantee to all users predictable and reliable sharing arrangements, and without prejudice to the application of competition law;
(27)
‘access’ means the making available of facilities or services to another undertaking, under defined conditions, either on an exclusive or a non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic communications services, including when they are used for the delivery of information society services or broadcast content services; it covers, inter alia: access to network elements and associated facilities, which may involve the connection of equipment, by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this includes access to the local loop and to facilities and services necessary to provide services over the local loop); access to physical infrastructure including buildings, ducts and masts; access to relevant software systems including operational support systems; access to information systems or databases for pre-ordering, provisioning, ordering, maintaining and repair requests, and billing; access to number translation or systems offering equivalent functionality; access to fixed and mobile networks, in particular for roaming; access to conditional access systems for digital television services and access to virtual network services;
(28)
‘interconnection’ means a specific type of access implemented between public network operators by means of the physical and logical linking of public electronic communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in order to allow the users of one undertaking to communicate with users of the same or another undertaking, or to access services provided by another undertaking where such services are provided by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the network;
(29)
‘operator’ means an undertaking providing or authorised to provide a public electronic communications network or an associated facility;
(30)
‘local loop’ means the physical path used by electronic communications signals connecting the network termination point to a distribution frame or equivalent facility in the fixed public electronic communications network;
(31)
‘call’ means a connection established by means of a publicly available interpersonal communications service allowing two-way voice communication;
(32)
‘voice communications service’ means a publicly available electronic communications service for originating and receiving, directly or indirectly, national or national and international calls through a number or numbers in a national or international numbering plan;
(33)
‘geographic number’ means a number from the national numbering plan where part of its digit structure contains geographic significance used for routing calls to the physical location of the network termination point;
(34)
‘non-geographic number’ means a number from the national numbering plan that is not a geographic number, such as mobile, freephone and premium-rate numbers;
(35)
‘total conversation service’ means a multimedia real time conversation service that provides bidirectional symmetric real time transfer of motion video, real time text and voice between users in two or more locations;
(36)
‘public safety answering point’ or ‘PSAP’ means a physical location where an emergency communication is first received under the responsibility of a public authority or a private organisation recognised by the Member State;
(37)
‘most appropriate PSAP’ means a PSAP established by responsible authorities to cover emergency communications from a certain area or for emergency communications of a certain type;
(38)
‘emergency communication’ means communication by means of interpersonal communications services between an end-user and the PSAP with the goal to request and receive emergency relief from emergency services;
(39)
‘emergency service’ means a service, recognised as such by the Member State, that provides immediate and rapid assistance in situations where there is, in particular, a direct risk to life or limb, to individual or public health or safety, to private or public property, or to the environment, in accordance with national law;
(40)
‘caller location information’ means, in a public mobile network, the data processed, derived from network infrastructure or handsets, indicating the geographic position of an end-user’s mobile terminal equipment, and, in a public fixed network, the data about the physical address of the network termination point;
(41)
‘terminal equipment’ means terminal equipment as defined in point (1) of Article 1 of Commission Directive 2008/63/EC 
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;
(42)
‘security incident’ means an event having an actual adverse effect on the security of electronic communications networks or services.
CHAPTER II
Objectives
Article 3
General objectives
1.   Member States shall ensure that in carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive, the national regulatory and other competent authorities take all reasonable measures which are necessary and proportionate for achieving the objectives set out in paragraph 2. Member States, the Commission, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (‘RSPG’), and BEREC shall also contribute to the achievement of those objectives.
National regulatory and other competent authorities shall contribute within their competence to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of freedom of expression and information, cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.
2.   In the context of this Directive, the national regulatory and other competent authorities as well as BEREC, the Commission and the Member States shall pursue each of the following general objectives, which are not listed in order of priority:
(a)
promote connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks, by all citizens and businesses of the Union;
(b)
promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and associated facilities, including efficient infrastructure-based competition, and in the provision of electronic communications services and associated services;
(c)
contribute to the development of the internal market by removing remaining obstacles to, and facilitating convergent conditions for, investment in, and the provision of, electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, associated facilities and associated services, throughout the Union, by developing common rules and predictable regulatory approaches, by favouring the effective, efficient and coordinated use of radio spectrum, open innovation, the establishment and development of trans-European networks, the provision, availability and interoperability of pan-European services, and end-to-end connectivity;
(d)
promote the interests of the citizens of the Union, by ensuring connectivity and the widespread availability and take-up of very high capacity networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks, and of electronic communications services, by enabling maximum benefits in terms of choice, price and quality on the basis of effective competition, by maintaining the security of networks and services, by ensuring a high and common level of protection for end-users through the necessary sector-specific rules and by addressing the needs, such as affordable prices, of specific social groups, in particular end-users with disabilities, elderly end-users and end-users with special social needs, and choice and equivalent access for end-users with disabilities.
3.   Where the Commission establishes benchmarks and reports on the effectiveness of Member States’ measures towards achieving the objectives referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall, where necessary, be assisted by Member States, national regulatory authorities, BEREC and the RSPG.
4.   The national regulatory and other competent authorities shall, in pursuit of the policy objectives referred to in paragraph 2 and specified in this paragraph, inter alia:
(a)
promote regulatory predictability by ensuring a consistent regulatory approach over appropriate review periods and through cooperation with each other, with BEREC, with the RSPG and with the Commission;
(b)
ensure that, in similar circumstances, there is no discrimination in the treatment of providers of electronic communications networks and services;
(c)
apply Union law in a technologically neutral fashion, to the extent that this is consistent with the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 2;
(d)
promote efficient investment and innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by ensuring that any access obligation takes appropriate account of the risk incurred by the investing undertakings and by permitting various cooperative arrangements between investors and parties seeking access to diversify the risk of investment, while ensuring that competition in the market and the principle of non-discrimination are preserved;
(e)
take due account of the variety of conditions relating to infrastructure, competition, the circumstances of end-users and, in particular, consumers in the various geographic areas within a Member State, including local infrastructure managed by natural persons on a not-for-profit basis;
(f)
impose ex ante regulatory obligations only to the extent necessary to secure effective and sustainable competition in the interest of end-users and relax or lift such obligations as soon as that condition is fulfilled.
Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory and other competent authorities act impartially, objectively, transparently and in a non-discriminatory and proportionate manner.
Article 4
Strategic planning and coordination of radio spectrum policy
1.   Member States shall cooperate with each other and with the Commission in the strategic planning, coordination and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum in the Union in accordance with Union policies for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in electronic communications. To that end, they shall take into consideration, inter alia, the economic, safety, health, public interest, freedom of expression, cultural, scientific, social and technical aspects of Union policies, as well as the various interests of radio spectrum user communities, with the aim of optimising the use of radio spectrum and avoiding harmful interference.
2.   By cooperating with each other and with the Commission, Member States shall promote the coordination of radio spectrum policy approaches in the Union and, where appropriate, harmonised conditions with regard to the availability and efficient use of radio spectrum necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in electronic communications.
3.   Member States shall, through the RSPG, cooperate with each other and with the Commission in accordance with paragraph 1, and upon their request with the European Parliament and with the Council, in support of the strategic planning and coordination of radio spectrum policy approaches in the Union, by:
(a)
developing best practices on radio spectrum related matters, with a view to implementing this Directive;
(b)
facilitating the coordination between Member States with a view to implementing this Directive and other Union law and to contributing to the development of the internal market;
(c)
coordinating their approaches to the assignment and authorisation of use of radio spectrum and publishing reports or opinions on radio spectrum related matters.
BEREC shall participate on issues concerning its competence relating to market regulation and competition related to radio spectrum.
4.   The Commission, taking utmost account of the opinion of the RSPG, may submit legislative proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council for the purpose of establishing multiannual radio spectrum policy programmes, setting out the policy orientations and objectives for the strategic planning and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum in accordance with this Directive, as well as for the purpose of releasing harmonised radio spectrum for shared use or for use not subject to individual rights.
TITLE II
INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP AND GOVERNANCE
CHAPTER I
National regulatory and other competent authorities
Article 5
National regulatory and other competent authorities
1.   Member States shall ensure that each of the tasks laid down in this Directive is undertaken by a competent authority.
Within the scope of this Directive, the national regulatory authorities shall be responsible at least for the following tasks:
(a)
implementing ex ante market regulation, including the imposition of access and interconnection obligations;
(b)
ensuring the resolution of disputes between undertakings;
(c)
carrying out radio spectrum management and decisions or, where those tasks are assigned to other competent authorities, providing advice regarding the market-shaping and competition elements of national processes related to the rights of use for radio spectrum for electronic communications networks and services;
(d)
contributing to the protection of end-user rights in the electronic communications sector, in coordination, where relevant, with other competent authorities;
(e)
assessing and monitoring closely market-shaping and competition issues regarding open internet access;
(f)
assessing the unfair burden and calculating the net cost of the provision of universal service;
(g)
ensuring number portability between providers;
(h)
performing any other task that this Directive reserves to national regulatory authorities.
Member States may assign other tasks provided for in this Directive and other Union law to national regulatory authorities, in particular, those related to market competition or market entry, such as general authorisation, and those related to any role conferred on BEREC. Where those tasks related to market competition or market entry are assigned to other competent authorities, they shall seek to consult the national regulatory authority before taking a decision. For the purposes of contributing to BEREC's tasks, national regulatory authorities shall be entitled to collect necessary data and other information from market participants.
Member States may also assign to national regulatory authorities other tasks on the basis of national law, including national law implementing Union law.
Member States shall, in particular, promote stability of competences of the national regulatory authorities when transposing this Directive with regard to the attribution of tasks resulting from the Union electronic communications regulatory framework as amended in 2009.
2.   National regulatory and other competent authorities of the same Member State or of different Member States shall, where necessary, enter into cooperative arrangements with each other to foster regulatory cooperation.
3.   Member States shall publish the tasks to be undertaken by national regulatory and other competent authorities in an easily accessible form, in particular where those tasks are assigned to more than one body. Member States shall ensure, where appropriate, consultation and cooperation between those authorities, and between those authorities and national authorities entrusted with the implementation of competition law or consumer law, on matters of common interest. Where more than one authority has competence to address such matters, Member States shall ensure that the respective tasks of each authority are published in an easily accessible form.
4.   Member States shall notify to the Commission all national regulatory and other competent authorities that are assigned tasks under this Directive, and their respective responsibilities, as well as any change thereof.
Article 6
Independence of national regulatory and other competent authorities
1.   Member States shall guarantee the independence of national regulatory authorities and of other competent authorities by ensuring that they are legally distinct from, and functionally independent of, any natural or legal person providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services. Member States that retain ownership or control of undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services shall ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or control.
2.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory and other competent authorities exercise their powers impartially, transparently and in a timely manner. Member States shall ensure that they have adequate technical, financial and human resources to carry out the tasks assigned to them.
Article 7
Appointment and dismissal of members of national regulatory authorities
1.   The head of a national regulatory authority, or, where applicable, the members of the collegiate body fulfilling that function within a national regulatory authority or their alternates, shall be appointed for a term of office of at least three years from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience, on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge and experience and following an open and transparent selection procedure. Member States shall ensure continuity of decision-making.
2.   Member States shall ensure that the head of a national regulatory authority, or where applicable, members of the collegiate body fulfilling that function within a national regulatory authority or their alternates may be dismissed during their term only if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties which are laid down in national law before their appointment.
3.   The decision to dismiss the head of the national regulatory authority concerned, or where applicable members of the collegiate body fulfilling that function, shall be made public at the time of dismissal. The dismissed head of the national regulatory authority or, where applicable, members of the collegiate body fulfilling that function shall receive a statement of reasons. In the event that the statement of reasons is not published, it shall be published upon that person’s request. Member States shall ensure that this decision is subject to review by a court, on points of fact as well as on points of law.
Article 8
Political independence and accountability of the national regulatory authorities
1.   Without prejudice to Article 10, national regulatory authorities shall act independently and objectively, including in the development of internal procedures and the organisation of staff, shall operate in a transparent and accountable manner in accordance with Union law, and shall not seek or take instructions from any other body in relation to the exercise of the tasks assigned to them under national law implementing Union law. This shall not prevent supervision in accordance with national constitutional law. Only appeal bodies set up in accordance with Article 31 shall have the power to suspend or overturn decisions of the national regulatory authorities.
2.   National regulatory authorities shall report annually, inter alia, on the state of the electronic communications market, on the decisions they issue, on their human and financial resources and how those resources are attributed, as well as on future plans. Their reports shall be made public.
Article 9
Regulatory capacity of national regulatory authorities
1.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities have separate annual budgets and have autonomy in the implementation of the allocated budget. Those budgets shall be made public.
2.   Without prejudice to the obligation to ensure that national regulatory authorities have adequate financial and human resources to carry out the task assigned to them, financial autonomy shall not prevent supervision or control in accordance with national constitutional law. Any control on the budget of the national regulatory authorities shall be exercised in a transparent manner and made public.
3.   Member States shall also ensure that national regulatory authorities have adequate financial and human resources to enable them to actively participate in and contribute to BEREC.
Article 10
Participation of national regulatory authorities in BEREC
1.   Member States shall ensure that the goals of BEREC of promoting greater regulatory coordination and consistency are actively supported by their respective national regulatory authorities.
2.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities take utmost account of guidelines, opinions, recommendations, common positions, best practices and methodologies adopted by BEREC when adopting their own decisions for their national markets.
Article 11
Cooperation with national authorities
National regulatory authorities, other competent authorities under this Directive, and national competition authorities shall provide each other with the information necessary for the application of this Directive. In respect of the information exchanged, Union data protection rules shall apply, and the receiving authority shall ensure the same level of confidentiality as that of the originating authority.
CHAPTER II
General authorisation
Section 1
General part
Article 12
General authorisation of electronic communications networks and services
1.   Member States shall ensure the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services, subject to the conditions set out in this Directive. To this end, Member States shall not prevent an undertaking from providing electronic communications networks or services, except where this is necessary for the reasons set out in Article 52(1) TFEU. Any such limitation to the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services shall be duly reasoned and shall be notified to the Commission.
2.   The provision of electronic communications networks or services, other than number-independent interpersonal communications services, may, without prejudice to the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2) or rights of use referred to in Articles 46 and 94, be subject only to a general authorisation.
3.   Where a Member State considers that a notification requirement is justified for undertakings subject to a general authorisation, that Member State may require such undertakings only to submit a notification to the national regulatory or other competent authority. The Member State shall not require such undertakings to obtain an explicit decision or any other administrative act by such authority or by any other authority before exercising the rights derived from the general authorisation.
Upon notification, when required, an undertaking may start the activity, where necessary subject to the provisions on the rights of use under this Directive.
4.   The notification referred to in paragraph 3 shall not entail more than a declaration by a natural or legal person to the national regulatory or other competent authority of the intention to start the provision of electronic communications networks or services and the submission of the minimal information which is required to allow BEREC and that authority to keep a register or list of providers of electronic communications networks and services. That information shall be limited to:
(a)
the name of the provider;
(b)
the provider’s legal status, form and registration number, where the provider is registered in a trade or other similar public register in the Union;
(c)
the geographical address of the provider’s main establishment in the Union, if any, and, where applicable, any secondary branch in a Member State;
(d)
the provider’s website address, where applicable, associated with the provision of electronic communications networks or services;
(e)
a contact person and contact details;
(f)
a short description of the networks or services intended to be provided;
(g)
the Member States concerned; and
(h)
an estimated date for starting the activity.
Member States shall not impose any additional or separate notification requirements.
In order to approximate notification requirements, BEREC shall publish guidelines for the notification template and maintain a Union database of the notifications transmitted to the competent authorities. To that end, the competent authorities shall, by electronic means, forward each notification received to BEREC without undue delay. Notifications made to the competent authorities before 21 December 2020 shall be forwarded to BEREC by 21 December 2021.
Article 13
Conditions attached to the general authorisation and to the rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources, and specific obligations
1.   The general authorisation for the provision of electronic communications networks or services and the rights of use for radio spectrum and rights of use for numbering resources may be subject only to the conditions listed in Annex I. Such conditions shall be non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent. In the case of rights of use for radio spectrum, such conditions shall ensure the effective and efficient use thereof and be in accordance with Articles 45 and 51, and, in the case of rights of use for numbering resources, shall be in accordance with Article 94.
2.   Specific obligations which may be imposed on undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services under Article 61(1) and (5) and Articles 62, 68 and 83 or on those designated to provide universal service under this Directive shall be legally separate from the rights and obligations under the general authorisation. In order to achieve transparency, the criteria and procedures for imposing such specific obligations on individual undertakings shall be referred to in the general authorisation.
3.   The general authorisation shall contain only conditions which are specific for that sector and are set out in Parts A, B and C of Annex I and shall not duplicate conditions which are applicable to undertakings by virtue of other national law.
4.   Member States shall not duplicate the conditions of the general authorisation where they grant the right of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources.
Article 14
Declarations to facilitate the exercise of rights to install facilities and rights of interconnection
Competent authorities shall, within one week of the request of an undertaking, issue standardised declarations confirming, where applicable, that the undertaking has submitted a notification under Article 12(3). Those declarations shall detail the circumstances under which any undertaking providing electronic communications networks or services under the general authorisation has the right to apply for rights to install facilities, negotiate interconnection, and obtain access or interconnection, in order to facilitate the exercise of those rights, for instance at other levels of government or in relation to other undertakings. Where appropriate, such declarations may also be issued as an automatic reply following the notification referred to in Article 12(3).
Section 2
General authorisation rights and obligations
Article 15
Minimum list of rights derived from the general authorisation
1.   Undertakings subject to the general authorisation pursuant to Article 12, shall have the right to:
(a)
provide electronic communications networks and services;
(b)
have their application for the necessary rights to install facilities considered in accordance with Article 43;
(c)
use, subject to Articles 13, 46 and 55, radio spectrum in relation to electronic communications networks and services;
(d)
have their application for the necessary rights of use for numbering resources considered in accordance with Article 94.
2.   Where such undertakings provide electronic communications networks or services to the public, the general authorisation shall give them the right to:
(a)
negotiate interconnection with and, where applicable, obtain access to, or interconnection from, other providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services covered by a general authorisation in the Union in accordance with this Directive;
(b)
be given an opportunity to be designated to provide different elements of the universal service or to cover different parts of the national territory in accordance with Article 86 or 87.
Article 16
Administrative charges
1.   Any administrative charges imposed on undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services under the general authorisation or to which a right of use has been granted shall:
(a)
cover, in total, only the administrative costs incurred in the management, control and enforcement of the general authorisation system and of the rights of use and of specific obligations as referred to in Article 13(2), which may include costs for international cooperation, harmonisation and standardisation, market analysis, monitoring compliance and other market control, as well as regulatory work involving preparation and enforcement of secondary legislation and administrative decisions, such as decisions on access and interconnection; and
(b)
be imposed upon the individual undertakings in an objective, transparent and proportionate manner which minimises additional administrative costs and associated charges.
Member States may choose not to apply administrative charges to undertakings the turnover of which is below a certain threshold or the activities of which do not reach a minimum market share or have a very limited territorial scope.
2.   Where national regulatory or other competent authorities impose administrative charges, they shall publish an annual overview of their administrative costs and of the total sum of the charges collected. Where there is a difference between the total sum of the charges and the administrative costs, appropriate adjustments shall be made.
Article 17
Accounting separation and financial reports
1.   Member States shall require undertakings providing public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services which have special or exclusive rights for the provision of services in other sectors in the same or another Member State to:
(a)
keep separate accounts for the activities associated with the provision of electronic communications networks or services, to the extent that would be required if those activities were carried out by legally independent entities, in order to identify all elements of cost and revenue, with the basis of their calculation and the detailed attribution methods used, related to such activities, including an itemised breakdown of fixed assets and structural costs; or
(b)
have structural separation for the activities associated with the provision of electronic communications networks or services.
Member States may choose not to apply the requirements referred to in the first subparagraph to undertakings which have an annual turnover of less than EUR 50 million in activities associated with electronic communications networks or services in the Union.
2.   Where undertakings providing public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services are not subject to the requirements of company law and do not satisfy the small and medium-sized enterprise criteria of Union law accounting rules, their financial reports shall be drawn up and submitted to independent audit and published. The audit shall be carried out in accordance with the relevant Union and national rules.
The first subparagraph of this paragraph shall also apply to the separate accounts required under point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1.
Section 3
Amendment and withdrawal
Article 18
Amendment of rights and obligations
1.   Member States shall ensure that the rights, conditions and procedures concerning general authorisations and rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources or rights to install facilities may be amended only in objectively justified cases and in a proportionate manner, taking into consideration, where appropriate, the specific conditions applicable to transferable rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources.
2.   Except where proposed amendments are minor and have been agreed with the holder of the rights or of the general authorisation, notice shall be given in an appropriate manner of the intention to make such amendments. Interested parties, including users and consumers, shall be allowed a sufficient period of time to express their views on the proposed amendments. That period shall be no less than four weeks except in exceptional circumstances.
Amendments shall be published, together with the reasons therefor.
Article 19
Restriction or withdrawal of rights
1.   Without prejudice to Article 30(5) and (6), Member States shall not restrict or withdraw rights to install facilities or rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources before the expiry of the period for which they were granted, except where justified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, and, where applicable, in accordance with Annex I, and to relevant national provisions regarding compensation for the withdrawal of rights.
2.   In line with the need to ensure the effective and efficient use of radio spectrum, or the implementation of the technical implementing measures adopted under Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC, Member States may allow the restriction or withdrawal of rights of use for radio spectrum, including the rights referred to in Article 49 of this Directive, based on pre-established and clearly defined procedures, in accordance with the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination. In such cases, the holders of the rights may, where appropriate and in accordance with Union law and relevant national provisions, be compensated appropriately.
3.   A modification in the use of radio spectrum as a result of the application of Article 45(4) or (5) shall not alone constitute grounds to justify the withdrawal of a right of use for radio spectrum.
4.   Any intention to restrict or withdraw rights under the general authorisation or individual rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources without the consent of the holder of the rights shall be subject to consultation of the interested parties in accordance with Article 23.
CHAPTER III
Provision of information, surveys and consultation mechanism
Article 20
Information request to undertakings
1.   Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services, associated facilities, or associated services, provide all the information, including financial information, necessary for national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC to ensure conformity with the provisions of, or decisions or opinions adopted in accordance with, this Directive and Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(
44
)
. In particular, national regulatory authorities and, where necessary for performing their tasks, other competent authorities shall have the power to require those undertakings to submit information concerning future network or service developments that could have an impact on the wholesale services that they make available to competitors, as well as information on electronic communications networks and associated facilities, which is disaggregated at local level and sufficiently detailed to enable the geographical survey and designation of areas in accordance with Article 22.
Where the information collected in accordance with the first subparagraph is insufficient for national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC to carry out their regulatory tasks under Union law, such information may be inquired from other relevant undertakings active in the electronic communications or closely related sectors.
Undertakings designated as having significant market power on wholesale markets may also be required to submit accounting data on the retail markets that are associated with those wholesale markets.
National regulatory and other competent authorities may request information from the single information points established pursuant to Directive 2014/61/EU.
Any request for information shall be proportionate to the performance of the task and shall be reasoned.
Undertakings shall provide the information requested promptly and in accordance with the timescales and level of detail required.
2.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory and other competent authorities provide the Commission, after a reasoned request, with the information necessary for it to carry out its tasks under the TFEU. The information requested by the Commission shall be proportionate to the performance of those tasks. Where the information provided refers to information previously provided by undertakings at the request of the authority, such undertakings shall be informed thereof. To the extent necessary, and unless the authority that provides the information has made an explicit and reasoned request to the contrary, the Commission shall make the information provided available to another such authority in another Member State.
Subject to the requirements of paragraph 3, Member States shall ensure that the information submitted to one authority can be made available to another such authority in the same or different Member State and to BEREC, after a substantiated request, where necessary to allow either authority, or BEREC, to fulfil its responsibilities under Union law.
3.   Where information gathered pursuant to paragraph 1, including information gathered in the context of a geographical survey, is considered to be confidential by a national regulatory or other competent authority in accordance with Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality, the Commission, BEREC and any other competent authorities concerned shall ensure such confidentiality. Such confidentiality shall not prevent the sharing of information between the competent authority, the Commission, BEREC and any other competent authorities concerned in a timely manner for the purposes of reviewing, monitoring and supervising the application of this Directive.
4.   Member States shall ensure that, acting in accordance with national rules on public access to information and subject to Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality and protection of personal data, national regulatory and other competent authorities publish information that contributes to an open and competitive market.
5.   National regulatory and other competent authorities shall publish the terms of public access to information as referred to in paragraph 4, including the procedures for obtaining such access.
Article 21
Information required with regard to the general authorisation, rights of use and specific obligations
1.   Without prejudice to any information requested pursuant to Article 20 and information and reporting obligations under national law other than the general authorisation, national regulatory and other competent authorities may require undertakings to provide information with regard to the general authorisation, the rights of use or the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2), which is proportionate and objectively justified in particular for the purposes of:
(a)
verifying, on a systematic or case-by-case basis, compliance with condition 1 of Part A, conditions 2 and 6 of Part D, and conditions 2 and 7 of Part E, of Annex I and of compliance with obligations as referred to in Article 13(2);
(b)
verifying, on a case-by-case basis, compliance with conditions as set out in Annex I where a complaint has been received or where the competent authority has other reasons to believe that a condition is not complied with or in the case of an investigation by the competent authority on its own initiative;
(c)
carrying out procedures for and the assessment of requests for granting rights of use;
(d)
publishing comparative overviews of quality and price of services for the benefit of consumers;
(e)
collating clearly defined statistics, reports or studies;
(f)
carrying out market analyses for the purposes of this Directive, including data on the downstream or retail markets associated with or related to the markets which are the subject of the market analysis;
(g)
safeguarding the efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio spectrum and of numbering resources;
(h)
evaluating future network or service developments that could have an impact on wholesale services made available to competitors, on territorial coverage, on connectivity available to end-users or on the designation of areas pursuant to Article 22;
(i)
conducting geographical surveys;
(j)
responding to reasoned requests for information by BEREC.
The information referred to in points (a) and (b), and (d) to (j) of the first subparagraph shall not be required prior to, or as a condition for, market access.
BEREC may develop templates for information requests, where necessary, to facilitate consolidated presentation and analysis of the information obtained.
2.   As regards the rights of use for radio spectrum, the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall refer in particular to the effective and efficient use of radio spectrum as well as to compliance with any coverage and quality of service obligations attached to the rights of use for radio spectrum and their verification.
3.   Where national regulatory or other competent authorities require undertakings to provide information as referred to in paragraph 1, they shall inform them of the specific purpose for which this information is to be used.
4.   National regulatory or other competent authorities shall not duplicate requests of information already made by BEREC pursuant to Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 where BEREC has made the information received available to those authorities.
Article 22
Geographical surveys of network deployments
1.   National regulatory and/or other competent authorities shall conduct a geographical survey of the reach of electronic communications networks capable of delivering broadband (‘broadband networks’) by 21 December 2023 and shall update it at least every three years thereafter.
The geographical survey shall include a survey of the current geographic reach of broadband networks within their territory, as required for the tasks of national regulatory and/or other competent authorities under this Directive and for the surveys required for the application of State aid rules.
The geographical survey may also include a forecast for a period determined by the relevant authority of the reach of broadband networks, including very high capacity networks, within their territory.
Such forecast shall include all relevant information, including information on planned deployments by any undertaking or public authority, of very high capacity networks and significant upgrades or extensions of networks to at least 100 Mbps download speeds. For this purpose, national regulatory and/or other competent authorities shall request undertakings and public authorities to provide such information to the extent that it is available and can be provided with reasonable effort.
The national regulatory authority shall decide, with respect to tasks specifically attributed to it under this Directive, the extent to which it is appropriate to rely on all or part of the information gathered in the context of such forecast.
Where a geographical survey is not conducted by the national regulatory authority, it shall be done in cooperation with that authority to the extent it may be relevant for its tasks.
The information collected in the geographical survey shall be at an appropriate level of local detail and shall include sufficient information on the quality of service and parameters thereof and shall be treated in accordance with Article 20(3).
2.   National regulatory and/or other competent authorities may designate an area with clear territorial boundaries where, on the basis of the information gathered and any forecast prepared pursuant to paragraph 1, it is determined that, for the duration of the relevant forecast period, no undertaking or public authority has deployed or is planning to deploy a very high capacity network or significantly upgrade or extend its network to a performance of at least 100 Mbps download speeds. National regulatory and/or other competent authorities shall publish the designated areas.
3.   Within a designated area, the relevant authorities may invite undertakings and public authorities to declare their intention to deploy very high capacity networks over the duration of the relevant forecast period. Where this invitation results in a declaration by an undertaking or public authority of its intention to do so, the relevant authority may require other undertakings and public authorities to declare any intention to deploy very high capacity networks, or significantly upgrade or extend its network to a performance of at least 100 Mbps download speeds in this area. The relevant authority shall specify the information to be included in such submissions, in order to ensure at least a similar level of detail as that taken into consideration in any forecast pursuant to paragraph 1. It shall also inform any undertaking or public authority expressing its interest whether the designated area is covered or likely to be covered by a next-generation access network offering download speeds below 100 Mbps on the basis of the information gathered pursuant to paragraph 1.
4.   Measures pursuant to paragraph 3 shall be taken in accordance with an efficient, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure, whereby no undertaking is excluded a priori.
5.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory and other competent authorities, and local, regional and national authorities with responsibility for the allocation of public funds for the deployment of electronic communications networks, for the design of national broadband plans, for defining coverage obligations attached to rights of use for radio spectrum and for verifying availability of services falling within the universal service obligations in their territory take into account the results of the geographical survey and of any designated areas pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.
Member States shall ensure that the authorities conducting the geographical survey shall supply those results subject to the receiving authority ensuring the same level of confidentiality and protection of business secrets as the originating authority and inform the parties which provided the information. Those results shall also be made available to BEREC and the Commission upon their request and under the same conditions.
6.   If the relevant information is not available on the market, competent authorities shall make data from the geographical surveys which are not subject to commercial confidentiality directly accessible in accordance with Directive 2003/98/EC to allow for its reuse. They shall also, where such tools are not available on the market, make available information tools enabling end-users to determine the availability of connectivity in different areas, with a level of detail which is useful to support their choice of operator or service provider.
7.   By 21 June 2020, in order to contribute to the consistent application of geographical surveys and forecasts, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission and relevant national authorities, issue guidelines to assist national regulatory and/or other competent authorities on the consistent implementation of their obligations under this Article.
Article 23
Consultation and transparency mechanism
1.   Except in cases falling within Article 26 or 27 or Article 32(10), Member States shall ensure that, where national regulatory or other competent authorities intend to take measures in accordance with this Directive, or where they intend to provide for restrictions in accordance with Article 45(4) and (5), which have a significant impact on the relevant market, they give interested parties the opportunity to comment on the draft measure within a reasonable period, having regard to the complexity of the matter and, except in exceptional circumstances, in any event not shorter than 30 days.
2.   For the purposes of Article 35, the competent authorities shall inform the RSPG at the moment of publication about any draft measure which falls within the scope of the comparative or competitive selection procedure pursuant to Article 55(2) and relates to the use of radio spectrum for which harmonised conditions have been set by technical implementing measures in accordance with Decision No 676/2002/EC in order to enable its use for wireless broadband electronic communications networks and services (‘wireless broadband networks and services’).
3.   National regulatory and other competent authorities shall publish their national consultation procedures.
Member States shall ensure the establishment of a single information point through which all current consultations can be accessed.
4.   The results of the consultation procedure shall be made publicly available, except in the case of confidential information in accordance with Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality.
Article 24
Consultation of interested parties
1.   Member States shall ensure, as appropriate, that competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities take account of the views of end-users, in particular consumers, and end-users with disabilities, manufacturers and undertakings that provide electronic communications networks or services on issues related to all end-user and consumer rights, including equivalent access and choice for end-users with disabilities, concerning publicly available electronic communications services, in particular where they have a significant impact on the market.
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities establish a consultation mechanism, accessible for end-users with disabilities, ensuring that in their decisions on issues related to end-user and consumer rights concerning publicly available electronic communications services, due consideration is given to consumer interests in electronic communications.
2.   Interested parties may develop, with the guidance of competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities, mechanisms, involving consumers, user groups and service providers, to improve the general quality of service provision by, inter alia, developing and monitoring codes of conduct and operating standards.
3.   Without prejudice to national rules in accordance with Union law promoting cultural and media policy objectives, such as cultural and linguistic diversity and media pluralism, competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities may promote cooperation between undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services and sectors interested in the promotion of lawful content in electronic communications networks and services. That cooperation may also include coordination of the public-interest information to be provided pursuant to Article 103(4).
Article 25
Out-of-court dispute resolution
1.   Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory authority or another competent authority responsible for, or at least one independent body with proven expertise in, the application of Articles 102 to 107 and Article 115 of this Directive is listed as an alternative dispute resolution entity in accordance with Article 20(2) of Directive 2013/11/EU with a view to resolving disputes between providers and consumers arising under this Directive and relating to the performance of contracts. Member States may extend access to alternative dispute resolution procedures provided by that authority or body to end-users other than consumers, in particular microenterprises and small enterprises.
2.   Without prejudice to Directive 2013/11/EU, where such disputes involve parties in different Member States, Member States shall coordinate their efforts with a view to bringing about a resolution of the dispute.
Article 26
Dispute resolution between undertakings
1.   In the event of a dispute arising in connection with existing obligations under this Directive between providers of electronic communications networks or services in a Member State, or between such undertakings and other undertakings in the Member State benefiting from obligations of access or interconnection or between providers of electronic communications networks or services in a Member State and providers of associated facilities, the national regulatory authority concerned shall, at the request of either party, and without prejudice to paragraph 2, issue a binding decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest possible time-frame on the basis of clear and efficient procedures, and in any case within four months except in exceptional circumstances. The Member State concerned shall require that all parties cooperate fully with the national regulatory authority.
2.   Member States may make provision for national regulatory authorities to decline to resolve a dispute where other mechanisms, including mediation, exist that would better contribute to resolution of the dispute in a timely manner in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 3. The national regulatory authority shall inform the parties thereof without delay. If, after four months, the dispute is not resolved, and if the dispute has not been brought before the courts by the party seeking redress, the national regulatory authority shall issue, at the request of either party, a binding decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest possible time-frame and in any case within four months.
3.   In resolving a dispute, the national regulatory authority shall take decisions aimed at achieving the objectives set out in Article 3. Any obligations imposed on an undertaking by the national regulatory authority in resolving a dispute shall comply with this Directive.
4.   The decision of the national regulatory authority shall be made available to the public, having regard to the requirements of commercial confidentiality. The national regulatory authority shall provide the parties concerned with a full statement of the reasons on which the decision is based.
5.   The procedure referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 shall not preclude either party from bringing an action before the courts.
Article 27
Resolution of cross-border disputes
1.   In the event of a dispute arising under this Directive between undertakings in different Member States, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article shall apply. Those provisions shall not apply to disputes relating to radio spectrum coordination covered by Article 28.
2.   Any party may refer the dispute to the national regulatory authority or authorities concerned. Where the dispute affects trade between Member States, the competent national regulatory authority or authorities shall notify the dispute to BEREC in order to bring about a consistent resolution of the dispute, in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 3.
3.   Where such a notification has been made, BEREC shall issue an opinion inviting the national regulatory authority or authorities concerned to take specific action in order to resolve the dispute or to refrain from action, in the shortest possible time-frame, and in any case within four months except in exceptional circumstances.
4.   The national regulatory authority or authorities concerned shall await BEREC's opinion before taking any action to resolve the dispute. In exceptional circumstances, where there is an urgent need to act, in order to safeguard competition or protect the interests of end-users, any of the competent national regulatory authorities may, either at the request of the parties or on its own initiative, adopt interim measures.
5.   Any obligations imposed on an undertaking by the national regulatory authority as part of the resolution of the dispute shall comply with this Directive, take the utmost account of the opinion adopted by BEREC, and be adopted within one month of such opinion.
6.   The procedure referred to in paragraph 2 shall not preclude either party from bringing an action before the courts.
Article 28
Radio Spectrum Coordination among Member States
1.   Member States and their competent authorities shall ensure that the use of radio spectrum is organised on their territory in a way that no other Member State is prevented from allowing on its territory the use of harmonised radio spectrum in accordance with Union law, especially due to cross-border harmful interference between Member States.
Member States shall take all necessary measures to this effect without prejudice to their obligations under international law and relevant international agreements such as the ITU Radio Regulations and the ITU Radio Regional Agreements.
2.   Member States shall cooperate with each other, and, where appropriate, through the RSPG, in the cross-border coordination of the use of radio spectrum in order to:
(a)
ensure compliance with paragraph 1;
(b)
resolve any problem or dispute in relation to cross-border coordination or cross-border harmful interference between Member States, as well as with third countries, which prevent Member States from using the harmonised radio spectrum in their territory.
3.   In order to ensure compliance with paragraph 1, any affected Member State may request the RSPG to use its good offices to address any problem or dispute in relation to cross-border coordination or cross-border harmful interference. Where appropriate, the RSPG may issue an opinion proposing a coordinated solution regarding such a problem or dispute.
4.   Where the actions referred to in paragraph 2 or 3 have not resolved the problem or dispute, and at the request of any affected Member State, the Commission may, taking utmost account of any opinion of the RSPG recommending a coordinated solution pursuant to paragraph 3, adopt decisions addressed to the Member States concerned by the unresolved harmful interference issue by means of implementing acts to resolve cross-border harmful interference between two or more Member States which prevent them from using the harmonised radio spectrum in their territory.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
5.   The Union shall, upon the request of any affected Member State, provide legal, political and technical support to resolve radio spectrum coordination issues with countries neighbouring the Union, including candidate and acceding countries, in such a way that the Member States concerned can observe their obligations under Union law. In the provision of such assistance, the Union shall promote the implementation of Union policies.
TITLE III
IMPLEMENTATION
Article 29
Penalties
1.   Member States shall lay down rules on penalties, including, where necessary, fines and non-criminal predetermined or periodic penalties, applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive or of any binding decision adopted by the Commission, the national regulatory or other competent authority pursuant to this Directive, and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Within the limits of national law, national regulatory and other competent authorities shall have the power to impose such penalties. The penalties provided for shall be appropriate, effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2.   Member States shall provide for penalties in the context of the procedure referred to in Article 22(3) only where an undertaking or public authority knowingly or grossly negligently provides misleading, erroneous or incomplete information.
When determining the amount of fines or periodic penalties imposed on an undertaking or public authority for knowingly or grossly negligently providing misleading, erroneous or incomplete information in the context of the procedure referred to in Article 22(3), regard shall be had, inter alia, to whether the behaviour of the undertaking or public authority has had a negative impact on competition and, in particular, whether, contrary to the information originally provided or any update thereof, the undertaking or public authority either has deployed, extended or upgraded a network, or has not deployed a network and has failed to provide an objective justification for that change of plan.
Article 30
Compliance with the conditions of the general authorisation or of rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources and compliance with specific obligations
1.   Member States shall ensure that their relevant competent authorities monitor and supervise compliance with the conditions of the general authorisation or of rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources, with the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2) and with the obligation to use radio spectrum effectively and efficiently in accordance with Article 4, Article 45(1) and Article 47.
Competent authorities shall have the power to require undertakings subject to the general authorisation or benefitting from rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbering resources to provide all information necessary to verify compliance with the conditions of the general authorisation or of rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources or with the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2) or Article 47, in accordance with Article 21.
2.   Where a competent authority finds that an undertaking does not comply with one or more of the conditions of the general authorisation or of rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources, or with the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2), it shall notify the undertaking of those findings and give the undertaking the opportunity to state its views, within a reasonable time limit.
3.   The competent authority shall have the power to require the cessation of the breach referred to in paragraph 2 either immediately or within a reasonable time limit and shall take appropriate and proportionate measures aimed at ensuring compliance.
In this regard, Member States shall empower the competent authorities to impose:
(a)
where appropriate, dissuasive financial penalties which may include periodic penalties with retroactive effect; and
(b)
orders to cease or delay provision of a service or bundle of services which, if continued, would result in significant harm to competition, pending compliance with access obligations imposed following a market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 67.
The competent authorities shall communicate the measures and the reasons on which they are based to the undertaking concerned without delay and shall stipulate a reasonable period for the undertaking to comply with the measures.
4.   Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, Member States shall empower the competent authority to impose, where appropriate, financial penalties on undertakings for failure to provide information, in accordance with the obligations imposed under point (a) or (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 21(1) and Article 69, within a reasonable period set by the competent authority.
5.   In the case of a serious breach or repeated breaches of the conditions of the general authorisation or of the rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources, or of the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2) or Article 47(1) or (2), where measures aimed at ensuring compliance as referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article have failed, Member States shall empower competent authorities to prevent an undertaking from continuing to provide electronic communications networks or services or suspend or withdraw those rights of use. Member States shall empower the competent authority to impose penalties which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Such penalties may be applied to cover the period of any breach, even if the breach has subsequently been rectified.
6.   Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of this Article, the competent authority may take urgent interim measures to remedy the situation in advance of reaching a final decision, where it has evidence of a breach of the conditions of the general authorisation, of the rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbering resources, or of the specific obligations referred to in Article 13(2) or Article 47(1) or (2) which represents an immediate and serious threat to public safety, public security or public health or risks creating serious economic or operational problems for other providers or users of electronic communications networks or services or other users of the radio spectrum. The competent authority shall give the undertaking concerned a reasonable opportunity to state its views and propose any remedies. Where appropriate, the competent authority may confirm the interim measures, which shall be valid for a maximum of three months, but which may, in circumstances where enforcement procedures have not been completed, be extended for a further period of up to three months.
7.   Undertakings shall have the right to appeal against measures taken under this Article in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31.
Article 31
Right of appeal
1.   Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level under which any user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks or services or associated facilities who is affected by a decision of a competent authority has the right of appeal against that decision to an appeal body that is independent of the parties involved and of any external intervention or political pressure liable to jeopardise its independent assessment of matters coming before it. This body, which may be a court, shall have the appropriate expertise to enable it to carry out its functions effectively. Member States shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account.
Pending the outcome of the appeal, the decision of the competent authority shall stand, unless interim measures are granted in accordance with national law.
2.   Where the appeal body referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is not judicial in character, it shall always give written reasons for its decision. Furthermore, in such a case, its decision shall be subject to review by a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.
Member States shall ensure that the appeal mechanism is effective.
3.   Member States shall collect information on the general subject matter of appeals, the number of requests for appeal, the duration of the appeal proceedings and the number of decisions to grant interim measures. Member States shall provide such information, as well as the decisions or judgments, to the Commission and to BEREC upon their reasoned request.
TITLE IV
INTERNAL MARKET PROCEDURES
CHAPTER I
Article 32
Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications
1.   In carrying out their tasks under this Directive, national regulatory authorities shall take the utmost account of the objectives set out in Article 3.
2.   National regulatory authorities shall contribute to the development of the internal market by working with each other and with the Commission and BEREC, in a transparent manner, in order to ensure the consistent application, in all Member States, of this Directive. To this end, they shall, in particular, work with the Commission and BEREC to identify the types of instruments and remedies best suited to address particular types of situations in the market.
3.   Except where otherwise provided in recommendations or guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 34 upon completion of the public consultation, if required under Article 23, where a national regulatory authority intends to take a measure which:
(a)
falls within the scope of Article 61, 64, 67, 68 or 83; and
(b)
would affect trade between Member States,
it shall publish the draft measure and communicate it to the Commission, to BEREC, and to the national regulatory authorities in other Member States, at the same time, stating the reasons for the measure, in accordance with Article 20(3). National regulatory authorities, BEREC and the Commission may comment on that draft measure within one month. The one-month period shall not be extended.
4.   The draft measure referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall not be adopted for a further two months, where that measure aims to:
(a)
define a relevant market which is different from those defined in the recommendation referred to in Article 64(1); or
(b)
designate an undertaking as having, either individually or jointly with others, significant market power, under Article 67(3) or (4);
and it would affect trade between Member States, and the Commission has indicated to the national regulatory authority that it considers that the draft measure would create a barrier to the internal market or if it has serious doubts as to its compatibility with Union law and in particular the objectives referred to in Article 3. That two-month period shall not be extended. The Commission shall inform BEREC and national regulatory authorities of its reservations in such a case and simultaneously make them public.
5.   BEREC shall publish an opinion on the Commission’s reservations referred to in paragraph 4, indicating whether it considers that the draft measure should be maintained, amended or withdrawn and shall, where appropriate, provide specific proposals to that end.
6.   Within the two-month period referred to in paragraph 4, the Commission may either:
(a)
take a decision requiring the national regulatory authority concerned to withdraw the draft measure; or
(b)
take a decision to lift its reservations referred to in paragraph 4.
The Commission shall take utmost account of the opinion of BEREC before taking a decision.
Decisions referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph shall be accompanied by a detailed and objective analysis of why the Commission considers that the draft measure is not to be adopted, together with specific proposals for amending it.
7.   Where the Commission has adopted a decision in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 6 of this Article requiring the national regulatory authority to withdraw a draft measure, the national regulatory authority shall amend or withdraw the draft measure within six months of the date of the Commission’s decision. Where the draft measure is amended, the national regulatory authority shall undertake a public consultation in accordance with Article 23, and shall notify the amended draft measure to the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.
8.   The national regulatory authority concerned shall take the utmost account of comments of other national regulatory authorities, of BEREC and of the Commission and may, except in the cases covered by paragraph 4 and point (a) of paragraph 6, adopt the resulting draft measure and shall, where it does so, communicate it to the Commission.
9.   The national regulatory authority shall communicate to the Commission and to BEREC all adopted final measures which fall under points (a) and (b) of paragraph 3.
10.   In exceptional circumstances, where a national regulatory authority considers that there is an urgent need to act, in order to safeguard competition and protect the interests of users, by way of derogation from the procedure set out in paragraphs 3 and 4, it may immediately adopt proportionate and provisional measures. It shall, without delay, communicate those measures, with full reasons, to the Commission, to the other national regulatory authorities, and to BEREC. A decision of the national regulatory authority to render such measures permanent or extend the period for which they are applicable shall be subject to paragraphs 3 and 4.
11.   A national regulatory authority may withdraw a draft measure at any time.
Article 33
Procedure for the consistent application of remedies
1.   Where an intended measure covered by Article 32(3) aims to impose, amend or withdraw an obligation on an undertaking in application of Article 61 or 67 in conjunction with Articles 69 to 76 and Article 83, the Commission may, within the one-month period referred to in Article 32(3), notify the national regulatory authority concerned and BEREC of its reasons for considering that the draft measure would create a barrier to the internal market or of its serious doubts as to its compatibility with Union law. In such a case, the draft measure shall not be adopted for a further three months following the Commission's notification.
In the absence of such notification, the national regulatory authority concerned may adopt the draft measure, taking utmost account of any comments made by the Commission, BEREC or any other national regulatory authority.
2.   Within the three-month period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission, BEREC and the national regulatory authority concerned shall cooperate closely to identify the most appropriate and effective measure in light of the objectives laid down in Article 3, whilst taking due account of the views of market participants and the need to ensure the development of consistent regulatory practice.
3.   Within six weeks from the beginning of the three-month period referred to in paragraph 1, BEREC shall issue an opinion on the Commission’s notification referred to in paragraph 1, indicating whether it considers that the draft measure should be amended or withdrawn and, where appropriate, provide specific proposals to that end. That opinion shall provide reasons and be made public.
4.   If in its opinion, BEREC shares the serious doubts of the Commission, it shall cooperate closely with the national regulatory authority concerned to identify the most appropriate and effective measure. Before the end of the three-month period referred to in paragraph 1, the national regulatory authority may either:
(a)
amend or withdraw its draft measure taking utmost account of the Commission’s notification referred to in paragraph 1 and of BEREC’s opinion; or
(b)
maintain its draft measure.
5.   The Commission may, within one month following the end of the three-month period referred to in paragraph 1 and taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, if any:
(a)
issue a recommendation requiring the national regulatory authority concerned to amend or withdraw the draft measure, including specific proposals to that end and providing reasons for its recommendation, in particular where BEREC does not share the Commission’s serious doubts;
(b)
take a decision to lift its reservations indicated in accordance with paragraph 1; or
(c)
for draft measures falling under the second subparagraph of Article 61(3) or under Article 76(2), take a decision requiring the national regulatory authority concerned to withdraw the draft measure, where BEREC shares the serious doubts of the Commission, accompanied by a detailed and objective analysis of why the Commission considers that the draft measure should not be adopted, together with specific proposals for amending the draft measure, subject to the procedure referred to in Article 32(7), which shall apply mutatis mutandis.
6.   Within one month of the Commission issuing the recommendation in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 5 or lifting its reservations in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 5, the national regulatory authority concerned shall communicate to the Commission and to BEREC the adopted final measure.
That period may be extended to allow the national regulatory authority to undertake a public consultation in accordance with Article 23.
7.   Where the national regulatory authority decides not to amend or withdraw the draft measure on the basis of the recommendation issued under point (a) of paragraph 5, it shall provide reasons.
8.   The national regulatory authority may withdraw the proposed draft measure at any stage of the procedure.
Article 34
Implementing provisions
After public consultation and after consulting the national regulatory authorities and taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, the Commission may adopt recommendations or guidelines in relation to Article 32 that lay down the form, content and level of detail to be given in the notifications required in accordance with Article 32(3), the circumstances in which notifications would not be required, and the calculation of the time-limits.
CHAPTER II
Consistent radio spectrum assignment
Article 35
Peer review process
1.   Where the national regulatory or other competent authority intends to undertake a selection procedure in accordance with Article 55(2) in relation to radio spectrum for which harmonised conditions have been set by technical implementing measures in accordance with Decision No 676/2002/EC in order to enable its use for wireless broadband networks and services, it shall, pursuant to Article 23, inform the RSPG about any draft measure which falls within the scope of the comparative or competitive selection procedure pursuant to Article 55(2) and indicate whether and when it is to request the RSPG to convene a Peer Review Forum.
When requested to do so, the RSPG shall organise a Peer Review Forum in order to discuss and exchange views on the draft measures transmitted and shall facilitate the exchange of experiences and best practices on those draft measures.
The Peer Review Forum shall be composed of the members of the RSPG and organised and chaired by a representative of the RSPG.
2.   At the latest during the public consultation conducted pursuant to Article 23, the RSPG may exceptionally take the initiative to convene a Peer Review Forum in accordance with the rules of procedure for organising it in order to exchange experiences and best practices on a draft measure relating to a selection procedure where it considers that the draft measure would significantly prejudice the ability of the national regulatory or other competent authority to achieve the objectives set in Articles 3, 45, 46 and 47.
3.   The RSPG shall define in advance and make public the objective criteria for the exceptional convening of the Peer Review Forum.
4.   During the Peer Review Forum, the national regulatory authority or other competent authority shall provide an explanation on how the draft measure:
(a)
promotes the development of the internal market, the cross-border provision of services, as well as competition, and maximises the benefits for the consumer, and overall achieves the objectives set in Articles 3, 45, 46 and 47 of this Directive, as well as in Decisions No 676/2002/EC and No 243/2012/EU;
(b)
ensures effective and efficient use of radio spectrum; and
(c)
ensures stable and predictable investment conditions for existing and prospective radio spectrum users when deploying networks for the provision of electronic communications services which rely on radio spectrum.
5.   The Peer Review Forum shall be open to voluntary participation by experts from other competent authorities and from BEREC.
6.   The Peer Review Forum shall be convened only once during the overall national preparation and consultation process of a single selection procedure concerning one or several radio spectrum bands, unless the national regulatory or other competent authority requests that it is reconvened.
7.   At the request of the national regulatory or other competent authority that requested the meeting, the RSPG may adopt a report on how the draft measure achieves the objectives provided in paragraph 4, reflecting the views exchanged in the Peer Review Forum.
8.   The RSPG shall publish in February each year a report concerning the draft measures discussed pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2. The report shall indicate experiences and best practices noted.
9.   Following the Peer Review Forum, at the request of the national regulatory or other competent authority that requested the meeting, the RSPG may adopt an opinion on the draft measure.
Article 36
Harmonised assignment of radio spectrum
Where the use of radio spectrum has been harmonised, access conditions and procedures have been agreed, and undertakings to which the radio spectrum shall be assigned have been selected in accordance with international agreements and Union rules, Member States shall grant the right of use for such radio spectrum in accordance therewith. Provided that all national conditions attached to the right to use the radio spectrum concerned have been satisfied in the case of a common selection procedure, Member States shall not impose any further conditions, additional criteria or procedures which would restrict, alter or delay the correct implementation of the common assignment of such radio spectrum.
Article 37
Joint authorisation process to grant individual rights of use for radio spectrum
Two or several Member States may cooperate with each other and with the RSPG, taking into account any interest expressed by market participants, by jointly establishing the common aspects of an authorisation process and, where appropriate, also jointly conducting the selection process to grant individual rights of use for radio spectrum.
When designing the joint authorisation process, Members States may take into consideration the following criteria:
(a)
the individual national authorisation processes shall be initiated and implemented by the competent authorities in accordance with a jointly agreed schedule;
(b)
it shall provide, where appropriate, for common conditions and procedures for the selection and granting of individual rights of use for radio spectrum among the Member States concerned;
(c)
it shall provide, where appropriate, for common or comparable conditions to be attached to the individual rights of use for radio spectrum among the Member States concerned, inter alia allowing users to be assigned similar radio spectrum blocks;
(d)
it shall be open at any time to other Member States until the joint authorisation process has been conducted.
Where, in spite of the interest expressed by market participants, Member States do not act jointly, they shall inform those market participants of the reasons explaining their decision.
CHAPTER III
Harmonisation procedures
Article 38
Harmonisation procedures
1.   Where the Commission finds that divergences in the implementation by the national regulatory or other competent authorities of the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive could create a barrier to the internal market, the Commission may, taking the utmost account of the opinion of BEREC or, where relevant, the RSPG, adopt recommendations or, subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, decisions by means of implementing acts to ensure the harmonised application of this Directive and in order to further the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3.
2.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory and other competent authorities take the utmost account of the recommendations referred to in paragraph 1 in carrying out their tasks. Where a national regulatory or other competent authority chooses not to follow a recommendation, it shall inform the Commission, giving the reasons for its position.
3.   The decisions adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall include only the identification of a harmonised or coordinated approach for the purpose of addressing the following matters:
(a)
the inconsistent implementation of general regulatory approaches by national regulatory authorities on the regulation of electronic communications markets in the application of Articles 64 and 67, where it creates a barrier to the internal market; such decisions shall not refer to specific notifications issued by the national regulatory authorities pursuant to Article 32; in such a case, the Commission shall propose a draft decision only:
(i)
after at least two years following the adoption of a Commission recommendation dealing with the same matter; and
(ii)
taking utmost account of an opinion from BEREC on the case for adoption of such a decision, which shall be provided by BEREC within three months of the Commission’s request;
(b)
numbering, including number ranges, portability of numbers and identifiers, number and address translation systems, and access to emergency services through the single European emergency number ‘112’.
4.   The implementing acts referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
5.   BEREC may, on its own initiative, advise the Commission on whether a measure should be adopted pursuant to paragraph 1.
6.   If the Commission has not adopted a recommendation or a decision within one year from the date of adoption of an opinion by BEREC indicating the existence of divergences in the implementation by the national regulatory or other competent authorities of the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive that could create a barrier to the internal market, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of its reasons for not doing so, and make those reasons public.
Where the Commission has adopted a recommendation in accordance with paragraph 1, but the inconsistent implementation creating barriers to the internal market persists for two years thereafter, the Commission shall, subject to paragraph 3, adopt a decision by means of implementing acts in accordance with paragraph 4.
Where the Commission has not adopted a decision within a further year from any recommendation adopted pursuant to the second subparagraph, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of its reasons for not doing so, and make those reasons public.
Article 39
Standardisation
1.   The Commission shall draw up and publish in the Official Journal of the European Union a list of non-compulsory standards or specifications to serve as a basis for encouraging the harmonised provision of electronic communications networks, electronic communications services and associated facilities and associated services. Where necessary, the Commission may, following consultation of the Committee established by Directive (EU) 2015/1535, request that standards be drawn up by the European standardisation organisations (European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec), and European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)).
2.   Member States shall encourage the use of the standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 1 for the provision of services, technical interfaces or network functions, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services, end-to-end connectivity, facilitation of provider switching and portability of numbers and identifiers, and to improve freedom of choice for users.
In the absence of publication of standards or specifications in accordance with paragraph 1, Member States shall encourage the implementation of standards or specifications adopted by the European standardisation organisations.
In the absence of such standards or specifications, Member States shall encourage the implementation of international standards or recommendations adopted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
Where international standards exist, Member States shall encourage the European standardisation organisations to use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for the standards they develop, except where such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective.
Any standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 1 or in this paragraph shall not prevent access as may be required under this Directive, where feasible.
3.   If the standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 1 have not been adequately implemented so that interoperability of services in one or more Member States cannot be ensured, the implementation of such standards or specifications may be made compulsory under the procedure laid down in paragraph 4, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure such interoperability and to improve freedom of choice for users.
4.   Where the Commission intends to make the implementation of certain standards or specifications compulsory, it shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and invite public comment by all parties concerned. The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, make implementation of the relevant standards compulsory by making reference to them as compulsory standards in the list of standards or specifications published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
5.   Where the Commission considers that the standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 1 no longer contribute to the provision of harmonised electronic communications services, no longer meet consumers’ needs or hamper technological development, it shall remove them from the list of standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 1.
6.   Where the Commission considers that the standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 4 no longer contribute to the provision of harmonised electronic communications services, no longer meet consumers’ needs, or hamper technological development, it shall, by means of implementing acts, remove those standards or specifications from the list of standards or specifications referred to in paragraph 1.
7.   The implementing acts referred to in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Article shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
8.   This Article does not apply in respect of any of the essential requirements, interface specifications or harmonised standards to which Directive 2014/53/EU applies.
TITLE V
SECURITY
Article 40
Security of networks and services
1.   Member States shall ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to the security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, those measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures, including encryption where appropriate, shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (‘ENISA’) shall facilitate, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(
45
)
, the coordination of Member States to avoid diverging national requirements that may create security risks and barriers to the internal market.
2.   Member States shall ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services notify without undue delay the competent authority of a security incident that has had a significant impact on the operation of networks or services.
In order to determine the significance of the impact of a security incident, where available the following parameters shall, in particular, be taken into account:
(a)
the number of users affected by the security incident;
(b)
the duration of the security incident;
(c)
the geographical spread of the area affected by the security incident;
(d)
the extent to which the functioning of the network or service is affected;
(e)
the extent of impact on economic and societal activities.
Where appropriate, the competent authority concerned shall inform the competent authorities in other Member States and ENISA. The competent authority concerned may inform the public or require the providers to do so, where it determines that disclosure of the security incident is in the public interest.
Once a year, the competent authority concerned shall submit a summary report to the Commission and to ENISA on the notifications received and the action taken in accordance with this paragraph.
3.   Member States shall ensure that in the case of a particular and significant threat of a security incident in public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, providers of such networks or services shall inform their users potentially affected by such a threat of any possible protective measures or remedies which can be taken by the users. Where appropriate, providers shall also inform their users of the threat itself.
4.   This Article is without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC.
5.   The Commission, taking utmost account of ENISA’s opinion, may adopt implementing acts detailing the technical and organisational measures referred to in paragraph 1, as well as the circumstances, format and procedures applicable to notification requirements pursuant to paragraph 2. They shall be based on European and international standards to the greatest extent possible, and shall not prevent Member States from adopting additional requirements in order to pursue the objectives set out in paragraph 1.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
Article 41
Implementation and enforcement
1.   Member States shall ensure that, in order to implement Article 40, the competent authorities have the power to issue binding instructions, including those regarding the measures required to remedy a security incident or prevent one from occurring when a significant threat has been identified and time-limits for implementation, to providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services.
2.   Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the power to require providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services to:
(a)
provide information needed to assess the security of their networks and services, including documented security policies; and
(b)
submit to a security audit carried out by a qualified independent body or a competent authority and make the results thereof available to the competent authority; the cost of the audit shall be paid by the provider.
3.   Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities have all the powers necessary to investigate cases of non-compliance and the effects thereof on the security of the networks and services.
4.   Member States shall ensure that, in order to implement Article 40, the competent authorities have the power to obtain the assistance of a Computer Security Incident Response Team (‘CSIRT’) designated pursuant to Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 in relation to issues falling within the tasks of the CSIRTs pursuant to point 2 of Annex I to that Directive.
5.   The competent authorities shall, where appropriate and in accordance with national law, consult and cooperate with the relevant national law enforcement authorities, the competent authorities within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 and the national data protection authorities.
PART II
NETWORKS
TITLE I
MARKET ENTRY AND DEPLOYMENT
CHAPTER I
Fees
Article 42
Fees for rights of use for radio spectrum and rights to install facilities
1.   Member States may allow the competent authority to impose fees for the rights of use for radio spectrum or rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private property that are used for the provision of electronic communications networks or services and associated facilities which ensure the optimal use of those resources. Member States shall ensure that such fees are objectively justified, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate in relation to their intended purpose and shall take into account the general objectives of this Directive.
2.   With respect to rights of use for radio spectrum, Member States shall seek to ensure that applicable fees are set at a level which ensures efficient assignment and use of radio spectrum, including by:
(a)
setting reserve prices as minimum fees for rights of use for radio spectrum by having regard to the value of those rights in their possible alternative uses;
(b)
taking into account costs entailed by conditions attached to those rights; and
(c)
applying, to the extent possible, payment arrangements linked to the actual availability for use of the radio spectrum.
CHAPTER II
Access to land
Article 43
Rights of way
1.   Member States shall ensure that, when a competent authority considers an application for the granting of rights:
—
to install facilities on, over or under public or private property to an undertaking authorised to provide public electronic communications networks, or
—
to install facilities on, over or under public property to an undertaking authorised to provide electronic communications networks other than to the public,
that competent authority:
(a)
acts on the basis of simple, efficient, transparent and publicly available procedures, applied without discrimination and without delay, and in any event makes its decision within six months of the application, except in the case of expropriation; and
(b)
follows the principles of transparency and non-discrimination in attaching conditions to any such rights.
The procedures referred to in points (a) and (b) may differ depending on whether the applicant is providing public electronic communications networks or not.
2.   Member States shall ensure that, where public or local authorities retain ownership or control of undertakings providing public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services, there is an effective structural separation of the function responsible for granting the rights referred to in paragraph 1 from the activities associated with ownership or control.
Article 44
Co-location and sharing of network elements and associated facilities for providers of electronic communications networks
1.   Where an operator has exercised the right under national law to install facilities on, over or under public or private property, or has taken advantage of a procedure for the expropriation or use of property, competent authorities may impose co-location and sharing of the network elements and associated facilities installed on that basis, in order to protect the environment, public health, public security or to meet town- and country-planning objectives.
Co-location or sharing of network elements and facilities installed and sharing of property may be imposed only after an appropriate period of public consultation, during which all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to express their views and only in the specific areas where such sharing is considered to be necessary with a view to pursuing the objectives provided in the first subparagraph. Competent authorities may impose the sharing of such facilities or property, including land, buildings, entries to buildings, building wiring, masts, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, ducts, conduits, manholes, cabinets or measures facilitating the coordination of public works. Where necessary, a Member State may designate a national regulatory or other competent authority for one or more of the following tasks:
(a)
coordinating the process provided for in this Article;
(b)
acting as a single information point;
(c)
setting down rules for apportioning the costs of facility or property sharing and of civil works coordination.
2.   Measures taken by a competent authority in accordance with this Article shall be objective, transparent, non-discriminatory, and proportionate. Where relevant, these measures shall be carried out in coordination with the national regulatory authorities.
CHAPTER III
Access to radio spectrum
Section 1
Authorisations
Article 45
Management of radio spectrum
1.   Taking due account of the fact that radio spectrum is a public good that has an important social, cultural and economic value, Member States shall ensure the effective management of radio spectrum for electronic communications networks and services in their territory in accordance with Articles 3 and 4. They shall ensure that the allocation of, the issuing of general authorisations in respect of, and the granting of individual rights of use for radio spectrum for electronic communications networks and services by competent authorities are based on objective, transparent, pro-competitive, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.
In applying this Article, Member States shall respect relevant international agreements, including the ITU Radio Regulations and other agreements adopted in the framework of the ITU applicable to radio spectrum, such as the agreement reached at the Regional Radiocommunications Conference of 2006, and may take public policy considerations into account.
2.   Member States shall promote the harmonisation of use of radio spectrum by electronic communications networks and services across the Union, consistent with the need to ensure effective and efficient use thereof and in pursuit of benefits for the consumer such as competition, economies of scale and interoperability of networks and services. In so doing, they shall act in accordance with Article 4 of this Directive and with Decision No 676/2002/EC, inter alia, by:
(a)
pursuing wireless broadband coverage of their national territory and population at high quality and speed, as well as coverage of major national and European transport paths, including trans-European transport network as referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(
46
)
;
(b)
facilitating the rapid development in the Union of new wireless communications technologies and applications, including, where appropriate, in a cross-sectoral approach;
(c)
ensuring predictability and consistency in the granting, renewal, amendment, restriction and withdrawal of rights of use for radio spectrum in order to promote long-term investments;
(d)
ensuring the prevention of cross-border or national harmful interference in accordance with Articles 28 and 46 respectively, and taking appropriate pre-emptive and remedial measures to that end;
(e)
promoting the shared use of radio spectrum between similar or different uses of radio spectrum in accordance with competition law;
(f)
applying the most appropriate and least onerous authorisation system possible in accordance with Article 46 in such a way as to maximise flexibility, sharing and efficiency in the use of radio spectrum;
(g)
applying rules for the granting, transfer, renewal, modification and withdrawal of rights of use for radio spectrum that are clearly and transparently laid down in order to guarantee regulatory certainty, consistency and predictability;
(h)
pursuing consistency and predictability throughout the Union regarding the way the use of radio spectrum is authorised in protecting public health taking into account Recommendation 1999/519/EC.
For the purpose of the first subparagraph, and in the context of the development of technical implementing measures for a radio spectrum band under Decision No 676/2002/EC, the Commission may request the RSPG to issue an opinion recommending the most appropriate authorisation regimes for the use of radio spectrum in that band or parts thereof. Where appropriate and taking utmost account of such opinion, the Commission may adopt a recommendation with a view to promoting a consistent approach in the Union with regard to the authorisation regimes for the use of that band.
Where the Commission is considering the adoption of measures in accordance with Article 39(1), (4), (5) and (6), it may request the opinion of the RSPG with regard to the implications of any such standard or specification for the coordination, harmonisation and availability of radio spectrum. The Commission shall take utmost account of the RSPG’s opinion in taking any subsequent steps.
3.   In the case of a national or regional lack of market demand for the use of a band in the harmonised radio spectrum, Member States may allow an alternative use of all or part of that band, including the existing use, in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, provided that:
(a)
the finding of a lack of market demand for the use of such a band is based on a public consultation in accordance with Article 23, including a forward-looking assessment of market demand;
(b)
such alternative use does not prevent or hinder the availability or the use of such a band in other Member States; and
(c)
the Member State concerned takes due account of the long-term availability or use of such a band in the Union and the economies of scale for equipment resulting from using the harmonised radio spectrum in the Union.
Any decision to allow alternative use on an exceptional basis shall be subject to a regular review and shall in any event be reviewed promptly upon a duly justified request by a prospective user to the competent authority for use of the band in accordance with the technical implementing measure. The Member State shall inform the Commission and the other Member States of the decision taken, together with the reasons therefor, as well as of the outcome of any review.
4.   Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, Member States shall ensure that all types of technology used for the provision of electronic communications networks or services may be used in the radio spectrum declared available for electronic communications services in their National Frequency Allocation Plan in accordance with Union law.
Member States may, however, provide for proportionate and non-discriminatory restrictions to the types of radio network or wireless access technology used for electronic communications services where this is necessary to:
(a)
avoid harmful interference;
(b)
protect public health against electromagnetic fields, taking utmost account of Recommendation 1999/519/EC;
(c)
ensure technical quality of service;
(d)
ensure maximisation of radio spectrum sharing;
(e)
safeguard efficient use of radio spectrum; or
(f)
ensure the fulfilment of a general interest objective in accordance with paragraph 5.
5.   Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, Member States shall ensure that all types of electronic communications services may be provided in the radio spectrum declared available for electronic communications services in their National Frequency Allocation Plan in accordance with Union law. Member States may, however, provide for proportionate and non-discriminatory restrictions to the types of electronic communications services to be provided, including, where necessary, to fulfil a requirement under the ITU Radio Regulations.
Measures that require an electronic communications service to be provided in a specific band available for electronic communications services shall be justified in order to ensure the fulfilment of a general interest objective as laid down by the Member States in accordance with Union law, including, but not limited to:
(a)
safety of life;
(b)
the promotion of social, regional or territorial cohesion;
(c)
the avoidance of inefficient use of radio spectrum; or
(d)
the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and media pluralism, for example the provision of radio and television broadcasting services.
A measure which prohibits the provision of any other electronic communications service in a specific band may be provided for only where justified by the need to protect the safety of life services. Member States may, on an exceptional basis, also extend such a measure in order to fulfil other general interest objectives as laid down by the Member States in accordance with Union law.
6.   Member States shall regularly review the necessity of the restrictions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, and shall make the results of those reviews public.
7.   Restrictions established prior to 25 May 2011 shall comply with paragraphs 4 and 5 by 20 December 2018.
Article 46
Authorisation of the use of radio spectrum
1.   Member States shall facilitate the use of radio spectrum, including shared use, under general authorisations and limit the granting of individual rights of use for radio spectrum to situations where such rights are necessary to maximise efficient use in light of demand and taking into account the criteria set out in the second subparagraph. In all other cases, they shall set out the conditions for the use of radio spectrum in a general authorisation.
To that end, Member States shall decide on the most appropriate regime for authorising the use of radio spectrum, taking account of:
(a)
the specific characteristics of the radio spectrum concerned;
(b)
the need to protect against harmful interference;
(c)
the development of reliable conditions for radio spectrum sharing, where appropriate;
(d)
the need to ensure technical quality of communications or service;
(e)
objectives of general interest as laid down by Member States in accordance with Union law;
(f)
the need to safeguard efficient use of radio spectrum.
When considering whether to issue general authorisations or to grant individual rights of use for the harmonised radio spectrum, taking into account technical implementing measures adopted in accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC, Member States shall seek to minimise problems of harmful interference, including in cases of shared use of radio spectrum on the basis of a combination of general authorisation and individual rights of use.
Where appropriate, Member States shall consider the possibility to authorise the use of radio spectrum based on a combination of general authorisation and individual rights of use, taking into account the likely effects of different combinations of general authorisations and individual rights of use and of gradual transfers from one category to the other on competition, innovation and market entry.
Member States shall seek to minimise restrictions on the use of radio spectrum by taking appropriate account of technological solutions for managing harmful interference in order to impose the least onerous authorisation regime possible.
2.   When taking a decision pursuant to paragraph 1 with a view to facilitating the shared use of radio spectrum, the competent authorities shall ensure that the conditions for the shared use of radio spectrum are clearly set out. Such conditions shall facilitate efficient use of radio spectrum, competition and innovation.
Article 47
Conditions attached to individual rights of use for radio spectrum
1.   Competent authorities shall attach conditions to individual rights of use for radio spectrum in accordance with Article 13(1) in such a way as to ensure optimal and the most effective and efficient use of radio spectrum. They shall, before the assignment or renewal of such rights, clearly establish any such conditions, including the level of use required and the possibility to fulfil that requirement through trading or leasing, in order to ensure the implementation of those conditions in accordance with Article 30. Conditions attached to renewals of right of use for radio spectrum shall not provide undue advantages to existing holders of those rights.
Such conditions shall specify the applicable parameters, including any deadline for exercising the rights of use, the non-fulfilment of which would entitle the competent authority to withdraw the right of use or impose other measures.
Competent authorities shall, in a timely and transparent manner, consult and inform interested parties regarding conditions attached to individual rights of use before their imposition. They shall determine in advance and inform interested parties, in a transparent manner, of the criteria for the assessment of the fulfilment of those conditions.
2.   When attaching conditions to individual rights of use for radio spectrum, competent authorities may, in particular with a view to ensuring effective and efficient use of radio spectrum or promoting coverage, provide for the following possibilities:
(a)
sharing passive or active infrastructure which relies on radio spectrum or radio spectrum;
(b)
commercial roaming access agreements;
(c)
joint roll-out of infrastructures for the provision of networks or services which rely on the use of radio spectrum.
Competent authorities shall not prevent the sharing of radio spectrum in the conditions attached to the rights of use for radio spectrum. Implementation by undertakings of conditions attached pursuant to this paragraph shall remain subject to competition law.
Section 2
Rights of use
Article 48
Granting of individual rights of use for radio spectrum
1.   Where it is necessary to grant individual rights of use for radio spectrum, Member States shall grant such rights, upon request, to any undertaking for the provision of electronic communications networks or services under the general authorisation referred to in Article 12, subject to Article 13, to point (c) of Article 21(1) and to Article 55 and to any other rules ensuring the efficient use of those resources in accordance with this Directive.
2.   Without prejudice to specific criteria and procedures adopted by Member States to grant individual rights of use for radio spectrum to providers of radio or television broadcast content services with a view to pursuing general interest objectives in accordance with Union law, the individual rights of use for radio spectrum shall be granted through open, objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate procedures, and in accordance with Article 45.
3.   An exception to the requirement of open procedures may apply where the granting of individual rights of use for radio spectrum to the providers of radio or television broadcast content services is necessary to achieve a general interest objective as laid down by Member States in accordance with Union law.
4.   Competent authorities shall consider applications for individual rights of use for radio spectrum in the context of selection procedures pursuant to objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory eligibility criteria that are set out in advance and reflect the conditions to be attached to such rights. Competent authorities shall be able to request all necessary information from applicants in order to assess, on the basis of those criteria, their ability to comply with those conditions. Where the competent authority concludes that an applicant does not possess the required ability, it shall provide a duly reasoned decision to that effect.
5.   When granting individual rights of use for radio spectrum, Member States shall specify whether those rights can be transferred or leased by the holder of the rights, and under which conditions. Articles 45 and 51 shall apply.
6.   The competent authority shall take, communicate and make public the decisions on the granting of individual rights of use for radio spectrum as soon as possible after the receipt of the complete application and within six weeks in the case of radio spectrum declared available for electronic communications services in their National Frequency Allocation Plan. That time limit shall be without prejudice to Article 55(7) and to any applicable international agreements relating to the use of radio spectrum or of orbital positions.
Article 49
Duration of rights
1.   Where Member States authorise the use of radio spectrum through individual rights of use for a limited period, they shall ensure that the right of use is granted for a period that is appropriate in light of the objectives pursued in accordance with Article 55(2), taking due account of the need to ensure competition, as well as, in particular, effective and efficient use of radio spectrum, and to promote innovation and efficient investments, including by allowing for an appropriate period for investment amortisation.
2.   Where Member States grant individual rights of use for radio spectrum for which harmonised conditions have been set by technical implementing measures in accordance with Decision No 676/2002/EC in order to enable its use for wireless broadband electronic communications services (‘wireless broadband services’) for a limited period, they shall ensure regulatory predictability for the holders of the rights over a period of at least 20 years regarding conditions for investment in infrastructure which relies on the use of such radio spectrum, taking account of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. This Article is subject, where relevant, to any modification of the conditions attached to those rights of use in accordance with Article 18.
To that end, Member States shall ensure that such rights are valid for a duration of at least 15 years and include, where necessary to comply with the first subparagraph, an adequate extension thereof, under the conditions laid down in this paragraph.
Member States shall make available the general criteria for an extension of the duration of rights of use, in a transparent manner, to all interested parties in advance of granting rights of use, as part of the conditions laid down under Article 55(3) and (6). Such general criteria shall relate to:
(a)
the need to ensure the effective and efficient use of the radio spectrum concerned, the objectives pursued in points (a) and (b) of Article 45(2), or the need to fulfil general interest objectives related to ensuring safety of life, public order, public security or defence; and
(b)
the need to ensure undistorted competition.
At the latest two years before the expiry of the initial duration of an individual right of use, the competent authority shall conduct an objective and forward-looking assessment of the general criteria laid down for extension of the duration of that right of use in light of point (c) of Article 45(2). Provided that the competent authority has not initiated enforcement action for non-compliance with the conditions of the rights of use pursuant to Article 30, it shall grant the extension of the duration of the right of use unless it concludes that such an extension would not comply with the general criteria laid down in point (a) or (b) of the third subparagraph of this paragraph.
On the basis of that assessment, the competent authority shall notify the holder of the right as to whether the extension of the duration of the right of use is to be granted.
If such extension is not to be granted, the competent authority shall apply Article 48 for granting rights of use for that specific radio spectrum band.
Any measure under this paragraph shall be proportionate, non-discriminatory, transparent and reasoned.
By way of derogation from Article 23, interested parties shall have the opportunity to comment on any draft measure pursuant to the third and the fourth subparagraphs of this paragraph for a period of at least three months.
This paragraph is without prejudice to the application of Articles 19 and 30.
When establishing fees for rights of use, Member States shall take account of the mechanism provided for under this paragraph.
3.   Where duly justified, Member States may derogate from paragraph 2 of this Article in the following cases:
(a)
in limited geographical areas, where access to high-speed networks is severely deficient or absent and this is necessary to ensure achievement of the objectives of Article 45(2);
(b)
for specific short-term projects;
(c)
for experimental use;
(d)
for uses of radio spectrum which, in accordance with Article 45(4) and (5), can coexist with wireless broadband services; or
(e)
for alternative use of radio spectrum in accordance with Article 45(3).
4.   Member States may adjust the duration of rights of use laid down in this Article to ensure the simultaneous expiry of the duration of rights in one or several bands.
Article 50
Renewal of individual rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum
1.   National regulatory or other competent authorities shall take a decision on the renewal of individual rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum in a timely manner before the duration of those rights expired, except where, at the time of assignment, the possibility of renewal has been explicitly excluded. For that purpose, those authorities shall assess the need for such renewal at their own initiative or upon request by the holder of the right, in the latter case not earlier than five years prior to expiry of the duration of the rights concerned. This shall be without prejudice to renewal clauses applicable to existing rights.
2.   In taking a decision pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, competent authorities shall consider, inter alia:
(a)
the fulfilment of the objectives set out in Article 3, Article 45(2) and Article 48(2), as well as public policy objectives under Union or national law;
(b)
the implementation of a technical implementing measure adopted in accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC;
(c)
the review of the appropriate implementation of the conditions attached to the right concerned;
(d)
the need to promote, or avoid any distortion of, competition in line with Article 52;
(e)
the need to render the use of radio spectrum more efficient in light of technological or market evolution;
(f)
the need to avoid severe service disruption.
3.   When considering possible renewal of individual rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum for which the number of rights of use is limited pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, competent authorities shall conduct an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure, and shall, inter alia:
(a)
give all interested parties the opportunity to express their views through a public consultation in accordance with Article 23; and
(b)
clearly state the reasons for such possible renewal.
The national regulatory or other competent authority shall take into account any evidence arising from the consultation pursuant to the first subparagraph of this paragraph of market demand from undertakings other than those holding rights of use for radio spectrum in the band concerned when deciding whether to renew the rights of use or to organise a new selection procedure in order to grant the rights of use pursuant to Article 55.
4.   A decision to renew the individual rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum may be accompanied by a review of the fees as well as of the other terms and conditions attached thereto. Where appropriate, national regulatory or other competent authorities may adjust the fees for the rights of use in accordance with Article 42.
Article 51
Transfer or lease of individual rights of use for radio spectrum
1.   Member States shall ensure that undertakings may transfer or lease to other undertakings individual rights of use for radio spectrum.
Member States may determine that this paragraph does not apply where the undertaking’s individual right of use for radio spectrum was initially granted free of charge or assigned for broadcasting.
2.   Member States shall ensure that an undertaking’s intention to transfer or lease rights of use for radio spectrum, as well as the effective transfer thereof is notified in accordance with national procedures to the competent authority and is made public. In the case of harmonised radio spectrum, any such transfer shall comply with such harmonised use.
3.   Member States shall allow the transfer or lease of rights of use for radio spectrum where the original conditions attached to the rights of use are maintained. Without prejudice to the need to ensure the absence of a distortion of competition, in particular in accordance with Article 52, Member States shall:
(a)
submit transfers and leases to the least onerous procedure possible;
(b)
not refuse the lease of rights of use for radio spectrum where the lessor undertakes to remain liable for meeting the original conditions attached to the rights of use;
(c)
not refuse the transfer of rights of use for radio spectrum unless there is a clear risk that the new holder is unable to meet the original conditions for the right of use.
Any administrative charge imposed on undertakings in connection with processing an application for the transfer or lease of rights of use for radio spectrum shall comply with Article 16.
Points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph are without prejudice to the Member States’ competence to enforce compliance with the conditions attached to the rights of use at any time, both with regard to the lessor and the lessee, in accordance with their national law.
Competent authorities shall facilitate the transfer or lease of rights of use for radio spectrum by giving consideration to any request to adapt the conditions attached to the rights in a timely manner and by ensuring that those rights or the relevant radio spectrum may to the best extent be partitioned or disaggregated.
In light of any transfer or lease of rights of use for radio spectrum, competent authorities shall make relevant details relating to tradable individual rights publicly available in a standardised electronic format when the rights are created and keep those details for as long as the rights exist.
The Commission may adopt implementing acts specifying those relevant details.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
Article 52
Competition
1.   National regulatory and other competent authorities shall promote effective competition and avoid distortions of competition in the internal market when deciding to grant, amend or renew rights of use for radio spectrum for electronic communications networks and services in accordance with this Directive.
2.   When Member States grant, amend or renew rights of use for radio spectrum, their national regulatory or other competent authorities upon the advice provided by national regulatory authority may take appropriate measures such as:
(a)
limiting the amount of radio spectrum bands for which rights of use are granted to any undertaking, or, in justified circumstances, attaching conditions to such rights of use, such as the provision of wholesale access, national or regional roaming, in certain bands or in certain groups of bands with similar characteristics;
(b)
reserving, if appropriate and justified with regard to a specific situation in the national market, a certain part of a radio spectrum band or group of bands for assignment to new entrants;
(c)
refusing to grant new rights of use for radio spectrum or to allow new radio spectrum uses in certain bands, or attaching conditions to the grant of new rights of use for radio spectrum or to the authorisation of new uses of radio spectrum, in order to avoid the distortion of competition by any assignment, transfer or accumulation of rights of use;
(d)
including conditions prohibiting, or imposing conditions on, transfers of rights of use for radio spectrum, not subject to Union or national merger control, where such transfers are likely to result in significant harm to competition;
(e)
amending the existing rights in accordance with this Directive where this is necessary to remedy ex post a distortion of competition by any transfer or accumulation of rights of use for radio spectrum.
National regulatory and other competent authorities shall, taking into account market conditions and available benchmarks, base their decisions on an objective and forward-looking assessment of the market competitive conditions, of whether such measures are necessary to maintain or achieve effective competition, and of the likely effects of such measures on existing and future investments by market participants in particular for network roll-out. In doing so, they shall take into account the approach to market analysis as set out in Article 67(2).
3.   When applying paragraph 2 of this Article, national regulatory and other competent authorities shall act in accordance with the procedures provided in Articles 18, 19, 23 and 35.
Section 3
Procedures
Article 53
Coordinated timing of assignments
1.   Member States shall cooperate in order to coordinate the use of harmonised radio spectrum for electronic communications networks and services in the Union taking due account of the different national market situations. This may include identifying one, or, where appropriate, several common dates by which the use of specific harmonised radio spectrum is to be authorised.
2.   Where harmonised conditions have been set by technical implementing measures in accordance with Decision No 676/2002/EC in order to enable the radio spectrum use for wireless broadband networks and services, Member States shall allow the use of that radio spectrum, as soon as possible and at the latest 30 months after the adoption of that measure, or as soon as possible after the lifting of any decision to allow alternative use on an exceptional basis pursuant to Article 45(3) of this Directive. This is without prejudice to Decision (EU) 2017/899 and to the Commission’s right of initiative to propose legislative acts.
3.   A Member State may delay the deadline provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article for a specific band under the following circumstances:
(a)
to the extent justified by a restriction to the use of that band based on the general interest objective provided in point (a) or (d) of Article 45(5);
(b)
in the case of unresolved cross-border coordination issues resulting in harmful interference with third countries, provided the affected Member State has, where appropriate, requested Union assistance pursuant to Article 28(5);
(c)
safeguarding national security and defence; or
(d)
force majeure.
The Member State concerned shall review such a delay at least every two years.
4.   A Member State may delay the deadline provided for in paragraph 2 for a specific band to the extent necessary and up to 30 months in the case of:
(a)
unresolved cross-border coordination issues resulting in harmful interference between Member States, provided that the affected Member State takes all necessary measures in a timely manner pursuant to Article 28(3) and (4);
(b)
the need to ensure, and the complexity of ensuring, the technical migration of existing users of that band.
5.   In the event of a delay under paragraph 3 or 4, the Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission in a timely manner, stating the reasons.
Article 54
Coordinated timing of assignments for specific 5G bands
1.   By 31 December 2020, for terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband services, Member States shall, where necessary in order to facilitate the roll-out of 5G, take all appropriate measures to:
(a)
reorganise and allow the use of sufficiently large blocks of the 3,4-3,8 GHz band;
(b)
allow the use of at least 1 GHz of the 24,25-27,5 GHz band, provided that there is clear evidence of market demand and of the absence of significant constraints for migration of existing users or band clearance.
2.   Member States may, however, extend the deadline laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article, where justified, in accordance with Article 45(3) or Article 53(2), (3) or (4).
3.   Measures taken pursuant paragraph 1 of this Article shall comply with the harmonised conditions set by technical implementing measures in accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC.
Article 55
Procedure for limiting the number of rights of use to be granted for radio spectrum
1.   Without prejudice to Article 53, where a Member State concludes that a right to use radio spectrum cannot be subject to a general authorisation and where it considers whether to limit the number of rights of use to be granted for radio spectrum, it shall, inter alia:
(a)
clearly state the reasons for limiting the rights of use, in particular by giving due weight to the need to maximise benefits for users and to facilitate the development of competition, and review, as appropriate, the limitation at regular intervals or at the reasonable request of affected undertakings;
(b)
give all interested parties, including users and consumers, the opportunity to express their views on any limitation through a public consultation in accordance with Article 23.
2.   When a Member State concludes that the number of rights of use is to be limited, it shall clearly establish, and give reasons for, the objectives pursued by means of a competitive or comparative selection procedure under this Article, and where possible quantify them, giving due weight to the need to fulfil national and internal market objectives. The objectives that the Member State may set out with a view to designing the specific selection procedure shall, in addition to promoting competition, be limited to one or more of the following:
(a)
promoting coverage;
(b)
ensuring the required quality of service;
(c)
promoting efficient use of radio spectrum, including by taking into account the conditions attached to the rights of use and the level of fees;
(d)
promoting innovation and business development.
The national regulatory or other competent authority shall clearly define and justify the choice of the selection procedure, including any preliminary phase to access the selection procedure. It shall also clearly state the outcome of any related assessment of the competitive, technical and economic situation of the market and provide reasons for the possible use and choice of measures pursuant to Article 35.
3.   Member States shall publish any decision on the selection procedure chosen and the related rules, clearly stating the reasons therefor. It shall also publish the conditions that are to be attached to the rights of use.
4.   After having determined the selection procedure, the Member State shall invite applications for rights of use.
5.   Where a Member State concludes that additional rights of use for radio spectrum or a combination of general authorisation and individual rights of use can be granted, it shall publish that conclusion and initiate the process of granting such rights.
6.   Where the granting of rights of use for radio spectrum needs to be limited, Member States shall grant such rights on the basis of selection criteria and a selection procedure which are objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Any such selection criteria shall give due weight to the achievement of the objectives and requirements of Articles 3, 4, 28 and 45.
7.   Where competitive or comparative selection procedures are to be used, Member States may extend the maximum period of six weeks referred to in Article 48(6) for as long as necessary to ensure that such procedures are fair, reasonable, open and transparent to all interested parties, but by no longer than eight months, subject to any specific timetable established pursuant to Article 53.
Those time limits shall be without prejudice to any applicable international agreements relating to the use of radio spectrum and satellite coordination.
8.   This Article is without prejudice to the transfer of rights of use for radio spectrum in accordance with Article 51.
CHAPTER IV
Deployment and use of wireless network equipment
Article 56
Access to radio local area networks
1.   Competent authorities shall allow the provision of access through RLANs to a public electronic communications network, as well as the use of the harmonised radio spectrum for that provision, subject only to applicable general authorisation conditions relating to radio spectrum use as referred to in Article 46(1).
Where that provision is not part of an economic activity or is ancillary to an economic activity or a public service which is not dependent on the conveyance of signals on those networks, any undertaking, public authority or end-user providing such access shall not be subject to any general authorisation for the provision of electronic communications networks or services pursuant to Article 12, to obligations regarding end-users rights pursuant to Title II of Part III, or to obligations to interconnect their networks pursuant to Article 61(1).
2.   Article 12 of Directive 2000/31/EC shall apply.
3.   Competent authorities shall not prevent providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services from allowing access to their networks to the public, through RLANs, which may be located at an end-user’s premises, subject to compliance with the applicable general authorisation conditions and the prior informed agreement of the end-user.
4.   In accordance in particular with Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, competent authorities shall ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services do not unilaterally restrict or prevent end-users from:
(a)
accessing RLANs of their choice provided by third parties; or
(b)
allowing reciprocally or, more generally, accessing the networks of such providers by other end-users through RLANs, including on the basis of third-party initiatives which aggregate and make publicly accessible the RLANs of different end-users.
5.   Competent authorities shall not limit or prevent end-users from allowing access, reciprocally or otherwise, to their RLANs by other end-users, including on the basis of third-party initiatives which aggregate and make the RLANs of different end-users publicly accessible.
6.   Competent authorities shall not unduly restrict the provision of access to RLANs to the public:
(a)
by public sector bodies or in public spaces close to premises occupied by such public sector bodies, when that provision is ancillary to the public services provided on those premises;
(b)
by initiatives of non-governmental organisations or public sector bodies to aggregate and make reciprocally or more generally accessible the RLANs of different end-users, including, where applicable, the RLANs to which public access is provided in accordance with point (a).
Article 57
Deployment and operation of small-area wireless access points
1.   Competent authorities shall not unduly restrict the deployment of small-area wireless access points. Member States shall seek to ensure that any rules governing the deployment of small-area wireless access points are nationally consistent. Such rules shall be published in advance of their application.
In particular, competent authorities shall not subject the deployment of small-area wireless access points complying with the characteristics laid down pursuant to paragraph 2 to any individual town planning permit or other individual prior permits.
By way of derogation from the second subparagraph of this paragraph, competent authorities may require permits for the deployment of small-area wireless access points on buildings or sites of architectural, historical or natural value protected in accordance with national law or where necessary for public safety reasons. Article 7 of Directive 2014/61/EU shall apply to the granting of those permits.
2.   The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, specify the physical and technical characteristics, such as maximum size, weight, and where appropriate emission power of small-area wireless access points.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
The first such implementing act shall be adopted by 30 June 2020.
3.   This Article is without prejudice to the essential requirements laid down in Directive 2014/53/EU and to the authorisation regime applicable for the use of the relevant radio spectrum.
4.   Member States shall, by applying, where relevant, the procedures adopted in accordance with Directive 2014/61/EU, ensure that operators have the right to access any physical infrastructure controlled by national, regional or local public authorities, which is technically suitable to host small-area wireless access points or which is necessary to connect such access points to a backbone network, including street furniture, such as light poles, street signs, traffic lights, billboards, bus and tramway stops and metro stations. Public authorities shall meet all reasonable requests for access on fair, reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, which shall be made public at a single information point.
5.   Without prejudice to any commercial agreements, the deployment of small-area wireless access points shall not be subject to any fees or charges going beyond the administrative charges in accordance with Article 16.
Article 58
Technical regulations on electromagnetic fields
The procedures laid down in Directive (EU) 2015/1535 shall apply with respect to any draft measure by a Member State that would impose on the deployment of small-area wireless access points different requirements with respect to electromagnetic fields than those provided for in Recommendation 1999/519/EC.
TITLE II
ACCESS
CHAPTER I
General provisions, access principles
Article 59
General framework for access and interconnection
1.   Member States shall ensure that there are no restrictions which prevent undertakings in the same Member State or in different Member States from negotiating between themselves agreements on technical and commercial arrangements for access or interconnection, in accordance with Union law. The undertaking requesting access or interconnection does not need to be authorised to operate in the Member State where access or interconnection is requested, if it is not providing services and does not operate a network in that Member State.
2.   Without prejudice to Article 114, Member States shall not maintain legal or administrative measures which require undertakings, when granting access or interconnection, to offer different terms and conditions to different undertakings for equivalent services or measures imposing obligations that are not related to the actual access and interconnection services provided without prejudice to the conditions set out in Annex I.
Article 60
Rights and obligations of undertakings
1.   Operators of public electronic communications networks shall have a right and, when requested by other undertakings so authorised in accordance with Article 15, an obligation to negotiate with each other interconnection for the purpose of providing publicly available electronic communications services, in order to ensure provision and interoperability of services throughout the Union. Operators shall offer access and interconnection to other undertakings on terms and conditions consistent with obligations imposed by the national regulatory authority pursuant to Articles 61, 62 and 68.
2.   Without prejudice to Article 21, Member States shall require that undertakings which acquire information from another undertaking before, during or after the process of negotiating access or interconnection arrangements use that information solely for the purpose for which it was supplied and respect at all times the confidentiality of information transmitted or stored. Such undertakings shall not pass on the received information to any other party, in particular other departments, subsidiaries or partners, for whom such information could provide a competitive advantage.
3.   Member States may provide for negotiations to be conducted through neutral intermediaries when conditions of competition so require.
CHAPTER II
Access and interconnection
Article 61
Powers and responsibilities of the national regulatory and other competent authorities with regard to access and interconnection
1.   National regulatory authorities or other competent authorities in the case of points (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 of this Article shall, acting in pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 3, encourage and, where appropriate, ensure, in accordance with this Directive, adequate access and interconnection, and the interoperability of services, exercising their responsibility in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, the deployment of very high capacity networks, efficient investment and innovation, and gives the maximum benefit to end-users.
They shall provide guidance and make publicly available the procedures applicable to gain access and interconnection to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises and operators with a limited geographical reach can benefit from the obligations imposed.
2.   In particular, without prejudice to measures that may be taken regarding undertakings designated as having significant market power in accordance with Article 68, national regulatory authorities, or other competent authorities in the case of points (b) and (c) of this subparagraph, shall be able to impose:
(a)
to the extent necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity, obligations on undertakings subject to general authorisation that control access to end-users, including, in justified cases, the obligation to interconnect their networks where this is not already the case;
(b)
in justified cases and to the extent necessary, obligations on undertakings subject to general authorisation that control access to end-users to make their services interoperable;
(c)
in justified cases, where end-to-end connectivity between end-users is endangered due to a lack of interoperability between interpersonal communications services, and to the extent necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity between end-users, obligations on relevant providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services which reach a significant level of coverage and user uptake, to make their services interoperable;
(d)
to the extent necessary to ensure accessibility for end-users to digital radio and television broadcasting services and related complementary services specified by the Member State, obligations on operators to provide access to the other facilities referred to in Part II of Annex II on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
The obligations referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph shall be imposed only:
(i)
to the extent necessary to ensure interoperability of interpersonal communications services and may include proportionate obligations on providers of those services to publish and allow the use, modification and redistribution of relevant information by the authorities and other providers, or to use and implement standards or specifications listed in Article 39(1) or of any other relevant European or international standards;
(ii)
where the Commission, after consulting BEREC and taking utmost account of its opinion, has found an appreciable threat to end-to-end connectivity between end-users throughout the Union or in at least three Member States and has adopted implementing measures specifying the nature and scope of any obligations that may be imposed.
The implementing measures referred to in point (ii) of the second subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
3.   In particular, and without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 2, national regulatory authorities may impose obligations, upon reasonable request, to grant access to wiring and cables and associated facilities inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point as determined by the national regulatory authority, where that point is located outside the building. Where it is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable, such obligations may be imposed on providers of electronic communications networks or on the owners of such wiring and cables and associated facilities, where those owners are not providers of electronic communications networks. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access to such network elements and to associated facilities and associated services, on transparency and non-discrimination and on apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.
Where a national regulatory authority concludes, having regard, where applicable, to the obligations resulting from any relevant market analysis, that the obligations imposed in accordance with the first subparagraph do not sufficiently address high and non-transitory economic or physical barriers to replication which underlie an existing or emerging market situation significantly limiting competitive outcomes for end-users, it may extend the imposition of such access obligations, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, beyond the first concentration or distribution point, to a point that it determines to be the closest to end-users, capable of hosting a sufficient number of end-user connections to be commercially viable for efficient access seekers. In determining the extent of the extension beyond the first concentration or distribution point, the national regulatory authority shall take utmost account of relevant BEREC guidelines. If justified on technical or economic grounds, national regulatory authorities may impose active or virtual access obligations.
National regulatory authorities shall not impose obligations in accordance with the second subparagraph on providers of electronic communications networks where they determine that:
(a)
the provider has the characteristics listed in Article 80(1) and makes available a viable and similar alternative means of reaching end-users by providing access to a very high capacity network to any undertaking, on fair, non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions; national regulatory authorities may extend that exemption to other providers offering, on fair, non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions, access to a very high capacity network; or
(b)
the imposition of obligations would compromise the economic or financial viability of a new network deployment, in particular by small local projects.
By way of derogation from point (a) of the third subparagraph, national regulatory authorities may impose obligations on providers of electronic communications networks fulfilling the criteria laid down in that point where the network concerned is publicly funded.
By 21 December 2020, BEREC shall publish guidelines to foster a consistent application of this paragraph, by setting out the relevant criteria for determining:
(a)
the first concentration or distribution point;
(b)
the point, beyond the first concentration or distribution point, capable of hosting a sufficient number of end-user connections to enable an efficient undertaking to overcome the significant replicability barriers identified;
(c)
which network deployments can be considered to be new;
(d)
which projects can be considered to be small; and
(e)
which economic or physical barriers to replication are high and non-transitory.
4.   Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities have the power to impose on undertakings providing or authorised to provide electronic communications networks obligations in relation to the sharing of passive infrastructure or obligations to conclude localised roaming access agreements, in both cases if directly necessary for the local provision of services which rely on the use of radio spectrum, in accordance with Union law and provided that no viable and similar alternative means of access to end-users is made available to any undertaking on fair and reasonable terms and conditions. Competent authorities may impose such obligations only where this possibility is clearly provided for when granting the rights of use for radio spectrum and where justified on the grounds that, in the area subject to such obligations, the market-driven deployment of infrastructure for the provision of networks or services which rely on the use of radio spectrum is subject to insurmountable economic or physical obstacles and therefore access to networks or services by end-users is severely deficient or absent. In those circumstances where access and sharing of passive infrastructure alone does not suffice to address the situation, national regulatory authorities may impose obligations on sharing of active infrastructure.
Competent authorities shall have regard to:
(a)
the need to maximise connectivity throughout the Union, along major transport paths and in particular territorial areas, and to the possibility to significantly increase choice and higher quality of service for end-users;
(b)
the efficient use of radio spectrum;
(c)
the technical feasibility of sharing and associated conditions;
(d)
the state of infrastructure-based as well as service-based competition;
(e)
technological innovation;
(f)
the overriding need to support the incentive of the host to roll out the infrastructure in the first place.
In the event of dispute resolution, competent authorities may, inter alia, impose on the beneficiary of the sharing or access obligation, the obligation to share radio spectrum with the infrastructure host in the relevant area.
5.   Obligations and conditions imposed in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article shall be objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory, they shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 23, 32 and 33. The national regulatory and other competent authorities which have imposed such obligations and conditions shall assess the results thereof by five years after the adoption of the previous measure adopted in relation to the same undertakings and assess whether it would be appropriate to withdraw or amend them in light of evolving conditions. Those authorities shall notify the outcome of their assessment in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 23, 32 and 33.
6.   For the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory authority is empowered to intervene on its own initiative where justified in order to secure the policy objectives of Article 3, in accordance with this Directive and, in particular, with the procedures referred to in Articles 23 and 32.
7.   By 21 June 2020 in order to contribute to a consistent definition of the location of network termination points by national regulatory authorities, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, adopt guidelines on common approaches to the identification of the network termination point in different network topologies. National regulatory authorities shall take utmost account of those guidelines when defining the location of network termination points.
Article 62
Conditional access systems and other facilities
1.   Member States shall ensure that the conditions laid down in Part I of Annex II apply in relation to conditional access to digital television and radio services broadcast to viewers and listeners in the Union, irrespective of the means of transmission.
2.   Where, as a result of a market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 67(1), a national regulatory authority finds that one or more undertakings do not have significant market power on the relevant market, it may amend or withdraw the conditions with respect to those undertakings, in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 23 and 32, only to the extent that:
(a)
accessibility for end-users to radio and television broadcasts and broadcasting channels and services specified in accordance with Article 114 would not be adversely affected by such amendment or withdrawal; and
(b)
the prospects for effective competition in the following markets would not be adversely affected by such amendment or withdrawal:
(i)
retail digital television and radio broadcasting services; and
(ii)
conditional access systems and other associated facilities.
An appropriate notice period shall be given to parties affected by such amendment or withdrawal of conditions.
3.   Conditions applied in accordance with this Article are without prejudice to the ability of Member States to impose obligations in relation to the presentational aspect of EPGs and similar listing and navigation facilities.
4.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States may allow their national regulatory authority, as soon as possible after 20 December 2018 and periodically thereafter, to review the conditions applied in accordance with this Article, by undertaking a market analysis in accordance with Article 67(1) to determine whether to maintain, amend or withdraw the conditions applied.
CHAPTER III
Market analysis and significant market power
Article 63
Undertakings with significant market power
1.   Where this Directive requires national regulatory authorities to determine whether undertakings have significant market power in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 67, paragraph 2 of this Article shall apply.
2.   An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, namely a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.
In particular, national regulatory authorities shall, when assessing whether two or more undertakings are in a joint dominant position in a market, act in accordance with Union law and take into the utmost account the guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power published by the Commission pursuant to Article 64.
3.   Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it may also be designated as having significant market power on a closely related market, where the links between the two markets allow the market power held on the specific market to be leveraged into the closely related market, thereby strengthening the market power of the undertaking. Consequently, remedies aiming to prevent such leverage may be applied in the closely related market pursuant to Articles 69, 70, 71 and 74.
Article 64
Procedure for the identification and definition of markets
1.   After public consultation including with national regulatory authorities and taking the utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, the Commission shall adopt a Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets (‘the Recommendation’). The Recommendation shall identify those product and service markets within the electronic communications sector the characteristics of which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set out in this Directive, without prejudice to markets that may be defined in specific cases under competition law. The Commission shall define markets in accordance with the principles of competition law.
The Commission shall include product and service markets in the Recommendation where, after observing overall trends in the Union, it finds that each of the three criteria listed in Article 67(1) is met.
The Commission shall review the Recommendation by 21 December 2020 and regularly thereafter.
2.   After consulting BEREC, the Commission shall publish guidelines for market analysis and the assessment of significant market power (‘the SMP guidelines’) which shall be in accordance with the relevant principles of competition law. The SMP guidelines shall include guidance to national regulatory authorities on the application of the concept of significant market power to the specific context of ex ante regulation of electronic communications markets, taking account of the three criteria listed in Article 67(1).
3.   National regulatory authorities shall, taking the utmost account of the Recommendation and the SMP guidelines, define relevant markets appropriate to national circumstances, in particular relevant geographic markets within their territory by taking into account, inter alia, the degree of infrastructure competition in those areas, in accordance with the principles of competition law. National regulatory authorities shall, where relevant, also take into account the results of the geographical survey conducted in accordance with Article 22(1). They shall follow the procedures referred to in Articles 23 and 32 before defining the markets that differ from those identified in the Recommendation.
Article 65
Procedure for the identification of transnational markets
1.   If the Commission or at least two national regulatory authorities concerned submit a reasoned request, including supporting evidence, BEREC shall conduct an analysis of a potential transnational market. After consulting stakeholders and taking utmost account of the analysis carried out by BEREC, the Commission may adopt decisions identifying transnational markets in accordance with the principles of competition law and taking utmost account of the Recommendation and SMP guidelines adopted in accordance with Article 64.
2.   In the case of transnational markets identified in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the national regulatory authorities concerned shall jointly conduct the market analysis taking the utmost account of the SMP guidelines and, in a concerted fashion, shall decide on any imposition, maintenance, amendment or withdrawal of regulatory obligations referred to in Article 67(4). The national regulatory authorities concerned shall jointly notify to the Commission their draft measures regarding the market analysis and any regulatory obligations pursuant to Articles 32 and 33.
Two or more national regulatory authorities may also jointly notify their draft measures regarding the market analysis and any regulatory obligations in the absence of transnational markets, where they consider that market conditions in their respective jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous.
Article 66
Procedure for the identification of transnational demand
1.   BEREC shall conduct an analysis of transnational end-user demand for products and services that are provided within the Union in one or more of the markets listed in the Recommendation, if it receives a reasoned request providing supporting evidence from the Commission or from at least two of the national regulatory authorities concerned indicating that there is a serious demand problem to be addressed. BEREC may also conduct such analysis if it receives a reasoned request from market participants providing sufficient supporting evidence and considers that there is a serious demand problem to be addressed. BEREC’s analysis is without prejudice to any findings of transnational markets in accordance with Article 65(1) and to any findings of national or sub-national geographical markets by national regulatory authorities in accordance with Article 64(3).
That analysis of transnational end-user demand may include products and services that are supplied within product or service markets that have been defined in different ways by one or more national regulatory authorities when taking into account national circumstances, provided that those products and services are substitutable to those supplied in one of the markets listed in the Recommendation.
2.   If BEREC concludes that a transnational end-user demand exists, is significant and is not sufficiently met by supply provided on a commercial or regulated basis, it shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, issue guidelines on common approaches for national regulatory authorities to meet the identified transnational demand, including, where appropriate, when they impose remedies in accordance with Article 68. National regulatory authorities shall take into utmost account those guidelines when performing their regulatory tasks within their jurisdiction. Those guidelines may provide the basis for interoperability of wholesale access products across the Union and may include guidance for the harmonisation of technical specifications of wholesale access products capable of meeting such identified transnational demand.
Article 67
Market analysis procedure
1.   National regulatory authorities shall determine whether a relevant market defined in accordance with Article 64(3) is such as to justify the imposition of the regulatory obligations set out in this Directive. Member States shall ensure that an analysis is carried out, where appropriate, in collaboration with the national competition authorities. National regulatory authorities shall take utmost account of the SMP guidelines and shall follow the procedures referred to in Articles 23 and 32 when conducting such analysis.
A market may be considered to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set out in this Directive if all of the following criteria are met:
(a)
high and non-transitory structural, legal or regulatory barriers to entry are present;
(b)
there is a market structure which does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon, having regard to the state of infrastructure-based competition and other sources of competition behind the barriers to entry;
(c)
competition law alone is insufficient to adequately address the identified market failure(s).
Where a national regulatory authority conducts an analysis of a market that is included in the Recommendation, it shall consider that points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph have been met, unless the national regulatory authority determines that one or more of such criteria is not met in the specific national circumstances.
2.   Where a national regulatory authority conducts the analysis required by paragraph 1, it shall consider developments from a forward-looking perspective in the absence of regulation imposed on the basis of this Article in that relevant market, and taking into account all of the following:
(a)
market developments affecting the likelihood of the relevant market tending towards effective competition;
(b)
all relevant competitive constraints, at the wholesale and retail levels, irrespective of whether the sources of such constraints are considered to be electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, or other types of services or applications which are comparable from the perspective of the end-user, and irrespective of whether such constraints are part of the relevant market;
(c)
other types of regulation or measures imposed and affecting the relevant market or related retail market or markets throughout the relevant period, including, without limitation, obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 44, 60 and 61;
(d)
regulation imposed on other relevant markets on the basis of this Article.
3.   Where a national regulatory authority concludes that a relevant market does not justify the imposition of regulatory obligations in accordance with the procedure in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, or where the conditions set out in paragraph 4 of this Article are not met, it shall not impose or maintain any specific regulatory obligations in accordance with Article 68. Where there already are sector specific regulatory obligations imposed in accordance with Article 68, it shall withdraw such obligations placed on undertakings in that relevant market.
National regulatory authorities shall ensure that parties affected by such a withdrawal of obligations receive an appropriate notice period, defined by balancing the need to ensure a sustainable transition for the beneficiaries of those obligations and end-users, end-user choice, and that regulation does not continue for longer than necessary. When setting such a notice period, national regulatory authorities may determine specific conditions and notice periods in relation to existing access agreements.
4.   Where a national regulatory authority determines that, in a relevant market the imposition of regulatory obligations in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article is justified, it shall identify any undertakings which individually or jointly have a significant market power on that relevant market in accordance with Article 63. The national regulatory authority shall impose on such undertakings appropriate specific regulatory obligations in accordance with Article 68 or maintain or amend such obligations where they already exist if it considers that the outcome for end-users would not be effectively competitive in the absence of those obligations.
5.   Measures taken in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be subject to the procedures referred to in Articles 23 and 32. National regulatory authorities shall carry out an analysis of the relevant market and notify the corresponding draft measure in accordance with Article 32:
(a)
within five years from the adoption of a previous measure where the national regulatory authority has defined the relevant market and determined which undertakings have significant market power; that five-year period may, on an exceptional basis, be extended for up to one year, where the national regulatory authority has notified a reasoned proposal for an extension to the Commission no later than four months before the expiry of the five-year period, and the Commission has not objected within one month of the notified extension;
(b)
within three years from the adoption of a revised Recommendation on relevant markets, for markets not previously notified to the Commission; or
(c)
within three years from their accession, for Member States which have newly joined the Union.
6.   Where a national regulatory authority considers that it may not complete or has not completed its analysis of a relevant market identified in the Recommendation within the time limit laid down in paragraph 5 of this Article, BEREC shall, upon request, provide assistance to the national regulatory authority concerned in completing the analysis of the specific market and the specific obligations to be imposed. With this assistance, the national regulatory authority concerned shall, within six months of the limit laid down in paragraph 5 of this Article, notify the draft measure to the Commission in accordance with Article 32.
CHAPTER IV
Access remedies imposed on undertakings with significant market power
Article 68
Imposition, amendment or withdrawal of obligations
1.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities are empowered to impose the obligations set out in Articles 69 to 74 and Articles 76 to 81.
2.   Where an undertaking is designated as having significant market power on a specific market as a result of a market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 67, national regulatory authorities shall, as appropriate, impose any of the obligations set out in Articles 69 to 74 and Articles 76 and 80. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, a national regulatory authority shall choose the least intrusive way of addressing the problems identified in the market analysis.
3.   National regulatory authorities shall impose the obligations set out in Articles 69 to 74 and Articles 76 and 80 only on undertakings that have been designated as having significant market power in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, without prejudice to:
(a)
Articles 61 and 62;
(b)
Articles 44 and 17 of this Directive, Condition 7 in Part D of Annex I as applied by virtue of Article 13(1) of this Directive, Articles 97 and 106 of this Directive and the relevant provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC containing obligations on undertakings other than those designated as having significant market power; or
(c)
the need to comply with international commitments.
In exceptional circumstances, where a national regulatory authority intends to impose on undertakings designated as having significant market power obligations for access or interconnection other than those set out in Articles 69 to 74 and Articles 76 and 80, it shall submit a request to the Commission.
The Commission shall, taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, adopt decisions by means of implementing acts, authorising or preventing the national regulatory authority from taking such measures.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 118(3).
4.   Obligations imposed in accordance with this Article shall be:
(a)
based on the nature of the problem identified by a national regulatory authority in its market analysis, where appropriate taking into account the identification of transnational demand pursuant to Article 66;
(b)
proportionate, having regard, where possible, to the costs and benefits;
(c)
justified in light of the objectives laid down in Article 3; and
(d)
imposed following consultation in accordance with Articles 23 and 32.
5.   In relation to the need to comply with international commitments referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, national regulatory authorities shall notify decisions to impose, amend or withdraw obligations on undertakings to the Commission, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 32.
6.   National regulatory authorities shall consider the impact of new market developments, such as in relation to commercial agreements, including co-investment agreements, influencing competitive dynamics.
If those developments are not sufficiently important to require a new market analysis in accordance with Article 67, the national regulatory authority shall assess without delay whether it is necessary to review the obligations imposed on undertakings designated as having significant market power and amend any previous decision, including by withdrawing obligations or imposing new obligations, in order to ensure that such obligations continue to meet the conditions set out in paragraph 4 of this Article. Such amendments shall be imposed only after consultations in accordance with Articles 23 and 32.
Article 69
Obligation of transparency
1.   National regulatory authorities may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations of transparency in relation to interconnection or access, requiring undertakings to make public specific information, such as accounting information, prices, technical specifications, network characteristics and expected developments thereof, as well as terms and conditions for supply and use, including any conditions altering access to or use of services and applications, in particular with regard to migration from legacy infrastructure, where such conditions are allowed by Member States in accordance with Union law.
2.   In particular, where an undertaking has obligations of non-discrimination, national regulatory authorities may require that undertaking to publish a reference offer, which shall be sufficiently unbundled to ensure that undertakings are not required to pay for facilities which are not necessary for the service requested. That offer shall contain a description of the relevant offerings broken down into components according to market needs, and the associated terms and conditions, including prices. The national regulatory authority may, inter alia, impose changes to reference offers to give effect to obligations imposed under this Directive.
3.   National regulatory authorities may specify the precise information to be made available, the level of detail required and the manner of publication.
4.   By 21 December 2019, in order to contribute to the consistent application of transparency obligations, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, issue guidelines on the minimum criteria for a reference offer and shall review them where necessary in order to adapt them to technological and market developments. In providing such minimum criteria, BEREC shall pursue the objectives in Article 3, and shall have regard to the needs of the beneficiaries of access obligations and of end-users that are active in more than one Member State, as well as to any BEREC guidelines identifying transnational demand in accordance with Article 66 and to any related decision of the Commission.
Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this Article, where an undertaking has obligations under Article 72 or 73 concerning wholesale access to network infrastructure, national regulatory authorities shall ensure the publication of a reference offer taking utmost account of the BEREC guidelines on the minimum criteria for a reference offer, shall ensure that key performance indicators are specified, where relevant, as well as corresponding service levels, and closely monitor and ensure compliance with them. In addition, national regulatory authorities may, where necessary, predetermine the associated financial penalties in accordance with Union and national law.
Article 70
Obligations of non-discrimination
1.   A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations of non-discrimination, in relation to interconnection or access.
2.   Obligations of non-discrimination shall ensure, in particular, that the undertaking applies equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances to other providers of equivalent services, and provides services and information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as it provides for its own services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners. National regulatory authorities may impose on that undertaking obligations to supply access products and services to all undertakings, including to itself, on the same timescales, terms and conditions, including those relating to price and service levels, and by means of the same systems and processes, in order to ensure equivalence of access.
Article 71
Obligation of accounting separation
1.   A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations for accounting separation in relation to specified activities related to interconnection or access.
In particular, a national regulatory authority may require a vertically integrated undertaking to make transparent its wholesale prices and its internal transfer prices, inter alia to ensure compliance where there is an obligation of non-discrimination under Article 70 or, where necessary, to prevent unfair cross-subsidy. National regulatory authorities may specify the format and accounting methodology to be used.
2.   Without prejudice to Article 20, to facilitate the verification of compliance with obligations of transparency and non-discrimination, national regulatory authorities shall have the power to require that accounting records, including data on revenues received from third parties, are provided on request. National regulatory authorities may publish information that would contribute to an open and competitive market, while complying with Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality.
Article 72
Access to civil engineering
1.   A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations on undertakings to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, civil engineering including, but not limited to, buildings or entries to buildings, building cables, including wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, conduits, inspection chambers, manholes, and cabinets, in situations where, having considered the market analysis, the national regulatory authority concludes that denial of access or access given under unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market and would not be in the end-user’s interest.
2.   National regulatory authorities may impose obligations on an undertaking to provide access in accordance with this Article, irrespective of whether the assets that are affected by the obligation are part of the relevant market in accordance with the market analysis, provided that the obligation is necessary and proportionate to meet the objectives of Article 3.
Article 73
Obligations of access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities
1.   National regulatory authorities may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations on undertakings to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, in situations where the national regulatory authorities consider that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-user’s interest.
National regulatory authorities may require undertakings inter alia:
(a)
to give third parties access to, and use of, specific physical network elements and associated facilities, as appropriate, including unbundled access to the local loop and sub-loop;
(b)
to give third parties access to specific active or virtual network elements and services;
(c)
to negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access;
(d)
not to withdraw access to facilities already granted;
(e)
to provide specific services on a wholesale basis for resale by third parties;
(f)
to grant open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other key technologies that are indispensable for the interoperability of services or virtual network services;
(g)
to provide co-location or other forms of associated facilities sharing;
(h)
to provide specific services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-end services to users, or roaming on mobile networks;
(i)
to provide access to operational support systems or similar software systems necessary to ensure fair competition in the provision of services;
(j)
to interconnect networks or network facilities;
(k)
to provide access to associated services such as identity, location and presence service.
National regulatory authorities may subject those obligations to conditions covering fairness, reasonableness and timeliness.
2.   Where national regulatory authorities consider the appropriateness of imposing any of the possible specific obligations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and in particular where they assess, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, whether and how such obligations are to be imposed, they shall analyse whether other forms of access to wholesale inputs, either on the same or on a related wholesale market, would be sufficient to address the identified problem in the end-user’s interest. That assessment shall include commercial access offers, regulated access pursuant to Article 61, or existing or planned regulated access to other wholesale inputs pursuant to this Article. National regulatory authorities shall take account in particular of the following factors:
(a)
the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products, such as access to ducts;
(b)
the expected technological evolution affecting network design and management;
(c)
the need to ensure technology neutrality enabling the parties to design and manage their own networks;
(d)
the feasibility of providing the access offered, in relation to the capacity available;
(e)
the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment, with particular regard to investments in, and risk levels associated with, very high capacity networks;
(f)
the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition and innovative business models that support sustainable competition, such as those based on co-investment in networks;
(g)
where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights;
(h)
the provision of pan-European services.
Where a national regulatory authority considers, in accordance with Article 68, imposing obligations on the basis of Articles 72 or of this Article, it shall examine whether the imposition of obligations in accordance with Article 72 alone would be a proportionate means by which to promote competition and the end-user's interest.
3.   When imposing obligations on an undertaking to provide access in accordance with this Article, national regulatory authorities may lay down technical or operational conditions to be met by the provider or the beneficiaries of such access, where necessary to ensure normal operation of the network. Obligations to follow specific technical standards or specifications shall comply with the standards and specifications laid down in accordance with Article 39.
Article 74
Price control and cost accounting obligations
1.   A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations relating to cost recovery and price control, including obligations for cost orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost-accounting systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the undertaking concerned may sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users.
In determining whether price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the need to promote competition and long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the undertaking, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the undertaking. Where the national regulatory authorities consider price control obligations to be appropriate, they shall allow the undertaking a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.
National regulatory authorities shall consider not imposing or maintaining obligations pursuant to this Article, where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 69 to 73, including, in particular, any economic replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 70, ensures effective and non-discriminatory access.
When national regulatory authorities consider it appropriate to impose price control obligations on access to existing network elements, they shall also take account of the benefits of predictable and stable wholesale prices in ensuring efficient market entry and sufficient incentives for all undertakings to deploy new and enhanced networks.
2.   National regulatory authorities shall ensure that any cost recovery mechanism or pricing methodology that is mandated serves to promote the deployment of new and enhanced networks, efficiency and sustainable competition and maximises sustainable end-user benefits. In this regard, national regulatory authorities may also take account of prices available in comparable competitive markets.
3.   Where an undertaking has an obligation regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the burden of proof that charges are derived from costs, including a reasonable rate of return on investment, shall lie with the undertaking concerned. For the purpose of calculating the cost of efficient provision of services, national regulatory authorities may use cost accounting methods independent of those used by the undertaking. National regulatory authorities may require an undertaking to provide full justification for its prices, and may, where appropriate, require prices to be adjusted.
4.   National regulatory authorities shall ensure that, where implementation of a cost-accounting system is mandated in order to support price control, a description of the cost-accounting system is made publicly available, showing at least the main categories under which costs are grouped and the rules used for the allocation of costs. A qualified independent body shall verify compliance with the cost-accounting system and shall publish annually a statement concerning compliance.
Article 75
Termination rates
1.   By 31 December 2020, the Commission shall, taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 117 supplementing this Directive by setting a single maximum Union-wide mobile voice termination rate and a single maximum Union-wide fixed voice termination rate (together referred to as ‘the Union-wide voice termination rates’), which are imposed on any provider of mobile voice termination or fixed voice termination services, respectively, in any Member State.
To that end, the Commission shall:
(a)
comply with the principles, criteria and parameters provided in Annex III;
(b)
when setting the Union-wide voice termination rates for the first time, take into account the weighted average of efficient costs in fixed and mobile networks established in accordance with the principles provided in Annex III, applied across the Union; the Union-wide voice termination rates in the first delegated act shall not be higher than the highest rate among the rates that were in force six months before the adoption of that delegated act in all Member States, after any necessary adjustment for exceptional national circumstances;
(c)
take into account the total number of end-users in each Member State, in order to ensure a proper weighting of the maximum termination rates, as well as national circumstances which result in significant differences between Member States when determining the maximum termination rates in the Union;
(d)
take into account market information provided by BEREC, national regulatory authorities or, directly, by undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services; and
(e)
consider the need to allow for a transitional period of no longer than 12 months in order to allow adjustments in Member States where this is necessary on the basis of rates previously imposed.
2.   Taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, the Commission shall review the delegated act adopted pursuant to this Article every five years and shall consider on each such occasion, by applying the criteria listed in Article 67(1), whether setting Union-wide voice termination rates continue to be necessary. Where the Commission decides, following its review in accordance with this paragraph, not to impose a maximum mobile voice termination rate or a maximum fixed voice termination rate, or neither, national regulatory authorities may conduct market analyses of voice termination markets in accordance with Article 67, to assess whether the imposition of regulatory obligations is necessary. If a national regulatory authority imposes, as a result of such analysis, cost-oriented termination rates in a relevant market, it shall follow the principles, criteria and parameters set out in Annex III and its draft measure shall be subject to the procedures referred to in Articles 23, 32 and 33.
3.   National regulatory authorities shall closely monitor, and ensure compliance with, the application of the Union-wide voice termination rates by providers of voice termination services. National regulatory authorities may, at any time, require a provider of voice termination services to amend the rate it charges to other undertakings if it does not comply with the delegated act referred to in paragraph 1. National regulatory authorities shall annually report to the Commission and to BEREC with regard to the application of this Article.
Article 76
Regulatory treatment of new very high capacity network elements
1.   Undertakings which have been designated as having significant market power in one or several relevant markets in accordance with Article 67 may offer commitments, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 79 and subject to the second subparagraph of this paragraph, to open the deployment of a new very high capacity network that consists of optical fibre elements up to the end-user premises or base station to co-investment, for example by offering co-ownership or long-term risk sharing through co-financing or through purchase agreements giving rise to specific rights of a structural character by other providers of electronic communications networks or services.
When the national regulatory authority assesses those commitments, it shall determine, in particular, whether the offer to co-invest complies with all of the following conditions:
(a)
it is open at any moment during the lifetime of the network to any provider of electronic communications networks or services;
(b)
it would allow other co-investors which are providers of electronic communications networks or services to compete effectively and sustainably in the long term in downstream markets in which the undertaking designated as having significant market power is active, on terms which include:
(i)
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms allowing access to the full capacity of the network to the extent that it is subject to co-investment;
(ii)
flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the participation of each co-investor;
(iii)
the possibility to increase such participation in the future; and
(iv)
reciprocal rights awarded by the co-investors after the deployment of the co-invested infrastructure;
(c)
it is made public by the undertaking in a timely manner and, if the undertaking does not have the characteristics listed in Article 80(1), at least six months before the start of the deployment of the new network; that period may be prolonged based on national circumstances;
(d)
access seekers not participating in the co-investment can benefit from the outset from the same quality, speed, conditions and end-user reach as were available before the deployment, accompanied by a mechanism of adaptation over time confirmed by the national regulatory authority in light of developments on the related retail markets, that maintains the incentives to participate in the co-investment; such mechanism shall ensure that access seekers have access to the very high capacity elements of the network at a time, and on the basis of transparent and non-discriminatory terms, which reflect appropriately the degrees of risk incurred by the respective co-investors at different stages of the deployment and take into account the competitive situation in retail markets;
(e)
it complies at a minimum with the criteria set out in Annex IV and is made in good faith.
2.   If the national regulatory authority concludes, taking into account the results of the market test conducted in accordance with Article 79(2), that the co-investment commitment offered complies with the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall make that commitment binding pursuant to Article 79(3), and shall not impose any additional obligations pursuant to Article 68 as regards the elements of the new very high capacity network that are subject to the commitments, if at least one potential co-investor has entered into a co-investment agreement with the undertaking designated as having significant market power.
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the regulatory treatment of circumstances that do not comply with the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, taking into account the results of any market test conducted in accordance with Article 79(2), but that have an impact on competition and are taken into account for the purposes of Articles 67 and 68.
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, a national regulatory authority may, in duly justified circumstances, impose, maintain or adapt remedies in accordance with Articles 68 to 74 as regards new very high capacity networks in order to address significant competition problems on specific markets, where the national regulatory authority establishes that, given the specific characteristics of these markets, those competition problems would not otherwise be addressed.
3.   National regulatory authorities shall, on an ongoing basis, monitor compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 1 and may require the undertaking designated as having significant market power to provide it with annual compliance statements.
This Article shall be without prejudice to the power of a national regulatory authority to take decisions pursuant to Article 26(1) in the event of a dispute arising between undertakings in connection with a co-investment agreement considered by it to comply with the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article.
4.   BEREC, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, shall publish guidelines to foster the consistent application by national regulatory authorities of the conditions set out in paragraph 1, and the criteria set out in Annex IV.
Article 77
Functional separation
1.   Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate obligations imposed under Articles 69 to 74 have failed to achieve effective competition and that there are important and persisting competition problems or market failures identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product markets, it may, on an exceptional basis, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 68(3), impose an obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale provision of relevant access products in a business entity operating independently.
That business entity shall supply access products and services to all undertakings, including to other business entities within the parent company, on the same timescales, terms and conditions, including those relating to price and service levels, and by means of the same systems and processes.
2.   When a national regulatory authority intends to impose an obligation of functional separation, it shall submit a request to the Commission that includes:
(a)
evidence justifying the conclusions of the national regulatory authority as referred to in paragraph 1;
(b)
a reasoned assessment concluding that there is no or little prospect of effective and sustainable infrastructure-based competition within a reasonable time-frame;
(c)
an analysis of the expected impact on the national regulatory authority, on the undertaking, in particular on the workforce of the separated undertaking, and on the electronic communications sector as a whole, and on incentives to invest therein, in particular with regard to the need to ensure social and territorial cohesion, and on other stakeholders including, in particular, the expected impact on competition and any potential resulting effects on consumers;
(d)
an analysis of the reasons justifying that this obligation would be the most efficient means to enforce remedies aimed at addressing the competition problems or the markets failures identified.
3.   The draft measure shall include the following elements:
(a)
the precise nature and level of separation, specifying in particular the legal status of the separate business entity;
(b)
an identification of the assets of the separate business entity, and the products or services to be supplied by that entity;
(c)
the governance arrangements to ensure the independence of the staff employed by the separate business entity, and the corresponding incentive structure;
(d)
rules for ensuring compliance with the obligations;
(e)
rules for ensuring transparency of operational procedures, in particular towards other stakeholders;
(f)
a monitoring programme to ensure compliance, including the publication of an annual report.
Following the Commission’s decision taken in accordance with Article 68(3) on that draft measure, the national regulatory authority shall conduct a coordinated analysis of the different markets related to the access network in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 67. On the basis of that analysis, the national regulatory authority shall impose, maintain, amend or withdraw obligations, in accordance with the procedures set out in Articles 23 and 32.
4.   An undertaking on which functional separation has been imposed may be subject to any of the obligations referred to in Articles 69 to 74 in any specific market where it has been designated as having significant market power in accordance with Article 67, or any other obligations authorised by the Commission pursuant to Article 68(3).
Article 78
Voluntary separation by a vertically integrated undertaking
1.   Undertakings which have been designated as having significant market power in one or several relevant markets in accordance with Article 67 shall inform the national regulatory authority at least three months before any intended transfer of their local access network assets or a substantial part thereof to a separate legal entity under different ownership, or establishment of a separate business entity in order to provide all retail providers, including its own retail divisions, with fully equivalent access products.
Those undertakings shall also inform the national regulatory authority of any change of that intent, as well as the final outcome of the process of separation.
Such undertakings may also offer commitments regarding access conditions that are to apply to their network during an implementation period after the proposed form of separation is implemented, with a view to ensuring effective and non-discriminatory access by third parties. The offer of commitments shall include sufficient details, including in terms of timing of implementation and duration, in order to allow the national regulatory authority to conduct its tasks in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. Such commitments may extend beyond the maximum period for market reviews set out in Article 67(5).
2.   The national regulatory authority shall assess the effect of the intended transaction, together with the commitments offered, where applicable, on existing regulatory obligations under this Directive.
For that purpose, the national regulatory authority shall conduct an analysis of the different markets related to the access network in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 67.
The national regulatory authority shall take into account any commitments offered by the undertaking, having regard in particular to the objectives set out in Article 3. In so doing, the national regulatory authority shall consult third parties in accordance with Article 23, and shall address, in particular, those third parties which are directly affected by the intended transaction.
On the basis of its analysis, the national regulatory authority shall impose, maintain, amend or withdraw obligations, in accordance with the procedures set out in Articles 23 and 32, applying, if appropriate, Article 80. In its decision, the national regulatory authority may make the commitments binding, wholly or in part. By way of derogation from Article 67(5), the national regulatory authority may make the commitments binding, wholly or in part, for the entire period for which they are offered.
3.   Without prejudice to Article 80, the legally or operationally separate business entity that has been designated as having significant market power in any specific market in accordance with Article 67 may be subject, as appropriate, to any of the obligations referred to in Articles 69 to 74 or any other obligations authorised by the Commission pursuant to Article 68(3), where any commitments offered are insufficient to meet the objectives set out in Article 3.
4.   The national regulatory authority shall monitor the implementation of the commitments offered by the undertakings that it has made binding in accordance with paragraph 2 and shall consider their extension when the period for which they are initially offered has expired.
Article 79
Commitments procedure
1.   Undertakings designated as having significant market power may offer to the national regulatory authority commitments regarding conditions for access, co-investment, or both, applicable to their networks in relation, inter alia, to:
(a)
cooperative arrangements relevant to the assessment of appropriate and proportionate obligations pursuant to Article 68;
(b)
co-investment in very high capacity networks pursuant to Article 76; or
(c)
effective and non-discriminatory access by third parties pursuant to Article 78, both during an implementation period of voluntary separation by a vertically integrated undertaking and after the proposed form of separation is implemented.
The offer for commitments shall be sufficiently detailed including as to the timing and scope of their implementation and their duration, to allow the national regulatory authority to undertake its assessment pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article. Such commitments may extend beyond the periods for carrying out market analysis provided in Article 67(5).
2.   In order to assess any commitments offered by an undertaking pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the national regulatory authority shall, except where such commitments clearly do not fulfil one or more relevant conditions or criteria, perform a market test, in particular on the offered terms, by conducting a public consultation of interested parties, in particular third parties which are directly affected. Potential co-investors or access seekers may provide views on the compliance of the commitments offered with the conditions provided, as applicable, in Article 68, 76 or 78 and may propose changes.
As regards the commitments offered under this Article, the national regulatory authority shall, when assessing obligations pursuant to Article 68(4), have particular regard to:
(a)
evidence regarding the fair and reasonable character of the commitments offered;
(b)
the openness of the commitments to all market participants;
(c)
the timely availability of access under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions, including to very high capacity networks, before the launch of related retail services; and
(d)
the overall adequacy of the commitments offered to enable sustainable competition on downstream markets and to facilitate cooperative deployment and take-up of very high capacity networks in the interest of end-users.
Taking into account all the views expressed in the consultation, and the extent to which such views are representative of different stakeholders, the national regulatory authority shall communicate to the undertaking designated as having significant market power its preliminary conclusions whether the commitments offered comply with the objectives, criteria and procedures set out in this Article and, as applicable, in Article 68, 76 or 78, and under which conditions it may consider making the commitments binding. The undertaking may revise its initial offer to take account of the preliminary conclusions of the national regulatory authority and with a view to satisfying the criteria set out in this Article and, as applicable, in Article 68, 76 or 78.
3.   Without prejudice to first subparagraph of Article 76(2), the national regulatory authority may issue a decision to make the commitments binding, wholly or in part.
By way of derogation from Article 67(5), the national regulatory authority may make some or all commitments binding for a specific period, which may be the entire period for which they are offered, and in the case of co-investment commitments made binding pursuant to first subparagraph of Article 76(2), it shall make them binding for a period of minimum seven years.
Subject to Article 76, this Article is without prejudice to the application of the market analysis procedure pursuant to Article 67 and the imposition of obligations pursuant to Article 68.
Where the national regulatory authority makes commitments binding pursuant to this Article, it shall assess under Article 68 the consequences of that decision for market development and the appropriateness of any obligation that it has imposed or would, absent those commitments, have considered imposing pursuant to that Article or Articles 69 to 74. When notifying the relevant draft measure under Article 68 in accordance with Article 32, the national regulatory authority shall accompany the notified draft measure with the commitments decision.
4.   The national regulatory authority shall monitor, supervise and ensure compliance with the commitments that it has made binding in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article in the same way in which it monitors, supervises and ensures compliance with obligations imposed under Article 68 and shall consider the extension of the period for which they have been made binding when the initial period expires. If the national regulatory authority concludes that an undertaking has not complied with the commitments that have been made binding in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, it may impose penalties on such undertaking in accordance with Article 29. Without prejudice to the procedure for ensuring compliance of specific obligations under Article 30, the national regulatory authority may reassess the obligations imposed in accordance with Article 68(6).
Article 80
Wholesale-only undertakings
1.   A national regulatory authority that designates an undertaking which is absent from any retail markets for electronic communications services as having significant market power in one or several wholesale markets in accordance with Article 67 shall consider whether that undertaking has the following characteristics:
(a)
all companies and business units within the undertaking, all companies that are controlled but not necessarily wholly owned by the same ultimate owner, and any shareholder capable of exercising control over the undertaking, only have activities, current and planned for the future, in wholesale markets for electronic communications services and therefore do not have activities in any retail market for electronic communications services provided to end-users in the Union;
(b)
the undertaking is not bound to deal with a single and separate undertaking operating downstream that is active in any retail market for electronic communications services provided to end-users, because of an exclusive agreement, or an agreement which de facto amounts to an exclusive agreement.
2.   If the national regulatory authority concludes that the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article are fulfilled, it may impose on that undertaking only obligations pursuant to Articles 70 and 73 or relative to fair and reasonable pricing if justified on the basis of a market analysis including a prospective assessment of the likely behaviour of the undertaking designated as having significant market power.
3.   The national regulatory authority shall review obligations imposed on the undertaking in accordance with this Article at any time if it concludes that the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article are no longer met and it shall, as appropriate, apply Articles 67 to 74. The undertakings shall, without undue delay, inform the national regulatory authority of any change of circumstance relevant to points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article.
4.   The national regulatory authority shall also review obligations imposed on the undertaking in accordance with this Article if on the basis of evidence of terms and conditions offered by the undertaking to its downstream customers, the authority concludes that competition problems have arisen or are likely to arise to the detriment of end-users which require the imposition of one or more obligations provided in Article 69, 71, 72 or 74, or the amendment of the obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
5.   The imposition of obligations and their review in accordance with this Article shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 23, 32 and 33.
Article 81
Migration from legacy infrastructure
1.   Undertakings which have been designated as having significant market power in one or several relevant markets in accordance with Article 67 shall notify the national regulatory authority in advance and in a timely manner when they plan to decommission or replace with a new infrastructure parts of the network, including legacy infrastructure necessary to operate a copper network, which are subject to obligations pursuant to Articles 68 to 80.
2.   The national regulatory authority shall ensure that the decommissioning or replacement process includes a transparent timetable and conditions, including an appropriate notice period for transition, and establishes the availability of alternative products of at least comparable quality providing access to the upgraded network infrastructure substituting the replaced elements if necessary to safeguard competition and the rights of end-users.
With regard to assets which are proposed for decommissioning or replacement, the national regulatory authority may withdraw the obligations after having ascertained that the access provider:
(a)
has established the appropriate conditions for migration, including making available an alternative access product of at least comparable quality as was available using the legacy infrastructure enabling the access seekers to reach the same end-users; and
(b)
has complied with the conditions and process notified to the national regulatory authority in accordance with this Article.
Such withdrawal shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 23, 32 and 33.
3.   This Article shall be without prejudice to the availability of regulated products imposed by the national regulatory authority on the upgraded network infrastructure in accordance with the procedures set out in Articles 67 and 68.
Article 82
BEREC guidelines on very high capacity networks
By 21 December 2020, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, issue guidelines on the criteria that a network is to fulfil in order to be considered a very high capacity network, in particular in terms of down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. The national regulatory authorities shall take those guidelines into utmost account. BEREC shall update the guidelines by 31 December 2025, and regularly thereafter.
CHAPTER V
Regulatory control of retail services
Article 83
Regulatory control of retail services
1.   Member States may ensure that national regulatory authorities impose appropriate regulatory obligations on undertakings identified as having significant market power on a given retail market in accordance with Article 63, where:
(a)
as a result of a market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 67, a national regulatory authority determines that a given retail market identified in accordance with Article 64 is not effectively competitive; and
(b)
the national regulatory authority concludes that obligations imposed under Articles 69 to 74 would not result in the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3.
2.   Obligations imposed under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be based on the nature of the problem identified and be proportionate and justified in light of the objectives laid down in Article 3. The obligations imposed may include requirements that the identified undertakings do not charge excessive prices, inhibit market entry or restrict competition by setting predatory prices, show undue preference to specific end-users or unreasonably bundle services. National regulatory authorities may apply to such undertakings appropriate retail price cap measures, measures to control individual tariffs, or measures to orient tariffs towards costs or prices on comparable markets, in order to protect end-user interests whilst promoting effective competition.
3.   National regulatory authorities shall ensure that, where an undertaking is subject to retail tariff regulation or other relevant retail controls, the necessary and appropriate cost-accounting systems are implemented. National regulatory authorities may specify the format and accounting methodology to be used. Compliance with the cost-accounting system shall be verified by a qualified independent body. National regulatory authorities shall ensure that a statement concerning compliance is published annually.
4.   Without prejudice to Articles 85 and 88, national regulatory authorities shall not apply retail control mechanisms under paragraph 1 of this Article to geographical or retail markets where they are satisfied that there is effective competition.
PART III
SERVICES
TITLE I
UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS
Article 84
Affordable universal service
1.   Member States shall ensure that all consumers in their territories have access at an affordable price, in light of specific national conditions, to an available adequate broadband internet access service and to voice communications services at the quality specified in their territories, including the underlying connection, at a fixed location.
2.   In addition, Member States may also ensure the affordability of the services referred to in paragraph 1 that are not provided at a fixed location where they consider this to be necessary to ensure consumers’ full social and economic participation in society.
3.   Each Member State shall, in light of national conditions and the minimum bandwidth enjoyed by the majority of consumers within the territory of that Member State, and taking into account the BEREC report on best practices, define the adequate broadband internet access service for the purposes of paragraph 1 with a view to ensuring the bandwidth necessary for social and economic participation in society. The adequate broadband internet access service shall be capable of delivering the bandwidth necessary for supporting at least the minimum set of services set out in Annex V.
By 21 June 2020, BEREC shall, in order to contribute towards a consistent application of this Article, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, taking into account available Commission (Eurostat) data, draw up a report on Member States’ best practices to support the defining of adequate broadband internet access service pursuant to the first subparagraph. That report shall be updated regularly to reflect technological advances and changes in consumer usage patterns.
4.   When a consumer so requests, the connection referred to in paragraph 1 and, where applicable, in paragraph 2 may be limited to support voice communications services.
5.   Member States may extend the scope of application of this Article to end-users that are microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises and not-for-profit organisations.
Article 85
Provision of affordable universal service
1.   National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities shall monitor the evolution and level of retail prices of the services referred to in Article 84(1) available on the market, in particular in relation to national prices and national consumer income.
2.   Where Member States establish that, in light of national conditions, retail prices for the services referred to in Article 84(1) are not affordable, because consumers with a low income or special social needs are prevented from accessing such services, they shall take measures to ensure affordability for such consumers of adequate broadband internet access service and voice communications services at least at a fixed location.
To that end, Member States may ensure that support is provided to such consumers for communication purposes or require providers of such services to offer to those consumers tariff options or packages different from those provided under normal commercial conditions, or both. For that purpose, Member States may require such providers to apply common tariffs, including geographic averaging, throughout the territory.
In exceptional circumstances, in particular where the imposition of obligations under the second subparagraph of this paragraph on all providers would result in a demonstrated excessive administrative or financial burden for providers or the Member State, a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, decide to impose the obligation to offer those specific tariff options or packages only on designated undertakings. Article 86 shall apply to such designations mutatis mutandis. Where a Member State designates undertakings, it shall ensure that all consumers with a low-income or special social needs benefit from a choice of undertakings offering tariff options addressing their needs, unless ensuring such choice is impossible or would create an excessive additional organisational or financial burden.
Member States shall ensure that consumers entitled to such tariff options or packages have a right to conclude a contract either with a provider of the services referred to in Article 84(1), or with an undertaking designated in accordance with this paragraph, and that their number remains available to them for an adequate period and unwarranted disconnection of the service is avoided.
3.   Member States shall ensure that undertakings which provide tariff options or packages to consumers with a low income or special social needs pursuant to paragraph 2 keep the national regulatory and other competent authorities informed of the details of such offers. National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities shall ensure that the conditions under which undertakings provide tariff options or packages pursuant to paragraph 2 are fully transparent and are published and applied in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination. National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities may require such tariff options or packages to be modified or withdrawn.
4.   Member States shall ensure, in light of national conditions, that support is provided, as appropriate, to consumers with disabilities, and that other specific measures are taken, where appropriate, with a view to ensuring that related terminal equipment, and specific equipment and specific services that enhance equivalent access, including where necessary total conversation services and relay services, are available and affordable.
5.   When applying this Article, Member States shall seek to minimise market distortions.
6.   Member States may extend the scope of application of this Article to end-users that are microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises and not-for-profit organisations.
Article 86
Availability of universal service
1.   Where a Member State has established, taking into account the results, where available, of the geographical survey conducted in accordance with Article 22(1), and any additional evidence where necessary, that the availability at a fixed location of an adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and of voice communications services cannot be ensured under normal commercial circumstances or through other potential public policy tools in its national territory or different parts thereof, it may impose appropriate universal service obligations to meet all reasonable requests by end-users for accessing those services in the relevant parts of its territory.
2.   Member States shall determine the most efficient and appropriate approach for ensuring the availability at a fixed location of an adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and of voice communications services, whilst respecting the principles of objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality. Member States shall seek to minimise market distortions, in particular the provision of services at prices or subject to other terms and conditions which depart from normal commercial conditions, whilst safeguarding the public interest.
3.   In particular, where Member States decide to impose obligations to ensure for end-users the availability at a fixed location of an adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and of voice communications services, they may designate one or more undertakings to guarantee such availability throughout the national territory. Member States may designate different undertakings or sets of undertakings to provide an adequate broadband internet access service and voice communications services at a fixed location or to cover different parts of the national territory.
4.   When Member States designate undertakings in part or all of the national territory to ensure availability of services in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, they shall use an efficient, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory designation mechanism, whereby no undertaking is a priori excluded from being designated. Such designation methods shall ensure that an adequate broadband internet access service and voice communications services at a fixed location are provided in a cost-effective manner and may be used as a means of determining the net cost of the universal service obligations in accordance with Article 89.
5.   When an undertaking designated in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article intends to dispose of a substantial part or all of its local access network assets to a separate legal entity under different ownership, it shall inform the national regulatory or other competent authority in advance and in a timely manner, in order to allow that authority to assess the effect of the intended transaction on the provision at a fixed location of an adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and of voice communications services. The national regulatory or other competent authority may impose, amend or withdraw specific obligations in accordance with Article 13(2).
Article 87
Status of the existing universal service
Member States may continue to ensure the availability or affordability of other services than adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and voice communications services at a fixed location that were in force on 20 December 2018, if the need for such services is established in light of national circumstances. When Member States designate undertakings in part or all of the national territory for the provision of those services, Article 86 shall apply. Financing of those obligations shall comply with Article 90.
Member States shall review the obligations imposed pursuant to this Article by 21 December 2021, and every three years thereafter.
Article 88
Control of expenditure
1.   Member States shall ensure that, in providing facilities and services additional to those referred to in Article 84, providers of an adequate broadband internet access service and of voice communications services in accordance with Articles 84 to 87 establish terms and conditions in such a way that the end-user is not obliged to pay for facilities or services which are not necessary or not required for the service requested.
2.   Member States shall ensure that the providers of an adequate broadband internet access service and of voice communications services referred to in Article 84 that provide services pursuant to Article 85 offer the specific facilities and services set out in Part A of Annex VI as applicable, in order that consumers can monitor and control expenditure. Member States shall ensure that such providers put in place a system to avoid unwarranted disconnection of voice communications services or of an adequate broadband internet access service with regard to consumers as referred to in Article 85, including an appropriate mechanism to check continued interest in using the service.
Member States may extend the scope of application of this paragraph to end-users that are microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises and not-for-profit organisations.
3.   Each Member State shall ensure that the competent authority is able to waive the requirements of paragraph 2 in all or part of its national territory if the competent authority is satisfied that the facility is widely available.
Article 89
Cost of universal service obligations
1.   Where national regulatory authorities consider that the provision of an adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and of voice communications services as set out in Articles 84, 85 and 86 or the continuation of the existing universal service as set out in Article 87 may represent an unfair burden on providers of such services that request compensation, national regulatory authorities shall calculate the net costs of such provision.
For that purpose, national regulatory authorities shall:
(a)
calculate the net cost of the universal service obligations, taking into account any market benefit which accrues to a provider of an adequate broadband internet access service as defined in accordance with Article 84(3) and voice communications services as set out in Articles 84, 85 and 86 or the continuation of the existing universal service as set out in Article 87, in accordance with Annex VII; or
(b)
make use of the net costs of providing universal service identified by a designation mechanism in accordance with Article 86(4).
2.   The accounts and other information serving as the basis for the calculation of the net cost of universal service obligations under point (a) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall be audited or verified by the national regulatory authority or a body independent of the relevant parties and approved by the national regulatory authority. The results of the cost calculation and the conclusions of the audit shall be publicly available.
Article 90
Financing of universal service obligations
1.   Where, on the basis of the net cost calculation referred to in Article 89, national regulatory authorities find that a provider is subject to an unfair burden, Member States shall, upon request from the provider concerned, decide to do one or both of the following:
(a)
introduce a mechanism to compensate that provider for the determined net costs under transparent conditions from public funds;
(b)
share the net cost of universal service obligations between providers of electronic communications networks and services.
2.   Where the net cost is shared in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall establish a sharing mechanism administered by the national regulatory authority or a body independent from the beneficiaries under the supervision of the national regulatory authority. Only the net cost, as determined in accordance with Article 89, of the obligations laid down in Articles 84 to 87 may be financed.
The sharing mechanism shall respect the principles of transparency, least market distortion, non-discrimination and proportionality, in accordance with the principles set out in Part B of Annex VII. Member States may choose not to require contributions from undertakings the national turnover of which is less than a set limit.
Any charges related to the sharing of the cost of universal service obligations shall be unbundled and identified separately for each undertaking. Such charges shall not be imposed on, or collected from, undertakings that are not providing services in the territory of the Member State that has established the sharing mechanism.
Article 91
Transparency
1.   Where the net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated in accordance with Article 89, national regulatory authorities shall ensure that the principles for net cost calculation, including the details of methodology to be used are publicly available.
Where a mechanism for sharing the net cost of universal service obligations as referred to in Article 90(2) is established, national regulatory authorities shall ensure that the principles for cost sharing and compensation of the net cost are publicly available.
2.   Subject to Union and national rules on commercial confidentiality, national regulatory authorities shall publish an annual report providing the details of calculated cost of universal service obligations, identifying the contributions made by all undertakings involved, including any market benefits that may have accrued to the undertakings pursuant to universal service obligations laid down in Articles 84 to 87.
Article 92
Additional mandatory services
Member States may decide to make services additional to those included in the universal service obligations referred to in Articles 84 to 87, publicly available on their territories. In such cases, no compensation mechanism involving specific undertakings shall be imposed.
TITLE II
NUMBERING RESOURCES
Article 93
Numbering resources
1.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory or other competent authorities control the granting of rights of use for all national numbering resources and the management of the national numbering plans and that they provide adequate numbering resources for the provision of publicly available electronic communications services. Member States shall ensure that objective, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures for granting rights of use for national numbering resources are established.
2.   National regulatory or other competent authorities may also grant rights of use for numbering resources from the national numbering plans for the provision of specific services to undertakings other than providers of electronic communications networks or services, provided that adequate numbering resources are made available to satisfy current and foreseeable future demand. Those undertakings shall demonstrate their ability to manage the numbering resources and to comply with any relevant requirements set out pursuant to Article 94. National regulatory or other competent authorities may suspend the further granting of rights of use for numbering resources to such undertakings if it is demonstrated that there is a risk of exhaustion of numbering resources.
By 21 June 2020, in order to contribute to the consistent application of this paragraph, BEREC shall adopt, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, guidelines on common criteria for the assessment of the ability to manage numbering resources and of the risk of exhaustion of numbering resources.
3.   National regulatory or other competent authorities shall ensure that national numbering plans and procedures are applied in a manner that gives equal treatment to all providers of publicly available electronic communications services and the undertakings eligible in accordance with paragraph 2. In particular, Member States shall ensure that an undertaking to which the right of use for numbering resources has been granted does not discriminate against other providers of electronic communications services as regards the numbering resources used to give access to their services.
4.   Each Member State shall ensure that national regulatory or other competent authorities make available a range of non-geographic numbers which may be used for the provision of electronic communications services other than interpersonal communications services, throughout the territory of the Union, without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 and Article 97(2) of this Directive. Where rights of use for numbering resources have been granted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article to undertakings other than providers of electronic communications networks or services, this paragraph shall apply to the specific services for the provision of which the rights of use have been granted.
National regulatory or other competent authorities shall ensure that the conditions listed in Part E of Annex I that may be attached to the rights of use for numbering resources used for the provision of services outside the Member State of the country code, and their enforcement, are as stringent as the conditions and enforcement applicable to services provided within the Member State of the country code, in accordance with this Directive. National regulatory or other competent authorities shall also ensure in accordance with Article 94(6) that providers using numbering resources of their country code in other Member States comply with consumer protection and other national rules related to the use of numbering resources applicable in those Member States where the numbering resources are used. This obligation is without prejudice to the enforcement powers of the competent authorities of those Member States.
BEREC shall assist national regulatory or other competent authorities, at their request, in coordinating their activities to ensure the efficient management of numbering resources with a right of extraterritorial use within the Union.
In order to facilitate the monitoring by the national regulatory or other competent authorities of compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, BEREC shall establish a database on the numbering resources with a right of extraterritorial use within the Union. For this purpose, national regulatory or other competent authorities shall transmit the relevant information to BEREC. Where numbering resources with a right of extraterritorial use within the Union are not granted by the national regulatory authority, the competent authority responsible for their granting or management shall consult the national regulatory authority.
5.   Member States shall ensure that the ‘00’ code is the standard international access code. Special arrangements for the use of number-based interpersonal communications services between locations adjacent to one another across borders between Member States may be established or continued.
Member States may agree to share a common numbering plan for all or specific categories of numbers.
End-users affected by such arrangements or agreements shall be fully informed.
6.   Without prejudice to Article 106, Member States shall promote over-the-air provisioning, where technically feasible, to facilitate switching of providers of electronic communications networks or services by end-users, in particular providers and end-users of machine-to-machine services.
7.   Member States shall ensure that the national numbering plans, and all subsequent additions or amendments thereto, are published, subject only to limitations imposed on the grounds of national security.
8.   Member States shall support the harmonisation of specific numbers or numbering ranges within the Union where it promotes both the functioning of the internal market and the development of pan-European services. Where necessary to address unmet cross-border or pan-European demand for numbering resources, the Commission shall, taking utmost account of the opinion of BEREC, adopt implementing acts harmonising specific numbers or numbering ranges.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
Article 94
Procedure for granting of rights of use for numbering resources
1.   Where it is necessary to grant individual rights of use for numbering resources, national regulatory or other competent authorities shall grant such rights, upon request, to any undertaking for the provision of electronic communications networks or services covered by a general authorisation referred to in Article 12, subject to Article 13 and to point (c) of Article 21(1) and to any other rules ensuring the efficient use of those numbering resources in accordance with this Directive.
2.   The rights of use for numbering resources shall be granted through open, objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate procedures.
When granting rights of use for numbering resources, national regulatory or other competent authorities shall specify whether those rights can be transferred by the holder of the rights, and under which conditions.
Where national regulatory or other competent authorities grant rights of use for numbering resources for a limited period, the duration of that period shall be appropriate for the service concerned with a view to the objective pursued, taking due account of the need to allow for an appropriate period for investment amortisation.
3.   National regulatory or other competent authorities shall take decisions on the granting of rights of use for numbering resources as soon as possible after receipt of the complete application and within three weeks in the case of numbering resources that have been allocated for specific purposes within the national numbering plan. Such decisions shall be made public.
4.   Where national regulatory or other competent authorities have determined, after consulting interested parties in accordance with Article 23, that rights of use for numbering resources of exceptional economic value are to be granted through competitive or comparative selection procedures, national regulatory or other competent authorities may extend the three-week period referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article by up to a further three weeks.
5.   National regulatory or other competent authorities shall not limit the number of individual rights of use to be granted, except where this is necessary to ensure the efficient use of numbering resources.
6.   Where the rights of use for numbering resources include their extraterritorial use within the Union in accordance with Article 93(4), national regulatory or other competent authorities shall attach to those rights of use specific conditions in order to ensure compliance with all the relevant national consumer protection rules and national law related to the use of numbering resources applicable in the Member States where the numbering resources are used.
Upon request from a national regulatory or other competent authority of a Member State where the numbering resources are used, demonstrating a breach of relevant consumer protection rules or national laws related to the use of numbering resources of that Member State, the national regulatory or other competent authorities of the Member State where the rights of use for the numbering resources have been granted shall enforce the conditions attached under the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 30, including, in serious cases, by withdrawing the rights of extraterritorial use for the numbering resources granted to the undertaking concerned.
BEREC shall facilitate and coordinate the exchange of information between the competent authorities of the different Member States involved and ensure the appropriate coordination of work among them.
7.   This Article shall also apply where national regulatory or other competent authorities grant rights of use for numbering resources to undertakings other than providers of electronic communications networks or services in accordance with Article 93(2).
Article 95
Fees for rights of use for numbering resources
Member States may allow national regulatory or other competent authorities to impose fees for the rights of use for numbering resources which reflect the need to ensure the optimal use of those resources. Member States shall ensure that such fees are objectively justified, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate in relation to their intended purpose and shall take into account the objectives set out in Article 3.
Article 96
Missing children and child helpline hotlines
1.   Member States shall ensure that end-users have access free of charge to a service operating a hotline to report cases of missing children. The hotline shall be available on the number ‘116000’.
2.   Member States shall ensure that end-users with disabilities are able to access services provided under the number ‘116000’ to the greatest extent possible. Measures taken to facilitate access by end-users with disabilities to such services whilst travelling in other Member States shall be based on compliance with relevant standards or specifications laid down in accordance with Article 39.
3.   Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the authority or undertaking to which the number ‘116000’ has been assigned allocates the necessary resources to operate the hotline.
4.   Member States and the Commission shall ensure that end-users are adequately informed of the existence and use of services provided under the numbers ‘116000’ and, where appropriate, ‘116111’.
Article 97
Access to numbers and services
1.   Member States shall ensure that, where economically feasible, except where a called end-user has chosen for commercial reasons to limit access by calling parties located in specific geographical areas, national regulatory or other competent authorities take all necessary steps to ensure that end-users are able to:
(a)
access and use services using non-geographic numbers within the Union; and
(b)
access all numbers provided in the Union, regardless of the technology and devices used by the operator, including those in the national numbering plans of Member States and Universal International Freephone Numbers (UIFN).
2.   Member States shall ensure that national regulatory or other competent authorities are able to require providers of public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services to block, on a case-by-case basis, access to numbers or services where this is justified by reasons of fraud or misuse and to require that in such cases providers of electronic communications services withhold relevant interconnection or other service revenues.
TITLE III
END-USER RIGHTS
Article 98
Exemption of certain microenterprises
With the exception of Articles 99 and 100, this Title shall not apply to microenterprises providing number-independent interpersonal communications services unless they also provide other electronic communications services.
Member States shall ensure that end-users are informed of an exemption under the first paragraph before concluding a contract with a microenterprise benefitting from such an exemption.
Article 99
Non-discrimination
Providers of electronic communications networks or services shall not apply any different requirements or general conditions of access to, or use of, networks or services to end-users, for reasons related to the end-user’s nationality, place of residence or place of establishment, unless such different treatment is objectively justified.
Article 100
Fundamental rights safeguard
1.   National measures regarding end-users’ access to, or use of, services and applications through electronic communications networks shall respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union (the ‘Charter’) and general principles of Union law.
2.   Any measure regarding end-users’ access to, or use of, services and applications through electronic communications networks liable to limit the exercise of the rights or freedoms recognised by the Charter shall be imposed only if it is provided for by law and respects those rights or freedoms, is proportionate, necessary, and genuinely meets general interest objectives recognised by Union law or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others in line with Article 52(1) of the Charter and with general principles of Union law, including the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. Accordingly, such measures shall be taken only with due respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy. A prior, fair and impartial procedure shall be guaranteed, including the right to be heard of the person or persons concerned, subject to the need for appropriate conditions and procedural arrangements in duly substantiated cases of urgency in accordance with the Charter.
Article 101
Level of harmonisation
1.   Member States shall not maintain or introduce in their national law end-user protection provisions diverging from Articles 102 to 115, including more, or less, stringent provisions to ensure a different level of protection, unless otherwise provided for in this Title.
2.   Until 21 December 2021, Member States may continue to apply more stringent national consumer protection provisions diverging from those laid down in Articles 102 to 115, provided that those provisions were in force on 20 December 2018 and any restrictions to the functioning of the internal market resulting therefrom are proportionate to the objective of consumer protection.
Member States shall notify the Commission by 21 December 2019 of any national provisions to be applied on the basis of this paragraph.
Article 102
Information requirements for contracts
1.   Before a consumer is bound by a contract or any corresponding offer, providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services shall provide the information referred to in Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 2011/83/EU, and, in addition, the information listed in Annex VIII of this Directive to the extent that that information relates to a service they provide.
The information shall be provided in a clear and comprehensible manner on a durable medium as defined in point (10) of Article 2 of Directive 2011/83/EU or, where provision on a durable medium is not feasible, in an easily downloadable document made available by the provider. The provider shall expressly draw the consumer’s attention to the availability of that document and the importance of downloading it for the purposes of documentation, future reference and unchanged reproduction.
The information shall, upon request, be provided in an accessible format for end-users with disabilities in accordance with Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services.
2.   The information referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 shall also be provided to end-users that are microenterprises or small enterprises or not-for-profit organisations, unless they have explicitly agreed to waive all or parts of those provisions.
3.   Providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services shall provide consumers with a concise and easily readable contract summary. That summary shall identify the main elements of the information requirements in accordance with paragraph 1. Those main elements shall include at least:
(a)
the name, address and contact information of the provider and, if different, the contact information for any complaint;
(b)
the main characteristics of each service provided;
(c)
the respective prices for activating the electronic communications service and for any recurring or consumption-related charges, where the service is provided for direct monetary payment;
(d)
the duration of the contract and the conditions for its renewal and termination;
(e)
the extent to which the products and services are designed for end-users with disabilities;
(f)
with respect to internet access services, a summary of the information required pursuant to points (d) and (e) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120.
By 21 December 2019, the Commission shall, after consulting BEREC, adopt implementing acts specifying a contract summary template to be used by the providers to fulfil their obligations under this paragraph.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 118(4).
Providers subject to the obligations under paragraph 1 shall duly complete that contract summary template with the required information and provide the contract summary free of charge to consumers, prior to the conclusion of the contract, including distance contracts. Where, for objective technical reasons, it is impossible to provide the contract summary at that moment, it shall be provided without undue delay thereafter, and the contract shall become effective when the consumer has confirmed his or her agreement after reception of the contract summary.
4.   The information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall become an integral part of the contract and shall not be altered unless the contracting parties expressly agree otherwise.
5.   Where internet access services or publicly available interpersonal communications services are billed on the basis of either time or volume consumption, their providers shall offer consumers the facility to monitor and control the usage of each of those services. This facility shall include access to timely information on the level of consumption of services included in a tariff plan. In particular, providers shall notify consumers before any consumption limit, as established by competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities, included in their tariff plan, is reached and when a service included in their tariff plan is fully consumed.
6.   Member States may maintain or introduce in their national law provisions requiring providers to provide additional information on the consumption level and temporarily prevent further use of the relevant service in excess of a financial or volume limit determined by the competent authority.
7.   Member States shall remain free to maintain or introduce in their national law provisions relating to aspects not regulated by this Article, in particular in order to address newly emerging issues.
Article 103
Transparency, comparison of offers and publication of information
1.   Competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities shall ensure that, where providers of internet access services or publicly available interpersonal communication services make the provision of those services subject to terms and conditions, the information referred to in Annex IX is published in a clear, comprehensive, machine-readable manner and in an accessible format for end-users with disabilities in accordance with Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services, by all such providers, or by the competent authority itself in coordination, where relevant, with the national regulatory authority. Such information shall be updated regularly. Competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities may specify additional requirements regarding the form in which such information is to be published. That information shall, on request, be supplied to the competent authority and, where relevant, to the national regulatory authority before its publication.
2.   Competent authorities shall, in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities, ensure that end-users have access free of charge to at least one independent comparison tool which enables them to compare and evaluate different internet access services and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services, and, where applicable, publicly available number-independent interpersonal communications services, with regard to:
(a)
prices and tariffs of services provided against recurring or consumption-based direct monetary payments; and
(b)
the quality of service performance, where minimum quality of service is offered or the undertaking is required to publish such information pursuant to Article 104.
3.   The comparison tool referred to in paragraph 2 shall:
(a)
be operationally independent from the providers of such services, thereby ensuring that those providers are given equal treatment in search results;
(b)
clearly disclose the owners and operators of the comparison tool;
(c)
set out clear and objective criteria on which the comparison is to be based;
(d)
use plain and unambiguous language;
(e)
provide accurate and up-to-date information and state the time of the last update;
(f)
be open to any provider of internet access services or publicly available interpersonal communications services making available the relevant information, and include a broad range of offers covering a significant part of the market and, where the information presented is not a complete overview of the market, a clear statement to that effect, before displaying results;
(g)
provide an effective procedure to report incorrect information;
(h)
include the possibility to compare prices, tariffs and quality of service performance between offers available to consumers and, if required by Member States, between those offers and the standard offers publicly available to other end-users.
Comparison tools fulfilling the requirements in points (a) to (h) shall, upon request by the provider of the tool, be certified by competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities.
Third parties shall have a right to use, free of charge and in open data formats, the information published by providers of internet access services or publicly available interpersonal communications services, for the purposes of making available such independent comparison tools.
4.   Member States may require that providers of internet access services or publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services, or both, distribute public interest information free of charge to existing and new end-users, where appropriate, by the means that they ordinarily use in their communications with end-users. In such a case, that public interest information shall be provided by the relevant public authorities in a standardised format and shall, inter alia, cover the following topics:
(a)
the most common uses of internet access services and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services to engage in unlawful activities or to disseminate harmful content, in particular where it may prejudice respect for the rights and freedoms of others, including infringements of data protection rights, copyright and related rights, and their legal consequences; and
(b)
the means of protection against risks to personal security, privacy and personal data when using internet access services and publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services.
Article 104
Quality of service related to internet access services and publicly available interpersonal communications services
1.   National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities may require providers of internet access services and of publicly available interpersonal communications services to publish comprehensive, comparable, reliable, user-friendly and up-to-date information for end-users on the quality of their services, to the extent that they control at least some elements of the network either directly or by virtue of a service level agreement to that effect, and on measures taken to ensure equivalence in access for end-users with disabilities. National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities may also require providers of publicly available interpersonal communication services to inform consumers if the quality of the services they provide depends on any external factors, such as control of signal transmission or network connectivity.
That information shall, on request, be supplied to the national regulatory and, where relevant, to other competent authorities before its publication.
The measures to ensure quality of service shall comply with Regulation (EU) 2015/2120.
2.   National regulatory authorities in coordination with other competent authorities shall specify, taking utmost account of BEREC guidelines, the quality of service parameters to be measured, the applicable measurement methods, and the content, form and manner of the information to be published, including possible quality certification mechanisms. Where appropriate, the parameters, definitions and measurement methods set out in Annex X shall be used.
By 21 June 2020, in order to contribute to a consistent application of this paragraph and of Annex X, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, adopt guidelines detailing the relevant quality of service parameters, including parameters relevant for end-users with disabilities, the applicable measurement methods, the content and format of publication of the information, and quality certification mechanisms.
Article 105
Contract duration and termination
1.   Member States shall ensure that conditions and procedures for contract termination do not act as a disincentive to changing service provider and that contracts concluded between consumers and providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than number-independent interpersonal communications services and other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services, do not mandate a commitment period longer than 24 months. Member States may adopt or maintain provisions which mandate shorter maximum contractual commitment periods.
This paragraph shall not apply to the duration of an instalment contract where the consumer has agreed in a separate contract to instalment payments exclusively for deployment of a physical connection, in particular to very high capacity networks. An instalment contract for the deployment of a physical connection shall not include terminal equipment, such as a router or modem, and shall not preclude consumers from exercising their rights under this Article.
2.   Paragraph 1 shall also apply to end-users that are microenterprises, small enterprises or not-for-profit organisations, unless they have explicitly agreed to waive those provisions.
3.   Where a contract or national law provides for automatic prolongation of a fixed duration contract for electronic communications services other than number-independent interpersonal communications services and other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services, Member States shall ensure that, after such prolongation, end-users are entitled to terminate the contract at any time with a maximum one-month notice period, as determined by Member States, and without incurring any costs except the charges for receiving the service during the notice period. Before the contract is automatically prolonged, providers shall inform end-users, in a prominent and timely manner and on a durable medium, of the end of the contractual commitment and of the means by which to terminate the contract. In addition, and at the same time, providers shall give end-users best tariff advice relating to their services. Providers shall provide end-users with best tariff information at least annually.
4.   End-users shall have the right to terminate their contract without incurring any further costs upon notice of changes in the contractual conditions proposed by the provider of publicly available electronic communications services other than number-independent interpersonal communications services, unless the proposed changes are exclusively to the benefit of the end-user, are of a purely administrative nature and have no negative effect on the end-user, or are directly imposed by Union or national law.
Providers shall notify end-users at least one month in advance of any change in the contractual conditions, and shall simultaneously inform them of their right to terminate the contract without incurring any further costs if they do not accept the new conditions. The right to terminate the contract shall be exercisable within one month after notification. Member States may extend that period by up to three months. Member States shall ensure that notification is made in a clear and comprehensible manner on a durable medium.
5.   Any significant continued or frequently recurring discrepancy between the actual performance of an electronic communications service, other than an internet access service or a number-independent interpersonal communications service, and the performance indicated in the contract shall be considered to be a basis for triggering the remedies available to the consumer in accordance with national law, including the right to terminate the contract free of cost.
6.   Where an end-user has the right to terminate a contract for a publicly available electronic communications service, other than a number-independent interpersonal communications service, before the end of the agreed contract period pursuant to this Directive or to other provisions of Union or national law, no compensation shall be due by the end-user other than for retained subsidised terminal equipment.
Where the end-user chooses to retain terminal equipment bundled at the moment of the contract conclusion, any compensation due shall not exceed its pro rata temporis value as agreed at the moment of the conclusion of the contract or the remaining part of the service fee until the end of the contract, whichever is the smaller.
Member States may determine other methods to calculate the compensation rate, provided that such methods do not result in a level of compensation exceeding that calculated in accordance with the second subparagraph.
The provider shall lift any condition on the use of that terminal equipment on other networks free of charge at a time specified by Member States and at the latest upon payment of the compensation.
7.   As far as transmission services used for machine-to-machine services are concerned, the rights mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 6 shall benefit only end-users that are consumers, microenterprises, small enterprises or not-for-profit organisations.
Article 106
Provider switching and number portability
1.   In the case of switching between providers of internet access services, the providers concerned shall provide the end-user with adequate information before and during the switching process and ensure continuity of the internet access service, unless technically not feasible. The receiving provider shall ensure that the activation of the internet access service occurs within the shortest possible time on the date and within the timeframe expressly agreed with the end-user. The transferring provider shall continue to provide its internet access service on the same terms until the receiving provider activates its internet access service. Loss of service during the switching process shall not exceed one working day.
National regulatory authorities shall ensure the efficiency and simplicity of the switching process for the end-user.
2.   Member States shall ensure that all end-users with numbers from the national numbering plan have the right to retain their numbers, upon request, independently of the undertaking providing the service, in accordance with Part C of Annex VI.
3.   Where an end-user terminates a contract, Member States shall ensure that the end-user can retain the right to port a number from the national numbering plan to another provider for a minimum of one month after the date of termination, unless that right is renounced by the end-user.
4.   National regulatory authorities shall ensure that pricing among providers related to the provision of number portability is cost-oriented, and that no direct charges are applied to end-users.
5.   The porting of numbers and their subsequent activation shall be carried out within the shortest possible time on the date explicitly agreed with the end-user. In any case, end-users who have concluded an agreement to port a number to a new provider shall have that number activated within one working day from the date agreed with the end-user. In the case of failure of the porting process, the transferring provider shall reactivate the number and related services of the end-user until the porting is successful. The transferring provider shall continue to provide its services on the same terms and conditions until the services of the receiving provider are activated. In any event, the loss of service during the process of provider switching and the porting of numbers shall not exceed one working day. Operators whose access networks or facilities are used by either the transferring or the receiving provider, or both, shall ensure that there is no loss of service that would delay the switching and porting process.
6.   The receiving provider shall lead the switching and porting processes set out in paragraphs 1 and 5 and both the receiving and transferring providers shall cooperate in good faith. They shall not delay or abuse the switching and porting processes, nor shall they port numbers or switch end-users without the end-users’ explicit consent. The end-users’ contracts with the transferring provider shall be terminated automatically upon conclusion of the switching process.
National regulatory authorities may establish the details of the switching and porting processes, taking into account national provisions on contracts, technical feasibility and the need to maintain continuity of service to the end-users. This shall include, where technically feasible, a requirement for the porting to be completed through over-the-air provisioning, unless an end-user requests otherwise. National regulatory authorities shall also take appropriate measures ensuring that end-users are adequately informed and protected throughout the switching and porting processes and are not switched to another provider without their consent.
Transferring providers shall refund, upon request, any remaining credit to the consumers using pre-paid services. Refund may be subject to a fee only if provided for in the contract. Any such fee shall be proportionate and commensurate with the actual costs incurred by the transferring provider in offering the refund.
7.   Member States shall lay down rules on penalties in the case of the failure of a provider to comply with the obligations laid down in this Article, including delays in, or abuses of, porting by, or on behalf of, a provider.
8.   Member States shall lay down rules on the compensation of end-users by their providers in an easy and timely manner in the case of the failure of a provider to comply with the obligations laid down in this Article, as well as in the case of delays in, or abuses of, porting and switching processes, and missed service and installation appointments.
9.   In addition to the information required under Annex VIII, Member States shall ensure that end-users are adequately informed about the existence of the rights to compensation referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8.
Article 107
Bundled offers
1.   If a bundle of services or a bundle of services and terminal equipment offered to a consumer comprises at least an internet access service or a publicly available number-based interpersonal communications service, Article 102(3), Article 103(1), Article 105 and Article 106(1) shall apply to all elements of the bundle including, mutatis mutandis, those not otherwise covered by those provisions.
2.   Where the consumer has, under Union law, or national law in accordance with Union law, a right to terminate any element of the bundle as referred to in paragraph 1 before the end of the agreed contract term because of a lack of conformity with the contract or a failure to supply, Member States shall provide that the consumer has the right to terminate the contract with respect to all elements of the bundle.
3.   Any subscription to additional services or terminal equipment provided or distributed by the same provider of internet access services or of publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services shall not extend the original duration of the contract to which such services or terminal equipment are added, unless the consumer expressly agrees otherwise when subscribing to the additional services or terminal equipment.
4.   Paragraphs 1 and 3 shall also apply to end-users that are microenterprises, small enterprises, or not-for-profit organisations, unless they have explicitly agreed to waive all or parts of those provisions.
5.   Member States may also apply paragraph 1 as regards other provisions laid down in this Title.
Article 108
Availability of services
Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure the fullest possible availability of voice communications services and internet access services provided over public electronic communications networks in the event of catastrophic network breakdown or in cases of force majeure. Member States shall ensure that providers of voice communications services take all necessary measures to ensure uninterrupted access to emergency services and uninterrupted transmission of public warnings.
Article 109
Emergency communications and the single European emergency number
1.   Member States shall ensure that all end-users of the services referred to in paragraph 2, including users of public pay telephones, are able to access the emergency services through emergency communications free of charge and without having to use any means of payment, by using the single European emergency number ‘112’ and any national emergency number specified by Member States.
Member States shall promote the access to emergency services through the single European emergency number ‘112’ from electronic communications networks which are not publicly available but which enable calls to public networks, in particular when the undertaking responsible for that network does not provide an alternative and easy access to an emergency service.
2.   Member States shall, after consulting national regulatory authorities and emergency services and providers of electronic communications services, ensure that providers of publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services, where those services allow end-users to originate calls to a number in a national or international numbering plan, provide access to emergency services through emergency communications to the most appropriate PSAP.
3.   Member States shall ensure that all emergency communications to the single European emergency number ‘112’ are appropriately answered and handled in the manner best suited to the national organisation of emergency systems. Such emergency communications shall be answered and handled at least as expeditiously and effectively as emergency communications to the national emergency number or numbers, where those continue to be in use.
4.   By 21 December 2020 and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effectiveness of the implementation of the single European emergency number ‘112’.
5.   Member States shall ensure that access for end-users with disabilities to emergency services is available through emergency communications and is equivalent to that enjoyed by other end-users, in accordance with Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services. The Commission and the national regulatory or other competent authorities shall take appropriate measures to ensure that, whilst travelling in another Member State, end-users with disabilities can access emergency services on an equivalent basis with other end-users, where feasible without any pre-registration. Those measures shall seek to ensure interoperability across Member States and shall be based, to the greatest extent possible, on European standards or specifications laid down in accordance with Article 39. Such measures shall not prevent Member States from adopting additional requirements in order to pursue the objectives set out in this Article.
6.   Member States shall ensure that caller location information is made available to the most appropriate PSAP without delay after the emergency communication is set up. This shall include network-based location information and, where available, handset-derived caller location information. Member States shall ensure that the establishment and the transmission of the caller location information are free of charge for the end-user and the PSAP with regard to all emergency communications to the single European emergency number ‘112’. Member States may extend that obligation to cover emergency communications to national emergency numbers. Competent regulatory authorities, if necessary after consulting BEREC, shall lay down criteria for the accuracy and reliability of the caller location information provided.
7.   Member States shall ensure that end-users are adequately informed about the existence and the use of the single European emergency number ‘112’, as well as its accessibility features, including through initiatives specifically targeting persons travelling between Member States and end-users with disabilities. That information shall be provided in accessible formats, addressing different types of disabilities. The Commission shall support and complement Member States’ action.
8.   In order to ensure effective access to emergency services through emergency communications to the single European emergency number ‘112’ in the Member States, the Commission shall, after consulting BEREC, adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 117 supplementing paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of this Article on the measures necessary to ensure the compatibility, interoperability, quality, reliability and continuity of emergency communications in the Union with regard to caller location information solutions, access for end-users with disabilities and routing to the most appropriate PSAP. The first such delegated act shall be adopted by 21 December 2022.
Those delegated acts shall be adopted without prejudice to, and shall have no impact on, the organisation of emergency services, which remains in the exclusive competence of Member States.
BEREC shall maintain a database of E.164 numbers of Member State emergency services to ensure that they are able to contact each other from one Member State to another, if such a database is not maintained by another organisation.
Article 110
Public warning system
1.   By 21 June 2022, Member States shall ensure that, when public warning systems regarding imminent or developing major emergencies and disasters are in place, public warnings are transmitted by providers of mobile number-based interpersonal communications services to the end-users concerned.
2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States may determine that public warnings be transmitted through publicly available electronic communications services other than those referred to in paragraph 1, and other than broadcasting services, or through a mobile application relying on an internet access service, provided that the effectiveness of the public warning system is equivalent in terms of coverage and capacity to reach end-users, including those only temporarily present in the area concerned, taking utmost account of BEREC guidelines. Public warnings shall be easy for end-users to receive.
By 21 June 2020, and after consulting the authorities in charge of PSAPs, BEREC shall publish guidelines on how to assess whether the effectiveness of public warning systems under this paragraph is equivalent to the effectiveness of those under paragraph 1.
Article 111
Equivalent access and choice for end-users with disabilities
1.   Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities specify requirements to be met by providers of publicly available electronic communications services to ensure that end-users with disabilities:
(a)
have access to electronic communications services, including the related contractual information provided pursuant to Article 102, equivalent to that enjoyed by the majority of end-users; and
(b)
benefit from the choice of undertakings and services available to the majority of end-users.
2.   In taking the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall encourage compliance with the relevant standards or specifications laid down in accordance with Article 39.
Article 112
Directory enquiry services
1.   Member States shall ensure that all providers of number-based interpersonal communications services which attribute numbers from a numbering plan meet all reasonable requests to make available, for the purposes of the provision of publicly available directory enquiry services and directories, the relevant information in an agreed format, on terms which are fair, objective, cost oriented and non-discriminatory.
2.   National regulatory authorities shall be empowered to impose obligations and conditions on undertakings that control access to end-users, for the provision of directory enquiry services, in accordance with Article 61. Such obligations and conditions shall be objective, equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent.
3.   Member States shall not maintain any regulatory restrictions which prevent end-users in one Member State from accessing directly the directory enquiry service in another Member State by voice call or SMS, and shall take measures to ensure such access in accordance with Article 97.
4.   This Article shall apply subject to the requirements of Union law on the protection of personal data and privacy and, in particular, Article 12 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
Article 113
Interoperability of car radio and consumer radio receivers and consumer digital television equipment
1.   Member States shall ensure the interoperability of car radio receivers and consumer digital television equipment in accordance with Annex XI.
2.   Member States may adopt measures to ensure the interoperability of other consumer radio receivers, while limiting the impact on the market for low-value radio broadcast receivers and ensuring that such measures are not applied to products where a radio receiver is purely ancillary, such as smartphones, and to equipment used by radio amateurs.
3.   Member States shall encourage providers of digital television services to ensure, where appropriate, that the digital television equipment that they provide to their end-users is interoperable so that, where technically feasible, the digital television equipment is reusable with other providers of digital television services.
Without prejudice to Article 5(2) of Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(
47
)
, Member States shall ensure that, upon termination of their contract, end-users have the possibility to return the digital television equipment through a free and easy process, unless the provider demonstrates that it is fully interoperable with the digital television services of other providers, including those to which the end-user has switched.
Digital television equipment which complies with harmonised standards the references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union, or with parts thereof, shall be considered to comply with the requirement of interoperability set out in the second subparagraph covered by those standards or parts thereof.
Article 114
‘Must carry’ obligations
1.   Member States may impose reasonable ‘must carry’ obligations for the transmission of specified radio and television broadcast channels and related complementary services, in particular accessibility services to enable appropriate access for end-users with disabilities and data supporting connected television services and EPGs, on undertakings under their jurisdiction providing electronic communications networks and services used for the distribution of radio or television broadcast channels to the public, where a significant number of end-users of such networks and services use them as their principal means to receive radio and television broadcast channels. Such obligations shall be imposed only where they are necessary to meet general interest objectives as clearly defined by each Member State and shall be proportionate and transparent.
2.   By 21 December 2019 and every five years thereafter, Member States shall review the obligations referred to in the paragraph 1, except where Member States have carried out such a review within the previous four years.
3.   Neither paragraph 1 of this Article nor Article 59(2) shall prejudice the ability of Member States to determine appropriate remuneration, if any, in respect of measures taken in accordance with this Article while ensuring that, in similar circumstances, there is no discrimination in the treatment of providers of electronic communications networks and services. Where remuneration is provided for, Member States shall ensure that the obligation to remunerate is clearly set out in national law, including, where relevant, the criteria for calculating such remuneration. Member States shall also ensure that it is applied in a proportionate and transparent manner.
Article 115
Provision of additional facilities
1.   Without prejudice to Article 88(2), Member States shall ensure that competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities are able to require all providers of internet access services or publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services to make available free of charge all or part of the additional facilities listed in Part B of Annex VI, subject to technical feasibility, as well as all or part of the additional facilities listed in Part A of Annex VI.
2.   When applying paragraph 1, Member States may go beyond the list of additional facilities in Parts A and B of Annex VI in order to ensure a higher level of consumer protection.
3.   A Member State may decide to waive the application of paragraph 1 in all or part of its territory if it considers, after taking into account the views of interested parties, that there is sufficient access to those facilities.
Article 116
Adaptation of annexes
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 117 amending Annexes V, VI, IX, X, and XI in order to take account of technological and social developments or changes in market demand.
PART IV
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 117
Exercise of the delegation
1.   The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.
2.   The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 75, 109 and 116 shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from 20 December 2018. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.
3.   The delegation of power referred to in Articles 75, 109 and 116 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.
4.   Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.
5.   As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.
6.   A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 75, 109 and 116 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and to the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.
Article 118
Committee
1.   The Commission shall be assisted by a committee (‘the Communications Committee’). That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
2.   For the implementing acts referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 28(4), the Commission shall be assisted by the Radio Spectrum Committee established pursuant to Article 3(1) of Decision No 676/2002/EC. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
3.   Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.
Where the opinion of the committee is to be obtained by written procedure, that procedure shall be terminated without result when, within the time-limit for delivery of the opinion, the chair of the committee so decides or a committee member so requests. In such a case, the chair shall convene a committee meeting within a reasonable time.
4.   Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply, having regard to Article 8 thereof.
Where the opinion of the committee is to be obtained by written procedure, that procedure shall be terminated without result when, within the time-limit for delivery of the opinion, the chair of the committee so decides or a committee member so requests. In such a case, the chair shall convene a committee meeting within a reasonable time.
Article 119
Exchange of information
1.   The Commission shall provide all relevant information to the Communications Committee on the outcome of regular consultations with the representatives of network operators, service providers, users, consumers, manufacturers and trade unions, as well as third countries and international organisations.
2.   The Communications Committee shall, taking account of the Union’s electronic communications policy, foster the exchange of information between the Member States and between the Member States and the Commission on the situation and the development of regulatory activities regarding electronic communications networks and services.
Article 120
Publication of information
1.   Member States shall ensure that up-to-date information regarding the implementation of this Directive is made publicly available in a manner that guarantees all interested parties easy access to that information. They shall publish a notice in their national official gazette describing how and where the information is published. The first such notice shall be published before 21 December 2020 and thereafter a notice shall be published where there is any change in the information contained therein.
2.   Member States shall submit to the Commission a copy of all such notices at the time of publication. The Commission shall distribute the information to the Communications Committee as appropriate.
3.   Member States shall ensure that all relevant information on rights, conditions, procedures, charges, fees and decisions concerning general authorisations, rights of use and rights to install facilities is published and kept up to date in an appropriate manner in order to provide easy access to that information for all interested parties.
4.   Where information referred to in paragraph 3 is held at different levels of government, in particular information regarding procedures and conditions on rights to install facilities, the competent authority shall make all reasonable efforts, having regard to the costs involved, to create a user-friendly overview of all such information, including information on the relevant levels of government and the responsible authorities, in order to facilitate applications for rights to install facilities.
5.   Member States shall ensure that the specific obligations imposed on undertakings under this Directive are published and that the specific product and service, and geographical markets are identified. Subject to the need to protect commercial confidentiality, they shall ensure that up-to-date information is made publicly available in a manner that guarantees all interested parties easy access to that information.
6.   Member States shall provide the Commission with information that they make publicly available pursuant to paragraph 5. The Commission shall make that information available in a readily accessible form, and shall distribute the information to the Communications Committee as appropriate.
Article 121
Notification and monitoring
1.   National regulatory authorities shall notify to the Commission by 21 December 2020, and immediately following any change thereafter, the names of undertakings designated as having universal service obligations under Article 85(2), Article 86 or 87.
2.   National regulatory authorities shall notify to the Commission the names of undertakings designated as having significant market power for the purposes of this Directive, and the obligations imposed upon them under this Directive. Any changes affecting the obligations imposed upon undertakings or of the undertakings affected under this Directive shall be notified to the Commission without delay.
Article 122
Review procedures
1.   By 21 December 2025 and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall review the functioning of this Directive and report to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Those reviews shall evaluate in particular the market implications of Article 61(3) and Articles 76, 78 and 79 and whether the ex ante and other intervention powers pursuant to this Directive are sufficient to enable national regulatory authorities to address uncompetitive oligopolistic market structures, and to ensure that competition in electronic communications markets continues to thrive to the benefit of end-users.
To that end, the Commission may request information from the Member States, which shall be supplied without undue delay.
2.   By 21 December 2025, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall review the scope of universal service, in particular with a view to proposing to the European Parliament and to the Council that the scope be changed or redefined.
That review shall be undertaken in light of social, economic and technological developments, taking into account, inter alia, mobility and data rates in light of the prevailing technologies used by the majority of end-users. The Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council regarding the outcome of the review.
3.   BEREC shall, by 21 December 2021 and every three years thereafter, publish an opinion on the national implementation and functioning of the general authorisation, and on their impact on the functioning of the internal market.
The Commission may, taking utmost account of the BEREC opinion, publish a report on the application of Chapter II of Title II of Part I and of Annex I, and may submit a legislative proposal to amend those provisions where it considers this to be necessary for the purpose of addressing obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market.
Article 123
Specific review procedure on end-user rights
1.   BEREC shall monitor the market and technological developments regarding the different types of electronic communications services and shall, by 21 December 2021 and every three years thereafter, or upon a reasoned request from at least two of its Member State members, publish an opinion on such developments and on their impact on the application of Title III of Part III.
In that opinion, BEREC shall assess to what extent Title III of Part III meets the objectives set out in Article 3. The opinion shall in particular take into account the scope of Title III of Part III as regards the types of electronic communications services covered. As a basis for the opinion, BEREC shall in particular analyse:
(a)
to what extent end-users of all electronic communications services are able to make free and informed choices, including on the basis of complete contractual information, and are able to switch easily their provider of electronic communications services;
(b)
to what extent any lack of abilities referred to in point (a) has resulted in market distortions or end-user harm;
(c)
to what extent effective access to emergency services is appreciably threatened, in particular due to an increased use of number-independent interpersonal communications services, by a lack of interoperability or technological developments;
(d)
the likely cost of any potential readjustments of obligations in Title III of Part III or impact on innovation for providers of electronic communications services.
2.   The Commission, taking utmost account of the BEREC opinion, shall publish a report on the application of Title III of Part III and shall submit a legislative proposal to amend that Title where it considers this to be necessary to ensure that the objectives set out in Article 3 continue to be met.
Article 124
Transposition
1.   Member States shall adopt and publish, by 21 December 2020, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall immediately communicate the text of those measures to the Commission.
Member States shall apply those measures from 21 December 2020.
When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. They shall also include a statement that references in existing laws, regulations and administrative provisions to the Directives repealed by this Directive shall be construed as references to this Directive. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made and how that statement is to be formulated.
2.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, Article 53(2), (3) and (4) of this Directive shall apply from 20 December 2018 where harmonised conditions have been set by technical implementing measures in accordance with Decision No 676/2002/EC in order to enable the radio spectrum use for wireless broadband networks and services. In relation to radio spectrum bands for which harmonised conditions have not been set by 20 December 2018, Article 53(2), (3) and (4) of this Directive shall apply from the date of the adoption of the technical implementing measures in accordance with Article 4 of Decision No 676/2002/EC.
By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall apply the measures necessary to comply with Article 54 from 31 December 2020.
3.   Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
Article 125
Repeal
Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC, as listed in Annex XII, Part A, are repealed with effect from 21 December 2020, without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States relating to the time-limits for the transposition into national law and the dates of application of the Directives set out in Annex XII, Part B.
Article 5 of Decision No 243/2012/EU is deleted with effect from 21 December 2020.
References to the repealed Directives shall be construed as references to this Directive and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex XIII.
Article 126
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union
.
Article 127
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Strasbourg, 11 December 2018.
For the European Parliament
The President
A. TAJANI
For the Council
The President
J. BOGNER-STRAUSS
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OJ C 125, 21.4.2017, p. 56
.
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2
)
  
            
OJ C 207, 30.6.2017, p. 87
.
(
3
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  Position of the European Parliament of 14 November 2018 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of 4 December 2018.
(
4
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  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) (
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7
).
(
5
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  Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) (
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21
).
(
6
)
  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33
)
(
7
)
  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) (
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51
).
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8
)
  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (
OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37
).
(
9
)
  Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office (
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 1
).
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10
)
  
            
OJ C 77, 28.3.2002, p. 1
.
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11
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  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (
OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1
).
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12
)
  Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (
OJ L 153, 22.5.2014, p. 62
).
(
13
)
  Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (
OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1
).
(
14
)
  Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (
OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, p. 1
).
(
15
)
  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (
OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1
).
(
16
)
  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 April 1988, Bond van Adverteerders and Others v The Netherlands State, C-352/85, ECLI: EU:C:1988:196.
(
17
)
  Regulation (EU) 2015/758 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system based on the 112 service and amending Directive 2007/46/EC (
OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p 77
).
(
18
)
  Commission Regulation (EU) No 305/2013 of 26 November 2012 supplementing Directive 2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the harmonised provision for an interoperable EU-wide eCall (
OJ L 91, 3.4.2013, p. 1
).
(
19
)
  Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (
OJ L 81, 21.3.2012, p. 7
).
(
20
)
  Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (
OJ L 172, 30.6.2012, p. 10
).
(
21
)
  in particular the judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 October 2012, European Commission v Republic of Austria, Case C-614/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:631.
(
22
)
  Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks (
OJ L 155, 23.5.2014, p. 1
).
(
23
)
  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (
OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6
).
(
24
)
  Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) (
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 1
).
(
25
)
  Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information (
OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90
).
(
26
)
  Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (
OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36
).
(
27
)
  Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) (
OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 63
).
(
28
)
  Commission Decision 2002/622/EC of 26 July 2002 establishing a Radio Spectrum Policy Group (
OJ L 198, 27.7.2002, p. 49
).
(
29
)
  Directive 2014/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility (
OJ L 96, 29.3.2014, p. 79
).
(
30
)
  Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits (
OJ L 96, 29.3.2014, p. 357
).
(
31
)
  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (
OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1
).
(
32
)
  Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC of 12 July 1999 on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz) (
OJ L 199, 30.7.1999, p. 59
).
(
33
)
  Decision (EU) 2017/899 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 on the use of the 470-790 MHz frequency band in the Union (
OJ L 138, 25.5.2017, p. 131
).
(
34
)
  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) (
OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1
).
(
35
)
  Commission Recommendation 2005/698/EC of 19 September 2005 on accounting separation and cost accounting systems under the regulatory framework for electronic communications (
OJ L 266, 11.10.2005, p. 64
).
(
36
)
  Commission Recommendation 2013/466/EU of 11 September 2013 on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment (
OJ L 251, 21.9.2013, p. 13
).
(
37
)
  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (
OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29
).
(
38
)
  Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (
OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64
).
(
39
)
  Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services (
OJ L 249, 17.9.2002, p. 21
).
(
40
)
  
            
OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1
.
(
41
)
  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (
OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13
).
(
42
)
  
            
OJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14
.
(
43
)
  Commission Directive 2008/63/EC of 20 June 2008 on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment (
OJ L 162, 21.6.2008, p. 20
).
(
44
)
  Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office), amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 (see page 1 of this Official Journal).
(
45
)
  Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 (
OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 41
).
(
46
)
  Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU (
OJ L 348 20.12.2013, p. 1
).
(
47
)
  Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (
OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 38
).
ANNEX I
LIST OF CONDITIONS WHICH MAY BE ATTACHED TO GENERAL AUTHORISATIONS, RIGHTS OF USE FOR RADIO SPECTRUM AND RIGHTS OF USE FOR NUMBERING RESOURCES
This Annex provides for the maximum list of conditions which may be attached to general authorisations for electronic communications networks and services, except number-independent interpersonal communications services (Part A), electronic communications networks (Part B), electronic communications services, except number-independent interpersonal communications services (Part C), rights of use for radio spectrum (Part D), and rights of use for numbering resources (Part E)
A.   General conditions which may be attached to a general authorisation
1.
Administrative charges in accordance with Article 16.
2.
Personal data and privacy protection specific to the electronic communications sector in accordance with Directive 2002/58/EC
3.
Information to be provided under a notification procedure in accordance with Article 12 and for other purposes as included in Article 21.
4.
Enabling of legal interception by competent national authorities in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC.
5.
Terms of use for communications from public authorities to the general public for warning the public of imminent threats and for mitigating the consequences of major catastrophes.
6.
Terms of use during major disasters or national emergencies to ensure communications between emergency services and authorities.
7.
Access obligations other than those provided for in Article 13 applying to undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services.
8.
Measures designed to ensure compliance with the standards or specifications referred to in Article 39.
9.
Transparency obligations on providers of public electronic communications network providing publicly available electronic communications services to ensure end-to-end connectivity, in accordance with the objectives and principles set out in Article 3 and, where necessary and proportionate, access by competent authorities to such information needed to verify the accuracy of such disclosure.
B.   Specific conditions which may be attached to a general authorisation for the provision of electronic communications networks
1.
Interconnection of networks in accordance with this Directive.
2.
‘Must carry’ obligations in accordance with this Directive.
3.
Measures for the protection of public health against electromagnetic fields caused by electronic communications networks in accordance with Union law, taking utmost account of Recommendation 1999/519/EC.
4.
Maintenance of the integrity of public electronic communications networks in accordance with this Directive including by conditions to prevent electromagnetic interference between electronic communications networks or services in accordance with Directive 2014/30/EU.
5.
Security of public networks against unauthorised access in accordance with Directive 2002/58/EC.
6.
Conditions for the use of radio spectrum, in accordance with Article 7(2) of Directive 2014/53/EU, where such use is not made subject to the granting of individual rights of use in accordance with Article 46(1) and Article 48 of this Directive.
C.   Specific conditions which may be attached to a general authorisation for the provision of electronic communications services, except number-independent interpersonal communications services
1.
Interoperability of services in accordance with this Directive.
2.
Accessibility by end-users of numbers from the national numbering plan, numbers from the UIFN and, where technically and economically feasible, from numbering plans of other Member States, and conditions in accordance with this Directive.
3.
Consumer protection rules specific to the electronic communications sector.
4.
Restrictions in relation to the transmission of illegal content in accordance with Directive 2000/31/EC and restrictions in relation to the transmission of harmful content in accordance with Directive 2010/13/EU.
D.   Conditions which may be attached to rights of use for radio spectrum
1.
Obligation to provide a service or to use a type of technology within the limits of Article 45 including, where appropriate, coverage and quality of service requirements.
2.
Effective and efficient use of radio spectrum in accordance with this Directive.
3.
Technical and operational conditions necessary for the avoidance of harmful interference and for the protection of public health against electromagnetic fields, taking utmost account of Recommendation 1999/519/EC where such conditions are different from those included in the general authorisation.
4.
Maximum duration in accordance with Article 49, subject to any changes in the National Frequency Allocation Plan.
5.
Transfer or leasing of rights at the initiative of the holder of the rights and conditions for such transfer in accordance with this Directive.
6.
Fees for rights of use in accordance with Article 42.
7.
Any commitments which the undertaking obtaining the rights of use has made in the framework of an authorisation or authorisation renewal process prior to the authorisation being granted or, where applicable, to the invitation for application for rights of use.
8.
Obligations to pool or share radio spectrum or allow access to radio spectrum for other users in specific regions or at national level.
9.
Obligations under relevant international agreements relating to the use of radio spectrum bands.
10.
Obligations specific to an experimental use of radio spectrum bands.
E.   Conditions which may be attached to rights of use for numbering resources
1.
Designation of service for which the number shall be used, including any requirements linked to the provision of that service and, for the avoidance of doubt, tariff principles and maximum prices that can apply in the specific number range for the purposes of ensuring consumer protection in accordance with point (d) of Article 3(2).
2.
Effective and efficient use of numbering resources in accordance with this Directive.
3.
Number portability requirements in accordance with this Directive.
4.
Obligation to provide public directory end-user information for the purposes of Article 112.
5.
Maximum duration in accordance with Article 94, subject to any changes in the national numbering plan.
6.
Transfer of rights at the initiative of the holder of the rights and conditions for such transfer in accordance with this Directive, including any condition that the right of use for a number be binding on all the undertakings to which the rights are transferred.
7.
Fees for rights of use in accordance with Article 95.
8.
Any commitments which the undertaking obtaining the rights of use has made in the course of a competitive or comparative selection procedure.
9.
Obligations under relevant international agreements relating to the use of numbers.
10.
Obligations concerning the extraterritorial use of numbers within the Union to ensure compliance with consumer protection and other number-related rules in Member States other than that of the country code.
ANNEX II
CONDITIONS FOR ACCESS TO DIGITAL TELEVISION AND RADIO SERVICES BROADCAST TO VIEWERS AND LISTENERS IN THE UNION
Part I
Conditions for conditional access systems to be applied in accordance with Article 62(1)
In relation to conditional access to digital television and radio services broadcast to viewers and listeners in the Union, irrespective of the means of transmission, Member States shall ensure in accordance with Article 62 that the following conditions apply:
(a)
all undertakings providing conditional access services, irrespective of the means of transmission, which provide access services to digital television and radio services and the access services of which broadcasters depend on to reach any group of potential viewers or listeners are to:
—
offer to all broadcasters, on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis compatible with Union competition law, technical services enabling the broadcasters’ digitally-transmitted services to be received by viewers or listeners authorised by means of decoders administered by the service operators, and comply with Union competition law,
—
keep separate financial accounts regarding their activity as conditional access providers.
(b)
when granting licences to manufacturers of consumer equipment, holders of industrial property rights to conditional access products and systems are to ensure that this is done on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Taking into account technical and commercial factors, holders of rights are not to subject the granting of licences to conditions prohibiting, deterring or discouraging the inclusion in the same product of:
—
a common interface allowing connection with several other access systems, or
—
means specific to another access system, provided that the licensee complies with the relevant and reasonable conditions ensuring, as far as he is concerned, the security of transactions of conditional access system operators.
Part II
Other facilities to which conditions may be applied under point (D) of Article 61(2)
(a)
Access to APIs;
(b)
Access to EPGs.
ANNEX III
CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF WHOLESALE VOICE TERMINATION RATES
Principles, criteria and parameters for the determination of rates for wholesale voice termination on fixed and mobile markets referred to in Article 75(1):
(a)
rates shall be based on the recovery of costs incurred by an efficient operator; the evaluation of efficient costs shall be based on current cost values; the cost methodology to calculate efficient costs shall be based on a bottom-up modelling approach using long-run incremental traffic-related costs of providing the wholesale voice termination service to third parties;
(b)
the relevant incremental costs of the wholesale voice termination service shall be determined by the difference between the total long-run costs of an operator providing its full range of services and the total long-run costs of that operator not providing a wholesale voice termination service to third parties;
(c)
only those traffic-related costs which would be avoided in the absence of a wholesale voice termination service being provided shall be allocated to the relevant termination increment;
(d)
costs related to additional network capacity shall be included only to the extent that they are driven by the need to increase capacity for the purpose of carrying additional wholesale voice termination traffic;
(e)
radio spectrum fees shall be excluded from the mobile voice termination increment;
(f)
only those wholesale commercial costs shall be included which are directly related to the provision of the wholesale voice termination service to third parties;
(g)
all fixed network operators shall be considered to provide voice termination services at the same unit costs as the efficient operator, regardless of their size;
(h)
for mobile network operators, the minimum efficient scale shall be set at a market share not below 20 %;
(i)
the relevant approach for asset depreciation shall be economic depreciation; and
(j)
the technology choice of the modelled networks shall be forward looking, based on an IP core network, taking into account the various technologies likely to be used over the period of validity of the maximum rate; in the case of fixed networks, calls shall be considered to be exclusively packet switched.
ANNEX IV
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING CO-INVESTMENT OFFERS
When assessing a co-investment offer pursuant to Article 76(1), the national regulatory authority shall verify whether the following criteria have at a minimum been met. National regulatory authorities may consider additional criteria to the extent they are necessary to ensure accessibility of potential investors to the co-investment, in light of specific local conditions and market structure:
(a)
The co-investment offer shall be open to any undertaking over the lifetime of the network built under a co-investment offer on a non-discriminatory basis. The undertaking designated as having significant market power may include in the offer reasonable conditions regarding the financial capacity of any undertaking, so that for instance potential co-investors need to demonstrate their ability to deliver phased payments on the basis of which the deployment is planned, the acceptance of a strategic plan on the basis of which medium-term deployment plans are prepared, and so on.
(b)
The co-investment offer shall be transparent:
—
the offer shall be available and easily identified on the website of the undertaking designated as having significant market power;
—
full detailed terms shall be made available without undue delay to any potential bidder that has expressed an interest, including the legal form of the co-investment agreement and, when relevant, the heads of term of the governance rules of the co-investment vehicle; and
—
the process, like the road map for the establishment and development of the co-investment project shall be set in advance, shall be clearly explained in writing to any potential co-investor, and all significant milestones shall be clearly communicated to all undertakings without any discrimination.
(c)
The co-investment offer shall include terms to potential co-investors which favour sustainable competition in the long term, in particular:
—
All undertakings shall be offered fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions for participation in the co-investment agreement relative to the time they join, including in terms of financial consideration required for the acquisition of specific rights, in terms of the protection awarded to the co-investors by those rights both during the building phase and during the exploitation phase, for example by granting indefeasible rights of use (IRUs) for the expected lifetime of the co-invested network and in terms of the conditions for joining and potentially terminating the co-investment agreement. Non-discriminatory terms in this context do not entail that all potential co-investors shall be offered exactly the same terms, including financial terms, but that all variations of the terms offered shall be justified on the basis of the same objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and predictable criteria such as the number of end-user lines committed for.
—
The offer shall allow flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each co-investor, for example by means of an agreed and potentially increasing percentage of the total end-user lines in a given area, to which co-investors have the possibility to commit gradually and which is set at a unit level enabling smaller co-investors with limited resources to enter the co-investment at a reasonably minimum scale and to gradually increase their participation while ensuring adequate levels of initial commitment. The determination of the financial consideration to be provided by each co-investor needs to reflect the fact that early investors accept greater risks and engage capital sooner.
—
A premium increasing over time shall be considered to be justified for commitments made at later stages and for new co-investors entering the co-investment after the commencement of the project, to reflect diminishing risks and to counteract any incentive to withhold capital in the earlier stages.
—
The co-investment agreement shall allow the assignment of acquired rights by co-investors to other co-investors, or to third parties willing to enter into the co-investment agreement subject to the transferee undertaking being obliged to fulfil all original obligations of the transferor under the co-investment agreement.
—
Co-investors shall grant each other reciprocal rights on fair and reasonable terms and conditions to access the co-invested infrastructure for the purposes of providing services downstream, including to end-users, in accordance with transparent conditions which are to be made transparent in the co-investment offer and subsequent agreement, in particular where co-investors are individually and separately responsible for the deployment of specific parts of the network. If a co-investment vehicle is created, it shall provide access to the network to all co-investors, whether directly or indirectly, on an equivalence of inputs basis and in accordance with fair and reasonable terms and conditions, including financial conditions that reflect the different levels of risk accepted by the individual co-investors.
(d)
The co-investment offer shall ensure a sustainable investment likely to meet future needs, by deploying new network elements that contribute significantly to the deployment of very high capacity networks.
ANNEX V
MINIMUM SET OF SERVICES WHICH THE ADEQUATE BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 84(3) SHALL BE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING
(1)
E-mail
(2)
search engines enabling search and finding of all type of information
(3)
basic training and education online tools
(4)
online newspapers or news
(5)
buying or ordering goods or services online
(6)
job searching and job searching tools
(7)
professional networking
(8)
internet banking
(9)
eGovernment service use
(10)
social media and instant messaging
(11)
calls and video calls (standard quality)
ANNEX VI
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND SERVICES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 88 (CONTROL OF EXPENDITURE), ARTICLE 115 (ADDITIONAL FACILITIES) AND ARTICLE 106 (PROVIDER SWITCHING AND NUMBER PORTABILITY)
Part A
Facilities and services referred to in Articles 88 and 115
When applied on the basis of Article 88, Part A is applicable to consumers and other categories of end-users where Member States have extended the beneficiaries of Article 88(2).
When applied on the basis of Article 115, Part A is applicable to the categories of end-users determined by Member States, except for points (c), (d) and (g) of this Part which are applicable only to consumers.
(a)
Itemised billing
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities, subject to the requirements of relevant law on the protection of personal data and privacy, may lay down the basic level of itemised bills which are to be offered by providers to end-users free of charge in order that they can:
(i)
allow verification and control of the charges incurred in using internet access services or voice communications services, or number-based interpersonal communications services in the case of Article 115; and
(ii)
adequately monitor their usage and expenditure and thereby exercise a reasonable degree of control over their bills.
Where appropriate, additional levels of detail may be offered to end-users at reasonable tariffs or at no charge.
Such itemised bills shall include an explicit mention of the identity of the supplier and of the duration of the services charged by any premium numbers unless the end-user has requested that information not to be mentioned.
Calls which are free of charge to the calling end-users, including calls to helplines, shall not be required to be identified in the calling end-user’s itemised bill.
National regulatory authorities may require operators to provide calling-line identification free of charge.
(b)
Selective barring for outgoing calls or premium SMS or MMS, or, where technically feasible, other kinds of similar applications, free of charge
namely, the facility whereby the end-users can, on request to the providers of voice communications services, or number-based interpersonal communications services in the case of Article 115, bar outgoing calls or premium SMS or MMS or other kinds of similar applications of defined types or to defined types of numbers free of charge.
(c)
Pre-payment systems
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities may require providers to offer means for consumers to pay for access to the public electronic communications network and use of voice communications services, or internet access services, or number-based interpersonal communications services in the case of Article 115, on pre-paid terms.
(d)
Phased payment of connection fees
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities may require providers to allow consumers to pay for connection to the public electronic communications network on the basis of payments phased over time.
(e)
Non-payment of bills
Member States shall authorise specified measures, which are to be proportionate, non-discriminatory and published, to cover non-payment of bills issued by providers. Those measures are to ensure that due warning of any consequent service interruption or disconnection is given to the end-users beforehand. Except in cases of fraud, persistent late payment or non-payment, those measures shall ensure, as far as is technically feasible, that any service interruption is confined to the service concerned. Disconnection for non-payment of bills shall take place only after due warning is given to the end-users. Member States may allow a period of limited service prior to complete disconnection, during which only calls that do not incur a charge to the end-users (for example, calls to the ‘112’ number) and minimum service level of internet access services, defined by Member States in light of national conditions, are permitted.
(f)
Tariff advice
namely, the facility whereby end-users may request the provider to offer information regarding alternative lower-cost tariffs, if available.
(g)
Cost control
namely, the facility whereby providers offer other means, if determined to be appropriate by competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities, to control the costs of voice communications services or internet access services, or number-based interpersonal communications services in the case of Article 115, including free-of-charge alerts to consumers in the case of abnormal or excessive consumption patterns.
(h)
facility to deactivate third party billing
namely, the facility for end-users to deactivate the ability for third party service providers to use the bill of a provider of an internet access service or a provider of a publicly available interpersonal communications service to charge for their products or services.
Part B
Facilities referred to in Article 115
(a)
Calling-line identification
namely, the calling party’s number is presented to the called party prior to the call being established.
This facility shall be provided in accordance with relevant law on protection of personal data and privacy, in particular Directive 2002/58/EC.
To the extent technically feasible, operators shall provide data and signals to facilitate the offering of calling-line identity and tone dialling across Member State boundaries.
(b)
E-mail forwarding or access to e-mails after termination of the contract with a provider of an internet access service.
This facility shall, on request and free-of-charge, enable end-users who terminate their contract with a provider of an internet access service to either access their e-mails received on the e-mail address(es) based on the commercial name or trade mark of the former provider, during a period that the national regulatory authority considers necessary and proportionate, or to transfer e-mails sent to that (or those) address(es) during that period to a new email address specified by the end-user.
Part C
Implementation of the number portability provisions referred to in Article 106
The requirement that all end-users with numbers from the national numbering plan, who so request can retain their numbers independently of the undertaking providing the service shall apply:
(a)
in the case of geographic numbers, at a specific location; and
(b)
in the case of non-geographic numbers, at any location.
This Part does not apply to the porting of numbers between networks providing services at a fixed location and mobile networks.
ANNEX VII
CALCULATING THE NET COST, IF ANY, OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS AND ESTABLISHING ANY COMPENSATION OR SHARING MECHANISM IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES 89 AND 90
Part A
Calculation of net cost
Universal service obligations refer to those obligations placed upon an undertaking by a Member State which concern the provision of universal service as set out in Articles 84 to 87.
National regulatory authorities are to consider all means to ensure appropriate incentives for undertakings (designated or not) to provide universal service obligations cost efficiently. In undertaking a calculation exercise, the net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated as the difference between the net cost for any undertaking operating with the universal service obligations and operating without the universal service obligations. Due attention is to be given to correctly assessing the costs that any undertaking would have chosen to avoid had there been no universal service obligations. The net cost calculation shall assess the benefits, including intangible benefits, to the universal service provider.
The calculation is to be based upon the costs attributable to:
(i)
elements of the identified services which can only be provided at a loss or provided under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards.
This category may include service elements such as access to emergency telephone services, provision of certain public pay telephones, provision of certain services or equipment for end-users with disabilities, and so on;
(ii)
specific end-users or groups of end-users who, taking into account the cost of providing the specified network and service, the revenue generated and any geographical averaging of prices imposed by the Member State, can only be served at a loss or under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards.
This category includes those end-users or groups of end-users which would not be served by a commercial provider which did not have an obligation to provide universal service.
The calculation of the net cost of specific aspects of universal service obligations is to be made separately and in order to avoid the double counting of any direct or indirect benefits and costs. The overall net cost of universal service obligations to any undertaking is to be calculated as the sum of the net costs arising from the specific components of universal service obligations, taking account of any intangible benefits. The responsibility for verifying the net cost lies with the national regulatory authority.
Part B
Compensation of net costs of universal service obligations
The recovery or financing of any net costs of universal service obligations may require undertakings with universal service obligations to be compensated for the services they provide under non-commercial conditions. Because such a compensation involves financial transfers, Member States are to ensure that those are undertaken in an objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate manner. This means that the transfers result in the least distortion to competition and to user demand.
In accordance with Article 90(3), a sharing mechanism based on a fund shall use a transparent and neutral means for collecting contributions that avoids the danger of a double imposition of contributions falling on both outputs and inputs of undertakings.
The independent body administering the fund is to be responsible for collecting contributions from undertakings which are assessed as liable to contribute to the net cost of universal service obligations in the Member State and is to oversee the transfer of sums due or administrative payments to the undertakings entitled to receive payments from the fund.
ANNEX VIII
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS TO BE PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 102 (INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTS)
A.
Information requirements for providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services
Providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services shall provide the following information:
(1)
as part of the main characteristics of each service provided, any minimum levels of quality of service to the extent that those are offered and, for services other than internet access services, the specific quality parameters assured.
Where no minimum levels of quality of service are offered, a statement to this effect shall be made;
(2)
as part of the information on price, where and to the extent applicable, the respective prices for activating the electronic communications service and for any recurring or consumption-related charges;
(3)
as part of the information on the duration of the contract and the conditions for renewal and termination of the contract, including possible termination fees, to the extent that such conditions apply:
(i)
any minimum use or duration required to benefit from promotional terms;
(ii)
any charges related to switching and compensation and refund arrangements for delay or abuse of switching, as well as information about the respective procedures;
(iii)
information on the right of consumers using pre-paid services to a refund, upon request, of any remaining credit in the event of switching, as set out in Article 106(6);
(iv)
any fees due on early termination of the contract, including information on unlocking the terminal equipment and any cost recovery with respect to terminal equipment;
(4)
any compensation and refund arrangements, including, where applicable, explicit reference to rights of consumers, which apply if contracted levels of quality of service are not met or if the provider responds inadequately to a security incident, threat or vulnerability;
(5)
the type of action that might be taken by the provider in reaction to security incidents or threats or vulnerabilities.
B.
Information requirements for providers of internet access services and publicly available interpersonal communications services
I.
In addition to the requirements set out in Part A, providers of internet access services and publicly available interpersonal communications services shall provide the following information:
(1)
as part of the main characteristics of each service provided:
(i)
any minimum levels of quality of service to the extent that these are offered, and taking utmost account of the BEREC guidelines adopted in accordance with Article 104(2) regarding:
—
for internet access services: at least latency, jitter, packet loss,
—
for publicly available interpersonal communications services, where they exert control over at least some elements of the network or have a service level agreement to that effect with undertakings providing access to the network: at least the time for the initial connection, failure probability, call signalling delays in accordance with Annex X; and
(ii)
without prejudice to the right of end-users to use terminal equipment of their choice in accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, any conditions, including fees, imposed by the provider on the use of terminal equipment supplied;
(2)
as part of the information on price, where and to the extent applicable, the respective prices for activating the electronic communications service and for any recurring or consumption-related charges:
(i)
details of specific tariff plan or plans under the contract and, for each such tariff plan the types of services offered, including where applicable, the volumes of communications (such as MB, minutes, messages) included per billing period, and the price for additional communication units;
(ii)
in the case of tariff plan or plans with a pre-set volume of communications, the possibility for consumers to defer any unused volume from the preceding billing period to the following billing period, where this option is included in the contract;
(iii)
facilities to safeguard bill transparency and monitor the level of consumption;
(iv)
tariff information regarding any numbers or services subject to particular pricing conditions; with respect to individual categories of services, competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities may require in addition such information to be provided immediately prior to connecting the call or to connecting to the provider of the service;
(v)
for bundled services and bundles including both services and terminal equipment the price of the individual elements of the bundle to the extent they are also marketed separately;
(vi)
details and conditions, including fees, of any after-sales service, maintenance, and customer assistance; and
(vii)
the means by which up-to-date information on all applicable tariffs and maintenance charges may be obtained;
(3)
as part of the information on the duration of the contract for bundled services and the conditions for renewal and termination of the contract, where applicable, the conditions of termination of the bundle or of elements thereof;
(4)
without prejudice to Article 13 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679, information on what personal data shall be provided before the performance of the service or collected in the context of the provision of the service;
(5)
details on products and services designed for end-users with disabilities and how updates on this information can be obtained;
(6)
the means of initiating procedures for the resolution of disputes including national and cross-border disputes in accordance with Article 25.
II.
In addition to the requirements set out in Part A and under Point I, providers of publicly available number-based interpersonal communications services shall also provide the following information:
(1)
any constraints on access to emergency services or caller location information due to a lack of technical feasibility insofar as the service allows end-users to originate calls to a number in a national or international numbering plan;
(2)
the end-user’s right to determine whether to include his or her personal data in a directory, and the types of data concerned, in accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2002/58/EC;
III.
In addition to the requirements set out in Part A and under Point I, providers of internet access services shall also provide the information required pursuant to Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120.
ANNEX IX
INFORMATION TO BE PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 (TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION)
The competent authority in coordination, where relevant, with the national regulatory authority is responsible for ensuring that the information in this Annex is published, in accordance with Article 103. The competent authority in coordination, where relevant, with the national regulatory authority shall decide which information is relevant to be published by the providers of internet access services or publicly available interpersonal communications services, and which information is to be published by the competent authority itself in coordination, where relevant, with the national regulatory authority, in order to ensure that all end-users are able to make informed choices. If considered to be appropriate, competent authorities in coordination, where relevant, with national regulatory authorities may promote self- or co-regulatory measures prior to imposing any obligation.
1.
Contact details of the undertaking
2.
Description of the services offered
2.1.
Scope of the services offered and the main characteristics of each service provided, including any minimum levels of quality of service where offered and any restrictions imposed by the provider on the use of terminal equipment supplied.
2.2.
Tariffs of the services offered, including information on communications volumes (such as restrictions of data usage, numbers of voice minutes, numbers of messages) of specific tariff plans and the applicable tariffs for additional communication units, numbers or services subject to particular pricing conditions, charges for access and maintenance, all types of usage charges, special and targeted tariff schemes and any additional charges, as well as costs with respect to terminal equipment.
2.3.
After-sales, maintenance and customer assistance services offered and their contact details.
2.4.
Standard contract conditions, including contract duration, charges due on early termination of the contract, rights related to the termination of bundled offers or of elements thereof, and procedures and direct charges related to the portability of numbers and other identifiers, if relevant.
2.5.
If the undertaking is a provider of number-based interpersonal communications services, information on access to emergency services and caller location, or any limitation on the latter. If the undertaking is a provider of number-independent interpersonal communications services, information on the degree to which access to emergency services may be supported or not.
2.6.
Details of products and services, including any functions, practices, policies and procedures and alterations in the operation of the service, specifically designed for end-users with disabilities, in accordance with Union law harmonising accessibility requirements for products and services.
3.
Dispute resolution mechanisms, including those developed by the undertaking.
ANNEX X
QUALITY OF SERVICE PARAMETERS
Quality-of-Service Parameters, Definitions and Measurement Methods referred to in Article 104
For providers of access to a public electronic communications network
PARAMETER
(Note 1)
DEFINITION
MEASUREMENT METHOD
Supply time for initial connection
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Fault rate per access line
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Fault repair time
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
For providers of interpersonal communications services who exert control over at least some elements of the network or have a service level agreement to that effect with undertakings providing access to the network
PARAMETER
(Note 2)
DEFINITION
MEASUREMENT METHOD
Call set up time
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Bill correctness complaints
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Voice connection quality
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Dropped call ratio
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Unsuccessful call ratio
(Note 2)
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Failure probability
Call signalling delays
Version number of ETSI EG 202 057-1 is 1.3.1 (July 2008)
For providers of internet access services
PARAMETER
DEFINITION
MEASUREMENT METHOD
Latency (delay)
ITU-T Y.2617
ITU-T Y.2617
Jitter
ITU-T Y.2617
ITU-T Y.2617
Packet loss
ITU-T Y.2617
ITU-T Y.2617
Note 1
Parameters shall allow for performance to be analysed at a regional level (namely, no less than level 2 in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) established by Eurostat).
Note 2
Member States may decide not to require up-to-date information concerning the performance for those two parameters to be kept if evidence is available to show that performance in those two areas is satisfactory.
ANNEX XI
INTEROPERABILITY OF CAR RADIO RECEIVERS AND CONSUMER DIGITAL TELEVISION EQUIPMENT REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 113
1.
Common scrambling algorithm and free-to-air reception
All consumer equipment intended for the reception of digital television signals (namely, broadcasting via terrestrial, cable or satellite transmission), for sale or rent or otherwise made available in the Union, capable of descrambling digital television signals, is to possess the capability to:
(a)
allow the descrambling of such signals in accordance with a common European scrambling algorithm as administered by a recognised European standardisation organisation (currently ETSI);
(b)
display signals that have been transmitted in the clear, provided that, in the event that such equipment is rented, the renter complies with the relevant rental agreement.
2.
Interoperability for digital television sets
Any digital television set with an integral screen of visible diagonal larger than 30 cm which is put on the market for sale or rent in the Union is to be fitted with at least one open interface socket (either standardised by, or conforming to a standard adopted by, a recognised European standardisation organisation, or conforming to an industry-wide specification) permitting simple connection of peripherals, and able to pass all relevant elements of a digital television signal, including information relating to interactive and conditionally accessed services.
3.
Interoperability for car radio receivers
Any car radio receiver integrated in a new vehicle of category M which is made available on the market for sale or rent in the Union from 21 December 2020 shall comprise a receiver capable of receiving and reproducing at least radio services provided via digital terrestrial radio broadcasting. Receivers which are in accordance with harmonised standards the references of which have been published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union
 or with parts thereof shall be considered to comply with that requirement covered by those standards or parts thereof.
ANNEX XII
Part A
Repealed Directives with list of the successive amendments thereto
(referred to in Article 125)
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33
)
Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37
)
Article 1
Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 167, 29.6.2009, p. 12
)
Article 2
Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 171, 29.6.2007, p. 32
)
Article 10
Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21
)
Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37
)
Article 3 and Annex
Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7
)
Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 37
)
Article 2
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51
)
Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 11
)
Article 1 and Annex I
Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(
OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, p. 1
)
Article 8
Part B
Time-limits for transposition into national law and dates of application
(referred to in Article 125)
Directive
Time-limit for transposition
Date of application
2002/19/EC
24 July 2003
25 July 2003
2002/20/EC
24 July 2003
25 July 2003
2002/21/EC
24 July 2003
25 July 2003
2002/22/EC
24 July 2003
25 July 2003
ANNEX XIII
CORRELATION TABLE
Directive 2002/21/EC
Directive 2002/20/EC
Directive 2002/19/EC
Directive 2002/22/EC
This Directive
Article 1(1), (2) and (3)
Article 1(1), (2) and (3)
Article 1(3a)
Article 1(4)
Article 1(4) and (5)
Article 1(5) and (6)
Point (a) of Article 2
Point (1) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (2) of Article 2
Point (b) of Article 2
Point (3) of Article 2
Point (c) of Article 2
Point (4) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (5) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (6) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (7) of Article 2
Point (d) of Article 2
Point (8) of Article 2
Point (da) of Article 2
Point (9) of Article 2
Point (e) of Article 2
Point (10) of Article 2
Point (ea) of Article 2
Point (11) of Article 2
Point (f) of Article 2
Point (12) of Article 2
Point (g) of Article 2
—
Point (h) of Article 2
Point (13) of Article 2
Point (i) of Article 2
Point (14) of Article 2
Point (j) of Article 2
—
Point (k) of Article 2
—
Point (l) of Article 2
—
Point (m) of Article 2
Point (15) of Article 2
Point (n) of Article 2
Point (16) of Article 2
Point (o) of Article 2
Point (17) of Article 2
Point (p) of Article 2
Point (18) of Article 2
Point (q) Article 2
Point (19) of Article 2
Point (r) Article 2
Point (20) of Article 2
Point (s) Article 2
Point (31) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (22) of Article 2
Article 3(1)
Article 5(1)
—
—
—
—
Article 5(2)
Article 3(2)
Article 6(1)
Article 3(3)
Article 6(2)
Article 3(3a) first subparagraph
Article 8(1)
—
—
—
—
Article 8(2)
—
—
—
—
Article 7(1)
Article 3(3a) second subparagraph
Article 7(2) and (3)
Article 3(3a) third subparagraph
Article 9(1) and (3)
—
—
—
—
Article 9(2)
Article 3(3b)
Article 10(1)
Article 3(3c)
Article 10(2)
Article 3(4)
Article 5(3)
Article 3(5)
Article 11
Article 3(6)
Article 5(4)
Article 4
Article 31
Article 5
Article 20
—
—
—
—
Article 22
Article 6
Article 23
Article 7
Article 32
Article 7a
Article 33
—
—
—
—
Point (c) of Article 33(5)
Article 8(1) and (2)
Article 3(1) and (2)
Article 8(5)
Article 3(3)
Article 8a(1) and (2)
Article 4(1) and (2)
—
—
—
—
Article 4(3)
Article 8a(3)
Article 4(4)
—
—
—
—
Article 29
Article 9(1) and (2)
Article 45(1) and (2)
—
—
—
—
Article 45(3)
Article 9(3)
Article 45(4)
Article 9(4) and (5)
Article 45(5) and (6)
Article 9(6) and (7)
—
Article 9a
—
Article 9b(1) and (2)
Article 51(1) and (2)
Article 9b(3)
Article 51(4)
—
—
—
—
Article 51(3)
Article 10(1)
Article 95(1)
Article 10(2)
Article 95(3)
—
—
—
—
Article 95(2)
—
—
—
—
Article 95(4)
—
—
—
—
Article 95(5)
—
—
—
—
Article 95(6)
Article 10(3)
Article 95(7)
Article 10(4)
Article 95(8)
Article 10(5)
—
Article 11
Article 43
Article 12(1)
Article 44(1)
Article 12(2)
—
Article 12(3)
Article 61(2)
Article 12(4)
—
Article 12(5)
Article 44(2)
Article 13
Article 17
Article 13a(1), (2) and (3)
Article 40(1), (2) and (3)
Article 13a(4)
—
—
Article 40(5)
—
—
—
—
Article 40(4)
Article 13b(1), (2) and (3)
Article 41(1), (2) and (3)
—
—
—
—
Article 41(4)
Article 13b(4)
Article 41(7)
—
—
—
—
Article 41(5)
—
—
—
—
Article 41(6)
Article 14
Article 63
Article 15(1),(2),(3)
Article 64(1), (2), (3)
Article 15 (4)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Article 66
Article 16
Article 67
Article 17
Article 39
Article 18
—
Article 19
Article 38
Article 20
Article 26
Article 21(1)
Article 27(1)
Article 21(2) first and second subparagraphs
Article 27(2)
Article 21(2) third subparagraph
Article 27(3)
Article 21(2) fourth and fifth subparagraphs
Article 27(4)
—
Article 27(5)
Article 21(3)
—
Article 21(4)
Article 27(6)
Article 21a
Article 29
Article 22(1)
Article 118(1)
Article 22(2)
Article 118(3)
Article 22(3)
Article 118(4)
—
—
—
—
Article 11(2)
—
—
—
—
Article 118(5)
—
—
—
—
Article 117
Article 23
Article 119
Article 24
Article 120(1) and (2)
Article 25
Article 122(1)
Article 26
Article 125
Article 28
Article 124
Article 29
Article 127
Article 30
Article 128
Annex II
—
Article 1
Article 1(1)
Article 2(1)
—
Article 2(2)
Point (22) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (23) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (24) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (25) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (26) of Article 2
Article 3(1)
Article 12(1)
Article 3(2) first sentence
Article 12(2)
Article 3(2) 2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences
Article 12(3)
Article 3(3)
Article 12(4)
—
—
—
—
Article 4
Article 15
Article 5(1)
Article 46(1)
—
—
—
—
Article 46(2) and (3)
Article 5(2) first subparagraph
Article 48(1)
Article 5(2) second subparagraph first sentence
Article 48(2)
Article 5(2) third subparagraph
Article 48(5)
Article 5(2) second subparagraph second sentence
Article 48(3)
—
—
—
—
Article 48(4)
Article 5(3)
Article 48(6)
Article 5(4) and (5)
Article 93(4) and (5)
Article 5(6)
Article 52
—
—
—
—
Article 93
Article 6(1),(2),(3) and (4)
Article 13
—
—
—
—
Article 47
Article 7
—
—
Article 55
Article 8
Article 36
Article 9
Article 14
Article 10
Article 30
—
—
—
—
Article 11
Article 21
Article 12
Article 16
Article 13
Article 42
—
—
—
—
Article 94
Article 14(1)
Article 18
Article 14(2)
Article 19
Article 15
Article 120(3) and (4)
Article 16
—
Article 17
—
Article 18
—
Article 19
—
Article 20
—
Annex
Annex I
Article 1 (1 and 2)
Article 1(2) and (3)
Point (a) of Article 2
Point (27) of Article 2
Point (b) of Article 2
Point (28) of Article 2
Point (c) of Article 2
Point (29) of Article 2
Point (d) of Article 2
—
Point (e) of Article 2
Point (30) of Article 2
Article 3
Article 59
Article 4
Article 60
Article 5
Article 61
Article 6
Article 62
—
Article 8
Article 68
Article 9
Article 69
Article 10
Article 70
Article 11
Article 71
—
—
—
—
Article 72
Article 12
Article 73
Article 13
Article 74
—
—
—
—
Article 75
—
—
—
—
Article 76
Article 13a
Article 77
Article 13b
Article 78
—
—
—
—
Article 80
—
—
—
—
Article 81
Article 14
—
Article 15
Article 120(5)
Article 16(1)
—
Article 16(2)
Article 121(4)
Article 17
—
Article 18
—
Article 19
—
Article 20
—
Annex I
Annex II
Annex II
—
—
—
—
—
Annex III
Article 1
Article 1(4) and (5)
Point (a) of Article 2
—
Point (c) of Article 2
Point (32) of Article 2
Point (d) of Article 2
Point (33) of Article 2
Point (f) of Article 2
Point (34) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (35) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (37) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (38) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Point (39) of Article 2
—
—
—
—
Article 84
—
—
—
—
Article 85
Article 3
Article 86(1) and (2)
Article 4
—
Article 5
—
Article 6
—
Article 7
—
Article 8(1)
Article 86(3)
Article 8(2)
Article 86(4)
Article 8(3)
Article 86(5)
Article 9
—
—
—
—
—
Article 87
Article 10
Article 88
Article 11
—
Article 12
Article 89
Article 13
Article 90
Article 14
Article 91
Article 15
Article 122(2) and (3)
Article 17
—
—
—
—
—
Article 99
—
—
—
—
Article 101
Article 20(1)
Article 102
Article 20(2)
Article 105(3)
Article 21
Article 103
Article 22
Article 104
Article 23
Article 108
Article 23a
Article 111
Article 24
Article 113
Article 25
Article 112
Article 26
Article 109
Article 27
—
Article 27a
Article 96
Article 28
Article 97
Article 29
Article 115
Article 30(1)
Article 106(2)
Article 30(2)
Article 106(4)
Article 30(3)
Article 106(4)
Article 30(4)
Article 106(5)
Article 30(5)
Article 105(1)
Article 31
Article 114
Article 32
Article 92
Article 33
Article 24
Article 34
Article 25
Article 35
Article 116
Article 36
Article 121
Article 37
—
Article 38
—
Article 39
—
Article 40
—
Annex I
Annex V
Annex II
Annex VII
Annex III
Annex IX
Annex IV
Annex VI
Annex V
—
Annex VI
Annex X
Annex IV

Summary:
European Electronic Communications Code
SUMMARY OF:
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code
WHAT IS THE AIM OF THE DIRECTIVE?
The 
directive
:
establishes a set of updated rules to regulate electronic communications (telecoms) networks, telecoms services, and associated facilities and services;
sets out tasks for national regulatory authorities and other relevant authorities, and establishes a set of procedures to ensure that the regulatory framework is harmonised throughout the 
European Union
 (EU);
aims to stimulate competition and increased investment in 
5G
1
 and very high capacity networks, so that every citizen and business in the EU can enjoy high-quality connectivity, a high level of consumer protection and an increased choice of innovative digital services.
KEY POINTS
The directive establishes a 
European Electronic Communications Code
, a comprehensive set of new or revised rules for the telecoms sector as part of a package of telecom laws, including Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 establishing the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications
 (BEREC) and the Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office).
It replaces and repeals Directives 
2002/19/EC
, 
2002/20/EC
 and 
2002/21/EC
, and Article 5 of Decision 
No 
243/2012/EU
. An 
evaluation and review
 of Directive 
2002/58/EC
 (
directive on privacy and electronic communications
) has been carried out separately.
The general objectives are to:
promote connectivity
 and take-up of very high capacity networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks, for all EU citizens and businesses;
promote the interests of EU citizens by: 
enabling maximum benefits in terms of choice, price and quality through 
effective competition
,
maintaining 
network and services security
,
ensuring 
protection for consumers
 through specific rules, and
addressing the 
needs of specific social groups
, in particular people with disabilities, older people and people with special social needs;
facilitate market entry and 
promote competition
 in the delivery of telecoms networks and associated facilities;
contribute to the development of 
the 
internal market
 in telecoms networks and services in the EU, by 
developing common rules and predictable regulation
 featuring: 
the effective, efficient and coordinated use of 
radio spectrum
,
open innovation
,
the development of 
trans-European networks
,
the availability and interoperability of 
Europe-wide services
, and
end-to-end connectivity
.
The responsibility of EU Member States is to:
cooperate with each other and with the 
European Commission
 in the 
strategic planning and coordination
 of radio spectrum policy, avoiding harmful interference, through the 
Radio Spectrum Policy Group
;
ensure that tasks set out in the directive are undertaken by a 
relevant authority
;
guarantee that national regulatory authorities and other relevant authorities are 
independent
 of telecoms equipment manufacturers and service providers;
ensure that the national regulatory authorities: 
are protected against external intervention or political pressure which might jeopardise their independent assessment, and
have budget autonomy and adequate financial and human resources to carry out the tasks assigned to them.
New objectives and tasks
In addition to replacing and repealing existing legislation, the directive introduces a series of new objectives and tasks.
Strengthened consumer rules
 aim to make it easier to switch between service providers and offer better protection, for example, for people who subscribe to bundled services. Consumers will benefit from a similar, higher level of protection across the EU.
Telecoms services now include 
services provided over the internet
 that do not use calling numbers, such as messaging apps and email. A review mechanism aims to ensure that consumer rights remain robust and up to date as business models and consumer behaviour change.
Affordable and adequate broadband internet access
 must be available to all consumers, irrespective of their location or income.
People with disabilities
 should have equivalent access to telecoms services.
Member States will set up a 
public warning system
 to send alerts to citizens on their mobile phones in the event of a natural disaster or other major emergency in their area.
Member States must provide operators with 
predictable regulation for radio spectrum licensing
 for wireless broadband for at least 20 years to promote investment, in particular in 5G connectivity, and increased convergence of national selection procedures through a peer review forum.
New frequency bands for 5G connectivity
 for faster internet connections and better connectivity, together with coordinated timing of spectrum licensing and a lighter regulatory regime for small mobile network equipment deployment.
Rules on 
operator access to networks
 to encourage competition and make it easier for companies to invest in new, very high capacity infrastructure (download speeds of 100 Mbps or more), including in remote areas, while ensuring effective market regulation.
New tools will address issues that may arise in certain market circumstances. 
Symmetric regulation
2
 will apply to electronic communications network providers 
in some very specific situations
 to ensure competition.
Implementing and delegated acts
The Commission has adopted the following 
implementing
 acts:
Regulation (EU) 
2019/2243
 setting out a template for the contract summary to be used by providers of publicly available electronic communications services; and
Regulation (EU) 
2020/1070
 specifying the characteristics of small-area wireless access points.
The Commission has adopted the following 
delegated acts
 which supplement Directive (EU) 2018/1972:
Regulation (EU) 
2021/654
 setting a single maximum EU-wide mobile 
voice termination rate
 (charge for calls) and a single maximum EU-wide fixed voice termination rate;
Regulation (EU) 
2023/444
 on measures to ensure effective access to emergency services through emergency communications to the single European emergency number ‘112’.
FROM WHEN DO THE RULES APPLY?
The directive had to be 
transposed
 into national law by 
21 December 2020
. These rules have applied since the same date.
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 
recasts
 and replaces Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC and 2002/21/EC (and their subsequent amendments), which had to be transposed into national law by 2003.
BACKGROUND
For further information, see:
Digital single market: EU negotiators reach a political agreement to update the EU’s telecoms rules
 – press release (European Commission)
Digital single market: Political agreement on the rules shaping the telecommunication markets in the 5G era
 – memo (European Commission)
Spectrum in the European Union
 – factsheet (European Commission)
More and better internet connectivity requires investments in high speed and quality networks
 – factsheet (European Commission)
Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI)
 (European Commission)
Connectivity for a European gigabit society
 (European Commission)
Electronic communications
 (European Commission).
KEY TERMS
5G.
 The latest generation of cellular mobile communication, characterised by a high data rate, reduced latency, energy saving, cost reduction, higher system capacity and greater device connectivity.
Symmetric regulation.
 The same regulation of all network providers (as opposed to asymmetric regulation, which differentiates between providers, generally to provide a level playing field between providers of lesser and greater importance).
MAIN DOCUMENT
Directive (EU) 
2018/1972
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2018
 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) (OJ L 321, 
17.12.2018
, 
pp. 36–214
).
Successive corrections to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 have been incorporated into the original text. This 
consolidated version
 is of documentary value only.
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2023/444
 of 
16 December 2022
 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council with measures to ensure effective access to emergency services through emergency communications to the single European emergency number ‘112’ (OJ L 65, 
2.3.2023
, 
pp. 1–8
).
See 
consolidated version
.
Regulation (EU) 
2022/612
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 April 2022
 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (recast) (OJ L 115, 
13.4.2022
, 
pp. 1–37
).
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 
2022/173
 of 
7 February 2022
 on the harmonisation of the 900 MHz and 1 800 MHz frequency bands for terrestrial systems capable of providing electronic communications services in the Union and repealing Decision 2009/766/EC (OJ L 28, 
9.2.2022
, 
pp. 29–39
).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2021/654
 of 
18 December 2020
 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council by setting a single maximum Union-wide mobile voice termination rate and a single maximum Union-wide fixed voice termination rate (OJ L 137, 
22.4.2021
, 
pp. 1–9
).
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2020/1070
 of 
20 July 2020
 on specifying the characteristics of small-area wireless access points pursuant to Article 57 paragraph 2 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (OJ L 234, 
21.7.2020
, 
pp. 11–15
).
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2019/2243
 of 
17 December 2019
 establishing a template for the contract summary to be used by providers of publicly available electronic communications services pursuant to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 336, 
30.12.2019
, 
pp. 274–280
).
See 
consolidated version
.
Regulation (EU) 
2018/1971
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 December 2018
 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office), amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1211/2009
 (OJ L 321, 
17.12.2018
, 
pp. 1–35
).
Directive (EU) 
2016/1148
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
6 July 2016
 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 
19.7.2016
, 
pp. 1–30
).
Regulation (EU) 
2015/2120
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 2015
 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) 
No 531/2012
 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (OJ L 310, 
26.11.2015
, 
pp. 1–18
).
See 
consolidated version
.
Regulation (EU) 
2015/758
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2015
 concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system based on the 112 service and amending Directive 2007/46/EC (OJ L 123, 
19.5.2015
, 
pp. 77–89
).
See 
consolidated version
.
Directive 
2014/61/EU
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 May 2014
 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks (OJ L 155, 
23.5.2014
, 
pp. 1–14
).
Decision 
No 
243/2012/EU
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 March 2012
 establishing a multiannual radio spectrum policy programme (OJ L 81, 
21.3.2012
, 
pp. 7–17
).
See 
consolidated version
.
Commission Decision 
2008/411/EC
 of 
21 May 2008
 on the harmonisation of the 3 400-3 800 MHz frequency band for terrestrial systems capable of providing electronic communications services in the Community (notified under document number C(2008) 1873) (OJ L 144, 
4.6.2008
, 
pp. 77–81
).
See 
consolidated version
.
Decision 
No 
676/2002/EC
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
7 March 2002
 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) (OJ L 108, 
24.4.2002
, 
pp. 1–6
).
Directive 
2002/58/EC
 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 July 2002
 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 
31.7.2002
, 
pp. 37–47
).
See 
consolidated version
.
last update 
11.4.2023

--- DANISH ---

Document:
17.12.2018
DA
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
L 321/36
EUROPA-PARLAMENTETS OG RÅDETS DIREKTIV (EU) 2018/1972
af 11. december 2018
om oprettelse af en europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation
(omarbejdning)
(EØS-relevant tekst)
EUROPA-PARLAMENTET OG RÅDET FOR DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION HAR —
under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde, særlig artikel 114,
under henvisning til forslag fra Europa-Kommissionen,
efter fremsendelse af udkast til lovgivningsmæssig retsakt til de nationale parlamenter,
under henvisning til udtalelse fra Det Europæiske Økonomiske og Sociale Udvalg 
(
1
)
,
under henvisning til udtalelse fra Regionsudvalget 
(
2
)
,
efter den almindelige lovgivningsprocedure 
(
3
)
, og
ud fra følgende betragtninger:
(1)
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/19/EF 
(
4
)
, 2002/20/EF 
(
5
)
, 2002/21/EF 
(
6
)
 og 2002/22/EF 
(
7
)
 er blevet væsentligt ændret. Da der skal foretages yderligere ændringer i disse direktiver, bør de af klarhedshensyn omarbejdes.
(2)
Kommissionen skal jævnligt tage de fem direktiver, der indgår i det nuværende regelsæt for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, nemlig direktiv 2002/19/EF, 2002/20/EF, 2002/21/EF, 2002/22/EF og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/58/EF 
(
8
)
, op til fornyet vurdering, navnlig for at afgøre, om den teknologiske og markedsmæssige udvikling giver grund til ændringer.
(3)
I dens meddelelse af 6. maj 2015, der fastsætter strategien for det digitale indre marked, angav Kommissionen, at dens revision af regelsættet for telekommunikation ville lægge vægt på foranstaltninger, der tager sigte på at skabe incitamenter til investering i højhastighedsbredbåndsnet, opnå en mere sammenhængende tilgang til radiofrekvenspolitik og -forvaltning på det indre marked, skabe de rette betingelser for et reelt indre marked ved at håndtere opsplitningen i reguleringen, sikre effektiv forbrugerbeskyttelse, lige vilkår for alle markedsdeltagere og ensartet anvendelse af reglerne samt etablere mere effektive institutionelle rammer for reguleringen.
(4)
Dette direktiv er et led i en »målrettet regulering« (REFIT), hvis anvendelsesområde omfatter fire direktiver, nemlig direktiv 2002/19/EF, 2002/20/EF, 2002/21/EF og 2002/22/EF og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1211/2009 
(
9
)
. Hvert af disse direktiver indeholder foranstaltninger, der gælder for udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, i overensstemmelse med baggrunden for lovgivningen i en sektor, hvor virksomhederne har været vertikalt integrerede, dvs. aktive inden for udbud af både net og tjenester. Revisionen er en anledning til at omarbejde de fire direktiver for at forenkle den nuværende struktur med henblik på at gøre den mere sammenhængende og lettilgængelig i forhold til Refitmålet. Den giver også mulighed for at tilpasse strukturen til den nye markedssituation, hvor udbud af kommunikationstjenester ikke længere nødvendigvis er knyttet sammen med udbud af et net. Som fastsat i den interinstitutionelle aftale af 28. november 2001 om en mere systematisk omarbejdning af retsakter 
(
10
)
 består omarbejdning i, at der vedtages en ny retsakt, der i én og samme tekst samler både de indholdsmæssige ændringer, der foretages i en tidligere retsakt, og de uændrede bestemmelser i denne retsakt. Forslaget til omarbejdning vedrører de indholdsmæssige ændringer, der foretages i en tidligere retsakt, og omfatter accessorisk kodificering af de uændrede bestemmelser i den tidligere retsakt sammen med nævnte indholdsmæssige ændringer.
(5)
Dette direktiv skaber en retlig ramme for at sikre frit udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, således at disse kun er underlagt de vilkår, der er fastsat i dette direktiv, og begrænsningerne i overensstemmelse med artikel 52, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (TEUF), navnlig foranstaltninger vedrørende den offentlige orden, den offentlige sikkerhed eller den offentlige sundhed, og i overensstemmelse med artikel 52, stk. 1, i Den Europæiske Unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder (»chartret«).
(6)
Dette direktiv indskrænker ikke de enkelte medlemsstaters mulighed for at træffe nødvendige foranstaltninger til sikring af deres væsentlige sikkerhedsinteresser, beskyttelse af den offentlige orden og den offentlige sikkerhed samt til skabelse af de rette betingelser for efterforskning, afsløring og retsforfølgning af strafbare handlinger, under hensyntagen til at enhver begrænsning i udøvelsen af de rettigheder og friheder, der anerkendes ved chartret, navnlig artikel 7, 8 og 11, såsom begrænsninger vedrørende behandling af oplysninger, skal være fastlagt i lovgivningen, respektere disse rettigheders og friheders væsentligste indhold og være underlagt proportionalitetsprincippet, jf. chartrets artikel 52, stk. 1.
(7)
Konvergensen mellem tele-, medie- og IT-sektoren betyder, at alle elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester så vidt muligt bør være omfattet af en samlet europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation, der indføres ved et enkelt direktiv, idet der dog kan være områder, for hvilke det er bedre at fastsætte umiddelbart gældende regler ved forordning. Det er nødvendigt at adskille regulering af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester fra regulering af indhold. Derfor omfatter dette direktiv ikke indholdet i de tjenester, der leveres via elektroniske kommunikationsnet ved hjælp af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, f.eks. radio- og tv-udsendelsers indhold, finansielle ydelser og visse informationssamfundsydelser, og berører ikke foranstaltninger, der i henhold til EU-retten træffes på EU-plan eller på nationalt plan for så vidt angår sådanne tjenester med henblik på at fremme kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed og varetage forsvaret af mediepluralisme. Indholdet af tv-programmer er omfattet af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2010/13/EU 
(
11
)
. Reguleringen af audiovisuel politik og audiovisuelt indhold sigter mod at opfylde mål af almen interesse, som f.eks. ytringsfrihed, mediepluralisme, upartiskhed, kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed, social inklusion, forbrugerbeskyttelse og beskyttelse af mindreårige. Adskillelsen mellem regulering af elektronisk kommunikation og regulering af indhold hindrer ikke, at der tages hensyn til den forbindelse, der er mellem de to områder, navnlig med henblik på at garantere mediepluralisme, kulturel mangfoldighed og forbrugerbeskyttelse. De kompetente myndigheder bør inden for rammerne af deres beføjelser bidrage til at sikre gennemførelsen af politikker med sigte på at fremme disse mål.
(8)
Dette direktiv omfatter udstyr til bilradio og forbrugerudstyr til radiomodtagere og forbrugerudstyr til digitalt tv, men berører ikke anvendelsen af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/53/EU 
(
12
)
 på radioudstyr.
(9)
For at gøre det muligt for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder at opfylde de mål, der er opstillet i dette direktiv, navnlig om gennemgående interoperabilitet, bør direktivets anvendelsesområde omfatte visse aspekter af radioudstyr som defineret i direktiv 2014/53/EU og forbrugerudstyr til digitalt tv for at lette adgangen for slutbrugere med handicap. Det er vigtigt, at nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder tilskynder netoperatører og udstyrsfabrikanter til at samarbejde om at lette adgangen til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester for slutbrugere med handicap. Ikkeeksklusiv anvendelse af radiofrekvenser med henblik på egenanvendelse af radioterminaludstyr bør, skønt anvendelsen ikke har forbindelse med en økonomisk aktivitet, også være omfattet af dette direktiv, så der sikres en koordineret fremgangsmåde for så vidt angår tilladelsesordninger.
(10)
Visse elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i henhold til dette direktiv kunne også falde inden for definitionen af »tjeneste i informationssamfundet« i artikel 1 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/1535 
(
13
)
. Disse elektroniske kommunikationstjenester er også omfattet af det nævnte direktivs bestemmelser, der gælder for tjenester i informationssamfundet, for så vidt som dette direktiv eller andre EU-retsakter ikke indeholder mere specifikke bestemmelser for de elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Elektroniske kommunikationstjenester som f.eks. taletelefonitjenester, beskedtjenester og elektroniske posttjenester er dog omfattet af nærværende direktiv. En og samme virksomhed, f.eks. en internetudbyder, kan tilbyde både elektronisk kommunikation, som f.eks. adgang til internettet, og tjenester, som ikke er omfattet af nærværende direktiv, f.eks. levering af webbaseret, ikkekommunikationsrelateret indhold.
(11)
Samme virksomhed, f.eks. en kabeloperatør, kan både tilbyde en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, såsom overføring af tv-signaler, og tjenester, der ikke omhandles i dette direktiv, såsom kommercialisering af et tilbud om indholdsbaseret radio- eller tv-spredningsvirksomhed, og derfor kan en sådan virksomhed pålægges yderligere forpligtelser i forbindelse med dens aktivitet som udbyder eller distributør af radio- eller tv-spredningsvirksomhed i medfør af bestemmelser, der ikke indeholdes i dette direktiv, med forbehold af de i bilaget til dette direktiv indeholdte vilkår.
(12)
Regelsættet bør omfatte brugen af radiofrekvenser til alle elektroniske kommunikationsnet, herunder den voksende egenanvendelse af radiofrekvenser, som ikke nødvendigvis er et led i en bestemt økonomisk aktivitet, til nye typer net, der udelukkende består af autonome systemer af mobilt radioudstyr, der er trådløst forbundet uden nogen central styring eller centraliseret netoperatør. I den trådløse 5G-kommunikation, der er undervejs, vil der sandsynligvis navnlig udvikle sig sådanne net uden for bygninger og på vejene, til brug i forbindelse med transport, energi, forskning og udvikling, e-sundhed, civilbeskyttelse og katastrofehjælp, tingenes internet, kommunikation mellem maskiner og netforbundne biler. Derfor bør medlemsstaterne, hvis de på grundlag af artikel 7 i direktiv 2014/53/EU anvender yderligere nationale krav til ibrugtagning eller anvendelse af sådant radioudstyr eller begge for at sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenserne og undgå skadelig interferens, tage hensyn til principperne for det indre marked.
(13)
Kravene til de elektroniske kommunikationsnets ydeevne er konstant stigende. Mens der tidligere især blev lagt vægt på at stille større båndbredde til rådighed, både i almindelighed og for den enkelte bruger, får andre parametre såsom latenstid, tilgængelighed og pålidelighed stadig større betydning. For i dag at imødekomme denne efterspørgsel anlægges der optiske fibernet længere og længere ud til brugerne, og fremtidige »net med meget høj kapacitet« skal have præstationsparametre svarende til dem, som et net baseret på optiske fiberelementer, der som minimum dækker strækningen frem til fordelingspunktet på leveringsstedet, kan levere. For en fast forbindelse betyder dette en netpræstation svarende til, den, der kan opnås med en optisk fiberforbindelse frem til et flerfamiliehus, betragtet som leveringsstedet, og for en trådløs forbindelse betyder det en netpræstation svarende til, hvad der kan opnås med en optisk fiberforbindelse frem til basisstationen, betragtet som leveringsstedet. Variationer i slutbrugernes oplevelse, som skyldes de forskellige egenskaber ved det medium, hvormed nettet i sidste ende etablerer forbindelse med nettermineringspunktet, bør ikke tages i betragtning med henblik på at fastslå, hvorvidt et trådløst net kan anses for at levere en tilsvarende netpræstation. I overensstemmelse med princippet om teknologineutralitet bør andre teknologier og transmissionsmedier ikke udelukkes, hvis de er sammenlignelige med dette referencescenarie for så vidt angår ydeevne. Etableringen af sådanne »net med meget høj kapacitet« vil sandsynligvis yderligere øge nettenes ydeevne og bane vejen for udrulning af fremtidige generationer af trådløse net baseret på forbedrede radiogrænseflader og en tættere netarkitektur.
(14)
Der er behov for at tilpasse nogle af definitionerne for at sikre, at de er i overensstemmelse med princippet om teknologineutralitet og for at holde trit med den teknologiske udvikling, herunder nye former for netforvaltning, såsom ved hjælp af softwareemulerede net eller softwaredefinerede net. Den teknologiske og markedsmæssige udvikling har medført, at nettene er gået over til IP-teknologi (»Internet Protocol«), og at slutbrugerne har fået mulighed for at vælge mellem flere konkurrerende udbydere af taletelefoni. Derfor bør udtrykket »offentligt tilgængelig telefonitjeneste«, der udelukkende er anvendt i direktiv 2002/22/EF og i vid udstrækning opfattes som en henvisning til de traditionelle analoge telefonitjenester, erstattes af det mere tidssvarende og teknologineutrale udtryk »talekommunikationstjeneste«. Betingelserne for udbuddet af en tjeneste bør adskilles fra de egentlige definitoriske elementer i en talekommunikationstjeneste, dvs. en offentlig tilgængelig elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste med henblik på at etablere og modtage indenlandske eller indenlandske og internationale opkald direkte eller indirekte ved hjælp af et eller flere numre i en national eller international nummerplan, uanset om en sådan tjeneste er baseret på kredsløbskoblet eller pakkekoblet teknologi. Det ligger i en sådan tjenestes natur, at den går begge veje og giver begge parter mulighed for at kommunikere. En tjeneste, der ikke opfylder alle disse betingelser, f.eks. en »klik-selv«-funktion på et kundeservicewebsted, er ikke en sådan tjeneste. Talekommunikationstjenester omfatter også kommunikationsmidler specifikt beregnet til slutbrugere med handicap, som gør brug af tekstrelæ eller totale konversationstjenester.
(15)
De tjenester, der anvendes til kommunikationsformål, og de tekniske midler til leveringen heraf har udviklet sig betydeligt. I stedet for traditionelle taletelefonitjenester, tekstbeskeder (SMS) og elektroniske posttjenester anvender slutbrugerne i stigende grad funktionelt tilsvarende onlinetjenester som f.eks. internettelefoni, beskedtjenester og webbaserede e-posttjenester. For at sikre, at slutbrugerne og deres rettigheder beskyttes effektivt og på samme måde, når de benytter funktionelt ækvivalente tjenester, bør en fremtidsorienteret definition af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester ikke baseres på rent tekniske parametre, men snarere bygge på en funktionel tilgang. Reguleringen bør have en passende rækkevidde for at opfylde sine almennyttige mål. Mens »overføring af signaler« fortsat er et vigtigt parameter, når det fastslås, hvilke tjenester der er omfattet af dette direktiv, bør definitionen også omfatte andre tjenester, som muliggør kommunikation. Fra en slutbrugers synspunkt er det ikke relevant, om en udbyder overfører signalerne selv, eller om kommunikationen leveres via en internetadgangstjeneste. Definitionen af elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste bør derfor omfatte tre typer tjenester, der delvis kan overlappe hinanden, nemlig internetadgangstjenester som defineret i artikel 2, nr. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2120 
(
14
)
, interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester som defineret i dette direktiv, og tjenester, der udelukkende eller hovedsagelig består i overføring af signaler. Definitionen af elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste bør fjerne de tvetydigheder, der er konstateret i gennemførelsen af den definitionen som forelå inden vedtagelsen af dette direktiv, og muliggøre en nøje afpasset anvendelse, bestemmelse for bestemmelse, af de specifikke rettigheder og forpligtelser i regelsættet på de forskellige typer tjenester. Behandlingen af personoplysninger i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationstjenester bør, uanset om den sker mod betaling eller ej, være i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/679 
(
15
)
.
(16)
For at falde ind under definitionen af elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste skal en tjeneste normalt ydes mod betaling. I den digitale økonomi anser markedsdeltagerne i stigende grad oplysninger om brugerne for at have monetær værdi. Elektroniske kommunikationstjenester udbydes ofte til slutbrugeren ikke kun mod penge, men i stigende grad og navnlig mod afgivelse af personoplysninger eller andre oplysninger. Begrebet betaling bør derfor omfatte situationer, hvor udbyderen af en tjeneste anmoder slutbrugeren om personoplysninger som omhandlet i forordning (EU) 2016/679 eller andre oplysninger, og slutbrugeren bevidst afgiver sådanne oplysninger direkte eller indirekte til udbyderen. Det bør også omfatte situationer, hvor slutbrugeren giver adgang til oplysninger uden aktivt at afgive disse, f.eks. personoplysninger, herunder IP-adresse, eller andre automatisk genererede oplysninger som f.eks. oplysninger, der indsamles og overføres ved hjælp af en cookie. I overensstemmelse med retspraksis fra Den Europæiske Unions Domstol (EU-Domstolen) vedrørende artikel 57 i TEUF 
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 er der også tale om betaling som omhandlet i TEUF, selv om tjenesteudbyderen ikke modtager betaling af modtageren af tjenesteydelsen, men i stedet af tredjemand. Begrebet betaling bør derfor også omfatte situationer, hvor slutbrugeren udsættes for reklamer som betingelse for at få adgang til en tjeneste, og situationer, hvor tjenesteudbyderen omsætter personoplysninger, som vedkommende har indsamlet, i penge i overensstemmelse med forordning (EU) 2016/679.
(17)
Interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester er tjenester, der muliggør kommunikation mellem personer og interaktiv udveksling af oplysninger, og omfatter tjenester som traditionelle taleopkald mellem to personer, men også alle former for e-mail, beskedtjenester og gruppechat. Interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester omfatter kun kommunikation mellem et afgrænset, dvs. ikke potentielt ubegrænset, antal fysiske personer, der bestemmes af afsenderen af kommunikationen. Kommunikation, der involverer juridiske personer, bør falde inden for definitionen i de tilfælde, hvor fysiske personer handler på vegne af disse juridiske personer eller er involveret på mindst én side af kommunikationen. Interaktiv kommunikation indebærer, at tjenesten giver modtageren af oplysningerne mulighed for at svare. Tjenester, der ikke opfylder disse krav, såsom lineær spredning, video on demand, websteder, sociale netværk, blogs eller udveksling af oplysninger mellem maskiner, bør ikke betragtes som interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. En tjeneste bør under særlige omstændigheder ikke betragtes som en interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, når den interpersonelle og interaktive kommunikationsmulighed udgør en mindre og rent accessorisk funktion, der er knyttet til en anden tjeneste, og som af objektive tekniske grunde ikke kan anvendes uden den primære tjeneste, og hvis integration i den primære tjeneste ikke er et middel til at omgå anvendelsen af reglerne for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Da begreberne »mindre« og »rent accessorisk« udgør en undtagelse fra definitionen, bør de fortolkes snævert og fra et objektivt slutbrugerperspektiv. En interpersonel kommunikationsfunktion kan betragtes som mindre, hvis dens objektive nytte for en slutbruger er meget begrænset, og hvis den i virkeligheden knap nok anvendes af slutbrugerne. Et eksempel på en funktion, der kunne anses for at falde uden for anvendelsesområdet for definitionen på interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, kunne i princippet være en kommunikationskanal i forbindelse med onlinespil, alt afhængigt af egenskaberne ved tjenestens kommunikationsmulighed.
(18)
Interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der anvender numre i en national eller international nummerplan, etablerer forbindelse til offentligt tildelte nummerressourcer. Disse nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester omfatter både tjenester, der er tildelt slutbrugernumre med henblik på at sikre end-to-end-konnektivitet, og tjenester, der giver slutbrugere mulighed for at få forbindelse til personer, der har fået tildelt sådanne numre. Den blotte anvendelse af et nummer som et identifikationsmiddel bør ikke sidestilles med anvendelse af et nummer til tilslutning til offentligt tildelte numre og bør derfor ikke i sig selv betragtes som tilstrækkelig til, at en tjeneste betragtes som en nummerbaseret interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste. Nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester bør kun være underlagt forpligtelser, hvis almenvellet kræver, at der anvendes bestemte reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser for alle typer interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, uanset om de anvender numre til at udbyde deres tjeneste eller ej. Det er rimeligt at behandle nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester anderledes, da de deltager i, og dermed også nyder godt af, et offentligt garanteret interoperabelt økosystem.
(19)
Et nettermineringspunkt (NTP) udgør i reguleringsøjemed en grænse mellem regelsættet for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og tjenester på den ene side og reguleringen af teleterminaludstyr på den anden. Det er de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders ansvar at fastlægge nettermineringspunkternes placering. På baggrund af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders praksis og i betragtning af de mange forskellige fastnettopologier og trådløse topologier bør Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Tilsynsmyndigheder inden for Elektronisk Kommunikation (»BEREC«) i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen vedtage retningslinjer for fælles tilgang til identifikation af nettermineringspunktet i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv fastlægges i de forskellige konkrete tilfælde.
(20)
Den tekniske udvikling gør det muligt for slutbrugerne at få adgang til beredskabstjenester, ikke kun ved taleopkald, men også ved hjælp af andre interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. Begrebet alarmkommunikation bør derfor omfatte alle de interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der gør det muligt at få adgang til sådanne beredskabstjenester. Det bygger på begreber, der allerede er fastlagt i EU-retten, nemlig en alarmcentral og den mest passende alarmcentral som defineret i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/758 
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 og »beredskabstjeneste« som defineret i Kommissionens delegerede forordning (EU) nr. 305/2013 
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.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders tiltag bør være baseret på et harmoniseret sæt af målsætninger og principper, og de bør, når det er nødvendigt, koordinere deres tiltag med myndighederne i andre medlemsstater og med BEREC, når de udfører deres opgaver i henhold til nærværende regelsæt.
(22)
De opgaver, som er tildelt de kompetente myndigheder i henhold til dette direktiv, bidrager til gennemførelsen af mere generelle politikker inden for områderne kultur, beskæftigelse, miljø, social samhørighed samt by- og landsplanlægning.
(23)
Regelsættet bør ud over de eksisterende tre hovedmålsætninger om at fremme konkurrence, det indre marked og slutbrugernes interesser forfølge endnu et mål, der vedrører konnektivitet og udtrykkes i resultater: udbredt adgang til og ibrugtagning af net med meget høj kapacitet for alle unionsborgere og Unionens virksomheder på grundlag af rimelige priser og valgmuligheder, effektiv og fair konkurrence, åben innovation, effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, fælles regler og forudsigelige reguleringstilgange på det indre marked samt de nødvendige sektorspecifikke regler til beskyttelse af unionsborgernes interesser. For medlemsstaterne, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder samt interessenter betyder dette konnektivitetsmål på den ene side, at de skal sigte mod net med størst mulig kapacitet og tjenester, der er økonomisk bæredygtige inden for et bestemt område, og på den anden side, at de skal tilstræbe territorial samhørighed gennem konvergens for så vidt angår den kapacitet, der er til rådighed i forskellige områder.
(24)
Fremskridt hen imod opfyldelsen af de generelle mål i dette direktiv bør understøttes af et robust system til Kommissionens løbende evaluering og benchmarking af medlemsstaterne for så vidt angår tilgængeligheden af net med meget høj kapacitet hos alle større socioøkonomiske drivkræfter som f.eks. skoler, transportknudepunkter og større udbydere af offentlige tjenester såvel som stærkt digitaliserede virksomheder, tilgængeligheden af uafbrudt 5G-dækning i byområder og langs store landtransportveje samt tilgængeligheden til alle husstande i hver medlemsstat af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, der kan yde mindst 100Mbit/s, og som hurtigt kan opgraderes til gigabithastigheder. Med henblik herpå bør Kommissionen fortsætte med at overvåge medlemsstaternes resultater, herunder indekser, der sammenfatter relevante indikatorer for Unionens digitale resultater og følger udviklingen i medlemsstaternes digitale konkurrenceevne, såsom indekset over den digitale økonomi og det digitale samfund, og om nødvendigt udarbejde nye metoder og nye objektive, konkrete og målbare kriterier for benchmarking af medlemsstaternes effektivitet.
(25)
Princippet om, at medlemsstaterne bør anvende EU-retten på en teknologineutral måde, dvs. at en national tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed hverken bør påtvinge eller diskriminere til fordel for brugen af en bestemt type teknologi, udelukker ikke, at der, når det er berettiget for at nå målene for regelsættet, tages rimelige skridt til at fremme visse specifikke tjenester, som f.eks. digitalt tv, som et middel til øget radiofrekvenseffektivitet. Endvidere udelukker dette princip ikke, at der tages hensyn til, at visse transmissionsmedier har fysiske egenskaber og arkitekturtræk, der kan være overlegne med hensyn til tjenestekvalitet, kapacitet, vedligeholdelsesomkostninger, energieffektivitet, forvaltningsmæssig fleksibilitet, pålidelighed, robusthed og skalerbarhed og i sidste ende præstationer, hvilket kan afspejles i de skridt, der tages med henblik på forfølgelsen af de forskellige reguleringsmål.
(26)
Der bør tilskyndes til både reelle investeringer og konkurrence, som går hånd i hånd, således at økonomisk vækst, innovation og forbrugernes valgmuligheder øges.
(27)
Konkurrencen fremmes bedst ved at sikre et økonomisk effektivt niveau for investering i nye og eksisterende infrastrukturer, suppleret med regulering, hvor det måtte være nødvendigt, for at opnå effektiv konkurrence i detailleddet. Et effektivt infrastrukturbaseret konkurrenceniveau findes, når infrastrukturoverlapningen er af et omfang, der betyder, at investorer kan forventes at opnå et rimeligt udbytte på baggrund af fornuftige forventninger til udviklingen i markedsandele.
(28)
Det er nødvendigt at skabe passende incitamenter for investering i nye net med meget høj kapacitet, der støtter innovationen i forbindelse med indholdsrige internettjenester og styrker Unionens internationale konkurrenceevne. Sådanne net har et enormt potentiale til at give forbrugerne og erhvervslivet i hele Unionen fordele. Det er derfor afgørende at fremme bæredygtige investeringer i udviklingen af disse nye net, idet man fastholder konkurrencen, da der fortsat er flaskehalse og adgangsbarrierer på infrastrukturniveau, og øger forbrugernes valgmuligheder gennem forudsigelighed og sammenhæng i reguleringen.
(29)
Målet er gradvis at mindske mængden af forhåndsregulerende sektorspecifikke bestemmelser, efterhånden som konkurrencen på markederne udvikler sig, og i sidste instans at sikre, at den elektroniske kommunikation reguleres udelukkende gennem konkurrenceretten. Da markederne for elektronisk kommunikation har udvist stærk konkurrencedynamik de seneste år, er det meget vigtigt, at forhåndsregulerede forpligtelser kun benyttes, hvor der ikke er effektiv og bæredygtig konkurrence på de relevante markeder. Sigtet med forhåndsregulering er at opnå fordele for slutbrugerne ved at sikre effektiv konkurrence på detailmarkederne på et varigt grundlag. Forpligtelser på engrosniveau bør indføres, hvis konkurrencen på et eller flere detailmarkeder sandsynligvis ikke vil blive effektiv uden sådanne forpligtelser. Navnlig i betragtning af de forventede fremskridt med hensyn til innovation og konkurrence er det sandsynligt, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder gennem markedsanalyseprocessen gradvist kan konstatere, at der findes konkurrencedygtige detailmarkeder, også selv om der ikke reguleres på engrosniveau. I et sådant tilfælde bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed konkludere, at det ikke længere er nødvendigt at regulere på engrosniveau, og foretage en vurdering af det tilsvarende relevante engrosmarked med henblik på at tilbagetrække forhåndsreguleringen. I den forbindelse bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed tage hensyn til eventuelle løftestangseffekter mellem engrosmarkeder og relaterede detailmarkeder, hvilket kan kræve, at adgangsbarrierer på infrastrukturniveau fjernes med henblik på at sikre langsigtet konkurrence på detailniveau.
(30)
Elektronisk kommunikation er ved at blive uundværlig for et stigende antal sektorer. Tingenes internet er et eksempel på, hvordan overføring af radiosignaler, der er grundlaget for elektronisk kommunikation, er i stadig udvikling og påvirker den samfundsmæssige og forretningsmæssige virkelighed. For at vi kan drage størst mulig fordel af denne udvikling, er det afgørende, at der indføres og tages hensyn til nye trådløse kommunikationsteknologier og -applikationer i radiofrekvensforvaltningen. Da andre teknologier og applikationer, der anvender radiofrekvenser, også er genstand for stigende efterspørgsel og kan styrkes ved integration af eller kombination med elektronisk kommunikation, bør radiofrekvensforvaltningen, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, følge en tværsektoriel tilgang for at sikre en mere effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenserne.
(31)
Strategisk planlægning, samordning og i givet fald harmonisering på EU-plan kan medvirke til at sikre, at radiofrekvensbrugerne får fuldt udbytte af fordelene ved det indre marked, og at Unionens interesser forsvares effektivt på globalt plan. Derfor bør det være muligt at vedtage flerårige radiofrekvenspolitikprogrammer, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt. Det første af sådanne programmer blev fastlagt ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse nr. 243/2012/EU 
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, som fastlægger politiske retningslinjer og målsætninger for den strategiske planlægning og harmonisering af brugen af radiofrekvenser i Unionen. Det bør være muligt for disse politiske retningslinjer og målsætninger at indeholde henvisninger til den adgang til og den effektive udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, der er en forudsætning for etableringen af et funktionsdygtigt indre marked, i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
(32)
Landegrænser bliver i stigende grad irrelevante for fastlæggelsen af, hvordan frekvensressourcerne udnyttes optimalt. Ubegrundede forskelle mellem de nationale politikker medfører øgede omkostninger og tabte markedsmuligheder for frekvensbrugerne og forsinker innovationen til skade for et velfungerende indre marked og forbrugerne og økonomien som helhed.
(33)
Bestemmelserne om radiofrekvensforvaltning i dette direktiv bør være i overensstemmelse med arbejdet i internationale og regionale organisationer, der beskæftiger sig med radiofrekvensforvaltning, såsom Den Internationale Telekommunikationsunion (ITU) og Den Europæiske Konference af Post- og Teleadministrationer (CEPT), for at sikre en effektiv forvaltning og harmonisering af radiofrekvensanvendelsen i hele Unionen og mellem medlemsstaterne og andre medlemmer af ITU.
(34)
I overensstemmelse med princippet om adskillelse af regulerings- og driftsopgaver bør medlemsstaterne, for at sikre de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders uvildige afgørelser, garantere disses uafhængighed. Dette krav om uafhængighed berører hverken medlemsstaternes institutionelle autonomi og forfatningsmæssige forpligtelser eller princippet om neutralitet i forhold til de ejendomsretlige ordninger i medlemsstaterne, jf. artikel 345 i TEUF. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder bør råde over de nødvendige personale- og ekspertressourcer samt økonomiske midler til at udføre deres opgaver.
(35)
Visse opgaver i henhold til direktivet som f.eks. forhåndsregulering af markedet, herunder indførelse af forpligtelser vedrørende adgang og samtrafik og bilæggelse af tvister mellem virksomheder, bør kun varetages af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, dvs. organer, som er uafhængige af både sektoren og enhver ydre indblanding i form af politisk pres. Medmindre andet er fastsat, bør medlemsstaterne kunne tildele andre tilsynsopgaver, der er fastsat i dette direktiv, til enten de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder. Under gennemførelsen bør medlemsstaterne fremme stabiliteten af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders kompetencer med hensyn til tildelingen af de opgaver, der fulgte af gennemførelsen af Unionens rammebestemmelser for elektronisk kommunikation som ændret i 2009, navnlig opgaverne vedrørende markedskonkurrence eller markedsadgang. Hvis opgaver er tildelt andre kompetente myndigheder, bør disse andre kompetente myndigheder tilstræbe at høre de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, inden de træffer en afgørelse. I henhold til princippet om godt samarbejde bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder udveksle oplysninger med henblik på udøvelsen af deres opgaver.
(36)
Dette direktiv indeholder ingen materielle bestemmelser om åben internetadgang eller roaming og berører ikke fordelingen af beføjelser til de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 531/2012 
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 og i forordning (EU) 2015/2120. På den anden side fastsætter dette direktiv endvidere, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder er kompetente med henblik på vurdering og nøje overvågning af markedsadgang og konkurrencespørgsmål, der potentielt påvirker slutbrugeres ret til åben internetadgang.
(37)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders uafhængighed blev styrket i forbindelse med revisionen af rammebestemmelserne for elektronisk kommunikation, der blev gennemført i 2009, så de kan anvende regelsættet med større gennemslagskraft, og deres autoritet og forudsigeligheden i deres afgørelser øges. Til dette formål måtte det udtrykkelig fastsættes i national ret, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i udførelsen af sine opgaver er beskyttet mod indblanding udefra og politisk pres, der kan forhindre en uafhængig vurdering af de sager, den skal behandle. En sådan påvirkning udefra gør en instans, der medvirker i den nationale lovgivningsproces, uegnet til at fungere som tilsynsmyndighed under regelsættet. Derfor måtte der på forhånd opstilles regler for, på hvilket grundlag ledelsen for en national tilsynsmyndighed kan afskediges, så enhver rimelig tvivl om tilsynsmyndighedens uafhængighed og upåvirkelighed over for eksterne faktorer fjernes. For at undgå vilkårlige afskedigelser bør medlemmer, der afskediges, have ret til at anmode om, at de kompetente retsinstanser efterprøver, om der foreligger en gyldig grund til afskedigelserne, jf. de grunde, der betragtes som gyldige i henhold til dette direktiv. Sådanne afskedigelser bør kun begrundes i medlemmets personlige eller faglige kvalifikationer. Det er vigtigt, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har deres eget budget, der navnlig sætter dem i stand til at ansætte tilstrækkeligt kvalificeret personale. Af hensyn til åbenhed i forvaltningen bør dette budget hvert år offentliggøres. Inden for rammerne af deres budget bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kunne forvalte deres personalemæssige og økonomiske ressourcer i fuld uafhængighed. For at sikre upartiskhed bør medlemsstater, der stadig ejer eller kontrollerer virksomheder, som gennem administrationsgebyrer bidrager til den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds eller andre kompetente myndigheders budget, sikre, at der er effektiv strukturel adskillelse mellem aktiviteterne i forbindelse med ejerskab eller kontrol og udøvelsen af kontrol over budgettet.
(38)
Det er nødvendigt yderligere at styrke de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders uafhængighed for at sikre, at deres ledelse og medlemmer er upåvirkelige over for pres udefra, ved at fastsætte mindstekrav til, hvilke kvalifikationer disse skal have for at kunne udnævnes, og en minimumsvarighed for deres mandat. For at afhjælpe risikoen for, at tilsynsmyndighederne varetager interesser i sektoren (»regulatory capture«), sikre kontinuitet og styrke uafhængigheden bør medlemsstaterne desuden overveje at begrænse muligheden for at forny mandatet for ledelsen eller bestyrelsesmedlemmerne og oprette en passende rotationsordning for bestyrelsen og den øverste ledelse. Dette kan være f.eks. gøres ved at udnævne de første medlemmer af det kollegiale organ for forskellige perioder, så de forskellige medlemmers såvel som deres efterfølgeres mandater ikke udløber på samme tidspunkt.
(39)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør stå til ansvar for den måde, hvorpå de udfører deres opgaver, og bør være forpligtet til at aflægge rapport herom. Denne forpligtelse bør normalt tage form af et krav om årlig rapportering snarere end ad hoc-anmodninger om rapportering, der kan begrænse deres uafhængighed eller hindre dem i udførelsen af deres opgaver, hvis kravene bliver urimeligt omfattende. Ifølge EU-Domstolens retspraksis 
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 kan vidtgående eller ubetingede rapporteringskrav indirekte påvirke en myndigheds uafhængighed.
(40)
Medlemsstaterne bør meddele Kommissionen navnene på de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder. For myndigheder, der er kompetente med hensyn til tildeling af tilladelse til at installere faciliteter, bør det være muligt at opfylde meddelelsespligten ved at henvise til den centrale dokumentationstjeneste, der er oprettet i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/61/EU 
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.
(41)
Der bør bruges et system, der er så lidt indgribende som muligt, for tilladelser til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester med henblik på at fremme udviklingen af nye kommunikationstjenester og paneuropæiske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, og så tjenesteudbyderne og forbrugerne kan udnytte det indre markeds stordriftsfordele.
(42)
Fordelene ved det indre marked for tjenesteudbydere og slutbrugere kan bedst virkeliggøres ved at anvende generelle tilladelser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, uden at stille krav om udtrykkelige beslutninger eller administrative afgørelser fra nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, og ved at begrænse eventuelle procedurekrav til kun at omfatte en deklaratorisk anmeldelse. Hvis medlemsstaterne stiller krav om, at udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester skal indgive anmeldelse, når de påbegynder deres aktiviteter, bør denne anmeldelse ikke indebære administrationsomkostninger for udbyderne, og anmeldelsesformularen kan eventuelt stilles til rådighed via et link på de kompetente myndigheders websted. For at støtte en effektiv koordinering på tværs af grænserne, navnlig hvad angår paneuropæiske operatører, bør BEREC oprette og vedligeholde en database over sådanne anmeldelser. De kompetente myndigheder bør kun fremsende fuldstændige anmeldelser til BEREC. Medlemsstaterne bør ikke forhindre udbud af net eller tjenester på nogen måde, herunder på grund af en ufuldstændig anmeldelse.
(43)
Anmeldelser bør blot bestå i en erklæring om, at udbyderen agter at påbegynde udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester. Udbyderen bør kun forpligtes til at lade erklæringen supplere af de oplysninger, der er opført i dette direktiv. Medlemsstaterne bør ikke pålægge yderligere eller særskilte anmeldelseskrav.
(44)
I modsætning til de øvrige kategorier af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, der er defineret i dette direktiv, gør nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester ikke brug af offentlige nummerressourcer og deltager ikke i et offentligt garanteret interoperabelt økosystem. Derfor bør denne type tjenester ikke være underlagt den generelle tilladelsesordning.
(45)
Ved tildeling af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, nummerressourcer eller tilladelse til at installere faciliteter bør de kompetente myndigheder meddele de virksomheder, der får tildelt sådanne rettigheder, de relevante vilkår. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne fastsætte sådanne vilkår for brug af radiofrekvenser i individuelle brugsrettigheder eller i den generelle tilladelse.
(46)
Generelle tilladelser bør kun indeholde vilkår, som udelukkende vedrører den elektroniske kommunikationssektor. De bør ikke omfatte vilkår, som allerede gælder i medfør af anden eksisterende national ret, navnlig vedrørende forbrugerbeskyttelse, der ikke udelukkende vedrører kommunikationssektoren. De kompetente myndigheder bør f.eks. kunne holde virksomheder orienteret om gældende miljøbeskyttelses- samt by- og landsplanlægningskrav. De fastsatte vilkår i den generelle tilladelse har ikke betydning for bestemmelsen af, hvilken lovgivning der finder anvendelse i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 593/2008 
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.
(47)
De vilkår, der kunne knyttes til generelle tilladelser, bør omfatte særlige betingelser vedrørende tilgængelighed for brugere med handicap og offentlige myndigheders og beredskabstjenesters behov for at kommunikere indbyrdes og med offentligheden før, under og efter en større katastrofe.
(48)
Virksomhedernes rettigheder og forpligtelser i henhold til generelle tilladelser må udtrykkeligt angives i disse tilladelser for at sikre ensartet konkurrence i hele Unionen og fremme grænseoverskridende forhandlinger om samtrafik mellem offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet.
(49)
Generelle tilladelser berettiger virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester til offentligheden, til at forhandle samtrafik på vilkårene i dette direktiv. Virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester til andre end offentligheden, kan forhandle samtrafik på kommercielle vilkår.
(50)
Når de kompetente myndigheder fastsætter vilkårene for generelle tilladelser og opkræver administrative gebyrer, bør de tage behørigt hensyn til situationer, hvor elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester udbydes af fysiske personer på et nonprofitgrundlag. Elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, der ikke udbydes til offentligheden, bør være underlagt færre og mindre krævende vilkår, eller slet ingen, end hvad der er rimeligt for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, der udbydes til offentligheden.
(51)
Hvis virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i henhold til EU-retten, pålægges særlige forpligtelser som følge af deres udpegning som havende en stærk markedsposition som defineret i dette direktiv, bør disse særlige forpligtelser finde anvendelse adskilt fra de generelle rettigheder og forpligtelser, som gælder i henhold til den generelle tilladelse.
(52)
Det er muligt, at virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester har brug for dokumentation for deres rettigheder i henhold til en generel tilladelse for så vidt angår samtrafik og installation af faciliteter, navnlig for at fremme forhandlinger med regionale eller lokale myndigheder eller med tjenesteudbydere i andre medlemsstater. Derfor bør de kompetente myndigheder forsyne virksomhederne med erklæringer herom enten efter anmodning eller alternativt som automatisk svar på en anmeldelse i henhold til den generelle tilladelse. Sådanne erklæringer bør ikke i sig selv kunne begrunde krav om rettigheder, og hverken rettigheder i medfør af den generelle tilladelse, brugsrettigheder eller udøvelsen af sådanne rettigheder må afhænge af en erklæring.
(53)
Det bør være muligt at opkræve administrationsgebyrer fra virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationstjenester for at finansiere den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds eller andre kompetente myndigheders aktiviteter vedrørende administration af det generelle tilladelsessystem og tildeling af brugsrettigheder. Sådanne gebyrer bør kun dække de reelle administrationsomkostninger ved disse aktiviteter. Med henblik herpå bør det sikres, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders indtægter og udgifter er gennemsigtige via årlige opgørelser over de samlede gebyrbeløb, der er opkrævet, og de administrationsomkostninger, der er påløbet, for at virksomhederne kan kontrollere, om der er overensstemmelse mellem dem.
(54)
Ordningerne vedrørende administrationsgebyrer bør ikke fordreje konkurrencen eller skabe hindringer for markedsadgangen. Et generelt tilladelsessystem gør det umuligt at afkræve de enkelte virksomheder administrationsomkostninger og dermed gebyrer, undtagen for tildeling af brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer, radiofrekvenser og tilladelser til installation af faciliteter. Alle administrationsgebyrer bør være i overensstemmelse med principperne i et generelt tilladelsessystem. Et eksempel på et rimeligt, enkelt og gennemsigtigt alternativ til disse kriterier for opkrævning af gebyrer kunne være en omsætningsafhængig fordelingsnøgle. Hvis administrationsgebyrerne er meget lave, kan enhedsgebyrer eller gebyrer, der kombinerer en enhedssats med et omsætningsafhængigt element, også være hensigtsmæssige. Hvor det generelle tilladelsessystem omfatter virksomheder med meget små markedsandele, f.eks. lokalsamfundsbaserede netudbydere, eller tjenesteudbydere, hvis forretningsmodel medfører meget begrænsede indtægter, selv hvor der er tale om en væsentlig markedsdækning målt i volumen, bør medlemsstaterne overveje at fastsætte en passende minimumstærskel for pålæggelse af administrationsgebyrer.
(55)
Medlemsstaterne kan være nødt til at ændre de rettigheder, vilkår, procedurer, gebyrer og afgifter, som hænger sammen med generelle tilladelser og brugsrettigheder, i tilfælde hvor det er objektivt velbegrundet. Sådanne påtænkte ændringer bør behørigt meddeles alle berørte parter i god tid, så de har fyldestgørende lejlighed til at udtale sig. Unødvendige procedurer bør undgås i forbindelse med mindre ændringer i eksisterende tilladelser til at installere faciliteter eller i brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller til nummerressourcer, når disse ændringer ikke berører tredjemands interesser. Ved mindre ændringer af rettigheder og forpligtelser forstås ændringer, som hovedsagelig er af administrativ art og ikke ændrer den generelle tilladelse og de individuelle brugsrettigheder i væsentlig grad og således ikke kan give konkurrencemæssige fordele i forhold til andre virksomheder.
(56)
Under hensyntagen til betydningen af at sikre juridisk forudsigelighed og for at fremme forudsigelighed i reguleringen for at skabe et sikkert miljø for investeringer, navnlig for ny trådløs bredbåndskommunikation, bør enhver begrænsning eller tilbagekaldelse af eksisterende brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller nummerressourcer eller tilladelser til at installere faciliteter være genstand for forudsigelige og transparente procedurer. Derfor kan der eventuelt indføres strengere krav eller en anmeldelsesordning, navnlig i tilfælde hvor der er tildelt brugsrettigheder efter konkurrenceprægede eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedurer og i tilfælde af harmoniserede radiofrekvensbånd, der skal bruges til trådløse elektroniske bredbåndskommunikationstjenester (»trådløse bredbåndstjenester«). Begrundelser, der henviser til faktisk og effektiv brug af radiofrekvenser og teknologisk udvikling, kunne bygge på de tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, der er vedtaget i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse 2002/676/EF 
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. Hvis de generelle tilladelser og individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser endvidere skal begrænses, tilbagekaldes eller ændres uden samtykke fra rettighedshaveren, kan dette ske efter høring af de berørte parter, medmindre de foreslåede ændringer ermindre. Da begrænsninger eller tilbagekaldelser af generelle tilladelser eller rettigheder kan have betydelige konsekvenser for deres indehavere, bør de kompetente myndigheder være særligt opmærksomme og foretage en forhåndsvurdering af den potentielle skade, som sådanne foranstaltninger kan forårsage, inden de træffer disse foranstaltninger.
(57)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, andre kompetente myndigheder og BEREC må, for at kunne udføre deres opgaver effektivt, indsamle oplysninger fra markedets aktører, herunder en vurdering af, om de generelle vilkår og betingelser er i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv uden at suspendere anvendelsen af disse vilkår og betingelser i forbindelse med vurderingen. Undtagelsesvis kan det også være nødvendigt at indhente oplysninger fra andre virksomheder, der er aktive i sektorer tæt knyttet til den elektroniske kommunikationssektor, herunder indholdsudbydere, som ligger inde med oplysninger, der kan være nødvendige, for at de kan udføre deres opgaver i henhold til EU-retten. Det kan også være nødvendigt at indsamle sådanne oplysninger på Kommissionens vegne, således at den kan opfylde sine forpligtelser i henhold til EU-retten. Anmodninger om oplysninger bør stå i et rimeligt forhold til formålet og bør ikke påføre virksomhederne urimelige byrder. De oplysninger, der indsamles af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder, bør, medmindre de i henhold til nationale regler om aktindsigt er fortrolige samt med forbehold af EU-regler og national regler om kommerciel fortrolighed, være offentligt tilgængelige.
(58)
For at sikre, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder udfører deres tilsynsopgaver effektivt, bør de oplysninger, som de indsamler, omfatte regnskabsoplysninger om de detailmarkeder, der er knyttet til engrosmarkeder, hvor en virksomhed er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, og som derfor reguleres af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed. Endvidere bør oplysningerne omfatte data, der sætter den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i stand til at vurdere overholdelsen af de vilkår, der er knyttet til brugsrettigheder og de mulige følger af planlagte opgraderinger eller ændringer i nettopologien for udviklingen i konkurrencen eller for engrosprodukter, der stilles til rådighed for andre parter. Oplysninger om overholdelse af de dækningsforpligtelser, der er knyttet til brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, er afgørende for at sikre fuldstændighed i de geografiske undersøgelser af netudrulning. I den forbindelse bør den kompetente myndighed kunne kræve, at der afgives oplysninger opdelt efter lokalområder med en granularitet, der er tilstrækkelig til at foretage en geografisk undersøgelse af netudrulningen.
(59)
For at lette byrden af indberetnings- og informationsforpligtelser for net- og tjenesteudbyderne og de berørte kompetente myndigheder bør disse krav være forholdsmæssigt afpassede, objektivt berettigede og begrænset til det strengt nødvendige. Navnlig bør gentagne anmodninger fra den kompetente myndighed og fra BEREC om de samme oplysninger samt krav om systematisk og jævnlig dokumentation for overholdelsen af samtlige vilkår for den generelle tilladelse eller brugsrettigheden undgås. Virksomhederne bør være bekendt med, hvad de oplysninger, de anmodes om at fremlægge, skal bruges til. Fremlæggelse af oplysninger bør ikke være en betingelse for markedsadgang. Til statistiske formål kan der stilles krav om, at udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester skal indgive anmeldelse, når deres aktiviteter ophører.
(60)
Dette direktiv bør hverken berøre medlemsstaternes forpligtelse til at fremlægge enhver oplysning, som er nødvendig for at forsvare Unionens interesser i forbindelse med internationale aftaler, eller indberetningskrav i ret, der ikke er specifik for sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation, f.eks. konkurrenceretten.
(61)
Det er muligt at udveksle oplysninger, der af en kompetent myndighed betragtes som fortrolige i henhold til EU-regler og nationale regler om kommerciel fortrolighed og beskyttelse af personoplysninger, med Kommissionen, BEREC og andre myndigheder, hvis det er nødvendigt for anvendelsen af national ret, der gennemfører dette direktiv. De udvekslede oplysninger bør begrænses til, hvad der er relevant og rimeligt under hensyn til formålet med udvekslingen.
(62)
Bredbåndsnettene til elektronisk kommunikation bliver stadig mere forskelligartede med hensyn til teknologi, topologi, de anvendte medier og ejendomsforholdene Reguleringstiltag skal derfor bygge på detaljerede oplysninger vedrørende netudrulningen for at være effektiv og målrettet mod de områder, hvor der er behov for regulering. Disse oplysninger er afgørende for at fremme investeringer, øge konnektiviteten i hele Unionen og formidle oplysninger til alle relevante myndigheder og borgerne. De bør omfatte undersøgelser om både udrulning af net med meget høj kapacitet og væsentlige opgraderinger eller udvidelser af eksisterende kobbernet eller andre net, der muligvis ikke i alle henseender har samme præstationsegenskaber som net med meget høj kapacitet, f.eks. udrulning af fibernet til gadeskabet, kombineret med aktive teknologier som vectoring. De relevante prognoser bør vedrøre perioder på op til tre år. Detaljeringsgraden og den territoriale granularitet i de oplysninger, som de kompetente myndigheder bør indsamle, bør være afstemt efter det specifikke mål for reguleringen og være tilstrækkelig til at opfylde de reguleringsmæssige formål. Derfor vil størrelsen af den territoriale enhed også variere fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat afhængigt af de reguleringsmæssige behov under de særlige nationale omstændigheder og af, hvilke oplysninger der er til rådighed lokalt. I de fleste tilfælde vil niveau 3 i nomenklaturen for statistiske regionale enheder (NUTS) sandsynligvis ikke være en tilstrækkelig lille territorial enhed. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder bør følge BEREC's retningslinjer for bedste praksis i forbindelse med en sådan opgave, og disse retningslinjer vil kunne trække på erfaringerne fra de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og/eller andre kompetente myndigheders gennemførelse af geografiske undersøgelser af netudrulningen. Uden at det berører kravet om kommerciel fortrolighed, bør de kompetente myndigheder, hvis oplysningerne ikke allerede er tilgængelige på markedet, stille de data, der er indsamlet i disse undersøgelser, direkte til rådighed i et åbent format i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2003/98/EF 
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 og uden begrænsninger med hensyn til videreanvendelse, og de bør stille værktøjer til at fastslå tjenestekvaliteten til rådighed for slutbrugerne for at bidrage til øget bevidsthed om de tilgængelige konnektivitetstjenester. I forbindelse med indsamlingen af disse oplysninger bør alle berørte myndigheder respektere fortrolighedsprincippet og undgå at skabe konkurrencemæssige ulemper for virksomheder.
(63)
Mindskelse af den digitale kløft i Unionen er afgørende, hvis alle Unionens borgere skal have adgang til internettjenester og digitale tjenester. Med henblik herpå bør de relevante myndigheder i tilfælde af specifikke og veldefinerede områder have mulighed for at opfordre virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder til at erklære, at de har til hensigt at udrulle net med meget høj kapacitet i disse områder, ved at give dem tilstrækkelig tid til at fremlægge et velovervejet svar. Oplysningerne i prognoserne bør afspejle de økonomiske udsigter for sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation og virksomheders investeringsplaner på det tidspunkt, hvor oplysningerne er indsamlet, så det er muligt at kortlægge konnektiviteten i forskellige områder. Hvis en virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed erklærer, at den har til hensigt at foretage udrulning i et område, bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed kunne kræve, at andre virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder erklærer, hvorvidt de agter at udrulle net med meget høj kapacitet eller væsentligt opgradere eller udvide deres net, så det kan yde en downloadhastighed på mindst 100 Mbit/s i dette område. Denne procedure vil skabe gennemsigtighed for de virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder, der har tilkendegivet interesse i udrulning i det pågældende område, hvormed de ved udformningen af deres forretningsplaner kan vurdere den sandsynlige konkurrence, de vil møde fra andre net. Den positive virkning af en sådan gennemsigtighed afhænger af, om markedsdeltagerne svarer sandfærdigt og i god tro.
(64)
Markedsdeltagerne kan ændre deres udrulningsplaner af uforudsete, objektive og berettigede årsager, men de kompetente myndigheder bør gribe ind, herunder hvis offentlige midler er berørt, og om nødvendigt pålægge sanktioner, hvis de forsætligt eller som følge af grov uagtsomhed har modtaget vildledende, fejlagtige eller ufuldstændige oplysninger fra en virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed. Med henblik på anvendelsen af de relevante bestemmelser om sanktioner bør grov uagtsomhed henvise til en situation, hvor en virksomhed eller en offentlig myndighed giver vildledende, fejlagtige eller ufuldstændige oplysninger som følge af dens adfærd eller intern organisation, der ligger væsentligt under fornøden omhu i forbindelse med de afgivne oplysninger. Grov uagtsomhed bør ikke kræve, at virksomheden eller den offentlige myndighed er vidende om, at de afgivne oplysninger er vildledende, fejlagtige eller ufuldstændige, men snarere at vedkommende burde have haft kendskab til det, hvis den havde handlet eller var organiseret med fornøden omhu. Det er vigtigt, at sanktionerne er tilstrækkeligt afskrækkende i lyset af den negative indvirkning på konkurrencen og på offentligt finansierede projekter. Bestemmelserne om sanktioner bør ikke berøre retten til at kræve erstatning for skader i henhold til national ret.
(65)
For at sikre forudsigelige investeringsbetingelser bør de kompetente myndigheder kunne meddele virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder, der tilkendegiver interesse i udrulning af net med meget høj kapacitet, om der er foretaget eller planlagt andre typer netopgraderinger, herunder med downloadhastigheder på under 100 Mbit/s, i det pågældende område.
(66)
Det er vigtigt, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder hører alle interesserede parter om påtænkte afgørelser, giver dem tilstrækkelig tid under hensyn til sagens kompleksitet til at fremsætte kommentarer og tager hensyn til disse kommentarer, før de træffer endelig afgørelse. For at sikre, at afgørelser på nationalt plan ikke får negative følger for det indre markeds funktion eller for andre af TEUF's målsætninger, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder desuden underrette Kommissionen og andre nationale tilsynsmyndigheder om visse udkast til afgørelser, så disse får mulighed for at kommentere dem. Det er rimeligt, at de kompetente myndigheder hører de interesserede parter i de tilfælde, der er fastsat i dette direktiv, om alle udkast til foranstaltninger med konsekvenser for handelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
(67)
Det er i et konkurrencebaseret miljø vigtigt, at der tages hensyn til de berørte parters, herunder brugernes og forbrugernes, synspunkter. Medlemsstaterne bør tilrettelægge en passende høringsmekanisme for at tage behørigt hensyn til borgernes interesser. En sådan mekanisme kunne involvere et organ, som uafhængigt af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed og af tjenesteudbyderne udfører forskning for så vidt angår forbrugerrelaterede spørgsmål, eksempelvis forbrugeradfærd og mekanismer for leverandørskift, og som fungerer i åbenhed og leverer bidrag til de eksisterende mekanismer for høring af de berørte parter. Desuden kan der indføres en mekanisme, med det formål at muliggøre et passende samarbejde om spørgsmål vedrørende fremme af lovligt indhold. Samarbejdsprocedurer, der indføres ved hjælp af en sådan mekanisme, bør imidlertid ikke kunne benyttes til systematisk overvågning af brug af internettet.
(68)
Udenretslig tvistbilæggelse kan være et hurtigt og omkostningseffektivt middel for slutbrugerne til at håndhæve deres rettigheder, navnlig for forbrugere, mikrovirksomheder og små virksomheder, som defineret i bilaget til Kommissionens henstilling 2003/361/EF 
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. Medlemsstaterne bør give mulighed for, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed med ansvar for eller mindst et uafhængigt organ med dokumenteret ekspertise i at håndtere slutbrugerrettigheder kan fungere som en alternativ tvistbilæggelsesinstans. Med hensyn til tvistbilæggelse af denne art bør myndighederne ikke være underlagt nogen instrukser. Da mange medlemsstater har indført tvistbilæggelsesprocedurer også for slutbrugere, der ikke er forbrugere, og som ikke er omfattet af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2013/11/EU 
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, er det rimeligt at fastholde den sektorspecifikke tvistbilæggelsesprocedure for både forbrugere og, hvor medlemsstaterne udvider proceduren, andre slutbrugere, navnlig mikrovirksomheder og små virksomheder. For så vidt angår udenretslig tvistbilæggelse bør medlemsstaterne kunne opretholde eller indføre strengere bestemmelser end dem, der er fastsat i direktiv 2013/11/EU, for at sikre et højere forbrugerbeskyttelsesniveau.
(69)
Hvis der opstår en tvist mellem virksomheder i én medlemsstat på et område, der er omfattet af dette direktiv, f.eks. vedrørende forpligtelser i forbindelse med adgang og samtrafik eller metoder til overførsel af slutbrugerfortegnelser, bør den forurettede part, der har forhandlet i god tro, men ikke har kunnet nå til enighed med modparten, kunne anmode den nationale tilsynsmyndighed om at afgøre tvisten. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør kunne pålægge parterne en løsning. Når en national tilsynsmyndighed deltager i bilæggelsen af en tvist mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester eller tilhørende faciliteter i en medlemsstat, bør den søge at sikre, at de forpligtelser, der følger af dette direktiv, overholdes.
(70)
Ud over den klageadgang, der følger af EU-retten eller national ret, er der behov for en enkel procedure, der efter anmodning af en af tvistens parter sættes i gang for at bilægge grænseoverskridende tvister mellem virksomheder, der udbyder eller har tilladelse til at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i forskellige medlemsstater.
(71)
En vigtig opgave for BEREC er i givet fald at vedtage udtalelser i forbindelse med tvister mellem parter i forskellige medlemsstater. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør derfor i sådanne sager tage fuldt hensyn til BEREC's udtalelse, når de pålægger en virksomhed forpligtelser eller på anden vis bilægger tvisten.
(72)
Manglende koordinering mellem medlemsstaterne i forbindelse med tilrettelæggelse af brugen af radiofrekvenser på deres område kan, hvis den ikke afhjælpes ved bilaterale forhandlinger mellem medlemsstaterne, skabe store interferensproblemer med alvorlige konsekvenser for udviklingen af det digitale indre marked. Medlemsstaterne bør træffe alle nødvendige foranstaltninger for at undgå grænseoverskridende og skadelig interferens mellem sig. Frekvenspolitikgruppen, der blev nedsat ved Kommissionens afgørelse 2002/622/EF 
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, bør pålægges at støtte den nødvendige koordinering på tværs af landegrænserne og være det udpegede forum for bilæggelse af tvister mellem medlemsstaterne om grænseoverskridende spørgsmål. På grundlag af Frekvenspolitikgruppens løsningsforslag er en gennemførelsesforanstaltning i visse tilfælde nødvendig for definitivt at løse et problem med grænseoverskridende interferens eller for at håndhæve en koordineret løsning, der er aftalt af to eller flere medlemsstater i bilaterale forhandlinger, på et EU-retligt grundlag. Manglende koordinering mellem medlemsstaterne og Unionens nabolande kan også skabe store interferensproblemer. Medlemsstaterne bør træffe passende foranstaltninger for at undgå grænseoverskridende og skadelig interferens med Unionens nabolande og samarbejde med hinanden til dette formål. Efter anmodning fra medlemsstater, der er berørt af grænseoverskridende interferens fra tredjelande, bør Unionen give sin fulde støtte til disse medlemsstater.
(73)
Frekvenspolitikgruppen er en rådgivende gruppe på højt plan i Kommissionen, der blev nedsat ved afgørelse 2002/622/EF for at bidrage til udviklingen af det indre marked og støtte udformningen af en radiofrekvenspolitik på EU-plan under hensyntagen til økonomiske, politiske, kulturelle, strategiske, sundhedsmæssige og sociale aspekter samt tekniske parametre. Gruppen bør sammensættes af lederne af de organer, som har det overordnede politiske ansvar for strategisk radiofrekvenspolitik. Den bør bistå og rådgive Kommissionen med hensyn til radiofrekvenspolitikken. Dette bør yderligere øge radiofrekvenspolitikkens synlighed på Unionens forskellige politikområder og bidrage til at sikre sammenhæng på tværs af sektorerne på EU-plan og nationalt plan. På anmodning fra Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet bør Frekvenspolitikgruppen også yde rådgivning til disse. Desuden bør gruppen også være forum for koordinering af medlemsstaternes gennemførelse af deres forpligtelser vedrørende radiofrekvenser i henhold til dette direktiv, og den bør spille en central rolle på områder af afgørende betydning for det indre marked, f.eks. koordinering og standardisering på tværs af grænserne. Der kan også nedsættes tekniske arbejdsgrupper eller ekspertgrupper til at bistå ved plenarmøder, hvor højtstående repræsentanter fra medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen udstikker rammer for den strategiske politik. Kommissionen har tilkendegivet, at den senest seks måneder efter dette direktivs ikrafttræden agter at ændre afgørelse 2002/622/EF, således at den afspejler de nye opgaver, som overdrages til Frekvenspolitikgruppen ved dette direktiv.
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De kompetente myndigheder bør overvåge og sikre, at vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse og brugsrettighederne overholdes, og navnlig at sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenserne og overholdelse af forpligtelserne vedrørende dækning og tjenestekvalitet i kraft af administrative sanktioner, herunder økonomiske sanktioner og påbud og tilbagekaldelse af brugsrettigheder i tilfælde af manglende overholdelse af disse vilkår. Virksomhederne bør fremlægge de mest nøjagtige og fuldstændige oplysninger som muligt for de kompetente myndigheder, så disse er i stand til at løse deres tilsynsopgaver.
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De vilkår, som knyttes til generelle tilladelser og individuelle brugsrettigheder, bør begrænses til dem, der er strengt nødvendige for at sikre overholdelsen af krav og forpligtelser i henhold til national ret og EU-retten.
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Alle, der er genstand for en kompetent myndigheds afgørelse, bør kunne påklage afgørelsen til en instans, som er uafhængig af de involverede parter og af indblanding udefra og politisk pres, der kan forhindre en uafhængig vurdering af de sager, den skal behandle. Denne instans kan være en domstol. Desuden bør virksomhederne, hvis de finder, at deres ansøgninger om tilladelse til at installere faciliteter ikke er blevet behandlet i overensstemmelse med principperne i dette direktiv, have ret til at påklage sådanne afgørelser. Denne klageprocedure bør ikke berøre kompetencefordelingen inden for de nationale retssystemer og juridiske og fysiske personers rettigheder i henhold til national ret. Under alle omstændigheder bør medlemsstaterne garantere effektiv domstolskontrol af sådanne afgørelser.
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For at skabe juridisk forudsigelighed for markedsdeltagerne bør klageinstanserne udføre deres funktioner effektivt. Klagesager bør navnlig ikke være unødigt langvarige. Foreløbige foranstaltninger, der suspenderer virkningerne af en kompetent myndigheds afgørelse, bør kun være tilladt, hvis det er presserende nødvendigt for at forhindre, at den part, der har anmodet om disse foranstaltninger, påføres alvorlig og uoprettelig skade, og når det er nødvendigt af hensyn til balancen mellem parternes interesser.
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Der har været store forskelle i den måde, hvorpå klageinstanserne har benyttet foreløbige foranstaltninger til at suspendere de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders eller andre kompetente myndigheders afgørelser. For at skabe større ensartethed bør der indføres fælles fremgangsmåder i overensstemmelse med EU-Domstolens retspraksis. Klageinstanserne bør også have ret til at anmode om tilgængelige oplysninger, som er offentliggjort af BEREC. I betragtning af den betydning klagesager har for, hvordan regelsættet som helhed fungerer, bør der i alle medlemsstater indføres en ordning for indsamling af oplysninger om klagesager og beslutninger om suspension af de kompetente myndigheders afgørelser samt for rapportering af disse oplysninger til Kommissionen og BEREC. Denne ordning bør sikre, at Kommissionen eller BEREC kan indhente teksten til de pågældende afgørelser eller domme fra medlemsstaterne med henblik på at samle dem i en database.
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Der bør foretages en mere transparent anvendelse af EU-mekanismen til konsolidering af det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation af hensyn til borgerne og interessenter og for at give de berørte parter mulighed for at fremsætte deres synspunkter, herunder ved at kræve, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder offentliggør eventuelle udkast til foranstaltning, samtidig med at de meddeles Kommissionen, BEREC og de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i andre medlemsstater. Alle sådanne udkast til foranstaltning bør være begrundede og indeholde en detaljeret analyse.
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Kommissionen bør, under størst mulig hensyntagen til udtalelsen fra BEREC, kunne anmode en national tilsynsmyndighed om at trække et udkast til foranstaltning tilbage, hvis det vedrører afgrænsningen af relevante markeder eller udpegning af virksomheder som havende en stærk markedsposition eller ej, og hvis sådanne afgørelser ville hindre det indre marked eller være uforenelige med EU-retten, herunder navnlig de politiske mål, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed bør følge. Denne procedure berører hverken anmeldelsesproceduren i henhold til direktiv (EU) 2015/1535 eller Kommissionens særlige beføjelser i henhold til TEUF for så vidt angår overtrædelse af EU-retten.
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Den nationale høring af de berørte parter bør gennemføres før høringen på EU-plan med henblik på konsolidering af det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation og som led i proceduren for ensartet anvendelse af afhjælpende foranstaltninger, således at de berørte parters synspunkter kan afspejles i høringen på EU-plan. Derved undgår man også at skulle gennemføre endnu en høring på EU-plan, hvis den nationale høring fører til ændring af den planlagte foranstaltning.
(82)
Det er vigtigt, at regelsættet gennemføres rettidigt. Når Kommissionen har truffet afgørelse om, at en national tilsynsmyndighed skal trække en planlagt foranstaltning tilbage, bør tilsynsmyndigheden trække sit udkast til foranstaltning tilbage eller forelægge en revideret foranstaltning for Kommissionen. Der bør fastsættes en frist for meddelelsen af den reviderede foranstaltning til Kommissionen, for at informere markedsdeltagerne om, hvor længe markedsundersøgelsen varer, og den juridiske forudsigelighed øges.
(83)
Den EU-mekanisme, der gør det muligt for Kommissionen at kræve, at en national tilsynsmyndighed trækker planlagte foranstaltninger vedrørende markedsafgrænsning og udpegning af virksomheder med en stærk markedsposition tilbage, har bidraget væsentligt til en ensartet fremgangsmåde for udpegning af forhold, hvor der kan anvendes forhåndsregulering, og hvor virksomheder skal være omfattet af en sådan regulering. Erfaringerne med procedurerne i artikel 7 og 7a i direktiv 2002/21/EF har vist, at manglende ensartethed i de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders anvendelse af afhjælpende foranstaltninger under lignende markedsforhold underminerer det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation. Derfor bør Kommissionen og BEREC inden for deres respektive ansvarsområder bidrage til at sikre en større grad af konsekvens i anvendelsen af afhjælpende foranstaltninger i forbindelse med udkast til foranstaltninger, som foreslås af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder. Hvis BEREC deler Kommissionens tvivl for så vidt angår udkast til foranstaltninger vedrørende udvidelsen af forpligtelser efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, når det er nødvendigt for at imødegå store og varige økonomiske eller fysiske hindringer for duplikering, for virksomheder uafhængigt af udpegningen som havende en stærk markedsposition eller for reguleringen af nye netelementer med meget høj kapacitet, bør Kommissionen derudover kunne pålægge en national tilsynsmyndighed at trække udkastet til foranstaltning tilbage. For at få gavn af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders ekspertise inden for markedsanalyse bør Kommissionen rådføre sig med BEREC, før den træffer sine afgørelser eller vedtager sine henstillinger.
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I betragtning af de korte tidsfrister, der gælder ifølge ordningen for høring på EU-plan, bør Kommissionen tillægges beføjelse til at vedtage henstillinger eller retningslinjer til forenkling af procedurerne for udveksling af oplysninger mellem Kommissionen og de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, f.eks. hvor der er tale om stabile markeder eller mindre ændringer i tidligere meddelte foranstaltninger. Kommissionen bør også tillægges beføjelse til at tillade en undtagelse fra kravet om meddelelse for at strømline procedurerne i visse tilfælde.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør samarbejde indbyrdes, med BEREC og med Kommissionen på en transparent måde for at sikre en ensartet anvendelse af dette direktiv i alle medlemsstaterne.
(86)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders skønsbeføjelser må forliges med udviklingen af en ensartet reguleringspraksis og en konsekvent anvendelse af regelsættet, for at tilsynsmyndighederne kan medvirke effektivt til at udvikle og komplettere det indre marked. Tilsynsmyndighederne bør derfor støtte Kommissionens og BEREC's aktiviteter vedrørende det indre marked.
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Foranstaltninger, der kan få indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, er foranstaltninger, som kunne øve en direkte eller indirekte, faktisk eller potentiel indflydelse på handelsmønsteret mellem medlemsstaterne på en måde, der kan skabe en hindring for det indre marked. Det kan være foranstaltninger, som har væsentlig indvirkning på virksomheder eller brugere i andre medlemsstater, herunder foranstaltninger, der påvirker brugerprisen i andre medlemsstater, foranstaltninger, der påvirker de muligheder, en virksomhed med hjemsted i en anden medlemsstat har for at udbyde en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, og navnlig foranstaltninger, som påvirker muligheden for at udbyde transnationale tjenester, samt foranstaltninger, der påvirker markedsstrukturen eller -adgangen og dermed får følger for virksomheder i andre medlemsstater.
(88)
En mere ensartet brug og fastlæggelse af elementerne i udvælgelsesprocedurerne og de vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser, som har en væsentlig indvirkning på markedsforholdene og konkurrencesituationen, herunder betingelserne for markedsadgang og ekspansion, ville fremmes af en koordineringsordning, hvorved Frekvenspolitikgruppen på anmodning af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed eller undtagelsesvis på eget initiativ sammenkalder et peer review-forum for at gennemgå udkast til foranstaltninger forud for en given medlemsstats tildeling af brugsrettigheder med henblik på at udveksle bedste praksis. Peer review-forummet er et instrument til peerlæring. Det bør bidrage til forbedret udveksling af bedste praksis mellem medlemsstaterne og øge gennemsigtigheden af de konkurrenceprægede eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedurer. Peer review-processen bør ikke være en formel betingelse for nationale tilladelsesprocedurer. Udvekslingen af synspunkter bør baseres på oplysninger fra den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed, som anmoder om peer review-forummet, og være et led i en bredere national foranstaltning vedrørende brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser, der mere generelt kan omfatte tildeling, handel og udlejning, varighed, fornyelse eller ændring af brugsrettighederne. Derfor bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed også kunne forelægge oplysninger om andre udkast til nationale foranstaltninger eller aspekter heraf, der hænger sammen med den pågældende udvælgelsesprocedure med henblik på begrænsning af antallet af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, men som ikke er omfattet af peer review-ordningen. For at mindske den administrative byrde bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed kunne fremlægge disse oplysninger i et fælles indberetningsformat, hvis et sådant findes, med henblik på videresendelse til medlemmer af Frekvenspolitikgruppen.
(89)
Når det på EU-plan er vedtaget at harmonisere tildelingen af radiofrekvenser til bestemte virksomheder, bør medlemsstaterne nøje gennemføre disse vedtagelser ved tildelingen af brugsrettigheder af radiofrekvenser fra den nationale frekvensplan.
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Medlemsstaterne bør kunne overveje at gøre brug af fælles tilladelsesprocesser, når de tildeler brugsrettigheder i tilfælde, hvor den forventede anvendelse strækker sig over grænsen til en anden medlemsstat.
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Enhver kommissionsafgørelse med henblik på at sikre en harmoniseret anvendelse af dette direktiv bør være begrænset til reguleringsprincipper, -strategier og -metoder. For at undgå tvetydighed bør den ikke indeholde nogle detaljer, som normalt kræves til at afspejle nationale forhold, ligesom den ikke bør forbyde alternative strategier, som med rimelighed kan forventes at have tilsvarende virkning. En sådan afgørelse bør være forholdsmæssigt afpasset og bør ikke have nogen indvirkning på beslutninger, der er truffet af nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, og som ikke udgør nogen hindring for det indre marked.
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Unionen og medlemsstaterne har i Verdenshandelsorganisationens regi afgivet en række tilsagn vedrørende standarder og regelsæt for telenet og -tjenester.
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Standardisering bør fortsat primært være en markedsstyret proces. Der kan dog stadig være situationer, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt at kræve bestemte standarder overholdt på EU-plan for at forbedre interoperabiliteten og brugernes valgmuligheder samt tilskynde til interkonnektivitet på det indre marked. På nationalt plan er medlemsstaterne undergivet direktiv (EU) 2015/1535. Standardiseringsprocedurer i henhold til nærværende direktiv berører ikke Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/30/EU 
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 og 2014/35/EU 
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 og direktiv 2014/53/EU.
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Udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige kommunikationstjenester eller begge dele bør forpligtes til at træffe foranstaltninger for at beskytte henholdsvis sikkerheden i deres net og tjenester og for at forhindre eller minimere virkningen af sikkerhedshændelser. Under hensyn til teknologiens aktuelle stade bør disse foranstaltninger garantere et niveau af sikkerhed i net og tjenester, der står i et passende forhold til risikoen. Sikkerhedsforanstaltningerne bør som minimum tage hensyn til alle relevante aspekter af de følgende elementer: vedrørende nets og faciliteters sikkerhed: fysisk og miljømæssig sikkerhed, forsyningssikkerhed, kontrol af adgang til net og netintegritet; vedrørende håndtering af sikkerhedshændelser: procedurer for håndtering af sikkerhedshændelser, kapacitet til detektering af sikkerhedshændelser, underretning om og meddelelse af sikkerhedshændelser; vedrørende styring af driftskontinuitet: strategi for tjenesters kontinuitet og beredskabsplaner, katastrofeberedskabskapacitet; vedrørende monitorering, audit og testning: monitorerings- og logningspolitikker, øvelsesberedskabsplaner, testning af net og tjenester, sikkerhedsvurdering og kontrol med overholdelse; samt overholdelse af internationale standarder.
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I betragtning af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenesters stigende betydning er det nødvendigt at sikre, at de også er omfattet af passende sikkerhedskrav i overensstemmelse med deres særlige karakter og økonomiske betydning. Udbydere af sådanne tjenester bør derfor også garantere et sikkerhedsniveau, der står i et passende forhold til risikoen. Da udbydere af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester normalt ikke udøver egentlig kontrol over transmissionen af signaler via net, kan risikoen i forbindelse med disse tjenester i visse henseender anses for at være lavere end i forbindelse med traditionelle elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Hvor det er berettiget på baggrund af en vurdering af de faktiske sikkerhedsrisici, bør de foranstaltninger, der træffes af udbydere af de nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester derfor være mindre strenge. Samme fremgangsmåde bør finde tilsvarende anvendelse på interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der gør brug af numre, men hvor udbyderen ikke udøver egentlig kontrol over transmissionen af signaler.
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Udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester bør via internettet informere brugerne om særlige og betydelige trusler og om, hvordan de kan sikre deres kommunikation, f.eks. ved at anvende bestemte typer software eller krypteringsteknologier. Kravet om at oplyse brugerne om sådanne trusler bør ikke fritage tjenesteudbyderne for forpligtelsen til for egen regning at træffe passende og øjeblikkelige foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe eventuelle sikkerhedstrusler og genoprette tjenestens normale sikkerhedsniveau. Sådanne oplysninger om sikkerhedstrusler bør stilles gratis til rådighed for brugerne.
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For at garantere sikkerheden i net og tjenester og med forbehold for medlemsstaternes beføjelser til at sikre beskyttelse af deres væsentlige sikkerhedsinteresser og den offentlige sikkerhed og for at tillade efterforskning, afsløring og retsforfølgning af strafbare handlinger bør anvendelse af kryptering, f.eks. end-to-end, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, fremmes og, hvis det er nødvendigt, være obligatorisk i overensstemmelse med principperne om indbygget sikkerhed og privatlivsbeskyttelse som standard.
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De kompetente myndigheder bør sikre, at de offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnets integritet og tilgængelighed opretholdes. Den Europæiske Unions Agentur for Net- og Informationssikkerhed (»ENISA«) bør medvirke til at øge sikkerhedsniveauet inden for elektronisk kommunikation ved bl.a. at yde ekspertise og rådgivning samt fremme udveksling af bedste praksis. De kompetente myndigheder bør have de nødvendige midler til at varetage deres opgaver, herunder beføjelser til at indhente tilstrækkelige oplysninger til, at de kan vurdere niveauet af sikkerhed i net eller tjenester. De bør også have beføjelser til at indhente omfattende og pålidelige oplysninger om faktiske sikkerhedshændelser, der har haft væsentlige følger for driften af net eller tjenester. De bør, hvor det er nødvendigt, bistås af enheder, der håndterer IT-sikkerhedshændelser (»CSIRT'er«), og som er oprettet ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2016/1148 
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. CSIRT'er kan navnlig pålægges at forsyne de kompetente myndigheder med oplysninger om risici og sikkerhedshændelser, der berører offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet og offentligt tilgængelige kommunikationstjenester, samt at anbefale løsninger.
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Hvor udbud af elektronisk kommunikation afhænger af offentlige ressourcer, hvis anvendelse kræver specifik tilladelse, bør medlemsstaterne kunne give den myndighed, der er kompetent med hensyn til udstedelsen af tilladelser, ret til at opkræve afgifter for at sikre en optimal udnyttelse af de pågældende ressourcer i overensstemmelse med de procedurer, der er fastlagt i dette direktiv. Medlemsstaterne kan ikke opkræve andre gebyrer eller afgifter i forbindelse med udbud af net og elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end dem, som er fastsat i dette direktiv, jf. EU-Domstolens retspraksis. I den henseende bør medlemsstaterne have en ensartet tilgang til fastsættelse af disse gebyrer eller afgifter, så den generelle tilladelsesprocedure eller tildelingen af brugsrettigheder ikke indebærer en urimelig økonomisk byrde for udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester.
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For at sikre en optimal udnyttelse af ressourcerne bør afgifterne afspejle den økonomiske og tekniske situation på det pågældende marked såvel som enhver anden faktor af væsentlig betydning for deres værdi. Samtidig bør afgifterne fastsættes på en måde, der sikrer effektiv tildeling og brug af radiofrekvenserne. Dette direktiv berører ikke det formål, som afgifterne for brugsrettigheder og tilladelser til at installere faciliteter anvendes til. Det bør f.eks. være muligt at anvende sådanne afgifter til at finansiere aktiviteter, der gennemføres af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder, og som ikke kan dækkes af administrationsgebyrer. Når udvælgelse foregår ved en konkurrencepræget eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedure, og afgifter for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser helt eller delvis består i engangsbeløb, bør betalingsordninger sikre, at sådanne afgifter ikke i praksis fører til udvælgelse på grundlag af kriterier, der ingen forbindelse har med målet om at sikre optimal udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser. Kommissionen bør med jævne mellemrum kunne offentliggøre sammenlignende undersøgelser af og, hvis det er hensigtsmæssigt, anden vejledning om bedste praksis med henblik på tildeling af radiofrekvenser, nummerressourcer eller tilladelse til at installere faciliteter.
(101)
Afgifter, som pålægges virksomheder for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, kan påvirke afgørelser om, hvorvidt der skal anmodes om sådanne rettigheder, og om, hvorvidt der skal gøres brug af radiofrekvensressourcer. For at sikre optimal udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser bør medlemsstaterne derfor fastsætte mindstepriser på en måde, der fører til en effektiv tildeling af disse brugsrettigheder, uanset hvilken udvælgelsesprocedure der anvendes. Medlemsstaterne kunne også tage hensyn til eventuelle omkostninger, der er forbundet med at opfylde de tilladelsesvilkår, som fastsættes med henblik på at tilgodese politiske mål. I den forbindelse skal der også tages hensyn til konkurrenceforholdene på det pågældende marked, herunder en eventuel alternativ anvendelse af ressourcerne.
(102)
Optimal brug af radiofrekvensressourcer afhænger af, om der er egnede net og tilhørende faciliteter til rådighed. I den henseende bør medlemsstaterne sigte mod at sikre, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, hvis de anvender afgifter for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og retten til at installere faciliteter, tager hensyn til behovet for at fremme en løbende infrastrukturudvikling med henblik på at opnå den mest effektive udnyttelse af ressourcerne. Medlemsstaterne bør derfor søge at sikre, at ordningerne for betaling af afgifter for brugsrettigheden til radiofrekvenser, der er knyttet til den ressource, som faktisk er til rådighed, i muligt omfang anvendes optimalt, så de støtter de investeringer, der er nødvendige for at fremme en sådan infrastrukturudvikling og udbuddet af tilhørende tjenester. Betalingsordningerne bør specificeres på en objektiv, transparent, forholdsmæssig og ikkediskriminerende måde, inden der indledes procedurer om tildelingen af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser.
(103)
Der bør sikres, at der på rette tid og sted findes ikkediskriminerende og transparente procedurer for tildeling af tilladelse til at installere faciliteter, således at vilkårene for en loyal og effektiv konkurrence garanteres. Dette direktiv berører hverken medlemsstaternes lovgivning om ekspropriering og brug af ejendom, normal udøvelse af ejendomsretten, normal brug af offentlig ejendom eller princippet om neutralitet over for de ejendomsretlige ordninger i medlemsstaterne.
(104)
Tilladelser til udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, som giver dem adgang til offentlig eller privat ejendom, er en væsentlig faktor i etableringen af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og nye netelementer. Unødvendig kompleksitet og forsinkelse i procedurerne for tildeling af rettigheder til at installere faciliteter kan derfor udgøre en betydelig hindring for udviklingen af konkurrence. Derfor bør tildelingen af rettigheder til at installere faciliteter til godkendte virksomheder forenkles. De kompetente myndigheder bør koordinere erhvervelsen af rettigheder til at installere faciliteter og stille relevante oplysninger til rådighed på deres websteder.
(105)
Det er nødvendigt at styrke medlemsstaternes beføjelser med hensyn til indehavere af rettigheder til at installere faciliteter for at sikre, at et nyt net etableres eller udbygges på en retfærdig, effektiv og miljømæssigt forsvarlig måde og uafhængigt af enhver forpligtelse for en virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, til at give adgang til sit elektroniske kommunikationsnet. En bedre delt udnyttelse af faciliteter kan nedsætte de miljømæssige omkostninger ved etablering af elektronisk kommunikationsinfrastruktur og tjene folkesundheden, den offentlige sikkerhed samt målene for by- og landsplanlægningen. De kompetente myndigheder bør have beføjelse til at kræve, at virksomheder, som har draget fordel af rettighederne til at installere faciliteter på, over eller under offentlig eller privat ejendom, deles om sådanne faciliteter eller sådan ejendom, herunder fysisk samhusning, efter en offentlig høring af passende varighed, hvor alle berørte parter bør have mulighed for at give deres synspunkter til kende på de specifikke områder, hvor hensynet til den almene interesse nødvendiggør en sådan deling. Det kan f.eks. være tilfældet, hvor der allerede er stor pladsmangel i undergrunden, eller hvor en naturlig barriere skal krydses. De kompetente myndigheder bør navnlig kunne pålægge delt brug af netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter såsom kabelkanaler, ledningskanaler, master, mandehuller, gadeskabe, antenner, tårne og andre støttekonstruktioner, bygninger eller adgangsveje til bygninger og en bedre koordinering af anlægsarbejder af miljøhensyn eller andre politiske hensyn. Det bør derimod være op til de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder at fastlægge regler for fordelingen af omkostningerne ved delt brug af faciliteter eller ejendom for at sikre, at de berørte virksomheder belønnes passende for deres risici. I lyset af de forpligtelser, der pålægges ved direktiv 2014/61/EU, bør de kompetente myndigheder, navnlig lokale myndigheder, i samarbejde med de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder også udarbejde passende koordineringsprocedurer for offentlige arbejder og andre relevante offentlige faciliteter eller anden relevant offentlig ejendom, der bør kunne omfatte procedurer, som sikrer, at de berørte parter får oplysning om relevante offentlige faciliteter eller relevant offentlig ejendom og igangværende eller planlagte offentlige arbejder, at de underrettes rettidigt om sådanne arbejder, og at delt brug fremmes så vidt muligt.
(106)
Hvor mobiloperatører af miljøhensyn får pålagt delt brug af tårne eller master, kan hensynet til folkesundheden medføre, at den enkelte operatørs maksimale tilladte sendeeffekt nedsættes, og det kan medføre, at operatørerne installerer flere sendeanlæg for at sikre et landsdækkende net. De kompetente myndigheder bør tilstræbe at forene miljøhensyn og hensynet til folkesundheden, idet de tager behørigt hensyn til forsigtighedsprincippet i Rådets henstilling 1999/519/EF 
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(107)
Radiofrekvenser er en knap ressource med en stor offentlig værdi og markedsværdi. De er en altafgørende ressource for radiobaserede elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, og i det omfang de anvendes til sådanne net og tjenester, bør de derfor effektivt allokeres og tildeles af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i overensstemmelse med harmoniserede mål og principper samt efter objektive, transparente og ikkediskriminerende kriterier, alt sammen under hensyntagen til demokratiske, sociale, sproglige og kulturelle interesser i forbindelse med anvendelsen af radiofrekvenser. Beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF fastlægger rammerne for en harmonisering af radiofrekvensanvendelsen.
(108)
Frekvenspolitiske tiltag i Unionen bør hverken berøre foranstaltninger, der under overholdelse af EU-retten træffes på EU-plan eller på nationalt plan med sigte på almennyttige målsætninger, navnlig i forbindelse med offentlige myndigheders net og forsvarsnet, regulering af indhold og med AV- og mediepolitikken, eller medlemsstaternes ret til at tilrettelægge og anvende deres radiofrekvenser med henblik på den offentlige orden, den offentlige sikkerhed eller forsvaret.
(109)
Det er vigtigt for den økonomiske og sociale udvikling, deltagelsen i det offentlige liv og den sociale og territorielle samhørighed, at der i alle medlemsstater sikres udbredt konnektivitet. I takt med at konnektivitet og brugen af elektronisk kommunikation bliver en integreret del af det europæiske samfund og den europæiske velfærd, bør medlemsstaterne tilstræbe at sikre trådløs bredbåndsdækning i hele Unionen. En sådan dækning bør opnås ved at sørge for, at medlemsstaterne pålægger de fornødne dækningskrav, som bør tilpasses til de enkelte områder, der dækkes, og begrænses til rimelige byrder, som ikke står i vejen for tjenesteudbydernes udrulning. I betragtning af den store rolle, som systemer som f.eks. radiobaserede lokalnet (RLAN) spiller i leveringen af trådløst højhastighedsbredbånd indendørs, bør foranstaltningerne sigte mod at sikre frigivelse af tilstrækkelige radiofrekvenser i frekvensbånd, der er særligt værdifulde aktiver, når det gælder omkostningseffektiv udbygning af trådløse net med almen dækning, navnlig indendørs. Desuden bør sammenhængende og koordinerede foranstaltninger med henblik på jordbaseret trådløs dækning af høj kvalitet i hele Unionen, som bygger på bedste nationale praksis med hensyn til operatørernes tilladelsesforpligtelser, sigte mod at opfylde radiofrekvenspolitikprogrammets målsætning om, at alle unionsborgere, både indendørs og udendørs, skal have adgang til de hurtigste bredbåndshastigheder på mindst 30 Mbit/s senest i 2020, og mod opnåelse af en ambitiøs vision om et gigabitsamfund i Unionen. Sådanne foranstaltninger vil fremme innovative digitale tjenester og sikre socioøkonomiske fordele på langt sigt. Den sammenhængende områdedækning og konnektiviteten på tværs af medlemsstater bør være størst mulig og pålidelig med henblik på at fremme nationale og grænseoverskridende tjenester og applikationer, såsom netforbundne biler og e-sundhed.
(110)
Det er bydende nødvendigt at sikre, at borgerne ikke eksponeres for elektromagnetiske felter på et niveau, der er skadeligt for folkesundheden. Medlemsstaterne bør tilstræbe konsekvens i hele Unionen for at adressere dette spørgsmål, idet der navnlig tages hensyn til forsigtighedsprincippet i henstilling nr. 1999/519/EF for at arbejde hen imod at sikre mere ensartede udrulningsbetingelser. Medlemsstaterne bør anvende den procedure, der er fastsat i direktiv (EU) 2015/1535, når det er relevant, bl.a. med henblik på at skabe gennemsigtighed for interessenter og give de øvrige medlemsstater og Kommissionen mulighed for at reagere.
(111)
Harmonisering og koordinering af radiofrekvenser og regulering af udstyr understøttet af standardisering er komplementære størrelser, der bør koordineres nøje, således at deres fælles mål opfyldes effektivt med støtte fra Frekvenspolitikgruppen. En koordinering af indholdet og timingen af mandater til Den Europæiske Konference af Post- og Teleadministratorer (CEPT) i henhold til beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF og standardiseringsanmodninger til standardiseringsorganer såsom Det Europæiske Standardiseringsinstitut for Telekommunikation, herunder med hensyn til radiomodtagerparametre, bør fremme indførelsen af fremtidige systemer, understøtte mulighederne for radiofrekvensdeling og sikre en effektiv radiofrekvensforvaltning.
(112)
Efterspørgslen efter harmoniserede radiofrekvenser er ikke ens i hele Unionen. Når der er mangel på efterspørgsel efter hele eller dele af et harmoniseret frekvensbånd på regionalt eller nationalt plan kunne medlemsstaterne undtagelsesvis tillade en alternativ brug af frekvensbåndet, f.eks. for at dække manglende markedsudbud til visse former for brug, så længe den manglende efterspørgsel gør sig gældende, og forudsat at den alternative brug ikke er til ulempe for den harmoniserede brug af frekvensbåndet i andre medlemsstater, og at den ophører, hvis der bliver efterspørgsel efter den harmoniserede brug.
(113)
Der er opnået fleksibilitet i radiofrekvensforvaltningen og adgangen til radiofrekvenser gennem teknologi- og tjenesteneutrale tilladelser, der tillader radiofrekvensbrugerne at vælge de bedste teknologier og tjenester til udnyttelse af radiofrekvensbånd, der i de relevante nationale planer for frekvensallokering, der er opstillet i overensstemmelse med EU-retten (»princippet om teknologineutralitet og princippet om tjenesteneutralitet«), står til rådighed for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Administrative beslutninger om brug af bestemte teknologier og tjenester bør kun gælde, når mål af almen interesse står på spil, og bør være klart begrundede og jævnligt tages op til overvejelse.
(114)
Begrænsninger i princippet om teknologineutralitet bør være relevante og begrundet i nødvendigheden af at undgå skadelig interferens, f.eks. ved at stille krav om udstrålingsmasker og effektniveau, at beskytte folkesundheden ved at begrænse befolkningens udsættelse for elektromagnetiske felter, at sikre velfungerende tjenester gennem et passende niveau for tjenesternes tekniske kvalitet, uden nødvendigvis at udelukke muligheden for at anvende mere end en tjeneste i samme radiofrekvensbånd, at sikre en passende fælles brug af frekvenser, navnlig hvor brugen kun er betinget af generelle tilladelser, at sikre effektiv brug af frekvenser eller at opfylde almennyttige mål i overensstemmelse med EU-retten.
(115)
Radiofrekvensbrugerne bør også kunne vælge frit, hvilke tjenester de vil tilbyde via radiofrekvenserne. Der bør på den anden side tillades foranstaltninger, der kræver, at der tilbydes en bestemt tjeneste for at opfylde klart afgrænsede almennyttige målsætninger, herunder menneskers sikkerhed, behovet for fremme af social, regional eller territorial samhørighed eller undgåelse af ineffektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, hvis en sådan fravigelse er nødvendig og står i et rimeligt forhold til målene. Disse mål bør omfatte fremme af kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed og mediepluralisme som fastlagt af medlemsstaterne i overensstemmelse med EU-retten. Medmindre det er nødvendigt for at beskytte menneskers sikkerhed eller undtagelsesvis for at opfylde andre almennyttige mål som defineret af medlemsstaterne i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, bør undtagelser ikke give bestemte tjenester eksklusiv brugsrettigheder, men i stedet give de pågældende tjenester forrang, så andre tjenester eller teknologier så vidt muligt også kan anvende samme radiofrekvensbånd. Det henhører under medlemsstaternes kompetence at fastlægge omfanget og arten af enhver undtagelse vedrørende fremme af kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed og mediepluralisme.
(116)
Da allokering af radiofrekvenser til bestemte teknologier eller tjenester udgør en fravigelse af principperne om teknologi- og tjenesteneutralitet og begrænser friheden til at vælge, hvilken tjeneste der udbydes, eller hvilken teknologi der anvendes, bør ethvert forslag om en sådan allokering være gennemsigtigt og gøres til genstand for en offentlig høring.
(117)
Hvor medlemsstaterne undtagelsesvist beslutter at begrænse friheden til at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester af hensyn til den offentlige orden, den offentlige sikkerhed eller den offentlige sundhed, bør medlemsstaterne angive grundene til en sådan begrænsning.
(118)
Radiofrekvenser bør forvaltes på en måde, der sikrer, at skadelig interferens undgås. Det grundlæggende begreb skadelig interferens bør derfor defineres tydeligt, så regulerende indgreb begrænses til, hvad der er nødvendigt for at forhindre en sådan interferens, idet der også tages hensyn til behovet for at overveje avancerede metoder til beskyttelse mod skadelig interferens med det formål at anvende disse teknologier og radiofrekvensforvaltningsmetoder til så vidt muligt at undgå anvendelse af princippet om ikkeinterferens og ikkebeskyttelse. Transport har i høj grad et grænseoverskridende element, og digitaliseringen af den medfører store udfordringer. Køretøjer (såsom metro, busser, biler, lastbiler, toge) bliver mere og mere autonome og netforbundne. I det indre marked er det blevet lettere for køretøjer at krydse nationale grænser. Det er afgørende at have pålidelig kommunikation og undgå skadelig interferens, hvis køretøjerne og de ombordværende kommunikationssystemer skal fungere sikkert og godt.
(119)
Med en stigende radiofrekvensefterspørgsel og nye forskellige applikationer og teknologier, som forudsætter en mere fleksibel adgang og brug af radiofrekvenser, bør medlemsstaterne fremme delt brug af radiofrekvenser ved at indføre så egnede tilladelsesordninger som muligt for de enkelte scenarier og ved at fastsætte egnede og transparente regler og betingelser herfor. Delt brug af radiofrekvenser sikrer i højere grad faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af frekvenserne, idet den giver flere uafhængige brugere eller anordninger adgang til samme radiofrekvensbånd efter forskellige retlige ordninger, således at der bliver yderligere radiofrekvensressourcer til rådighed, udnyttelsen bliver mere effektiv, og fremme adgangen til radiofrekvenserne for nye brugere. Delt brug kan bygge på generelle tilladelser eller tilladelsesfri brug, som under bestemte betingelser for delt brug giver flere brugere mulighed for at få adgang til og bruge samme radiofrekvenser i forskellige geografiske områder eller på forskellige tidspunkter. Den kan også baseres på individuelle brugsrettigheder efter ordninger såsom tilladelsesbetinget delt adgang, hvor alle brugere (med en eksisterende bruger og nye brugere) aftaler vilkårene og betingelserne for den delte adgang under tilsyn af de kompetente myndigheder, således at et minimum af radiotransmissionskvalitet sikres. Hvis medlemsstaterne tillader delt brug efter forskellige tilladelsesordninger, bør de ikke fastsætte varighed for en sådan brug, der er meget forskellige, i de forskellige tilladelsesordninger.
(120)
Generelle tilladelser til anvendelse af radiofrekvenser kan fremme den mest effektive radiofrekvensanvendelse og i nogle tilfælde fremme innovation og er konkurrencefremmende, mens individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser i andre tilfælde kan være den mest hensigtsmæssige tilladelsesordning under visse specifikke omstændigheder. Individuelle brugsrettigheder bør f.eks. overvejes, når radiofrekvensernes gunstige spredningsmønstre eller transmissionens påtænkte effektniveau indebærer, at generelle tilladelser ikke kan afhjælpe interferensproblemerne i lyset af den påkrævede tjenestekvalitet. Tekniske foranstaltninger som f.eks. løsninger til at forbedre kvaliteten af modtagere kan gøre det muligt at anvende generelle tilladelser eller muliggøre radiofrekvensdeling og eventuelt undgå systematisk brug af princippet om ikkeinterferens og ikkebeskyttelse.
(121)
Medlemsstaterne bør for at sikre forudsigelighed, juridisk forudsigelighed og investeringsstabilitet på forhånd fastsætte passende kriterier med henblik på at fastslå, om målene om effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser overholdes af rettighedshaverne, når de anvender de vilkår, der er knyttet til de individuelle brugsrettigheder og generelle tilladelser. Interesserede parter bør inddrages i fastlæggelsen af sådanne vilkår og på en transparent måde meddeles, hvordan det vil blive vurderet, om de har opfyldt deres forpligtelser.
(122)
For at undgå, at der skabes hindringer for adgangen til markedet, navnlig gennem konkurrencehæmmende hamstring, bør medlemsstaternes håndhævelse af de vilkår, der er knyttet til brugsrettigheden til radiofrekvenser, være effektiv, og alle kompetente myndigheder bør om nødvendigt bidrage. Håndhævelsesbetingelserne bør omfatte anvendelse af en klausul om, at brugsrettigheden fortabes, hvis frekvenserne ikke reelt udnyttes (»use it or lose it«). Af hensyn til den juridiske forudsigelighed i forbindelse med eventuelle sanktioner for manglende udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser bør der på forhånd fastsættes minimumsgrænser for udnyttelse, herunder med hensyn til tidsrum, omfang og radiofrekvensernes identitet. Salg og udlejning af radiofrekvenser bør sikre en effektiv udnyttelse for den oprindelige rettighedshaver.
(123)
Hvis de harmoniserede betingelser for et radiofrekvensbånd er blevet fastsat i henhold til beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, skal de kompetente myndigheder træffe afgørelse om, hvilken tilladelsesordning der er den mest hensigtsmæssige at anvende i det pågældende frekvensbånd eller dele heraf. Hvis alle medlemsstaterne sandsynligvis står over for lignende problemer, hvor divergerende løsninger kan fragmentere det indre marked for udstyr og derved forsinke udrulningen af 5G-systemer, kan det være nødvendigt for Kommissionen under videst mulig hensyntagen til udtalelsen fra Frekvenspolitikgruppen at anbefale fælles løsninger, som anerkender gældende tekniske harmoniseringsforanstaltninger. Dette kunne være en fælles værktøjskasse for medlemsstaterne, som de kan tage i betragtning, når de fastlægger passende ensartede tilladelsesordninger, der skal anvendes på et bånd eller en del af et bånd, alt efter faktorer som f.eks. befolkningstæthed, båndenes spredningsmønstre, forskellen mellem anvendelse i byområder og landdistrikter, et eventuelt behov for at beskytte eksisterende tjenester og de deraf følgende konsekvenser for stordriftsfordele i produktionen.
(124)
Deling af netinfrastruktur og i visse tilfælde radiofrekvensdeling kan gøre en mere faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser mulig og sikre en hurtig udrulning af net, navnlig i områder, der er mindre tætbefolkede. Når de kompetente myndigheder fastsætter, hvilke betingelser der skal knyttes til retten til radiofrekvenser, bør de også overveje at tillade forskellige former for deling eller koordinering mellem virksomheder med henblik på at sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser eller overholdelse af dækningsforpligtelser i overensstemmelse med konkurrenceretlige principper.
(125)
Kravene om overholdelse af principperne om teknologi- og tjenesteneutralitet i tildelingen af brugsrettigheder samt muligheden for at overdrage rettigheder mellem virksomheder understøtter friheden og midlerne til at levere elektroniske kommunikationstjenester til offentligheden og gør det derved også lettere at opfylde almennyttige mål. Dette direktiv foregriber ikke, hvorvidt radiofrekvenser tildeles direkte til udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester eller til enheder, der bruger disse net eller tjenester. Sådanne enheder kan være udbydere af radio- eller tv-spredningsvirksomhed. Ansvaret for overholdelsen af de vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser, og de relevante vilkår, der er knyttet til den generelle tilladelse, bør dog ligge hos den virksomhed, der har fået tildelt brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenserne. Visse forpligtelser, som radio- og tv-selskaber pålægges for udbud af audiovisuelle medietjenester, kan gøre det nødvendigt at anvende særlige kriterier og procedurer for tildelingen af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser for at opfylde et bestemt almennyttigt mål, som medlemsstaterne har fastsat i overensstemmelse med EU-retten. Proceduren for at tildele sådanne rettigheder bør dog under alle omstændigheder være objektiv, transparent, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpasset.
(126)
Ifølge EU-Domstolens retspraksis bør alle nationale begrænsninger af de rettigheder, der sikres i artikel 56 i TEUF, være objektivt begrundet og forholdsmæssigt afpasset og bør ikke overskride dem, der er nødvendige for at nå deres mål. Radiofrekvenser, der er tildelt uden at følge en åben procedure, bør endvidere ikke anvendes til andre formål end det almennyttige mål, til hvilket de blev tildelt. I så tilfælde bør de interesserede parter gives mulighed for at fremsætte bemærkninger inden for en rimelig frist. Som led i ansøgningsproceduren for tildeling af rettigheder bør medlemsstaterne efterprøve, om ansøgeren kan opfylde de vilkår, der skal knyttes til sådanne rettigheder. Disse vilkår bør afspejles i udvælgelseskriterierne, som fastsættes på en objektiv, transparent, forholdsmæssigt afpasset og ikkediskriminerende måde forud for indledningen af en konkurrencepræget udvælgelsesprocedure. Med henblik på at anvende sådanne kriterier kan ansøgeren anmodes om at fremlægge de oplysninger, der er nødvendige for at kunne godtgøre den pågældendes evne til at opfylde disse vilkår. Hvis disse oplysninger ikke gives, kan ansøgningen om ret til at anvende en radiofrekvens afvises.
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Medlemsstaterne bør forud for tildelingen af rettigheder kun pålægge kontrol af elementer, som en ansøger, der udviser almindelig omhu, med rimelighed kan forventes af opfylde, idet der tages behørigt hensyn til vigtigheden af den samfundsmæssige værdi og markedsværdien af radiofrekvenser som en knap offentlig ressource. Dette berører ikke muligheden for efterfølgende kontrol af, hvorvidt udvælgelseskriterierne er opfyldt, f.eks. ved milepæle, hvis kriterierne ikke med rimelighed kunne opfyldes indledningsvist. For at opretholde en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser bør medlemsstater ikke tildele rettigheder, hvis deres kontrol tyder på, at ansøgeren ikke kan opfylde betingelserne, jf. dog muligheden for at fremme en tidsbegrænset brug til forsøgsformål. Tilladelser til brug af radiofrekvenser af en vis varighed bør gøre investeringerne mere forudsigelige, hvilket bidrager til en hurtigere netudrulning og bedre tjenester samt til stabilitet, der understøtter radiofrekvenshandel og -udlejning. Medmindre der gives tilladelse til at bruge radiofrekvenser for en ubegrænset periode, bør varigheden både tage hensyn til de fastsatte mål og være tilstrækkelig til at fremme tilbagebetalingen af de investeringer, der er foretaget. Selv om en længere varighed bidrager til større investeringsforudsigelighed, tjener foranstaltninger, der skal sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, såsom den kompetente myndigheds beføjelse til at ændre eller tilbagekalde retten, såfremt vilkårene fastsat i brugsrettighederne ikke opfyldes, eller fremme af radiofrekvenshandel og -udlejning, til at forhindre en uhensigtsmæssig akkumulering af radiofrekvenser og skaber større fleksibilitet i distributionen af radiofrekvensressourcer. Større brug af afgifter på årsbasis er også et middel til at sikre en løbende vurdering af brugen af radiofrekvenserne af rettighedshaveren.
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I betragtning af hvor vigtig en rolle teknisk innovation spiller, bør medlemsstaterne kunne tildele rettigheder til brug af radiofrekvenser til forsøgsformål med særlige begrænsninger og på særlige betingelser, der er nøje begrundet i, at rettighederne kun gælder for sådanne forsøg.
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De kompetente myndigheder bør, når de beslutter, om en eksisterende brugsrettighed til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser skal fornys, tage hensyn til, i hvilken grad en fornyelse vil fremme målene med regelsættet og andre mål i henhold til EU-retten eller national ret. Sådanne beslutninger bør være genstand for en åben, ikkediskriminerende og transparent procedure og bygge på en revision af, hvordan de vilkår fastsat i de pågældende brugsrettigheder, er blevet opfyldt. Når medlemsstaterne vurderer, om der er behov for at forny brugsrettigheder, bør de afveje, hvilke konsekvenser det har for konkurrencen at forny tildelte rettigheder i forhold til at åbne frekvensbåndet for nye brugere og dermed måske fremme en mere effektiv udnyttelse eller en innovativ ny brug. De kompetente myndigheder bør i denne forbindelse kunne beslutte kun at tillade en begrænset varighed af fornyelsen for at forhindre alvorlige forstyrrelser af den etablerede brug. Selv om beslutninger om, hvorvidt rettigheder, der er tildelt inden dette direktiv finder anvendelse, skal fornys, bør respektere allerede gældende regler, bør medlemsstaterne også sikre, at de ikke skader målene med dette direktiv.
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Når medlemsstaterne fornyereksisterende brugsrettigheder til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser, bør de sammen med vurderingen af behovet for at forny rettigheden, revurdere de dertil hørende afgifter for at sikre, at disse afgifter fortsat fremmer en optimal brug, idet der tages hensyn til bl.a. markedsudviklingen og den teknologiske udvikling. Af hensyn til den juridiske forudsigelighed er det hensigtsmæssigt, at eventuelle tilpasninger af eksisterende afgifter baseres på de samme principper, som gælder ved tildeling af nye brugsrettigheder.
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En effektiv forvaltning af radiofrekvenser kan sikres ved at sørge for, at de radiofrekvenser, der allerede er tildelt, fortsat bruges effektivt. For at give rettighedshavere juridisk forudsigelighed bør der tages stilling til muligheden for at forny brugsrettigheder inden for en rimelig frist forud for udløbet af de pågældende rettigheder, f.eks. hvor rettigheder er blevet tildelt for 15 år eller derover, mindst to år før udløbet af disse rettighederne, medmindre muligheden for fornyelse udtrykkeligt blev udelukket på tidspunktet for tildeling af rettighederne. Af hensyn til den løbende forvaltning af ressourcer bør de kompetente myndigheder kunne tage stilling til sådanne spørgsmål på eget initiativ samt på anmodning af rettighedshaveren. Brugsrettighederne bør ikke fornys imod rettighedshaverens ønske.
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Overdragelse af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser kan være et effektivt middel til at opnå en mere effektiv udnyttelse af frekvenserne. Af fleksibilitets- og effektivitetshensyn og for at muliggøre en markedsbaseret værdiansættelse af radiofrekvenser bør medlemsstaterne som udgangspunkt tillade radiofrekvensbrugerne at overdrage eller udleje deres brugsrettigheder til tredjemand efter en enkelt procedure og i overensstemmelse med de vilkår, der er fastsat i sådanne rettigheder, og konkurrencereglerne under den ansvarlige nationale tilsynsmyndigheds tilsyn. Medlemsstaterne bør for at fremme en sådan overdragelse eller udlejning, forudsat at de tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, der er vedtaget i henhold til beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, overholdes, også behandle anmodninger om at få radiofrekvensrettigheder delt eller skilt ad og om at få vilkår for brugen taget op til fornyet overvejelse.
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Det bør være op til de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder at træffe foranstaltninger specifikt med henblik på at fremme konkurrencen, når brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser tildeles eller fornys, da de har den fornødne økonomiske og tekniske viden og det fornødne kendskab til markedet. Betingelserne for tildeling af radiofrekvenser kan påvirke konkurrenceforholdene på markederne for elektronisk kommunikation og adgangsbetingelserne. Begrænset adgang til radiofrekvenser, navnlig hvor disse er knappe, kan skabe adgangsbarrierer eller hæmme investeringer, udrulning af net, levering af nye tjenester eller applikationer, innovation og konkurrence. Nye brugsrettigheder, herunder dem, der er erhvervet gennem overdragelse eller leje, og indførelsen af nye fleksible kriterier for radiofrekvensbrug kan også påvirke konkurrencen. Visse betingelser, der bruges til at fremme konkurrencen, kan, hvis de anvendes urimeligt, have andre virkninger, f.eks. kan radiofrekvenslofter og -reservationer skabe en kunstig knaphed, engrosadgangsforpligtelser kan begrænse forretningsmodeller unødigt i mangel af markedsstyrke og begrænsninger af overdragelser kan hindre udviklingen af sekundære markeder. Det er derfor nødvendigt at foretage en konsistent og objektiv konkurrencetest af pålæggelsen af sådanne betingelser, og den bør foretages konsekvent. Brugen af sådanne foranstaltninger bør derfor baseres på de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders grundige og objektive vurdering af markedet og konkurrenceforholdene. De nationale kompetente myndigheder bør imidlertid altid sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser og at konkurrenceforvridning gennem konkurrencehæmmende hamstring undgås.
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Med udgangspunkt i Frekvenspolitikgruppens udtalelser kan det for at undgå grænseoverskridende interferens være nødvendigt at vedtage en fælles frist for, hvornår det kan tillades at bruge et radiofrekvensbånd, der er blevet harmoniseret i overensstemmelse med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, ligesom en sådan frist kan være nyttig, når det skal sikres, at fordelene ved de tilhørende tekniske harmoniseringsforanstaltninger for udstyrsmarkeder og ved udrulningen af net og tjenester med meget høj kapacitet udnyttes fuldt ud. Anvendelse af et radiofrekvensbånd kræver, at der tildeles radiofrekvenser i henhold til en generel tilladelsesordning eller individuelle brugsrettigheder, for at det er tilladt at anvende radiofrekvenserne, så snart tildelingsprocessen er afsluttet. Af hensyn til tildelingen af radiofrekvensbånd kan det være nødvendigt at frigive et frekvensbånd, som er optaget af andre brugere, og at yde dem erstatning. Gennemførelse af en fælles frist for tilladelse til anvendelse af harmoniserede frekvensbånd for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, herunder 5G, kan imidlertid i en given medlemsstat blive berørt af uløste problemer i forbindelse med grænseoverskridende koordinering mellem medlemsstaterne eller med tredjelande, problemer med at sikre den tekniske migrering af eksisterende brugere af et bånd, begrænsning af anvendelsen af frekvensbåndet af hensyn til et mål af almen interesse, beskyttelse af den nationale sikkerhed og forsvaret eller force majeure. Under alle omstændigheder bør medlemsstaterne, hvad angår geografisk dækning, tidsaspekter og radiofrekvensområde, gøre alt for at begrænse eventuelle forsinkelser mest muligt. Derudover kan medlemsstaterne, hvor det er relevant, i lyset af deres vurdering af de relevante forhold anmode Unionen om at yde juridisk, politisk og teknisk bistand med henblik på at løse problemer vedrørende radiofrekvenskoordinering med Unionens nabolande, herunder kandidatlande og tiltrædelseslande, således at de pågældende medlemsstater kan opfylde deres forpligtelser i henhold til EU-retten.
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For at sikre øget koordineret adgang til radiofrekvensressourcer senest i 2020 med henblik på at opnå faste og trådløse højhastighedsnet, i forbindelse med 5G, er 3,4-3,8 GHz- og 24,25-27,5 GHz-båndene af Frekvenspolitikgruppen blevet identificeret som prioriterede frekvensbånd, der er egnede til at opfylde målene i 5G-handlingsplanen senest i 2020. 40,5-43,5 GHz- og 66-71 GHz-båndene er også blevet udpeget med henblik på yderligere undersøgelse. Det er derfor nødvendigt at sikre, at 3,4-3,8 GHz- og 24,25-27,5 GHz-båndene eller dele deraf senest den 31. december 2020 stilles til rådighed for jordbaserede systemer, som kan levere trådløse bredbåndstjenester på harmoniserede betingelser fastsat i tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i henhold til artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF som supplement til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse (EU) 2017/899 
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, eftersom disse bånd har særlige egenskaber, hvad angår dækning og datakapacitet, som gør det muligt at kombinere dem i tilstrækkelig grad med henblik på at opfylde 5G-kravene. Medlemsstaterne kan dog blive berørt af interferens, der sandsynligvis vil hidrøre fra tredjelande, som i overensstemmelse med ITU's radioreglement har udpeget disse frekvensbånd til andre tjenester end international mobil telekommunikation. Dette kan påvirke forpligtelsen til at overholde en fælles gennemførelsesdato. Den fremtidige anvendelse af 26 GHz-båndet til jordbaserede trådløse 5G-tjenester vil sandsynligvis bl.a. være rettet mod byområder og hotspotområder i byudkanter, mens der må påregnes en vis udrulning langs større veje og jernbanespor i landdistrikter. Dette giver mulighed for at anvende 26 GHz-båndet til andre tjenester end trådløse 5G-tjenester uden for disse geografiske områder, f.eks. til erhvervsspecifik kommunikation eller indendørs brug, og gør det derfor muligt for medlemsstaterne at udpege dette frekvensbånd og gøre det tilgængeligt på et ikkeeksklusivt grundlag.
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Når efterspørgslen efter et radiofrekvensbånd overstiger de tilgængelige radiofrekvenser, og medlemsstaterne som følge deraf konkluderer, at brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser skal begrænses, bør de procedurer, der gælder for tildeling af disse rettigheder, være hensigtsmæssige og gennemskuelige for at undgå forskelsbehandling og for at optimere brugen af disse knappe ressourcer. Sådanne begrænsninger bør være berettigede, forholdsmæssigt afpassede og baseret på en omhyggelig vurdering af markedsvilkårene, idet der tages behørigt hensyn til de overordnede fordele for brugerne og til nationale mål og målene for det indre marked. Målene for enhver begrænsningsprocedure bør fastsættes tydeligt i forvejen. Medlemsstaterne bør, når de skal vælge den mest hensigtsmæssige udvælgelsesprocedure, rettidigt og på en transparent måde, og i overensstemmelse med koordineringstiltag truffet på EU-plan, høre alle interesserede parter om procedurens berettigelse, mål og betingelser. Medlemsstaterne bør bl.a. kunne anvende konkurrenceprægede eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedurer ved tildeling af radiofrekvenser eller nummerressourcer af særlig økonomisk værdi. Ved forvaltningen af sådanne ordninger bør de kompetente myndigheder tage hensyn til målene i dette direktiv. Hvis en medlemsstat konstaterer, at der kan stilles yderligere rettigheder til rådighed i et frekvensbånd, bør den indlede proceduren herfor.
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En voldsom stigning i efterspørgslen efter radiofrekvenser og i slutbrugernes efterspørgsel efter trådløs bredbåndskapacitet kan betyde, at der må findes løsninger, som muliggør alternative, komplementære og frekvensmæssigt effektive adgangsløsninger, herunder trådløse adgangssystemer med lav effekt og lille rækkevidde, såsom RLAN og net med små mobiladgangspunkter med lav effekt. Sådanne komplementære trådløse adgangssystemer, navnlig offentligt tilgængelige RLAN-adgangspunkter, forbedrer adgangen til internettet for slutbrugere og mobiltrafikfordelingen for mobiloperatørerne. RLAN benytter harmoniserede radiofrekvenser, uden at der stilles krav om en individuel tilladelse eller brugsrettighed til radiofrekvenser. De fleste RLAN-adgangspunkter benyttes til dato af private brugere som lokale trådløse forlængelser af deres faste bredbåndsforbindelse. Slutbrugere bør inden for rammerne af deres eget internetabonnement ikke forhindres i at dele adgangen til deres RLAN med andre, således at antallet af tilgængelige adgangspunkter øges, navnlig i tætbefolkede områder, den trådløse datakapacitet maksimeres ved hjælp af genanvendelse af radiofrekvenser, og der skabes en omkostningseffektiv trådløs bredbåndsinfrastruktur, der er tilgængelig for andre brugere. Unødige begrænsninger for udrulning og sammenkobling af RLAN-adgangspunkter bør derfor også fjernes.
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De offentlige myndigheder eller offentlige tjenesteudbydere, som bruger RLAN i deres bygninger til gavn for personale, gæster eller kunder, f.eks. for at fremme adgangen til e-forvaltningstjenester eller til oplysninger om offentlig transport eller trafikstyring, kunne også give adgang til sådanne adgangspunkter til almen brug for borgerne som en ekstra tjeneste ud over de tjenester, som de leverer til offentligheden i disse lokaler, i det omfang konkurrencereglerne og reglerne om offentlige udbud tillader det. Udbydere af en sådan lokal adgang til elektroniske kommunikationsnet på eller omkring en privat ejendom eller et afgrænset offentligt område på et ikkekommercielt grundlag eller som ekstraydelse til en anden aktivitet, der ikke afhænger af en sådan adgang, såsom RLAN-hotspots, der stilles til rådighed for kunder, der betaler for andre ydelser, eller til offentligheden generelt i området, kan blive omfattet af kravene i generelle tilladelser til brug af radiofrekvenser, men bør ikke skulle opfylde betingelser eller krav, der er knyttet til de generelle tilladelser, og som gælder udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester eller forpligtelser vedrørende slutbrugere eller samtrafik. En sådan udbyder bør dog være omfattet af reglerne om ansvar fastsat i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2000/31/EF 
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. Nye teknologier kommer til, såsom LiFi (Light Fidelity), og de vil supplere den aktuelle radiofrekvenskapacitet i RLAN og trådløse adgangspunkter med adgangspunkter, der er baseret på optisk synligt lys, og vil føre til hybride lokale datanet, der muliggør optisk trådløs kommunikation.
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Da trådløse adgangspunkter med lav effekt og lille rækkevidde som f.eks. femtoceller, picoceller, metroceller eller mikroceller kan være meget små og benytter udstyr, der ikke er iøjefaldende i lighed med, hvad der anvendes i private RLAN-routere, som ikke kræver tilladelser ud over, dem der er nødvendigt for brugen af radiofrekvenser, og da sådanne adgangspunkter har en positiv indflydelse på udnyttelsen af radiofrekvenser og udviklingen af trådløs kommunikation, bør enhver indskrænkning af deres udrulning begrænses mest muligt. Som følge heraf bør medlemsstaterne for at fremme udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde og med forbehold af gældende krav vedrørende radiofrekvensforvaltning ikke underlægge udrulning af sådanne anordninger på bygninger, som ikke er officielt beskyttet som en del af et særligt udpeget miljø eller på grund af deres særlige arkitektoniske eller historiske værdi, individuelle tilladelser, undtagen af hensyn til den offentlige sikkerhed. Med henblik herpå bør deres egenskaber, såsom maksimal størrelse, vægt og emissionsegenskaber, specificeres på EU-plan på en forholdsmæssig afpasset måde for så vidt angår lokal udrulning og for at sikre et højt beskyttelsesniveau for folkesundheden som fastsat i henstilling 1999/519/EF. Med henblik på drift af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde bør artikel 7 i direktiv 2014/53/EU anvendes. Dette gælder med forbehold for den private ejendomsret, der er fastsat i EU-retten eller national ret. Proceduren for behandling af ansøgninger om tilladelser bør strømlines og bør ikke berøre eventuelle kommercielle aftaler, og eventuelle administrationsgebyrer bør begrænses til de administrative omkostninger ved behandling af ansøgningen. Vurderingen af en ansøgning om en tilladelse bør tage så kort tid som muligt og i princippet højst fire måneder.
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Offentlige bygninger og anden offentlig infrastruktur besøges og anvendes dagligt af et stort antal slutbrugere, der har behov for konnektivitet til at bruge e-forvaltning, e-transport og andre tjenester. Andre offentlige infrastrukturer såsom gadelamper, lyssignaler er meget værdifulde steder til udrulning af små celler f.eks. som følge af deres tæthed. Uden at dette berører de kompetente myndigheders mulighed for at underlægge udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde forudgående individuelle tilladelser, bør operatørerne have adgang til disse offentlige steder, så de i tilstrækkelig grad kan imødekomme efterspørgslen. Medlemsstaterne bør derfor sikre, at sådanne offentlige bygninger og anden offentlig infrastruktur stilles til rådighed på rimelige betingelser i forbindelse med udrulningen af små celler med henblik på at supplere direktiv 2014/61/EU, jf. dog principperne i dette direktiv. I direktiv 2014/61/EU følges en funktionel tilgang, og der pålægges kun adgangsforpligtelser for fysisk infrastruktur, når denne indgår i et net, og kun hvis den ejes eller benyttes af en netoperatør, hvorved mange bygninger, der ejes eller benyttes af offentlige myndigheder, falder uden for direktivets anvendelsesområde. Det er imidlertid ikke nødvendigt med en særlig forpligtelse for fysisk infrastruktur såsom kabelkanaler eller master, der anvendes til intelligente transportsystemer, som ejes af netoperatører (udbydere af transporttjenester eller udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet), og et nets værtsdele, som derved er omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for direktiv 2014/61/EU.
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Bestemmelserne i nærværende direktiv finder for så vidt angår adgang og samtrafik anvendelse på offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet. Udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet til andre end offentligheden er ikke underlagt nogen forpligtelser vedrørende adgang eller samtrafik i henhold til dette direktiv, medmindre de i kraft af adgang til offentlige net kan underlægges betingelser, som er fastsat af medlemsstaterne.
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Begrebet »adgang« defineres vidt forskelligt, og der er derfor behov for en præcis definition af, hvordan begrebet bruges i dette direktiv, uden at det berører dets anvendelse i forbindelse med andre af Unionens bestemmelser. En operatør kan eje det underliggende net eller de underliggende faciliteter eller leje nogle af dem eller dem alle.
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På et marked med fri og åben konkurrence bør der ikke være begrænsninger, der hindrer virksomheder i at forhandle sig frem til indbyrdes adgangs- og samtrafikaftaler, navnlig hvad angår grænseoverskridende aftaler, i overensstemmelse med TEUF's konkurrenceregler. I forbindelse med skabelsen af et mere effektivt, reelt paneuropæisk marked med effektiv konkurrence, flere valgmuligheder og konkurrencedygtige tjenester for slutbrugere bør virksomheder, som modtager anmodninger om adgang eller samtrafik fra andre virksomheder, som er omfattet af en generel tilladelse for at kunne udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester til offentligheden, i princippet indgå sådanne aftaler på et kommercielt grundlag og forhandle i god tro.
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På markeder, hvor der også fremover vil være stor forskel på virksomhedernes forhandlingsposition, og hvor visse virksomheder er afhængige af infrastruktur, der udbydes af andre selskaber, for at kunne fremføre deres tjenester, vil det være hensigtsmæssigt, at der opstilles en rammelovgivning, som sikrer, at markedet fungerer effektivt. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør gives mulighed for at sikre den fornødne adgang, samtrafik og interoperabilitet mellem tjenester til gavn for slutbrugerne, når det ikke lykkes at nå til enighed om en aftale på kommercielt grundlag. De kan navnlig sikre end-to-end-konnektivitet ved at pålægge virksomheder, der er omfattet af den generelle tilladelse, og som kontrollerer adgangen til slutbrugere, forholdsmæssige forpligtelser. Kontrol over adgangsmuligheder kan indebære ejerskab af eller kontrol over den fysiske forbindelse til slutbrugeren (hvad enten det er på fast- eller mobilnettet) eller mulighed for at ændre eller inddrage det eller de nationale numre, der er nødvendige for at oprette forbindelse til en slutbrugers nettermineringspunkt. Det vil f.eks. være aktuelt, hvis netoperatører uden rimelig grund begrænser slutbrugernes muligheder for at tilslutte sig internetportaler og tjenester.
(145)
I lyset af princippet om ikkediskrimination bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikre, at alle virksomheder uanset deres størrelse eller forretningsmodel, og hvad enten de er vertikalt integrerede eller adskilte, kan opnå samtrafik på rimelige vilkår med henblik på at udbyde end-to-end-konnektivitet og adgang til internettet.
(146)
Nationale love eller administrative forskrifter, der knytter betingelser og vilkår for adgang eller samtrafik sammen med aktiviteterne hos den part, der anmoder om samtrafik, herunder specifikt omfanget af den pågældendes investeringer i netinfrastruktur, i stedet for at knytte dem til de leverede samtrafik- eller adgangstjenester, kan resultere i konkurrencefordrejning, hvilket er i strid med konkurrencelovgivningen.
(147)
Netoperatører, der kontrollerer adgangen til deres egne kunder, gør dette ved hjælp af entydige numre eller adresser i en offentliggjort nummer- eller adresseoversigt. Andre netoperatører skal kunne aflevere trafik til disse kunder og har således brug for at kunne kobles sammen enten direkte eller indirekte. Der bør derfor fastsættes bestemmelser om rettigheder og pligter til at forhandle om indgåelse af samtrafikaftaler.
(148)
Interoperabilitet er en fordel for slutbrugerne og er et vigtigt mål for denne rammelovgivning. Fremme af interoperabilitet er et af målene for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder i henhold til denne rammelovgivning Denne rammelovgivning fastslår endvidere, at Kommissionen skal offentliggøre en liste over standarder eller specifikationer for udbud af tjenester, tekniske grænseflader eller netfunktioner som grundlag for at fremme harmoniseringen inden for elektronisk kommunikation. Medlemsstaterne bør fremme anvendelsen af de offentliggjorte standarder eller specifikationer i det omfang, disse er strengt nødvendige for at sikre interoperabilitet mellem tjenester og øge brugernes valgmuligheder.
(149)
I øjeblikket afhænger både end-to-end-konnektivitet og adgang til beredskabstjenester af, at slutbrugere benytter nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. Den teknologiske udvikling eller en øget brug af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester kunne medføre mangel på tilstrækkelig interoperabilitet mellem kommunikationstjenester. Dette kunne skabe betydelige hindringer for markedsadgangen og for den videre innovation og dermed i betydeligt omfang true effektiv end-to-end-konnektivitet mellem slutbrugere.
(150)
Hvis sådanne interoperabilitetsproblemer opstår, bør Kommissionen kunne anmode om en rapport fra BEREC, som skal udarbejde en faktuel vurdering af markedssituationen på EU-niveau og medlemsstatsniveau. Under størst mulig hensyntagen til BEREC's rapport og anden til rådighed værende dokumentation og under hensyntagen til virkninger på det indre marked bør Kommissionen afgøre, om der er behov for, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder griber ind med regulering. Hvis Kommissionen mener, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder bør overveje regulatorisk indgriben, bør den kunne vedtage gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, som specificerer, hvilken form og hvilket omfang eventuel regulatorisk indgriben fra de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder bør have, herunder navnlig myndighedernes og andre udbyderes forpligtelser til at offentliggøre og tillade brug, ændring og videreformidling af relevante oplysninger og foranstaltninger med henblik på at pålægge alle eller bestemte udbydere obligatorisk brug af standarder eller specifikationer.
(151)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder bør i lyset af de specifikke nationale omstændigheder vurdere, om en intervention er nødvendig og berettiget for at sikre end-to-end-konnektivitet, og i givet fald pålægge de udbydere af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, som har et betydeligt dækningsniveau og betydelig brugerudbredelse, forholdsmæssigt afpassede forpligtelser i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens gennemførelsesforanstaltninger. Termen betydelig/-t bør fortolkes således, at den berørte udbyders geografiske dækning og antal slutbrugere repræsenterer en kritisk masse med henblik på at nå målet om at sikre end-to-end-konnektivitet mellem slutbrugere. Udbydere med et begrænset antal slutbrugere eller begrænset geografisk dækning, som kun marginalt ville kunne bidrage til at nå dette mål, bør normalt ikke være omfattet af sådanne interoperabilitetsforpligtelser.
(152)
I tilfælde hvor virksomheder ikke har adgang til realistiske alternativer til et ikkereplikerbart ledningsnet, kabler og tilhørende faciliteter i bygninger eller frem til det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, og med henblik på at skabe konkurrencemæssige resultater i slutbrugernes interesse, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder have beføjelse til at pålægge alle virksomheder adgangsforpligtelser, uanset en udpegning som havende en stærk markedsposition. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør i den forbindelse tage hensyn til alle tekniske og økonomiske hindringer for fremtidig replikering af net. Eftersom disse forpligtelser i visse tilfælde kan være indgribende, underminere incitamenter til investeringer og have den konsekvens, at dominerende aktørers position bliver styrket, bør de imidlertid kun pålægges, hvor det er begrundet og står i rimeligt forhold til at opnå bæredygtig konkurrence på de relevante markeder. Alene det forhold, at der allerede findes mere end en infrastruktur, bør ikke nødvendigvis fortolkes som tegn på, at dets aktiver kan replikeres. Virksomhederne bør, om nødvendigt i kombination med sådanne adgangsforpligtelser, også kunne påberåbe sig forpligtelsen til at give adgang til fysisk infrastruktur på grundlag af direktiv 2014/61/EU. Forpligtelser, der pålægges af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i henhold til nævnte direktiv, og afgørelser truffet af andre kompetente myndigheder i henhold til direktiv 2014/61/EU for at sikre adgang til fysisk infrastruktur i bygninger eller fysisk infrastruktur frem til det første adgangspunkt bør være i overensstemmelse.
(153)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør i nødvendigt omfang kunne pålægge virksomhederne forpligtelser til at give adgang til de faciliteter, der er nævnt i et bilag til dette direktiv, dvs. programmeringsgrænseflader for applikationer (API'er) og elektroniske programoversigter (EPG'er), ikke kun for at sikre slutbrugernes adgang til digitale radio- og tv-tjenester, men også til beslægtede supplerende tjenester. Sådanne supplerende tjenester bør kunne omfatte programrelaterede tjenester, der specifikt er udformet til at forbedre adgang for slutbrugere med handicap, og programrelaterede internetforbundne tv-tjenester.
(154)
Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder vurderer det koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, frem til hvilket eller hvilken de agter at pålægge adgangsforpligtelser, er det vigtigt, at de vælger et punkt i overensstemmelse med BEREC's retningslinjer. Hvis der vælges et punkt tættere på slutbrugerne, vil det være mere fordelagtigt for den infrastrukturbaserede konkurrence og udrulningen af net med meget høj kapacitet. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed bør således først overveje at vælge et punkt i en bygning eller lige uden for en bygning. Det kan være berettiget at udvide adgangsforpligtelserne til ledningsnet og kabler efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, idet sådanne forpligtelser begrænses til punkter, der ligger så tæt på slutbrugerne som muligt, og som kan være vært for et tilstrækkeligt antal slutbrugere, i tilfælde hvor det påvises, at der er store og varige fysiske eller økonomiske hindringer ved replikering, der medfører vigtige konkurrenceproblemer eller markedssvigt på detailniveau til skade for slutbrugerne. Vurderingen af netelementers replikabilitet kræver en markedsundersøgelse, der adskiller sig fra en analyse, der vurderer stærk markedsposition, og den nationale tilsynsmyndighed behøver således ikke at fastslå, at der er tale om stærk markedsposition, for at pålægge disse forpligtelser. På den anden side kræver en sådan analyse en tilstrækkelig økonomisk vurdering af markedsforholdene for at fastslå, om de kriterier, som er nødvendige for at pålægge forpligtelser, der går videre end det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, er opfyldt. Der er større sandsynlighed for, at sådanne udvidede adgangsforpligtelser er nødvendige i geografiske områder, hvor forretningsmulighederne for at udrulle alternativ infrastruktur er forbundet med større risici, f.eks. på grund af lav befolkningstæthed eller et begrænset antal flerfamiliehuse. Omvendt kan en høj koncentration af husstande være et tegn på, at det ikke er nødvendigt at pålægge sådanne forpligtelser. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør også overveje, om sådanne forpligtelser vil kunne styrke positionen for virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør kunne pålægge adgang til aktive eller virtuelle netelementer, der bruges til at udbyde tjenester på sådan infrastruktur, hvis adgangen til passive elementer ville være økonomisk ineffektiv eller fysisk umulig, og hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed mener, at formålet med adgangsforpligtelsen ville blive omgået, hvis der ikke blev grebet ind. For at styrke en ensartet reguleringspraksis i hele Unionen bør Kommissionen kunne kræve, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed trækker sine udkast til foranstaltninger til udvidelse af adgangsforpligtelserne tilbage efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, hvis BEREC deler Kommissionens alvorlige tvivl om, hvorvidt udkastet til foranstaltning er foreneligt med EU-retten og navnlig reguleringsmålene i dette direktiv.
(155)
I sådanne tilfælde og for at efterleve proportionalitetsprincippet kan det være hensigtsmæssigt for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder at undtage visse kategorier af ejere eller virksomheder eller begge fra forpligtelser, der går videre end det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, der bør fastlægges af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, med den begrundelse, at en adgangsforpligtelse, som ikke bygger på en virksomheds udpegning som havende en stærk markedsposition, ville risikere at skade deres forretningsmuligheder ved nyligt udrullede netelementer, navnlig for små lokale projekter. Virksomheder, der udelukkende opererer på engrosniveau, bør ikke være genstand for sådanne adgangsforpligtelser, hvis de tilbyder en effektiv alternativ adgang på et kommercielt grundlag til et net med meget høj kapacitet på fair, ikkediskriminerende og rimelige vilkår og betingelser, herunder hvad angår pris. Det bør være muligt at udvide denne undtagelse til også at gælde andre udbydere på samme vilkår. Undtagelsen er muligvis ikke hensigtsmæssig for udbydere, der modtager offentlige midler.
(156)
Deling af passiv infrastruktur, der benyttes ved trådløse elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i overensstemmelse med konkurrenceretlige principper, kan være særlig nyttig for at maksimere konnektivitet med meget høj kapacitet i hele Unionen, navnlig i områder, der er mindre tætbefolkede, hvor replikering ikke er mulig, og hvor slutbrugerne risikerer ikke at have en sådan konnektivitet. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder bør undtagelsesvis kunne pålægge en sådan deling eller lokal roamingadgang i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, hvis denne mulighed er klart fastlagt i de oprindelige vilkår for brugsrettigheden, og de påviser, at en sådan deling med fordel kan bidrage til at overvinde uoverstigelige økonomiske eller fysiske hindringer, og adgangen til net eller tjenester derfor er alvorligt mangelfuld eller fraværende, idet der tages hensyn til mange aspekter, herunder især behovet for dækning langs større transportveje, udvalg og en bedre kvalitet af tjenester til slutbrugerne samt behovet for at bevare incitamentet til at udrulle infrastruktur. I tilfælde, hvor der ikke er adgang for slutbrugere, og deling af passiv infrastruktur alene ikke er tilstrækkelig til at håndtere situationen, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kunne pålægge forpligtelser til deling af aktiv infrastruktur. Dermed bevarer de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder fleksibiliteten til at vælge den mest hensigtsmæssige deling- eller adgangsforpligtelse, der bør være forholdsmæssig og begrundet med udgangspunkt i det konstaterede problems art.
(157)
Selvom det under visse omstændigheder kan være hensigtsmæssigt, at en national tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed indfører forpligtelser for virksomheder, uanset om de er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, for at nå mål som end-to-end-konnektivitet eller interoperabilitet mellem tjenester, er det nødvendigt at sikre, at sådanne forpligtelser pålægges i overensstemmelse med regelsættet og navnlig dets anmeldelsesprocedurer. Sådanne forpligtelser bør kun pålægges, når det er begrundet i hensynet til at sikre formålene med dette direktiv, og hvor det er objektivt begrundet, gennemsigtigt, forholdsmæssigt og ikkediskriminerende med hensyn til at fremme effektivitet, holdbar konkurrence, effektive investeringer og effektiv innovation og giver slutbrugerne flest mulige fordele, og såfremt de pålægges i overensstemmelse med de relevante anmeldelsesprocedurer.
(158)
For at overvinde uoverstigelige økonomiske eller fysiske hindringer for at udbyde tjenester eller net, der afhænger af udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, til slutbrugerne, og hvor der er huller i mobildækningen, kan lukningen heraf kræve adgang til og deling af passiv infrastruktur — eller hvor dette ikke er tilstrækkeligt — deling af aktiv infrastruktur eller lokale roamingaftaler. Uden at dette berører de delingsforpligtelser, der er knyttet til brugsrettigheder på grundlag af andre bestemmelser i dette direktiv, og navnlig foranstaltninger med henblik på at fremme konkurrencen, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, når de agter at træffe foranstaltninger til at pålægge deling af passiv infrastruktur — eller når passiv adgang og deling ikke er tilstrækkelig — deling af aktiv infrastruktur eller lokale roamingaftaler, dog også opfordres til at overveje den mulige risiko for markedsdeltagerne i underforsynede områder.
(159)
Konkurrenceregler kan muligvis ikke i sig selv altid sikre den kulturelle mangfoldighed og mediepluralisme inden for digitalt tv. Den teknologiske og markedsmæssige udvikling nødvendiggør, at forpligtelser til at give betinget adgang på fair, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår tages op til fornyet overvejelse med jævne mellemrum af en medlemsstat for så vidt angår dens nationale marked for navnlig at afgøre, om det er berettiget at udvide dem, så de også omfatter EPG'er og API'er, i det omfang, det er nødvendigt for at sikre slutbrugernes adgang til bestemte digitale radio- og tv-transmissionstjenester. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne nærmere angive de digitale radio- og tv-transmissionstjenester, som slutbrugerne skal sikres adgang til ved hjælp af de love og administrative bestemmelser, de skønner nødvendige.
(160)
Medlemsstaterne bør også kunne give deres nationale tilsynsmyndighed tilladelse til at revurdere forpligtelserne i forbindelse med adgangsstyring af digitale radio- og tv-transmissionstjenester for gennem en markedsanalyse at vurdere, om betingelserne for virksomheder, som ikke har en stærk markedsposition på det relevante marked, skal trækkes tilbage eller ændres. En sådan tilbagetrækning eller ændring bør ikke få negative følger for slutbrugernes adgang til sådanne tjenester eller for udsigterne til en effektiv konkurrence.
(161)
Det er under visse omstændigheder nødvendigt at opstille en række ex ante-forpligtelser for at sikre udvikling af et konkurrencepræget marked med vilkår, som fremmer udrulning og ibrugtagning af net og tjenester med meget høj kapacitet og de størst mulige fordele for slutbrugerne. Definitionen på stærk markedsposition i dette direktiv svarer til begrebet dominerende stilling som fastlagt i EU-Domstolens retspraksis.
(162)
Der er en formodning for, at to eller flere virksomheder indtager en kollektivt dominerende stilling ikke alene, når der består strukturelle eller andre indbyrdes forbindelser, men også når det relevante markeds struktur må siges at være befordrende for koordineringseffekter, altså at det tilskynder til parallel eller gensidigt tilpasset konkurrencebegrænsende markedsadfærd.
(163)
Det er vigtigt, at sådanne ex ante-forpligtelser kun pålægges på et engrosmarked, hvor der er en eller flere virksomheder med en stærk markedsposition, med henblik på at sikre holdbar konkurrence, og hvor midlerne i medlemsstatens eller Unionens konkurrenceret ikke er tilstrækkelige til at løse problemet. Kommissionen har under iagttagelse af principperne i konkurrenceretten opstillet retningslinjer på EU-plan for, hvordan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder skal vurdere, om der er reel konkurrence på et givet marked, og om der er tale om en stærk markedsposition. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør analysere, om der er reel konkurrence for så vidt angår et bestemt produkt eller tjenestemarked i et nærmere bestemt geografisk område, som kan være enten hele den pågældende medlemsstat, en del heraf eller tilgrænsende dele af områder i flere medlemsstater set under ét. En analyse af, om der foreligger effektiv konkurrence, bør omfatte en analyse af, om markedet er et potentielt konkurrencemarked, og om den eventuelle mangel på konkurrence altså er varig. Disse retningslinjer bør også behandle spørgsmålet om nye, fremspirende markeder, hvor den faktiske markedsleder sandsynligvis har en betydelig markedsandel, men ikke bør pålægges urimelige forpligtelser. Kommissionen bør regelmæssigt tage retningslinjerne op til revision, navnlig i forbindelse med en revision af den eksisterende ret og under hensyntagen til EU-Domstolens retspraksis, økonomisk tænkning og faktisk markedserfaring for at sikre, at de til stadighed er hensigtsmæssige på et marked i hastig udvikling. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder må samarbejde med hinanden, hvor det pågældende marked viser sig at være transnationalt.
(164)
Ved afgørelser af, om en virksomhed har en stærk markedsposition på et bestemt marked, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder handle i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og tage størst muligt hensyn til Kommissionens retningslinjer for markedsanalyse og vurderingen af en stærk markedsposition.
(165)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør afgrænse relevante geografiske markeder på deres område, idet der tages størst muligt hensyn til Kommissionens henstilling om relevante produkt- og tjenestemarkeder (»henstillingen«), som er vedtaget i henhold til dette direktiv, og til nationale og lokale forhold. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør derfor som minimum analysere de markeder, som er omfattet af henstillingen, herunder de markeder, som er opført, men ikke længere er reguleret i den specifikke nationale eller lokale kontekst. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør ligeledes analysere markeder, der ikke er omfattet af henstillingen, men som er reguleret på det område, der er under deres jurisdiktion, på grundlag af tidligere markedsanalyser, eller andre markeder, hvis de har tilstrækkelig grundlag for at mene, at de tre kriterier, som er fastsat i dette direktiv, er opfyldt.
(166)
Transnationale markeder kan afgrænses, når det er begrundet i markedsafgrænsning, under hensyntagen til alle udbuds- og efterspørgselssidefaktorer i overensstemmelse med konkurrenceretlige principper. BEREC er det mest egnede organ til at foretage en sådan analyse, idet det drager fordel af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders omfattende fælles erfaring med afgræsning af nationale markeder. Der bør tages hensyn til nationale forhold, når der foretages en analyse af potentielle transnationale markeder. Hvis de transnationale markeder afgrænses og berettiger foranstaltninger, bør de berørte nationale tilsynsmyndigheder samarbejde om at finde en hensigtsmæssig reguleringsmæssig respons, herunder i anmeldelsesproceduren over for Kommissionen. De kan også samarbejde på samme vis i tilfælde, hvor de transnationale markeder ikke er identificeret, men markedsvilkårene på deres områder er tilstrækkeligt ensartede til at kunne få gavn af en koordineret reguleringspraksis, eksempelvis hvad angår lignende omkostninger, markedsstrukturer eller operatører eller i tilfælde af transnational eller sammenlignelig efterspørgsel fra slutbrugerne.
(167)
Under visse omstændigheder er de geografiske markeder defineret som nationale eller subnationale, f.eks. fordi udrulningen af nettet er af national eller lokal karakter, hvilket sætter grænserne for virksomhedernes potentielle markedsposition, hvad angår engrosforsyning, men der er fortsat en markant transnational efterspørgsel hos en eller flere kategorier af slutbrugere. Det kan navnlig være tilfældet ved efterspørgsel fra slutbrugere inden for erhvervslivet, som driver faciliteter på flere steder i forskellige medlemsstater. Hvis denne transnationale efterspørgsel ikke kan efterkommes af leverandørerne i tilstrækkelig grad, f.eks. hvis disse er fragmenteret langs nationale grænser eller lokalt, opstår der en potentiel hindring for det indre marked. BEREC bør derfor tildeles beføjelser til at fastsætte retningslinjer for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder om fælles reguleringstilgange for at sikre, at den transnationale efterspørgsel kan efterkommes på tilfredsstillende vis, hvilket danner grundlag for interoperabiliteten af engrosadgangsprodukter i hele Unionen og muliggør effektivitet og stordriftsfordele til trods for en fragmenteret udbudsside. BEREC's retningslinjer bør forme de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders valg på vej mod målsætningen om det indre marked, når de pålægger virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, lovgivningsmæssige forpligtelser på nationalt niveau, og samtidig fungere som rettesnor for harmoniseringen af tekniske specifikationer for engrosadgangsprodukter, der kan dække en sådan konstateret transnational efterspørgsel i det indre markeds interesse.
(168)
Sigtet med enhver form for forhåndsregulering er i sidste instans at opnå fordele for slutbrugerne med hensyn til pris, kvalitet og valgmuligheder ved at sikre detailmarkeder med effektiv konkurrence på et holdbart grundlag. Navnlig i betragtning af de forventede fremskridt med hensyn til innovation og konkurrence er det sandsynligt, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder gradvist vil konstatere, at der findes mange konkurrenceprægede detailmarkeder, også selv om der ikke reguleres på engrosniveau.
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For de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder er udgangspunktet for udpegningen af engrosmarkeder, hvor forhåndsregulering kan være berettiget, en analyse af tilsvarende detailmarkeder. Analysen af den effektive konkurrence på detail- og engrosniveau foretages ud fra et fremadrettet perspektiv over en given tidshorisont og bygger på konkurrenceretten, herunder EU-Domstolens retspraksis, hvis det er relevant. Hvis det konkluderes, at der vil være effektiv konkurrence på et detailmarked uden forhåndsregulering på engrosniveau på det eller de tilsvarende relevante markeder, bør det føre til, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed konkluderer, at det ikke længere er nødvendigt at regulere på det relevante engrosniveau.
(170)
Sideløbende med den gradvise overgang til deregulerede markeder vil kommercielle aftaler, herunder om saminvestering og adgang mellem operatører, blive stadig mere almindelige, og hvis de er holdbare og forbedrer konkurrencedynamikken, vil de kunne bidrage til den konklusion, at et bestemt engrosmarked ikke berettiger forhåndsregulering. En lignende logik vil gælde den anden vej rundt på kommercielle aftalers uforudsete ophør på et dereguleret marked. Analysen af sådanne aftaler bør tage højde for, at muligheden for regulering kan være grund til, at netejere indgår i kommercielle forhandlinger. Med henblik på at sikre, at der tages passende hensyn til indvirkningen af regulering på tilknyttede markeder, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, når de bestemmer, om et givet marked berettiger forhåndsregulering, sikre, at markederne analyseres på sammenhængende vis og om muligt enten på samme tid eller så tæt på hinanden som muligt.
(171)
Når det vurderes, om regulering på engrosniveau kan løse problemer på detailniveau, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tage højde for det forhold, at adskillige engrosmarkeder kan bidrage med input fra det foregående engrosled for et givet detailmarked, ligesom et enkelt engrosmarked omvendt kan bidrage med input fra det foregående engrosled for en række detailmarkeder. Derudover kan konkurrencedynamikken på et givet marked blive påvirket af markeder, som hænger sammen, men ikke har et vertikalt forhold, sådan som det kan være tilfældet mellem visse fastnet- og mobilnetmarkeder. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør foretage denne vurdering for hvert enkelt engrosmarked, der er i betragtning til regulering, idet de starter med foranstaltninger til adgang til civil infrastruktur, da sådanne foranstaltninger sædvanligvis er befordrende for mere holdbar konkurrence, herunder infrastrukturkonkurrence, og efterfølgende analyserer alle engrosmarkeder, hvor forhåndsregulering kan være berettiget, opstillet efter deres egnethed til at håndtere de konstaterede konkurrenceproblemer på detailniveau. Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder beslutter, hvilken specifik foranstaltning der skal træffes, bør de vurdere dens tekniske gennemførlighed og foretage en cost-benefit-analyse under hensyntagen til, hvor egnet foranstaltningen er til at håndtere de konstaterede konkurrenceproblemer på detailniveau og muliggøre konkurrence baseret på differentiering og teknologineutralitet. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør overveje konsekvenserne af at træffe specifikke foranstaltninger, som, hvis de kun er gennemførlige i visse nettopologier, kan udgøre en hindring for udrulningen af net med meget høj kapacitet i slutbrugernes interesse.
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Med forbehold af princippet om teknologineutralitet bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder gennem de indførte foranstaltninger og, hvor det er muligt, inden infrastrukturen udrulles, skabe incitamenter til at udvikle fleksible og åbne netarkitekturer, der med tiden kan reducere byrden ved og kompleksiteten af de foranstaltninger, der pålægges på et senere tidspunkt. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed bør i hver fase af vurderingen, og før den beslutter, om en supplerende, mere byrdefuld foranstaltning skal træffes for en virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, stræbe mod at fastslå, hvorvidt det pågældende detailmarked reelt vil være effektivt konkurrencedygtigt, også under hensyntagen til relevante kommercielle aftaler eller andre omstændigheder på engrosmarkedet, herunder andre former for regulering, der allerede er i kraft som f.eks. generelle adgangsforpligtelser til aktiver, der ikke kan erstattes, eller forpligtelser, der er pålagt i henhold til direktiv 2014/61/EU, og enhver regulering, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed allerede betragter som passende for en virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition. En sådan vurdering, der har til formål at sikre, at der kun indføres de afhjælpende foranstaltninger, der bedst egner sig til effektivt at håndtere eventuelle problemer, der er konstateret i markedsanalysen, hindrer ikke en national tilsynsmyndighed i at konkludere, at en kombination af disse foranstaltninger, også selv om de er af varierende intensitet, i overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet er den mindst indgribende måde at håndtere problemet på. Selv om sådanne forskelle ikke resulterer i afgræsningen af bestemte geografiske markeder, bør de kunne berettige differentiering i de afhjælpende foranstaltninger, der træffes på baggrund af konkurrencebegrænsningens varierende intensitet.
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Forhåndsregulering, der pålægges på engrosniveau, og som i princippet er mindre indgribende end regulering på detailniveau, bør anses for tilstrækkelig til at afhjælpe potentielle konkurrenceproblemer på det eller de tilknyttede downstreammarked(er). Den gradvise afregulering af detailmarkederne i Unionen er udtryk for de fremskridt, der er sket med konkurrencens funktion, siden regelsættet for elektronisk kommunikation trådte i kraft. Derudover bør reglerne i forbindelse med indførelsen af forhåndsforanstaltninger over for virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, om muligt forenkles og gøres mere forudsigelige. Derfor bør indførelsen af forudgående kontrol baseret på en virksomheds udpegning som havende en stærk markedsposition på engrosmarkeder have forrang.
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Når en national tilsynsmyndighed ophæver regulering på engrosniveau, bør den fastsætte en rimelig varslingsfrist for at sikre en holdbar overgang til et afreguleret marked. Ved fastsættelse af en sådan varslingsfrist skal den nationale tilsynsmyndighed tage højde for de eksisterende aftaler mellem adgangsudbydere og adgangssøgende, der er indgået på grundlag af pålagte lovgivningsmæssige forpligtelser. Sådanne aftaler kan i en bestemt periode navnlig give adgangssøgende en aftalemæssig beskyttelse. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed bør ligeledes tage højde for markedsdeltagernes reelle mulighed for at tage imod eventuelle tilbud om kommerciel engrosadgang eller saminvestering, som kan findes på markedet, og nødvendigheden af at undgå en længere periode med mulig reguleringsarbitrage. De overgangsordninger, som er fastsat af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, bør tage hensyn til omfanget og planlægningen af tilsynet med de aftaler, der allerede eksisterer, når varslingsperioden starter.
(175)
For at give markedsdeltagerne vished om retsgrundlaget er det nødvendigt at sætte en frist for markedsundersøgelserne. Det er vigtigt, at der gennemføres en markedsanalyse med jævne mellemrum og inden for en rimelig tidsramme. Der er risiko for, at en national tilsynsmyndigheds manglende analyse af et marked inden for den fastsatte frist, påvirker det indre marked negativt, og almindelige overtrædelsesprocedurer vil ikke medføre den ønskede virkning i rette tid. Alternativt bør den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed kunne anmode BEREC om bistand til at fuldføre markedsanalysen. En sådan bistand kunne f.eks. have form af en særlig taskforce bestående af repræsentanter for andre nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
(176)
På grund af den høje grad af teknologisk innovation og stærkt dynamiske markeder i sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation er det nødvendigt hurtigt at tilpasse lovgivning på en koordineret og harmoniseret måde på EU- plan, da erfaringen har vist, at afvigelser mellem de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i gennemførelsen af regelsættet kan skabe hindringer for det indre marked.
(177)
For at skabe større stabilitet og forudsigelighed i de regulerende foranstaltninger bør den maksimale tilladte periode mellem markedsanalyserne dog forlænges fra tre til fem år under forudsætning af, at markedsændringer i den mellemliggende periode ikke kræver en ny analyse. For at fastslå, om en national tilsynsmyndighed har opfyldt sin forpligtelse til at analysere markeder, og om den har meddelt det tilsvarende udkast til foranstaltning mindst hvert femte år, er det kun en meddelelse indeholdende en ny vurdering af markedsafgrænsningen og af en stærk markedsposition, der vil blive betragtet som starten på en ny femårig periode. Den blotte meddelelse af nye eller ændrede foranstaltninger, der pålægges på grundlag af en tidligere og urevideret markedsanalyse, vil ikke blive betragtet som opfyldelse af denne forpligtelse. En national tilsynsmyndigheds manglende overholdelse af forpligtelsen til med jævne mellemrum at gennemføre markedsanalyser som fastsat i dette direktiv bør ikke i sig selv betragtes som grund til, at eksisterende forpligtelser, som den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed har pålagt det pågældende marked, er ugyldige eller ikke kan anvendes.
(178)
Indførelsen af en særlig forpligtelse for en virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, kræver ikke en supplerende markedsanalyse, men i stedet en begrundelse for, at den pågældende forpligtelse er hensigtsmæssig og passende i forhold til det konstaterede problem på det pågældende marked og på det tilknyttede detailmarked.
(179)
Ved vurderingen af forholdsmæssigheden af de forpligtelser og vilkår, der pålægges, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tage hensyn til de forskellige konkurrenceforhold i de forskellige områder i medlemsstaterne under henvisning til især resultaterne af den geografiske undersøgelse, der foretages i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
(180)
Når det overvejes, om der skal indføres foranstaltninger til kontrol af priser, og hvilken form disse foranstaltninger i så fald skal have, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder søge at tillade investorerne et rimeligt udbytte af et bestemt nyt investeringsprojekt. Navnlig er der risici forbundet med investeringsprojekter i forbindelse med nye adgangsnet, som understøtter produkter, for hvilke efterspørgslen er usikker på det tidspunkt, hvor investeringen foretages.
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Revision af forpligtelser, der er pålagt virksomheder, som er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition i den periode, som markedsanalysen omfatter, bør gøre det muligt for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder at tage højde for, hvordan ny udvikling indvirker på de konkurrencemæssige forhold, f.eks. nyligt indgåede frivillige aftaler mellem virksomheder, såsom adgangsaftaler eller aftaler om saminvestering, for derved at tilvejebringe den fleksibilitet, der er særlig nødvendig i forbindelse med længerevarende reguleringscyklusser. En lignende logik bør gælde i tilfælde af et uforudset brud på eller en uforudset ophævelse af en kommercielle aftale, eller hvis de har virkninger, der adskiller sig fra markedsanalysen. Hvis ophævelse af en eksisterende aftale finder sted på et dereguleret marked, er det muligt, at der kræves en ny markedsanalyse. I mangel af en enkelt, vigtig ændring på markedet kan det dog i tilfælde af dynamiske markeder være nødvendigt at foretage en markedsanalyse oftere end hvert femte år, f.eks. ikke tidligere end hvert tredje år, således som det var tilfældet indtil datoen for dette direktivs anvendelse. Markeder bør betragtes som dynamiske, hvis den teknologiske udvikling og slutbrugernes efterspørgselsmønstre sandsynligvis vil udvikle sig på en sådan måde, at konklusionerne af analysen ville blive overflødiggjort på mellemlang sigt for en betydelig gruppe af geografiske områder eller af slutbrugere inden for det geografiske marked og produktmarked som defineret af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed.
(182)
Transparente betingelser og vilkår for adgang og samtrafik, herunder priser, gør det lettere at indgå aftaler, undgå uoverensstemmelser og styrke markedsaktørernes tillid til, at en tjeneste ikke udbydes på diskriminerende vilkår. Åbne og transparente tekniske grænseflader kan være særlig vigtige for at sikre interoperabilitet. Når en national tilsynsmyndighed pålægger forpligtelser med henblik på offentliggørelse af oplysninger, bør den også kunne præcisere, hvordan oplysningerne skal stilles til rådighed, og om de skal være vederlagsfrie under hensyntagen til oplysningernes art og formål.
(183)
Set i lyset af mængden af forskellige nettopologier, adgangsprodukter og markedsomstændigheder, der er opstået siden 2002, kan målsætningerne i bilag II til direktiv 2002/19/EF vedrørende ubundtet adgang til abonnentledninger og adgangsprodukter for udbydere af digitale tv- og radiotjenester nås bedre og på en mere fleksibel måde ved at opstille retningslinjer for minimumskriterier for et standardtilbud, der skal udarbejdes og jævnligt ajourføres af BEREC. Dette bilag bør derfor udgå.
(184)
Princippet om ikkediskrimination hindrer, at virksomheder med stærk markedsposition fordrejer konkurrencen, navnlig når der er tale om vertikalt integrerede virksomheder, der udbyder tjenester til virksomheder, som de konkurrerer med på downstreammarkeder.
(185)
For at håndtere og forhindre ikkeprisrelateret diskrimination er EoI (Equivalence of Inputs) i princippet den sikreste måde at opnå effektiv beskyttelse mod diskrimination. På den anden side vil levering af regulerede engrosinput på et EoI-grundlag sandsynligvis resultere i højere efterlevelsesomkostninger end andre former for forpligtelser vedrørende ikkediskrimination. Disse højere efterlevelsesomkostninger bør holdes op mod fordelene ved en hårdere konkurrence mellem aftagervirksomhederne og mod relevansen af garantier for ikkediskrimination i situationer, hvor den virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, ikke er omfattet af direkte priskontrol. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan navnlig tage hensyn til, at engrosinput via nye systemer på et EoI-grundlag sandsynligvis vil generere tilstrækkelige nettofordele og derfor være forholdsmæssigt afpassede i betragtning af de relativt lavere inkrementalomkostninger til sikring af, at nykonstruerede systemer er i overensstemmelse med EoI. Omvendt bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder ligeledes overveje, om forpligtelserne er forholdsmæssige for de berørte virksomheder, f.eks. ved at tage hensyn til gennemførelsesomkostningerne, og vægte de mulige hindringer for udrulningen af nye systemer, som står i forhold til mere trinvise opgraderinger, såfremt førstnævnte skulle blive genstand for mere restriktive lovgivningsmæssige forpligtelser. I medlemsstater med et højt antal af mindre virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, kan det være uforholdsmæssigt at indføre EoI for hver af disse virksomheder.
(186)
Regnskabsmæssig opsplitning gør det muligt at klarlægge interne afregningspriser og giver de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder mulighed for at kontrollere, om eventuelle krav om ikkediskrimination er opfyldt. Kommissionen har i den forbindelse fremsat henstilling 2005/698/EF 
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Anlægsaktiver, som kan være vært for et elektronisk kommunikationsnet, er altafgørende for en vellykket udrulning af nye net pga. de høje omkostninger ved at kopiere dem og de betydelige besparelser, som kan opnås ved at genanvende dem. Der er som supplement til reglerne for den fysiske infrastruktur, som er fastsat i direktiv 2014/61/EU, følgelig behov for en særlig foranstaltning i de tilfælde, hvor anlægsaktiverne er ejet af en virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition. Hvis der findes anlægsaktiver, og de er genanvendelige, er den positive virkning af opnåelse af faktisk adgang hertil på udrulningen af konkurrerende infrastruktur meget høj, og det er derfor nødvendigt at sikre, at adgangen til sådanne aktiver kan anvendes som en selvstændig foranstaltning, der kan forbedre konkurrence- og udrulningsdynamikken på ethvert downstreammarked, og som skal tages i betragtning forud for vurderingen af behovet for at pålægge andre eventuelle foranstaltninger og ikke blot anses som en accessorisk foranstaltning for andre engrosprodukter eller -tjenester eller som en foranstaltning, der er begrænset til virksomheder, som selv benytter sig af sådanne andre engrosprodukter eller -tjenester. Nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør værdisætte oprindelige genanvendelige anlægsaktiver på grundlag af den forskriftsmæssigt bogførte værdi, efter fradrag af den akkumulerede afskrivning på beregningstidspunktet og indekseret ud fra et passende prisindeks, f.eks. detailpristallet, og udelukke de aktiver, der er fuldt ud afskrevet over en periode på ikke under 40 år, men som stadig anvendes.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør, når de pålægger forpligtelser i forbindelse med adgang til nye og forbedrede infrastrukturer, sikre, at disse adgangsbetingelser afspejler de omstændigheder, der ligger til grund for investeringsbeslutningen, og bl.a. tager hensyn til udrulningsomkostningerne, hvor hurtigt nye produkter og tjenester forventes at slå igennem, og det forventede detailprisniveau. For at give investorerne planlægningssikkerhed bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder endvidere være i stand til om nødvendigt at fastsætte vilkår og betingelser for adgang, der er stabile gennem hensigtsmæssige analyseperioder. I tilfælde, hvor priskontrol skønnes hensigtsmæssig, kan disse vilkår og betingelser omfatte prisordninger, der afhænger af en aftales omfang eller løbetid, i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, forudsat at de ikke har diskriminerende virkninger. Eventuelle adgangsbetingelser bør tage højde for nødvendigheden af at opretholde effektiv konkurrence til fordel for forbrugerne og virksomhederne.
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Obligatorisk adgang til netinfrastruktur kan begrundes ud fra behovet for at styrke konkurrencen, men de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder er nødt til at afveje infrastrukturejernes ret til at udnytte deres infrastrukturer til egne formål mod andre tjenesteudbyderes ret til at få adgang til faciliteter, der er væsentlige for, at de kan udbyde konkurrerende tjenester.
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På markeder, hvor der fremadrettet kan forventes et øget antal adgangsnet, vil slutbrugerne sandsynligvis i højere grad nyde godt af forbedringer i netkvaliteten takket være infrastrukturbaseret konkurrence i forhold til markeder med kun ét net. Hvorvidt konkurrencen inden for andre parametre såsom pris og udvalg er tilstrækkelig, afhænger sandsynligvis af de nationale og lokale konkurrenceforhold. Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder vurderer tilstrækkeligheden af konkurrencen på sådanne parametre og behovet for reguleringstiltag, bør de også tage hensyn til, om engrosadgang er tilgængelig for interesserede virksomheder på rimelige kommercielle vilkår, der muliggør bæredygtige og konkurrencedygtige resultater for slutbrugerne på detailmarkedet. Anvendelsen af generelle konkurrenceregler på markeder, der er karakteriseret ved bæredygtig og effektiv infrastrukturbaseret konkurrence, burde være tilstrækkelig.
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Hvis virksomhederne pålægges forpligtelser til at imødekomme rimelige anmodninger om adgang til og anvendelse af netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter, bør disse anmodninger kun afslås på grundlag af objektive kriterier som f.eks. teknisk gennemførlighed eller behov for at bevare nettets integritet. Når adgang afslås, bør den afviste part kunne klage, jf. procedurerne for bilæggelse af tvister i dette direktiv. En virksomhed, der er pålagt adgangsforpligtelser kan ikke forpligtes til at stille sådanne former for adgang til rådighed, som han ikke har mulighed for at stille til rådighed. Adgangsforpligtelser, som øger konkurrencen på kort sigt, bør ikke resultere i, at konkurrenterne mister deres incitament til at investere i alternative faciliteter, der kan styrke en mere bæredygtig konkurrence eller en bedre ydeevne og fordele for slutbrugerne på længere sigt. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan f.eks., når de vælger det mindst indgribende reguleringstiltag og i overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet, beslutte at revidere de forpligtelser, som er pålagt virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, og ændre tidligere afgørelser, herunder ved at trække forpligtelser tilbage og pålægge eller ikke pålægge nye adgangsforpligtelser, hvis dette er til fordel for brugerne og den bæredygtige konkurrence inden for tjenester. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør kunne pålægge udbyderen af eller de parter, der er berettiget til adgang, tekniske og driftsmæssige betingelser i overensstemmelse med EU- retten. Navnlig indførelsen af tekniske standarder bør være i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/1535.
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Det kan være nødvendigt at kontrollere priserne, såfremt en analyse af et bestemt marked viser, at konkurrencen er utilstrækkelig. Navnlig virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, bør undgå en prisklemme, således at forskellen mellem deres detailpriser og de samtrafik- eller adgangspriser, der skal betales af konkurrenter, der udbyder lignende detailtjenester, ikke er tilstrækkelig til at skabe bæredygtig konkurrence. Når en national tilsynsmyndighed beregner de omkostninger, der er forbundet med oprettelse af en tjeneste i henhold til dette direktiv, bør der tillades en rimelig forrentning af den investerede kapital, herunder passende omkostninger til arbejdskraft og byggeri, idet der i fornødent omfang foretages en tilpasning af kapitalens værdi, så den afspejler den løbende ansættelse af aktiver og af driftens effektivitet. Den metode, der anvendes ved omkostningsdækningen, bør afhænge af situationen og tage hensyn til nødvendigheden af at fremme effektiviteten, skabe holdbar konkurrence og udbygning af net med meget høj kapacitet og således øgede fordele for slutbrugerne, ligesom som den skal tage hensyn til behovet for forudsigelige og stabile engrospriser til gavn for alle operatører, der ønsker at udrulle nye og forbedrede net, jf. Kommissionens henstilling 2013/466/EU 
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Grundet usikkerheden om, hvor hurtigt efterspørgslen efter næste generation af bredbåndstjenester øges, er det vigtigt at give de operatører, som investerer i nye eller opgraderede net, en vis grad af prisfastsættelsesfleksibilitet med henblik på at fremme effektive investeringer og innovation. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør kunne beslutte at fastholde eller ikke at pålægge regulerede engrospriser for adgang til næstegenerationsnet, hvis der er tilstrækkelige konkurrencemæssige garantier. Mere specifikt for at dæmme op for urimeligt høje priser på markeder med virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, bør prisfastsættelsesfleksibiliteten ledsages af yderligere foranstaltninger til beskyttelse af konkurrencen og slutbrugernes interesser såsom strenge forpligtelser vedrørende ikkediskrimination, foranstaltninger til sikring af teknisk og økonomisk replikabilitet for downstreamprodukter og en påviselig begrænsning af detailprisen som resultat af infrastrukturkonkurrencen eller et prisanker, der stammer fra andre regulerede adgangsprodukter, eller begge. Disse konkurrencemæssige garantier er ikke til hinder for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders indkredsning af andre omstændigheder, under hvilke det vil være passende ikke at indføre regulerede adgangspriser for visse engrosinput, f.eks. når høj priselasticitet i slutbrugerefterspørgslen gør det urentabelt for virksomheden, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, at opkræve priser, som ligger væsentligt over konkurrenceniveauet, eller hvor en lavere befolkningstæthed begrænser incitamenterne til udvikling af net med meget høj kapacitet, og den nationale tilsynsmyndighed fastslår, at effektiv og ikkediskriminerende adgang er sikret gennem forpligtelser pålagt i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
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Når en national tilsynsmyndighed pålægger forpligtelser til at indføre et omkostningsregnskabssystem med henblik på at støtte priskontrol, bør den selv kunne foretage en årlig revision for at sikre, at dette omkostningsregnskabssystem følges, hvis den råder over nødvendigt kvalificeret personale, eller kræve, at en sådan revision udføres af et andet kvalificeret organ, som er uafhængigt af den pågældende virksomhed.
(195)
Unionens afregningssystem for engrosterminering af taleopkald er baseret på, at det opkaldende net betaler. En analyse af substitution på efterspørgsels- og udbudssiden viser, at der hverken nu eller i en overskuelig fremtid findes erstatninger på engrosniveau, som kan begrænse fastsættelsen af takster for terminering i et givet net. Termineringsmarkedernes tovejskarakter betyder, at yderligere potentielle konkurrencemæssige problemer kan omfatte krydssubsidiering mellem operatører. Disse potentielle konkurrenceproblemer er fælles for markederne for terminering af taleopkald i både fast- og mobilnet. På grund af termineringsoperatørernes mulighed for og incitament til at hæve priserne væsentligt over omkostningerne synes omkostningsbaseret prisfastsættelse derfor at være det mest hensigtsmæssige middel til at løse dette problem på mellemlang sigt. Fremtidige markedsudviklinger kan ændre dynamikken på disse markeder i en sådan udstrækning, at regulering ikke længere vil være nødvendig.
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Med henblik på at mindske den lovgivningsmæssige byrde ved at håndtere de konkurrencemæssige problemer, der er forbundet med engrosterminering af taleopkald, på en ensartet måde i hele Unionen bør Kommissionen ved hjælp af en delegeret retsakt fastsætte en fælles maksimal termineringstakst for taleopkald i mobilnettjenester og en fælles maksimal termineringstakst for taleopkald i fastnettjenester, der gælder i hele Unionen.
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Dette direktiv bør opstille detaljerede kriterier og parametre, på grundlag af hvilke værdierne for termineringstakster for taleopkald fastsættes. Termineringstaksterne i hele Unionen er faldet støt og forventes fortsat at gøre det. Når Kommissionen fastsætter de maksimale termineringstakster i den første delegerede retsakt, som den vedtager i henhold til dette direktiv, bør den se bort fra enhver ubegrundet ekstraordinær national afvigelse fra denne tendens.
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Da det er usikkert, hvor hurtigt efterspørgslen efter bredbåndstjenester med meget høj kapacitet samt de generelle stordriftsfordele og tætheden vil vokse, giver aftaler om saminvestering betydelige fordele, hvad angår samling af omkostninger og risici, hvilket gør det muligt for mindre virksomheder at investere på økonomisk fornuftige vilkår, og således at fremme bæredygtig langsigtet konkurrence, herunder i områder, hvor den infrastrukturbaserede konkurrence måske ikke er effektiv. Sådanne saminvesteringer kan antage forskellige former, f.eks. medejerskab af netaktiver eller langsigtet risikodeling gennem samfinansiering eller købsaftaler. I denne forbindelse medfører købsaftaler, der udgør saminvesteringer, erhvervelse af specifikke rettigheder til kapacitet af strukturel karakter, der indebærer en grad af medbestemmelse og giver medinvestorer mulighed for at konkurrere effektivt og bæredygtigt på lang sigt på downstreammarkeder, hvor den virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, er aktiv. Derimod giver kommercielle adgangsaftaler, der er begrænset til leje af kapacitet, ikke anledning til sådanne rettigheder og bør derfor ikke betragtes som saminvesteringer.
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Hvis en virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, fremsætter et tilbud om saminvestering på fair, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår i net med meget høj kapacitet, som består af optiske fiberelementer, der dækker strækningen op til slutbrugerens ejendom eller basisstationen og giver virksomheder af forskellig størrelse og med forskellig økonomisk kapacitet mulighed for at blive medinvestorer i infrastruktur, bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed kunne afstå fra at pålægge forpligtelser i henhold til dette direktiv for det nye net med meget høj kapacitet, hvis mindst én potentiel medinvestor har indgået en aftale om saminvestering med denne virksomhed. Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed beslutter at gøre et tilbud om saminvestering, der ikke har ført til en aftale, bindende og beslutter ikke at pålægge yderligere lovgivningsmæssige forpligtelser, kan den gøre dette, forudsat at en sådan aftale indgås, inden den deregulerende foranstaltning får virkning. Når det er teknisk umuligt at udrulle optiske fiberelementer op til slutbrugerens ejendom, bør net med meget høj kapacitet, der består af optiske fiberelementer op til et sted i umiddelbar nærhed af, dvs. lige uden for, denne ejendom, også kunne drage fordel af den samme regulatoriske behandling.
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Når den nationale tilsynsmyndighed beslutter at afstå fra at pålægge forpligtelser, bør den tage disse skridt efter at have sikret, at tilbuddene om saminvestering overholder de nødvendige kriterier og er fremsat i god tro. Den differentierede regulering af nye net med meget høj kapacitet bør vurderes i efterfølgende markedsanalyser, hvilket navnlig efter en vis tid kan nødvendiggøre tilpasninger af reguleringen. Under behørigt begrundede omstændigheder bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kunne pålægge forpligtelser vedrørende sådanne nye netelementer, når de fastslår, at visse markeder i mangel af reguleringstiltag ville stå over for betydelige konkurrenceproblemer. Navnlig kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, når der er flere downstreammarkeder, der ikke har nået samme grad af konkurrence, kræve specifikke asymmetriske foranstaltninger for at fremme effektiv konkurrence, f.eks., men ikke begrænset til, nichedetailmarkeder såsom elektroniske kommunikationsprodukter til slutbrugere inden for erhvervslivet. For at bevare markedernes konkurrenceevne bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder også sikre rettighederne for de adgangssøgende, som ikke deltager i en given saminvestering. Dette bør opnås ved at bevare eksisterende adgangsprodukter eller — i tilfælde hvor oprindelige netelementer på sigt bliver afviklet — ved at indføre adgangsprodukter med en funktionalitet og kvalitet, der mindst svarer til det, der tidligere var tilgængeligt i den gamle infrastruktur, og i begge tilfælde med forbehold af en passende fleksibel mekanisme, der er godkendt af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, og som ikke underminerer incitamenterne for medinvestorerne.
(201)
For at styrke en ensartet reguleringspraksis i hele Unionen bør Kommissionen, hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har konkluderet, at betingelserne i saminvesteringstilbuddet er opfyldt, kunne kræve, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed trækker sine udkast til foranstaltninger tilbage og enten afstår fra at pålægge forpligtelser eller griber ind med lovgivningsmæssige forpligtelser for at afhjælpe væsentlige konkurrenceproblemer, hvis BEREC deler Kommissionens alvorlige tvivl om, hvorvidt udkastet til foranstaltning er foreneligt med EU-retten og navnlig reguleringsmålene i dette direktiv. Af effektivitetshensyn bør en national tilsynsmyndighed kunne sende en enkelt anmeldelse til Kommissionen af et udkast til foranstaltning, som vedrører en saminvesteringsordning, der opfylder de relevante betingelser. Hvis Kommissionen ikke udøver sine beføjelser til at kræve tilbagetrækning af udkastet til foranstaltning, vil det være uforholdsmæssigt, hvis efterfølgende forenklede anmeldelser af individuelle udkast til afgørelser fra den nationale tilsynsmyndighed på grundlag af samme ordning, herunder desuden dokumentation for faktisk indgåelse af en aftale med mindst en medinvestor, gøres til genstand for en afgørelse om tilbagetrækning i mangel af en ændring i omstændighederne. Endvidere finder forpligtelser, der er pålagt virksomheder uanset om de er udpeget som havende en stærkt markedsposition i henhold til dette direktiv eller direktiv 2014/61/EU, fortsat anvendelse. Forpligtelser i forbindelse med aftaler om saminvestering berører ikke anvendelsen af EU-retten.
(202)
Formålet med krav om funktionel adskillelse, hvorved en vertikalt integreret virksomhed forpligtes til at oprette driftsmæssigt adskilte forretningsenheder, er at sikre, at der leveres fuldt ligeværdige adgangsprodukter til alle operatører i detailleddet, herunder operatørens egne vertikalt integrerede afdelinger. Funktionel adskillelse kan styrke konkurrencen på en række relevante markeder ved at reducere incitamentet til forskelsbehandling væsentligt og ved at gøre det lettere at kontrollere og håndhæve overholdelsen af krav om ikkediskrimination. I særlige tilfælde bør det være muligt for en forpligtelse om funktionel adskillelse at være berettiget, hvor det trods vedvarende forsøg ikke er lykkedes at sikre reel ikkediskrimination på flere af de berørte markeder, og hvor der er ringe eller ingen udsigt til konkurrence på infrastrukturen inden for en rimelig tidsfrist, efter at der er indført en eller flere afhjælpende foranstaltninger, der tidligere ansås for hensigtsmæssige. Hvis der indføres et sådant krav, er det dog yderst vigtigt at sikre, at incitamenterne for den pågældende virksomhed til at investere i sit net bevares, og at der ikke opstår potentielle negative virkninger for forbrugerne. Der skal således først gennemføres en koordineret analyse af de forskellige relevante markeder i tilknytning til adgangsnettet i overensstemmelse med markedsanalyseproceduren. Under gennemførelsen af markedsanalysen og den nærmere udformning af forpligtelsen om funktionel adskillelse bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder være særlig opmærksomme på de produkter, der skal forvaltes af de særskilte forretningsenheder, og tage hensyn til nettets udrulning og teknologiske stade, der kan have betydning for muligheden for substitution mellem fastnettjenester og trådløse tjenester. For at undgå forvridning af konkurrencen i det indre marked bør planer om funktionel adskillelse godkendes på forhånd af Kommissionen.
(203)
Gennemførelsen af funktionel adskillelse bør ikke være til hinder for passende koordineringsmekanismer mellem de forskellige separate forretningsenheder, der sikrer, at moderselskabets økonomiske og ledelsesmæssige tilsynsrettigheder tilgodeses.
(204)
Hvis en vertikalt integreret virksomhed vælger at overdrage sine lokale adgangsnetaktiver eller en væsentlig del heraf til en særskilt juridisk enhed med en anden ejer eller oprette en særskilt forretningsenhed til at stå for adgangsprodukter, bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed vurdere konsekvenserne af den planlagte transaktion, herunder enhver adgangsforpligtelse, som denne virksomhed tilbyder, for alle eksisterende forpligtelser, der er pålagt den vertikalt integrerede virksomhed, for at sikre, at eventuelle nye ordninger er i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv. Den pågældende tilsynsmyndighed bør gennemføre en ny analyse af de markeder, hvor den udskilte forretningsenhed driver virksomhed, og indføre, opretholde, ændre eller ophæve forpligtelser i overensstemmelse hermed. Til dette formål bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed kunne anmode virksomheden om oplysninger.
(205)
Allerede i dag kan virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, som led i markedsanalysen give tilsagn på nogle markeder med det formål at håndtere konkurrenceproblemer, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed har konstateret, og som myndigheden derefter tager hensyn til, når den træffer afgørelse om de passende regulatoriske forpligtelser. Der bør tages hensyn til enhver ny markedsudvikling, når der træffes afgørelse om de mest hensigtsmæssige afhjælpende foranstaltninger. Uden at dette berører bestemmelserne om reguleringen af saminvestering, begrænser arten af de givne tilsagn som sådan dog ikke de skønsbeføjelser, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed tillægges for at pålægge virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, afhjælpende foranstaltninger. For at øge gennemsigtigheden og yde juridisk forudsigelighed i hele Unionen bør dette direktiv fastsætte en procedure for, hvordan virksomheder afgiver tilsagn, og hvordan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder vurderer dem, under hensyntagen til markedsdeltagernes synspunkter ved hjælp af en markedstest, samt i givet fald hvordan de gøres bindende for den virksomhed, der giver tilsagnet, og kan håndhæves af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed. Medmindre den nationale tilsynsmyndighed har gjort tilsagn om saminvestering bindende og besluttet ikke at pålægge forpligtelser, er denne procedure ikke til hinder for anvendelse af markedsanalyseproceduren og forpligtelsen til at pålægge passende og forholdsmæssige foranstaltninger for at afhjælpe det konstaterede markedssvigt.
(206)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør kunne gøre tilsagnene helt eller delvist bindende for en bestemt periode, som ikke bør overstige den periode, for hvilken de gives, efter at have foretaget en markedsundersøgelse ved hjælp af en offentlig høring af interessenter. Hvis tilsagnene er gjort bindende, bør den nationale tilsynsmyndighed overveje konsekvenserne af denne afgørelse i sin markedsanalyse og tage hensyn hertil, når den vælger den eller de mest hensigtsmæssige regulerende foranstaltninger. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør betragte de indgåede forpligtelser ud fra et fremadrettet bæredygtighedsperspektiv, navnlig når de fastsætter den periode, hvor forpligtelserne skal være bindende, og bør tage hensyn til den værdi, interessenterne tillægger den offentlige høring om stabile og forudsigelige markedsvilkår. Bindende forpligtelser vedrørende frivillig adskillelse hos vertikalt integrerede virksomheder, som er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på et eller flere relevante markeder, kan tilføre processen forudsigelighed og gennemsigtighed ved at fastsætte gennemførelsesprocessen for den planlagte adskillelse, f.eks. ved at fastsætte en køreplan for gennemførelsen med klare milepæle og forudsigelige konsekvenser, hvis visse milepæle ikke nås.
(207)
Forpligtelserne kan omfatte udnævnelsen af en tilsynsadministrator, hvis identitet og mandat bør godkendes af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, og virksomhedens pligt til at aflevere periodiske rapporter om gennemførelsen.
(208)
Netejere, hvis forretningsmodel er begrænset til at udbyde engrostjenester til andre, kan være til nytte for skabelsen af et engrosmarked i fremgang med positiv virkning på detailkonkurrencen downstream. Derudover kan deres forretningsmodel være attraktiv for potentielle økonomiske investorer i mindre omskiftelige infrastrukturaktiver og med mere langsigtede perspektiver for udrulningen af net med meget høj kapacitet. Ikke desto mindre fører tilstedeværelsen af en virksomhed, der udelukkende opererer på engrosniveau, ikke nødvendigvis til reelt konkurrencedygtige detailmarkeder, og virksomheder, der udelukkende opererer på engrosniveau, kan udpeges som havende en stærk markedsposition på bestemte produktmarkeder og geografiske markeder. Visse konkurrencerisici, der hidrører fra adfærden blandt virksomheder, hvis forretningsmodel udelukkende er engrosorienteret, kan være mindre, end hvad er tilfældet for vertikalt integrerede virksomheder, forudsat at engrosmodellen er reel, og der ikke findes incitamenter til at forskelsbehandle downstreamudbydere. Den reguleringsmæssige respons bør følgelig være tilsvarende mindre indgribende, men bør navnlig bevare muligheden for at indføre forpligtelser vedrørende fair og rimelig prisfastsættelse. Omvendt bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder være i stand til at gribe ind, hvis der er opstået konkurrenceproblemer til ulempe for slutbrugerne. En virksomhed, der er aktiv på et engrosmarked, og som udelukkende udbyder detailtjenester til erhvervsbrugere, som er større end små og mellemstore virksomheder, bør alene betragtes som en engrosvirksomhed.
(209)
For at fremme migreringen fra de gamle kobbernet til næstegenerationsnet, hvilket er i slutbrugernes interesse, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder være i stand til at overvåge netoperatørernes egne initiativer i den henseende og til om nødvendigt at fastsætte betingelserne for en hensigtsmæssig migreringsproces, f.eks. ved hjælp af forudgående varsel, gennemsigtighed og tilgængelighed af alternative adgangsprodukter af mindst tilsvarende kvalitet, når netejeren har påvist sin hensigt om og vilje til at skifte til opgraderede net. Med henblik på at undgå uberettigede forsinkelser i migreringen bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tildeles beføjelser til at ophæve adgangsforpligtelser vedrørende kobbernettet, når en hensigtsmæssig migreringsproces er blevet fastsat, og overholdelse af betingelserne og processen for migrering fra den eksisterende infrastruktur er sikret. Dog bør netejere kunne afvikle eksisterende net. Adgangssøgende, som migrerer fra et adgangsprodukt, der er baseret på en eksisterende infrastruktur, til et adgangsprodukt, der er baseret på en mere avanceret teknologi eller et mere avanceret medium, bør kunne opgradere deres adgang til ethvert reguleret produkt med højere kapacitet, men bør ikke være forpligtet til at gøre det. I forbindelse med en opgradering bør adgangssøgende overholde de lovgivningsmæssige betingelser for adgang til et adgangsprodukt med højere kapacitet som fastsat af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i dennes markedsanalyse.
(210)
Liberaliseringen af telesektoren, den stigende konkurrence og de øgede valgmuligheder inden for kommunikationstjenester går hånd i hånd med arbejdet for at fastlægge et harmoniseret regelsæt, der kan sikre udbuddet af forsyningspligtydelser. Begrebet forsyningspligt bør tages op til fornyet vurdering for at tage højde for de teknologiske fremskridt, markedsudviklingen og ændringer i brugernes behov.
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Det følger af artikel 169 i TEUF, at Unionen skal medvirke til beskyttelsen af forbrugerne.
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Forsyningspligten er et sikkerhedsnet, der skal sikre, at alle slutbrugere mindst har adgang til en række minimumsydelser og til en overkommelig pris for forbrugerne i situationer, hvor der er risiko for social udstødelse, som stammer fra manglen på en sådan adgang, der hindrer borgerne i fuld social og økonomisk deltagelse i samfundet.
(213)
Basal bredbåndsinternetadgang er praktisk talt tilgængelig overalt i Unionen og bruges i vis udstrækning til en lang række aktiviteter. Den generelle udnyttelse er dog lavere end tilgængeligheden, eftersom der stadig findes borgere som ikke har internetforbindelse grundet manglende kendskab, omkostninger, færdigheder eller efter eget valg. Tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang til en overkommelig pris har fået afgørende betydning for samfundet og for økonomien som helhed. Den danner grundlag for deltagelse i den digitale økonomi og i samfundet gennem grundlæggende onlineinternettjenester.
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Det er et fundamentalt krav til forsyningspligt at sikre, at alle forbrugere har adgang til en tilgængelig tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester til en overkommelig pris på et fast sted. Medlemsstaterne bør ligeledes have mulighed for at sikre, at anden tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og andre talekommunikationstjenester end adgang og tjenester, som ydes på et fast sted, til borgere på farten har en overkommelig pris, hvis de anser dette for nødvendigt for at sikre forbrugernes fulde sociale og økonomiske deltagelse i samfundet. I denne sammenhæng bør der lægges særlig vægt på at sikre, at slutbrugere med handicap har tilsvarende adgang. Der bør ikke være nogen begrænsninger på de tekniske midler, hvormed forbindelsen etableres, idet der kan anvendes trådbaseret eller trådløs teknologi, og heller ikke nogen begrænsning af, hvilken kategori af virksomheder der må varetage en del af eller hele forsyningspligten.
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Den internetadgangshastighed, som en given bruger oplever, afhænger af en række faktorer som f.eks. internetudbyderens tilslutningsmuligheder samt den applikation, som forbindelsen anvendes til. Det er op til medlemsstaterne under hensyntagen til BEREC's rapport om bedste praksis at definere den tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgang i lyset af de nationale forhold og den minimumsbåndbredde, som gælder for størstedelen af forbrugerne på en medlemsstats område, med henblik på at muliggøre et tilstrækkeligt niveau af social inklusion og deltagelse i den digitale økonomi og det digitale samfund på deres område. Den tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste til en overkommelig pris bør have tilstrækkelig båndbredde til at støtte adgangen til og anvendelsen af mindst ét minimumssæt af basale tjenester, som afspejler de tjenester, der anvendes af størstedelen af slutbrugerne. Med henblik herpå bør Kommissionen overvåge udviklingen i brugen af internet til at udpege de onlinetjenester, som størstedelen af slutbrugerne i hele Unionen anvender, og som er nødvendige for social og økonomisk deltagelse i samfundet, og ajourføre listen i overensstemmelse hermed. Kravene i EU-retten til adgangen til åbent internet, navnlig i forordning (EU) 2015/2120, bør finde anvendelse på alle tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjenester.
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Forbrugerne bør ikke være tvunget til at have adgang til tjenester, som de ikke ønsker, og det bør følgelig være muligt for berettigede forbrugere efter anmodning at begrænse forsyningspligtydelserne til en overkommelig pris til at omfatte talekommunikationstjenester.
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Medlemsstater bør kunne udvide foranstaltninger vedrørende overkommelige priser og kontrol med udgifter til også at omfatte mikrovirksomheder og små og mellemstore virksomheder samt nonprofitorganisationer, forudsat at de opfylder de relevante betingelser.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder kunne overvåge detailtaksternes udvikling og niveau for tjenester, der henhører under forsyningspligten. En sådan overvågning bør foretages på en sådan måde, at den ikke pålægger hverken de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder eller udbydere af sådanne tjenester for store administrative byrder.
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Ved overkommelig pris forstås en pris, som medlemsstaterne fastlægger på nationalt plan under hensyn til særlige nationale forhold. Hvis medlemsstaterne fastsætter, at detailpriserne for tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester ikke er overkommelige for forbrugere med lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov, herunder ældre, slutbrugere med handicap og forbrugere, der bor i landdistrikter eller geografisk isolerede områder, bør de træffe passende foranstaltninger. Med henblik herpå kan medlemsstaterne yde disse forbrugere direkte støtte til kommunikationsformål, der kan være en del af de sociale ydelser eller kuponer eller direkte betalinger til disse forbrugere. Dette kan være et hensigtsmæssigt alternativ, idet der tages hensyn til behovet for at minimere markedsforvridninger. Alternativt eller derudover kan medlemsstaterne pålægge alle udbydere af sådanne tjenester at tilbyde disse forbrugere basale takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker.
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Sikring af overkommelige priser kan omfatte særlige takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, der tager højde for behovene hos brugere med lav indkomst eller med særlige sociale behov. Sådanne tilbud bør leveres med basale funktioner for at undgå fordrejning af markedets funktion. Vurderingen af, om priserne er overkommelige for de enkelte forbrugere, bør være begrundet i, at disse har ret til at indgå en aftale med en udbyder, at de skal have et nummer til rådighed, at tjenesten skal være til rådighed uafbrudt, og at de skal kunne overvåge og kontrollere deres udgifter.
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Hvis en medlemsstat kræver, at udbydere tilbyder forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, der er anderledes end dem, som de tilbyder på normale kommercielle betingelser, bør disse takstvalgmuligheder eller pakker tilbydes af alle udbydere af internetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester. I overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet bør kravet om, at alle udbydere af internetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester skal tilbyde takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, ikke medføre en uforholdsmæssig stor administrativ eller økonomisk byrde for disse udbydere eller medlemsstater. Hvis en medlemsstat på grundlag af en objektiv vurdering påviser en sådan uforholdsmæssig stor administrativ eller økonomisk byrde, kan den undtagelsesvis beslutte kun at pålægge udpegede udbydere forpligtelse til at tilbyde særlige takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker. Den objektive vurdering bør også overveje fordelene for forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov ved et udvalg af udbydere og fordelene for alle udbydere, der kan nyde godt af at være udbyder af forsyningspligtydelser. Hvis en medlemsstat undtagelsesvis beslutter kun at pålægge udpegede udbydere forpligtelse til at tilbyde særlige takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, bør den sikre, at forbrugere med lav indkomst eller særlige behov kan vælge mellem flere udbydere, der tilbyder sociale takster. Dog kan medlemsstaterne i visse situationer måske ikke garantere et udvalg af udbydere, f.eks. hvis kun én virksomhed udbyder tjenester i den pågældende forbrugers bopælsområde, eller hvis det at tilbyde et udvalg af udbydere vil pålægge medlemsstaten en uforholdsmæssig stor organisatorisk og økonomisk ekstrabyrde.
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Overkommelige priser bør ikke længere være en hindring for forbrugernes adgang til et minimum af konnektivitetstjenester. Retten til at indgå en aftale med en udbyder bør indebære, at forbrugere, som kan få afslag, navnlig forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov, har mulighed for at indgå en aftale til en overkommelig pris om tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester i det mindste fra et fast sted med enhver udbyder af sådanne tjenester på dette sted eller en udpeget udbyder, hvis en medlemsstat undtagelsesvis har besluttet at udpege en eller flere udbydere til at tilbyde disse takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker. For at minimere de finansielle risici såsom ubetalte regninger bør udbyderne frit kunne beslutte, om de vil udbyde tjenesten efter forudbetaling på grundlag af individuelle forudbetalte enheder til en overkommelig pris.
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For at sikre at borgerne kan træffes via talekommunikationstjenester, bør medlemsstaterne sørge for, at et nummer stilles til rådighed i en rimelig periode, også i perioder hvor talekommunikationstjenesten ikke anvendes. Udbyderne bør være i stand til at etablere mekanismer til kontrol af, at forbrugeren fortsat er interesseret i at bevare adgangen til nummeret.
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Ydelse af kompensation til udbydere af sådanne tjenester under sådanne omstændigheder behøver ikke at medføre konkurrenceforvridning, når blot disse udbydere får kompensation for de specifikke nettoomkostninger derved, og nettoomkostningsbyrden inddækkes på en konkurrenceneutral måde.
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For at vurdere behovet for tiltag til sikring af en overkommelig pris bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder, være i stand til at overvåge udviklingen i og detaljerne vedrørende tilbud om takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker til forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov.
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Medlemsstaterne bør gennemføre foranstaltninger, som fremmer skabelsen af et marked for produkter og tjenester til overkommelige priser, som omfatter faciliteter for forbrugere med handicap, herunder udstyr med kompenserende teknologier. Dette kan f.eks. ske ved henvisning til europæiske standarder eller ved at støtte gennemførelsen af krav i henhold til EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser. Medlemsstaterne bør fastsætte passende foranstaltninger under hensyntagen til nationale omstændigheder, som giver medlemsstaterne fleksibilitet til at træffe specifikke foranstaltninger, f.eks. hvis markedet ikke leverer produkter og tjenester til en overkommelig pris, der omfatter faciliteter for forbrugere med handicap, under almindelige økonomiske omstændigheder. Disse foranstaltninger kan omfatte direkte økonomisk støtte til slutbrugere. Omkostningerne for forbrugere med handicap ved relætjenester bør svare til gennemsnitsprisen på talekommunikationstjenester.
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Relætjenester vedrører tjenester, som muliggør tovejskommunikation mellem fjernslutbrugere af forskellige former for kommunikation (f.eks. tekst, tegn og tale) ved at konvertere disse kommunikationsformer, normalt ved hjælp af en menneskelig operatør. Tekst i realtid er defineret i overensstemmelse med EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser og henviser til en slags tekstkonversation i punkt-til-punkt-situationer eller i multipunktkonference, hvor den tekst, der indtastes, sendes på en sådan måde, at brugeren opfatter kommunikationen som værende kontinuerlig på et tegn-for-tegn-grundlag.
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Med henblik på datakommunikation ved transmissionshastigheder, der er tilstrækkelige til at give en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang, er fastnetforbindelser stort set tilgængelige for alle og benyttes af størstedelen af unionsborgerne. Det almindelige fastnetbredbånd dækkede og var tilgængeligt for 97 % af husstandene i Unionen i 2015 med en gennemsnitlig udnyttelsesgrad på 72 %, og tjenester baseret på trådløs teknologi når ud til endnu flere. Der er dog forskelle mellem medlemsstaterne med hensyn til tilgængeligheden og prisrimeligheden af fastnetbredbånd både i by- og landområder.
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Markedet har en ledende rolle at spille for at sikre, at bredbåndsinternetadgang med en stadigt stigende kapacitet er tilgængelig. I områder, hvor markedet ikke vil levere, forekommer andre offentlige politikredskaber til fremme af tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangsforbindelser i princippet mere omkostningseffektive og mindre markedsforvridende end pålæggelse af forsyningspligt, og der kunne benyttes finansielle instrumenter såsom dem, der er tilgængelige under Den Europæiske Fond for Strategiske Investeringer og Connecting Europe-faciliteten, anvendelse af offentlige midler fra de europæiske struktur- og investeringsfonde, tilknytning af dækningsforpligtelser til brugsrettigheden til radiofrekvenser til støtte for udrulning af bredbåndsnet i områder, der er mindre tætbefolkede, og offentlige investeringer i overensstemmelse med EU's statsstøtteregler.
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Hvis det efter en behørig vurdering under hensyntagen til resultaterne af den kompetente myndigheds geografiske undersøgelse af udbredelsen af nettene eller de seneste oplysninger, der er til rådighed for medlemsstaterne, inden resultaterne af den første geografiske undersøgelse foreligger, påvises, at det hverken er sandsynligt, at markedet eller offentlige interventionsmekanismer kan tilbyde slutbrugerne i visse områder en forbindelse, der kan yde en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som defineret af medlemsstaterne, og talekommunikationstjenester på et fast sted, bør medlemsstaten undtagelsesvis kunne udpege forskellige udbydere eller grupper af udbydere af disse tjenester i de forskellige relevante dele af det nationale område. Ud over den geografiske undersøgelse bør medlemsstaterne om nødvendigt kunne anvende yderligere dokumentation for at konstatere, i hvilket omfang tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester er tilgængelige på et fast sted. Denne yderligere dokumentation kan omfatte oplysninger, der er til rådighed for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder gennem markedsanalyseproceduren, og oplysninger, der er indsamlet fra brugere. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne begrænse forsyningspligten til støtte for tilgængeligheden af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste, til kun at gælde slutbrugerens hovedopholdssted eller bopæl. Der bør ikke være nogen begrænsninger af de tekniske midler, hvormed den tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenesterne på et fast sted leveres, idet der kan anvendes trådbaseret eller trådløs teknologi, og heller ikke nogen begrænsning af, hvilken virksomhed der må varetage en del af eller hele forsyningspligten.
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Det er i overensstemmelse med subsidiaritetsprincippet op til medlemsstaterne at bestemme ud fra objektive kriterier, hvilke virksomheder der udpeges som forsyningspligtudbydere, i givet fald under hensyntagen til disse virksomheders evne og vilje til at levere alle eller en del af disse forsyningspligtydelser. Dette forhindrer ikke medlemsstaterne i forbindelse med udpegningsprocessen i at medtage specifikke vilkår, der er begrundet i hensynet til effektivitet, herunder samling af geografiske områder eller komponenter eller fastsættelse af minimumsperioder for udpegelsen.
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Omkostningerne ved at sikre, at der er en forbindelse til rådighed, der kan yde tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgangstjenester, jf. dette direktiv, og talekommunikationstjenester på et fast sted til en overkommelig pris inden for rammerne af forsyningspligten, bør anslås navnlig ved at vurdere den forventede finansielle byrde for udbydere og brugere i sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation.
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Som udgangspunkt må pålæggelse af krav til sikring af landsdækkende territorial dækning i udpegelsesproceduren forventes at udelukke eller afholde visse virksomheder fra at ansøge om at blive udpeget som forsyningspligtudbydere. Ligeledes kan det også medføre, at visse udbydere udelukkes på forhånd, hvis forsyningspligtudbydere udpeges for en uforholdsmæssigt lang eller ubegrænset periode. Hvis en medlemsstat beslutter at udpege en eller flere udbydere af hensyn til spørgsmålet om overkommelige priser, bør det være muligt for disse udbydere at være forskellige fra dem, der er udpeget med henblik på tilgængelighedselementet i forsyningspligten.
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Hvis en udbyder, der undtagelsesvis er udpeget til at tilbyde takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, der er anderledes end dem, som tilbydes på normale kommercielle betingelser som fastsat i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv, eller til at sikre tilgængeligheden på et fast sted af tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjenester eller talekommunikationstjenester som fastsat i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv, vælger at afhænde en set i forhold til dens forsyningspligt væsentlig del af eller alle sine lokale adgangsnetaktiver på det nationale område til en særskilt juridisk enhed med et andet endeligt ejerskab, bør den kompetente myndighed bedømme virkningerne af handelen for at sikre kontinuiteten i forsyningspligten på hele eller dele af det nationale område. Med henblik herpå bør den udbyder, der af den kompetente myndighed blev udpeget til at varetage forsyningspligten, på forhånd underrette denne myndighed om afhændelsen. Den kompetente myndigheds bedømmelse bør ikke berøre handelens indgåelse.
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For at sikre stabile forhold og fremme en gradvis overgang bør medlemsstaterne fortsat inden for deres område kunne sikre opfyldelse af andre forsyningspligtydelser end tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangs- og talekommunikationstjenester på et fast sted, som er omfattet af deres forsyningspligt i henhold til direktiv 2002/22/EF ved ikrafttrædelsen af nærværende direktiv, forudsat at disse tjenester eller sammenlignelige tjenester ikke er tilgængelige på normale kommercielle vilkår. Ved at tillade medlemsstaterne fortsat at sikre offentligheden offentlige betalingstelefoner, hvor der anvendes mønter, betalingskort eller forudbetalte kort, herunder kort sammen med en indtastet kode, telefonbøger og nummeroplysningstjenester inden for rammerne af forsyningspligten, så længe der er et påviseligt behov, vil de have den fornødne fleksibilitet til på behørig vis at tage hensyn til de forskellige nationale forhold. Dette kan omfatte opstilling af offentlige betalingstelefoner på vigtige steder for indrejse i landet, såsom i lufthavne eller på tog- og busstationer samt på steder, der opsøges af mennesker i nødsituationer, såsom hospitaler, politistationer og ved nødspor på motorveje, for at tilgodese rimelige behov hos slutbrugere, herunder navnlig slutbrugere med handicap.
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Medlemsstaterne bør følge med i forbrugernes forhold, hvad angår deres anvendelse af tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester, og navnlig kontrollere, om priserne er overkommelige. Hvorvidt prisen på tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang og talekommunikationstjenester er overkommelig hænger sammen med, hvor detaljerede oplysninger brugerne får om udgifterne til deres forbrug, samt med de relative omkostninger ved anvendelse i forhold til andre tjenester, og det afhænger også af, om de kan kontrollere udgifterne. Kravet om overkommelige priser indebærer derfor, at forbrugerne gives øget indflydelse, og at udbyderne pålægges visse forpligtelser. Blandt disse forpligtelser kan nævnes specifikke krav om specificeret fakturering samt muligheden for, at forbrugeren selektivt blokerer for visse opkald, f.eks. dyre opkald til særtjenester med overtaksering, kontrollerer udgifterne gennem forudbetaling og modregner oprettelsesgebyrer. Sådanne foranstaltninger vil eventuelt skulle revurderes og ændres på baggrund af markedsudviklingen. Specificerede regninger for internetforbrug bør kun angive tidspunktet for, varigheden af og størrelsen af forbruget i en bestemt internetsession, men ikke angive, hvilke websteder eller internetslutpunkter der er oprettet forbindelse til under en sådan internetsession.
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Medmindre forbrugere med ret til overkommelige priser konsekvent betaler for sent eller undlader at betale, bør de, så længe tvisten ikke er afgjort, beskyttes mod, at deres telefonforbindelse afbrydes øjeblikkeligt som følge af manglende betaling, og de bør, navnlig i tilfælde af uenighed om store regninger for opkald til særtjenester med overtaksering, fortsat have adgang til absolut nødvendige talekommunikationstjenester og et minimumstjenesteniveau af internetadgang som defineret af medlemsstaterne. Det bør være muligt for medlemsstaterne at beslutte, at en sådan adgang kun skal opretholdes, hvis abonnenten fortsætter med at betale abonnementsafgiften eller gebyret for basal internetadgang.
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Hvis udbuddet af tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgangs- og talekommunikationstjenester eller udbuddet af andre tjenester i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv påfører en udbyder en urimelig byrde, kan denne urimelige byrde under behørig hensyntagen til udgifter og indtægter samt de immaterielle fordele, der følger af udbuddet af de pågældende tjenester, medtages i en eventuel beregning af nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten.
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Medlemsstaterne skal om nødvendigt fastlægge ordninger til finansiering af nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten, såfremt det godtgøres, at forpligtelserne kun kan opfyldes med tab til følge eller er forbundet med nettoomkostninger, der ligger uden for normal forretningsstandard. Det er vigtigt at sikre, at nettoomkostningerne i forbindelse med forsyningspligten beregnes korrekt, og at eventuel finansiering så vidt muligt sker uden at påvirke konkurrencen og virksomhederne samt i overensstemmelse med artikel 107 og 108 i TEUF.
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Når nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten beregnes, skal både omkostninger og indtægter samt immaterielle goder, der resulterer af forsyningspligten, tages i betragtning, men der skal også tages højde for den generelle målsætning om at fastlægge prisstrukturer, der afspejler omkostningerne. Nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten bør beregnes efter gennemskuelige procedurer.
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Hensyntagen til immaterielle fordele betyder, at en skønnet pengeværdi af de indirekte fordele, som en virksomhed opnår som følge af sin stilling som forsyningspligtudbyder, bør fratrækkes den direkte nettoomkostning ved forsyningspligten for at kunne bestemme den samlede omkostningsbyrde.
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Hvis forsyningspligten udgør en urimelig byrde for en udbyder, vil det være hensigtsmæssigt at give medlemsstaterne lov til at indføre ordninger, der gør det muligt at få dækket nettoomkostningerne effektivt. Godtgørelse ved brug af offentlige midler er én måde at dække nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten på. Deling af nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligt mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester er en anden måde. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne finansiere nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligtens forskellige elementer gennem forskellige ordninger eller finansiere nettoomkostningerne ved nogle eller alle elementer gennem én af ordningerne eller en kombination heraf. Tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang giver ikke blot fordele for sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation, men også for onlineøkonomien i bred forstand og for samfundet som helhed. Når der tilvejebringes en forbindelse, som giver flere slutbrugere adgang til bredbåndshastighed, sættes disse i stand til at benytte onlinetjenester og dermed til aktivt at deltage i det digitale samfund. Det gavner både almenvellet og udbyderne af elektronisk kommunikation, at sådanne forbindelser sikres på grundlag af forsyningspligten. Medlemsstaterne bør tage hensyn til disse forhold, når de vælger og udformer ordninger for dækning af nettoomkostninger.
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I tilfælde af omkostningsdækning ved at dele nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligt mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester bør medlemsstaterne sikre, at metoden for allokering mellem udbydere bygger på objektive og ikkediskriminerende kriterier og er i overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet. Dette princip hindrer ikke medlemsstaterne i at undtage nye markedsaktører, der ikke har vundet tilstrækkelig fodfæste på markedet. Det skal ved fastlæggelsen af eventuelle finansieringsordninger sikres, at markedsdeltagerne kun bidrager til finansieringen af forsyningspligtydelser og ikke til andre aktiviteter, som ikke er direkte knyttet til varetagelsen af forsyningspligten. Dækningsordninger bør følge EU-rettens principper og deleordninger, navnlig principperne om ikkediskrimination og proportionalitet. Enhver finansieringsordning bør sikre, at brugere i én medlemsstat ikke bidrager til omkostningerne ved forsyningspligten i en anden medlemsstat. Det bør være muligt at dele nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten mellem alle eller nærmere bestemte kategorier af udbydere. Medlemsstaterne bør sikre, at deleordninger overholder principperne om gennemsigtighed, mindst mulig konkurrenceforvridning, ikkediskrimination og proportionalitet. Mindst mulig konkurrenceforvridning betyder, at bidrag skal dækkes på en måde, der i størst muligt omfang begrænser den økonomiske byrdes indvirkning på slutbrugerne, f.eks. ved at sprede bidrag mest muligt.
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Udbydere, der modtager økonomisk støtte til forsyningspligtydelser, bør fremlægge oplysninger om de enkelte støtteberettigede elementer, der er tilstrækkelig detaljerede til at begrunde deres anmodning, for de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder. Medlemsstaternes ordninger for omkostningsberegning og finansiering af forsyningspligten bør meddeles Kommissionen, så den kan undersøge, om de er forenelige med TEUF. Medlemsstaterne bør skabe reel åbenhed om og mulighed for at kontrollere de beløb, der opkræves til finansiering af forsyningspligten. Beregningen af nettoomkostningerne ved levering af forsyningspligtydelser bør baseres på en objektiv og transparent metode for at sikre en så omkostningseffektiv levering af forsyningspligtydelser som muligt og fremme lige vilkår for markedsaktørerne. Det kan bidrage til at skabe større gennemsigtighed, hvis den metode, som påtænkes anvendt til beregning af nettoomkostningerne ved de enkelte aspekter af forsyningspligten, offentliggøres på forhånd, inden beregningen foretages.
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Medlemsstaterne kan ikke pålægge markedsaktører finansielle bidrag vedrørende foranstaltninger, som ikke indgår i forsyningspligten. De enkelte medlemsstater har fortsat ret til at pålægge særlige foranstaltninger (uden for forsyningspligtens anvendelsesområde) og finansiere dem i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, men ikke ved hjælp af bidrag fra markedsaktører.
(246)
For effektivt at fremme den frie bevægelighed for varer, tjenesteydelser og personer inden for Unionen bør det være muligt at anvende visse nationale nummerressourcer, navnlig visse ikkegeografiske numre, på en ekstraterritorial måde, dvs. uden for den tildelende medlemsstats område. I lyset af den betydelige risiko for bedrageri med hensyn til interpersonel kommunikation bør en sådan ekstraterritorial anvendelse kun tillades til levering af andre elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. Håndhævelse af relevant national lovgivning, navnlig forbrugerbeskyttelsesreglerne og andre regler vedrørende brug af nummerressourcer, bør sikres af medlemsstaterne, uanset hvor brugsrettighederne er blevet tildelt, og hvor i Unionen nummerressourcerne bruges. Medlemsstaterne har fortsat kompetence til at anvende deres nationale ret på nummerressourcer, der bruges på deres område, også når rettighederne er blevet tildelt i en anden medlemsstat.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i medlemsstater, hvor nummerressourcer fra en anden medlemsstat bruges, har ikke kontrol over disse nummerressourcer. Det er derfor vigtigt, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed i en medlemsstat, der giver ret til ekstraterritorial anvendelse, også sikrer effektiv beskyttelse af slutbrugerne i de medlemsstater, hvor de pågældende numre anvendes. Med henblik på at opnå effektiv beskyttelse bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, som tildeler rettigheder til ekstraterritorial anvendelse, knytte betingelser dertil i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv vedrørende udbyderes overholdelse af forbrugerbeskyttelsesregler og andre regler vedrørende brug af nummerressourcer i de medlemsstater, hvor disse ressourcer vil blive brugt.
(248)
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i de medlemsstater, hvor nummerressourcerne bruges, bør kunne anmode om støtte fra de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, som har tildelt brugsrettighederne til nummerressourcerne, til at bistå med at håndhæve deres regler. Håndhævelsesforanstaltninger, som træffes af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, der har tildelt brugsrettighederne, bør omfatte sanktioner med afskrækkende virkning, og navnlig i tilfælde af en grov overtrædelse tilbagekaldelse af den rettighed til ekstraterritorial anvendelse af nummerressourcerne, der er tildelt den berørte virksomhed. Kravene til ekstraterritorial anvendelse bør ikke berøre medlemsstaternes beføjelser til i en konkret sag at blokere adgangen til numre eller tjenester, hvor dette er begrundet af bedrageri eller misbrug. Ekstraterritorial anvendelse af nummerressourcer bør ikke berøre EU-reglerne for levering af roamingtjenester, herunder reglerne vedrørende forhindring af unormal brug eller misbrug af roamingtjenester, der er genstand for detailprisregulering, og som nyder godt af regulerede engrosroamingtakster. Medlemsstaterne bør fortsat have mulighed for at indgå specifikke aftaler med tredjelande om ekstraterritorial anvendelse af nummerressourcer.
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Medlemsstaterne bør fremme trådløs provisionering af nummerressourcer for at gøre det lettere at skifte udbyder af elektronisk kommunikation. Trådløs provisionering af nummerressourcer gør det muligt at omprogrammere identifikatorer for kommunikationsudstyr uden fysisk adgang til de pågældende anordninger. Denne egenskab er især relevant for maskine-til-maskine-tjenester, dvs. tjenester, som indebærer automatisk overførsel af data og oplysninger mellem anordninger eller softwarebaserede applikationer med begrænset eller ingen menneskelig interaktion. Udbydere af sådanne maskine-til-maskine-tjenester har måske ikke mulighed for fysisk adgang til deres anordninger, fordi de anvendes i fjerntliggende områder, eller fordi der anvendes et stort antal anordninger, eller på grund af deres brugsmønster. I lyset af det spirende marked for maskine-til-maskine-tjenester og nye teknologier bør medlemsstaterne bestræbe sig på at sikre teknologineutralitet i forbindelse med fremme af trådløs provisionering.
(250)
For at virksomhederne kan konkurrere i den elektroniske kommunikationssektor, er det afgørende, at der stilles nummerressourcer til rådighed på grundlag af transparente, objektive og ikkediskriminerende kriterier. Medlemsstaterne bør gives mulighed for at tildele brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer til andre virksomheder end udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester i lyset af den øgede relevans af numre for forskellige tjenester i forbindelse med tingenes internet. Alle elementer i de nationale nummerplaner bør forvaltes af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, herunder de punktkoder, der anvendes i forbindelse med netadresser. Hvor der er behov for harmonisering af nummerressourcer i Unionen for at understøtte udviklingen af paneuropæiske tjenester eller grænseoverskridende tjenester, navnlig nye maskine-til-maskine-baserede tjenester såsom netforbundne biler, og hvor efterspørgslen ikke kan dækkes af de eksisterende nummerressourcer, kan Kommissionen med bistand fra BEREC under anvendelse af sine udøvende beføjelser træffe gennemførelsesforanstaltninger.
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Det bør være muligt at opfylde kravet om offentliggørelse af afgørelser om tildeling af brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer ved at gøre disse afgørelser offentligt tilgængelige via et websted.
(252)
Der gør sig særlige forhold gældende, når børn skal efterlyses, hvorfor medlemsstaterne bør opretholde deres indsats for at sikre, at der faktisk på deres område stilles en velfungerende tjeneste til rådighed til efterlysning af børn under nummer »116000«. Medlemsstaterne bør træffe passende foranstaltninger til at sikre et tilstrækkeligt tjenestekvalitetsniveau i forbindelse med »116000«-nummeret.
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Sideløbende med hotlinenummeret »116000« for efterlyste børn sørger mange medlemsstater også for, at børn har adgang til en børnevenlig tjeneste, der driver en telefonisk hjælpelinje for børn, der har brug for omsorg og beskyttelse, ved anvendelse af nummeret »116111«. Disse medlemsstater og Kommissionen bør sikre, at borgerne, navnlig børn og nationale børnebeskyttelsesordninger, gøres opmærksomme på eksistensen af »116111«-hjælpelinjen.
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Et indre marked indebærer, at slutbrugerne kan få forbindelse med alle numre i andre medlemsstaters nationale nummerplaner og benytte tjenester, der bruger ikkegeografiske numre inden for Unionen, herunder bl.a. frikalds- og overtakseringsnumre, bortset fra når den slutbruger, der ringes op, af kommercielle årsager har valgt at begrænse adgangen fra visse geografiske områder. Slutbrugerne bør også kunne få forbindelse med internationale frikaldsnumre (UIFN). Der bør ikke lægges hindringer i vejen for opkald på tværs af grænserne til numre og benyttelse af de tilknyttede tjenester, undtagen i objektivt velbegrundede tilfælde, som f.eks. når det er nødvendigt for at bekæmpe bedrageri eller misbrug (f.eks. i forbindelse med visse særtjenester med overtaksering), hvor nummeret er defineret som rent nationalt (f.eks. et indenlandsk kortnummer), eller hvor det ikke er økonomisk muligt. Taksten, der pålignes parter, som foretager opkald fra steder uden for den pågældende medlemsstat, skal ikke nødvendigvis være den samme som for parter, der foretager opkald fra medlemsstaten. Der bør gives tydelige og fuldstændige forhåndsoplysninger til brugerne om enhver afgift for frikaldsnumre, f.eks. afgifter for internationale opkald til numre, som kan kaldes via de normale internationale retningsnumre. Hvis indtægter fra samtrafik eller andre tjenester tilbageholdes af udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester på grund af bedrageri eller misbrug, bør medlemsstaterne sikre, at de tilbageholdte tjenesteindtægter tilbagebetales til de slutbrugere, der er berørt af det pågældende bedrageri eller det pågældende misbrug, hvor det er muligt.
(255)
I overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet bør en række af bestemmelserne om slutbrugernes rettigheder i dette direktiv ikke gælde for mikrovirksomheder, der kun udbyder nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. Ifølge EU-Domstolens retspraksis skal definitionen af små og mellemstore virksomheder, som omfatter mikrovirksomheder, fortolkes strengt. For kun at medtage virksomheder, der reelt er uafhængige mikrovirksomheder, er det nødvendigt at undersøge strukturen af mikrovirksomheder, som danner en økonomisk koncern, hvis styrke overstiger en mikrovirksomheds styrke, og at sikre, at definitionen af mikrovirksomhed ikke omgås på et rent formelt grundlag.
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Gennemførelsen af det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation kræver, at der fjernes hindringer for slutbrugernes grænseoverskridende adgang til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i hele Unionen. Udbyderne af elektronisk kommunikation til offentligheden bør ikke nægte eller begrænse adgang eller diskriminere slutbrugere på baggrund af deres nationalitet eller bopæls- eller etableringsmedlemsstat. Det bør imidlertid være muligt at differentiere på grundlag af forskelle, der kan retfærdiggøres objektivt, hvad angår omkostninger og risici, der ikke er begrænset til foranstaltningerne i forordning (EU) nr. 531/2012 med hensyn til misbrug eller unormal anvendelse af regulerede detailroamingtjenester.
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Den uensartede gennemførelse af reglerne om slutbrugerbeskyttelse har skabt væsentlige hindringer på det indre marked, som påvirker både udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og slutbrugerne. Disse hindringer bør reduceres ved anvendelse af ens regler, så der sikres et højt fælles beskyttelsesniveau i hele Unionen. En tilpasset fuld harmonisering af de slutbrugerrettigheder, der er omfattet af dette direktiv, bør i væsentlig grad øge den juridiske forudsigelighed for både slutbrugere og udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og bør medføre en markant reduktion af hindringerne for markedsadgang og den unødvendige byrde ved regeloverholdelse, der skyldes de fragmenterede regler. Fuld harmonisering er med til at overvinde hindringer for det indre markeds funktion, der skyldes sådanne nationale bestemmelser vedrørende slutbrugerrettigheder, som samtidig beskytter nationale udbydere mod konkurrence fra andre medlemsstater. For at opnå et højt fælles beskyttelsesniveau bør flere bestemmelser om slutbrugerrettigheder i nogen grad styrkes i dette direktiv i lyset af bedste praksis i medlemsstaterne. Fuld harmonisering af deres rettigheder øger slutbrugernes tillid til det indre marked, idet de nyder godt af en beskyttelse på samme høje niveau, når de benytter elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, både i deres medlemsstat og i forbindelse med ophold, arbejde eller rejser i andre medlemsstater. Fuld harmonisering bør kun vedrøre de emner, der er omfattet af bestemmelserne om slutbrugernes rettigheder i dette direktiv. Derfor bør den ikke berøre national ret for så vidt angår de aspekter af slutbrugerbeskyttelse, herunder visse aspekter af transparensforanstaltninger, der ikke er omfattet af disse bestemmelser. F.eks. bør foranstaltninger vedrørende transparensforpligtelser, som ikke er omfattet af dette direktiv, betragtes som forenelige med princippet om fuld harmonisering, mens yderligere krav vedrørende transparensspørgsmål, der er omfattet af dette direktiv, såsom offentliggørelse af oplysninger, bør betragtes som uforenelige. Desuden bør medlemsstaterne kunne opretholde eller indføre nationale bestemmelser om spørgsmål, der ikke er specifikt behandlet i dette direktiv, navnlig med henblik på at behandle nye spørgsmål.
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Aftaler er et vigtigt værktøj for slutbrugerne, når det drejer sig om at sikre gennemskuelige oplysninger og den fornødne juridiske forudsigelighed. De fleste tjenesteudbydere på et konkurrencebaseret marked indgår aftaler med deres kunder, fordi det rent kommercielt er det mest hensigtsmæssige. Forbrugertransaktioner i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester er ud over dette direktiv underlagt kravene i gældende EU-ret til beskyttelse af forbrugerne i forbindelse medaftaler, herunder navnlig Rådets direktiv 93/13/EØF 
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 og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2011/83/EU 
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. Medtagelse af oplysningskrav i dette direktiv, som også kan være krævet i henhold til direktiv 2011/83/EU, bør ikke føre til duplikering af oplysningerne i dokumenter før og efter indgåelse af en aftale. Relevante oplysninger, der er givet i forbindelse med dette direktiv, herunder eventuelle mere præskriptive og detaljerede oplysningskrav, bør anses for at opfylde de hertil svarende krav i medfør af direktiv 2011/83/EU.
(259)
Nogle af disse bestemmelser om slutbrugerbeskyttelse, der som udgangspunkt kun gælder for forbrugere, nemlig bestemmelserne om aftaleoplysninger, maksimal varighed af aftaler og pakker, bør ikke alene være til gavn for forbrugere, men også for mikrovirksomheder og små virksomheder og nonprofitorganisationer som defineret i medlemsstaternes nationale ret. Forhandlingspositionen for disse kategorier af virksomheder og organisationer er sammenlignelig med forbrugernes, og de bør derfor nyde godt af samme beskyttelsesniveau, medmindre de udtrykkeligt giver afkald på disse rettigheder. Forpligtelserne vedrørende aftaleoplysninger i dette direktiv, herunder de forpligtelser i direktiv 2011/83/EU, som der henvises til i dette direktiv, bør finde anvendelse, uanset om der foretages betaling og størrelsen af den betaling, som kunden skal betale. Forpligtelserne vedrørende aftaleoplysninger, herunder de forpligtelser, der findes i direktiv 2011/83/EU, bør finde automatisk anvendelse på mikrovirksomheder, små virksomheder og nonprofitorganisationer, medmindre de foretrækker at forhandle individuelle aftalevilkår med udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. I modsætning til mikrovirksomheder, små virksomheder samt nonprofitorganisationer har større virksomheder som regel en bedre forhandlingsposition og er derfor ikke afhængige af de samme aftalemæssige oplysningskrav som forbrugerne. Andre bestemmelser, f.eks. om nummerportabilitet, som også er vigtige for større virksomheder, bør fortsat finde anvendelse på alle slutbrugere. »Nonprofitorganisationer« er retlige enheder, som ikke indtjener overskud til deres ejere eller medlemmer. Nonprofitorganisationer er typisk velgørende organisationer eller andre slags offentlige interesseorganisationer. I lyset af sådanne organisationers sammenlignelige situation er det derfor rimeligt at behandle dem på samme måde som mikrovirksomheder og små virksomheder i henhold til dette direktiv for så vidt angår slutbrugernes rettigheder.
(260)
De særlige forhold, der kendetegner sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation, kræver ud over horisontale aftalebestemmelser et begrænset antal yderligere bestemmelser om slutbrugerbeskyttelse. Slutbrugerne bør oplyses bl.a. om eventuelle kvalitetsniveauer, der tilbydes, betingelser for tilbud og opsigelse af aftaler, abonnements- og prisvilkår, der finder anvendelse, og takster for tjenester, som er genstand for særlige prisvilkår. Disse oplysninger er relevante for udbydere af andre offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til at levere maskine-til-maskine-tjenester. Med forbehold af de gældende regler om beskyttelse af personoplysninger bør en udbyder af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester ikke være omfattet af forpligtelser vedrørende oplysningskrav for så vidt angår aftaler, hvis denne udbyder og tilknyttede selskaber eller personer ikke modtager nogen betaling, der er direkte eller indirekte knyttet til udbuddet af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, såsom hvor et universitet, giver besøgende fri adgang til sit wi-fi-net på universitetsområdet uden at modtage nogen betaling, hverken gennem brugerbetaling eller reklameindtægter.
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Hvis slutbrugeren skal kunne foretage et veloplyst valg, er det afgørende, at de påkrævede relevante oplysninger gives forud for aftalens indgåelse i et klart og forståeligt sprog på et varigt medium eller, hvis dette ikke er muligt, og uden at det berører definitionen af varigt medium i direktiv 2011/83/EU, i et dokument, der stilles til rådighed af udbyderen og gives meddelelse om til brugeren, og som er let at downloade, åbne og konsultere på anordninger, som almindeligvis anvendes af forbrugerne. For at lette valget bør udbydere også af samme grund stille et resumé af de væsentlige aftalevilkår til rådighed. For at gøre det lettere at sammenligne og mindske efterlevelsesomkostningerne bør Kommissionen efter høring af BEREC vedtage en skabelon for sådanne aftaleresuméer. De oplysninger, der gives før indgåelse af en aftale, bør ligesom resuméskabelonen udgøre en integrerende del af den endelige aftale. Aftaleresuméet bør være kortfattet og letlæseligt og ideelt set ikke længere, end hvad der svarer til én A4-side, eller, hvis en række forskellige tjenester er samlet i en enkelt aftale, hvad der svarer til op til tre A4-sider.
(262)
Efter vedtagelsen af forordning (EU) 2015/2120 er bestemmelserne i dette direktiv vedrørende oplysninger om betingelser for begrænsning af adgang til eller brug af tjenester og applikationer samt oplysninger om trafikkontrol blevet forældede og bør ophæves.
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Med hensyn til terminaludstyr bør kundeaftalen indeholde oplysninger om eventuelle betingelser, som udbyderen måtte have pålagt brugen af udstyret, f.eks. ved at SIM-låse mobile anordninger, hvis sådanne betingelser ikke er forbudt i henhold til den nationale ret, og om eventuelle gebyrer, som måtte forfalde til betaling ved aftalens opsigelse, uanset om denne finder sted før den fastsatte udløbsdato eller på denne dato, herunder om eventuelle omkostninger forbundet med at beholde udstyret. Hvis slutbrugeren beslutter at beholde det terminaludstyr, der blev solgt sammen på tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse, bør en eventuel kompensation ikke overstige dets værdi pro rata temporis som beregnet på grundlag af værdien ved aftalens indgåelse eller på grundlag af den resterende del af servicegebyret indtil aftalens udløb, afhængig af hvilket beløb der er mindst. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne vælge andre metoder til beregning af kompensationssatsen, når en sådan sats er lig med eller mindre end den beregnede kompensation. Eventuelle begrænsninger for brug af terminaludstyr på andre net bør gratis ophæves af udbyderen senest ved betaling af en sådan kompensation.
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Med forbehold af de materielle bestemmelser vedrørende sikkerhed, der påhviler udbyderen i henhold til dette direktiv, bør aftalen fastlægge, hvilke forholdsregler udbyderen kan træffe i tilfælde af sikkerhedshændelser, trusler eller sårbarheder. Desuden bør en aftale også angive eventuelle kompensations- og refusionsordninger, der er til rådighed, hvis en udbyder reagerer utilstrækkeligt på en sikkerhedshændelse, herunder hvis en sikringshændelse, som er anmeldt til udbyderen, finder sted på grund af kendte software- eller hardwaresårbarheder, som fabrikanten eller udvikleren har udsendt rettelser til, og tjenesteudbyderen ikke har foretaget disse rettelser eller truffet andre passende modforanstaltninger.
(265)
Gennemskuelige, aktuelle og sammenlignelige oplysninger om tilbud og tjenester er vigtige for forbrugerne på markeder med konkurrence mellem flere tjenesteudbydere. Slutbrugere bør let kunne sammenligne priserne for de forskellige tjenester, der tilbydes på markedet, på grundlag af oplysninger, der offentliggøres i en let tilgængelig form. For at gøre sammenligningen af priser og tjenester let bør de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder have mulighed for at kræve mere gennemskuelige oplysninger (herunder om takster, servicekvalitet, betingelser for leveret terminaludstyr og andre relevante statistiske oplysninger) af udbydere af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. Sådanne krav bør tage behørigt hensyn til disse nets eller tjenesters egenskaber. De bør også sikre, at tredjeparter har ret til gratis at benytte offentligt tilgængelige oplysninger, der er udsendt af sådanne virksomheder, med henblik på at udbyde sammenligningsværktøjer.
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Slutbrugere er ofte ikke opmærksomme på omkostningerne ved deres forbrugsadfærd eller har svært ved at vurdere deres tids- eller dataforbrug, når de bruger elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. For at øge gennemsigtigheden og muliggøre bedre kontrol med deres kommunikationsbudget er det vigtigt at give slutbrugerne faciliteter til i tide at overvåge deres forbrug. Desuden bør medlemsstaterne kunne opretholde eller indføre bestemmelser om forbrugsgrænser, der beskytter slutbrugere mod ubehagelige overraskelser på regningen, herunder vedrørende særtjenester med overtaksering og andre tjenester, for hvilke der gælder særlige prisvilkår. Dette giver de kompetente myndigheder mulighed for at kræve, at oplysninger om sådanne priser skal gives, inden tjenesten ydes, og berører ikke medlemsstaternes mulighed for at opretholde eller indføre generelle forpligtelser for særtjenester med overtaksering for at sikre effektiv slutbrugerbeskyttelse.
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Uafhængige sammenligningsværktøjer såsom websteder udgør et effektivt middel for slutbrugerne til at vurdere fordelene ved forskellige udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, når de ydes mod tilbagevendende eller forbrugsbaserede direkte pengebetalinger, og til at indhente upartiske oplysninger, navnlig ved at sammenligne priser, takster og kvalitetsparametre på ét sted. Sådanne værktøjer bør være operationelt uafhængige af tjenesteudbydere, og ingen tjenesteudbyder bør begunstiges i søgeresultaterne. Sådanne værktøjer bør sigte mod at give oplysninger, som både er klare, præcise, fuldstændige og omfattende. De bør også sigte mod at omfatte den bredest mulige vifte af tilbud for at give et repræsentativt overblik, samtidig med at de dækker en betydelig del af markedet. De oplysninger, der gives via sådanne værktøjer, bør være troværdige, upartiske og gennemsigtige. Slutbrugerne bør informeres om, at der findes sådanne værktøjer. Medlemsstaterne bør sikre, at slutbrugerne har gratis adgang til mindst et sådant værktøj på deres respektive områder. Hvis der kun er ét værktøj i en medlemsstat, og det værktøj tages ud af drift eller ikke længere lever op til kvalitetskriterierne, bør medlemsstaten sikre, at slutbrugerne inden for rimelig tid har adgang til et andet sammenligningsværktøj på nationalt plan.
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Uafhængige sammenligningsværktøjer kan være drevet af private virksomheder eller af eller på vegne af kompetente myndigheder, men bør drives i henhold til bestemte kvalitetskriterier, herunder kravet om at give oplysninger om ejere af værktøjet, give præcise og ajourførte oplysninger, angive tidspunktet for den seneste ajourføring, fastsætte klare, objektive kriterier for sammenligningen og inddrage en bred vifte af tilbud, som dækker en betydelig del af markedet. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne fastsætte, hvor ofte sammenligningsværktøjerne skal gennemgå og ajourføre de oplysninger, som de formidler til slutbrugerne, under hensyntagen til hvor ofte udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og af offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester almindeligvis ajourfører deres oplysninger om takster og kvalitet.
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Medlemsstaterne bør, af hensyn til at tage fat om spørgsmål af relevans for almenheden for så vidt angår brug af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester samt for at tilskynde beskyttelsen af andres rettigheder og frihedsrettigheder, med bistand fra udbydere af sådanne tjenester kunne udarbejde og formidle almennyttige oplysninger om brugen af sådanne tjenester eller foranledige sådanne oplysninger videreformidlet. Det bør være muligt, at sådanne oplysninger omfatter oplysninger til almenheden om de hyppigst forekommende overtrædelser og deres retlige konsekvenser, f.eks. om overtrædelse af reglerne om ophavsret, anden ulovlig anvendelse og formidling af skadeligt indhold og vejledning om og metoder til beskyttelse mod de risici, der kan true den personlige sikkerhed, f.eks. i forbindelse med videregivelse af personoplysninger under visse omstændigheder, samt privatlivets fred og personlige data, samt oplysninger om tilgængeligheden af let anvendelig og konfigurabel software eller softwareoptioner, som gør det muligt at beskytte børn eller sårbare personer. Disse oplysninger kunne koordineres ved hjælp af samarbejdsproceduren i dette direktiv. Sådanne almennyttige oplysninger bør ajourføres, når det er påkrævet, og bør forelægges på let forståelige formater som fastlagt af de enkelte medlemsstater og på de nationale offentlige myndigheders websider. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne pålægge udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester at videreformidle disse standardiserede oplysninger til alle deres kunder på en efter myndighedernes opfattelse hensigtsmæssig måde. Videreformidlingen af sådanne oplysninger bør imidlertid ikke være forbundet med for stor en byrde for udbyderne. Hvis den gør dette, bør medlemsstaterne kræve, at en sådan videreformidling sker under anvendelse af de midler, som udbyderne sædvanligvis benytter i deres kommunikation med slutbrugerne.
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Hvis der ikke findes relevante EU-retlige bestemmelser, betragtes indhold, applikationer og tjenester som lovlige eller skadevoldende i overensstemmelse med nationale materielle og processuelle regler. Det er en opgave for medlemsstaterne, ikke for udbyderne af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, ud fra gældende ret at tage stilling til, om indhold, applikationer eller tjenester er lovlige eller skadevoldende. Dette direktiv og direktiv 2002/58/EF finder anvendelse, medmindre andet er fastsat i direktiv 2000/31/EF, som bl.a. indeholder en regel om ren videreformidling (»mere conduit«) for mellemliggende tjenesteudbydere, som defineret deri.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder, eller, hvis det er relevant, andre kompetente myndigheder bør i koordination med de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bemyndiges til at overvåge kvaliteten af tjenesterne og til systematisk at indsamle oplysninger om kvaliteten af de tjenester, der tilbydes af udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og af offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, for så vidt sidstnævnte er i stand til at tilbyde mindsteniveauer for tjenestekvalitet enten gennem kontrol med mindst visse elementer af nettet eller i medfør af en serviceleveranceaftale med henblik herpå, herunder kvaliteten af tjenesteudbuddet til slutbrugere med handicap. Disse oplysninger bør indsamles baseret på kriterier, der gør det muligt at sammenligne oplysningerne mellem tjenesteudbydere og mellem medlemsstater. Udbydere af sådanne elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, som driver virksomhed på et marked med fri konkurrence, må forventes at gøre passende og ajourførte oplysninger om deres tjenester offentligt tilgængelige, eftersom de har en forretningsmæssig interesse heri. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder eller, hvis det er relevant, andre kompetente myndigheder bør i koordination med de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder dog alligevel kunne kræve, at sådanne oplysninger offentliggøres, såfremt det påvises, at de ikke tilstrækkeligt effektivt er bragt til offentlighedens kendskab. Hvis offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenesters tjenestekvalitet afhænger af eksterne faktorer, såsom kontrol af signaltransmission eller netforbindelse, bør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder kunne kræve, at udbydere af sådanne tjenester oplyser deres forbrugere herom.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder også fastsætte de målemetoder, som tjenesteudbyderne skal anvende for at forbedre sammenligneligheden af de formidlede data. For at fremme sammenligneligheden i hele Unionen og mindske efterlevelsesomkostningerne bør BEREC vedtage retningslinjer for relevante tjenestekvalitetsparametre, som de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder bør tage størst muligt hensyn til.
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Forbrugerne bør kunne træffe velinformerede valg og skifte udbyder, når det er i deres interesse, således at de kan få fuldt udbytte af konkurrencen på markedet. Det er afgørende at sikre, at de kan gøre dette uden hindringer af juridisk, teknisk eller praktisk art, herunder aftalevilkår, procedurer og afgifter. Dette forhindrer ikke udbydere i at fastsætte rimelige mindsteperioder på op til 24 måneder for forbrugeraftalens løbetid. Medlemsstater bør imidlertid have mulighed for at opretholde eller indføre bestemmelser om en kortere maksimal varighed og for at tillade forbrugere at skifte abonnements- og prisvilkår eller opsige en aftale i aftaleperioden uden at blive udsat for yderligere omkostninger i lyset af nationale forhold såsom konkurrenceniveauet og stabiliteten af investeringer i net. Uafhængigt af aftalen om en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste kunne forbrugerne tænkes at foretrække og have gavn af en længere tilbagebetalingsperiode for fysiske forbindelser. Sådanne forbrugerforpligtelser kan spille en vigtig rolle med hensyn til at lette udrulningen af net med meget høj kapacitet hen til eller meget tæt på slutbrugerens ejendom, herunder gennem efterspørgselsaggregeringsordninger, der giver netinvestorer mulighed for at reducere de risici, der er forbundet med den indledende ibrugtagning. Forbrugernes ret til at skifte mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester som fastsat i dette direktiv bør dog ikke begrænses af sådanne tilbagebetalingsperioder i aftaler om fysiske forbindelser, og sådanne aftaler bør ikke omfatte terminaludstyr eller internetadgangsudstyr, såsom mobiltelefoner, routere og modemmer. Medlemsstaterne bør sikre ligebehandling af enheder, herunder operatører, der finansierer udrulning af en fysisk forbindelse med meget høj kapacitet til en slutbrugers ejendom, herunder hvis en sådan finansiering sker ved hjælp af aftaler om afbetaling.
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Automatisk forlængelse af aftaler om elektroniske kommunikationstjenester er også mulig. I sådanne tilfælde bør slutbrugerne være i stand til at opsige deres aftale uden omkostninger efter aftaleperiodens udløb.
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Enhver ændring af aftalevilkår, der foreslås af udbydere af andre offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, og som ikke er til fordel for slutbrugeren f.eks. hvad angår gebyrer, takster, begrænsning af datamængden, datahastigheden, dækningen eller behandlingen af personoplysninger, bør give slutbrugeren ret til at opsige aftalen uden at blive pålagt nogen omkostninger, selv hvis disse ændringer er kombineret med ændringer, der indebærer fordele. Udbyderes ændring af aftalevilkår bør derfor give slutbrugeren ret at opsige den pågældende aftale, medmindre hver ændring i sig selv er til fordel for slutbrugeren, eller ændringerne er af rent administrativ karakter f.eks. en ændring i udbyderens adresse og ikke har negativ virkning for slutbrugeren, eller ændringerne udelukkende er pålagt ved lov- eller regelændringer, såsom nye aftaleoplysningskrav, der er pålagt ved EU-retten eller national ret. Hvorvidt en ændring udelukkende er til slutbrugerens fordel, bør vurderes på grundlag af objektive kriterier. Der bør kun ses bort fra slutbrugerens ret til at opsige aftalen, hvis udbyderen er i stand til at godtgøre, at alle aftaleændringer udelukkende er til fordel for slutbrugeren eller er af rent administrativ karakter uden negativ virkning for slutbrugeren.
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Slutbrugere bør underrettes om eventuelle ændringer i aftalevilkår ved hjælp af et varigt medium. Andre slutbrugere end forbrugere, mikrovirksomheder eller små virksomheder eller nonprofitorganisationer bør ikke kunne drage fordel af opsigelsesrettigheder i tilfælde af aftaleændringer for så vidt angår transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til maskine-til-maskine-tjenester. Medlemsstaterne bør kunne fastsætte specifik slutbrugerbeskyttelse vedrørende aftaleopsigelse, hvis slutbrugere skifter bopæl. Bestemmelserne om aftaleopsigelse bør ikke berøre andre bestemmelser i EU-retten eller national ret om grunde til, at tjenesteudbydere eller slutbrugere kan opsige aftaler eller ændre aftalevilkår og -betingelser.
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Det er afgørende for at gøre konkurrencen i et konkurrencepræget miljø effektiv, at der er mulighed for at skifte udbyder. Det forventes at øge slutbrugernes tryghed i forbindelse med skift af udbyder og gøre dem mere villige til at deltage aktivt i konkurrenceprocessen, hvis der er gennemsigtige, præcise og rettidige oplysninger om udbyderskift til rådighed. Tjenesteudbyderne bør sikre tjenestens kontinuitet, så slutbrugerne har mulighed for at skifte udbyder uden at blive hæmmet af risikoen for, at tjenesten er utilgængelig, og, hvis det er teknisk muligt, give mulighed for at skifte på den dato, som slutbrugerne ønsker.
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Nummerportabilitet spiller en nøglerolle med hensyn til at øge forbrugernes valgmuligheder og skabe effektiv konkurrence på liberaliserede markeder for elektronisk kommunikation. Slutbrugere, der anmoder herom, bør have mulighed for at beholde deres numre uanset tjenesteudbyder og for et begrænset tidsrum mellem skift af tjenesteudbyder. Nummerportabilitet mellem det offentlige fastnet og mobilnettet er ikke omfattet af direktivet. Medlemsstaterne bør dog kunne anvende bestemmelser om nummerportabilitet mellem net, der udbyder tjenester på faste steder, og mobilnet.
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Nummerportabilitet styrkes i betydelig grad, når såvel slutbrugerne, der tager deres numre med sig, og slutbrugere, der ringer til disse, har adgang til transparente takstoplysninger. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør, som led i implementeringen af nummerportabilitet, hvor det er muligt, fremme relevant taksttransparens.
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De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan, når de sikrer, at prissætningen af samtrafik i forbindelse med udbud af nummerportabilitet er omkostningsbaseret, også tage hensyn til tilgængelige priser på sammenlignelige markeder.
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Nummerportabilitet er en afgørende faktor, som letter forbrugernes valg og fremmer effektiv konkurrence på liberaliserede markeder for elektronisk kommunikation, og bør derfor gennemføres med mindst mulig forsinkelse, således at nummeret aktiveres og bliver funktionelt inden for en frist på én arbejdsdag, og slutbrugeren dermed ikke må undvære den pågældende tjeneste i mere end én arbejdsdag fra den aftalte dato. Retten til nummerportabilitet bør gives den slutbruger, der har den pågældende aftale (forudbetalt eller betalt efterfølgende) med en udbyder. For at understøtte etstedsbetjening og for at fremme gnidningsløst udbyderskift for slutbrugerne bør skifteprocessen styres af den modtagende udbyder af elektronisk kommunikation til offentligheden. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller, hvis det er relevant, andre kompetente myndigheder bør kunne fastlægge den globale proces for skiftet og porteringen af numre under hensyntagen til de nationale bestemmelser om aftaler og den teknologiske udvikling. Dette bør, hvor det er muligt, omfatte et krav om, at portering skal gennemføres trådløst, medmindre en slutbruger anmoder om en anden måde. Erfaringerne i visse medlemsstater har vist, at der er risiko for, at slutbrugere påtvinges et udbyderskift, uden at de har givet deres samtykke hertil. Skønt dette er et anliggende, der først og fremmest bør henhøre under de retshåndhævende myndigheder, bør det være muligt for medlemsstaterne at indføre det minimum af forholdsmæssige foranstaltninger, herunder passende sanktioner vedrørende udbyderskift, der er nødvendigt for at minimere sådanne risici, og at sikre, at slutbrugerne beskyttes under hele udbyderskiftet uden at gøre processen mindre attraktiv for dem. Retten til nummerportabilitet bør ikke begrænses af aftalevilkår.
(282)
For at sikre, at skift og portering finder sted inden for de tidsfrister, der er fastsat i dette direktiv, bør medlemsstaterne fastsætte, at slutbrugere modtager kompensation fra udbydere på en let og rettidig måde, hvis en aftale mellem en udbyder og en slutbruger ikke overholdes. En sådan kompensation bør stå i rimeligt forhold til forsinkelsen med at overholde den pågældende aftale. Slutbrugere bør i det mindste kompenseres for forsinkelser på mere end én arbejdsdag med tjenesteaktivering, nummerportering eller utilgængelig tjeneste, og hvor udbydere ikke opfylder berammede tjeneste- eller installationsaftaler. Yderligere kompensation kan også være i form af automatisk nedsættelse af betalingen i tilfælde, hvor den afgivende udbyder skal fortætte med at yde sine tjenester, indtil den modtagende udbyders tjenester er aktiveret.
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Pakker, der indeholder mindst enten én internetadgangstjeneste eller én offentligt tilgængelig nummerbaseret interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste og andre tjenester, såsom offentligt tilgængelige nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, lineær spredning, og maskine-til-maskine-tjenester eller terminaludstyr, er blevet mere og mere udbredt og udgør en vigtig faktor i konkurrencen. Med henblik på dette direktiv bør en pakke anses for at foreligge i tilfælde, hvor elementerne i pakken ydes eller sælges af samme udbyder i henhold til samme aftale eller i henhold til aftaler, som er tæt forbundet med eller knyttet til hinanden. Selv om pakker ofte indebærer fordele for forbrugerne, kan de gøre det sværere eller bekosteligt at skifte udbyder og øge risikoen for »fastlåsning« til en aftale. I tilfælde, hvor forskellige tjenester og terminaludstyr i en pakke er underlagt forskellige regler vedrørende opsigelse af aftalen og udbyderskift eller aftalemæssige forpligtelser vedrørende erhvervelse af terminaludstyr, er forbrugerne reelt hæmmede, hvad angår deres ret i henhold til dette direktiv til at skifte til konkurrencedygtige tilbud på hele pakken eller dele af den. Visse væsentlige bestemmelser i dette direktiv vedrørende aftaleresuméoplysninger, gennemsigtighed, aftalernes varighed og opsigelse og udbyderskift bør derfor finde anvendelse på alle dele af en pakke, herunder terminaludstyr, andre tjenester såsom digitalt indhold eller digitale tjenester og de elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, der ikke er direkte omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for disse bestemmelser. Alle slutbrugerforpligtelser, der finder anvendelse i henhold til dette direktiv på en given elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, som ydes eller sælges som en særskilt tjeneste, bør også finde anvendelse, når den indgår i en pakke med mindst én internetadgangstjeneste eller én offentligt tilgængelig nummerbaseret interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste. Andre aftalemæssige forhold, f.eks. vedrørende foranstaltninger i tilfælde af manglende overensstemmelse med aftalen, bør være omfattet af de regler, der finder anvendelse på de respektive dele af pakken, f.eks. af reglerne i aftaler om salg af varer eller levering af digitalt indhold. En ret til at opsige et element i en pakke, som består af mindst én internetadgangstjeneste eller én offentligt tilgængelig nummerbaseret interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, inden udløbet af den aftalte varighed i henhold til den pågældende aftale på grund af manglende overensstemmelse eller manglende levering bør imidlertid give en forbruger ret til at opsige alle elementerne i pakken. Forbrugerne bør ligeledes for at bibeholde deres evne til let at kunne skifte udbyder ikke blive låst fast i et forhold til en udbyder via en aftalemæssig de facto-forlængelse af den oprindelige aftaleperiode.
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Udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester er forpligtede til at give adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikationer. Under ekstraordinære omstændigheder, navnlig grundet manglende teknisk gennemførlighed, er disse måske ikke i stand til at give adgang til beredskabstjenester eller lokalisering af den kaldende part eller begge dele. I sådanne tilfælde bør de på passende vis oplyse deres kunder herom i aftalen. Sådanne udbydere bør give deres kunder klare og gennemskuelige oplysninger i den oprindelige aftale og ajourføre dem i forbindelse med enhver ændring af leveringen af adgang til beredskabstjenester, f.eks. i fakturaer. Disse oplysninger bør omfatte enhver begrænsning i territorial dækning baseret på planlagte tekniske driftsparametre for kommunikationstjenesten og den tilgængelige infrastruktur. Ydes tjenesten ikke over en forbindelse, som er opsat til at give en bestemt tjenestekvalitet, bør oplysningerne også omfatte pålidelighedsniveauet for adgang og for lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part i forhold til en tjeneste ydet over en sådan forbindelse under hensyntagen til den aktuelle teknologi og de gældende kvalitetsstandarder samt tjenestekvalitetsparametrene i dette direktiv.
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Slutbrugere bør fra enhver anordning, som muliggør brugen af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, kunne få adgang til beredskabstjenester gennem gratis alarmkommunikationer og uden at skulle benytte betalingsmidler, også når de benytter roamingtjenester i en medlemsstat. Ved alarmkommunikationer forstås kommunikationsmidler, der ikke kun omfatter talekommunikationstjenester, men også SMS, beskedtjenester, video eller andre former for kommunikation, f.eks. tekst i realtid samt totale konversationstjenester og relætjenester. Medlemsstater bør under hensyntagen til alarmcentralers kapacitet og tekniske udstyr kunne bestemme, hvilke nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester der er egnede til beredskabstjenester, herunder muligheden for at begrænse disse valgmuligheder til talekommunikationstjenester og tilsvarende for slutbrugere med handicap, eller at tilføje yderligere valgmuligheder som aftalt med nationale alarmcentraler. Alarmkommunikationer kan udløses på vegne af en person af et køretøjsmonteret alarmopkald eller et eCall som defineret i forordning (EU) 2015/758.
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Medlemsstaterne bør sikre, at udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester giver pålidelig og nøjagtig adgang til beredskabstjenester under hensyntagen til nationale specifikationer og kriterier samt de nationale alarmcentralers kapacitet. Medlemsstaterne bør overveje alarmcentralernes evne til at håndtere alarmkommunikationer på mere end ét sprog. I tilfælde hvor den nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjeneste ikke ydes via en forbindelse, som er opsat til at give en bestemt servicekvalitet, er tjenesteudbyderen måske ikke i stand til at sikre, at nødopkald foretaget via dennes tjeneste dirigeres til den mest passende alarmcentral med samme pålidelighed. For sådanne netuafhængige udbydere, navnlig udbydere, som ikke er integreret med en udbyder af et offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet, er det måske ikke altid teknisk muligt at give lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part. Medlemsstaterne bør sikre, at der indføres standarder til sikring af præcis og pålidelig routing og forbindelse til beredskabstjenesterne så hurtigt som muligt, så netuafhængige udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester kan opfylde de forpligtelser, der vedrører adgang til beredskabstjenester og levering af lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, på et niveau, der er sammenligneligt med det, der kræves af andre udbydere af sådanne kommunikationstjenester. Hvor sådanne standarder og tilhørende alarmcentralsystemer ikke er blevet indført, bør det ikke kræves, at netuafhængige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester giver adgang til beredskabstjenester, undtagen hvis det kan lade sig gøre rent teknisk eller på en måde, der er økonomisk rentabel. Dette kan eksempelvis omfatte medlemsstaters udpegning af en enkelt central alarmcentral til at modtage alarmkommunikationer. Sådanne udbydere bør ikke desto mindre orientere slutbrugerne, når adgang til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« eller lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part ikke er understøttet.
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For at forbedre medlemsstaternes rapportering og præstationsmåling med hensyn til besvarelse og håndtering af nødopkald bør Kommissionen hvert andet år aflægge rapport til Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om effektiviteten af gennemførelsen af det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«.
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Medlemsstaterne bør i overensstemmelse med EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser træffe særlige foranstaltninger for at sikre, at beredskabstjenesterne, herunder det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«, er lige så tilgængelige for slutbrugere med handicap, herunder døve, hørehæmmede, talehæmmede og døvblinde slutbrugere, som for andre. Det kan betyde, at der skal tilvejebringes særligt terminaludstyr for slutbrugere med handicap, når andre kommunikationsmåder ikke er egnede til dem.
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Det er vigtigt, at det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« bliver mere kendt, da det vil øge beskyttelsen og sikkerheden for borgere, der rejser i Unionen. Borgerne bør ved rejse i en hvilken som helst medlemsstat således bringes på det rene med, navnlig gennem oplysninger på opslag i internationale busterminaler, banegårde, havne og lufthavne samt i telefonbøger, slutbruger- og faktureringsmateriale, at det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« kan benyttes som fælles alarmnummer i hele Unionen. Det er først og fremmest medlemsstaterne, som er ansvarlige herfor, men Kommissionen bør fortsat både støtte og supplere medlemsstaternes initiativer med henblik på at øge kendskabet til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« og foretage regelmæssige evalueringer af offentlighedens kendskab til dette nummer.
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Lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, som finder anvendelse på alle alarmkommunikationer, øger beskyttelsesniveauet og sikkerheden for slutbrugerne og hjælper alarmtjenesterne med at udføre deres opgaver, forudsat at det nationale system af alarmcentraler garanterer, at alarmkommunikation og tilhørende data fremføres til beredskabstjenesterne. Modtagelsen og brugen af lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, som omfatter både netbaserede lokaliseringsoplysninger og, hvis de er tilgængelige, forbedrede lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, der stammer fra mobiltelefoner, bør ske i overensstemmelse med den relevante EU-ret om behandling af personoplysninger og sikkerhedsforanstaltninger. Virksomheder, der udbyder netbaseret lokalisering, bør stille lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part til rådighed for beredskabstjenester, så snart opkaldet når frem til den pågældende tjeneste, uanset hvilken teknologi der anvendes. Imidlertid har lokaliseringsteknologier baseret på mobiltelefoner vist sig at være betydelig mere præcise og omkostningseffektive på grund af tilgængeligheden af data fra den europæiske geostationære navigations-overlay-tjeneste og satellitnavigationssystemet Galileo samt andre globale satellitnavigationssystemer og wi-fi-data. Lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, der stammer fra mobiltelefoner, bør derfor supplere netbaserede lokaliseringsoplysninger, selv hvis lokalisering på grundlag af data fra mobiltelefoner først bliver tilgængelig, efter at alarmkommunikationen er etableret. Medlemsstaterne bør sikre, at lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, der stammer fra mobiltelefoner, når disse findes, gøres tilgængelige for den mest passende alarmcentral. Dette er måske ikke altid muligt, f.eks. når lokalisering ikke er tilgængelig på en mobiltelefon eller gennem den interpersonelle kommunikationstjeneste, der anvendes, eller når det ikke er teknisk muligt at indhente disse oplysninger. Medlemsstaterne bør desuden sikre, at alarmcentralen er i stand til at uddrage og håndtere de tilgængelige lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, hvis det er muligt. Etableringen og overførslen af lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part bør være omkostningsfri for både slutbrugeren og den myndighed, der håndterer alarmkommunikationen, uanset midlet til etablering, f.eks. via mobiltelefonen eller nettet, eller midlet til overførsel, f.eks. via talekanal, SMS eller IP-baseret.
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For at følge den teknologiske udvikling med hensyn til præcise lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, lige adgang for slutbrugere med handicap og routing af opkald til den mest passende alarmcentral bør Kommissionen have beføjelse til ved delegeret retsakt at vedtage de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre foreneligheden, interoperabiliteten, kvaliteten, pålideligheden og kontinuiteten af alarmkommunikationer i Unionen, såsom funktionelle bestemmelser, hvorved forskellige parters rolle i kommunikationskæden fastlægges, f.eks. udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, netoperatører og alarmcentraler, samt tekniske bestemmelser, hvorved de tekniske midler til at opfylde de funktionelle bestemmelser fastlægges. Sådanne foranstaltninger bør ikke berøre den måde, hvorpå medlemsstaternes beredskabstjenester er organiseret.
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En borger i en medlemsstat, som har behov for at kontakte beredskabstjenester i en anden medlemsstat, ikke gøre det, fordi beredskabstjenester ikke har nogle kontaktoplysninger for beredskabstjenesterne i andre medlemsstater. En EU-dækkende sikker database over numre på den eller de ledende beredskabstjenester i hvert land bør derfor indføres. Derfor bør BEREC opretholde en sikker database over medlemsstaternes beredskabstjenesters E.164-numre, hvis en anden organisation ikke opretholder en sådan database, med henblik på at sikre, at beredskabstjenesterne i én medlemsstat kan kontaktes af beredskabstjenesterne i en anden.
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Indbyrdes forskellig national ret har udviklet sig vedrørende udsendelse via elektroniske kommunikationstjenester af offentlige advarsler om overhængende eller truende alvorlige nødsituationer og katastrofer. Med henblik på at tilnærme lovgivningen på dette område bør dette direktiv derfor fastsætte, at offentlige advarsler, når offentlige varslingssystemer er etableret, bør udsendes af udbydere af mobile nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester til alle berørte slutbrugere. De berørte slutbrugere bør anses for at være de slutbrugere, som befinder sig i geografiske områder, der potentielt er berørt af overhængende eller truende alvorlige nødsituationer og katastrofer i varselsperioden, som fastslået af de kompetente myndigheder.
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Hvis effektiv forbindelse ud til alle berørte slutbrugere, uanset deres bopælssted eller -medlemsstat, er sikret og opfylder det højeste datasikkerhedsniveau, bør medlemsstaterne kunne give mulighed for udsendelsen af offentlige advarsler via andre offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end mobile nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester eller transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til radio- og tv-spredning, eller via mobilapplikationer, som transmitteres via internetadgangstjenester. Med henblik på at informere slutbrugere, der rejser ind i en medlemsstat, om sådanne offentlige varslingssystemer, bør den pågældende medlemsstat sikre, at disse slutbrugere straks automatisk pr. SMS modtager gratis og letforståelige oplysninger om, hvordan de kan modtage offentlige advarsler, herunder ved hjælp af mobilt terminaludstyr, der ikke er aktiveret til internetadgangstjenester. Andre offentlige advarsler end advarsler, der er afhængige af mobile nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, bør transmitteres til slutbrugerne på en måde, som er let at modtage. Hvis et offentligt varslingssystem bygger på en applikation, bør det ikke kræve, at slutbrugerne logger ind eller registreres hos myndighederne eller applikationsudbyderen. Slutbrugernes lokaliseringsoplysninger bør anvendes i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2002/58/EF. Udsendelsen af offentlige advarsler bør være gratis for slutbrugerne. Som led i sin gennemgang af dette direktivs gennemførelse kan Kommissionen også vurdere, om det er muligt, i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og gennemførligt at indføre et fælles EU-dækkende offentligt varslingssystem med henblik på at advare offentligheden i tilfælde af overhængende eller truende katastrofer eller alvorlige nødsituationer på tværs af forskellige medlemsstater.
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Medlemsstaterne bør have mulighed for at fastslå, om forslag til alternative systemer end gennem mobile nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester virkelig svarer til sådanne tjenester, under størst muligt hensyntagen til de tilsvarende retningslinjer fra BEREC. Sådanne retningslinjer bør udarbejdes efter høring af nationale myndigheder med ansvar for alarmcentraler for at sikre, at beredskabseksperter spiller en rolle i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen heraf, og at der er en fælles forståelse mellem de forskellige medlemsstaters myndigheder om, hvad der er nødvendigt for at sikre fuld indførelse af sådanne offentlige varslingssystemer i medlemsstaterne, og samtidig sikre, at Unionens borgerne beskyttes effektivt, når de rejser i en anden medlemsstat.
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I overensstemmelse med målene for chartret og de forpligtelser, der er fastsat i FN's konvention om rettigheder for personer med handicap, bør regelsættet sikre, at alle slutbrugere, herunder slutbrugere med handicap, ældre og brugere med særlige sociale behov, har nem og lige adgang til tjenester af høj kvalitet og til en overkommelig pris, uanset hvor de har bopæl i Unionen. Ifølge erklæring nr. 22, der er knyttet som bilag til slutakten til Amsterdamtraktaten, skal EU's institutioner i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af foranstaltninger i henhold til artikel 114 i TEUF tage hensyn til behovene hos personer med handicap.
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De kompetente myndigheder bør for at sikre, at slutbrugere med handicap kan udnytte konkurrencen og de samme valgmuligheder mellem tjenesteudbydere som de fleste slutbrugere, om nødvendigt og på baggrund af de nationale forhold og efter at have hørt slutbrugere med handicap præcisere de forbrugerbeskyttelseskrav for slutbrugere med handicap, som skal opfyldes af udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Sådanne krav kan bl.a. omfatte krav om, at udbyderne sikrer, at slutbrugere med handicap udnytter deres tjenester på tilsvarende vilkår og betingelser, herunder priser, takster og kvalitet, som deres øvrige slutbrugere, uanset de ekstraomkostninger, som disse udbydere måtte pådrage sig. Yderligere krav kan relatere sig til engrosordninger mellem udbydere. For at undgå at skabe en uforholdsmæssig stor byrde for tjenesteyderne bør de kompetente myndigheder kontrollere, om målene om lige adgang og valgmuligheder kan opnås uden sådanne foranstaltninger.
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Ud over EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser fastsætter dette direktiv nye udvidede krav til prismæssig overkommelighed og tilgængelighed for relevant terminaludstyr og specifikt udstyr og specifikke tjenester for slutbrugere med handicap. Derfor er den tilsvarende forpligtelse i direktiv 2002/22/EF, hvorved medlemsstaterne blev pålagt at fremme tilgængeligheden af terminaludstyr til slutbrugere med handicap, forældet og bør ophæves.
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Der er opstået effektiv konkurrence med hensyn til nummeroplysningstjenester og telefonbøger bl.a. i medfør af artikel 5 i Kommissionens direktiv 2002/77/EF 
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. For at opretholde denne situation med effektiv konkurrence bør alle udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der tildeler deres slutbrugere numre fra en nummerplan, fortsat have pligt til at stille alle relevante oplysninger til rådighed på en hensigtsmæssig, omkostningsbaseret og ikkediskriminerende måde.
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Slutbrugere bør oplyses om deres ret til at bestemme, om de ønsker at stå opført i en telefonbog. Udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester bør respektere slutbrugernes beslutning, når de giver udbydere af telefonbogstjenester adgang til data. I artikel 12 i direktiv 2002/58/EF sikres slutbrugernes ret til privatlivets fred for så vidt angår optagelsen af deres personoplysninger i en offentlig telefonbog.
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Foranstaltninger i engrosleddet til sikring af medtagelse af slutbrugerdata i databaser bør overholde kravene til beskyttelse af personoplysninger i henhold til forordning (EU) 2016/679 og artikel 12 i direktiv 2002/58/EF. Der bør indføres omkostningsorienteret levering af disse data til tjenesteudbydere, idet medlemsstaterne bør gives mulighed for at etablere en central mekanisme til levering af omfattende samlet information til telefonbogsudbydere, og drages omsorg for netadgang på rimelige og gennemsigtige vilkår for at sikre, at slutbrugerne fuldt ud kan drage fordel af konkurrence, hvilket i vidt omfang har gjort det muligt at afskaffe regulering af disse tjenester i detailleddet og tilvejebringelse af tilbud om telefonbogstjenester på rimelige og gennemskuelige vilkår.
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Efter at forsyningspligten for telefonbogstjenester er ophævet, og da der findes et velfungerende marked for sådanne tjenester, er der ikke længere behov for at sikre adgangsretten til telefonbogstjenester. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bør dog fortsat kunne indføre forpligtelser og betingelser for virksomheder, der kontrollerer adgangen til slutbrugerne, således at adgangen til og konkurrencen på dette marked opretholdes.
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Slutbrugerne skal kunne stole på, at alt udstyr, der sælges i Unionen til modtagelse af radio i nye køretøjer i klasse M og af digitalt tv, er indbyrdes kompatibelt. Medlemsstaterne skal kunne sikre, at sådant udstyr overholder et minimum af harmoniserede standarder. Disse standarder kan tilpasses løbende i takt med den teknologiske og markedsmæssige udvikling.
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Hvis medlemsstaterne beslutter at vedtage foranstaltninger i overensstemmelse med direktiv (EU) 2015/1535 om interoperabilitet for forbrugerradiomodtagere, bør de være i stand til at modtage og gengive radiotjenester, der udsendes via digital jordbaseret radiotransmission eller via IP-net, for at sikre, at interoperabilitet opretholdes. Dette kan også forbedre den offentlige sikkerhed, idet brugerne får mulighed for at benytte en bredere vifte af teknologier til at få adgang til og modtage oplysninger om nødsituationer i medlemsstaterne.
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Det er ønskeligt, at forbrugerne opnår den højeste grad af tilslutningsmuligheder til digitale tv-apparater. Interoperabilitet er et koncept, der udvikler sig på dynamiske markeder. Standardiseringsorganer bør gøre deres yderste for at sikre, at relevante standarder udvikler sig i takt med den pågældende teknologi. Det er ligeledes vigtigt at sikre, at der er stik på digitale tv-apparater, der kan overføre alle nødvendige elementer i et digitalt signal, herunder audio- og videosignaler, adgangsstyringsinformation, serviceoplysninger, API-oplysninger og kopibeskyttelsesinformation. Direktivet bør derfor sikre, at funktionalitet tilhørende eller implementeret i stik ikke begrænses af netoperatører, tjenesteudbydere eller udstyrsfabrikanter og fortsætter med at udvikle sig i takt med den teknologiske udvikling. Med hensyn til visning og udformning af internetforbundne tv-tjenester må det anses for at være til gavn for forbrugerne, at der etableres en fælles standard baseret på markedskræfterne. Til at fremme en sådan udvikling bør medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen kunne tage politiske initiativer i overensstemmelse med traktaterne.
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Bestemmelserne om interoperabilitet for forbrugerudstyr til radio og tv udelukker ikke, at bilradiomodtagere i nye køretøjer i klasse M er i stand til at modtage og gengive radiotjenester, der udsendes via analog jordbaseret radiotransmission, og disse bestemmelser udelukker heller ikke, at medlemsstaterne pålægger forpligtelser om at sikre, at digitalt radiomodtagere er i stand til at modtage og gengive analoge jordbaserede radioudsendelser.
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Uden at det berører EU-retten, forhindrer dette direktiv ikke medlemsstaterne i at vedtage tekniske forskrifter vedrørende digitalt jordbaseret tv-udstyr for at forberede forbrugernes migrering til nye standarder for jordbaseret transmission og undgå levering af udstyr, der ikke vil være i overensstemmelse med de standarder, som skal indføres.
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Medlemsstaterne bør kunne pålægge virksomheder i deres retsområde rimelige »must carry«-forpligtelser for at tilgodese velbegrundede politiske hensyn, men en sådan pligt bør kun pålægges i den udstrækning, det er nødvendigt for at virkeliggøre almennyttige målsætninger, som medlemsstaterne nøje har fastlagt i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, og den bør være rimelig og transparent. Det bør være muligt at anvende »must carry«-forpligtelser for nærmere bestemte radio- og tv-kanaler samt supplerende tjenester, der udbydes af en nærmere bestemt medietjenesteudbyder. En af medlemsstaterne pålagt fordelingspligt skal være rimelig, dvs. at den skal stå i et rimeligt forhold til det tilsigtede mål, og være transparent på baggrund af klart definerede målsætninger i almenhedens interesse. Medlemsstaterne bør give en objektiv begrundelse for de »must carry«-forpligtelser, som de pålægger i deres nationale ret, for at sikre, at sådanne forpligtelser er transparente, står i et rimeligt forhold til målet og er klart afgrænsede. Forpligtelserne bør udformes på en måde, der giver tilstrækkelige incitamenter til effektive infrastrukturinvesteringer.
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»Must carry«-forpligtelserne bør tages op til nyvurdering mindst hvert femte år med det formål at ajourføre dem i forhold til den teknologiske og markedsmæssige udvikling og sikre, at de fortsat står i et rimeligt forhold til de tilstræbte mål. Sådanne forpligtelser kan eventuelt indeholde en bestemmelse om en afpasset godtgørelse, som bør fastsættes i national ret. Hvor det er tilfældet, bør national ret også fastlægge den gældende metode til beregning af en passende godtgørelse. Denne metode bør undgå uoverensstemmelse med afhjælpende adgangsforanstaltninger, som de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan pålægge udbydere af transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til radio- og tv-spredning, og som er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition. Hvis en tidsbegrænset aftale undertegnet før den 20. december 2018 fastsætter en anden metode, bør det imidlertid være muligt fortsat at anvende denne metode i aftalens løbetid. I mangel af en national bestemmelse om godtgørelse bør udbydere af radio- eller tv-kanaler og udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, der anvendes til transmission af disse radio- eller tv-kanaler, kunne indgå en aftale om en afpasset godtgørelse.
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Elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, der bruges til transmission af radio- og tv-udsendelser til offentligheden, omfatter kabel-tv-, IPTV-, satellit- og jordbaserede sendernet. De kan også omfatte andre net, hvis et betydeligt antal slutbrugere anvender sådanne net som deres primære adgang til modtagelse af radio- og tv-udsendelser. »Must carry«-forpligtelser i forbindelse med transmission af analoge tv-udsendelser bør kun overvejes, hvis manglen på sådanne forpligtelser ville forårsage betydelige forstyrrelser for et betydeligt antal slutbrugere, eller hvis der ikke findes andre transmissionsmåder for bestemte tv-kanaler. »Must carry«-forpligtelser kan omfatte transmission af tjenester, der er specielt beregnet på at sikre slutbrugere med handicap lige adgang. Som følge heraf kan supplerende tjenester omfatte tjenester med det formål at lette adgangsmulighederne for slutbrugere med handicap, f.eks. videotekst, undertekstning for slutbrugere, der er døve eller hørehæmmede, synstolkning, oplæste undertekster og tegnsprogstolkning, og kan om nødvendigt omfatte adgang til de tilhørende rådata. I lyset af væksten i udbuddet og modtagelsen af internetforbundne tv-tjenester og EPG'ers vedvarende betydning for slutbrugernes valgmuligheder kan transmissionen af programrelaterede data, som er nødvendige for at understøtte internetforbundne tv- og EPG-funktioner, være omfattet af must carry-forpligtelser. Det bør være muligt for sådanne programrelaterede data at omfatte oplysninger om programindhold, og hvordan der opnås adgang til det, men ikke selve programindholdet.
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Faciliteter som nummervisning er normalt til rådighed på moderne telefoncentraler og kan derfor i stigende grad udbydes uden eller med ganske få omkostninger. Medlemsstaterne behøver ikke at stille krav om, at disse faciliteter udbydes, såfremt det allerede er tilfældet. Direktiv 2002/58/EF sikrer brugernes privatliv i forbindelse med specificeret fakturering ved at give dem mulighed for at beskytte deres privatliv i forbindelse med nummervisning. Udviklingen af disse tjenester på et paneuropæisk grundlag vil gavne forbrugerne og fremmes ved dette direktiv. Det er almindelig praksis for udbydere af internetadgangstjenester at give kunderne en e-mailadresse med deres virksomhedsnavn eller varemærke. For at sikre, at slutbrugerne ikke udsættes for fastlåsningsvirkninger i forbindelse med risikoen for at miste adgang til e-mails ved skift af internetadgangstjenester, bør medlemsstaterne kunne pålægge udbydere af sådanne tjenester en forpligtelse til efter anmodning enten at give adgang til deres e-mails eller at overføre e-mails sendt til den eller de relevante e-mailadresser. Faciliteten bør stilles til rådighed gratis og i en periode, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed anser for passende.
(312)
Medlemsstaterne sikrer ved at informere herom, at markedsaktørerne og potentielle nye aktører på markedet har kendskab til deres rettigheder og pligter og ved, hvor de kan få nærmere oplysninger herom. Når oplysningerne offentliggøres i den pågældende medlemsstats officielle tidende, kan de berørte parter i andre medlemsstater finde de oplysninger, de har brug for.
(313)
For at sikre, at det paneuropæiske marked for elektronisk kommunikation fungerer faktisk og effektivt, bør Kommissionen føre tilsyn med de omkostninger, der påvirker priserne for slutbrugerne, og offentliggøre oplysninger derom.
(314)
For at afgøre, om EU-retten anvendes korrekt, skal Kommissionen vide, hvilke virksomheder der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, og hvilke forpligtelser de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har pålagt markedsaktørerne. Det er derfor nødvendigt, at medlemsstaterne ud over at offentliggøre oplysningerne på nationalt niveau også sender dem til Kommissionen. Når medlemsstaterne skal sende oplysninger til Kommissionen, bør dette kunne ske i elektronisk form under forudsætning af, at der aftales passende procedurer for autentifikation.
(315)
For at tage hensyn til den markedsmæssige, sociale og teknologiske udvikling, herunder udviklingen inden for tekniske standarder, styre risiciene for sikkerheden i net og tjenester og sikre en effektiv adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikationer bør beføjelsen til at vedtage retsakter delegeres til Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 290 i TEUF for så vidt angår fastsættelse af en fælles EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald i fastnet- og mobilmarkeder, vedtagelse af foranstaltninger i relation til alarmkommunikationer i Unionen og tilpasning af bilagene til dette direktiv. Det er navnlig vigtigt, at Kommissionen gennemfører relevante høringer under sit forberedende arbejde, herunder på ekspertniveau, og at disse høringer gennemføres i overensstemmelse med principperne i den interinstitutionelle aftale af 13. april 2016 om bedre lovgivning 
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. For at sikre lige deltagelse i forberedelsen af delegerede retsakter modtager Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet navnlig alle dokumenter på samme tid som medlemsstaternes eksperter, og deres eksperter har systematisk adgang til møder i Kommissionens ekspertgrupper, der beskæftiger sig med forberedelsen af delegerede retsakter.
(316)
For at sikre ensartede betingelser for gennemførelsen af dette direktiv bør Kommissionen tillægges gennemførelsesbeføjelser til at vedtage afgørelser med henblik på at løse problemer med grænseoverskridende skadelig interferens mellem medlemsstater, at fastlægge en harmoniseret eller koordineret fremgangsmåde med henblik på at behandle inkonsekvent gennemførelse af almindelig regulering i praksis fra de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders side i forbindelse med regulering af markederne for elektronisk kommunikation samt nummerering, herunder nummerserier, portabilitet for numre og identifikationsmidler, nummer- og adresseomsætningssystemer og adgang til beredskabstjenesterne via det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«, at gøre gennemførelsen af standarder eller specifikationer obligatorisk eller fjerne standarder eller specifikationer fra den obligatoriske del af listen over standarder, at træffe tekniske og organisatoriske foranstaltninger for på passende vis at styre risiciene for sikkerheden i net og tjenester samt om, under hvilke forhold og efter hvilke procedurer der skal foretages underretninger om sikkerhedshændelser, at specificere relevante oplysninger vedrørende individuelle rettigheder, der kan sælges, offentligt til rådighed i et standardiseret elektronisk format, når brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser er tildelt, at specificere de trådløse adgangspunkters fysiske og tekniske egenskaber, at give en national tilsynsmyndighed beføjelse til eller forhindre denne i at pålægge virksomheder, som er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, visse forpligtelser vedrørende adgang eller samtrafik, at harmonisere særlige numre eller nummerserier for at løse problemer med uopfyldt efterspørgsel efter nummerressourcer på tværs af landegrænser eller på paneuropæisk plan og at præcisere en skabelon til aftaleresumé, der skal gives til forbrugere. Disse beføjelser bør udøves i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 182/2011 
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.
(317)
Endelig bør Kommissionen om nødvendigt og efter at have taget størst muligt hensyn til BEREC's udtalelse kunne vedtage henstillinger angående udpegningen af de relevante produkt- og tjenestemarkeder, anmeldelserne i henhold til proceduren for konsolidering af det indre marked og den harmoniserede anvendelse af bestemmelserne i regelsættet.
(318)
Kommissionen bør regelmæssigt undersøge, hvordan dette direktiv fungerer, navnlig med henblik på at afgøre, om der er behov for ændringer i lyset af skiftende teknologiske betingelser og markedsvilkår.
(319)
Kommissionen bør i forbindelse med sin undersøgelse af, hvordan dette direktiv fungerer, vurdere, om der på baggrund af udviklingen på markedet og med sigte på både konkurrence og forbrugerbeskyttelse fortsat er behov for bestemmelserne om sektorspecifik forhåndsregulering, eller om de skal ændres eller ophæves. Eftersom dette direktiv indfører nye tilgange til regulering af sektorer for elektronisk kommunikation, såsom muligheden for at udvide anvendelsen af symmetriske forpligtelser efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt og reguleringen af saminvesteringer, bør der tages særligt hensyn til vurdering af deres funktion.
(320)
Fremtidig teknologisk og markedsmæssig udvikling, navnlig ændringer inden for anvendelse af forskellige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og deres evne til at sikre effektiv adgang til beredskabstjenester, kan bringe opfyldelsen af målene i dette direktiv om slutbrugernes rettigheder i fare. BEREC bør derfor overvåge denne udvikling i medlemsstaterne og regelmæssigt offentliggøre en udtalelse, herunder en vurdering af indvirkningen af denne udvikling på anvendelsen i praksis af de bestemmelser i dette direktiv, der vedrører slutbrugere. Kommissionen bør under størst mulig hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse offentliggøre en rapport og forelægge et lovgivningsforslag, hvis den finder det nødvendigt for at sikre, at målene i dette direktiv opnås.
(321)
Direktiv 2002/19/EF, 2002/20/EF, 2002/21/EF, 2002/22/EF og artikel 5 i afgørelse nr. 243/2012//EU bør ophæves.
(322)
Kommissionen bør overvåge overgangen fra de gældende til de nye rammebestemmelser.
(323)
Målet for dette direktiv, nemlig at skabe harmoniserede og forenklede rammer for regulering af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og tilhørende faciliteter og tilknyttede tjenester, vilkårene for tilladelser til net og tjenester, radiofrekvensbrug og nummerressourcer, adgang til og samtrafik mellem elektroniske kommunikationsnet og tilhørende faciliteter samt beskyttelse af slutbrugerne, kan ikke i tilstrækkelig grad opfyldes af medlemsstaterne, men kan på grund af handlingens omfang eller virkninger bedre nås på EU-plan; Unionen kan derfor vedtage foranstaltninger i overensstemmelse med nærhedsprincippet, jf. artikel 5 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Union. I overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet, jf. nævnte artikel, går dette direktiv ikke videre, end hvad der er nødvendigt for at nå disse mål.
(324)
I henhold til den fælles politiske erklæring af 28. september 2011 fra medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen om forklarende dokumenter 
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 har medlemsstaterne forpligtet sig til i tilfælde, hvor det er berettiget, at lade meddelelsen af gennemførelsesforanstaltninger ledsage af et eller flere dokumenter, der forklarer forholdet mellem et direktivs bestanddele og de tilsvarende dele i de nationale gennemførelsesinstrumenter. I forbindelse med dette direktiv finder lovgiver, at fremsendelse af sådanne dokumenter er berettiget.
(325)
Forpligtelsen til at gennemføre dette direktiv i national ret bør kun omfatte de bestemmelser, hvori der er foretaget indholdsmæssige ændringer i forhold til de ophævede direktiver. Forpligtelsen til at gennemføre de bestemmelser, hvori der ikke er foretaget ændringer, følger af de ophævede direktiver.
(326)
Dette direktiv bør ikke berøre medlemsstaternes forpligtelser med hensyn til de i bilag XII, del B, angivne frister for gennemførelse i national ret og datoerne for anvendelse af direktiverne —
VEDTAGET DETTE DIREKTIV:
DEL I
RAMMEBESTEMMELSER (GENERELLE REGLER FOR FORVALTNING AF SEKTOREN)
AFSNIT I
ANVENDELSESOMRÅDE, MÅL, FORMÅL OG DEFINITIONER
KAPITEL I
Genstand, mål og definitioner
Artikel 1
Genstand, anvendelsesområde og mål
1.   Dette direktiv fastlægger harmoniserede rammer for regulering af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, tilhørende faciliteter og tilknyttede tjenester samt visse aspekter af terminaludstyr. Det fastsætter de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og, hvor det er relevant, andre kompetente myndigheders opgaver og opstiller en række procedurer, der skal sikre, at rammebestemmelserne anvendes ensartet i hele Unionen.
2.   Målene med dette direktiv er at:
a)
skabe et indre marked for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester med henblik på at sikre udrulning og ibrugtagning af net med meget høj kapacitet og skabe holdbar konkurrence, interoperabilitet mellem elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, tilgængelighed, sikkerhed i net og tjenester og fordele for slutbrugerne, og
b)
sikre gennem effektiv konkurrence og valgmuligheder, at der udbydes offentligt tilgængelige tjenester af høj kvalitet og til en overkommelig pris i hele Unionen, at tage højde for de tilfælde, hvor behovene hos slutbrugerne, herunder brugere med handicap for at få adgang til tjenesterne på lige fod med andre, ikke opfyldes tilfredsstillende af markedet, og at fastsætte de nødvendige rettigheder for slutbrugerne.
3.   Dette direktiv berører ikke:
a)
forpligtelser, der er pålagt ved national ret i henhold til EU-retten eller ved EU-retten for så vidt angår ydelser, der leveres via elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester
b)
foranstaltninger, der er truffet på EU-plan eller på nationalt plan i henhold til EU-retten for at forfølge mål af almen interesse, navnlig for så vidt angår beskyttelse af personoplysninger og privatlivets fred, regulering af indhold og politikken på det audiovisuelle område
c)
tiltag, der gennemføres af medlemsstaterne ud fra hensynet til den offentlige orden og den offentlige sikkerhed og til forsvaret
d)
forordning (EU) nr. 531/2012 og (EU) 2015/2120 og direktiv 2014/53/EU.
4.   Kommissionen, Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Tilsynsmyndigheder inden for Elektronisk Kommunikation (»BEREC«) og de berørte myndigheder sikrer, at deres behandling af personoplysninger er i overensstemmelse med Unionens databeskyttelsesregler.
Artikel 2
Definitioner
I dette direktiv forstås ved:
1)
»elektronisk kommunikationsnet«: transmissionssystemer, uanset om de bygger på en permanent infrastruktur eller centraliseret administrationskapacitet, og, hvor det er relevant, koblings- og dirigeringsudstyr og andre ressourcer, herunder netelementer, der ikke er aktive, som gør det muligt at overføre signaler ved hjælp af trådforbindelse, radiobølger, lyslederteknik eller andre elektromagnetiske midler, herunder satellitnet, jordbaserede fastnet (kredsløbs- og pakkekoblede, herunder i internettet) og mobilnet, elkabelsystemer, i det omfang de anvendes til transmission af signaler, net, som anvendes til radio- og tv-spredning, samt kabel-tv-net, uanset hvilken type information der overføres
2)
»net med meget høj kapacitet«: enten et elektronisk kommunikationsnet, der udelukkende består af optiske fiberelementer, som minimum frem til fordelingspunktet på leveringsstedet, eller et elektronisk kommunikationsnet, som under normale spidsbelastningsvilkår kan give en tilsvarende netpræstation for så vidt angår disponibel båndbredde til downlink og uplink, robusthed, fejlrelaterede parametre samt latenstid og variation heri; netpræstationen kan anses for tilsvarende, uanset om slutbrugerens oplevelse heraf varierer på grund af iboende forskellige egenskaber ved de medier, hvormed nettet i sidste ende etablerer forbindelse med nettermineringspunktet
3)
»transnationale markeder«: de i overensstemmelse med artikel 65 udpegede markeder, som dækker Unionen eller en væsentlig del heraf, og som er lokaliseret i mere end en medlemsstat
4)
»elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste«: en tjeneste, som normalt ydes mod betaling via elektroniske kommunikationsnet, og som med undtagelse af tjenester, der består i tilrådighedsstillelse af eller udøvelse af redaktionel kontrol over indhold fremført via elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester omfatter følgende typer tjenester:
a)
»internetadgangstjenester« som defineret i artikel 2, andet afsnit, nr. 2), i forordning (EU) 2015/2120
b)
»interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester«, og
c)
tjenester, der udelukkende eller overvejende består i overføring af signaler, som f.eks. transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester og til radio- og tv-spredning
5)
»interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste«: en tjeneste, som normalt ydes mod betaling, og som muliggør direkte interpersonel og interaktiv informationsudveksling via elektroniske kommunikationsnet mellem et afgrænset antal personer, hvor de personer, der indleder eller deltager i kommunikationen, bestemmer hvem modtageren eller modtagerne skal være, og omfatter ikke tjenester, der blot muliggør interpersonel og interaktiv kommunikation som en mindre støttefunktion, der er tæt knyttet til en anden tjeneste
6)
»nummerbaseret interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste«: en interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, der etablerer forbindelse til offentligt tildelte nummerressourcer, dvs. et eller flere numre i nationale eller internationale nummerplaner, eller som muliggør kommunikation med et eller flere numre i nationale eller internationale nummerplaner
7)
»nummeruafhængig interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste«: en interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, der ikke etablerer forbindelse til offentligt tildelte nummerressourcer, dvs. et eller flere numre i nationale eller internationale nummerplaner, eller der ikke muliggør kommunikation med et eller flere numre i nationale eller internationale nummerplaner
8)
»offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet«: et elektronisk kommunikationsnet, som udelukkende eller overvejende bruges til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, der er tilgængelige for offentligheden, og som danner grundlag for overførsel af information mellem nettermineringspunkter
9)
»nettermineringspunkt«: et fysisk punkt, hvor en slutbruger får adgang til et offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet; og som, for net, hvor der anvendes kobling eller routing, identificeres ved hjælp af en specifik netadresse, som kan være knyttet til slutbrugerens nummer eller navn
10)
»tilhørende faciliteter«: tilknyttede tjenester, fysiske infrastrukturer og andre faciliteter eller elementer i tilknytning til et elektronisk kommunikationsnet eller en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, som muliggør udbud af tjenester via dette net eller denne tjeneste eller støtter denne eller har mulighed for at gøre dette og omfatter bygninger eller adgangsveje til bygninger, ledningsnet i bygninger, antenner, tårne og andre støttekonstruktioner, kabelkanaler, ledningskanaler, master, mandehuller og skabe
11)
»tilknyttede tjenester«: tjenester i tilknytning til et elektronisk kommunikationsnet eller en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, som muliggør eller støtter udbud, selvforsyning eller automatisk levering af tjenester via dette net eller denne tjeneste eller har mulighed for at gøre dette og omfatter nummerkonvertering eller systemer, der tilbyder tilsvarende funktioner, adgangsstyringssystemer og elektroniske programoversigter (EPG'er) samt andre tjenester såsom identitet, geografisk placering og tilstedeværelse
12)
»adgangsstyringssystem«: teknisk foranstaltning, autentifikationssystem og/eller ordning, der gør adgang til en krypteret radio- eller tv-tjeneste i klar form betinget af abonnement eller en anden form for forudgående tilladelse
13)
»bruger«: en fysisk eller juridisk person, der anvender eller anmoder om en offentligt tilgængelig elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste
14)
»slutbruger«: bruger, der ikke udbyder offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester
15)
»forbruger«: enhver fysisk person, der anvender eller anmoder om en offentligt tilgængelig elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste til formål, der ikke har forbindelse med vedkommendes erhverv, forretning, håndværk eller profession
16)
»udbud af et elektronisk kommunikationsnet«: etablering, drift, styring eller tilrådighedsstillelse af et sådant net
17)
»enhanced digitalt tv-udstyr«: set-top-bokse beregnet til tilslutning til tv-apparater eller integrerede digitale tv-apparater, der kan modtage digitale interaktive tv-tjenester
18)
»programmeringsgrænseflade for applikationer« eller »API«: den softwaregrænseflade mellem applikationer, som radio- og tv-selskaber eller tjenesteudbydere stiller til rådighed, og faciliteterne i enhanced digitalt tv-udstyr til digitale radio- og tv-tjenester
19)
»allokering af radiofrekvenser«: udpegning af et givet radiofrekvensbånd til brug for en eller flere typer radiokommunikationstjenester, om nødvendigt på bestemte vilkår
20)
»skadelig interferens«: interferens, der udgør en fare for radionavigationstjenesters eller andre sikkerhedstjenesters funktion, eller som på anden måde i alvorlig grad forringer, hindrer eller gentagne gange afbryder radiokommunikationstjenester, der fungerer i overensstemmelse med gældende internationale regler eller Unionens eller medlemsstaternes gældende regler
21)
»sikkerhed i net og tjenester«: elektroniske kommunikationsnets og -tjenesters evne til på et givet fortrolighedsniveau at modstå handlinger, der er til skade for tilgængeligheden, autenticiteten, integriteten eller fortroligheden af disse net og tjenester, lagrede eller overførte eller behandlede data eller de dermed forbundne tjenester, der tilbydes af eller er tilgængelige via disse elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester
22)
»generel tilladelse«: retlige rammer, der i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv er fastsat af en medlemsstat, og som sikrer ret til at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester samt opstiller sektorspecifikke forpligtelser, der kan gælde alle eller specifikke typer elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester
23)
»trådløst adgangspunkt med lille rækkevidde«: lille trådløs netadgangsinstallation med lav effekt og lille rækkevidde, der enten benytter radiofrekvenser på grundlag af en tilladelse eller på et tilladelsesfrit grundlag eller begge dele, og som kan anvendes som del af et offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet, som kan være udstyret med en eller flere ikke iøjnefaldende antenner, og som giver brugerne trådløs adgang til elektroniske kommunikationsnet, uanset om den underliggende nettopologi er mobil- eller fastnetbaseret
24)
»radiobaseret lokalnet« eller »RLAN«: et trådløst adgangssystem med lav effekt og lille rækkevidde, der har en lav risiko for at skabe interferens med andre sådanne systemer etableret i nærheden af andre brugere, og som på et ikkeeksklusivt grundlag anvender harmoniserede radiofrekvenser
25)
»harmoniserede radiofrekvenser«: radiofrekvenser, for hvilke harmoniserede betingelser vedrørende adgang til og effektiv udnyttelse af dem er blevet fastsat ved tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF
26)
»delt brug af radiofrekvenser«: to eller flere brugeres adgang til samme radiofrekvensbånd i henhold til en fastlagt deleordning, der er godkendt på grundlag af en generel tilladelse, individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller en kombination heraf, herunder reguleringsmetoder som tilladelsesbetinget delt adgang, som har til formål at fremme delt brug af et radiofrekvensbånd, forudsat at der indgås en bindende aftale mellem alle involverede parter i overensstemmelse med de bestemmelser om deling, der indgår i deres brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, for at sikre alle brugere en forudsigelig og pålidelig deleordning, uden at anvendelsen af konkurrenceretten begrænses
27)
»adgang«: tilrådighedsstillelse af faciliteter eller tjenester for en anden virksomhed på nærmere fastsatte vilkår og på eksklusivt eller ikkeeksklusivt grundlag med henblik på udbud af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, herunder når de anvendes til levering af informationssamfundstjenester eller radio- eller tv-indholdstjenester; adgang omfatter bl.a. adgang til netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter, der kan indebære tilslutning af udstyr, såvel kabel- som radiobaseret tilslutning (dette omfatter navnlig adgang til abonnentledninger og de nødvendige faciliteter og tjenester med henblik på levering af tjenester via abonnentledninger), adgang til fysisk infrastruktur, herunder bygninger, kabelkanaler og master, adgang til relevante softwaresystemer, herunder driftsstøttesystemer, adgang til informationssystemer eller databaser til forhåndsbestilling, levering, bestilling, vedligeholdelses- og reparationsbestilling samt fakturering, adgang til nummerkonvertering eller systemer, der tilbyder tilsvarende funktioner, adgang til fastnet og mobilnet, navnlig med henblik på roaming, adgang til adgangsstyringssystemer til digitale tv-tjenester og adgang til virtuelle nettjenester
28)
»samtrafik«: en særlig form for adgang, der etableres mellem offentlige netoperatører ved hjælp af fysisk og logisk sammenkobling af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet, som bruges af den samme eller af en anden virksomhed med henblik på at give en virksomheds brugere mulighed for at kommunikere indbyrdes eller med en anden virksomheds brugere eller få adgang til andre virksomheders tjenester, hvor sådanne tjenester udbydes af de berørte parter eller af andre parter, som har adgang til nettet
29)
»operatør«: en virksomhed, der udbyder eller har tilladelse til at udbyde et offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet eller en tilhørende facilitet
30)
»abonnentledning«: den fysiske vej, som elektroniske kommunikationssignaler følger, og som forbinder nettermineringspunktet til en hovedfordeler eller et tilsvarende punkt i faste offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet
31)
»opkald«: en forbindelse, som etableres ved hjælp af en offentligt tilgængelig interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste og giver mulighed for tovejstalekommunikation
32)
»talekommunikationstjeneste«: en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, der er tilgængelig for offentligheden med henblik på at etablere og modtage indenlandske eller indenlandske og internationale opkald direkte eller indirekte ved hjælp af et eller flere numre i en national eller international nummerplan
33)
»geografisk nummer«: et nummer fra den nationale nummerplan, hvor en del af talstrukturen indeholder en geografisk information, der anvendes til at dirigere opkald til nettermineringspunktets fysiske placering
34)
»ikkegeografisk nummer«: et nummer fra den nationale nummerplan, som ikke er et geografisk nummer, f.eks. mobil-, frikalds- og overtakseringsnumre
35)
»totale konversationstjenester«: multimediekonversationstjeneste i realtid, som leverer symmetrisk tovejsoverførsel i realtid af video, tekst i realtid og tale mellem brugere på to eller flere steder
36)
»alarmcentral«: en fysisk lokalitet, hvor en alarmkommunikation modtages under ansvar af en offentlig myndighed eller en privat organisation, der er godkendt af medlemsstaten
37)
»den mest passende alarmcentral«: den alarmcentral, som de ansvarlige myndigheder har fastsat skal dække alarmkommunikationer fra et bestemt område eller af en bestemt type
38)
»alarmkommunikation«: kommunikation, der etableres via en interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste mellem en slutbruger og alarmcentralen med det formål at anmode om og modtage hjælp fra beredskabstjenester
39)
»beredskabstjeneste«: en tjeneste, der er godkendt som en sådan af medlemsstaten, og som i overensstemmelse med national ret yder omgående og hurtig bistand i situationer, hvor der i særlig grad er direkte risiko for liv eller lemmer, for individuel eller kollektiv sundhed eller sikkerhed, for privat eller offentlig ejendom eller for miljøet
40)
»lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part«: i et offentligt mobilnet de behandlede data, der stammer fra netinfrastruktur eller mobiltelefoner, og som angiver den geografiske position for en slutbrugers mobilterminaludstyr, og i et offentligt fastnet data om nettermineringspunktets fysiske adresse
41)
»terminaludstyr«: terminaludstyr som defineret i artikel 1, nr. 1), i Kommissionens direktiv 2008/63/EF 
(
43
)
42)
»sikkerhedshændelse«: en begivenhed, der har en faktisk negativ indvirkning på sikkerheden i elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester.
KAPITEL II
Mål
Artikel 3
Overordnede mål
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder under udførelsen af de i dette direktiv omhandlede tilsynsopgaver, træffer alle rimelige foranstaltninger, der er nødvendige og forholdsmæssige med henblik på opfyldelse af målene i stk. 2. Medlemsstaterne, Kommissionen, Frekvenspolitikgruppen og BEREC bidrager også til opfyldelsen af disse mål.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder bidrager inden for deres beføjelser til at sikre, at der på forskellige områder gennemføres en politik, der tilsigter at fremme ytringsfrihed og informationsfrihed, kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed og mediepluralisme.
2.   I forbindelse med dette direktiv forfølger de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder samt BEREC, Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne hvert af følgende overordnede mål, der ikke er opstillet i prioriteret rækkefølge:
a)
fremme konnektivitet og adgang til og ibrugtagning af net med meget høj kapacitet, herunder fastnet, mobilnet og trådløse net, blandt alle borgere og virksomheder i Unionen
b)
fremme konkurrencen inden for udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og tilhørende faciliteter, herunder reel infrastrukturbaseret konkurrence, og inden for udbud af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og tilknyttede tjenester
c)
bidrage til udviklingen af det indre marked ved at fjerne de resterende hindringer og fremme ensartede vilkår for investering i og udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, tilhørende faciliteter og tilknyttede tjenester i hele Unionen ved at fastlægge fælles regler og en forudsigelig reguleringspraksis ved at fremme en reel, effektiv og koordineret anvendelse af radiofrekvenser, åben innovation, etablering og udvikling af transeuropæiske net, udbud af, tilgængelighed af og interoperabilitet mellem paneuropæiske tjenester samt end-to-end-konnektivitet
d)
fremme Unionens borgeres interesser ved at sikre konnektivitet og udbredt tilgængelighed og ibrugtagning af net med meget høj kapacitet, herunder fastnet, mobilnet og trådløse net, samt elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, ved på grundlag af effektiv konkurrence at skabe størst mulige fordele for så vidt angår valgmuligheder, pris og kvalitet, ved at opretholde sikkerheden i net og tjenester, ved at sikre slutbrugerne et højt og ensartet beskyttelsesniveau ved hjælp af de nødvendige sektorspecifikke regler og ved at tilgodese behovene, f.eks. behovet for overkommelige priser, hos særlige sociale grupper, især slutbrugere med handicap, ældre slutbrugere og slutbrugere med særlige sociale behov, samt valgmuligheder og lige adgang for slutbrugere med handicap.
3.   Når Kommissionen udarbejder benchmarks og rapporter om effektiviteten af medlemsstaternes foranstaltninger til opfyldelse af de mål, der er nævnt i stk. 2, skal Kommissionen, hvor det er nødvendigt, bistås af medlemsstaterne, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, BEREC og Frekvenspolitikgruppen.
4.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder skal med henblik på opfyldelse af de politiske mål, der henvises til i stk. 2 og uddybes i nærværende stykke, bl.a.:
a)
fremme forudsigelighed i reguleringen ved at sikre en ensartet tilsynspraksis i passende analyseperioder og ved at samarbejde med hinanden, med BEREC, med Frekvenspolitikgruppen og med Kommissionen
b)
sikre, at udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, under ensartede omstændigheder behandles lige
c)
anvende EU-retten på en teknologineutral måde, for så vidt som dette er foreneligt med opfyldelsen af målene i stk. 2
d)
fremme effektive investeringer og innovation i ny og forbedret infrastruktur, herunder ved at sikre, at adgangsbetingelserne tager behørigt højde for de risici, som de investerende virksomheder tager, og ved at tillade forskellige samarbejdsordninger mellem investorer og adgangssøgende aktører for at sprede investeringsrisikoen og samtidig sikre, at konkurrencen på markedet og princippet om ikkediskrimination opretholdes
e)
tage behørigt hensyn til de mange forskellige betingelser vedrørende infrastruktur, konkurrence og slutbrugerforhold og navnlig forbrugerforhold i de forskellige geografiske områder i medlemsstaterne, herunder lokal infrastruktur, der forvaltes af fysiske personer på et nonprofitgrundlag
f)
kun indføre forhåndsregulerende forpligtelser, i det omfang det er nødvendigt for at sikre effektiv og holdbar konkurrence i slutbrugernes interesse, og lempe eller ophæve sådanne forpligtelser, så snart denne betingelse er opfyldt.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder handler upartisk, objektivt, transparent og på en ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssig måde.
Artikel 4
Strategisk planlægning og koordinering af radiofrekvenspolitikken
1.   Medlemsstaterne samarbejder med hinanden og med Kommissionen om den strategiske planlægning, koordinering og harmonisering af brugen af radiofrekvenser i Unionen i overensstemmelse med Unionens politikker for oprettelse og funktion af det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation. De tager med henblik herpå bl.a. hensyn til de økonomiske, sikkerhedsmæssige, sundhedsmæssige, kulturelle, videnskabelige, sociale og tekniske aspekter af Unionens politikker og til aspekter som offentlighedens interesser, samt ytringsfrihed og til de forskellige interesser hos grupper af brugere af radiofrekvenserne med henblik på at optimere anvendelsen af radiofrekvenser og undgå skadelig interferens.
2.   Medlemsstaterne bidrager gennem samarbejde med hinanden og med Kommissionen til koordineringen af politiske tiltag vedrørende radiofrekvenser i Unionen og, om nødvendigt, harmoniserede betingelser med hensyn til tilgængeligheden og den effektive udnyttelse af radiofrekvenserne, der er nødvendig for oprettelsen og funktionen af det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation.
3.   Medlemsstaterne samarbejder gennem Frekvenspolitikgruppen med hinanden og med Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med stk. 1 samt efter deres anmodning med Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet for at støtte den strategiske planlægning og koordinering af politiske tiltag vedrørende radiofrekvenser i Unionen ved at:
a)
udvikle bedste praksis i spørgsmål vedrørende radiofrekvenser med henblik på gennemførelsen af dette direktiv
b)
fremme koordineringen mellem medlemsstaterne med henblik på at gennemføre dette direktiv og anden EU-ret og bidrage til udviklingen af det indre marked
c)
koordinere deres tilgange til tildeling af og tilladelse til brug af radiofrekvenser og offentliggøre rapporter eller udtalelser om spørgsmål vedrørende radiofrekvenser.
BEREC skal deltage i spørgsmål vedrørende dens beføjelser i forhold til markedsregulering og konkurrence i forbindelse med radiofrekvenser.
4.   Kommissionen kan under videst mulig hensyntagen til udtalelsen fra Frekvenspolitikgruppen forelægge lovgivningsforslag for Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet med henblik på oprettelse af flerårige radiofrekvenspolitikprogrammer, der opstiller politiske retningslinjer og målsætninger for den strategiske planlægning og harmonisering af anvendelsen af radiofrekvenser i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv og med henblik på frigivelse af harmoniserede radiofrekvenser til delt brug og brug, der ikke er underlagt individuelle brugsrettigheder.
AFSNIT II
INSTITUTIONEL RAMME OG FORVALTNING
KAPITEL I
Nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder
Artikel 5
Nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle opgaver, der er fastlagt i dette direktiv, varetages af en kompetent myndighed.
Inden for rammerne af dette direktivs anvendelsesområde er de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder som minimum ansvarlig for følgende opgaver:
a)
at gennemføre forhåndsregulering af markedet, herunder indføre forpligtelser vedrørende adgang og samtrafik
b)
at sikre, at tvister mellem virksomheder løses
c)
at varetage radiofrekvensforvaltning og træffe afgørelser herom eller, hvis disse opgaver er tildelt andre kompetente myndigheder, rådgive om markedsformnings- og konkurrenceelementer i nationale procedurer vedrørende brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester
d)
at bidrage til beskyttelsen af slutbrugernes rettigheder i den elektroniske kommunikationssektor, hvor det er relevant i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder
e)
at vurdere og nøje overvåge markedsformnings- og konkurrencespørgsmål vedrørende adgang til det åbne internet
f)
at vurdere omfanget af den urimelige byrde og beregne nettoomkostningerne ved opfyldelse af forsyningspligten
g)
at sikre nummerportabilitet mellem udbydere
h)
at udføre andre opgaver, som i henhold til dette direktiv er forbeholdt de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
Medlemsstaterne kan pålægge de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder andre opgaver, der er fastsat i dette direktiv og anden EU-ret, navnlig opgaver vedrørende markedskonkurrence eller markedsadgang som f.eks. generel tilladelse og opgaver vedrørende roller, der er tillagt BEREC. Når de opgaver, der vedrører markedskonkurrencen eller markedsadgangen, pålægges andre kompetente myndigheder, tilstræber disse at høre de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, før der træffes afgørelse. Med henblik på at bidrage til BEREC's opgaver har de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder ret til at indsamle de nødvendige data og andre oplysninger fra markedsdeltagerne.
Medlemsstaterne kan også pålægge de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder andre opgaver på grundlag af national ret, herunder national ret, der gennemfører EU-retten.
Medlemsstaterne skal ved gennemførelsen af dette direktiv navnlig fremme stabiliteten af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders kompetencer med hensyn til fordelingen af de opgaver, der fulgte af Unionens rammebestemmelser for elektronisk kommunikation som ændret i 2009.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder i samme medlemsstat eller i forskellige medlemsstater indgår, hvor det er nødvendigt, samarbejdsaftaler med hinanden for at fremme et reguleringsmæssigt samarbejde.
3.   Medlemsstaterne offentliggør, hvilke opgaver der udføres af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder, i en let tilgængelig form, navnlig hvor disse opgaver er fordelt på flere organer. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der, hvor det er relevant, foregår høringer og samarbejdes om spørgsmål af fælles interesse mellem disse myndigheder indbyrdes samt mellem disse myndigheder og nationale myndigheder med ansvar for gennemførelse af konkurrenceretten eller forbrugerlovgivningen. Hvis mere end én myndighed har beføjelser til at tage sig af sådanne spørgsmål, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at disse myndigheder offentliggør deres respektive opgaver i en let tilgængelig form.
4.   Medlemsstaterne meddeler Kommissionen, hvilke nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder der har fået tildelt opgaver i henhold til dette direktiv, samt disses respektive ansvarsområder såvel som ændringer heraf.
Artikel 6
Nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders uafhængighed
1.   Medlemsstaterne garanterer de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders uafhængighed, idet de sikrer, at de er retligt adskilt fra og funktionelt uafhængige af enhver fysisk eller juridisk person, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet, elektronisk kommunikationsudstyr eller elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Medlemsstater, som bevarer ejerskab til eller kontrol over virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, sikrer, at der er reel strukturel adskillelse mellem tilsynsfunktion og aktiviteter, der er knyttet til ejerskab eller kontrol.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder udøver deres beføjelser upartisk, transparent og rettidigt. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de har tilstrækkelige tekniske og økonomiske ressourcer og tilstrækkeligt personale til at udføre de opgaver, som de pålægges.
Artikel 7
Udnævnelse og afskedigelse af medlemmer af nationale tilsynsmyndigheder
1.   Lederen af en national tilsynsmyndighed eller i givet fald medlemmerne af det kollegiale ledelsesorgan i en national tilsynsmyndighed eller deres stedfortrædere udnævnes for en periode på mindst tre år blandt personer, som er værdige i almindeligt omdømme, og som har professionel erfaring, på grundlag af fortjeneste, kvalifikationer, viden og erfaring og efter en åben og transparent udvælgelsesprocedure. Medlemsstaterne sikrer kontinuitet i beslutningsprocessen.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at lederen af en national tilsynsmyndighed eller i givet fald medlemmer af det kollegiale ledelsesorgan i en national tilsynsmyndighed eller disses stedfortrædere kun kan afskediges i løbet af deres mandatperiode, hvis de ikke længere opfylder de betingelser for at udøve deres hverv, der er fastlagt i national ret før deres udnævnelse.
3.   Afgørelsen om at afskedige lederen af den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller i givet fald medlemmer af det kollegiale ledelsesorgan skal offentliggøres på tidspunktet for afskedigelsen. Den afskedigede leder af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller i givet fald de afskedigede medlemmer af det kollegiale ledelsesorgan modtager en begrundelse. I det tilfælde at begrundelsen ikke er offentliggjort, skal den offentliggøres på denne persons anmodning. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at denne afgørelse kan underkastes domstolsprøvelse med hensyn til såvel faktiske som retlige forhold.
Artikel 8
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders politiske uafhængighed og ansvarlighed
1.   Med forbehold af artikel 10 skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder handle uafhængigt og objektivt, herunder i forbindelse med udformning af interne procedurer og organisering af personale, fungere på en transparent og ansvarlig måde i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og må hverken søge eller modtage instrukser fra andre organer i forbindelse med udførelsen af de opgaver, som de er pålagt i henhold til den nationale ret, der gennemfører EU-retten. Dette er ikke til hinder for, at der kan føres tilsyn i overensstemmelse med nationale forfatningsretlige bestemmelser. Kun klageinstanser, der er oprettet i overensstemmelse med artikel 31, har beføjelse til at suspendere eller omstøde afgørelser truffet af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder aflægger hvert år rapport bl.a. om situationen på markedet for elektronisk kommunikation, hvilke beslutninger de har truffet, deres personalemæssige og økonomiske ressourcer og hvordan disse ressourcer fordeles, samt om deres fremtidige planer. Rapporterne offentliggøres.
Artikel 9
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders handleevne
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har særskilte årsbudgetter og kan gennemføre det tildelte budget i fuld uafhængighed. Disse budgetter offentliggøres.
2.   Uden at det indskrænker forpligtelsen til at sikre, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har tilstrækkelige økonomiske ressourcer og tilstrækkeligt personale til at udføre de opgaver, de pålægges, må økonomisk uafhængighed ikke forhindre tilsyn eller kontrol i overensstemmelse med nationale forfatningsretlige bestemmelser. Udøves der kontrol over de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders budget, skal det ske på en transparent måde og offentliggøres.
3.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer desuden, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder råder over tilstrækkelige økonomiske ressourcer og tilstrækkeligt personale til aktivt at deltage i og bidrage til BEREC.
Artikel 10
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders deltagelse i BEREC
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at BEREC's mål med hensyn til at fremme en bedre koordinering og sammenhæng på tilsynsområdet støttes aktivt af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager nøje hensyn til retningslinjer, udtalelser, henstillinger, fælles holdninger, bedste praksis og metoder vedtaget af BEREC, når de træffer deres egne afgørelser for deres nationale markeder.
Artikel 11
Samarbejde mellem nationale myndigheder
Nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, andre kompetente myndigheder i henhold til dette direktiv og nationale konkurrencemyndigheder giver hinanden de oplysninger, der er nødvendige for at anvende dette direktiv. Hvad angår de udvekslede oplysninger, finder Unionens databeskyttelsesregler anvendelse, og den modtagende myndighed skal sikre den samme grad af fortrolighed som den afgivende myndighed.
KAPITEL II
Generel tilladelse
Afdeling 1
Generel del
Artikel 12
Generel tilladelse til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer fri adgang til at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester på de i dette direktiv omhandlede vilkår. I denne forbindelse må medlemsstaterne ikke hindre en virksomhed i at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, medmindre dette er nødvendigt under hensyn til artikel 52, stk. 1, i TEUF. Enhver sådan begrænsning af friheden til at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester skal være behørigt begrundet og skal meddeles Kommissionen.
2.   Udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, kan med forbehold af de særlige forpligtelser, der er omhandlet i artikel 13, stk. 2, eller brugsrettigheder omhandlet i artikel 46 og 94, kun gøres betinget af en generel tilladelse.
3.   Hvis en medlemsstat vurderer, at et anmeldelseskrav er berettiget for virksomheder, der er omfattet af en generel tilladelse, kan den pågældende medlemsstat kræve, at sådanne virksomheder kun anmelder aktiviteten til den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed. Medlemsstaten kan ikke kræve, at sådanne virksomheder indhenter en udtrykkelig afgørelse eller anden administrativ handling fra denne myndigheds eller en anden myndigheds side, inden de udøver de rettigheder, som kan afledes af den generelle tilladelse.
Efter anmeldelse, når en sådan kræves, kan en virksomhed påbegynde sin aktivitet, om nødvendigt med forbehold af bestemmelserne om brugsrettigheder i medfør af dette direktiv.
4.   Den i stk. 3 omhandlede anmeldelse må højst kræve, at en fysisk eller juridisk person afgiver erklæring til den nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller anden kompetent myndighed om, at førstnævnte har til hensigt at begynde at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, og indgiver de minimumsoplysninger, som BEREC og denne myndighed skal bruge for at kunne føre register eller fortegnelse over udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester. Disse oplysninger begrænses til:
a)
udbyderens navn
b)
udbyderens retlige status, retlige form og registreringsnummer, hvis udbyderen er optaget i et handelsregister eller et andet lignende offentligt register i Unionen
c)
den fysiske adresse på udbyderens hovedsæde i Unionen, hvis et sådant findes, og, hvor det er relevant, på filialer i medlemsstaterne
d)
udbyders webadresse, hvor det er relevant, vedrørende udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester
e)
en kontaktperson og kontaktoplysninger
f)
en kort beskrivelse af de net eller tjenester, som det er hensigten at udbyde
g)
de berørte medlemsstater og
h)
en skønnet begyndelsesdato for aktiviteten.
Medlemsstaterne må ikke pålægge yderligere eller særskilte anmeldelseskrav.
For at tilnærme anmeldelseskravene skal BEREC offentliggøre retningslinjer vedrørende anmeldelsesskabelonen og føre en EU-database over anmeldelser, der sendes til de kompetente myndigheder. Med henblik herpå videresender de kompetente myndigheder i elektronisk form uden unødig forsinkelse hver modtaget anmeldelse til BEREC. Anmeldelser til de kompetente myndigheder, der er foretaget inden den 21. december 2020, videresendes til BEREC den 21. december 2021.
Artikel 13
Vilkår fastsat i den generelle tilladelse og brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer samt særlige forpligtelser
1.   Den generelle tilladelse til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester samt brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer kan kun underlægges de i bilag I anførte vilkår. Sådanne vilkår skal være ikkediskriminerende, forholdsmæssigt afpassede og transparente. I tilfælde af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser skal sådanne vilkår sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse deraf og være i overensstemmelse med artikel 45 og 51, og i tilfælde af brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer skal de være i overensstemmelse med artikel 94.
2.   Særlige forpligtelser, der i henhold til artikel 61, stk. 1 og 5, og artikel 62, 68 og 83 kan pålægges virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester eller udbydere, som i henhold til dette direktiv er blevet udpeget til at varetage forsyningspligt, skal være retligt adskilt fra de rettigheder og forpligtelser, som gælder i henhold til den generelle tilladelse. For at sikre gennemsigtighed skal der i den generelle tilladelse henvises til de kriterier og procedurer, der ligger til grund for at pålægge den enkelte virksomhed sådanne særlige forpligtelser.
3.   Den generelle tilladelse må kun indeholde vilkår, der er specifikke for den pågældende sektor og er anført i bilag I, del A, B og C, og må ikke indeholde vilkår, som allerede gælder for virksomhederne i medfør af anden national ret.
4.   Medlemsstaterne må ikke gentage den generelle tilladelses vilkår, når de giver virksomheder brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller til nummerressourcer.
Artikel 14
Erklæringer med henblik på at fremme udøvelsen af rettigheder til installation af faciliteter og samtrafikrettigheder
Efter anmodning fra en virksomhed udsteder de kompetente myndigheder inden for en uge standardiserede erklæringer, hvori det i givet fald bekræftes, at virksomheden har indgivet en anmeldelse i henhold til artikel 12, stk. 3. Disse erklæringer beskriver nøje under hvilke omstændigheder enhver virksomhed, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester i medfør af den generelle tilladelse, har ret til at ansøge om tilladelse til at installere faciliteter, forhandle samtrafik og få adgang eller samtrafik, for dermed at fremme udøvelsen af disse rettigheder f.eks. over for andre instanser eller andre virksomheder. Hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, kan sådanne erklæringer også udstedes som et automatisk svar på en anmeldelse som omhandlet i artikel 12, stk. 3.
Afdeling 2
Rettigheder og forpligtelser i henhold til generel tilladelse
Artikel 15
Minimumsliste over rettigheder, som kan afledes af den generelle tilladelse
1.   Virksomheder, der er omfattet af den generelle tilladelse i henhold til artikel 12, har ret til:
a)
at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester
b)
at få deres ansøgning om de nødvendige tilladelser til installation af faciliteter behandlet i henhold til artikel 43
c)
at anvende radiofrekvenser i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester med forbehold af artikel 13, 46 og 55
d)
at få deres ansøgning om de nødvendige brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer behandlet i overensstemmelse med artikel 94.
2.   Når sådanne virksomheder udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester til offentligheden, giver den generelle tilladelse dem ret til:
a)
at forhandle samtrafik med og, hvor det er relevant, få adgang til eller samtrafik med andre udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, som er omfattet af en generel tilladelse inden for Unionen i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv
b)
at få mulighed for at blive udpeget til at opfylde forskellige dele af forsyningspligten eller til at dække forskellige dele af en medlemsstats område, jf. artikel 86 eller 87.
Artikel 16
Administrationsgebyrer
1.   Administrationsgebyrer, som afkræves virksomheder, der udbyder et elektronisk kommunikationsnet eller en -tjeneste i henhold til den generelle tilladelse, eller som har fået tildelt brugsrettigheder,
a)
må i alt kun dække de administrationsomkostninger, der påløber som led i administration, kontrol og gennemførelse af det generelle tilladelsessystem, brugsrettigheder og særlige forpligtelser, jf. artikel 13, stk. 2, som kan omfatte udgifter til internationalt samarbejde, harmonisering og standardisering, markedsanalyse, tilsyn og anden markedsovervågning, samt lovgivningsarbejde vedrørende udarbejdelse og gennemførelse af sekundær ret og administrative afgørelser, såsom afgørelser om adgang og samtrafik, og
b)
skal pålægges de enkelte virksomheder på en objektiv, transparent og forholdsmæssigt afpasset måde, der minimerer ekstra administrationsomkostninger og tilhørende gebyrer.
En medlemsstat kan vælge ikke at opkræve administrationsgebyrer af virksomheder, hvis omsætning ligger under en bestemt tærskel, eller hvis aktiviteter ikke opnår en minimumsandel af markedet eller har en meget begrænset geografisk rækkevidde.
2.   Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder pålægger administrationsgebyrer, offentliggør de en årlig oversigt over deres administrationsomkostninger og det samlede gebyrbeløb, der er opkrævet. Hvis der er forskel på det samlede gebyrbeløb og administrationsomkostningerne, foretages der passende justeringer.
Artikel 17
Regnskabsmæssig adskillelse og regnskaber
1.   Medlemsstaterne stiller krav om, at virksomheder, der udbyder offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, og som nyder særlige eller eksklusive rettigheder til at udbyde tjenester i andre sektorer i samme eller en anden medlemsstat:
a)
fører særskilte regnskaber for aktiviteter, der vedrører udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, i samme grad som det ville være påkrævet, hvis disse aktiviteter blev forestået af retligt uafhængige enheder, således at det er muligt at identificere alle omkostnings- og indtægtselementer, inklusive anvendt beregningsgrundlag og anvendte detaljerede henføringsmetoder, i forbindelse med sådanne aktiviteter, herunder en specificeret opgørelse over anlægsaktiver og strukturomkostninger, eller
b)
er organiseret, så aktiviteterne vedrørende udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester er strukturelt udskilt.
En medlemsstat kan vælge ikke at stille de i litra a) omhandlede krav over for virksomheder, hvis årlige omsætning på aktiviteter i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester i Unionen er mindre end 50 mio. EUR.
2.   Virksomheder, der udbyder offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, som ikke er omfattet af selskabsrettens krav, og som ikke opfylder kriterierne for små og mellemstore virksomheder i EU-retten om regnskabsaflæggelse, skal udarbejde regnskaber, lade dem revidere af en uafhængig revisor og offentliggøre dem. Revisionen skal ske i henhold til gældende EU-regler og nationale regler.
Første afsnit i dette stykke gælder også særskilte regnskaber, jf. stk. 1, første afsnit, litra a).
Afdeling 3
Ændring og tilbagekaldelse
Artikel 18
Ændring af rettigheder og forpligtelser
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at rettigheder, vilkår og procedurer vedrørende generelle tilladelser og brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller nummerressourcer eller tilladelser til at installere faciliteter kun kan ændres i objektivt begrundede tilfælde og på en forholdsmæssigt afpasset måde, idet der, hvor det er rimeligt, tages hensyn til de særlige vilkår, der gælder for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller nummerressourcer, som kan overdrages.
2.   Medmindre de foreslåede ændringer er beskedne og er aftalt med rettighedshaveren eller indehaveren af den generelle tilladelse, skal der på passende vis orienteres om, at sådanne ændringer er planlagt. De berørte parter, herunder brugere og forbrugere, skal have en rimelig frist til at fremføre deres synspunkter om de foreslåede ændringer. Denne frist må kun i særlige tilfælde være mindre end fire uger.
Ændringer offentliggøres med angivelse af årsagerne hertil.
Artikel 19
Begrænsning eller tilbagekaldelse af rettigheder
1.   Med forbehold af artikel 30, stk. 5 og 6, må medlemsstaterne ikke begrænse eller tilbagekalde tilladelser til at installere faciliteter eller brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller til nummerressourcer inden udløbet af den periode, for hvilken de er tildelt, undtagen i begrundede tilfælde i medfør af stk. 2 og, hvor det er relevant, i overensstemmelse med bilag I og relevante nationale bestemmelser om kompensation for tilbagekaldelse af rettigheder.
2.   I overensstemmelse med behovet for at sikre en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenserne eller gennemførelsen af tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, der er vedtaget i henhold til artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, kan medlemsstaterne tillade, at brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser begrænses eller tilbagekaldes, herunder rettigheder som omhandlet i artikel 49 i dette direktiv, på grundlag af på forhånd fastsatte og klart definerede procedurer i overensstemmelse med principperne om proportionalitet og ikkediskrimination. I sådanne tilfælde kan indehavere af sådanne rettigheder, hvor det er relevant og i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og relevante nationale bestemmelser, kompenseres på passende vis.
3.   En ændring i brugen af radiofrekvenserne som følge af anvendelsen af artikel 45, stk. 4 eller 5, er ikke i sig selv en begrundelse for at tilbagekalde en brugsrettighed til radiofrekvenser.
4.   Enhver plan om at begrænse eller tilbagekalde rettigheder i henhold til den generelle tilladelse eller individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller nummerressourcer uden samtykke fra rettighedshaveren skal underkastes en høring af de berørte parter i overensstemmelse med artikel 23.
KAPITEL III
Oplysningspligt, undersøgelser og høringsordning
Artikel 20
Oplysningskrav til virksomheder
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, tilhørende faciliteter eller tilknyttede tjenester, giver de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, andre kompetente myndigheder og BEREC alle de oplysninger, herunder økonomiske, som disse myndigheder har behov for for at kunne påse, at bestemmelserne i dette direktiv samt afgørelser truffet eller udtalelser afgivet i henhold til dette direktiv og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2018/1971 
(
44
)
 overholdes. Det understreges, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og, hvis det er nødvendigt for udførelsen af deres opgaver, andre kompetente myndigheder har beføjelse til at afkræve disse virksomheder oplysninger om fremtidige ændringer i net eller tjenester, der kan få indflydelse på de engrostjenester, som de stiller til rådighed for konkurrenter, og oplysninger om elektroniske kommunikationsnet og tilhørende faciliteter, der er opdelt efter lokalområder og tilstrækkeligt detaljerede til at muliggøre den geografiske undersøgelse og udpegelsen af områder, jf. artikel 22.
Hvis de oplysninger, der er indsamlet i overensstemmelse med første afsnit, er utilstrækkelige til, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, andre kompetente myndigheder og BEREC kan udføre deres regulatoriske opgaver i henhold til EU-retten, kan sådanne oplysninger indhentes fra andre relevante virksomheder, der er aktive i den elektroniske kommunikationssektor eller tæt tilknyttede sektorer.
Det kan også kræves, at virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på engrosmarkeder, forelægger regnskabsoplysninger om de detailmarkeder, der er forbundet med disse engrosmarkeder.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder kan udbede sig oplysninger fra de centrale dokumentationstjenester, der er oprettet i medfør af direktiv 2014/61/EU.
Enhver anmodning om oplysninger skal stå i et rimeligt forhold til, hvad opgaven kræver og skal være begrundet.
Virksomhederne afgiver de anmodede oplysningerne straks, under overholdelse af de fastsatte frister og i den krævede detaljeringsgrad.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder, efter begrundet anmodning fra Kommissionen, forelægger denne de oplysninger, der er nødvendige for, at den kan udføre sine opgaver i henhold til TEUF. De oplysninger, som Kommissionen udbeder sig, skal stå i et rimeligt forhold til, hvad opgaverne kræver. Hvis de forelagte oplysninger henviser til oplysninger, som på et tidligere tidspunkt er indgivet af virksomheder på myndighedens anmodning, underrettes virksomhederne herom. Kommissionen stiller i nødvendigt omfang oplysninger til rådighed for en anden myndighed af samme art i en anden medlemsstat, medmindre den myndighed, der har indgivet oplysningerne, har fremsat en udtrykkelig og begrundet anmodning om ikke at gøre det.
Med forbehold af kravene i stk. 3 sikrer medlemsstaterne, at de oplysninger, som er blevet indgivet til en myndighed, efter en begrundet anmodning kan stilles til rådighed for en anden myndighed i samme eller en anden medlemsstat og for BEREC, hvis det er nødvendigt for, at den ene eller den anden af disse myndigheder eller BEREC kan opfylde sine forpligtelser i henhold til EU-retten.
3.   Oplysninger, der er indsamlet i henhold til stk. 1, herunder oplysninger, der er indsamlet i forbindelse med en geografisk undersøgelse, der af en national tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed betragtes som fortrolige i henhold til EU-regler og nationale regler om kommerciel fortrolighed, behandles som fortrolige af Kommissionen, BEREC og alle andre berørte kompetente myndigheder. Sådan fortrolighed hindrer ikke rettidig udveksling af oplysninger mellem den kompetente myndighed, Kommissionen, BEREC og alle andre berørte kompetente myndigheder med henblik på at undersøge, overvåge og føre tilsyn med anvendelsen af dette direktiv.
4.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder under iagttagelse af nationale regler om aktindsigt og med forbehold af EU-regler og nationale regler om kommerciel fortrolighed og beskyttelse af personoplysninger offentliggør oplysninger, som bidrager til skabelsen af et åbent og konkurrencepræget marked.
5.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder offentliggør vilkårene for offentlighedens adgang til de i stk. 4 omhandlede oplysninger, herunder procedurer for opnåelse af en sådan adgang.
Artikel 21
Oplysninger, som kræves i forbindelse med generelle tilladelser, brugsrettigheder og de særlige forpligtelser
1.   Med forbehold af alle oplysninger, der kræves i henhold til artikel 20, og oplysninger og indberetningskrav i henhold til anden national ret end den generelle tilladelse kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder stille krav om, at virksomheder fremlægger oplysninger i forbindelse med den generelle tilladelse, brugsrettigheder eller de særlige forpligtelser i artikel 13, stk. 2, som er forholdsmæssigt afpasset, og som der er et objektivt grundlag for, navnlig med henblik på:
a)
systematisk eller i det konkrete tilfælde at kunne kontrollere overholdelsen af vilkår nr. 1 i del A, vilkår nr. 2 og 6 i del D og vilkår nr. 2 og 7 i del E, alle i bilag I, samt af de i artikel 13, stk. 2, omhandlede forpligtelser
b)
i det konkrete tilfælde at kunne kontrollere, om de i bilag I angivne vilkår overholdes, når der er modtaget en klage, eller når den kompetente myndighed har andre grunde til at antage, at et vilkår overtrædes, eller når den kompetente myndighed foretager en undersøgelse på eget initiativ
c)
gennemføre procedurer for og vurdering af anmodninger om tildeling af brugsret
d)
offentliggørelse af sammenlignende oversigter over tjenesters kvalitet og pris til gavn for forbrugerne
e)
indsamle klart definerede statistikker, rapporter eller undersøgelser
f)
udføre markedsanalyser jf. dette direktiv, herunder data om downstream- eller detailmarkeder, der er knyttet til eller forbundet med de markeder, der er genstand for markedsanalysen
g)
at sikre en effektiv udnyttelse og en effektiv forvaltning af radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer
h)
at evaluere fremtidige ændringer i net eller tjenester, der kan få indflydelse på de engrostjenester, som stilles til rådighed for konkurrenter, på territorial dækning, på slutbrugernes muligheder for konnektivitet eller på udpegningen af områder i henhold til artikel 22
i)
at gennemføre geografiske undersøgelser
j)
at svare på begrundede anmodninger om oplysninger fra BEREC.
Der må ikke stilles krav om fremlæggelse af de i første afsnit, litra a), og b), og litra d)- j), omhandlede oplysninger forud for eller som betingelse for markedsadgang.
BEREC kan udarbejde modeller for anmodning om oplysninger, hvis det er nødvendig for at fremme en konsolideret fremlæggelse og analyse af de indsamlede oplysninger.
2.   For så vidt angår brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser skal oplysninger som omhandlet i stk. 1 navnlig vedrøre faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser og opfyldelse af enhver forpligtelse vedrørende dækning og tjenestekvalitet, der er knyttet til brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser, samt kontrol af, om forpligtelserne opfyldes.
3.   Hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder kræver, at virksomheder fremlægger oplysninger, jf. stk. 1, skal de informere virksomhederne om, til hvilket specifikt formål disse oplysninger skal bruges.
4.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder må ikke anmode om oplysninger, som BEREC allerede har anmodet om i henhold til artikel 40 i forordning (EU) 2018/1971, hvis BEREC har stillet de modtagne oplysninger til rådighed for de pågældende myndigheder.
Artikel 22
Geografiske undersøgelser af netudrulning
1.   Senest den 21. december 2023 gennemfører de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og/eller andre kompetente myndigheder en geografisk undersøgelse af rækkevidden af elektroniske kommunikationsnet med bredbåndkapacitet (»bredbåndsnet«); en ny undersøgelse gennemføres mindst hvert tredje år derefter.
Den geografiske undersøgelse skal omfatte en undersøgelse af den aktuelle geografiske rækkevidde af bredbåndsnet på deres område som krævet med henblik på tilsynsmyndighedernes og andre kompetente myndigheders opgaver i henhold til dette direktiv og de undersøgelser, der kræves i forbindelse med anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne.
Den geografiske undersøgelse kan også omfatte en prognose for en periode, der fastsættes af den relevante myndighed, for rækkevidden af bredbåndsnettene, herunder net med meget høj kapacitet på deres område.
Sådan prognose skal indeholde alle relevante oplysninger, herunder oplysninger om alle virksomheders og offentlige myndigheders planer om udrulning af net med meget høj kapacitet samt væsentlige opgraderinger eller udvidelser af net til downloadhastigheder på mindst 100 Mbit/s. Til dette formål anmoder de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og/eller andre kompetente myndigheder virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder om sådanne oplysninger, i det omfang oplysningerne er til rådighed og kan fremlægges ved en rimelig indsats.
Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed træffer afgørelse for så vidt angår de opgaver, der specifikt er tildelt den i henhold til dette direktiv om, i hvilket omfang det er hensigtsmæssigt at henholde sig til alle eller en del af de oplysninger, der indsamles som led i en sådan prognose.
Hvis en geografisk undersøgelse ikke foretages af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, skal den foretages i samarbejde med denne myndighed, i det omfang den kan være relevant for myndighedens opgaver.
De oplysninger, der indsamles som led i den geografiske undersøgelse, skal have en passende detaljeringsgrad på lokalt plan og omfatte tilstrækkelige oplysninger om tjenestekvalitet og de forskellige aspekter heraf og skal behandles i overensstemmelse med artikel 20, stk. 3.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og/eller andre kompetente myndigheder kan udpege et klart afgrænset område, hvorom det ud fra de oplysninger, der er indsamlet, og den eventuelle prognose, der er udarbejdet i henhold til stk. 1, fastslås, at der i den pågældende prognoseperiode ikke er nogen virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed, der har udrullet eller har planer om at udrulle et net med meget høj kapacitet eller opgradere eller udvide sit net væsentligt, så det kan yde en downloadhastighed på mindst 100 Mbit/s. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og/eller andre kompetente myndigheder offentliggør oplysninger om de udpegede områder.
3.   Inden for et udpeget område kan de relevante myndigheder anmode virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder om at erklære, om de har til hensigt at udrulle net med meget høj kapacitet i løbet af den relevante prognoseperiode. Når denne anmodning resulterer i en erklæring fra en virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed om, at den har til hensigt at gøre dette, kan den relevante myndighed kræve, at andre virksomheder og offentlige myndigheder erklærer, om de har til hensigt at udrulle net med meget høj kapacitet, eller væsentligt at opgradere eller udvide deres net, så det kan yde en downloadhastighed på mindst 100 Mbit/s på dette område. Den relevante myndighed præciserer, hvilke oplysninger sådanne erklæringer skal indeholde, så der sikres mindst samme detaljeringsgrad som den, der er taget i betragtning i den eventuelle prognose, jf. stk. 1. Den meddeler også enhver virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed, der tilkendegiver sin interesse, om det pågældende område ifølge de oplysninger, der er indsamlet i henhold til stk. 1, er dækket eller sandsynligvis vil blive dækket af et næstegenerationsnet med downloadhastigheder på under 100 Mbit/s.
4.   Foranstaltninger i henhold til stk. 3 skal træffes efter en effektiv, objektiv, transparent og ikkediskriminerende procedure, hvorved ingen virksomheder på forhånd udelukkes.
5.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder samt lokale, regionale og nationale myndigheder med ansvar for tildeling af offentlige midler til etablering af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, til udformning af nationale bredbåndsplaner, til fastsættelse af dækningsforpligtelser, der er knyttet til brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, og til kontrol af udbuddet af tjenester, der er omfattet af forsyningspligt på deres område, tager hensyn til resultaterne af den geografiske undersøgelse og eventuelle udpegede områder, jf. stk. 1, 2 og 3.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de myndigheder, der foretager den geografiske undersøgelse, videregiver disse resultater, på betingelse af at den modtagende myndighed sikrer samme grad af kommerciel fortrolighed som den afgivende myndighed, og underretter de parter, der gav oplysningerne. Disse resultater stilles også til rådighed for BEREC og Kommissionen efter anmodning og på samme betingelser.
6.   Hvis de relevante oplysninger ikke er til rådighed på markedet, skal de kompetente myndigheder gøre de data fra de geografiske undersøgelser, der ikke er underlagt krav om kommerciel fortrolighed, direkte tilgængelige i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2003/98/EF, således at de kan genanvendes. De skal også, hvis sådanne værktøjer ikke er tilgængelige på markedet, stille it-værktøjer til rådighed, således at slutbrugerne sættes i stand til at fastslå, hvilken konnektivitet der er til rådighed i forskellige områder, med en detaljeringsgrad, som kan støtte dem i deres valg af operatør eller tjenesteudbyder.
7.   For at bidrage til en ensartet anvendelse af geografiske undersøgelser og prognoser udsteder BEREC efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen og de relevante nationale myndigheder senest den 31. juni 2020 retningslinjer for at bistå de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og/eller andre kompetente myndigheder med en ensartet gennemførelse af deres forpligtelser i henhold til denne artikel.
Artikel 23
Høring og gennemsigtighed
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, med undtagelse af spørgsmål, der er omfattet af artikel 26 eller 27 eller artikel 32, stk. 10, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, når de i medfør af dette direktiv agter at træffe foranstaltninger, eller når de agter at indføre begrænsninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 45, stk. 4 og 5, med væsentlige påvirkning af det relevante marked, giver de interesserede parter lejlighed til inden for en rimelig frist at fremsætte bemærkninger til udkastet til foranstaltninger; denne frist fastsættes under hensyn til sagens kompleksitet og må ikke være kortere end 30 dage, medmindre der foreligger ekstraordinære omstændigheder.
2.   Med henblik på artikel 35 underretter de kompetente myndigheder på tidspunktet for offentliggørelsen Frekvenspolitikgruppen om alle udkast til foranstaltninger, der falder ind under anvendelsesområdet for den sammenlignende eller konkurrenceprægede udvælgelsesprocedure i henhold til artikel 55, stk. 2, og vedrører anvendelsen af radiofrekvenser, for hvilke de harmoniserede betingelser er blevet fastsat ved tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF med henblik på at muliggøre deres anvendelse til trådløse elektroniske bredbåndskommunikationsnet og -tjenester (»trådløse bredbåndsnet og -tjenester«).
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder offentliggør deres nationale høringsprocedurer.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der etableres ét informationssted, hvorfra der er adgang til alle igangværende høringer.
4.   Resultaterne af høringsproceduren skal gøres offentligt tilgængelige, medmindre de er fortrolige i henhold til EU-regler og nationale regler om kommerciel fortrolighed.
Artikel 24
Høring af interesserede parter
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer i fornødent omfang, at de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder for så vidt angår alle spørgsmål vedrørende slutbruger- og forbrugerrettigheder, herunder lige adgangs- og valgmuligheder for slutbrugere med handicap, i forbindelse med offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, tager hensyn til synspunkter fra slutbrugere, navnlig forbrugere og slutbrugere med handicap, producenter og virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, navnlig når disse har stor indvirkning på markedet.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder opretter en høringsmekanisme, der er tilgængelig for slutbrugere med handicap, og som sikrer, at forbrugernes interesser i elektronisk kommunikation får tilstrækkelig vægt i tilsynsmyndighedernes beslutninger for så vidt angår spørgsmål vedrørende slutbruger- og forbrugerrettigheder i forbindelse med offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester.
2.   De berørte parter kan under vejledning af de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder udvikle mekanismer, som inddrager forbrugere, brugergrupper og tjenesteudbydere, med det formål at fremme tjenesternes generelle kvalitet ved bl.a. at udvikle og overvåge adfærdskodekser og driftsstandarder.
3.   Uden at dette berører anvendelsen af nationale regler, som er i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, til fremme af målene for kultur- og mediepolitikken, f.eks. kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed og mediepluralisme, kan de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fremme samarbejdet mellem virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, og sektorer, der interesserer sig for fremme af lovligt indhold i de elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester. Dette samarbejde kan også omfatte koordinering af de almennyttige oplysninger, som skal stilles til rådighed i henhold til artikel 103, stk. 4.
Artikel 25
Udenretslig bilæggelse af tvister
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller anden kompetent myndighed med ansvar for, eller mindst ét uafhængigt organ med dokumenteret ekspertise inden for, anvendelsen af artikel 102 til 107 og artikel 115 er opført som alternativ tvistbilæggelsesinstans i overensstemmelse med artikel 20, stk. 2, i direktiv 2013/11/EU med henblik på at bilægge tvister mellem udbydere og forbrugere, der følger af dette direktiv, og som vedrører gennemførelsen af aftaler. Medlemsstaterne kan udvide adgangen til alternative tvistbilæggelsesprocedurer, som denne myndighed eller dette organ fastlægger for andre slutbrugere end forbrugere, især mikrovirksomheder og små virksomheder.
2.   Vedrører en tvist parter i forskellige medlemsstater, koordinerer disse deres indsats med henblik på at bilægge tvisten, uden at dette i øvrigt tilsidesætter direktiv 2013/11/EU.
Artikel 26
Tvistbilæggelse mellem virksomheder
1.   Opstår der en tvist i forbindelse med eksisterende forpligtelser, der følger af dette direktiv, mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester i en medlemsstat eller mellem sådanne virksomheder og andre virksomheder i medlemsstaten, som gør brug af adgangs- eller samtrafikforpligtelser, eller mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester i en medlemsstat og udbydere af tilhørende faciliteter træffer den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed efter anmodning fra den ene eller den anden af parterne med forbehold af stk. 2 en bindende afgørelse for at bilægge tvisten hurtigst muligt på grundlag af klare og effektive procedurer og under alle omstændigheder inden fire måneder, bortset fra helt ekstraordinære tilfælde. Den berørte medlemsstat kræver, at alle parter samarbejder fuldt og helt med den nationale tilsynsmyndighed.
2.   Medlemsstaterne kan i bestemmelserne åbne mulighed for, at nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan afslå at bilægge en tvist, hvis der findes andre mulige mekanismer, f.eks. mægling, som bedre kunne bidrage til en hurtig bilæggelse af tvisten i overensstemmelse med målene i artikel 3. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed underretter hurtigst muligt parterne herom. Er tvisten endnu ikke bilagt efter fire måneder, og er den ikke indbragt for en domstol af den klagende part, træffer den nationale tilsynsmyndighed på anmodning fra en af parterne hurtigst muligt, og under alle omstændigheder inden fire måneder, en bindende afgørelse til bilæggelse af tvisten.
3.   Ved bilæggelse af en tvist træffer den nationale tilsynsmyndighed afgørelser, der tilsigter at opfylde målene i artikel 3. Forpligtelser, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed pålægger en virksomhed som led i bilæggelsen af en tvist, skal efterkomme dette direktiv.
4.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds afgørelse offentliggøres, idet der dog tages hensyn til krav om kommerciel fortrolighed. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed skal give de berørte parter en fuldstændig redegørelse for de grunde, som afgørelsen bygger på.
5.   Proceduren i stk. 1, 3 og 4 hindrer ikke nogen af parterne i at indbringe sagen for en domstol.
Artikel 27
Tvistbilæggelse mellem parter i forskellige medlemsstater
1.   Opstår der uenighed mellem virksomheder i forskellige medlemsstater på et område, der er omfattet af dette direktiv, finder stk. 2, 3 og 4 anvendelse. Disse bestemmelser finder dog ikke anvendelse på tvister vedrørende radiofrekvenskoordinering, der er omfattet af artikel 28.
2.   Alle parter kan forelægge tvisten for den eller de berørte nationale tilsynsmyndigheder. Hvis tvisten påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, underretter den eller de kompetente nationale tilsynsmyndigheder BEREC om tvisten for at finde en konsekvent løsning på tvisten i overensstemmelse med målene i artikel 3.
3.   Hvis der er foretaget en sådan underretning, afgiver BEREC hurtigst muligt og under alle omstændigheder inden for fire måneder, bortset fra under ekstraordinære omstændigheder, en udtalelse, hvori den eller de berørte nationale tilsynsmyndigheder opfordres til at træffe konkrete foranstaltninger for at bilægge tvisten eller undlade handling.
4.   Den eller de berørte nationale tilsynsmyndigheder afventer BEREC's udtalelse, før den/de tager skridt til at bilægge tvisten. Under ekstraordinære omstændigheder, hvor der er et påtrængende behov for en hurtig indsats for at sikre konkurrence og beskytte slutbrugernes interesser, kan enhver af de kompetente nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, enten på parternes anmodning eller på eget initiativ, vedtage midlertidige foranstaltninger.
5.   Enhver forpligtelse, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed pålægger en virksomhed som led i bilæggelse af en tvist, skal være i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv, tage nøje hensyn til den udtalelse, som BEREC har vedtaget, og skal vedtages senest en måned efter udtalelsen.
6.   Den i stk. 2 omhandlede procedure hindrer ikke nogen af parterne i at indbringe sagen for en domstol.
Artikel 28
Koordinering af anvendelsen af radiofrekvenser mellem medlemsstaterne
1.   Medlemsstaterne og deres kompetente myndigheder sikrer, at brugen af radiofrekvenser på deres område tilrettelægges på en sådan måde, at ingen anden medlemsstat forhindres i at tillade brug af harmoniserede radiofrekvenser i henhold til EU-retten på dens område, navnlig som følge af grænseoverskridende skadelig interferens mellem medlemsstater.
Medlemsstaterne træffer alle nødvendige foranstaltninger med henblik herpå, uden at dette berører deres forpligtelser i henhold til folkeretten og relevante internationale aftaler, herunder ITU's radioreglement og ITU's regionale radioaftaler.
2.   Medlemsstaterne samarbejder med hinanden og, hvis det er relevant, via Frekvenspolitikgruppen om grænseoverskridende koordinering af anvendelsen af radiofrekvenser med henblik på at:
a)
sikre overholdelse af stk. 1
b)
løse eventuelle problemer eller tvister i forbindelse med grænseoverskridende koordinering eller grænseoverskridende skadelig interferens mellem medlemsstater og med tredjelande, som forhindrer medlemsstater i at anvende harmoniserede radiofrekvenser på deres område.
3.   For at sikre overholdelse af stk. 1 kan enhver berørt medlemsstat anmode Frekvenspolitikgruppen om at optræde som mellemled for at løse eventuelle problemer eller tvister i forbindelse med grænseoverskridende koordinering eller grænseoverskridende skadelig interferens. Om nødvendigt kan Frekvenspolitikgruppen afgive en udtalelse, der foreslår en koordineret løsning på sådan et problem eller sådan en tvist.
4.   Kommissionen kan, hvis foranstaltningerne som omhandlet i stk. 2 eller 3 ikke har løst problemet eller tvisten, på anmodning af enhver berørt medlemsstat under videst mulig hensyntagen til en eventuel udtalelse fra Frekvenspolitikgruppen, der anbefaler en koordineret løsning i henhold til stk. 3, vedtage afgørelser, der er rettet til de medlemsstater, der er berørt af det uløste skadelige interferensproblem, ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter, for at løse problemer med grænseoverskridende skadelig interferens mellem to eller flere medlemsstater, der forhindrer dem i at gøre brug af harmoniserede radiofrekvenser på deres område.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
5.   Unionen yder efter anmodning fra en berørt medlemsstat juridisk, politisk og teknisk bistand med henblik på at løse problemer vedrørende radiofrekvenskoordinering med Unionens nabolande, herunder kandidatlande og tiltrædelseslande, således at de pågældende medlemsstater kan opfylde deres forpligtelser i henhold til EU-retten. I forbindelse med en sådan bistand fremmer Unionen gennemførelsen af sine politikker.
AFSNIT III
GENNEMFØRELSE
Artikel 29
Sanktioner
1.   Medlemsstaterne fastsætter, hvor det er nødvendigt, bestemmelser om sanktioner, herunder bøder og forhåndsfastsatte eller periodiske sanktioner af ikkestrafferetlig karakter, for overtrædelse af nationale bestemmelser eller bindende afgørelser truffet af Kommissionen, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i henhold til dette direktiv og træffer alle nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre gennemførelsen heraf. Inden for rammerne af national ret har de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder beføjelse til at pålægge sådanne sanktioner. De sanktioner, der pålægges, skal være passende, effektive, stå i rimeligt forhold til overtrædelsen og have afskrækkende virkning.
2.   Medlemsstaterne fastlægger sanktioner inden for rammerne af den procedure, der er omhandlet i artikel 22, stk. 3, alene når en virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed forsætligt eller groft uagtsomt afgiver vildledende, fejlagtige eller ufuldstændige oplysninger.
Som led i fastsættelsen af bøder eller periodiske sanktioner, der pålægges en virksomhed eller offentlig myndighed for bevidst eller groft uagtsomt at have afgivet vildledende, fejlagtige eller ufuldstændige oplysninger, inden for rammerne af den procedure, der er omhandlet i artikel 22, stk. 3, skal der bl.a. tages hensyn til, om adfærden hos virksomheden eller den offentlige myndighed har haft en negativ indvirkning på konkurrencen, og navnlig om virksomheden eller den offentlige myndighed i modsætning til de oplysninger, der oprindeligt blev afgivet eller enhver ajourføring heraf, enten har udrullet, udvidet eller opgraderet et net, eller ikke har udrullet et net, og har undladt at give en objektiv begrundelse for denne ændring af planen.
Artikel 30
Overholdelse af vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse eller for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer og overholdelse af særlige forpligtelser
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at deres relevante kompetente myndigheder overvåger og kontrollerer overholdelsen af vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse, vilkårene for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer, de særlige forpligtelser, jf. artikel 13, stk. 2, og forpligtelsen til at udnytte radiofrekvenser faktisk og effektivt i overensstemmelse med artikel 4, artikel 45, stk. 1, og artikel 47.
De kompetente myndigheder skal have beføjelse til i overensstemmelse med artikel 21 at pålægge virksomheder, der er omfattet af den generelle tilladelse, eller som har brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller til nummerressourcer, at fremlægge alle de oplysninger, der måtte være nødvendige for at kontrollere, om vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse, vilkårene for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer eller de særlige forpligtelser i artikel 13, stk. 2, eller artikel 47, overholdes.
2.   Hvis en kompetent myndighed konstaterer, at en virksomhed ikke overholder et eller flere af vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse eller brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer, eller de særlige forpligtelser, der nævnes i artikel 13, stk. 2, underretter den virksomheden herom og giver den mulighed for at fremføre sine synspunkter inden for en rimelig frist.
3.   Den kompetente myndighed har beføjelse til at kræve, at overtrædelsen, jf. stk. 2, ophører øjeblikkeligt eller inden for en rimelig frist, og tager passende og forholdsmæssigt afpassede skridt for at sikre, at vilkårene overholdes.
Medlemsstaterne bemyndiger i denne forbindelse de kompetente myndigheder til at:
a)
iværksætte afskrækkende økonomiske sanktioner, hvor det skønnes hensigtsmæssigt, herunder periodiske sanktioner med tilbagevirkende kraft, og
b)
give påbud om at indstille eller udsætte leveringen af en tjeneste eller bundtede tjenester, som, hvis den fortsatte, i alvorlig grad ville kunne skade konkurrencen, indtil adgangsforpligtelser pålagt efter udarbejdelsen af en markedsanalyse i henhold til artikel 67 er opfyldt.
De kompetente myndigheder skal straks meddele foranstaltningerne og begrundelsen herfor den pågældende virksomhed, og denne skal have en rimelig frist til at efterkomme foranstaltningerne.
4.   Uanset stk. 2 og 3 bemyndiger medlemsstaterne den kompetente myndighed til, hvor det er relevant, at iværksætte økonomiske sanktioner over for virksomhederne, hvis de ikke fremlægger oplysninger i overensstemmelse med de forpligtelser, der er fastsat efter artikel 21, stk. 1, første afsnit, litra a) eller b), og artikel 69, inden for en rimelig frist, der fastlægges af den kompetente myndighed.
5.   Ved alvorlige eller gentagne overtrædelser af vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse eller for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer eller af særlige forpligtelser i artikel 13, stk. 2, eller artikel 47, stk. 1 eller 2, giver medlemsstaterne de kompetente myndigheder, hvis de i denne artikels stk. 3 omhandlede foranstaltninger til sikring af vilkårenes overholdelse har været virkningsløse, beføjelse til at hindre en virksomhed i fortsat at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, eller suspendere eller tilbagekalde disse brugsrettigheder. Medlemsstaterne giver den kompetente myndighed beføjelse til at pålægge sanktioner, der er effektive, står i rimeligt forhold til overtrædelsen og har afskrækkende virkning. Sådanne sanktioner kan anvendes for en periode svarende til overtrædelsens varighed, selv om overtrædelsen efterfølgende er bragt til ophør.
6.   Uanset stk. 2, 3 og 5 kan den kompetente myndighed, træffe foreløbige hasteforanstaltninger for at afhjælpe situationen, inden der træffes en endelig afgørelse, når den har bevis for en overtrædelse af vilkårene for den generelle tilladelse eller for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og nummerressourcer eller af de særlige forpligtelser i artikel 13, stk. 2, eller artikel 47, stk. 1 eller 2, som udgør en umiddelbar og alvorlig trussel for den offentlige sikkerhed eller den offentlige sundhed, eller risiko for at skabe alvorlige økonomiske eller driftsmæssige problemer for andre udbydere eller brugere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester eller andre brugere af radiofrekvenser. Den kompetente myndighed skal give den pågældende virksomhed en rimelig mulighed for at fremføre sine synspunkter og foreslå eventuel afhjælpning. Når det er hensigtsmæssigt, kan den kompetente myndighed bekræfte de foreløbige foranstaltninger, der højst kan gælde i tre måneder, men som i tilfælde, hvor håndhævelsesprocedurerne ikke er afsluttet, kan forlænges med indtil tre måneder.
7.   Virksomheder har ret til at indklage foranstaltninger, som træffes i henhold til denne artikel, efter proceduren i artikel 31.
Artikel 31
Klageadgang
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der på nationalt plan findes effektive mekanismer, ved hjælp af hvilke enhver bruger eller enhver virksomhed, der udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester eller tilhørende faciliteter, og som berøres af en kompetent myndigheds afgørelse, kan påklage denne til en klageinstans, som er uafhængig af de involverede parter og af indblanding udefra eller politisk pres, der kan forhindre en uafhængig vurdering af sager, som den skal behandle. Denne instans, som kan være en domstol, skal have den nødvendige ekspertise til at udføre sine funktioner effektivt. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der tages behørigt hensyn til sagens omstændigheder.
Klagesagen har ikke opsættende virkning for den afgørelse, som den kompetente myndighed har truffet, medmindre der træffes foreløbige foranstaltninger i overensstemmelse med national ret.
2.   Når den i stk. 1 omhandlede klageinstans ikke har domstolskarakter, begrundes dens afgørelser altid skriftligt. I sådanne tilfælde kan dens afgørelser desuden indbringes for en ret i en medlemsstat, jf. artikel 267 i TEUF.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at klagemekanismen er effektiv.
3.   Medlemsstaterne indsamler oplysninger om klagers generelle genstand, antallet af klager, klagesagernes varighed og antallet af afgørelser om foreløbige forholdsregler. Medlemsstaterne meddeler disse oplysninger samt afgørelser eller domme til Kommissionen og til BEREC efter deres begrundede anmodning.
AFSNIT IV
PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE DET INDRE MARKED
KAPITEL I
Artikel 32
Konsolidering af det indre marked for elektronisk kommunikation
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager under udførelsen af deres opgaver i medfør af dette direktiv størst muligt hensyn til målene i artikel 3.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bidrager til udviklingen af det indre marked ved at samarbejde indbyrdes og med Kommissionen og BEREC på en transparent måde for at sikre en ensartet anvendelse af dette direktiv i alle medlemsstaterne. De samarbejder navnlig i denne forbindelse med Kommissionen og BEREC om at identificere, hvilke typer af instrumenter og afhjælpende foranstaltninger der er de bedst egnede til at håndtere bestemte typer af situationer på markedet.
3.   Medmindre andet gælder ifølge henstillinger eller retningslinjer, der er vedtaget i henhold til artikel 34, og når en offentlig høring, hvis en sådan er påkrævet i medfør af artikel 23, er afsluttet, skal en national tilsynsmyndighed, der agter at træffe en foranstaltning, som
a)
er omfattet af artikel 61, 64, 67, 68 eller 83 og
b)
vil få indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne,
under iagttagelse af artikel 20, stk. 3, samtidig offentliggøre udkastet til foranstaltning og meddele det samt begrundelsen for foranstaltningen til Kommissionen, BEREC og de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i andre medlemsstater. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, BEREC og Kommissionen kan kun fremsætte bemærkninger til dette udkast til foranstaltning inden for en måned. Fristen på én måned kan ikke forlænges.
4.   Det i stk. 3 omhandlede udkast til foranstaltning kan først vedtages efter en yderligere frist på to måneder, hvis denne foranstaltning sigter på:
a)
at afgrænse et relevant marked, som afviger fra dem, der er nævnt i den i artikel 64, stk. 1, omhandlede henstilling, eller
b)
at udpege en virksomhed enten alene eller i fællesskab med andre for at have en stærk markedsposition, jf. artikel 67, stk. 3, eller 4,
og det vil få indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, samt hvis Kommissionen har meddelt den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, at den betragter udkastet til foranstaltning som en hindring for det indre marked eller nærer alvorlig tvivl om dets forenelighed med EU-retten og mere specifikt med målene i artikel 3. Denne frist på to måneder kan ikke forlænges. Kommissionen underretter i så fald BEREC og de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder om sine forbehold og offentliggør dem samtidigt.
5.   BEREC offentliggør en udtalelse om Kommissionens i stk. 4 omhandlede forbehold, hvori det oplyser, om det mener, at udkastet til foranstaltning bør fastholdes, ændres eller trækkes tilbage, og fremsætter, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, specifikke forslag med henblik herpå.
6.   Inden for den tomåneders frist, der er nævnt i stk. 4, kan Kommissionen:
a)
træffe en afgørelse med krav om, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed trækker udkastet tilbage, eller
b)
træffe afgørelse om at hæve sine forbehold, der er omhandlet i stk. 4.
Før Kommissionen træffer en afgørelse, tager den nøje hensyn til udtalelsen fra BEREC.
Afgørelser, der er omhandlet i første afsnit, litra a), skal ledsages af en detaljeret og objektiv begrundelse fra Kommissionen om, hvorfor udkastet til foranstaltning ikke skal vedtages, sammen med konkrete forslag til ændringer.
7.   Har Kommissionen i henhold til stk. 6, første afsnit, litra a), truffet en afgørelse med krav om, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed trækker et udkast til foranstaltning tilbage, skal den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ændre udkastet eller trække det tilbage inden for seks måneder fra datoen for Kommissionens afgørelse. Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ændrer udkastet, skal den gennemføre en offentlig høring i overensstemmelse med artikel 23 og igen give Kommissionen meddelelse om det ændrede udkast i overensstemmelse med stk. 3.
8.   Den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed tager i videst mulig udstrækning hensyn til bemærkningerne fra andre nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, BEREC og Kommissionen, og kan, når bortses fra de i stk. 4 og stk. 6, litra a), omhandlede tilfælde, vedtage det således ændrede udkast til foranstaltning og skal i så fald fremsende det til Kommissionen.
9.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed fremsender alle vedtagne endelige foranstaltninger, der falder ind under stk. 3, litra a) og b), til Kommissionen og BEREC.
10.   Hvor en national tilsynsmyndighed under ekstraordinære omstændigheder mener, at der er et påtrængende behov for en hurtig indsats for at sikre konkurrencen og beskytte brugernes interesser, kan den som en fravigelse af proceduren i stk. 3 og 4 med det samme vedtage forholdsmæssige foranstaltninger af midlertidig karakter. Den fremsender straks de vedtagne foranstaltninger til Kommissionen, de andre nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og BEREC med en udførlig begrundelse. En afgørelse truffet af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed om at gøre sådanne foranstaltninger permanente eller forlænge deres gyldighedsperiode er omfattet af stk. 3 og 4.
11.   En national tilsynsmyndighed kan trække et udkast til foranstaltning tilbage på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt.
Artikel 33
Procedure for ensartet anvendelse af afhjælpende foranstaltninger
1.   Hvis en planlagt foranstaltning, der er omfattet af artikel 32, stk. 3, sigter mod at pålægge, ændre eller ophæve en forpligtelse for en virksomhed i medfør af artikel 61 eller 67 sammenholdt med artikel 69-76 og 83, kan Kommissionen inden for den periode på en måned, der er fastsat i artikel 32, stk. 3, underrette den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed og BEREC om årsagerne til, at den mener, at udkastet til foranstaltning vil skabe hindringer for det indre marked, eller om, at den er stærkt i tvivl om foranstaltningens forenelighed med EU-retten. I et sådant tilfælde vedtages udkastet til foranstaltning ikke før yderligere tre måneder efter, at Kommissionen har underrettet den pågældende tilsynsmyndighed.
Udebliver en sådan underretning, kan den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed vedtage den foreslåede foranstaltning under størst mulig hensyntagen til eventuelle bemærkninger fremsat af Kommissionen, BEREC eller andre nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
2.   Inden for den i stk. 1 omhandlede tremåneders periode arbejder Kommissionen, BEREC og den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed tæt sammen for at finde frem til den mest hensigtsmæssige og effektive foranstaltning i lyset af målene i artikel 3 og under behørig hensyntagen til markedsdeltagernes synspunkter og behovet for at sikre udviklingen af en ensartet tilsynspraksis.
3.   Inden for seks uger fra begyndelsen af den i stk. 1 omhandlede periode på tre måneder afgiver BEREC en udtalelse om Kommissionens i stk. 1 omhandlede meddelelse, hvori den oplyser, om det mener, at udkastet til foranstaltning bør ændres eller trækkes tilbage, og fremsætter om nødvendigt specifikke forslag herom. Udtalelsen begrundes og offentliggøres.
4.   Hvis BEREC i sin udtalelse deler Kommissionens alvorlige tvivl, arbejder den tæt sammen med den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed for at finde frem til den mest hensigtsmæssige og effektive foranstaltning. Inden udløbet af den i stk. 1 omhandlede tremånedersperiode kan den nationale tilsynsmyndighed enten:
a)
ændre sit udkast til foranstaltning eller trække det tilbage under størst mulig hensyntagen til Kommissionens i stk. 1 omhandlede underretning og BEREC's udtalelse eller
b)
fastholde sit udkast til foranstaltning.
5.   Kommissionen kan senest en måned fra udløbet af den i stk. 1 omhandlede tremåneders periode og under størst mulig hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse, hvis en sådan foreligger
a)
udarbejde en henstilling til den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed om at ændre udkastet til foranstaltning eller trække det tilbage, herunder specifikke forslag herom samt begrundelse for dens henstilling, navnlig hvis BEREC ikke deler Kommissionens alvorlige tvivl,
b)
træffe afgørelse om at hæve sine forbehold, jf. stk. 1, eller
c)
for udkast til foranstaltninger, der falder ind under artikel 61, stk. 3, andet afsnit, eller artikel 76, stk. 2, træffe afgørelse om at pålægge den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed at trække udkastet til foranstaltning tilbage, hvis BEREC deler Kommissionens alvorlige tvivl, der er ledsaget af en detaljeret og objektiv begrundelse fra Kommissionen om, hvorfor udkastet til foranstaltning ikke bør vedtages, sammen med konkrete forslag til ændring af udkastet til foranstaltning i henhold til proceduren i artikel 32, stk. 7, som finder tilsvarende anvendelse.
6.   Senest en måned efter, at Kommissionen har udarbejdet sin henstilling i henhold til stk. 5, litra a), eller hævet sine forbehold i henhold til stk. 5, litra b), underretter den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed Kommissionen og BEREC om den vedtagne endelige foranstaltning.
Denne frist kan forlænges for at give den nationale tilsynsmyndighed mulighed for at foretage en offentlig høring i henhold til artikel 23.
7.   Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed på grundlag af henstillingen i henhold til stk. 5, litra a), træffer afgørelse om ikke at ændre udkastet til foranstaltning eller trække det tilbage, forelægger den en begrundelse for denne afgørelse.
8.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed kan trække den foreslåede foranstaltning tilbage på et hvilket som helst trin i proceduren.
Artikel 34
Gennemførelsesbestemmelser
Efter en offentlig høring og efter høring af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og under størst mulig hensyntagen til udtalelsen fra BEREC kan Kommissionen vedtage henstillinger eller retningslinjer vedrørende artikel 32 om, hvilken form og hvilket indhold de anmeldelser af foranstaltninger, der kræves i henhold til artikel 32, stk. 3, skal have, hvor detaljerede de skal være, under hvilke omstændigheder anmeldelse ikke er påkrævet, samt om hvordan tidsfristerne fastsættes.
KAPITEL II
Ensartet radiofrekvenstildeling
Artikel 35
Peer review-proces
1.   Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed har til hensigt at gennemføre en udvælgelsesprocedure i overensstemmelse med artikel 55, stk. 2, i forhold til radiofrekvenser for hvilke der er fastsat harmoniserede betingelser ved tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, for at muliggøre deres anvendelse til trådløse bredbåndsnet og -tjenester, underretter den i henhold til artikel 23 Frekvenspolitikgruppen om alle udkast til foranstaltninger, der er omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for den sammenlignende eller konkurrenceprægede udvælgelsesprocedure i henhold til artikel 55, stk. 2, og angiver, om og hvornår den skal anmode Frekvenspolitikgruppen om at indkalde til et peer review-forum.
Når Frekvenspolitikgruppen anmodes herom, tilrettelægger den et peer review-forum for at drøfte og udveksle synspunkter om de fremsendte udkast til foranstaltninger og fremmer udvekslingen af erfaringer og bedste praksis om disse udkast til foranstaltninger.
Peer review-forummet består af medlemmerne af Frekvenspolitikgruppen og tilrettelægges og ledes af en repræsentant for Frekvenspolitikgruppen.
2.   Senest under den offentlige høring i henhold til artikel 23 kan Frekvenspolitikgruppen undtagelsesvist tage initiativ til at indkalde til et peer review-forum i overensstemmelse med forretningsordenen for tilrettelæggelse heraf med henblik på at udveksle erfaringer og bedste praksis om et udkast til foranstaltning vedrørende en udvælgelsesprocedure, hvor den finder, at udkastet til foranstaltning i væsentlig grad vil berøre den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndigheds mulighed for at realisere de mål, der er fastsat i artikel 3, 45, 46 og 47.
3.   Frekvenspolitikgruppen fastlægger på forhånd de objektive kriterier for den særlige indkaldelse af peer review-forummet og offentliggør dem.
4.   Under peer review-forummet skal den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed forklare, hvordan udkastet til foranstaltning:
a)
fremmer udviklingen af det indre marked, udbuddet af tjenester på tværs af grænser såvel som konkurrence og skaber størst mulige fordele for forbrugerne og overordnet betragtet opfylder de mål, der er fastsat i artikel 3, 45, 46 og 47, samt i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF og afgørelse nr. 243/2012/EU
b)
sikrer en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser og
c)
sikrer stabile og forudsigelige investeringsvilkår for eksisterende og potentielle brugere af radiofrekvenser, når der udrulles net til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, som er afhængige af radiofrekvenser.
5.   Peer review-forummet skal være åbent for frivillig deltagelse af eksperter fra andre kompetente myndigheder og fra BEREC.
6.   Peer review-forummet indkaldes kun én gang i løbet af den overordnede nationale forberedelses- og høringsproces i en enkelt udvælgelsesprocedure vedrørende et eller flere radiofrekvensbånd, medmindre den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed anmoder om, at det genindkaldes.
7.   Efter anmodning fra den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed, der anmodede om mødet, kan Frekvenspolitikgruppen vedtage en rapport om, hvordan udkastet til foranstaltning opfylder de målsætninger, der er omhandlet i stk. 4, idet de synspunkter, der blev udvekslet i peer review-forummet, afspejles.
8.   Frekvenspolitikgruppen offentliggør hver år i februar en rapport om udkastene til foranstaltninger i henhold til stk. 1 og 2. Rapporten skal omfatte erfaringer og bedste praksis, der er opsamlet.
9.   Efter peer review-forummet kan Frekvenspolitikgruppen efter anmodning fra den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed, der har anmodet om mødet, vedtage en udtalelse om udkastet til foranstaltning.
Artikel 36
Harmoniseret tildeling af radiofrekvenser
Hvis brugen af radiofrekvenser er harmoniseret, hvis der er indgået aftaler om adgangsvilkår og -procedurer, og hvis de virksomheder, som får tildelt radiofrekvenser, er blevet udvalgt i henhold til internationale aftaler og EU-regler, skal medlemsstaterne tildele brugsrettigheder til sådanne radiofrekvenser i overensstemmelse hermed. Under forudsætning af at alle de nationale vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne til de berørte radiofrekvenser er blevet opfyldt i tilfælde af anvendelse af en fælles tildelingsproces, må medlemsstaterne ikke opstille yderligere betingelser, supplerende kriterier eller procedurer, som kan begrænse, ændre eller forsinke en korrekt gennemførelse af den fælles tildeling af sådanne radiofrekvenser.
Artikel 37
Fælles tildelingsproces med henblik på tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser
To eller flere medlemsstater kan samarbejde med hinanden og med Frekvenspolitikgruppen under hensyntagen til eventuelle interessetilkendegivelser fra markedsdeltagere ved sammen at fastlægge de fælles aspekter af en tildelingsproces og, hvis det er hensigtsmæssigt, ligeledes sammen gennemføre udvælgelsesprocessen med henblik på tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser.
Ved udformningen af den fælles tildelingsproces kan medlemsstaterne tage hensyn til følgende kriterier:
a)
den enkelte nationale tildelingsproces skal indledes og gennemføres af de kompetente myndigheder i overensstemmelse en plan, der aftales i fællesskab
b)
den skal, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, omfatte fælles betingelser og procedurer for udvælgelse og tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser i de pågældende medlemsstater
c)
den skal, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, omfatte fælles eller sammenlignelige vilkår, som skal fastsættes til de individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser i de pågældende medlemsstater, og som bl.a. gør det muligt for brugerne at få tildelt tilsvarende frekvensblokke
d)
andre medlemsstater skal til enhver tid kunne tilslutte sig den fælles tildelingsproces, indtil processen er afsluttet.
Hvis medlemsstaterne på trods af den interesse, som markedsdeltagere har givet udtryk for, ikke handler i fællesskab, skal de underrette disse markedsdeltagere om grundene til deres beslutning.
KAPITEL III
Harmonisering
Artikel 38
Harmonisering
1.   Hvis Kommissionen finder, at afvigelser i de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders eller andre kompetente myndigheders udførelse af de tilsynsopgaver, de er pålagt i henhold til dette direktiv, kan skabe hindringer i det indre marked, kan den under nøje iagttagelse af BEREC's udtalelse eller, hvor det er relevant, Frekvenspolitikgruppen vedtage henstillinger eller med forbehold af stk. 3 vedtage en afgørelse ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter for at sikre den harmoniserede anvendelse af dette direktiv for at fremme opfyldelsen af målene i artikel 3.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder under udførelsen af deres opgaver tager nøje hensyn til henstillinger som omhandlet i stk. 1. Vælger en national tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed at undlade at følge en henstilling, underretter den Kommissionen herom og begrunder sin holdning.
3.   Afgørelser, der vedtages i henhold til stk. 1, omfatter kun fastlæggelse af en harmoniseret eller koordineret fremgangsmåde med henblik på at behandle følgende spørgsmål:
a)
inkonsekvent gennemførelse af generel regulatorisk praksis fra de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders side i forbindelse med regulering af markederne for elektronisk kommunikation i henhold til artikel 64 og 67, hvor det skaber hindringer for det indre marked. I sådanne afgørelser henvises der ikke til specifikke underretninger fra de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i medfør af artikel 32. I sådanne tilfælde udarbejder Kommissionen ikke et udkast til afgørelse
i)
før der er gået mindst to år fra vedtagelsen af en henstilling fra Kommissionen om samme spørgsmål, og
ii)
uden at tage nøje hensyn til en udtalelse fra BEREC om det hensigtsmæssige i at vedtage en sådan afgørelse, som udarbejdes af BEREC senest tre måneder efter Kommissionens anmodning
b)
nummerering, herunder nummerserier, portabilitet for numre og identifikationsmidler, nummer- og adresseomsætningssystemer og adgang til beredskabstjenesterne via det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«.
4.   De i stk. 1 nævnte gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren, jf. artikel 118, stk. 4.
5.   BEREC kan på eget initiativ rådgive Kommissionen om, hvorvidt der bør vedtages en foranstaltning i henhold til stk. 1.
6.   Hvis Kommissionen ikke har vedtaget en henstilling eller en afgørelse inden for et år fra datoen for vedtagelsen af en udtalelse fra BEREC, som påviser forskelle i de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders eller andre kompetente myndigheders gennemførelse af de tilsynsopgaver, der er anført i dette direktiv, som kunne skabe hindringer i det indre marked, underretter den Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om sine begrundelser for ikke at gøre dette og offentliggør disse begrundelser.
Hvis Kommissionen har vedtaget en henstilling i overensstemmelse med stk. 1, men den inkonsekvente gennemførelse, der skaber hindringer i det indre marked, fortsætter i to år derefter, skal Kommissionen, med forbehold af stk. 3, vedtage en afgørelse ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter i henhold til stk. 4.
Hvis Kommissionen ikke har vedtaget en afgørelse inden for yderligere et år fra enhver henstilling, der er vedtaget i henhold til andet afsnit, underretter den Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om sine begrundelser for ikke at gøre dette og offentliggør disse begrundelser.
Artikel 39
Standardisering
1.   Kommissionen udarbejder og offentliggør i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 en liste over ikkeobligatoriske standarder eller specifikationer, som skal danne grundlag for at fremme et harmoniseret udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og tilhørende faciliteter og tilknyttede tjenester. Kommissionen kan om nødvendigt og efter høring af det udvalg, som er nedsat i henhold til direktiv (EU) 2015/1535, anmode de europæiske standardiseringsorganisationer (Den Europæiske Standardiseringsorganisation (CEN), Den Europæiske Komité for Elektroteknisk Standardisering (Cenelec) og Det Europæiske Standardiseringsinstitut for Telekommunikation (ETSI)) om at udarbejde standarder.
2.   Medlemsstaterne fremmer anvendelse af de i stk. 1 omhandlede standarder eller specifikationer i forbindelse med udbud af tjenester, tekniske grænseflader eller netfunktioner, i det omfang det er strengt nødvendigt for at sikre interoperabilitet mellem tjenester, end-to-end-konnektivitet, lettelse af udbyderskift og portabilitet for numre og identifikationsmidler og øge brugernes valgmuligheder.
Så længe der ikke er offentliggjort standarder eller specifikationer som anført i stk. 1, tilskynder medlemsstaterne til anvendelse af standarder eller specifikationer, der er vedtaget af de europæiske standardiseringsorganisationer.
Hvis sådanne standarder eller specifikationer ikke foreligger, tilskynder medlemsstaterne til anvendelse af internationale standarder eller henstillinger, som er vedtaget af Den Internationale Telekommunikationsunion (ITU), Den Europæiske Konference af Post- og Teleadministrationer (CEPT), Den Internationale Standardiseringsorganisation (ISO) eller Den Internationale Elektrotekniske Kommission (IEC).
Hvor der foreligger internationale standarder, tilskynder medlemsstaterne de europæiske standardiseringsorganer til at benytte dem eller relevante dele af dem som grundlag for de standarder, som de udarbejder, undtagen i tilfælde, hvor sådanne internationale standarder eller relevante dele af standarder ville være virkningsløse.
De standarder og specifikationer, der er omhandlet i stk. 1 eller i dette stykke, må ikke forhindre adgang, der måtte kræves i henhold til dette direktiv, hvor dette er muligt.
3.   Hvis de i stk. 1 omhandlede standarder eller specifikationer ikke er blevet korrekt implementeret, således at interoperabiliteten mellem tjenester i en eller flere medlemsstater ikke kan sikres, kan implementeringen af sådanne standarder eller specifikationer efter den i stk. 4 omhandlede procedure gøres obligatorisk i det omfang, det er strengt nødvendigt for at sikre interoperabiliteten og øge brugernes valgmuligheder.
4.   Når Kommissionen påtænker at gøre implementering af bestemte standarder eller specifikationer obligatorisk, offentliggør den i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 en opfordring til alle berørte parter om at fremsætte deres bemærkninger offentligt. Kommissionen gør ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter implementering af de relevante standarder obligatorisk ved at betegne dem som obligatoriske standarder i den liste over standarder eller specifikationer, der offentliggøres i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
.
5.   Mener Kommissionen, at de i stk. 1 omhandlede standarder eller specifikationer ikke længere bidrager til udbud af harmoniserede elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, ikke længere opfylder forbrugernes behov eller hæmmer den teknologiske udvikling, skal den fjerne dem fra den i stk. 1 omhandlede liste over standarder eller specifikationer.
6.   Mener Kommissionen, at de i stk. 4 omhandlede standarder eller specifikationer ikke længere bidrager til udbud af harmoniserede elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, ikke længere opfylder forbrugernes behov eller hæmmer den teknologiske udvikling, skal den træffe passende gennemførelsesforanstaltninger og ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter fjerne disse standarder eller specifikationer fra den i stk. 1 omhandlede liste over standarder eller specifikationer.
7.   De gennemførelsesretsakter, der henvises til i stk. 4 og 6, vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren, jf. artikel 118, stk. 4.
8.   Denne artikel gælder ikke for nogen af de væsentlige krav, grænsefladespecifikationer eller harmoniserede standarder, som direktiv 2014/53/EU finder anvendelse på.
AFSNIT V
SIKKERHED
Artikel 40
Sikkerhed i net og tjenester
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester træffer passende og forholdsmæssige tekniske og organisatoriske foranstaltninger for på passende vis at styre risiciene for sikkerheden i net og tjenester. Under hensyn til teknologiens aktuelle stade skal disse foranstaltninger garantere et sikkerhedsniveau, der står i forhold til risikoen. Der skal navnlig træffes foranstaltninger, herunder kryptering, hvis det er relevant, for at forhindre og minimere virkningen af sikkerhedshændelser for brugerne og for andre net og tjenester.
Den Europæiske Unions Agentur for Net- og Informationssikkerhed (»ENISA«) fremmer i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 526/2013 
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 medlemsstaternes samordning for at undgå forskellige nationale krav, som kan skabe sikkerhedsrisici og hindringer for det indre marked.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester uden unødigt ophold underretter den kompetente myndighed om sikkerhedshændelser, der har haft væsentlig indvirkning på driften af net eller tjenester.
Med henblik på at fastlægge omfanget af en sikkerhedshændelses indvirkning tages navnlig følgende kriterier i betragtning, hvis de er til rådighed:
a)
antallet af brugere, der berøres af sikkerhedshændelsen
b)
varigheden af sikkerhedshændelsen
c)
den geografiske udbredelse med hensyn til det område, der er berørt af sikkerhedshændelsen
d)
i hvilket omfang nettets eller tjenestens funktionsdygtighed påvirkes
e)
omfanget af indvirkningen på økonomiske og samfundsmæssige aktiviteter.
Den pågældende kompetente myndighed underretter, hvor det er relevant, de kompetente myndigheder i andre medlemsstater og ENISA. Den kompetente myndighed kan underrette offentligheden eller kræve, at udbyderne gør det, hvis den godtgør, at det er i offentlighedens interesse, at sikkerhedshændelsen offentliggøres.
Én gang om året forelægger den pågældende kompetente myndighed en sammenfattende rapport for Kommissionen og ENISA om de underretninger, som den har modtaget, og de foranstaltninger, der er truffet i henhold til dette stykke.
3.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i tilfælde af en særlig og betydelig trussel om en sikkerhedshændelse i sådanne net eller tjenester informerer de af deres brugere, der potentielt er berørt af en sådan trussel, om eventuelle mulige beskyttelsesforanstaltninger eller afhjælpende foranstaltninger, som brugerne kan træffe. Hvis det er hensigtsmæssigt, underretter udbyderne ligeledes deres brugere om selve truslen.
4.   Denne artikel indskrænker ikke anvendelsen af forordning (EU) 2016/679 og direktiv 2002/58/EF.
5.   Kommissionen kan under nøje hensyn til udtalelsen fra ENISA vedtage gennemførelsesretsakter med nærmere bestemmelser om de tekniske og organisatoriske foranstaltninger, der er omhandlet i stk. 1, samt om, under hvilke forhold og efter hvilke procedurer der skal foretages underretninger, og om, hvordan underretningerne skal udformes i medfør af stk. 2. De skal i videst muligt omfang baseres på europæiske og internationale standarder og er ikke til hinder for, at medlemsstaterne vedtager supplerende krav med henblik på at forfølge målene i stk. 1.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
Artikel 41
Gennemførelse og håndhævelse
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer med henblik på gennemførelsen af artikel 40, at de kompetente myndigheder har beføjelse til at pålægge udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester bindende instrukser, bl.a. om, hvilke foranstaltninger der er nødvendige for at afhjælpe en sikkerhedshændelse eller hindre en sådan i at forekomme, når en betydelig trussel er blevet identificeret, og om gennemførelsesfrister.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder har beføjelse til at pålægge udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester at:
a)
forelægge de oplysninger, der nødvendige for at vurdere sikkerheden i deres tjenester og net, herunder en dokumenteret sikkerhedspolitik, og
b)
forelægge en sikkerhedsrevision udført af et kvalificeret uafhængigt organ eller en kompetent myndighed og stille resultaterne heraf til rådighed for den kompetente myndighed. Udgifterne til revisionen afholdes af udbyderen.
3.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder har de nødvendige beføjelser til at undersøge tilfælde af manglende opfyldelse af kravene samt virkningerne for nettenes og tjenesternes sikkerhed.
4.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder med henblik på gennemførelsen af artikel 40 har beføjelse til at indhente bistand fra en enhed, der håndterer IT-sikkerhedshændelser (»CSIRT«), som udpeget i henhold til artikel 9 i direktiv (EU) 2016/1148 vedrørende spørgsmål, der falder ind under CSIRT'ers opgaver i henhold til punkt 2 i bilag I til nævnte direktiv.
5.   De kompetente myndigheder skal, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt og i overensstemmelse med national ret, rådføre sig og samarbejde med de relevante nationale retshåndhævende myndigheder, de kompetente myndigheder som omhandlet i artikel 8, stk. 1, i direktiv (EU) 2016/1148 og de nationale databeskyttelsesmyndigheder.
DEL II
NET
AFSNIT I
MARKEDSADGANG OG UDRULNING
KAPITEL I
Afgifter
Artikel 42
Afgifter for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser og tilladelser til installation af faciliteter
1.   Medlemsstaterne kan give den kompetente myndighed tilladelse til at opkræve afgifter for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller for tilladelser til at installere faciliteter på, over eller under offentlig eller privat ejendom, der anvendes til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester eller -net og tilhørende faciliteter, som sikrer, at disse ressourcer udnyttes optimalt. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at sådanne afgifter er objektivt begrundede, transparente, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpassede efter det tilsigtede formål og tager hensyn til de overordnede mål i dette direktiv.
2.   Med hensyn til brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser skal medlemsstaterne bestræbe sig på at sikre, at gældende afgifter fastsættes på et niveau, som sikrer en effektiv tildeling og brug af radiofrekvenser, herunder ved:
a)
at fastsætte mindstepriser som minimumsafgifter for brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser ved at tage hensyn til værdien af disse rettigheder i forbindelse med deres eventuelle alternative former for brug
b)
at tage hensyn til de omkostninger, der følger af de vilkår, der er fastsat i disse rettigheder, og
c)
i muligt omfang at anvende betalingsordninger, der er knyttet til den faktiske mulighed for brug af radiofrekvenserne.
KAPITEL II
Adgang til landarealer
Artikel 43
Tilladelse til at installere faciliteter
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at en kompetent myndighed ved behandlingen af en ansøgning om tilladelse til
—
at installere faciliteter på, over eller under offentlig eller privat ejendom til en virksomhed, der har tilladelse til at udbyde offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet, eller
—
at installere faciliteter på, over eller under offentlig ejendom til en virksomhed, der har tilladelse til at udbyde ikke offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationsnet,
skal:
a)
handle på grundlag af enkle, effektive, transparente og offentligt tilgængelige procedurer, som anvendes uden diskrimination og uden forsinkelse, og under alle omstændigheder træffe afgørelse inden seks måneder, efter at ansøgningen er modtaget, undtagen i tilfælde af ekspropriation, og
b)
følge principperne om gennemsigtighed og ikkediskrimination, når der knyttes vilkår til sådanne rettigheder.
Procedurerne i litra a) og b) kan variere alt efter, om ansøgeren udbyder offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller ej.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der i sådanne tilfælde, hvor offentlige eller lokale myndigheder stadig ejer eller kontrollerer virksomheder, der udbyder offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, sker en reel organisatorisk adskillelse mellem den i stk. 1 omhandlede rettighedstildelingsfunktion og aktiviteterne i forbindelse med ejerskab og kontrol.
Artikel 44
Samhusning og delt brug af netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter for udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet
1.   Hvis en operatør i henhold til national ret har udøvet retten til at installere faciliteter på, over eller under offentlig eller privat ejendom, eller har påberåbt sig en procedure for ekspropriation af eller brugsrettigheder til ejendom, kan de kompetente nationale myndigheder stille krav om samhusning og delt brug af netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter, der er installeret på dette grundlag, for at beskytte miljøet, folkesundheden og den offentlige sikkerhed eller for at opfylde målene for by- og landsplanlægningen.
Krav om samhusning eller delt brug af installerede netelementer og faciliteter og delt brug af ejendom kan kun pålægges efter en offentlig høring af passende varighed, i løbet af hvilken alle interesserede parter skal have mulighed for at udtrykke deres holdninger, og kun inden for de specifikke områder, hvor en sådan delt brug skønnes nødvendig af hensyn til målene i første afsnit. De kompetente myndigheder kan stille krav om delt brug af sådanne faciliteter eller sådan ejendom, herunder jord, bygninger, adgangsveje til bygninger, kabler i bygninger, master, antenner, tårne og andre støttekonstruktioner, kabelkanaler, ledningskanaler, mandehuller, skabe eller foranstaltninger, som fremmer koordineringen af offentlige anlægsarbejder. En medlemsstat kan om nødvendigt udpege en national tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed til en eller flere af følgende opgaver:
a)
koordinere den procedure, der er fastsat i denne artikel
b)
fungere som et centralt informationssted
c)
fastsætte regler for fordeling af omkostninger ved delt brug af faciliteter eller ejendom og ved koordinering af anlægsarbejder.
2.   Foranstaltninger, som en kompetent myndighed træffer i overensstemmelse med denne artikel, skal være objektive, transparente, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpassede. Sådanne foranstaltninger gennemføres, hvor det er relevant, i samarbejde med de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
KAPITEL III
Adgang til radiofrekvenser
Afdeling 1
Tilladelser
Artikel 45
Forvaltning af radiofrekvenser
1.   Under behørig hensyntagen til det forhold, at radiofrekvenser er et offentligt gode, som har en vigtig social, kulturel og økonomisk værdi, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at radiofrekvenser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester forvaltes effektivt på deres område i overensstemmelse med artikel 3 og 4. De sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheders allokering af, udstedelse af generelle tilladelser til og tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til brug for radiofrekvenser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester bygger på objektive, transparente, konkurrencefremmende, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssige kriterier.
Når medlemsstaterne anvender denne artikel, overholder de relevante internationale aftaler, herunder ITU's radioreglement, og andre aftaler, der er vedtaget inden for rammerne af ITU, som finder anvendelse på radiofrekvenser, såsom den aftale, der blev indgået på den regionale radiokommunikationskonference i 2006, og kan tage hensyn til almene interesser.
2.   Medlemsstaterne fremmer harmoniseringen af radiofrekvensanvendelsen til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester i Unionen på en måde, der tilgodeser behovet for en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse, og som søger at sikre forbrugerne fordele, f.eks. konkurrence, stordriftsfordele og tjenesternes og nettenes interoperabilitet. I denne forbindelse handler de i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i dette direktiv og med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, bl.a. ved at:
a)
tilstræbe trådløs bredbåndsdækning for deres nationale område og befolkning af høj kvalitet og hastighed samt dækning af vigtige nationale transportveje og EU-transportveje, herunder det transeuropæiske transportnet som omhandlet i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1315/2013 
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b)
fremme en hurtig udvikling i Unionen af nye trådløse kommunikationsteknologier og -applikationer, herunder, hvis det er hensigtsmæssigt, på tværs af sektorer
c)
sikre forudsigelighed og sammenhæng i forbindelse med tildeling, fornyelse, ændring, begrænsning og tilbagekaldelse af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser med henblik på at fremme langsigtede investeringer
d)
sikre forebyggelse af grænseoverskridende eller national skadelig interferens i henhold til henholdsvis artikel 28 og 46 og træffe passende foregribende og afhjælpende foranstaltninger med henblik herpå
e)
fremme delt brug af radiofrekvenser mellem ens eller forskellig brug af radiofrekvenser i overensstemmelse med konkurrenceretten
f)
anvende det mest hensigtsmæssige og mindst byrdefulde tilladelsessystem, der er muligt, i overensstemmelse med artikel 46 på en måde, der maksimerer fleksibilitet, delt brug og effektivitet i brugen af radiofrekvenser
g)
anvende regler for tildeling, overdragelse, fornyelse, ændring og tilbagekaldelse af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, som er klart og tydeligt fastlagt, for at sikre sikkerhed, sammenhæng og forudsigelighed i reguleringen
h)
tilstræbe sammenhæng og forudsigelighed i hele Unionen med hensyn til måden, hvorpå brugen af radiofrekvenser tillades, når det gælder beskyttelse af folkesundheden, under hensyntagen til henstilling 1999/519/EF.
Med henblik på første afsnit og i forbindelse med udviklingen af tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger for et radiofrekvensbånd i henhold til beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF kan Kommissionen anmode Frekvenspolitikgruppen om at afgive en udtalelse om anbefaling af den eller de mest hensigtsmæssige tilladelsesordninger for anvendelse af radiofrekvenser i dette frekvensbånd eller dele deraf. Hvis det er relevant, kan Kommissionen under størst mulig hensyntagen til en sådan udtalelse vedtage en henstilling med henblik på at fremme en konsekvent tilgang i Unionen til en tilladelsesordning eller tilladelsesordninger for anvendelse af frekvensbåndet.
Når Kommissionen overvejer at vedtage foranstaltninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 39, stk. 1, 4, 5 og 6, kan den anmode Frekvenspolitikgruppen om en udtalelse, hvad angår følgerne af eventuelle standarder eller specifikationer for koordineringen og harmoniseringen af samt tilgængeligheden til radiofrekvenser. Kommissionen tager nøje hensyn til Frekvenspolitikgruppens udtalelse i forbindelse med eventuelle efterfølgende skridt.
3.   I tilfælde af manglende national eller regional markedsefterspørgsel på brugen af et harmoniseret radiofrekvensbånd kan medlemsstaterne tillade en alternativ brug af hele eller dele af frekvensbåndet, herunder den gældende brug, i overensstemmelse med stk. 4 og 5 i denne artikel, forudsat at:
a)
konstateringen af den manglende markedsefterspørgsel på brugen af et sådant frekvensbånd bygger på en offentlig høring i overensstemmelse med artikel 23, herunder en fremadrettet vurdering af markedsefterspørgslen
b)
en sådan alternativ anvendelse ikke lægger hindringer i vejen for tilgængeligheden eller brugen af et sådant frekvensbånd i andre medlemsstater, og
c)
den pågældende medlemsstat tager behørigt hensyn til den langsigtede tilgængelighed eller brug af et sådant frekvensbånd i Unionen og til stordriftsfordele for udstyr, som følger af brugen af de harmoniserede radiofrekvenser i Unionen.
Enhver beslutning om undtagelsesvis at tillade alternativ brug skal være genstand for regelmæssig revision og skal i alle tilfælde straks revideres på en potentiel brugers behørigt begrundede anmodning til den kompetente myndighed om brug af frekvensbåndet i overensstemmelse med de tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger. Medlemsstaten meddeler Kommissionen og de øvrige medlemsstater den afgørelse, der træffes, sammen med grundene hertil samt resultatet af en eventuel revision.
4.   Med forbehold af andet afsnit, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at alle typer teknologi, der anvendes til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, kan anvendes i de radiofrekvenser, der er erklæret til rådighed for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i deres nationale frekvensplan i overensstemmelse med EU-retten.
Medlemsstaterne kan dog fastsætte forholdsmæssigt afpassede og ikkediskriminerende begrænsninger for, hvilke typer af teknologi i forbindelse med radionet eller trådløs adgang der anvendes til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, hvor dette er nødvendigt for at:
a)
undgå skadelig interferens
b)
beskytte folkesundheden mod elektromagnetiske felter, idet der tages nøje hensyn til henstilling 1999/519/EF
c)
sikre tjenesters tekniske kvalitet
d)
sikre mest mulig delt brug af radiofrekvenser
e)
sikre effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser eller
f)
sikre opfyldelse af en almennyttig målsætning i overensstemmelse med stk. 5.
5.   Med forbehold af andet afsnit, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at alle typer teknologi, der anvendes til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, kan anvendes i de radiofrekvenser, der er erklæret til rådighed for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i deres nationale frekvensplan og i overensstemmelse med EU-retten. Medlemsstaterne kan dog fastsætte forholdsmæssige og ikkediskriminerende begrænsninger for, hvilke typer elektroniske kommunikationstjenester der kan udbydes, herunder om nødvendigt for at opfylde en forpligtelse under ITU-radioreglementet.
Foranstaltninger, der kræver, at en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste udbydes i et bestemt frekvensbånd afsat til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, skal være begrundet i hensynet til at sikre opfyldelse af en almennyttig målsætning som fastlagt af medlemsstater i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, herunder, men ikke begrænset til:
a)
menneskers sikkerhed
b)
fremme af social, regional eller territorial samhørighed
c)
forebyggelse af ineffektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser eller
d)
fremme af kulturel og sproglig mangfoldighed og mediepluralisme, f.eks. udbud af radio- og tv-tjenester.
En foranstaltning, der hindrer, at en hvilken som helst anden elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste udbydes i et bestemt frekvensbånd, skal være begrundet ud fra nødvendigheden af at beskytte livskritiske tjenester. Medlemsstaterne kan også undtagelsesvis udvide en sådan foranstaltning for at opfylde andre almennyttige målsætninger som fastlagt af medlemsstaterne i overensstemmelse med EU-retten.
6.   Medlemsstaterne foretager jævnligt en vurdering af, om de begrænsninger, der er omhandlet i stk. 4 og 5, fortsat er nødvendige, og offentliggør resultaterne af disse vurderinger.
7.   Begrænsninger, der blev indført inden den 25. maj 2011, skal være i overensstemmelse med stk. 4 og 5 senest den 20. december 2018.
Artikel 46
Tilladelse til brug af radiofrekvenser
1.   Medlemsstaterne skal fremme brugen af radiofrekvenser, herunder delt brug, inden for rammerne af generelle tilladelser og begrænse tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser til situationer, hvor sådanne rettigheder er nødvendige for at udnytte dem så effektivt som muligt i lyset af efterspørgslen og under hensyntagen til kriterierne i andet afsnit. I alle andre tilfælde skal de fastsætte betingelserne for brug af radiofrekvenser i en generel tilladelse.
Med henblik herpå beslutter medlemsstaterne, hvad der er den bedst egnede ordning for tilladelse til brug af radiofrekvenser, idet de tager hensyn til:
a)
de pågældende radiofrekvensers særlige egenskaber
b)
behovet for at beskytte mod skadelig interferens
c)
udarbejdelsen af pålidelige betingelser for delt brug af radiofrekvenser, hvor det er relevant
d)
behovet for at sikre den tekniske kvalitet af en kommunikation eller en tjeneste
e)
almennyttige målsætninger som fastlagt af medlemsstater i overensstemmelse med EU-retten
f)
behovet for at sikre effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser.
Når medlemsstaterne overvejer, om de skal udstede en generel tilladelse eller tildele individuelle brugsrettigheder til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser under hensyntagen til tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, der er vedtaget i henhold til artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF, tilstræber de at minimere problemer med skadelig interferens, herunder i tilfælde af delt brug af radiofrekvenser, på grundlag af en kombination af en generel tilladelse og individuelle brugsrettigheder.
Hvor det er relevant, overvejer medlemsstaterne muligheden for at tillade brug af radiofrekvenser på grundlag af en kombination af en generel tilladelse og individuelle brugsrettigheder under hensyntagen til de sandsynlige virkninger på konkurrence, innovation og markedsadgang, af forskellige kombinationer af generelle tilladelser og individuelle brugsrettigheder og af gradvise overførsler fra en kategori til en anden.
Medlemsstaterne tilstræber at minimere begrænsningerne for brug af radiofrekvenser ved at tage passende hensyn til teknologiske løsninger til at håndtere skadelig interferens med henblik på at indføre en tilladelsesordning, der er så lidt byrdefuld som muligt.
2.   Når der træffes en afgørelse i henhold til stk. 1 med henblik på at fremme delt brug af radiofrekvenser, sikrer de kompetente myndigheder, at betingelserne for den delte brug af radiofrekvenser er klart beskrevet. Sådanne betingelser skal fremme effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, konkurrence og innovation.
Artikel 47
Vilkår, der er fastsat i individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser
1.   De kompetente myndigheder fastsætter vilkår i individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser i overensstemmelse med artikel 13, stk. 1, på en måde, der sikrer optimal og størst mulig faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenserne. De fastsætter klart sådanne vilkår inden tildeling eller fornyelse af sådanne rettigheder, herunder hvilken brug der kræves, og muligheden for at opfylde denne forpligtelse gennem salg eller udleje, for at sikre, at vilkårene opfyldes i overensstemmelse med artikel 30.Vilkår, der er knyttet til fornyelsen af en brugsrettighed til radiofrekvenser, må ikke give aktuelle indehavere af en sådan ret urimelige fordele.
Sådanne vilkår skal angive de gældende parametre, herunder enhver frist for at anvende brugsrettighederne, hvis manglende opfyldelse berettiger den kompetente myndighed til at tilbagekalde brugsrettigheder eller pålægge andre foranstaltninger.
De kompetente myndigheder hører og underretter på en rettidig og gennemsigtig måde interesserede parter om, hvilke vilkår der er fastsat til individuelle brugsrettigheder, før vilkårene fastsættes. De fastlægger på forhånd kriterierne for at vurdere, om vilkårene er opfyldt, og underretter de interesserede parter klart og tydeligt herom.
2.   Når de kompetente myndigheder fastsætter vilkår i individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, kan de, navnlig med henblik på at sikre faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser eller at fremme dækning give mulighed for følgende:
a)
delt brug af passiv eller aktiv infrastruktur, der er afhængig af radiofrekvenser, eller af radiofrekvenser
b)
kommercielle roamingaftaler
c)
eller for i fællesskab at udrulle infrastruktur til levering af net eller tjenester, som er afhængig af brugen af radiofrekvenser.
De kompetente myndigheder må ikke forhindre delt brug af radiofrekvenser i vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne til radiofrekvenser. Virksomhedernes opfyldelse af de vilkår, der er fastsat i medfør af dette stykke, forbliver omfattet af konkurrenceretten.
Afdeling 2
Brugsrettigheder
Artikel 48
Tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser
1.   Hvor det er nødvendigt at tildele individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, tildeler medlemsstaterne efter anmodning sådanne rettigheder til enhver virksomhed med henblik på udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller tjenester i henhold til den generelle tilladelse, der er omhandlet i artikel 12, med forbehold af artikel 13, artikel 21, stk. 1, litra c), og artikel 55 og andre regler til sikring af en effektiv anvendelse af disse ressourcer i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
2.   Med forbehold af særlige kriterier og procedurer, som medlemsstaterne fastsætter for tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser til udbydere af radio- eller tv-indholdstjenester med henblik på at forfølge almennyttige målsætninger i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, tildeles individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser gennem åbne, objektive, transparente, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpassede procedurer og i overensstemmelse med artikel 45.
3.   Der kan gøres undtagelse fra kravet om åbne procedurer, hvor det er nødvendigt, at en udbyder af radio- eller tv-indholdstjenester tildeles individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, for at udbyderen kan opfylde en almennyttig målsætning, som medlemsstaterne har fastsat i overensstemmelse med EU-retten.
4.   De kompetente myndigheder behandler ansøgninger om individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser i forbindelse med udvælgelsesprocedurer på grundlag af objektive, transparente, forholdsmæssigt afpassede og ikkediskriminerende udvælgelseskriterier, som fastlægges på forhånd og afspejler de vilkår, der er fastsat de givne rettigheder. De kompetente myndigheder skal kunne anmode ansøgere om alle oplysninger, der er nødvendige for på grundlag af disse kriterier at kunne vurdere ansøgernes evne til at opfylde disse vilkår. Hvis den kompetente myndighed konkluderer, at ansøgeren ikke har de fornødne forudsætninger, skal den træffe en behørigt begrundet afgørelse herom.
5.   Når medlemsstaterne tildeler individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, angiver de, om rettighedshaveren kan overdrage eller udleje disse rettigheder, og på hvilke betingelser. Artikel 45 og 51 finder anvendelse.
6.   Den kompetente myndighed skal træffe, meddele og offentliggøre afgørelser vedrørende tildeling af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser hurtigst muligt, efter modtagelse af den fuldstændige ansøgning, og inden seks uger for så vidt angår radiofrekvenser, der er erklæret til rådighed for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i den nationale frekvensplan. Denne frist berører ikke artikel 55, stk. 7, og gældende internationale aftaler om brug af radiofrekvenser eller satellitbanepositioner.
Artikel 49
Rettighedernes varighed
1.   Hvis medlemsstaterne tillader brugen af radiofrekvenser gennem individuelle brugsrettigheder med en begrænset varighed, sikrer de, at brugsrettigheden gives for en periode, der er rimelig i lyset af de forfulgte mål i overensstemmelse med artikel 55, stk. 2, under behørig hensyntagen til nødvendigheden af at sikre konkurrence og navnlig en faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser og at fremme innovation og effektive investeringer, herunder ved at tillade en passende periode til amortisation af investeringen.
2.   Hvis medlemsstaterne tildeler individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, for hvilke harmoniserede betingelser er blevet fastsat ved tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF for at muliggøre deres anvendelse til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester til trådløst bredbånd (»trådløs bredbåndstjeneste«), for en begrænset periode, sikrer de reguleringsmæssig forudsigelighed for rettighedshaverne i en periode på mindst 20 år vedrørende betingelserne for investeringer i infrastruktur, som er afhængig af brug af sådanne radiofrekvenser, under hensyntagen til kravene som omhandlet i denne artikels stk. 1. Denne artikel gælder, hvor det er relevant, med forbehold af enhver ændring af de vilkår, der er fastsat i disse brugsrettigheder i overensstemmelse med artikel 18.
Med henblik herpå sikrer medlemsstaterne, at sådanne rettigheder har en varighed på mindst 15 år og for at overholde første afsnit om nødvendigt omfatter en passende forlængelse heraf på de betingelser, der er fastsat i dette stykke.
Medlemsstaterne stiller de generelle kriterier for forlængelse af varigheden af brugsrettigheder til rådighed på en gennemsigtig måde for alle interesserede parter forud for tildeling af brugsrettigheder som en del af de betingelser, der er fastsat i henhold til artikel 55, stk. 3 og 6. Sådanne generelle kriterier vedrører:
a)
behovet for at sikre faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af de pågældende radiofrekvenser, de mål, der forfølges i artikel 45, stk. 2, litra a) og b), eller behovet for at opnå mål af almen interesse med hensyn til sikring af menneskers sikkerhed, offentlig orden, offentlig sikkerhed eller forsvar og
b)
behovet for at sikre lige konkurrencevilkår.
Senest to år inden udløbet af en individuel brugsrettigheds første varighedsperiode foretager den kompetente myndighed en objektiv og fremadrettet vurdering af de generelle kriterier for forlængelse af varigheden af denne brugsrettighed i lyset af artikel 45, stk. 2, litra c). Forudsat at den kompetente myndighed ikke har iværksat håndhævelsesforanstaltninger for manglende opfyldelse af vilkårene i brugsrettigheden i medfør af artikel 30, tildeler den forlængelse af varigheden af brugsrettigheden, medmindre den konkluderer, at en sådan forlængelse ikke vil opfylde de generelle kriterier, der er fastlagt i henhold til litra a) og b) i dette stykkes tredje afsnit.
På grundlag af denne vurdering underretter den kompetente myndighed rettighedshaveren om, hvorvidt der skal tildeles forlængelse af brugsrettigheden.
Hvis der ikke skal tildeles en sådan forlængelse, anvender den kompetente myndighed artikel 48 til tildeling af brugsrettigheder til dette specifikke radiofrekvensbånd.
Enhver foranstaltning i henhold til dette stykke skal være forholdsmæssigt afpasset, ikkediskriminerende, transparent og begrundet.
Uanset artikel 23 skal interesserede parter have mulighed for at fremsætte bemærkninger om ethvert udkast til foranstaltning i medfør af dette stykkes tredje og fjerde afsnit i en periode på mindst tre måneder.
Dette stykke berører ikke anvendelsen af artikel 19 og 30.
Når medlemsstaterne fastsætter afgifter for brugsrettigheder, tager de hensyn til den mekanisme, der er omhandlet i dette stykke.
3.   Når det er behørigt begrundet, kan medlemsstaterne fravige denne artikels stk. 2 i følgende tilfælde:
a)
i begrænsede geografiske områder, hvor adgangen til højhastighedsnet er meget mangelfuld eller fraværende, og det er nødvendigt for at sikre opfyldelse af målene i artikel 45, stk. 2
b)
i forbindelse med specifikke kortsigtede projekter
c)
til forsøgsformål
d)
til brug af radiofrekvenser, som i henhold til artikel 45, stk. 4 og 5, kan sameksistere med trådløse bredbåndstjenester, eller
e)
til alternativ brug af radiofrekvenser i henhold til artikel 45, stk. 3.
4.   Medlemsstaterne kan tilpasse brugsrettigheders varighed, som er fastsat i henhold til denne artikel, for at sikre, at varigheden af rettigheder i et eller flere frekvensbånd udløber samtidigt.
Artikel 50
Fornyelse af individuelle brugsrettigheder til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder træffer i rimelig tid afgørelse om fornyelse af individuelle brugsrettigheder til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser, før varigheden af disse rettigheder udløber, bortset fra hvor mulighed for forlængelse på tidspunktet for tildelingen udtrykkelig er udelukket. Med henblik herpå vurderer disse myndigheder behovet for en sådan forlængelse på eget initiativ eller på anmodning af rettighedshaveren og i sidstnævnte tilfælde tidligst fem år før udløbet af varigheden af de pågældende rettigheder. Dette berører ikke forlængelsesklausuler, som gælder for eksisterende rettigheder.
2.   Når de kompetente myndigheder træffer afgørelse i henhold til denne artikels stk. 1, tager de bl.a. følgende i betragtning:
a)
opfyldelse af målene fastsat i artikel 3, artikel 45, stk. 2, og artikel 48, stk. 2, samt mål for den offentlige politik i henhold til EU-retten eller national ret
b)
gennemførelse af en tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltning, der er vedtaget i henhold til artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF
c)
kontrol af korrekt opfyldelse af de vilkår der er fastsat i de pågældende brugsrettigheder
d)
behovet for at fremme konkurrencen eller undgå forvridning heraf i overensstemmelse med artikel 52
e)
behovet for at effektivisere brugen af radiofrekvenser i lyset af den teknologiske udvikling eller markedsudviklingen
f)
behovet for at undgå alvorlige driftsforstyrrelser.
3.   Når de kompetente myndigheder tager stilling til, om individuelle brugsrettigheder til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser, for hvilke der er et begrænset antal brugsrettigheder, i medfør af denne artikels stk. 2, skal forlænges, følger de en åben, transparent og ikkediskriminerende procedure, idet de bl.a.
a)
giver alle interesserede parter mulighed for at tilkendegive deres holdning ved hjælp af en offentlig høring i overensstemmelse med artikel 23 og
b)
tydeligt angiver grundene til en eventuel forlængelse.
Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed tager hensyn til eventuel dokumentation som følge af høringen, jf. første afsnit, for, at der er markedsefterspørgsel fra andre virksomheder end dem, der er indehavere af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser i det pågældende frekvensbånd, når den afgør, om den skal forlænge brugsrettighederne eller gennemføre en ny udvælgelsesprocedure for at tildele brugsrettigheder i overensstemmelse med artikel 55.
4.   En afgørelse om at forlænge de individuelle brugsrettigheder til harmoniserede radiofrekvenser kan ledsages af en revision af de dertil knyttede afgifter samt øvrige vilkår og betingelser. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder kan, hvis det er relevant, justere afgifterne for brugsrettighederne i henhold til artikel 42.
Artikel 51
Overdragelse eller udlejning af individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at virksomheder kan overdrage eller udleje individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser til andre virksomheder.
Medlemsstaterne kan beslutte, at dette stykke ikke finder anvendelse, hvis virksomheden oprindeligt fik tildelt sine individuelle brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser uden betaling eller fik dem tildelt til radio- og tv-spredning.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at en virksomheds planer om at overdrage eller udleje brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser samt den faktiske overdragelse heraf i overensstemmelse med nationale procedurer meddeles den kompetente myndighed og offentliggøres. I tilfælde af harmoniserede radiofrekvenser skal en sådan overdragelse være i overensstemmelse med den harmoniserede brug.
3.   Medlemsstaterne tillader overdragelse eller udlejning af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, hvis de oprindelige vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne fastholdes. Med forbehold af behovet for at sikre, at der ikke forekommer konkurrenceforvridning, navnlig i henhold til artikel 52, påhviler det medlemsstaterne:
a)
at underkaste overdragelse og udlejning den mindst omkostningsfulde procedure
b)
ikke at nægte udlejning af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, hvis udlejer fortsat påtager sig ansvaret for at opfylde de oprindelige vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne
c)
ikke at nægte overdragelse af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, medmindre der er klar risiko for, at den nye indehaver ikke er i stand til at opfylde de oprindelige betingelser for brugsrettigheder.
Eventuelle administrationsgebyrer, som virksomheder pålægges i forbindelse med behandling af ansøgninger om overdragelse eller udlejning af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, skal overholde artikel 16.
Litra a), b) og c) i første afsnit berører ikke medlemsstaternes kompetence til at håndhæve overholdelsen af de vilkår fastsat i brugsrettighederne til enhver tid, både hvad angår udlejer og lejer, i henhold til deres nationale ret.
De kompetente myndigheder fremmer overdragelsen eller udlejningen af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser ved rettidigt at behandle anmodninger om at tilpasse de vilkår, der er fastsat i brugsrettighederne, og ved at sikre, at disse rettigheder eller de relevante radiofrekvenser så vidt muligt kan deles eller opsplittes.
De kompetente myndigheder stiller med henblik på overdragelse eller udlejning af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser relevante oplysninger vedrørende individuelle rettigheder, der kan sælges, offentligt til rådighed i et standardiseret elektronisk format, når rettighederne er tildelt, og opbevarer oplysningerne, så længe rettighederne eksisterer.
Kommission kan vedtage gennemførelsesretsakter med henblik på at udpege disse relevante oplysninger.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
Artikel 52
Konkurrence
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder fremmer effektiv konkurrence og undgår konkurrenceforvridning på det indre marked, når de træffer afgørelse om at tildele, ændre eller forny brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester i henhold til dette direktiv.
2.   Når medlemsstaterne tildeler, ændrer eller fornyer brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, kan deres nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder efter rådgivning fra den nationale tilsynsmyndighed træffe passende foranstaltninger, som f.eks.:
a)
at begrænse mængden af radiofrekvensbånd, for hvilke der tildeles brugsrettigheder til en enkelt virksomhed, eller under berettigede omstændigheder ved at fastsætte vilkår i sådanne brugsrettigheder, såsom at der skal være engrosadgang eller national eller regional roaming i visse frekvensbånd eller visse grupper af frekvensbånd med ensartede egenskaber
b)
om nødvendigt, og hvis det er berettiget med hensyn til en særlig situation på det nationale marked, at reservere en bestemt del af et radiofrekvensbånd eller gruppe af frekvensbånd til tildeling til nye aktører på markedet
c)
at nægte at tildele nye brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller tillade ny brug af radiofrekvenser i bestemte frekvensbånd eller ved at knytte betingelser til tildelingen af sådanne brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller fastsætte vilkår i tilladelsen i forhold til ny brug af radiofrekvenser med henblik på at undgå, at en tildeling, overdragelse eller akkumulering af brugsrettigheder fører til konkurrenceforvridning
d)
at medtage vilkår om forbud mod eller ved at pålægge betingelser for overdragelse af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, som ikke er omfattet af fusionskontrol på EU-plan eller nationalt plan, i tilfælde, hvor en sådan overdragelse sandsynligvis vil skade konkurrencen væsentligt
e)
at ændre gældende rettigheder i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv, hvis det er nødvendigt for efterfølgende at rette op på en konkurrenceforvridning, der er opstået som følge af overdragelse eller akkumulering af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder bygger under hensyntagen til markedsvilkår og til rådighed værende benchmark deres afgørelse på en objektiv og fremadrettet vurdering af konkurrencevilkårene på markedet, af nødvendigheden af sådanne foranstaltninger for at bevare eller opnå en effektiv konkurrence og af de sandsynlige konsekvenser af sådanne foranstaltninger for markedsaktørers aktuelle og kommende investeringer, især for udrulning af net. I denne forbindelse tager de hensyn til den tilgang til markedsanalyse, der er anført i artikel 67, stk. 2.
3.   Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder anvender stk. 2 i denne artikel, skal de handle efter procedurerne i artikel 18, 19, 23 og 35.
Afdeling 3
Procedurer
Artikel 53
Koordineret tidsplan for tildelinger
1.   Medlemsstaterne samarbejder med henblik på at koordinere brugen af harmoniserede radiofrekvenser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester i Unionen under behørig hensyntagen til de forskellige nationale markedssituationer. Dette kan omfatte at fastsætte en eller, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, flere fælles datoer for, hvornår brugen af bestemte harmoniserede radiofrekvensbånd skal være tilladt.
2.   Når harmoniserede betingelser er blevet fastsat ved tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF for at muliggøre brug af radiofrekvenser til trådløse bredbåndsnet og -tjenester, tillader medlemsstaterne brug af disse radiofrekvenser så hurtigt som muligt og senest 30 måneder efter vedtagelsen af foranstaltningen eller så hurtigt som muligt efter ophævelsen af en eventuel beslutning om undtagelsesvis at tillade alternativ brug i henhold til dette direktivs artikel 45, stk. 3. Dette berører ikke afgørelse (EU) 2017/899 eller Kommissionens initiativret til at foreslå lovgivningsmæssige retsakter.
3.   En medlemsstat kan udsætte fristen i denne artikels stk. 2 for et bestemt frekvensbånd under følgende omstændigheder:
a)
i et omfang, som er begrundet i en begrænsning af anvendelsen af det pågældende frekvensbånd af hensyn til et mål af almen interesse, jf. artikel 45, stk. 5, litra a) eller d),
b)
i tilfælde af uløste grænseoverskridende koordineringsproblemer, der medfører skadelig interferens med tredjelande, forudsat at den berørte medlemsstat har anmodet om EU-bistand, hvis det er relevant, i henhold til artikel 28, stk. 5
c)
beskyttelse af den nationale sikkerhed og forsvaret eller
d)
force majeure.
Den pågældende medlemsstat revurderer mindst hvert andet år en sådan udsættelse.
4.   En medlemsstat kan udsætte fristen i stk. 2 for et bestemt frekvensbånd i det nødvendige omfang og op til 30 måneder i tilfælde af:
a)
uløste grænseoverskridende koordineringsproblemer, der medfører skadelig interferens mellem medlemsstater, forudsat at den berørte medlemsstat rettidigt træffer alle nødvendige foranstaltninger i henhold til artikel 28, stk. 3 og 4
b)
behov for at sikre, og kompleksiteten i at sikre, teknisk migrering af eksisterende brugere af det pågældende frekvensbånd.
5.   I tilfælde af en udsættelse i henhold til stk. 3 eller 4 underretter den berørte medlemsstat på rettidig vis de øvrige medlemsstater og Kommissionen med angivelse af årsagerne.
Artikel 54
Koordineret tidsplan for tildelinger for bestemte 5G-frekvensbånd
1.   For så vidt angår jordbaserede systemer, som kan levere trådløse bredbåndstjenester, træffer medlemsstaterne senest den 31. december 2020, hvis det er nødvendigt for at fremme udrulning af 5G, alle passende foranstaltninger til:
a)
at omorganisere og tillade anvendelse af tilstrækkeligt store blokke af 3,4-3,8 GHz-båndet
b)
at tillade anvendelse af mindst 1 GHz af 24,25-27,5 GHz-båndet, forudsat at der er klart tegn på markedsefterspørgsel og fravær af betydelige begrænsninger for migrering af eksisterende brugere eller rydning af frekvensbåndet.
2.   Medlemsstaterne kan dog forlænge fristen i stk. 1, hvis det er berettiget, i overensstemmelse med artikel 45, stk. 3, eller artikel 53, stk. 2, 3 eller 4.
3.   Foranstaltninger, der træffes i henhold til stk. 1, skal opfylde de harmoniserede betingelser som fastsat i tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF.
Artikel 55
Procedure for begrænsning af det antal brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, der vil blive tildelt
1.   Hvis en medlemsstat konkluderer, at en brugsrettighed til en radiofrekvens ikke kan tildeles med forbehold af en generel tilladelse, og hvis den overvejer, om den skal begrænse det antal brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, der skal tildeles, skal den med forbehold af artikel 53 bl.a.:
a)
tydeligt angive grundene til, at brugsrettighederne begrænses, navnlig ved at tage fornødent hensyn til, at brugerne sikres de størst mulige fordele, og at konkurrencen fremmes, og om nødvendigt tage begrænsningen op til revision med jævne mellemrum eller på begrundet anmodning af de berørte virksomheder
b)
give alle interesserede parter, bl.a. brugere og forbrugere, lejlighed til ved en offentlig høring at tilkendegive deres holdning til eventuelle begrænsninger i henhold til artikel 23.
2.   Hvis en medlemsstat konkluderer, at antallet af brugsrettigheder skal begrænses, definerer og begrunder den klart de mål, som søges opfyldt med den konkurrenceprægede eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedure i henhold til denne artikel, og kvantificerer dem om muligt, idet den tillægger nødvendigheden af at opfylde nationale og interne markedsmål behørig vægt. De mål, som medlemsstaterne kan fastsætte med henblik på at udforme den specifikke udvælgelsesprocedure, skal ud over at fremme konkurrence begrænses til et eller flere af følgende:
a)
fremme af dækning
b)
sikring af den nødvendige tjenestekvalitet
c)
fremme af effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser, bl.a. ved at tage hensyn til de vilkår, der er fastsat i brugsrettighederne, og størrelsen af afgifter
d)
fremme af innovation og virksomhedsudvikling.
Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetent myndighed skal klart definere og begrunde valget af udvælgelsesproceduren, herunder eventuelt indledende faser med henblik på at få adgang til udvælgelsesproceduren. Den anfører også klart resultatet af eventuelle tilknyttede vurderinger af den konkurrencemæssige, tekniske og økonomiske situation på markedet og begrunder den eventuelle brug og det eventuelle valg af foranstaltninger i henhold til artikel 35.
3.   Medlemsstaterne offentliggør beslutninger om den valgte udvælgelsesprocedure og de tilhørende regler med tydelig angivelse af begrundelsen herfor. De offentliggør også de vilkår, der skal fastsættes i brugsrettigheder.
4.   Efter fastlæggelse af udvælgelsesproceduren skal medlemsstaten indkalde ansøgninger om brugsrettigheder.
5.   Hvis en medlemsstat konkluderer, at der kan tildeles yderligere brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser eller til en kombination af generel tilladelse og individuelle brugsrettigheder, offentliggør den denne konklusion og indleder proceduren for tildeling af sådanne rettigheder.
6.   Hvis det er nødvendigt at begrænse tildelingen af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, tildeler medlemsstaterne sådanne rettigheder på grundlag af udvælgelseskriterier og en udvælgelsesprocedure, som skal være objektive, transparente, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpassede. Alle udvælgelseskriterier af denne art skal i fornødent omfang tilgodese opfyldelsen af målene og kravene i artikel 3, 4, 28 og 45.
7.   Hvis der bruges konkurrenceprægede eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedurer, kan medlemsstaterne forlænge den i artikel 48, stk. 6, omhandlede maksimumsperiode på seks uger så meget, som det måtte være nødvendigt for at sikre, at sådanne procedurer er fair, rimelige, åbne og transparente for alle interesserede parter, dog højst med otte måneder, med forbehold af specifikke frister i henhold til artikel 53.
Disse tidsfrister berører ikke gældende internationale aftaler om anvendelse af radiofrekvenser og satellitkoordinering.
8.   Denne artikel berører ikke de i artikel 51 omhandlede overdragelser af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser.
KAPITEL IV
Udrulning og brug af trådløst netudstyr
Artikel 56
Adgang til radiobaserede lokalnet
1.   De kompetente myndigheder tillader udbud af adgang via RLAN til et offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet samt brug af harmoniserede radiofrekvenser til dette udbud med forbehold af gældende betingelser i den generelle tilladelse vedrørende brug af radiofrekvenser som omhandlet i artikel 46, stk. 1.
Hvis et sådant udbud ikke indgår i en økonomisk aktivitet eller blot er et supplement til en økonomisk aktivitet eller offentlig tjeneste, der ikke er afhængig af overførslen af signaler via disse net, er en virksomhed, offentlig myndighed eller slutbruger, som udbyder en sådan adgang, ikke omfattet af generelle tilladelser til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester i henhold til artikel 12 af forpligtelser vedrørende slutbrugeres rettigheder i henhold til afsnit II i del III eller af forpligtelser til at sammenkoble deres net i henhold til artikel 61, stk. 1.
2.   Artikel 12 i direktiv 2000/31/EF finder anvendelse.
3.   De kompetente myndigheder må ikke forhindre udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i at give offentligheden adgang til deres net gennem RLAN, der kan befinde sig på slutbrugerens ejendom, forudsat at det sker i overensstemmelse med betingelserne i den generelle tilladelse, og at slutbrugeren forudgående har givet sit informerede samtykke.
4.   De kompetente myndigheder sikrer i overensstemmelse med navnlig artikel 3, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2015/2120, at udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester ikke ensidigt begrænser eller hindrer slutbrugere i:
a)
at tilgå RLAN, som udbydes af tredjepart, efter eget valg, eller
b)
at tillade andre slutbrugere gensidig eller en mere generel adgang til disse udbyderes net gennem RLAN, herunder på grundlag af tredjeparts initiativer, som samler forskellige slutbrugeres RLAN og gør dem offentligt tilgængelige.
5.   De kompetente myndigheder må ikke begrænse eller hindre slutbrugere i at tillade andre slutbrugere adgang, gensidig eller på anden måde, til deres RLAN, herunder på grundlag af tredjeparts initiativer, som samler forskellige slutbrugeres RLAN og gør dem offentligt tilgængelige.
6.   De kompetente myndigheder må ikke uberettiget begrænse udbuddet af adgang til RLAN til offentligheden:
a)
gennem offentlige organer eller i offentlige områder tæt på lokaliteter, der benyttes af sådanne offentlige organer, når udbuddet er et supplement til de offentlige tjenester, der udbydes på de pågældende lokaliteter
b)
gennem ikkestatslige organisationers eller offentlige organers initiativer, der har til formål at samle forskellige slutbrugeres RLAN og stille dem til rådighed gensidigt eller mere generelt, herunder eventuelle RLAN, hvortil der gives offentlig adgang i overensstemmelse med litra a).
Artikel 57
Udrulning og drift af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde
1.   De kompetente myndigheder må ikke uberettiget begrænse udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde. Medlemsstaterne søger at sikre, at eventuelle regler for udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde er nationalt sammenhængende. Sådanne regler offentliggøres inden deres anvendelse.
De kompetente myndigheder må navnlig ikke underkaste udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde, som er i overensstemmelse med de karakteristika, der er fastlagt i medfør af stk. 2, individuelle byplanlægningstilladelser eller andre forudgående individuelle tilladelser.
Uanset stk. 1, andet afsnit, kan de kompetente myndigheder kræve tilladelse til udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde på bygninger eller på steder af arkitektonisk, historisk eller naturmæssig værdi, som er beskyttede i henhold til national ret, eller om nødvendigt af hensyn til den offentlige sikkerhed. Artikel 7 i direktiv 2014/61/EU finder anvendelse på tildelingen af disse tilladelser.
2.   Kommissionen angiver ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter de fysiske og tekniske karakteristika, såsom maksimumsstørrelse, vægt og, hvis det er relevant, udstrålingseffekt for trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages i henhold til undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
Den første af sådanne gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages senest den 30. juni 2020.
3.   Denne artikel berører ikke de væsentlige krav i direktiv 2014/53/EU eller tilladelsesordningen for brug af de pågældende radiofrekvenser.
4.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer ved at anvende de procedurer, der er vedtaget i henhold til direktiv 2014/61/EU, når det er relevant, at operatører har ret til at få adgang til fysisk infrastruktur, der kontrolleres af nationale, regionale eller lokale offentlige myndigheder, og som er teknisk egnet til at være vært for trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde, eller som er nødvendig for at forbinde sådanne adgangspunkter med et transportnet, herunder gadeinventar som f.eks. lysmaster, gadeskilte, trafiklys, reklameskilte, bus- og sporvognsstoppesteder samt metrostationer. De offentlige myndigheder imødekommer alle rimelige anmodninger om adgang på fair, rimelige, transparente og ikkediskriminerende vilkår og betingelser, som offentliggøres på et enkelt informationssted.
5.   Uden at dette berører eventuelle kommercielle aftaler, må udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde ikke gøres til genstand for afgifter eller gebyrer ud over administrationsgebyrer, jf. artikel 16.
Artikel 58
Tekniske bestemmelser om elektromagnetiske felter
De procedurer, der er fastlagt i direktiv (EU) 2015/1535, finder anvendelse på alle udkast til foranstaltninger fra en medlemsstat, der pålægger udrulning af trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde andre krav med hensyn til elektromagnetiske felter end dem, der er fastsat i henstilling 1999/519/EF.
AFSNIT II
ADGANG
KAPITEL I
Generelle bestemmelser og adgangsprincipper
Artikel 59
Generelle bestemmelser for adgang og samtrafik
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der ikke findes begrænsninger, som forhindrer virksomheder i samme medlemsstat eller i forskellige medlemsstater i indbyrdes at forhandle sig frem til tekniske og kommercielle aftaler om adgang eller samtrafik i overensstemmelse med EU-retten. Den virksomhed, der anmoder om adgang eller samtrafik, behøver ikke indhente tilladelse til at drive virksomhed i den medlemsstat, hvor der anmodes om adgang eller samtrafik, såfremt den ikke udbyder tjenester og ikke driver et net i denne medlemsstat.
2.   Med forbehold af artikel 114 undlader medlemsstaterne at opretholde love eller administrative forskrifter, som pålægger virksomheder ved etablering af adgang eller samtrafik at tilbyde virksomheder forskellige vilkår og betingelser for tilsvarende tjenester, eller foranstaltninger, som opstiller forpligtelser, der ikke er forbundet med de tjenester i forbindelse med adgang og samtrafik, der faktisk leveres, uden at dette berører betingelserne i bilag I.
Artikel 60
Rettigheder og pligter for virksomheder
1.   Operatører af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet har ret og, hvis andre virksomheder, der har en tilsvarende tilladelse i overensstemmelse med artikel 15, anmoder derom, også pligt til indbyrdes at forhandle med hinanden om samtrafik med henblik på at udbyde offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, så det sikres, at disse tjenester kan udbydes, og at der er interoperabilitet mellem tjenesterne i hele Unionen. Operatører skal tilbyde andre virksomheder adgang og samtrafik på vilkår og betingelser, der er i overensstemmelse med de forpligtelser, som pålægges af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i medfør af artikel 61, 62 og 68.
2.   Med forbehold af artikel 21 kræver medlemsstaterne, at virksomheder, der får oplysninger fra en anden virksomhed før, under eller efter forhandlingerne om adgangs- eller samtrafikaftaler, udelukkende anvender disse oplysninger til det formål, hvortil de er givet, og til enhver tid respekterer, at de oplysninger, der fremsendes eller opbevares, skal behandles fortroligt. De oplysninger, der modtages af sådanne virksomheder, må ikke videregives til anden side, og navnlig ikke til andre afdelinger, datterselskaber eller partnere, som herved kunne opnå en konkurrencemæssig fordel.
3.   Medlemsstaterne kan fastsætte, at forhandlingerne skal føres gennem neutrale mellemmænd, hvis konkurrencevilkårene kræver det.
KAPITEL II
Adgang og samtrafik
Artikel 61
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheders og andre kompetente myndigheders beføjelser og ansvar i forbindelse med adgang og samtrafik
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i tilfælde af stk. 2, første afsnit, litra b) og c), skal med henblik på at virkeliggøre målsætningerne i artikel 3 tilskynde til og, når det er hensigtsmæssigt, sørge for, at der i henhold til dette direktiv etableres den fornødne adgang og samtrafik og sikres interoperabilitet mellem tjenesterne, samt varetage deres ansvar med henblik på at fremme effektivitet, holdbar konkurrence, udrulning af net med meget høj kapacitet, effektive investeringer og innovation samt skabe flest mulige fordele for slutbrugerne.
De skal give vejledning og gøre procedurerne for adgang og samtrafik offentligt tilgængelige, således at det sikres, at små og mellemstore virksomheder og operatører med begrænset geografisk rækkevidde kan drage fordel af de gældende forpligtelser.
2.   Med forbehold af de foranstaltninger, der kan træffes vedrørende virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, i henhold til artikel 68, skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i tilfælde af litra b) og c) i dette afsnit navnlig:
a)
i det omfang, det er nødvendigt for at sikre end-to-end-konnektivitet, kunne indføre forpligtelser for virksomheder, der er omfattet af en generel tilladelse, som kontrollerer adgangen til slutbrugere, herunder i begrundede tilfælde pligt til at sammenkoble deres net, hvis det ikke allerede er sket,
b)
i begrundede tilfælde og i det omfang, det er nødvendigt, kunne indføre forpligtelser for virksomheder, der er omfattet af en generel tilladelse, og kontrollerer adgangen til slutbrugere, til at gøre deres tjenester interoperable,
c)
i begrundede tilfælde, hvor end-to-end-forbindelser mellem slutbrugere er i fare på grund af manglende interoperabilitet mellem interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, og i det omfang, det er nødvendigt for at sikre end-to-end-forbindelser mellem slutbrugere, kunne indføre forpligtelser for relevante udbydere af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, som har et betydeligt dækningsniveau og en betydelig brugerudbredelse, til at gøre deres tjenester interoperable, og
d)
i det omfang, det er nødvendigt for at sikre slutbrugeres adgang til digitale radio- og tv-transmissionstjenester samt relaterede supplerende tjenester, der nærmere angives af medlemsstaten, kunne forpligte operatører til at tilbyde adgang til de andre faciliteter, der er nævnt i del II i bilag II, på fair, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår.
Forpligtelserne i første afsnit, litra c), pålægges kun:
i)
i det omfang, det er nødvendigt for at sikre interoperabilitet mellem interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, og kan omfatte forholdsmæssige forpligtelser for udbydere af disse tjenester til at offentliggøre og tillade myndighedernes og andre udbyderes anvendelse, ændring og videreformidling af relevante oplysninger eller til at anvende og gennemføre standarder eller specifikationer anført i artikel 39, stk. 1, eller andre relevante europæiske eller internationale standarder
ii)
hvis Kommissionen efter høring af BEREC og under nøje hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse har konstateret en mærkbar trussel mod end-to-end-forbindelser mellem slutbrugere i hele Unionen eller i mindst tre medlemsstater og har vedtaget gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, der præciserer arten og omfanget af forpligtelser, der kan pålægges.
Gennemførelsesforanstaltningerne som omhandlet i andet afsnit, nr. ii) skal vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
3.   Med forbehold af stk. 1 og 2 kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder navnlig efter velbegrundet anmodning pålægge forpligtelser til at give adgang til ledningsnet og kabler og tilhørende faciliteter inde i bygninger eller frem til det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt som fastlagt af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, hvis dette koncentrationspunkt eller dette fordelingspunkt befinder sig uden for en bygning. Såfremt det er berettiget, fordi replikering af sådanne netelementer ikke vil være økonomisk rentabel eller gennemførlig i praksis, kan sådanne forpligtelser pålægges udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller ejere af sådanne ledningsnet, kabler og tilhørende faciliteter, hvis disse ejere ikke er udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet. De adgangsbetingelser, der pålægges, kan omfatte særlige regler om adgang til sådanne netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter og tilknyttede tjenester, gennemsigtighed og ikkediskrimination samt fordeling af adgangsomkostninger, som om nødvendigt tilpasses for at tage højde for risikofaktorer.
Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed under hensyntagen til, hvor det er relevant, de forpligtelser, der følger af en relevant markedsanalyse, konkluderer, at de forpligtelser, der er pålagt i overensstemmelse med første afsnit, ikke i tilstrækkelig grad imødegår store og varige økonomiske eller fysiske hindringer for replikering, som ligger til grund for en eksisterende eller fremspirende markedssituation, der i betydeligt omfang begrænser de konkurrencemæssige resultater for slutbrugerne, kan den på fair og rimelige vilkår og betingelser udvide pålæggelsen af sådanne adgangsforpligtelser efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt til et koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, som den afgør ligger tættest på slutbrugerne, og som kan være vært for et tilstrækkeligt antal slutbrugerforbindelser til at være kommercielt rentabel for effektive adgangssøgende. Ved fastlæggelsen af omfanget af udvidelsen efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkttager den nationale tilsynsmyndighed størst muligt hensyn til relevante BEREC-retningslinjer. Hvis det er berettiget af tekniske eller økonomiske grunde, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder pålægge aktive eller virtuelle adgangsforpligtelser.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder må ikke pålægge udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet forpligtelser i henhold til andet afsnit, hvis de fastslår, at:
a)
udbyderen har de egenskaber, der er anført i artikel 80, stk. 1, og stiller en rentabel og lignende alternativ mulighed for at nå slutbrugere ved at give adgang til et net med meget høj kapacitet til rådighed for enhver virksomhed på fair, ikkediskriminerende og rimelige vilkår og betingelser. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan udvide denne undtagelse til også at omfatte andre udbydere, der på fair, ikkediskriminerende og rimelige vilkår og betingelser tilbyder adgang til et net med meget høj kapacitet, eller
b)
pålæggelse af forpligtelser ville skade den økonomiske eller finansielle rentabilitet af udrulningen af et nyt net, navnlig ved små lokale projekter.
Uanset tredje afsnit, litra a) kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder pålægge forpligtelser for udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet, der opfylder kriterierne i nævnte litra, hvis det pågældende net er offentligt finansieret.
Senest den 21. december 2020 offentliggør BEREC retningslinjer for at fremme en konsekvent anvendelse af dette stykke ved at fastsætte relevante kriterier for fastlæggelse af:
a)
det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt
b)
det punkt efter det første koncentrationspunkt eller fordelingspunkt, som kan være vært for tilstrækkelig mange slutbrugerforbindelser til, at en effektiv virksomhed kan overvinde de betydelige replikeringshindringer, der er konstateret
c)
hvilke netudrulninger der kan betragtes som nye,
d)
hvilke projekter der kan betragtes som små, og
e)
hvilke økonomiske eller fysiske hindringer for duplikering der er store og varige.
4.   Med forbehold af stk. 1 og 2 sikrer medlemsstaterne, at de kompetente myndigheder har beføjelse til at pålægge virksomheder, der udbyder eller har tilladelse til at udbyde elektroniske kommunikationsnet, forpligtelser i forbindelse med deling af passiv infrastruktur eller forpligtelser til at indgå lokale roamingaftaler, i begge tilfælde, hvis det er umiddelbart nødvendigt for det lokale udbud af tjenester, som er afhængige af brugen af radiofrekvenser, i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, og forudsat at der ikke stilles nogen brugbar eller lignende alternativ adgangsmulighed for slutbrugere til rådighed for nogen virksomhed på fair og rimelige vilkår og betingelser. De kompetente myndigheder kan kun pålægge sådanne forpligtelser, hvis denne mulighed er klart fastsat ved tildelingen af brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser, og når det er berettiget med den begrundelse, at den markedsdrevne udrulning af infrastruktur til levering af net eller tjenester, som er afhængige af brugen af radiofrekvenser, i det område, der er omfattet af sådanne forpligtelser, er underlagt uoverstigelige økonomiske eller fysiske hindringer, og at slutbrugernes adgang til net eller tjenester dermed er alvorligt mangelfuld eller fraværende. I de tilfælde, hvor adgang og deling af passiv infrastruktur alene ikke er tilstrækkelig til at håndtere situationen, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder pålægge forpligtelser om deling af aktiv infrastruktur.
De kompetente myndigheder tager hensyn til:
a)
behovet for at maksimere konnektiviteten i hele Unionen, langs større transportveje og i bestemte områder, og muligheden for betydeligt at øge udvalget og kvaliteten af tjenester for slutbrugerne
b)
den effektive udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser
c)
de tekniske muligheder for deling og tilknyttede betingelser
d)
situationen med hensyn til infrastrukturbaseret og tjenestebaseret konkurrence
e)
teknologisk innovation
f)
det overordnede behov for at fremme værtens incitament til overhovedet at udrulle infrastrukturen.
I tilfælde af tvistbilæggelse kan de kompetente myndigheder bl.a. pålægge den part, der drager fordel af delings- eller adgangsforpligtelsen, pligt til at dele radiofrekvenser med infrastrukturværten i det pågældende område.
5.   Forpligtelser og betingelser, der pålægges i overensstemmelse med stk. 1-4, skal være objektive, transparente, forholdsmæssige og ikkediskriminerende, og de skal indføres efter procedurerne i artikel 23, 32 og 33. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder, der har pålagt sådanne forpligtelser og betingelser, vurderer resultaterne deraf senest fem år efter vedtagelsen af den tidligere foranstaltning, der blev vedtaget vedrørende samme virksomheder, og vurderer hvorvidt det ville være hensigtsmæssigt at ophæve eller ændre dem i lyset af ændrede forhold. Disse myndigheder meddeler resultatet af deres vurdering efter procedurerne som omhandlet i artikel 23, 32 og 33.
6.   Med henblik på stk. 1 og 2, sørger medlemsstaterne for, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed kan gribe ind på eget initiativ, når dette er begrundet i hensynet til at sikre de politiske målsætningerne i artikel 3, jf. dette direktiv og navnlig procedurerne i artikel 23 og 32.
7.   Med henblik på at bidrage til, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fastlægger en konsistent definition af nettermineringspunkters placering, vedtager BEREC efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen senest den 21. juni 2020 retningslinjer for fælles tilgang til identifikation af nettermineringspunktet i forskellige nettopologier. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager nøje hensyn til disse retningslinjer, når de definerer nettermineringspunkters placering.
Artikel 62
Adgangsstyringssystemer og andre faciliteter
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at betingelserne i del I i bilag II finder anvendelse på adgangsstyring for digitale radio- og tv-tjenester, som udsendes til seere og lyttere i Unionen, uanset transmissionsform.
2.   Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed på baggrund af en markedsanalyse, der er foretaget i overensstemmelse med artikel 67, stk. 1, finder, at en eller flere virksomheder ikke har en stærk markedsposition på det pågældende marked, kan den kun ændre eller trække betingelserne tilbage for så vidt angår disse virksomheder i overensstemmelse med artikel 23 og 32, for så vidt
a)
sådanne ændringer eller tilbagetrækninger ikke vil have negative følger for slutbrugeres adgang til radio- og tv-transmissioner, -kanaler og -tjenester som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 114, og
b)
mulighederne for effektiv konkurrence på de følgende markeder vil ikke blive negativt berørt af sådanne ændringer eller tilbagetrækninger:
i)
detailmarkederne for digitale tv- og radiospredningstjenester og
ii)
markedet for adgangsstyringssystemer og andre tilhørende faciliteter
Parter, der berøres af, at betingelser ændres eller trækkes tilbage, skal underrettes herom i passende tid i forvejen.
3.   Betingelser, der finder anvendelse i medfør af denne artikel, berører ikke medlemsstaternes mulighed for at pålægge forpligtelser om, hvordan EPG'er og lignende oversigts- og navigationsfaciliteter skal udformes.
4.   Uanset stk. 1 kan medlemsstaterne give deres nationale tilsynsmyndighed tilladelse til, hurtigst muligt efter den 20. december 2018 og derefter med regelmæssige mellemrum, at revurdere de betingelser, der finder anvendelse i medfør af denne artikel, ved at foretage en markedsanalyse efter proceduren i artikel 67, stk. 1, for at kunne afgøre, om de anvendte betingelser skal videreføres, ændres eller trækkes tilbage.
KAPITEL III
Markedsanalyse og stærk markedsposition
Artikel 63
Virksomheder med stærk markedsposition
1.   Stk. 2 finder anvendelse i de tilfælde, hvor de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder ifølge dette direktiv og efter proceduren i artikel 67 skal afgøre, om virksomheder har en stærk markedsposition.
2.   En virksomhed anses for at have en stærk markedsposition, hvis den enten alene eller i fællesskab med andre indtager, hvad der svarer til en dominerende stilling, dvs. en økonomisk styrkeposition, der giver den magt til i betragtelig grad at kunne handle uafhængigt af konkurrenter, kunder og i sidste ende forbrugerne.
Mere specifikt handler de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder ved vurderingen af, om to eller flere virksomheder indtager en kollektivt dominerende stilling på markedet, i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og tager i størst muligt omfang hensyn til de af Kommissionen i henhold til artikel 64 offentliggjorte retningslinjer for markedsanalyser og vurdering af stærk markedsposition.
3.   Når en virksomhed har en stærk markedsposition på et bestemt marked, kan den også betegnes som havende en stærk markedsposition på et nært beslægtet marked, hvis forbindelserne mellem de to markeder muliggør, at markedspositionen på det bestemte marked kan overføres til det nært beslægtede marked og dermed yderligere styrker virksomhedens markedsposition. Foranstaltninger, der har til formål at hindre en sådan overførsel, kan derfor anvendes på det nært beslægtede marked i medfør af artikel 69, 70, 71 og 74.
Artikel 64
Procedure for udpegning og afgrænsning af markeder
1.   Efter en offentlig høring, herunder af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, og under nøje hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse, vedtager Kommissionen en henstilling om relevante produkt- og tjenestemarkeder (»henstillingen«). I henstillingen udpeges de produkt- og tjenestemarkeder i den elektroniske kommunikationssektor, hvor forholdene kan være af en sådan art, at det vil være berettiget at indføre regulerende forpligtelser som omhandlet i dette direktiv, uden at muligheden for i særlige tilfælde at afgrænse markeder i henhold til konkurrenceretten derved indskrænkes. Kommissionen afgrænser markederne under anvendelse af principperne i konkurrenceretten.
Kommissionen medtager produkt- og tjenestemarkederne i henstillingen, hvis den efter at have iagttaget den generelle udvikling i Unionen konstaterer, at alle tre kriterier i artikel 67, stk. 1, er opfyldt.
Kommissionen tager senest den 21. december 2020 henstillingen op til revision og regelmæssigt derefter.
2.   Efter høring af BEREC offentliggør Kommissionen retningslinjer for markedsanalyser og vurdering af stærk markedsposition (»SMP-retningslinjerne«), der er i overensstemmelse med konkurrencerettens relevante principper. SMP-retningslinjerne omfatter vejledning til de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder om anvendelsen af begrebet stærk markedsposition i den særlige forbindelse med forudgående regulering af markeder for elektronisk kommunikation under hensyntagen til de tre kriterier i artikel 67, stk. 1.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder afgrænser under nøje hensyntagen til henstillingen og SMP-retningslinjerne de relevante markeder tilpasset de nationale forhold, navnlig relevante geografiske markeder på deres område, ved bl.a. at tage hensyn til graden af infrastrukturkonkurrence på disse områder, i overensstemmelse med konkurrencerettens principper. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager, hvis det er relevant, også hensyn til resultaterne af den geografiske undersøgelse, der foretages i overensstemmelse med artikel 22, stk. 1. De følger procedurerne i artikel 23 og 32, inden de afgrænser markeder, der afviger fra dem, der er udpeget i henstillingen.
Artikel 65
Procedure for udpegning af transnationale markeder
1.   Hvis Kommissionen eller mindst to berørte nationale tilsynsmyndigheder indgiver en begrundet anmodning med underbyggende dokumentation, foretager BEREC en analyse af et potentielt transnationalt marked. Kommissionen kan efter høring af interessenter og under nøje hensyntagen til BEREC's analyse vedtage afgørelser, hvori transnationale markeder udpeges i overensstemmelse med konkurrencerettens principper og under nøje hensyntagen til den henstilling og de SMP-retningslinjer, der er vedtaget i henhold til artikel 64.
2.   For så vidt angår de transnationale markeder, der udpeges i henhold til stk. 1, gennemfører de pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fælles markedsanalyser under nøje hensyntagen til SMP-retningslinjerne og træffer en samordnet afgørelse om, hvorvidt de i artikel 67, stk. 4, omhandlede forpligtelser skal pålægges, opretholdes, ændres eller ophæves. De pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndigheder giver i fællesskab Kommissionen meddelelse om deres udkast til foranstaltninger vedrørende markedsanalysen og eventuelle reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 32 og 33.
To eller flere nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan også i fællesskab give meddelelse om deres udkast til foranstaltninger vedrørende markedsanalysen og reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i fravær af transnationale markeder, hvis de mener, at markedsvilkårene inden for deres respektive jurisdiktioner er tilstrækkeligt ens.
Artikel 66
Procedure for udpegning af transnational efterspørgsel
1.   BEREC foretager en analyse af den transnationale efterspørgsel blandt slutbrugere efter produkter og tjenester, der udbydes i Unionen på et eller flere af de markeder, der er opført i henstillingen, hvis den modtager en begrundet anmodning med dokumentation fra Kommissionen eller fra mindst to af de berørte nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, der tyder på, at der er et alvorligt efterspørgselsproblem, som skal løses. BEREC kan også foretage sådanne analyser, hvis den modtager en begrundet anmodning fra markedsdeltagere med tilstrækkelig dokumentation og mener, at der er et alvorligt efterspørgselsproblem, der skal løses. BEREC's analyse griber ikke ind i konklusioner vedrørende transnationale markeder i henhold til artikel 65, stk. 1, eller konklusioner vedrørende nationale eller lokale geografiske markeder fra nationale tilsynsmyndigheder i henhold til artikel 64, stk. 3.
Denne analyse af den transnationale efterspørgsel blandt slutbrugere kan omfatte produkter og tjenester, der udbydes på produkt- og tjenestemarkeder, som er afgrænset på forskellig vis af en eller flere nationale tilsynsmyndigheder under hensyntagen til nationale forhold, forudsat at disse produkter og tjenester kan erstattes af dem, der udbydes på et af de markeder, der er opført i henstillingen.
2.   Hvis BEREC konkluderer, at der findes en transnational efterspørgsel blandt slutbrugere, at den er betydelig, og at den ikke i tilstrækkelig grad dækkes af udbuddet på et kommercielt eller reguleret grundlag, skal BEREC efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen udstede retningslinjer for en fælles tilgang til de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder med henblik på at dække den konstaterede transnationale efterspørgsel, herunder om nødvendigt når de indfører afhjælpende foranstaltninger i henhold til artikel 68. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager nøje hensyn til disse retningslinjer, når de udfører tilsynsopgaver inden for deres jurisdiktion. Disse retningslinjer kan danne grundlag for engrosadgangsprodukters interoperabilitet i hele Unionen og kan omfatte rådgivning om harmonisering af tekniske specifikationer for engrosadgangsprodukter, der kan dække den konstaterede transnationale efterspørgsel.
Artikel 67
Markedsanalyseprocedure
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fastlægger, om et relevant marked, der er afgrænset i overensstemmelse med artikel 64, stk. 3, kan berettige pålæggelse af de reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i dette direktiv. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at en analyse, hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt, foretages i samarbejde med de nationale konkurrencemyndigheder. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager nøje hensyn til SMP-retningslinjerne og følger de procedurer, der er omhandlet i artikel 23 og 32, når de foretager en sådan analyse.
Et marked kan anses for at berettige, at de reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i dette direktiv pålægges, hvis alle af de følgende kriterier er opfyldt:
a)
der er store og varige strukturelle, juridiske eller reguleringsmæssige hindringer for adgangen
b)
der er en markedsstruktur, som ikke går i retning af en effektiv konkurrence inden for den givne tidshorisont, hvad angår den infrastrukturbaserede konkurrence og andre kilder til konkurrence bag hindringerne for adgang
c)
konkurrenceretten alene er ikke tilstrækkelig til at kunne afhjælpe de konstaterede markedssvigt.
Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed foretager en markedsanalyse, som indgår i henstillingen, skal den antage, at litra a), b) og c), i andet afsnit er opfyldt, medmindre den nationale tilsynsmyndighed fastslår, at et eller flere af kriterierne ikke er opfyldt i den specifikke nationale situation.
2.   Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed foretager en analyse i henhold til stk. 1, ser den på udviklingen ud fra et fremadrettet perspektiv, i fraværet af regulering pålagt efter denne artikel på det relevante marked, og tager hensyn til alle følgende:
a)
markedsudvikling, der påvirker sandsynligheden for, at der vil opstå effektiv konkurrence på det relevante marked
b)
alle relevante former for konkurrencebegrænsninger, i engros- og detailleddet, uanset om kilderne til sådanne konkurrencebegrænsninger anses for at være elektroniske kommunikationsnet, elektroniske kommunikationstjenester eller andre former for tjenester eller applikationer, der er sammenlignelige hermed set fra slutbrugerens synspunkt, og uanset om sådanne former for pres er en del af det relevante marked
c)
andre former for forskrifter eller foranstaltninger, der er indført og påvirker det relevante marked eller det beslægtede detailmarked/de beslægtede detailmarkeder i hele den relevante periode, herunder men ikke begrænset til forpligtelser, der er indført i henhold til artikel 44, 60 og 61
d)
forskrifter, der er pålagt andre relevante markeder på grundlag af denne artikel.
3.   Konkluderer en national tilsynsmyndighed, at et relevant marked ikke berettiger, at der pålægges reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i overensstemmelse med proceduren i stk. 1 og 2, eller hvis betingelserne i stk. 4 ikke er opfyldt, må den ikke pålægge eller opretholde nogen specifikke forpligtelser, jf. artikel 68. Hvis der allerede er pålagt sektorspecifikke forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68, skal den ophæve sådanne forpligtelser for virksomheder på det relevante marked.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikrer, at parter, der påvirkes af en sådan ophævelse af forpligtelser, underrettes herom i passende tid i forvejen, idet der foretages en afvejning af behovet for at sikre en bæredygtig overgang for dem, der drager fordel af disse forpligtelser, og slutbrugerne, slutbrugernes muligheder, og at regulering ikke fortsætter længere end nødvendigt. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan, når de fastlægger en sådan varselsfrist, fastsætte bestemte betingelser og varselsfrister i forbindelse med gældende adgangsaftaler.
4.   Når en national tilsynsmyndighed fastslår, at pålæggelsen af reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i henhold til stk. 1 og 2 på et relevant marked er berettiget, udpeger den virksomheder, som hver især eller sammen har en stærk markedsposition på det pågældende relevante marked i overensstemmelse med artikel 63. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed pålægger sådanne virksomheder passende specifikke reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser i overensstemmelse med artikel 68 eller opretholder eller ændrer sådanne forpligtelser, hvis de findes i forvejen, hvis den mener, at resultatet for slutbrugerne ikke vil være effektiv konkurrence uden sådanne forpligtelser.
5.   Foranstaltninger, der træffes i henhold til stk. 3 og 4, behandles efter procedurerne i artikel 23 og 32. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder foretager en analyse af det relevante marked og meddeler det tilsvarende udkast til foranstaltning i overensstemmelse med artikel 32:
a)
inden for fem år efter vedtagelsen af en tidligere foranstaltning, når den nationale tilsynsmyndighed har afgrænset det relevante marked og fastlagt, hvilke virksomheder der har en stærk markedsposition. Denne femårsperiode kan undtagelsesvis forlænges med op til et år, når den nationale tilsynsmyndighed senest fire måneder inden udløbet af femårs perioden har meddelt en foreslået forlængelse til Kommissionen med en begrundelse, og Kommissionen ikke har gjort indsigelse mod den meddelte forlængelse inden en måned,
b)
inden for tre år efter vedtagelsen af en revideret henstilling om relevante markeder, når der er tale om markeder, der ikke tidligere er meddelt til Kommissionen, eller
c)
inden for tre år efter tiltrædelsen for medlemsstater, der for nylig er tiltrådt EU.
6.   Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed mener, at den måske ikke kan gennemføre eller ikke har gennemført analysen af et relevant marked, der er udpeget i henstillingen, inden for den frist, der er fastsat i stk. 5, yder BEREC på anmodning bistand til den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed ved at fuldføre analysen af det specifikke marked og de særlige forpligtelser, der skal pålægges. Med denne bistand meddeler den pågældende nationale tilsynsmyndighed inden seks måneder regnet fra fristen i stk. 5 udkastet til foranstaltning til Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 32.
KAPITEL IV
Afhjælpende adgangsforanstaltninger, der pålægges virksomheder med en stærk markedsposition
Artikel 68
Pålæggelse, ændring eller ophævelse af forpligtelser
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har beføjelse til at pålægge de forpligtelser, der er fastsat i artikel 69-74 og 76-81.
2.   Såfremt det som resultat af en markedsanalyse, der er foretaget ifølge artikel 67, fastslås, at en virksomhed har en stærk markedsposition på et bestemt marked, skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder pålægge forpligtelserne i artikel 69-74, 76 og 80 i fornødent omfang. I overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet skal en national tilsynsmyndighed vælge den mindst indgribende måde at løse de problemer, der er påvist i markedsanalysen.
3.   Nationale tilsynsmyndigheder må alene pålægge virksomheder, der er blevet udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition i henhold til stk. 2, de forpligtelser, der er nævnt i artikel 69-74, 76 og 80 med forbehold af
a)
artikel 61 og 62
b)
artikel 44 og 17, betingelse 7 i afdeling D i bilag I som anvendt i medfør af artikel 13, stk. 1, og artikel 97 og 106 i dette direktiv samt de relevante bestemmelser i direktiv 2002/58/EF, der også indeholder forpligtelser for andre virksomheder end dem, for hvilke det er fastslået, at de har en stærk markedsposition, eller
c)
nødvendigheden af at opfylde internationale forpligtelser.
Under ekstraordinære omstændigheder, hvor en national tilsynsmyndighed påtænker at pålægge virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition andre forpligtelser i forbindelse med adgang eller samtrafik end de i artikel 69-74, 76 og 80 nævnte, skal den fremsætte en anmodning herom over for Kommissionen.
Kommissionen træffer under nøje hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse afgørelser ved hjælp af gennemførelsesretsakter om, hvorvidt den nationale tilsynsmyndighed må træffe sådanne foranstaltninger eller ej.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages efter rådgivningsproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 3.
4.   Forpligtelser, der pålægges i henhold til denne artikel, skal:
a)
tage udgangspunkt i det konkrete problem, som en national tilsynsmyndighed har påvist i sin markedsanalyse, om nødvendigt under hensyntagen til udpegningen af den transnationale efterspørgsel, jf. artikel 66
b)
være forholdsmæssige, om muligt under hensyntagen til omkostninger og fordele
c)
være berettigede i lyset af de målsætninger, der er fastlagt i artikel 3, og
d)
pålægges efter høring i overensstemmelse med artikel 23 og 32.
5.   Med hensyn til nødvendigheden af at overholde internationale forpligtelser som omhandlet i stk. 3 underretter de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder Kommissionen efter proceduren i artikel 32 om deres afgørelser om at pålægge, ændre eller ophæve forpligtelser for virksomheder.
6.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder overvejer indvirkningen af ny markedsudvikling, f.eks. vedrørende kommercielle aftaler, herunder aftaler om saminvestering, der påvirker dynamikken i konkurrencen.
Hvis denne udvikling ikke er tilstrækkelig vigtig til at kræve en ny markedsanalyse i henhold til artikel 67, vurderer den nationale tilsynsmyndighed omgående, om det er nødvendigt at revidere de forpligtelser, som virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, er pålagt, og ændre enhver tidligere afgørelse, herunder ved at ophæve forpligtelser eller pålægge nye forpligtelser, for at sikre, at disse forpligtelser fortsat opfylder betingelserne i stk. 4. Sådanne ændringer kan kun pålægges efter høring i overensstemmelse med artikel 23 og 32.
Artikel 69
Forpligtelse vedrørende gennemsigtighed
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i medfør af artikel 68 pålægge forpligtelser vedrørende gennemsigtighed i forbindelse med samtrafik eller adgang og kræve, at virksomheder skal offentliggøre bestemte oplysninger, som f.eks. regnskabsoplysninger, priser, tekniske specifikationer, netkarakteristika og forventede udviklinger heraf, samt vilkår og betingelser for levering og anvendelse, herunder eventuelle betingelser, som ændrer adgangen til eller anvendelsen af tjenester og applikationer, navnlig med hensyn til migrering fra oprindelig infrastruktur, hvor medlemsstaterne tillader sådanne betingelser i overensstemmelse med EU-retten.
2.   Såfremt en virksomhed er underlagt forpligtelser vedrørende ikkediskrimination, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder navnlig forlange, at virksomheden offentliggør et standardtilbud, der skal være tilstrækkelig ubundtet til at sikre, at virksomhederne ikke skal betale for faciliteter, som ikke er nødvendige for den ønskede tjeneste. Dette tilbud indeholder en beskrivelse af de udbudte tjenester, opgjort efter enkeltkomponenter alt efter markedssituationen, og de hertil knyttede vilkår og betingelser, herunder priser. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan bl.a. forlange ændringer af standardtilbud for at sikre overholdelse af forpligtelser, der er pålagt i henhold til dette direktiv.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan fastlægge, hvilke specifikke oplysninger der skal stilles til rådighed, hvor detaljerede de skal være, og hvordan de skal offentliggøres.
4.   Med henblik på en ensartet gennemførelse af forpligtelserne til gennemsigtighed udsteder BEREC efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen senest den 21. december 2019 retningslinjer om minimumskriterierne for et standardtilbud og reviderer disse efter behov, således at de er afstemt efter den teknologiske udvikling og markedsudviklingen. Når BEREC udsteder sådanne minimumskriterier, skal det ske med målene i artikel 3 for øje og under hensyntagen til behovene hos dem, der drager fordel af adgangsforpligtelser, og hos slutbrugere, der er aktive i mere end en medlemsstat, samt til andre retningslinjer fra BEREC, som udpeger transnational efterspørgsel i henhold til artikel 66 og eventuelle relaterede kommissionsafgørelser.
Uanset stk. 3 skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikre, at der offentliggøres et standardtilbud, der tager nøje hensyn til retningslinjerne fra BEREC om minimumskriterier for et standardtilbud, når en virksomhed i henhold til artikel 72 eller 73 har forpligtelser vedrørende engrosadgang til netinfrastruktur, og de skal sikre, at centrale resultatindikatorer angives, hvis det er relevant, samt tilsvarende serviceniveauer og nøje overvåge og sikre overholdelsen heraf. Endvidere kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder om nødvendigt fastsætte de tilknyttede økonomiske sanktioner på forhånd i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og national ret.
Artikel 70
Forpligtelser vedrørende ikkediskrimination
1.   En national tilsynsmyndighed kan i medfør af artikel 68 pålægge forpligtelser vedrørende ikkediskrimination i forbindelse med samtrafik eller adgang.
2.   Forpligtelsen vedrørende ikkediskrimination skal navnlig sikre, at den pågældende virksomhed under tilsvarende forhold tilbyder andre udbydere af tilsvarende tjenester tilsvarende vilkår, og at den udbyder tjenester og formidler oplysninger til andre på samme vilkår og af samme kvalitet, som gælder for tjenester, der udbydes af den selv, dens datterselskaber eller partnere. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan pålægge denne virksomhed en forpligtelse til at levere adgangsprodukter og -tjenester til alle virksomheder, herunder sig selv, inden for samme frister, på samme vilkår og betingelser, herunder vedrørende pris og serviceniveau, og ved hjælp af samme systemer og processer for at sikre lige adgang.
Artikel 71
Forpligtelse vedrørende regnskabsmæssig opsplitning
1.   En national tilsynsmyndighed kan i medfør af artikel 68 pålægge forpligtelser vedrørende særskilte regnskaber for bestemte aktiviteter i forbindelse med samtrafik eller adgang.
En national tilsynsmyndighed kan navnlig kræve, at vertikalt integrerede virksomheder sørger for gennemsigtighed mht. deres engrospriser og interne afregningspriser, bl.a. for at sikre, at de overholder reglerne, hvis der stilles krav om ikkediskrimination i henhold til artikel 70, eller om nødvendigt for at undgå uretmæssig krydssubsidiering. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan specificere, hvilket format og hvilken regnskabsmetode der skal anvendes.
2.   Med forbehold af artikel 20 og for at kunne kontrollere, om forpligtelserne vedrørende gennemsigtighed og ikkediskrimination er overholdt, skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kunne kræve, at regnskabsoplysninger, herunder oplysninger om indtægter modtaget fra tredjemand, stilles til rådighed, såfremt der anmodes herom. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan under overholdelse af EU-regler og nationale regler om kommerciel fortrolighed offentliggøre oplysninger, der kan medvirke til virkeliggørelsen af et åbent og konkurrencebaseret marked.
Artikel 72
Adgang til anlægsarbejder
1.   En national tilsynsmyndighed kan i henhold til artikel 68 pålægge virksomheder forpligtelser til at imødekomme rimelige anmodninger om adgang til og anvendelse af anlægsarbejder, herunder, men ikke begrænset til, bygninger, adgangsveje til bygninger, kabler i bygninger, herunder ledningsnet, antenner, tårne og andre støttekonstruktioner, pæle, master, kabelkanaler, ledningskanaler, nedgangsbrønde, mandehuller og skabe, i situationer, hvor de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder på baggrund af markedsanalyser konkluderer, at nægtelse af adgang eller adgang på urimelige vilkår med tilsvarende virkning ville kunne hindre, at der skabes et bæredygtigt konkurrencebaseret marked, og være i strid med slutbrugernes interesser.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan pålægge en virksomhed en forpligtelse til at give adgang i henhold til denne artikel, uanset om de aktiver, der påvirkes af forpligtelsen, er en del af det relevante marked ifølge markedsanalysen, forudsat at forpligtelsen er nødvendig og rimelig for at kunne opfylde målene i artikel 3.
Artikel 73
Forpligtelser vedrørende adgang til og anvendelse af specifikke netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter
1.   Nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i overensstemmelse med artikel 68 pålægge virksomheder forpligtelser til at efterkomme rimelige anmodninger om adgang til og anvendelse af specifikke netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter i tilfælde, hvor de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder er af den opfattelse, at nægtelse af adgang eller urimelige vilkår og betingelser med tilsvarende virkning vil kunne hindre, at der skabes et holdbart konkurrencebaseret marked i detailleddet, og være i modstrid med slutbrugernes interesser.
Virksomheder kan af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder bl.a. pålægges pligt til:
a)
at give tredjemand adgang til og mulighed for anvendelse af specifikke fysiske netelementer og tilhørende faciliteter om nødvendigt, herunder ubundtet adgang til abonnentledninger og afsnit heraf
b)
at give tredjepart adgang til specifikke aktive eller virtuelle netelementer og tjenester
c)
at forhandle i god tro med virksomheder, der ansøger om adgang
d)
at opretholde adgang til faciliteter, som der tidligere er givet adgang til
e)
at yde specifikke tjenester på engrosniveau til tredjeparters gensalg
f)
at tilbyde fri adgang til tekniske grænseflader, protokoller eller andre nøgleteknologier, der er afgørende for tjenesternes eller virtuelle nettjenesters interoperabilitet
g)
at tilbyde samhusning eller andre former for fælles brug af tilhørende faciliteter
h)
at udbyde specifikke tjenester, der er nødvendige for at sikre interoperabilitet mellem end-to-end-tjenester til brugere eller roaming på mobile net
i)
at tilbyde adgang til driftsstøttesystemer eller lignende softwaresystemer, der er nødvendige for at skabe fair konkurrenceforhold på tjenesteområdet
j)
at sammenkoble net eller netfaciliteter
k)
at tilbyde adgang til tilknyttede tjenester såsom tjenester vedrørende identitet, geografisk placering og tilstedeværelse.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i tilknytning til de nævnte forpligtelser stille krav om redelighed, rimelighed og rettidighed.
2.   Når de nationale myndigheder overvejer, om det er hensigtsmæssigt at pålægge nogle af de mulige specifikke forpligtelser i denne artikels stk. 1, og især, når de i overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet vurderer, om og hvordan sådanne forpligtelser skal pålægges, skal de undersøge, om andre former for adgang til engrosinput enten på det samme eller et beslægtet engrosmarked ville være tilstrækkelige til at afhjælpe det konstaterede problem i slutbrugernes interesse. Undersøgelsen skal omfatte kommercielle tilbud om adgang, reguleret adgang i henhold til artikel 61 eller eksisterende eller planlagt reguleret adgang til andre engrosinput i henhold til nærværende artikel. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder skal navnlig tage hensyn til nedenstående faktorer:
a)
om det i lyset af den igangværende markedsudvikling er teknisk og økonomisk gennemførligt at bruge eller installere konkurrerende faciliteter under hensyntagen til karakteren og typen af de involverede samtrafik- eller adgangsordninger, herunder levedygtigheden af andre opstrømsadgangsprodukter såsom adgang til kabelkanaler
b)
den forventede teknologiske udvikling, som påvirker netudformningen og -forvaltningen
c)
behovet for at sikre teknologineutralitet, som sætter parterne i stand til at udforme og forvalte deres egne net
d)
om det er praktisk muligt at tilbyde den foreslåede adgang i betragtning af den forhåndenværende kapacitet
e)
hvor store startinvesteringer ejeren af faciliteten skal foretage, set i forhold til de offentlige investeringer og de risici, der er forbundet hermed, især hvad angår investeringer i net med meget høj kapacitet og risikoniveauer forbundet hermed
f)
behovet for at sikre konkurrence på længere sigt, med særlig opmærksomhed på økonomisk effektiv infrastrukturbaseret konkurrence og innovative forretningsmodeller, som støtter bæredygtig konkurrence, såsom dem, der er baseret på saminvesteringer i net
g)
i givet fald relevante intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder
h)
udbuddet af paneuropæiske tjenester.
Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed i overensstemmelse med artikel 68 overvejer at pålægge forpligtelser på grundlag af artikel 72 eller nærværende artikel, undersøger den, om alene pålæggelse af forpligtelser i overensstemmelse med artikel 72 ville være et rimeligt middel til at fremme konkurrencen og slutbrugerens interesser.
3.   Når det pålægges en virksomhed at give adgang i medfør af denne artikel, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fastsætte tekniske eller driftsmæssige betingelser, som skal opfyldes af udbyderen eller dem, der er berettiget i medfør af sådan adgang, når det er nødvendigt for at sikre normal drift af nettet. Forpligtelser til at overholde særlige tekniske standarder eller specifikationer skal være i overensstemmelse med de standarder og specifikationer, der er fastlagt i overensstemmelse med artikel 39.
Artikel 74
Forpligtelser vedrørende priskontrol og omkostningsregnskaber
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i medfør af artikel 68 pålægge forpligtelser vedrørende omkostningsdækning og priskontrol, herunder forpligtelser vedrørende omkostningsbaserede priser og vedrørende omkostningsregnskabssystemer i forbindelse med udbud af bestemte former for samtrafik eller adgang, såfremt en markedsanalyse viser, at den pågældende virksomhed som følge af en utilstrækkelig effektiv konkurrence vil kunne opretholde sine priser på et unaturligt højt niveau eller opretholde en prisklemme til skade for slutbrugerne.
Når de nationale myndigheder fastlægger, om forpligtelser vedrørende priskontrol er hensigtsmæssige, tager de hensyn til behovet for at fremme konkurrencen og slutbrugernes langsigtede interesser vedrørende udrulning og ibrugtagning af næstegenerationsnet, og navnlig net med meget høj kapacitet. For at tilskynde virksomheden til investeringer, herunder i næstegenerationsnet, skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder navnlig tage hensyn til virksomhedens investeringer. Hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder mener, at forpligtelser vedrørende priskontrol er hensigtsmæssige, lader de virksomheden få en rimelig forrentning af den relevante investerede kapital under hensyntagen til eventuelle specifikke risici i forbindelse med et bestemt nyt netinvesteringsprojekt.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder skal overveje ikke at pålægge eller fastholde forpligtelser i henhold til denne artikel, hvis de fastslår, at der findes en påviselig begrænsning af detailprisen, og at eventuelle forpligtelser pålagt i henhold til artikel 69-73, herunder navnlig økonomiske replikabilitetstest, der er pålagt i henhold til artikel 70, sikrer reel og ikkediskriminerende adgang.
Hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder mener, at det er hensigtsmæssigt at pålægge forpligtelser vedrørende priskontrol for adgang til eksisterende netelementer, skal de ligeledes tage hensyn til fordelene ved forudsigelige og stabile engrospriser, når det gælder om at sikre, at der er effektiv markedsadgang og tilstrækkelige incitamenter for alle virksomheden til at udrulle nye og forbedrede net.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikrer, at alle omkostningsdækningsmekanismer eller prisfastsættelsesmetoder, der stilles krav om, tjener til at fremme udrulning af nye og forbedrede net, effektivitet og holdbar konkurrence samt maksimere bæredygtige fordele for slutbrugerne. I den forbindelse kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder også tage hensyn til de priser, der kan opnås på tilsvarende markeder med konkurrence.
3.   Har en virksomhed pligt til sikre, at priserne er omkostningsbaserede, er det virksomheden selv, der skal bevise, at taksterne er baseret på omkostningerne, herunder en rimelig forrentning af investeringerne. Til beregning af omkostningerne ved et effektivt udbud af ydelser kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder anvende omkostningsberegningsmetoder, der er uafhængige af dem, som virksomheden anvender. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan anmode en virksomhed om at fremlægge fuld dokumentation for priserne og om nødvendigt kræve, at priserne tilpasses.
4.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sørger for, at der, hvis der stilles krav om anvendelse af et omkostningsregnskabssystem til støtte for priskontrol, stilles en beskrivelse af omkostningsregnskabssystemet, der som minimum viser de hovedkategorier, som omkostningerne er samlet i, og hvordan omkostningerne er fordelt, til rådighed for offentligheden. En kompetent uafhængig instans kontrollerer overholdelsen af omkostningsregnskabssystemet og offentliggør en gang om året en erklæring vedrørende dets overholdelse.
Artikel 75
Termineringstakster
1.   Kommissionen vedtager senest den 31. december 2020 under nøje hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse en delegeret retsakt i henhold til artikel 117, der supplerer dette direktiv ved at fastsætte en fælles maksimal EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald i mobilnet og en fælles maksimal EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald i fastnet (samlet benævnt »EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald«), som pålægges enhver udbyder af henholdsvis terminering af taleopkald i mobilnet eller taleopkald i fastnet i enhver medlemsstat.
Kommissionen skal med henblik herpå:
a)
overholde principperne, kriterierne og parametrene i bilag III
b)
ved fastsættelsen af EU-dækkende termineringstakster for taleopkald for første gang tage hensyn til det vægtede gennemsnit af effektive omkostninger i fastnet og mobilnet, der er fastlagt i overensstemmelse med principperne i bilag III, og som anvendes overalt i Unionen. EU-dækkende termineringstakster for taleopkald i den første delegerede retsakt må ikke være højere end den højeste takst blandt de takster, der var gældende seks måneder inden vedtagelsen af nævnte delegerede retsakt i alle medlemsstater, efter fornøden tilpasning efter særlige nationale omstændigheder
c)
tage hensyn til det samlede antal slutbrugere i hver medlemsstat for at sikre en korrekt vægtning af de maksimale termineringstakster samt de nationale forhold, som medfører væsentlige forskelle mellem medlemsstaterne, når de maksimale termineringstakster skal fastlægges i Unionen.
d)
tage hensyn til markedsoplysninger, som den får fra BEREC, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller direkte fra virksomheder, som udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, og
e)
overveje behovet for at give mulighed for en overgangsperiode på højst 12 måneder, så medlemsstaterne kan foretage tilpasninger, hvor dette er nødvendigt, på grundlag af tidligere pålagte takster.
2.   Under nøje hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse reviderer Kommissionen hvert femte år de delegerede retsakter, der er vedtaget i medfør af denne artikel, og overvejer ved hver lejlighed ved anvendelse af kriterierne i artikel 67, stk. 1, om de EU-dækkende termineringstakster for taleopkald fortsat er nødvendige. Når Kommissionen efter sin revision træffer afgørelse i henhold til dette stykke om ikke at pålægge en maksimal termineringstakst for taleopkald i mobilnet eller en maksimal termineringstakst for taleopkald i fastnet eller begge, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder foretage markedsanalyser af markederne for terminering af taleopkald i overensstemmelse med artikel 67 med henblik på at vurdere, om det er nødvendigt at indføre regulerende forpligtelser. Hvis en national tilsynsmyndighed som følge af en sådan analyse pålægger omkostningsbaserede termineringstakster i et relevant marked, skal den følge de principper, kriterier og parametre, der er fastsat i bilag III, og dens udkast til foranstaltning skal gennemføres med forbehold af de procedurer, der er omhandlet i artikel 23, 32 og 33.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder overvåger nøje termineringstjenesteudbydernes anvendelse af de EU-dækkende termineringstakster for taleopkald og sikrer, at de overholdes. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan til enhver tid kræve, at en udbyder af termineringstjenester for taleopkald ændrer den takst, som den anvender over for andre virksomheder, hvis den ikke overholder den delegerede retsakt, der er omhandlet i stk. 1. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder aflægger hvert år rapport til Kommissionen og BEREC om anvendelsen af denne artikel.
Artikel 76
Regulering af nye netelementer med meget høj kapacitet
1.   Virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på et eller flere relevante markeder i overensstemmelse med artikel 67, kan afgive tilsagn efter den procedure, der er fastsat i artikel 79, og med forbehold af dette stykkes andet afsnit, om at åbne udrulning af et nyt net med meget høj kapacitet, som består af optiske fiberelementer, der dækker strækningen op til slutbrugerens ejendom eller basisstationen, for saminvestering, f.eks. ved at tilbyde medejerskab eller langsigtet risikodeling gennem samfinansiering eller gennem købsaftaler, der medfører specifikke rettigheder af strukturel art for andre udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester.
Når den nationale tilsynsmyndighed vurderer disse tilsagn, skal den navnlig afgøre, om tilbuddet om saminvestering opfylder alle de følgende betingelser:
a)
det er på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt i løbet af nettets levetid åbent for enhver udbyder af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester
b)
det vil give andre medinvestorer, som er udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, mulighed for at konkurrere effektivt og bæredygtigt på lang sigt på downstreammarkeder, hvor den virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, er aktiv, på betingelser, som omfatter
i)
fair, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår, der giver adgang til nettets fulde kapacitet, i det omfang det er omfattet af saminvestering,
ii)
fleksibilitet med hensyn til værdien af og tidsplanen for de enkelte medinvestorers deltagelse,
iii)
muligheden for at øge denne deltagelse på et senere tidspunkt og
iv)
gensidige rettigheder, som tildeles af medinvestorerne efter udrulningen af den saminvesteringsomfattede infrastruktur
c)
det offentliggøres rettidigt af virksomheden, og hvis virksomheden ikke har de egenskaber, der er anført i artikel 80, stk. 1, mindst seks måneder før begyndelsen af udrulningen af det nye net, kan denne periode forlænges på grundlag af nationale omstændigheder
d)
adgangssøgende, som ikke deltager i saminvesteringen, kan fra begyndelsen drage fordel af samme kvalitet, hastighed, betingelser og muligheder for at nå ud til slutbrugere som før udrulningen, suppleret af en mekanisme for tilpasning over tid og bekræftet af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i lyset af udviklingen på de tilknyttede detailmarkeder, der opretholder incitamenterne til at deltage i saminvesteringen. En sådan mekanisme skal sikre, at adgangssøgende har adgang til netelementer med meget høj kapacitet på et tidspunkt og på grundlag af transparente og ikkediskriminerende vilkår, der på passende vis afspejler den grad af risiko, som de respektive medinvestorer løber i forskellige faser af udrulningen, og tage hensyn til konkurrenceforholdene på detailmarkederne
e)
det opfylder som minimum de kriterier, der er fastsat i bilag IV, og det er fremsat i god tro.
2.   Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed under hensyn til resultaterne af den markedstest, der er gennemført i overensstemmelse med artikel 79, stk. 2, konkluderer, at det afgivne saminvesteringstilsagn opfylder betingelserne i nærværende artikels stk. 1, skal den gøre dette tilsagn bindende i henhold til artikel 79, stk. 3, og skal ikke pålægge yderligere forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68 for så vidt angår de elementer af det nye net med meget høj kapacitet, som er omfattet af tilsagnene, hvis mindst én potentiel medinvestor har indgået en saminvesteringsaftale med den virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition.
Stk. 1 berører ikke reguleringen af omstændigheder, som ikke opfylder betingelserne i stk. 1, under hensyntagen til resultaterne af en eventuel markedstest, der er gennemført i overensstemmelse med artikel 79, stk. 2, men som har indvirkning på konkurrencen og tages i betragtning med henblik på artikel 67 og 68.
Uanset stk. 2, første afsnit, kan en national tilsynsmyndighed i behørigt begrundede tilfælde pålægge, fastholde eller tilpasse afhjælpende foranstaltninger i henhold til artikel 68-74, hvad angår nye net med meget høj kapacitet, for at afhjælpe væsentlige konkurrenceproblemer på bestemte markeder, hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed fastslår, at disse konkurrenceproblemer i betragtning af de særlige karakteristika ved disse markeder ellers ikke ville blive afhjulpet.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder overvåger løbende opfyldelsen af de betingelser, der er fastsat i stk. 1, og kan kræve, at den virksomhed, som er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, forelægger årlige overensstemmelseserklæringer.
Denne artikel berører ikke en national tilsynsmyndigheds beføjelse til at træffe afgørelser i henhold til artikel 26, stk. 1, hvis der opstår en tvist mellem virksomheder i forbindelse med en saminvesteringsaftale, som den skønner opfylder de betingelser, der er fastsat i nærværende artikels stk. 1.
4.   BEREC offentliggør efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen retningslinjer for at fremme de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders ensartede anvendelse af betingelserne i stk. 1 og kriterierne i bilag IV.
Artikel 77
Funktionel adskillelse
1.   Konkluderer den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, at de relevante forpligtelser, der er pålagt i henhold til artikel 69-74, ikke har kunnet tilvejebringe effektiv konkurrence, og at der er konstateret vigtige og vedvarende konkurrenceproblemer eller markedssvigt i forbindelse med engrossalg på visse markeder for adgangsprodukter, kan den undtagelsesvis i overensstemmelse med artikel 68, stk. 3, andet afsnit, pålægge vertikalt integrerede virksomheder at placere aktiviteter i forbindelse med engrossalg af relevante adgangsprodukter i en uafhængigt fungerende forretningsenhed.
Denne forretningsenhed skal levere adgangsprodukter og -tjenester til alle virksomheder, herunder andre forretningsenheder i moderselskabet, efter samme tidsfrister, vilkår og betingelser, herunder vedrørende priser og serviceniveau, og via samme systemer og processer.
2.   Når en national tilsynsmyndighed agter at pålægge et krav om funktionel adskillelse, forelægger den Kommissionen en anmodning, der omfatter:
a)
dokumentation, der underbygger den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds konklusioner, jf. stk. 1
b)
en begrundet vurdering, hvori det konkluderes, at der ingen eller ringe udsigt er til effektiv og bæredygtig infrastrukturbaseret konkurrence inden for en rimelig tidshorisont
c)
en analyse af de forventede konsekvenser for den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, for virksomheden, især de ansatte i den særskilte virksomhed og sektoren for elektronisk kommunikation som helhed, og for incitamenter til at investere deri, navnlig med hensyn til behovet for at sikre social og territorial samhørighed, samt for andreinteressenter, herunder navnlig de forventede konsekvenser for konkurrencen og eventuelle følgevirkninger for forbrugerne
d)
en analyse af årsagerne til, at denne forpligtelse vil være det mest effektive middel til at gennemføre afhjælpende foranstaltninger med sigte på at håndtere de konstaterede konkurrenceproblemer eller markedssvigt.
3.   Udkastet til foranstaltninger skal omfatte følgende elementer:
a)
nøje oplysninger om adskillelsens art og grad, herunder navnlig den særskilte forretningsenheds retlige status
b)
en udpegning af den særskilte forretningsenheds aktiver samt de produkter eller tjenester, der skal leveres af denne forretningsenhed
c)
de organisatoriske foranstaltninger, der skal træffes for at sikre personalets uafhængighed i den særskilte forretningsenhed, og den dertil svarende incitamentsstruktur
d)
regler til sikring af forpligtelsernes overholdelse
e)
regler til sikring af gennemsigtighed omkring driftsprocedurerne, navnlig over for andre interessenter
f)
et overvågningsprogram med henblik på at sikre, at forpligtelserne overholdes, herunder offentliggørelsen af en årlig rapport.
Når Kommissionen har truffet afgørelse i henhold til artikel 68, stk. 3, om udkastet til foranstaltninger gennemfører den nationale tilsynsmyndighed efter proceduren i artikel 67 en koordineret analyse af de forskellige markeder med tilknytning til adgangsnettet. På grundlag af denne analyse træffer den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i overensstemmelse med procedurerne i artikel 23 og 32 afgørelse om at pålægge, opretholde, ændre eller ophæve forpligtelser.
4.   En virksomhed, der er pålagt funktionel adskillelse, kan pålægges enhver af de forpligtelser, der er omhandlet i artikel 69-74 på ethvert specifikt marked, hvor den i overensstemmelse med artikel 67 er udpeget som virksomhed med en stærk markedsposition, eller enhver anden forpligtelse, der er godkendt af Kommissionen i medfør af artikel 68, stk. 3.
Artikel 78
Frivillig funktionel adskillelse hos vertikalt integrerede virksomheder
1.   En virksomhed, der i overensstemmelse med artikel 67 er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på et eller flere relevante markeder, skal underrette den nationale tilsynsmyndighed mindst tre måneder inden, hvis den agter at overdrage sine lokale adgangsnetaktiver eller en væsentlig del heraf til en særskilt juridisk enhed med en anden ejer eller oprette en særskilt forretningsenhed med henblik på at give alle detailudbydere, herunder virksomhedens egne detailafdelinger, fuldt ud tilsvarende adgangsprodukter.
Disse virksomheder skal også underrette den nationale tilsynsmyndighed om enhver ændring af denne plan og om slutresultatet af adskillelsesprocessen.
Sådanne virksomheder kan også afgive tilsagn om adgangsbetingelser, der skal gælde for dens net i løbet af gennemførelsesperioden, efter at den foreslåede form for adskillelse er gennemført, med henblik på at sikre tredjepart effektiv og ikkediskriminerende adgang. Tilbuddet om tilsagn skal indeholde tilstrækkelige detaljer, herunder om tidspunktet for og varigheden af gennemførelsen, til, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed kan udføre sine opgaver i henhold til stk. 2. Sådanne tilsagn kan forlænges ud over den maksimale frist for markedsundersøgelser, der er fastsat i artikel 67, stk. 5.
2.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed vurderer, hvilke følger den planlagte transaktion sammen med eventuelle afgivne tilsagn har for de gældende forpligtelser i henhold til dette direktiv.
Til det formål gennemfører den nationale tilsynsmyndighed efter proceduren i artikel 67 en analyse af de forskellige markeder med tilknytning til adgangsnettet.
Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed tager hensyn til eventuelle tilsagn fra virksomheden, navnlig vedrørende målene i artikel 3. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed konsulterer i den forbindelse tredjeparter i overensstemmelse med artikel 23, navnlig de tredjeparter, der er direkte berørt af den påtænkte transaktion.
På grundlag af resultatet af analysen træffer den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i overensstemmelse med procedurerne i artikel 23 og 32 afgørelse om at pålægge, opretholde, ændre eller ophæve forpligtelser, idet artikel 80 anvendes, hvor det er relevant. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed kan i sin afgørelse gøre tilsagnene helt eller delvist bindende. Uanset artikel 67, stk. 5, kan den nationale tilsynsmyndighed gøre tilsagnene helt eller delvist bindende i hele den periode, som de afgives for.
3.   Med forbehold af artikel 80 kan den juridisk eller driftsmæssigt særskilte forretningsenhed, der er blevet udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på ethvert specifikt marked i henhold til artikel 67, om nødvendigt pålægges enhver af de forpligtelser, der er omhandlet i artikel 69-74, eller enhver anden forpligtelse, der er godkendt af Kommissionen i medfør af artikel 68, stk. 3, såfremt alle andre tilsagn, der er afgivet, er utilstrækkelige til at kunne opfylde målene i artikel 3.
4.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed fører tilsyn med gennemførelsen af de af virksomhederne afgivne tilsagn, som tilsynsmyndigheden har gjort bindende i henhold til stk. 2, og tager stilling til en eventuel forlængelse af tilsagnene, når den periode, som de indledningsvis blev afgivet for, er udløbet.
Artikel 79
Tilsagnsprocedure
1.   Virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, kan afgive tilsagn til den nationale tilsynsmyndighed vedrørende betingelser for adgang, saminvestering eller begge dele, der finder anvendelse på deres net, for så vidt angår bl.a.:
a)
samarbejdsordninger, som er relevante for vurderingen af hensigtsmæssige og forholdsmæssigt afpassede forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68
b)
saminvestering i net med meget høj kapacitet i henhold til artikel 76 eller
c)
effektiv og ikkediskriminerende adgang for tredjeparter i henhold til artikel 78, både i løbet af en gennemførelsesperiode med frivillig adskillelse af en vertikalt integreret virksomhed, og efter at den foreslåede form for adskillelse er gennemført.
Tilbuddet om tilsagn skal være tilstrækkelig detaljeret, herunder med hensyn til tidsplanen og rammerne for tilsagnenes gennemførelse og deres varighed for at give den nationale tilsynsmyndighed mulighed for at foretage sin vurdering i henhold til stk. 2. Sådanne tilsagn kan forlænges ud over perioderne for gennemførelse af markedsanalyser som fastsat i artikel 67, stk. 5.
2.   For at vurdere tilsagn afgivet af en virksomhed i henhold til stk. 1 foretager den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, medmindre sådanne tilsagn tydeligvis ikke opfylder en eller flere af de pågældende betingelser eller et eller flere af de pågældende kriterier, en markedstest, navnlig vedrørende de tilbudte vilkår, ved at gennemføre en offentlig høring af interesserede parter, navnlig de tredjeparter, der er direkte berørt. Potentielle medinvestorer eller adgangssøgende kan fremsætte synspunkter om overholdelsen af de afgivne tilsagn med de betingelser, der er fastsat i artikel 68, 76 eller 78, alt efter hvad der er relevant, og kan foreslå ændringer.
For så vidt angår tilsagn, der er afgivet i henhold til denne artikel, tager den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ved vurderingen af forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68, stk. 4, særlig hensyn til:
a)
dokumentation vedrørende en fair og rimelig karakter af de afgivne tilsagn,
b)
tilsagnenes åbenhed over for alle markedsdeltagere,
c)
rettidig tilvejebringelse af adgang på fair, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende betingelser, herunder til net med meget høj kapacitet, forud for lanceringen af tilknyttede detailtjenester og
d)
de afgivne tilsagns generelle tilstrækkelighed med hensyn til at muliggøre bæredygtig konkurrence på downstreammarkeder og at fremme samarbejde om udrulning og ibrugtagning af net med meget høj kapacitet til gavn for slutbrugerne.
Under hensyntagen til alle de synspunkter, der er kommet til udtryk under høringen, og til, hvor repræsentative disse synspunkter er for de forskellige interessenter, meddeler den nationale tilsynsmyndighed den virksomhed, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, sine foreløbige konklusioner om, hvorvidt de afgivne tilsagn opfylder de mål og kriterier og overholder de procedurer, som er omhandlet i denne artikel og i artikel 68, 76 eller 78, alt efter hvad der er relevant, og på hvilke betingelser den kan overveje at gøre tilsagnene bindende. Virksomheden kan ændre sit oprindelige tilbud for at tage hensyn til de foreløbige konklusioner fra den nationale tilsynsmyndighed og med henblik på at opfylde de kriterier, der er fastsat i denne artikel og i artikel 68, 76 eller 78, alt efter hvad der er relevant.
3.   Uden at dette berører artikel 76, stk. 2, første afsnit, kan den nationale tilsynsmyndighed vedtage en afgørelse for at gøre tilsagnene helt eller delvist bindende.
Uanset artikel 67, stk. 5, kan den nationale tilsynsmyndighed gøre nogle af eller alle tilsagnene bindende for en bestemt periode, som kan være hele den periode, for hvilken de tilbydes, og i tilfælde af saminvesteringstilsagn, der er bindende i henhold til artikel 76, stk. 2, første afsnit, gøre dem bindende for en periode på mindst syv år.
Med forbehold af artikel 76, er denne artikel ikke til hinder for anvendelse af markedsanalyseproceduren i henhold til artikel 67 og pålæggelse af forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68.
Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed gør tilsagn bindende i henhold til denne artikel, skal den i henhold til artikel 68 vurdere konsekvenserne af denne afgørelse for markedsudviklingen og hensigtsmæssigheden af eventuelle forpligtelser, som den har pålagt eller i mangel af disse tilsagn ville have overvejet at pålægge i henhold til nævnte artikel eller artikel 69-74. Når den nationale tilsynsmyndighed meddeler det pågældende udkast til foranstaltning i henhold til artikel 68 i overensstemmelse med artikel 32, ledsages det meddelte udkast til foranstaltning af tilsagnsafgørelsen.
4.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed overvåger, fører tilsyn med og sikrer overholdelse af tilsagnene, som den har gjort bindende i henhold til stk. 3, på samme måde som den overvåger, fører tilsyn med og sikrer opfyldelse af de pålagte forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68, og tager stilling til en forlængelse af tilsagnene for den periode, for hvilken de er blevet gjort bindende, når den oprindelige periode udløber. Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed konkluderer, at en virksomhed ikke har opfyldt de tilsagn, som er gjort bindende i overensstemmelse med stk. 3, kan den pålægge virksomheden sanktioner i overensstemmelse med artikel 29. Uden at dette berører proceduren for sikring af opfyldelse af specifikke forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 30, kan den nationale tilsynsmyndighed revurdere de forpligtelser, der er pålagt i overensstemmelse med artikel 68, stk. 6.
Artikel 80
Virksomheder, der udelukkende opererer på engrosniveau
1.   En national tilsynsmyndighed, der udpeger en virksomhed, der ikke er aktiv på noget detailmarked for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, som havende en stærk markedsposition på et eller flere engrosmarkeder, jf. artikel 67, vurderer, om den pågældende virksomhed har følgende egenskaber:
a)
alle selskaber og forretningsenheder inden for virksomheden, alle selskaber, som kontrolleres, men ikke nødvendigvis ejes fuldstændig, af den samme endelige ejer, og eventuelle aktionærer, der kan udøve kontrol over virksomheden, har kun nuværende og planlagte aktiviteter på engrosmarkeder for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, og de har derfor ikke nogen aktiviteter på noget detailmarked for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester til slutbrugere i Unionen
b)
virksomheden er ikke forpligtet til at handle med en enkelt, selvstændig virksomhed senere i forsyningskæden, som er aktiv på et detailmarked for elektroniske kommunikationstjenester til slutbrugere, på grund af en eksklusivaftale eller en aftale, som de facto udgør en eksklusivaftale.
2.   Hvis den nationale tilsynsmyndighed konkluderer, at betingelserne i stk. 1 er opfyldt, kan tilsynsmyndigheden kun pålægge den pågældende virksomhed forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 70 og 73 eller vedrørende fair og rimelig prisfastsættelse, hvis det er berettiget på grundlag af en markedsanalyse, herunder en fremadrettet vurdering af den sandsynlige adfærd for virksomheden, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition.
3.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed reviderer de forpligtelser, der er pålagt virksomheden i henhold til denne artikel, hvis den konkluderer, at betingelserne i stk. 1 ikke længere er opfyldt, og den lader artikel 67-74 finde anvendelse, hvis det er relevant. Virksomhederne underretter straks den nationale tilsynsmyndighed om eventuelle ændringer af de forhold, der er relevante for stk. 1, litra a) og b).
4.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed reviderer også forpligtelser pålagt virksomheden i henhold til denne artikel, hvis den på grundlag af beviser for betingelser og vilkår, som virksomheden tilbyder sine kunder senere i forsyningskæden, konkluderer, at der er opstået eller sandsynligvis vil opstå konkurrenceproblemer til ulempe for slutbrugerne, som kræver, at der pålægges en eller flere af forpligtelserne i artikel 69, 71, 72 eller 74, eller at de pålagte forpligtelser ændres i overensstemmelse med stk. 2.
5.   Pålæggelsen af forpligtelser og revision af disse i overensstemmelse med denne artikel gennemføres i henhold til procedurerne i artikel 23, 32 og 33.
Artikel 81
Migrering fra oprindelig infrastruktur
1.   Virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på et eller flere relevante markeder i overensstemmelse med artikel 67, underretter den nationale tilsynsmyndighed på forhånd og i god tid, hvis de planlægger at afvikle eller med ny infrastruktur erstatte dele af nettet, herunder oprindelig infrastruktur, som er nødvendig for at drive et kobbernet, og som er underlagt forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 68-80.
2.   Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed sikrer, at afviklings- eller erstatningsprocessen omfatter en transparent tidsplan og transparente betingelser, herunder en passende anmeldelses- og overgangsperiode, og at der er adgang til alternative produkter af som minimum sammenlignelig kvalitet, som giver adgang til den opgraderede netinfrastruktur, der træder i stedet for de erstattede elementer, hvis dette er nødvendigt for at sikre konkurrence og slutbrugernes rettigheder.
For aktiver, der foreslås afviklet eller erstattet, kan den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ophæve forpligtelserne efter at have konstateret, at adgangsudbyderen:
a)
har skabt de rette betingelser for migrering, herunder gjort et alternativt adgangsprodukt af som minimum sammenlignelig kvalitet tilgængeligt, som kunne nås via den oprindelige infrastruktur, der giver de adgangssøgende mulighed for at nå ud til de samme slutbrugere, og
b)
har overholdt de betingelser og processer, som er meddelt den nationale tilsynsmyndighed i henhold til denne artikel.
En sådan ophævelse skal gennemføres i henhold til procedurerne i artikel 23, 32 og 33.
3.   Denne artikel berører ikke tilgængeligheden af regulerede produkter, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed pålægger den opgraderede netinfrastruktur i overensstemmelse med procedurerne, der er fastsat i artikel 67 og 68.
Artikel 82
BEREC's retningslinjer om net med meget høj kapacitet
Senest den 21. december 2020 fastlægger BEREC efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen retningslinjer for de kriterier, som et net skal opfylde for at blive anset for et net med meget høj kapacitet, navnlig for så vidt angår båndbredde til down- og uplink, robusthed, fejlrelaterede parametre samt latenstid og variation i denne. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder skal tage størst muligt hensyn til disse retningslinjer. BEREC ajourfører retningslinjerne senest den 31. december 2025 og regelmæssigt derefter.
KAPITEL V
Tilsyn med detailtjenester
Artikel 83
Tilsyn med detailtjenester
1.   Medlemsstaterne kan sikre, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder pålægger virksomheder, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition på et bestemt detailmarked i henhold til artikel 63, passende reguleringsmæssige forpligtelser, hvis:
a)
en national tilsynsmyndighed som resultat af en markedsanalyse foretaget i overensstemmelse med artikel 67 konstaterer, at der på et bestemt detailmarked, der er identificeret i overensstemmelse med artikel 64, ikke er effektiv konkurrence, og
b)
den nationale tilsynsmyndighed konkluderer, at de pålagte forpligtelser i henhold til artikel 69-74 ikke vil føre til opnåelse af de mål, der er fastsat i artikel 3.
2.   Forpligtelser, der pålægges i medfør af stk. 1, skal være baseret på det konstaterede problems art og være forholdsmæssige og begrundede under hensyn til de i artikel 3 omhandlede målsætninger. Pålagte forpligtelser kan omfatte krav om, at de udpegede virksomheder ikke forlanger urimeligt høje priser, hæmmer markedsadgang eller begrænser konkurrencen ved at fastsætte urimeligt lave priser, uberettiget favorisere bestemte slutbrugere eller foretage urimelig bundtning af tjenester. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan over for sådanne virksomheder lægge et passende loft over detailpriserne eller træffe foranstaltninger til at kontrollere individuelle takster eller til at gøre takster omkostningsbaserede eller baseret på priserne på sammenlignelige markeder for at beskytte slutbrugernes interesser og fremme effektiv konkurrence.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikrer, at der, når en virksomhed er underlagt detailtakstregulering eller anden relevant detailkontrol, anvendes de fornødne og relevante omkostningsregnskabssystemer. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan specificere, hvilket format og hvilken beregningsmetode der skal anvendes. Overholdelse af omkostningsregnskabssystemet kontrolleres af en kompetent uafhængig instans. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sørger for, at der årligt offentliggøres en erklæring vedrørende overholdelse.
4.   Uden at dette berører artikel 85 og 88, anvender de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder ikke de i stk. 1 omhandlede detailkontrolordninger på geografiske markeder eller detailmarkeder, hvis de har forvisset sig om, at der er effektiv konkurrence.
DEL III
TJENESTER
AFSNIT I
FORSYNINGSPLIGT
Artikel 84
Forsyningspligtydelser til en overkommelig pris
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle forbrugere på deres områder under hensyntagen til særlige nationale forhold har adgang til en tilgængelig tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste og til talekommunikationstjenester til en overkommelig pris og af den kvalitet, der er specificeret for deres områder, herunder den underliggende forbindelse, på et fast sted.
2.   Medlemsstaterne kan endvidere sikre, at tjenester som omhandlet i stk. 1, der ikke leveres på et fast sted, har en overkommelig pris, hvis de finder dette nødvendigt for at sikre forbrugernes fulde sociale og økonomiske deltagelse i samfundet.
3.   Hver medlemsstat definerer under hensyntagen til nationale forhold og den minimumsbåndbredde, som flertallet af forbrugere nyder godt af på den pågældende medlemsstats område, og under hensyntagen til BEREC's rapport om bedste praksis den tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste med henblik på stk. 1 for at sikre den båndbredde, der er nødvendig for social og økonomisk deltagelse i samfundet. En tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste er i stand til at levere den båndbredde, der er nødvendig for mindst at understøtte det minimum af tjenester, der er fastsat i bilag V.
Senest den 21. juni 2020 udarbejder BEREC for at bidrage til en konsekvent anvendelse af denne artikel efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen under hensyntagen til tilgængelige oplysninger fra Kommissionen (Eurostat) en rapport om medlemsstaternes bedste praksis til støtte for definitionen på en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste i medfør af første afsnit. Denne rapport ajourføres regelmæssigt for at afspejle den teknologiske udvikling og ændringer i forbrugernes brugsmønstre.
4.   Når en forbruger anmoder herom, kan den forbindelse, der er omhandlet i stk. 1 og, hvis det er relevant, stk. 2, begrænses til at understøtte talekommunikationstjenester.
5.   Medlemsstaterne kan udvide anvendelsesområdet for denne artikel til også at omfatte slutbrugere, der er mikrovirksomheder og små og mellemstore virksomheder samt nonprofitorganisationer.
Artikel 85
Udbud af forsyningspligtydelser til en overkommelig pris
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder overvåger i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder udviklingen og niveauet af de på markedet tilgængelige detailpriser for de tjenester, som er omhandlet i artikel 84, stk. 1, navnlig i forhold til nationale priser og national forbrugerindkomst.
2.   Hvis en medlemsstat fastsætter, at detailpriserne for de tjenester, der er omhandlet i artikel 84, stk. 1, under hensyntagen til de nationale forhold ikke er overkommelige, fordi forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov er forhindret i at få adgang til disse tjenester, træffer den foranstaltninger for at sikre, at sådanne forbrugere kan betale for tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste og talekommunikationstjenester som minimum på et fast sted.
Med henblik herpå kan medlemsstaterne sikre, at der ydes støtte til sådanne forbrugere til kommunikationsformål, eller de kan pålægge udbydere af sådanne tjenester at tilbyde disse forbrugere takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, der er anderledes end dem, som de leverer på normale kommercielle betingelser, eller begge dele. Med henblik herpå kan medlemsstaterne kræve, at sådanne udbydere anvender fælles takster, herunder geografisk udligning, i hele området.
Under særlige omstændigheder, navnlig hvis pålæggelsen af forpligtelser i henhold til nærværende stykkes andet afsnit, på alle udbydere ville medføre en påvist overdreven administrativ eller finansiel byrde for udbyderne eller den pågældende medlemsstat, kan en medlemsstat undtagelsesvis beslutte kun at pålægge udpegede virksomheder forpligtelse til at tilbyde disse særlige takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker. Artikel 86 finder tilsvarende anvendelse på sådanne udpegelser. Hvis en medlemsstat udpeger virksomheder, sikrer den, at alle forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov nyder godt af et udvalg af virksomheder, som tilbyder takstvalgmuligheder, der er målrettet deres behov, medmindre sikring af et sådant udvalg er umulig eller ville skabe en overdreven yderligere organisatorisk eller finansiel byrde.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at forbrugere, som er berettigede til disse takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker, har ret til indgå en aftale med en tjenesteudbyder som omhandlet i artikel 84, stk. 1, eller med en virksomhed, der er udpeget i overensstemmelse med nærværende stykke, og at deres nummer forbliver tilgængeligt for dem i en tilstrækkelig periode og uberettiget afbrydelse af tjenesten undgås.
3.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at virksomheder, der tilbyder forbrugere med en lav indkomst eller særlige sociale behov takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker i henhold til stk. 2, holder de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre kompetente myndigheder informeret om detaljerne i disse tilbud. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikrer i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder, at de betingelser, hvorpå virksomhederne tilbyder takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker i henhold til stk. 2, er fuldt transparente og offentliggøres og anvendes i overensstemmelse med princippet om ikkediskrimination. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder kræve, at sådanne takstvalgmuligheder eller -pakker ændres eller trækkes tilbage.
4.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer under hensyntagen til nationale forhold, at der ydes passende støtte til forbrugere med handicap, og, hvis det er relevant, at der træffes andre specifikke foranstaltninger med henblik på at sikre, at relevant terminaludstyr og specifikt udstyr og specifikke tjenester, der fremmer lige adgang, herunder om nødvendigt totale konversationstjenester og relætjenester, er tilgængelige og fås til en overkommelig pris.
5.   Når medlemsstaterne anvender denne artikel, skal de søge at minimere fordrejning af markedsvilkårene.
6.   Medlemsstaterne kan udvide anvendelsesområdet i denne artikel til også at omfatte slutbrugere, der er mikrovirksomheder og små og mellemstore virksomheder samt nonprofitorganisationer.
Artikel 86
Adgang til forsyningspligtydelser
1.   Hvis en medlemsstat under hensyntagen til resultaterne, hvis de foreligger, af den geografiske undersøgelse foretaget i overensstemmelse med artikel 22, stk. 1, og om nødvendigt eventuel supplerende dokumentation har påvist, at tilgængeligheden på et fast sted af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og af en talekommunikationstjeneste ikke kan sikres på normale kommercielle vilkår eller gennem andre mulige offentlige politikredskaber på sit nationale område eller forskellige dele heraf, kan den pålægge en passende forsyningspligt til at imødekomme alle rimelige anmodninger fra slutbrugere om adgang til disse tjenester på de pågældende dele af medlemsstatens område.
2.   Medlemsstaterne fastlægger den mest effektive og hensigtsmæssige strategi til at sikre tilgængelighed af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste på et fast sted som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og af en talekommunikationstjeneste under hensyntagen til principperne om objektivitet, gennemsigtighed, ikkediskrimination og proportionalitet. Medlemsstaterne skal tilstræbe at minimere konkurrenceforvridningen, navnlig udbud af tjenester til priser eller på betingelser eller vilkår, der afviger fra almindelige kommercielle betingelser, idet de samtidig tilgodeser samfundets interesser.
3.   Hvis medlemsstaterne beslutter at pålægge forpligtelser for at sikre tilgængelighed på et fast sted for slutbrugere af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og af en talekommunikationstjeneste, kan de navnlig udpege en eller flere virksomheder til at garantere sådan tilgængelighed på hele det nationale område. Medlemsstaterne kan udpege forskellige virksomheder eller grupper af virksomheder til at levere tilstrækkelige bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste og talekommunikationstjenester på et fast sted eller til at dække forskellige dele af det nationale område.
4.   Når medlemsstaterne udpeger virksomheder i dele af eller på hele det nationale område til at sikre tilgængelighed af tjenester i henhold til stk. 3, skal de anvende en effektiv, objektiv, transparent og ikkediskriminerende udpegningsmetode, der sikrer, at ingen virksomhed på forhånd er udelukket fra at blive udpeget. Sådanne udpegningsmetoder skal sikre, at en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste og talekommunikationstjenester på et fast sted tilvejebringes på en omkostningseffektiv måde og kan anvendes som et middel til at bestemme nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten, jf. artikel 89.
5.   Når en virksomhed, som er udpeget i henhold til stk. 3, vil afhænde sine lokale adgangsnetaktiver eller en væsentlig del heraf til en særskilt juridisk enhed med et andet ejerskab, underretter den i forvejen og i rimelig tid den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetente myndighed, så denne myndighed kan bedømme den påtænkte transaktions indvirkning på udbuddet på et fast sted af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og af en talekommunikationstjeneste. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller anden kompetente myndighed kan pålægge, ændre eller ophæve særlige forpligtelser i overensstemmelse med artikel 13, stk. 2.
Artikel 87
Status for den eksisterende forsyningspligt
Medlemsstaterne kan fortsat sikre tilgængelighed af og en overkommelig pris for andre tjenester end en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og en talekommunikationstjeneste på et fast sted, som var i drift den 20. december 2018, hvis det kan godtgøres, at der er behov for sådanne tjenester i under hensyntagen til de nationale forhold. Hvis medlemsstaterne udpeger virksomheder til i dele af eller på hele det nationale område at levere sådanne tjenester, finder artikel 86 anvendelse. Finansieringen af disse forpligtelser skal være i overensstemmelse med artikel 90.
Medlemsstaterne reviderer de forpligtelser, der er pålagt i henhold til denne artikel, senest den 21. december 2021 og derefter hvert tredje år.
Artikel 88
Kontrol med udgifter
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer i forbindelse med udbud af faciliteter og tjenester ud over de i artikel 84 omhandlede, at udbydere af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste og af talekommunikationstjenester i henhold til artikel 84-87 fastsætter vilkår og betingelser på en sådan måde, at slutbrugeren ikke er tvunget til at betale for faciliteter eller tjenester, der ikke er nødvendige for eller kræves til den tjeneste, der er anmodet om.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de udbydere af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste og talekommunikationstjenester, der er omhandlet i artikel 84, og som udbyder tjenester i henhold til artikel 85, tilbyder de særlige faciliteter og tjenester i bilag VI, del A, alt efter hvad der er relevant, således at forbrugerne kan overvåge og kontrollere udgifter. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at sådanne udbydere indfører et system til at hindre uberettiget afbrydelse af talekommunikationstjenester eller af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste for de forbrugere, der er omhandlet i artikel 85, herunder en passende mekanisme til at kontrollere fortsat interesse i at anvende tjenesten.
Medlemsstaterne kan udvide anvendelsesområdet i dette stykke til også at omfatte slutbrugere, der er mikrovirksomheder og små og mellemstore virksomheder samt nonprofitorganisationer.
3.   Hver medlemsstat sikrer, at den kompetente myndighed kan frafalde kravene i stk. 2 på hele eller dele af sit nationale område, hvis den kompetente myndighed har forvisset sig om, at faciliteten er tilgængelig i vid udstrækning.
Artikel 89
Beregning af omkostninger ved forsyningspligt
1.   Hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder finder, at udbud af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og af en talekommunikationstjeneste som fastlagt i artikel 84, 85 og 86 eller fortsættelse af den eksisterende forsyningspligt, jf. artikel 87, kan udgøre en urimelig byrde for udbydere af sådanne tjenester, som anmoder om kompensation, beregner de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder nettoomkostningerne herved.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder skal med henblik herpå:
a)
beregne nettoomkostningerne ved den pågældende forsyningspligt, idet der tages hensyn til eventuelle markedsfordele, som en udbyder af en tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgangstjeneste som fastsat i overensstemmelse med artikel 84, stk. 3, og en talekommunikationstjeneste som fastsat i artikel 84, 85 og 86 eller fortsættelse af den eksisterende forsyningspligt som fastsat i artikel 87 nyder godt af, jf. bilag VII, eller
b)
anvende de nettoomkostninger ved varetagelse af forsyningspligt, der bestemmes ved en udpegningsmekanisme i overensstemmelse med artikel 86, stk. 4.
2.   De regnskaber og oplysninger, der ligger til grund for beregningen af nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten, jf. stk. 1, andet afsnit, litra a), kvalitetskontrolleres eller verificeres af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller en af de berørte parter uafhængig instans, der er godkendt af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed. Resultaterne af omkostningsberegningen og kvalitetskontrollens konklusioner er offentligt tilgængelige.
Artikel 90
Finansiering af forsyningspligt
1.   Såfremt de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder på grundlag af den i artikel 89 omhandlede nettoomkostningsberegning mener, at en udbyder pålægges en urimelig byrde, skal medlemsstaterne efter anmodning fra den pågældende udbyder beslutte at gøre en eller begge af følgende:
a)
indføre en ordning, der på transparente vilkår giver den pågældende udbyder kompensation fra offentlige midler for de beregnede nettoomkostninger,
b)
dele nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligt mellem udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester.
2.   Såfremt nettoomkostningerne deles i henhold til nærværende artikels stk. 1, litra b), fastlægger medlemsstaterne en deleordning, som forvaltes af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed eller af en af de begunstigede uafhængig instans under de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders tilsyn. Kun nettoomkostningerne som fastsat i henhold til artikel 89 ved forpligtelserne i artikel 84-87 kan finansieres.
Deleordningen skal overholde principperne om gennemsigtighed, mindst mulig konkurrenceforvridning, ikkediskrimination og proportionalitet, jf. principperne i bilag VII, del B. Medlemsstaterne kan vælge ikke at kræve bidrag fra virksomheder, hvis nationale omsætning er under en fastsat grænse.
Eventuelle udgifter i forbindelse med deling af omkostningerne ved forsyningspligt skal udskilles og anføres særskilt for hver virksomhed. Sådanne udgifter kan ikke pålægges eller afkræves virksomheder, der ikke udbyder tjenester i den medlemsstat, som har indført deleordningen.
Artikel 91
Gennemsigtighed
1.   Hvis nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligt beregnes i overensstemmelse med artikel 89, sikrer de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, at principperne for beregning af nettoomkostninger, herunder oplysninger om den metode, der skal anvendes, er offentligt tilgængelige.
Såfremt en ordning til deling af nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligt som omhandlet i artikel 90, stk. 2, indføres, sikrer de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, at principperne for omkostningsdeling og godtgørelse af nettoomkostningerne er offentligt tilgængelige.
2.   Med forbehold af EU-regler og nationale regler om kommerciel fortrolighed offentliggør de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder en årlig rapport med oplysninger om de beregnede omkostninger ved forsyningspligt med angivelse af alle involverede virksomheders bidrag, herunder eventuelle markedsmæssige fordele, der kan være tilflydt den eller de pågældende virksomheder som følge af forsyningspligten, jf. artikel 84-87.
Artikel 92
Supplerende obligatoriske tjenester
Medlemsstaterne kan beslutte at stille tjenester ud over dem, der er omfattet af forsyningspligt som omhandlet i artikel 83-86, til rådighed for offentligheden på deres områder. I et sådanne tilfælde kan der ikke indføres en kompensationsordning, der omfatter bestemte virksomheder.
AFSNIT II
NUMMERRESSOURCER
Artikel 93
Nummerressourcer
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder kontrollerer tildelingen af brugsrettigheder til alle nationale nummerressourcer og forvaltningen af de nationale nummerplaner, og at de stiller tilstrækkelige nummerressourcer til rådighed med henblik på udbud af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der indføres objektive, transparente og ikkediskriminerende procedurer for tildeling af brugsrettigheder til nationale nummerressourcer.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder kan også tildele brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer fra de nationale nummerplaner med henblik på levering af specifikke tjenester til andre virksomheder end udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, forudsat at tilstrækkelige nummerressourcer gøres tilgængelige til at opfylde den nuværende og forudsigelige fremtidige efterspørgsel. Disse virksomheder skal vise deres evne til at forvalte nummerressourcerne og opfylde eventuelle relevante krav fastsat i henhold til artikel 94. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder kan suspendere yderligere tildeling af brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer til sådanne virksomheder, hvis det påvises, at der er risiko for at udtømme nummerressourcerne.
For at bidrage til en konsekvent anvendelse af dette stykke vedtager BEREC senest den 21. juni 2020 efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen retningslinjer for fælles kriterier for vurdering af evnen til at forvalte nummerressourcer og risikoen for at udtømme nummerressourcerne.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder sikrer, at nationale nummerplaner og -procedurer administreres således, at alle udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og de virksomheder, der lever op til kriterierne i stk. 2, behandles lige. Medlemsstaterne sikrer navnlig, at en virksomhed, som har fået tildelt brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer, ikke diskriminerer andre udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester med hensyn til de nummerressourcer, der anvendes til at give adgang til deres tjenester.
4.   Hver medlemsstat sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder stiller en serie af ikkegeografiske numre til rådighed, som kan bruges til at levere andre elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester på hele Unionens område, dog med forbehold af forordning (EU) nr. 531/2012 og artikel 97, stk. 2, i dette direktiv. Hvis brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer er tildelt virksomheder, som ikke er udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, i henhold til stk. 2, finder nærværende stykke anvendelse på de specifikke tjenester, til levering af hvilke brugsrettigheder er tildelt.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder sikrer, at de tilknyttede betingelser, der er anført i bilag I, del E, for brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer, der anvendes til at levere tjenester uden for en medlemsstats landekode, og håndhævelsen af disse er lige så streng som de betingelser og den håndhævelse, der gælder for tjenester leveret inden for medlemsstatens landekode, i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder sikrer også i overensstemmelse med artikel 94, stk. 6, at udbydere, der bruger nummerressourcer fra egen landekode i andre medlemsstater, overholder forbrugerbeskyttelsesreglerne og andre nationale regler vedrørende brug af nummerressourcer i de medlemsstater, hvor nummerressourcerne bruges. Denne forpligtelse berører ikke de pågældende medlemsstaters kompetente myndigheders håndhævelsesbeføjelser.
BEREC bistår på deres anmodning de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder med at koordinere deres aktiviteter med henblik på at sikre effektiv forvaltning af nummerressourcer med ret til ekstraterritorial anvendelse i Unionen.
For at fremme de nationale tilsynsmyndigheders eller andre kompetente myndigheders overvågning af opfyldelse af kravene i dette stykke opretter BEREC en database over nummerressourcer med ret til ekstraterritorial anvendelse i Unionen. Med henblik herpå indberetter de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder de relevante oplysninger til BEREC. I tilfælde, hvor den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ikke tildeler nummerressourcer med ret til ekstraterritorial anvendelse i Unionen, hører den kompetente myndighed, der er ansvarlig for tildeling eller forvaltning heraf, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed.
5.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at »00« er standardpræfiks for internationale opkald. Der kan indføres eller opretholdes særordninger for brug af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester mellem områder, der støder op til hinanden på hver sin side af grænsen mellem medlemsstater.
Medlemsstater kan aftale at dele en fælles nummerplan for alle eller specifikke kategorier af numre.
Slutbrugerne, der er påvirket af sådanne ordninger eller aftaler, informeres fyldestgørende.
6.   Med forbehold af artikel 106 fremmer medlemsstaterne, hvor det er teknisk muligt, trådløs provisionering for at gøre det lettere for slutbrugerne at skifte udbyder af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, især udbydere og slutbrugere af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester.
7.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale nummerplaner og alle senere tillæg og ændringer hertil offentliggøres, med hensynet til statens sikkerhed som eneste begrænsning.
8.   Medlemsstaterne støtter harmoniseringen af særlige numre eller nummerserier i Unionen, hvor dette både får det indre marked til at fungere bedre og fremmer udviklingen af paneuropæiske tjenester. Hvis det er nødvendigt for at imødekomme uopfyldt grænseoverskridende eller paneuropæisk efterspørgsel efter nummerressourcer, vedtager Kommissionen under størst mulig hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse gennemførelsesretsakter om harmonisering af specifikke numre eller nummerserier.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages efter undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
Artikel 94
Procedure for tildeling af brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer
1.   Hvor det er nødvendigt at tildele individuelle brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer, tildeler de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder efter anmodning sådanne rettigheder til enhver virksomhed med henblik på udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, som er omfattet af en generel tilladelse, jf. artikel 12, med forbehold af artikel 13 og artikel 21, stk. 1, litra c), og andre regler til sikring af en effektiv anvendelse af disse nummerressourcer i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
2.   Brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer tildeles gennem åbne, objektive, transparente, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpassede procedurer.
Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder tildeler brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer, angiver de, om rettighedshaveren kan overdrage disse rettigheder, og på hvilke betingelser.
Hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder tildeler brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer med en begrænset gyldighedsperiode, skal denne være rimelig for den pågældende tjeneste i betragtning af det forfulgte mål under behørig hensyntagen til nødvendigheden af at tillade en passende periode til amortisation af investeringen.
3.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder træffer afgørelser om tildeling af brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer hurtigst muligt efter modtagelsen af den fuldstændige ansøgning, og inden tre uger for så vidt angår nummerressourcer, der er afsat til særlige formål i henhold til den nationale nummerplan. Sådanne afgørelser offentliggøres.
4.   Hvis de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder efter høring af de interesserede parter i henhold til artikel 23 har besluttet, at brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer af særlig økonomisk værdi skal tildeles efter konkurrenceprægede eller sammenlignende udvælgelsesprocedurer, kan de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder forlænge perioden på tre uger som omhandlet i stk. 3 med indtil tre uger.
5.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder må ikke begrænse det antal individuelle brugsrettigheder, der skal tildeles, undtagen hvor dette er nødvendigt for at sikre en effektiv anvendelse af nummerressourcerne.
6.   Hvis brugsrettighederne til nummerressourcer omfatter ekstraterritorial brug heraf i Unionen i henhold til artikel 93, stk. 4, knytter de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder specifikke betingelser til brugsrettighederne for at sikre, at alle de relevante nationale forbrugerbeskyttelsesregler og nationale lovgivninger vedrørende brug af nummerressourcer, der gælder i de medlemsstater, hvor nummerressourcerne bruges, overholdes.
På anmodning fra en national tilsynsmyndighed eller en anden kompetent myndighed i en medlemsstat, hvor nummerressourcerne bruges, som kan påvise en overtrædelse af de relevante forbrugerbeskyttelsesregler eller nationale lovgivninger om brug af nummerressourcer i denne medlemsstat, håndhæver de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder i den medlemsstat, hvor brugsrettighederne til nummerressourcerne er blevet tildelt, de betingelser, som er tilknyttet i henhold til første afsnit i nærværende stykke, i overensstemmelse med artikel 30, herunder ved i alvorlige tilfælde at ophæve den rettighed til ekstraterritorial brug af nummerressourcer, der er tildelt den pågældende virksomhed.
BEREC fremmer og koordinerer udveksling af oplysninger mellem de forskellige involverede medlemsstaters kompetente myndigheder og sikrer en passende koordinering af arbejdet mellem dem.
7.   Denne artikel finder også anvendelse, når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder tildeler brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer til andre virksomheder end udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester, jf. artikel 93, stk. 2.
Artikel 95
Afgifter for brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer
Medlemsstaterne kan give de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder tilladelse til at opkræve afgifter for brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer, som afspejler behovet for at sikre, at disse ressourcer udnyttes optimalt. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at sådanne afgifter er ikkediskriminerende, transparente, objektivt begrundede og forholdsmæssigt afpassede efter det tilsigtede formål og tager hensyn til målene i artikel 3.
Artikel 96
Hotline for forsvundne børn og telefonrådgivning for børn
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at slutbrugere har gratis adgang til en tjeneste, der driver en hotline, hvor tilfælde med børn, der er forsvundet, kan indberettes. Denne hotline skal være til rådighed på nummer »116000«.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at slutbrugere med handicap i videst mulig udstrækning kan benytte adgangstjenesterne under nummeret »116000«. Foranstaltninger, der træffes for at lette adgang til sådanne tjenester for slutbrugere med handicap, når de rejser i andre medlemsstater, baseres på overholdelse af relevante standarder eller specifikationer fastlagt i henhold til artikel 39.
3.   Medlemsstaterne træffer passende foranstaltninger for at sikre, at den myndighed eller virksomhed, som er blevet tildelt nummeret »116000«, afsætter de nødvendige ressourcer til at drive hotlinen.
4.   Medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen sikrer, at slutbrugerne informeres fyldestgørende om eksistensen og brugen af de tjenester, der ydes på numrene »116000«, og hvor det er hensigtsmæssigt »116111«.
Artikel 97
Adgang til numre og tjenester
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder, hvor det er økonomisk muligt, bortset fra de tilfælde, hvor den opkaldte slutbruger af kommercielle grunde har valgt at begrænse adgangen for parter, som foretager opkald fra bestemte geografiske områder, træffer alle nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre, at slutbrugerne kan:
a)
få adgang til og benytte tjenester, der bruger ikkegeografiske numre inden for Unionen, og
b)
få adgang til alle numre, der udbydes i Unionen, uanset hvilken teknologi og hvilket udstyr operatøren anvender, herunder numrene i medlemsstaternes nationale nummerplaner og de internationale frikaldsnumre (UIFN).
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder kan pålægge udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, i enkelttilfælde at spærre adgang til numre eller tjenester, når bedrageri eller misbrug gør det berettiget, og kræve, at udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i sådanne tilfælde tilbageholder relevante indtægter fra samtrafik eller andre tjenester.
AFSNIT III
SLUTBRUGERNES RETTIGHEDER
Artikel 98
Undtagelse for visse mikrovirksomheder
Med undtagelse af artikel 99 og 100, finder dette afsnit ikke anvendelse på mikrovirksomheder, der udbyder nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, medmindre de også udbyder andre elektroniske kommunikationstjenester.
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at slutbrugerne er informeret om en undtagelse i henhold til stk. 1, inden de indgår en aftale med en mikrovirksomhed, der er omfattet af sådan en undtagelse.
Artikel 99
Ikkediskrimination
Udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller -tjenester må ikke anvende forskellige krav eller generelle betingelser for slutbrugernes adgang til eller brug af net eller tjenester af grunde, der vedrører slutbrugernes nationalitet, bopælssted eller hovedforretningssted medmindre en sådan forskellig behandling er objektivt begrundet.
Artikel 100
Overholdelse af grundlæggende rettigheder
1.   Nationale foranstaltninger vedrørende slutbrugeres adgang til eller brug af tjenester og applikationer via elektroniske kommunikationsnet skal overholde EU's charter om grundlæggende rettigheder (»chartret«) og de generelle principper i EU-retten.
2.   Alle foranstaltninger vedrørende slutbrugeres adgang til eller brug af tjenester og applikationer via elektroniske kommunikationsnet, der kan begrænse udøvelsen af de rettigheder eller frihedsrettigheder, der anerkendes ved chartret, må kun indføres, hvis de er fastsat ved lov og respekterer disse rettigheder eller frihedsrettigheder, er forholdsmæssigt afpassede, nødvendige og faktisk når mål af almen interesse, der er anerkendt af EU-retten, eller opfylder behovet for at beskytte andres rettigheder og frihedsrettigheder i overensstemmelse med artikel 52, stk. 1, i chartret og med EU-rettens generelle principper, herunder retten til effektive retsmidler og en retfærdig rettergang. Følgelig må sådanne foranstaltninger kun træffes under behørig hensyntagen til princippet om uskyldsformodning og retten til privatlivets fred. En forudgående, retfærdig og upartisk procedure skal garanteres, herunder den eller de berørte personers ret til at blive hørt, med forbehold af behovet for passende betingelser og proceduremæssige ordninger i behørigt begrundede hastetilfælde i overensstemmelse med chartret.
Artikel 101
Harmoniseringsniveau
1.   Medlemsstaterne må ikke i national ret opretholde eller indføre bestemmelser om beskyttelse af slutbrugere, som afviger fra artikel 102-115, herunder strengere eller lempeligere bestemmelser for at sikre et anderledes beskyttelsesniveau, medmindre andet fremgår af dette afsnit.
2.   Senest den 21. december 2021 kan medlemsstaterne fortsat anvende strengere nationale bestemmelser om forbrugerbeskyttelse, der afviger fra dem, der er fastsat i artikel 102-115, under forudsætning af at disse bestemmelser var i kraft den 20. december 2018, og at eventuelle begrænsninger vedrørende det indre markeds funktion, som følger heraf, står i et rimeligt forhold til målet om forbrugerbeskyttelse.
Medlemsstaterne underretter senest den 21. december 2019 Kommissionen om eventuelle nationale bestemmelser, der skal anvendes på grundlag af dette stykke.
Artikel 102
Oplysningskrav vedrørende aftaler
1.   Inden en forbruger bindes af en aftale eller et tilsvarende tilbud, stiller udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester, de oplysninger, der er omhandlet i artikel 5 og 6 i direktiv 2011/83/EU til rådighed og desuden de oplysninger, der er anført i bilag VIII til nærværende direktiv, i det omfang disse oplysninger vedrører en tjeneste, de udbyder.
Oplysningerne leveres på en klar og forståelig måde på et varigt medium som defineret i artikel 2, nr. 10), i direktiv 2011/83/EU eller, hvis levering på et varigt medium ikke er mulig, i et dokument, der let kan downloades, og som gøres tilgængeligt af udbyderen. Udbyderen skal udtrykkeligt gøre forbrugeren opmærksom på, at dette dokument er tilgængeligt, og på vigtigheden af at downloade det med henblik på dokumentation, fremtidig reference og uændret gengivelse.
Oplysningerne leveres efter anmodning i et format, der er tilgængeligt for slutbrugere med handicap i overensstemmelse med EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser.
2.   De oplysninger, der er omhandlet i stk. 1, 3 og 5, leveres også til slutbrugere, der er mikrovirksomheder eller små virksomheder eller nonprofitorganisationer, medmindre de udtrykkeligt har indvilliget i at give afkald på alle eller dele af disse bestemmelser.
3.   Udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester, forsyner forbrugerne med et kortfattet og letlæseligt aftaleresumé. Dette resumé fastsætter de vigtigste elementer af oplysningskravene, jf. stk. 1. De vigtigste elementer omfatter som minimum:
a)
udbyderens navn, adresse og kontaktoplysninger og, hvis de ikke er de samme, kontaktoplysninger for eventuelle klager
b)
de vigtigste egenskaber for hver udbudt tjeneste
c)
de respektive priser for at aktivere de elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og for eventuelle tilbagevendende eller forbrugsrelaterede gebyrer, hvor tjenesten leveres mod direkte kontant betaling
d)
aftalens varighed og vilkår for fornyelse og opsigelse heraf
e)
i hvilken grad produkter og tjenester er udformet til slutbrugere med handicap
f)
for så vidt angår internetadgangstjenester et resumé af de oplysninger, der kræves i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 1, litra d) og e), i forordning (EU) 2015/2120.
Senest den 21. december 2019 vedtager Kommissionen efter høring af BEREC gennemførelsesretsakter, der specificerer en skabelon til aftaleresumé, der skal anvendes af udbyderne til at opfylde deres forpligtelser i henhold til dette stykke.
Disse gennemførelsesretsakter vedtages i henhold til undersøgelsesproceduren i artikel 118, stk. 4.
Udbydere, der er omfattet af forpligtelserne i stk. 1, udfylder behørigt skabelonen til aftaleresumé med de nødvendige oplysninger og leverer aftaleresuméet gratis til forbrugere, forud for indgåelsen af aftalen, herunder aftaler om fjernsalg. Hvis det af objektive tekniske grunde ikke er muligt at levere aftaleresuméet på dette tidspunkt, skal det ske snarest muligt derefter, og aftalen træder i kraft, når forbrugeren har bekræftet sit samtykke efter modtagelse af aftaleresuméet.
4.   De oplysninger, der er omhandlet i stk. 1 og 3, udgør en integrerende del af aftalen og må ikke ændres, medmindre andet udtrykkeligt aftales mellem de kontraherende parter.
5.   Når internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester faktureres på grundlag af enten tids- eller mængdeforbrug, skal udbyderne heraf tilbyde forbrugerne mulighed for at overvåge og kontrollere brugen af hver af disse tjenester. Denne mulighed skal give adgang til rettidige oplysninger om forbruget af de tjenester, der indgår i abonnements- og prisvilkårene. Udbyderne skal navnlig underrette forbrugerne, inden enhver forbrugsgrænse, som fastsat af de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og medtaget i deres abonnements- og prisvilkår bliver nået, og når en tjeneste, der indgår i deres abonnements- og prisvilkår, er fuldt opbrugt.
6.   Medlemsstaterne kan i deres nationale ret opretholde eller indføre bestemmelser for at forpligte udbyderne til at fremlægge supplerende oplysninger om forbrug og midlertidigt at forhindre yderligere brug af den pågældende tjeneste ud over en beløbs- eller mængdegrænse, der er fastlagt af den kompetente myndighed.
7.   Det står medlemsstaterne frit for at opretholde eller indføre bestemmelser i deres nationale ret vedrørende aspekter, der ikke er omfattet af denne artikel, navnlig med henblik på at løse nye spørgsmål.
Artikel 103
Gennemsigtighed, sammenligning af tilbud og offentliggørelse af oplysninger
1.   De kompetente myndigheder sikrer i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, at når udbydere af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester underlægger leveringen af disse tjenester betingelser og vilkår, offentliggøres de oplysninger, der er omhandlet i bilag IX på en klar, forståelig og maskinlæsbar måde og i et format, der er tilgængeligt for slutbrugere med handicap, i overensstemmelse med EU-rettens krav om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser af alle sådanne udbydere eller af den kompetente myndighed selv i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed. Disse oplysninger skal ajourføres regelmæssigt. De kompetente myndigheder kan i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fastsætte yderligere krav til, i hvilken form sådanne oplysninger skal offentliggøres. På anmodning meddeles disse oplysninger den kompetente myndighed og, hvis det er relevant, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed inden offentliggørelse.
2.   De kompetente myndigheder sikrer i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, at slutbrugere har gratis adgang til mindst ét uafhængigt sammenligningsværktøj, som gør dem i stand til at sammenligne og evaluere forskellige internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester og, hvor det er relevant, offentligt tilgængelige nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester med hensyn til
a)
priser og takster for tjenester leveret mod tilbagevendende eller forbrugsbaserede direkte pengebetalinger og
b)
kvaliteten af de ydede tjenester, hvor der tilbydes et minimum af tjenestekvalitet, eller virksomheden skal offentliggøre sådanne oplysninger i henhold til artikel 104.
3.   Sammenligningsværktøjet som omhandlet i stk. 2 skal:
a)
være operationelt uafhængigt af udbydere af sådanne tjenester og derved sikre, at disse udbydere behandles lige i søgeresultaterne
b)
klart oplyse, hvem der ejer og driver sammenligningsværktøjet
c)
fastsætte klare og objektive kriterier, som sammenligningen baseres på
d)
bruge et klart og utvetydigt sprog
e)
levere præcise og ajourførte oplysninger med angivelse af tidspunktet for den seneste ajourføring
f)
være åbent for enhver udbyder af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der stiller de relevante oplysninger til rådighed, og omfatte en bred vifte af tilbud, der dækker en væsentlig del af markedet, og, såfremt de fremlagte oplysninger ikke giver et fuldstændigt billede af markedet, en tydelig erklæring herom, inden resultaterne vises
g)
sørge for en effektiv procedure til indberetning af ukorrekte oplysninger
h)
indebære mulighed for at sammenligne priser, takster og kvalitet af de ydede tjenester mellem tilbud, der er tilgængelige for forbrugerne, og, hvis medlemsstaterne kræver det, mellem disse tilbud og de standardtilbud, der er offentligt tilgængelige for andre slutbrugere.
Sammenligningsværktøjer, der opfylder kravene i litra a)- h), certificeres på anmodning af udbyderen af værktøjet af de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder.
Tredjeparter har ret til gratis og i åbne dataformater at bruge de oplysninger, der offentliggøres af udbydere af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, med henblik på at stille sådanne uafhængige sammenligningsværktøjer til rådighed.
4.   Medlemsstaterne kan kræve, at udbydere af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester eller begge dele gratis udsender oplysninger af offentlig interesse til eksisterende og nye slutbrugere, hvor det er relevant, ved hjælp af samme midler, som virksomhederne sædvanligvis bruger til kommunikation med deres slutbrugere. I så fald leveres disse oplysninger af offentlig interesse af de relevante offentlige myndigheder i et standardiseret format og omfatter bl.a. følgende emner:
a)
de mest gængse former for brug af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester til at foretage ulovlige handlinger eller formidle skadeligt indhold, navnlig hvor dette kan skade respekten for andres rettigheder og frihedsrettigheder, herunder overtrædelser af databeskyttelsesrettighederne, ophavsretten og beslægtede rettigheder og de retlige konsekvenser heraf, og
b)
midlerne til beskyttelse af den personlige sikkerhed, privatlivets fred og personoplysninger i forbindelse med brug af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester.
Artikel 104
Internetadgangstjenesters og offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenesters tjenestekvalitet
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder kræve, at udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester offentliggør omfattende, sammenlignelige, pålidelige, brugervenlige og ajourførte oplysninger for slutbrugerne om deres tjenesters kvalitet, i det omfang de kontrollerer mindst nogle elementer af nettet enten direkte eller som følge af en serviceleveranceaftale med det formål, og om foranstaltninger til sikring af samme adgangsmuligheder for slutbrugere med handicap. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder også kræve, at udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester skal meddele forbrugeren, hvis kvaliteten af de tjenester, som de udbyder, er afhængig af eventuelle eksterne faktorer såsom kontrol af signaltransmission eller netforbindelse.
På anmodning meddeles disse oplysninger den nationale tilsynsmyndighed og, hvis det er relevant, andre kompetente myndigheder inden offentliggørelse.
Foranstaltningerne til at sikre tjenestekvaliteten skal være i overensstemmelse med forordning (EU) 2015/2120.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder specificerer i koordination med andre kompetente myndigheder under nøje hensyn til BEREC's retningslinjer, hvilke parametre for tjenesters kvalitet der skal måles, hvilke målemetoder der kan anvendes, hvilke oplysninger der skal offentliggøres, samt i hvilken form og på hvilken måde det skal ske, herunder om der skal være kvalitetscertificeringsordninger. De i bilag X omhandlede parametre, definitioner og målemetoder skal anvendes, hvis det er relevant.
Senest den 21. juni 2020 vedtager BEREC for at bidrage til en konsekvent anvendelse af dette stykke og af bilag X, efter høring af interessenter og i tæt samarbejde med Kommissionen, retningslinjer, der udspecificerer de relevante tjenestekvalitetsparametre, herunder parametre af relevans for slutbrugere med handicap, anvendelige målemetoder, oplysningernes indhold og offentliggørelsesform og kvalitetscertificeringsordninger.
Artikel 105
Aftalers varighed og opsigelse
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at betingelserne og procedurerne for opsigelse af en aftale ikke er en hindring for skift af tjenesteudbyder, og at aftaler indgået mellem forbrugere og udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, og bortset fra transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester, ikke kræver en bindingsperiode på mere end 24 måneder. Medlemsstaterne kan vedtage eller opretholde bestemmelser, der kræver en kortere maksimal varighed af aftalemæssige bindingsperioder.
Dette stykke finder ikke anvendelse på varigheden af aftaler om afbetaling, hvor forbrugeren i en selvstændig aftale har indvilliget i at betale udelukkende for etableringen af en fysisk forbindelse til især net med meget høj kapacitet gennem afdrag. En aftale om afbetaling med henblik på etablering af en fysisk forbindelse må ikke omfatte terminaludstyr, f.eks. en router eller et modem, og må ikke forhindre forbrugerne i at udøve deres rettigheder i henhold til denne artikel.
2.   Stk. 1 finder også anvendelse på slutbrugere, der er mikrovirksomheder, små virksomheder eller almennyttige organisationer som slutbrugere, medmindre de udtrykkeligt har indvilliget i at give afkald på disse bestemmelser.
3.   Hvis det er fastsat i en aftale eller national ret, at en aftale med en begrænset varighed om elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, og bortset fra transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af tjenester mellem maskiner, automatisk forlænges, sikrer medlemsstaten, at slutbrugeren efter en sådan forlængelse har ret til at opsige aftalen når som helst med højst en måneds varsel som fastsat af medlemsstaterne og uden at pådrage sig andre omkostninger end gebyret for at modtage tjenesten i opsigelsesperioden. Inden aftalen forlænges automatisk, skal udbyderne på en iøjnefaldende og rettidig måde og på et varigt medium oplyse slutbrugeren om ophøret af den aftalemæssige forpligtelse og om, hvordan aftalen opsiges. Desuden skal udbyderne samtidig give slutbrugeren rådgivning om den bedste pris for dens tjenester. Udbyderne skal desuden mindst en gang om året give slutbrugerne oplysninger om den bedste pris.
4.   Slutbrugere har ret til at opsige deres aftale uden nogen yderligere omkostninger ved meddelelse om ændring i aftalevilkårene, der foreslås af udbyderen af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, medmindre de foreslåede ændringer udelukkende er til fordel for slutbrugeren, er af rent administrativ karakter og ingen negativ virkning har for slutbrugeren, eller er direkte pålagt ved EU-retten eller national ret.
Udbydere skal underrette slutbrugere med mindst en måneds varsel om enhver ændring i aftalevilkårene og skal samtidig underrette dem om deres ret til uden nogen yderligere omkostninger at opsige aftalen, hvis de ikke accepterer de nye vilkår. Retten til at opsige aftalen kan efter underretningen udnyttes inden for en måned, medlemsstaterne kan forlængedenne periode med op til yderligere tre måneder. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at underretningen foregår på en klar og forståelig måde på et varigt medium.
5.   Betydelige afvigelser, der er vedvarende eller regelmæssigt tilbagevendende, mellem den faktiske ydeevne af en elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, bortset fra en internetadgangstjeneste eller en nummeruafhængig interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, og den ydeevne, der er angivet i aftalen, betragtes som et grundlag for anvendelse af de retsmidler, der står til rådighed for forbrugeren i henhold til national ret, herunder retten til at opsige aftalen uden omkostninger.
6.   Hvis slutbrugeren har ret til at opsige en aftale om en offentligt tilgængelig elektronisk kommunikationstjeneste, bortset fra en nummeruafhængig interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, inden udløbet af aftaleperioden i henhold til dette direktiv eller andre bestemmelser i EU-retten eller national ret, skal slutbrugeren ikke betale anden kompensation end for det subsidierede terminaludstyr, som vedkommende beholder.
Hvis slutbrugeren beslutter at beholde terminaludstyr, der blev solgt sammen med aftalen, da den blev indgået, må en eventuel kompensation, der skal betales, ikke overstige dets værdi pro rata temporis som fastsat ved aftalens indgåelse eller den resterende del af serviceafgiften indtil aftalens udløb, afhængig af hvilket beløb der er mindst.
Medlemsstaterne kan fastsætte andre metoder til beregning af kompensationen, forudsat at en sådan metode ikke fører til et kompensationsniveau, der overskrider det, der er beregnet i henhold til andet afsnit.
Udbyderen fjerner gratis eventuelle betingelser for brug af dette terminaludstyr på andre net på et tidspunkt, som medlemsstaterne angiver, og senest ved betaling af kompensationen.
7.   For så vidt angår transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til maskine-til-maskine-tjenester, er de rettigheder, der er omhandlet i stk. 4 og 6, kun til gavn for slutbrugere, der er forbrugere, mikrovirksomheder eller små virksomheder eller nonprofitorganisationer.
Artikel 106
Udbyderskift og nummerportabilitet
1.   I forbindelse med skift mellem udbydere af internetadgangstjenester forsyner de pågældende udbydere slutbrugeren med tilstrækkelige oplysninger før og under skiftet og sikrer, at internetadgangstjenesten fortsat er tilgængelig, medmindre det ikke er teknisk muligt. Den modtagende udbyder sikrer, at aktiveringen af internetadgangstjenesten finder sted inden for det kortest mulige tidsrum på den dato og inden for den tidsfrist, der udtrykkeligt er aftalt med slutbrugeren. Den afgivende udbyder fortsætter med at stille internetadgangstjenesten til rådighed på samme vilkår, indtil den modtagende udbyder aktiverer sin internetadgangstjeneste. Den tid, tjenesten er utilgængelig i forbindelse med skiftet, må ikke udgøre mere end én arbejdsdag.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikrer, at skiftet foregår effektivt og enkelt for slutbrugeren.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle slutbrugere med numre fra den nationale nummerplan har ret til at bevare deres numre på anmodning uafhængigt af, hvilken virksomhed der udbyder tjenesten, i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i bilag VI, del C.
3.   Når en slutbruger opsiger en aftale, skal medlemsstaterne sikre, at slutbrugeren kan bevare retten til portering af et nummer fra den nationale nummerplan til en anden udbyder i mindst en måned efter datoen for opsigelsen, medmindre slutbrugeren har givet afkald på denne ret.
4.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sikrer, at prissætningen mellem udbydere i forbindelse med udbud af nummerportabilitet er omkostningsbaseret, og at der ikke opkræves nogen direkte gebyrer hos slutbrugerne.
5.   Portering og derpå følgende aktivering af numre udføres inden for det kortest mulige tidsrum på den dato, der udtrykkeligt er aftalt med slutbrugeren. Slutbrugere, der har indgået en aftale om portering af et nummer til en ny udbyder, skal under alle omstændigheder have dette nummer aktiveret inden for en frist på én arbejdsdag fra den dato, der er aftalt med slutbrugeren. I tilfælde af fejl i porteringsprocessen genaktiverer den afgivende udbyder slutbrugerens nummer og de forbundne tjenester, indtil porteringen er gennemført. Den afgivende udbyder fortsætter med at stille tjenesten til rådighed på samme vilkår og betingelser, indtil den modtagende udbyders tjeneste er blevet aktiveret. Den tid, som tjenesten er utilgængelig under skifte- og porteringsprocessen, må under alle omstændigheder ikke udgøre mere end én arbejdsdag. Operatører, hvis adgangsnet eller -faciliteter anvendes af enten den afgivende eller den modtagende udbyder eller begge, skal sikre, at der ikke sker et tab af tjeneste, som vil forsinke skifte- og porteringsprocessen.
6.   Den modtagende udbyder forestår skifte- og porteringsprocessen som omhandlet i stk. 1 og 5, og både den modtagende og den afgivende udbyder skal samarbejde i god tro. De skal ikke forsinke eller misbruge skifte- og porteringsprocessen, og de skal heller ikke portere numre eller skifte slutbrugere uden slutbrugernes udtrykkelige samtykke. Slutbrugerens aftaler med den afgivende udbyder ophører automatisk efter afslutningen af skiftet.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan fastlægge detaljerne for skifte- og porteringsprocessen under hensyntagen til de nationale bestemmelser om aftaler, den tekniske gennemførlighed og behovet for at opretholde kontinuiteten i tjenesten til slutbrugeren. Dette indbefatter, hvor det er teknisk gennemførligt, et krav om, at porteringen skal gennemføres trådløst, medmindre en slutbruger anmoder om en anden måde. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder træffer også passende foranstaltninger til sikring af, at slutbrugerne informeres tilstrækkeligt og beskyttes under hele skifte- og porteringsprocessen og ikke bliver genstand for skift til en anden udbyder mod deres vilje.
Afgivende udbydere skal på anmodning tilbagebetale eventuel resterende kredit til forbrugere, der anvender forudbetalte ydelser. Tilbagebetalingen må kun være underlagt et gebyr, hvis dette er fastsat i aftalen. Et eventuelt gebyr skal stå i et rimeligt forhold til og svare til de faktiske omkostninger, som den afgivende udbyder pådrager sig ved at yde tilbagebetalingen.
7.   Medlemsstaterne fastsætter regler om sanktioner i tilfælde af en udbyders manglende overholdelse af forpligtelserne i denne artikel, herunder forsinket portering eller misbrug af portering foretaget af eller på vegne af en udbyder.
8.   Medlemsstaterne fastsætter regler for, at udbyderne skal yde kompensation til slutbrugerne på en let og rettidig måde i tilfælde af en udbyders manglende overholdelse af forpligtelserne i denne artikel samt i tilfælde af forsinkelser i eller misbrug af porterings- og skifteprocessen og manglende tjeneste og aftale om installation.
9.   Ud over de oplysninger, der kræves i henhold til bilag VIII, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at slutbrugerne informeres tilstrækkeligt om eksistensen af retten til kompensation, jf. stk. 7 og 8.
Artikel 107
Pakketilbud
1.   Hvis en pakke med tjenester eller en pakke med tjenester og terminaludstyr, der tilbydes en forbruger, som minimum omfatter en internetadgangstjeneste eller en offentligt tilgængelig nummerbaseret interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste, finder artikel 102, stk. 3, artikel 103, stk. 1, artikel 105 og artikel 106, stk. 1, anvendelse på alle elementerne i pakken, herunder tilsvarende anvendelse på de elementer, der ellers ikke er omfattet af disse bestemmelser.
2.   Hvis forbrugeren i henhold til EU-retten eller national ret i overensstemmelse med EU-retten har ret til at opsige et element i pakken, jf. stk. 1, inden udløbet af den fastsatte aftaleperiode på grund af manglende overensstemmelse med aftalen eller manglende levering, fastsætter medlemsstaterne, at forbrugeren har ret til at opsige aftalen med hensyn til alle elementerne i pakken.
3.   Eventuelle abonnementer på supplerende tjenester eller terminaludstyr, der udbydes eller distribueres af den samme udbyder af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, bevirker ikke, at den oprindelige varighed af aftalen, til hvilken der føjes sådanne tjenester eller sådant terminaludstyr, forlænges, medmindre forbrugeren udtrykkeligt accepterer noget andet, når den pågældende tegner abonnement på de supplerende tjenester eller det supplerende terminaludstyr.
4.   Stk. 1 og 3 finder også anvendelse på slutbrugere, der er mikrovirksomheder, små virksomheder eller nonprofitorganisationer, medmindre de udtrykkeligt har indvilliget i at give afkald på alle eller dele af disse bestemmelser.
5.   Medlemsstaterne kan også anvende stk. 1 for så vidt angår andre bestemmelser i dette afsnit.
Artikel 108
Tjenesternes tilgængelighed
Medlemsstaterne træffer alle nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre, at de talekommunikations- og internetadgangstjenester, der udbydes over offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet, i tilfælde af netsvigt som følge af katastrofesituationer eller i force majeure-situationer i videst muligt omfang stadig er tilgængelige. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at udbydere af talekommunikationstjenester træffer alle nødvendige foranstaltninger til at sikre uafbrudt adgang til beredskabstjenester og uafbrudt transmission af offentlige advarsler.
Artikel 109
Alarmkommunikationer og det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle slutbrugere af den i stk. 2 anførte tjeneste, herunder brugere af offentlige betalingstelefoner, gratis og uden at være nødsaget til at benytte nogen form for betalingsmiddel har adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikationer på det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« og på andre nationale alarmnumre, som medlemsstaterne eventuelt har fastlagt.
Medlemsstaterne fremmer adgangen til beredskabstjenesterne via det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« fra elektroniske kommunikationsnet, der ikke er offentligt tilgængelige, men som gør det muligt at foretage opkald til offentlige net, navnlig når virksomheden med ansvar for det pågældende net ikke tilbyder en alternativ og nem adgang til en beredskabstjeneste.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer efter høring af de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og beredskabstjenester og udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, at udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, hvor disse tjenester giver slutbrugere mulighed for at foretage opkald til et nummer i en national eller international nummerplan, giver adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikationer til den mest passende alarmcentral.
3.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle alarmkommunikationer til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« besvares hensigtsmæssigt og håndteres bedst muligt i forhold til den måde, som de nationale alarmsystemer er tilrettelagt på. Sådanne alarmkommunikationer besvares og håndteres mindst lige så hurtigt og effektivt som alarmkommunikationer til det eller de nationale alarmnumre i lande, hvor sådanne numre stadig er i brug.
4.   Senest den 21. december 2020 og derefter hvert andet år aflægger Kommissionen rapport til Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om effektiviteten af gennemførelsen af det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«.
5.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at adgang for slutbrugere med handicap til beredskabstjenesterne er mulig via alarmkommunikationer og svarer til, hvad der gælder for andre slutbrugere i overensstemmelse med EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser. Kommissionen og de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder eller andre kompetente myndigheder træffer passende foranstaltninger med det formål at sikre, at slutbrugere med handicap, når de rejser i en anden medlemsstat, har adgang til beredskabstjenesterne på lige fod med andre slutbrugere, hvor det er muligt uden forudgående registrering. Disse foranstaltninger skal tilstræbe at sikre interoperabilitet på tværs af medlemsstaterne og baseres i videst mulig udstrækning på europæiske standarder eller specifikationer fastlagt efter bestemmelserne i artikel 39. Sådanne foranstaltninger er ikke til hinder for, at medlemsstaterne kan vedtage yderligere krav for at forfølge målene i denne artikel.
6.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part stilles til rådighed for den mest passende alarmcentral, straks efter at alarmkommunikationen er etableret. Dette omfatter netbaserede lokaliseringsoplysninger og, hvor disse foreligger, lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, der stammer fra mobiltelefoner. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at fremskaffelse og fremsendelse af lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part er gratis for slutbrugeren og for alarmcentralen for så vidt angår samtlige alarmkommunikationer til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«. Medlemsstaterne kan udvide denne forpligtelse til at omfatte alarmkommunikationer til nationale alarmnumre. De kompetente tilsynsmyndigheder fastsætter om nødvendigt efter høring af BEREC kriterier for, hvor nøjagtige og pålidelige de lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part, der stilles til rådighed, skal være.
7.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at slutbrugerne informeres fyldestgørende om, at det fælles europæiske alarmnummer »112« findes, og om, hvordan det bruges, samt om dets tilgængelighedsfunktioner, bl.a. gennem initiativer, der specifikt er rettet mod personer, der rejser mellem medlemsstaterne, og slutbrugere med handicap. Disse oplysninger stilles til rådighed i tilgængelige formater, som er rettet mod forskellige typer af handicap. Kommissionen støtter og supplerer medlemsstaternes tiltag.
8.   For at sikre effektiv adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikationer til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« i medlemsstaterne vedtager Kommissionen efter høring af BEREC delegerede retsakter i henhold til artikel 117, der supplerer stk. 2, 5 og 6 i denne artikel, om nødvendige foranstaltninger til at sikre forenelighed, interoperabilitet, kvalitet, pålidelighed og kontinuitet i alarmkommunikationer i Unionen for så vidt angår løsninger for lokaliseringsoplysninger vedrørende den kaldende part, adgang for slutbrugere med handicap og omdirigering til den mest passende alarmcentral. Den første af sådanne delegerede retsakter vedtages senest den 21. december 2022.
Disse delegerede retsakter vedtages, uden at det indskrænker eller har nogen indvirkning på tilrettelæggelsen af beredskabstjenester, der forbliver under medlemsstaternes enekompetence.
BEREC skal vedligeholde en database over medlemsstaternes beredskabstjenesters E.164-numre for at sikre, at de er i stand til at kontakte hinanden fra den ene medlemsstat til den anden, hvis andre organisationer ikke vedligeholder en sådan database.
Artikel 110
Offentligt varslingssystem
1.   Senest den 21. juni 2022 sikrer medlemsstaterne, at der, når offentlige varslingssystemer om overhængende eller truende alvorlige nødsituationer og katastrofer er etableret, udsendes offentlige advarsler af udbydere af mobile nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester til de berørte slutbrugere.
2.   Uanset stk. 1 kan medlemsstaterne fastsætte, at offentlige advarsler udsendes via andre offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester end de i stk. 1 omhandlede og radio- og tv-transmissionstjenester, eller via en mobilapplikation, der anvender en internetadgangstjeneste, forudsat at det offentlige varslingssystem er lige så effektivt med hensyn til dækning og kapacitet til at nå ud til slutbrugere, herunder dem, som kun midlertidigt opholder sig i det pågældende område, og at det tager nøje hensyn til BEREC's retningslinjer. Offentlige advarsler skal nemt kunne modtages af slutbrugerne.
Senest den 21. juni 2020 og efter høring af myndighederne med ansvar for alarmcentraler offentliggør BEREC retningslinjer for, hvordan det vurderes, om effektiviteten af offentlige varslingssystemer i henhold til dette stykke svarer til effektiviteten af systemerne i henhold til stk. 1.
Artikel 111
Lige adgangs- og valgmuligheder for slutbrugere med handicap
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder præciserer de krav, som skal opfyldes af udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, for at sikre, at slutbrugere med handicap:
a)
har en adgang til elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, herunder de dertil hørende aftalemæssige oplysninger i henhold til artikel 102, der svarer til, hvad der gælder for størsteparten af slutbrugerne, og
b)
i lighed med størsteparten af slutbrugerne kan vælge virksomheder og tjenester.
2.   Når medlemsstaterne træffer de i stk. 1 nævnte foranstaltninger, tilskynder de til overholdelse af de relevante standarder eller specifikationer, som er fastlagt i overensstemmelse med artikel 39.
Artikel 112
Nummeroplysningstjenester
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle udbydere af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der tildeler numre fra en nummerplan, som led i udbuddet af offentligt tilgængelige nummeroplysningstjenester og telefonbøger imødekommer enhver rimelig anmodning om at stille relevante oplysninger til rådighed i nærmere aftalt form og på fair, objektive, omkostningsbaserede og ikkediskriminerende vilkår.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder har beføjelse til at indføre forpligtelser og betingelser for virksomheder, der kontrollerer slutbrugeres adgang i forbindelse med nummeroplysningstjenester i henhold til artikel 61. Sådanne forpligtelser og betingelser skal være objektive, rimelige, ikkediskriminerende og transparente.
3.   Medlemsstaterne må ikke opretholde nogen reguleringsbegrænsninger, der forhindrer slutbrugerne i én medlemsstat i at få direkte adgang til nummeroplysningstjenesten i en anden medlemsstat via taleopkald eller SMS, og de skal træffe foranstaltninger for at sikre denne adgang i henhold til artikel 97.
4.   Nærværende artikel gælder, i det omfang andet ikke er fastsat i EU-retten om beskyttelse af personoplysninger og privatlivets fred, særlig artikel 12 i direktiv 2002/58/EF.
Artikel 113
Interoperabilitet for udstyr til bilradiomodtagere og forbrugerudstyr til radiomodtagere og forbrugerudstyr til digitalt tv
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer i overensstemmelse med bilag XI interoperabilitet for det deri omhandlede udstyr til bilradiomodtagere og forbrugerudstyr til digitalt tv.
2.   Medlemsstaterne kan vedtage foranstaltninger for at sikre interoperabilitet for andre forbrugerradiomodtagere og samtidig begrænse indvirkningen på markedet for radiomodtagere af lav værdi og sørge for, at sådanne foranstaltninger ikke anvendes på produkter, hvor en radiomodtager er rent accessorisk, f.eks. smartphones, og udstyr, der anvendes af radioamatører.
3.   Medlemsstaterne tilskynder udbydere af digitale tv-tjenester til i relevant omfang at sikre, at det digitale tv-udstyr, som de leverer til deres slutbrugere, er interoperabelt, således at det digitale tv-udstyr, hvor det er teknisk muligt, er genanvendeligt hos andre udbydere af digitale tv-tjenester.
Med forbehold af artikel 5, stk. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2012/19/EU 
(
47
)
 sikrer medlemsstaterne, at slutbrugerne efter opsigelse af deres aftale har mulighed for at returnere det digitale tv-udstyr ved hjælp af en gratis og nem proces, medmindre udbyderen godtgør, at det er fuldt interoperabelt med digitale tv-tjenester fra andre udbydere, herunder dem, som slutbrugeren har skiftet til.
Digitalt tv-udstyr, som er i overensstemmelse med harmoniserede standarder, hvis referencer er offentliggjort i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
, eller med dele heraf, anses for at opfylde kravet om interoperabilitet, således som det er fastsat i det andet afsnit, der er omfattet af disse standarder eller dele deraf.
Artikel 114
Must carry-forpligtelser
1.   Medlemsstaterne kan pålægge virksomheder inden for deres jurisdiktion, som udbyder elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, der anvendes til transmission af radio- og tv-kanaler til offentligheden, en rimelig must carry-forpligtelse for så vidt angår bestemte radio- og tv-kanaler samt relaterede supplerende tjenester, navnlig tilgængelighedstjenester for at sikre slutbrugere med handicap behørig adgang og data, som understøtter internetforbundne tv-tjenester og EPG'er, hvis et betydeligt antal slutbrugere af sådanne net og tjenester anvender dem som deres primære adgang til modtagelse af radio- og tv-kanaler. En sådan forpligtelse pålægges udelukkende, hvis det er nødvendigt for at opfylde målsætninger i almenhedens interesse, som er klart defineret af den enkelte medlemsstat, og forpligtelsen skal stå i et rimeligt forhold til det tilsigtede mål og være transparent.
2.   Medlemsstaterne tager de i stk. 1 omhandlede forpligtelser op til revurdering senest den … 21. december 2019 og derefter hvert femte år, medmindre medlemsstaterne har gennemført en sådan revurdering inden for de foregående fire år.
3.   Hverken stk. 1 i denne artikel eller artikel 59, stk. 2, indskrænker medlemsstaternes ret til eventuelt at fastsætte en passende godtgørelse for så vidt angår foranstaltninger, der træffes i medfør af denne artikel, idet det sikres, at der under lignende omstændigheder ikke finder diskrimination sted i behandlingen af udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester. I tilfælde, hvor der er fastsat godtgørelse, skal medlemsstaterne sikre, at forpligtelsen til at betale godtgørelse er klart fastsat i national ret, herunder kriterierne for beregning af en sådan godtgørelse, hvis det er relevant. Medlemsstaterne skal også sikre, at den anvendes på en forholdsmæssig og transparent måde.
Artikel 115
Udbud af yderligere faciliteter
1.   Uden at det berører bestemmelserne i artikel 88, stk. 2, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan pålægge alle udbydere af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, at stille alle eller en del af de i bilag VI, del B, anførte yderligere faciliteter gratis til rådighed i den udstrækning, det er teknisk muligt, samt alle eller en del af de i bilag VI, del A, anførte yderligere faciliteter.
2.   Ved anvendelse af stk. 1 kan medlemsstaterne gå ud over listen over yderligere faciliteter i bilag VI, del A og B, for at sikre et højere forbrugerbeskyttelsesniveau.
3.   En medlemsstat kan, hvis den efter at have taget hensyn til alle berørte parters synspunkter finder, at der er tilstrækkelig adgang til disse faciliteter, vælge ikke at anvende kravene i stk. 1 på hele sit område eller en del heraf.
Artikel 116
Tilpasning af bilag
Kommissionen tillægges beføjelse til at vedtage delegerede retsakter i henhold til artikel 117 om ændring af bilag V, VI, IX, X og XI for at tage hensyn til den tekniske og sociale udvikling eller ændringer i markedsefterspørgslen.
DEL IV
AFSLUTTENDE BESTEMMELSER
Artikel 117
Udøvelse af de delegerede beføjelser
1.   Beføjelsen til at vedtage delegerede retsakter tillægges Kommissionen på de i denne artikel fastlagte betingelser.
2.   Den i artikel 75, 109 og 116 omhandlede beføjelse til at vedtage delegerede retsakter tillægges Kommissionen for en periode på fem år fra den 20. december 2018. Kommissionen udarbejder senest ni måneder inden udløbet af femårsperioden en rapport om delegationen af beføjelser. Delegationen af beføjelser forlænges stiltiende for perioder af samme varighed, medmindre Europa-Parlamentet eller Rådet modsætter sig en sådan forlængelse senest tre måneder inden udløbet af hver periode.
3.   Den i artikel 75, 109 og 116 omhandlede delegation af beføjelser kan til enhver tid tilbagekaldes af Europa-Parlamentet eller Rådet. En afgørelse om tilbagekaldelse bringer delegationen af de beføjelser, der er angivet i den pågældende afgørelse, til ophør. Den får virkning dagen efter offentliggørelsen af afgørelsen i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 eller på et senere tidspunkt, der angives i afgørelsen. Den berører ikke gyldigheden af delegerede retsakter, der allerede er i kraft.
4.   Inden vedtagelsen af en delegeret retsakt hører Kommissionen eksperter, som er udpeget af hver enkelt medlemsstat, i overensstemmelse med principperne i den interinstitutionelle aftale om bedre lovgivning af 13. april 2016.
5.   Så snart Kommissionen vedtager en delegeret retsakt, giver den samtidigt Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet meddelelse herom.
6.   En delegeret retsakt vedtaget i henhold til artikel 75, 109 og 116 træder kun i kraft, hvis hverken Europa-Parlamentet eller Rådet har gjort indsigelse inden for en frist på to måneder fra meddelelsen af den pågældende retsakt til Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet, eller hvis Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet inden udløbet af denne frist begge har informeret Kommissionen om, at de ikke agter at gøre indsigelse. Fristen forlænges med to måneder på Europa-Parlamentets eller Rådets initiativ.
Artikel 118
Udvalg
1.   Kommissionen bistås af et udvalg (»Kommunikationsudvalget«). Dette udvalg er et udvalg som omhandlet i forordning (EU) nr. 182/2011.
2.   For så vidt angår de gennemførelsesretsakter, der er omhandlet i artikel 28, stk. 4, andet afsnit, bistås Kommissionen af Frekvensudvalget, der er nedsat i henhold til artikel 3, stk. 1, i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF. Dette udvalg er et udvalg som omhandlet i forordning (EU) nr. 182/2011.
3.   Når der henvises til dette stykke, anvendes artikel 4 i forordning (EU) nr. 182/2011.
Når udvalgets udtalelse indhentes efter en skriftlig procedure, afsluttes proceduren uden noget resultat, hvis formanden for udvalget træffer beslutning herom, eller et udvalgsmedlem anmoder herom inden fristen for afgivelse af udtalelsen. I så fald indkalder formanden til et møde i udvalget inden for en rimelig frist.
4.   Når der henvises til dette stykke, finder artikel 5 i forordning (EU) nr. 182/2011 anvendelse, jf. dennes artikel 8.
Når udvalgets udtalelse indhentes efter en skriftlig procedure, afsluttes proceduren uden noget resultat, hvis formanden for udvalget træffer beslutning herom, eller et udvalgsmedlem anmoder herom inden fristen for afgivelse af udtalelsen. I så fald indkalder formanden til et møde i udvalget inden for en rimelig frist.
Artikel 119
Informationsudveksling
1.   Kommissionen giver Kommunikationsudvalget alle relevante oplysninger om resultatet af de møder, der med jævne mellemrum holdes med repræsentanter for netoperatører, tjenesteudbydere, brugere, forbrugere, producenter og fagforeninger samt tredjelande og internationale organisationer.
2.   Kommunikationsudvalget fremmer under hensyntagen til Unionens politik inden for elektronisk kommunikation udveksling af oplysninger mellem medlemsstaterne indbyrdes og mellem medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen om status og udvikling inden for regulering af elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester.
Artikel 120
Offentliggørelse af oplysninger
1.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at ajourførte oplysninger om gennemførelsen af dette direktiv gøres offentligt tilgængelige på en måde, der sikrer, at alle berørte parter har let adgang til disse oplysninger. De offentliggør en meddelelse i deres officielle tidende om, hvordan og hvor oplysningerne offentliggøres. Den første af sådanne meddelelser offentliggøres inden den 21. december 2020, og derefter offentliggøres der en meddelelse, hvor oplysningerne i den første meddelelse ændres.
2.   Medlemsstaterne sender Kommissionen en kopi af disse meddelelser, når de offentliggøres. Kommissionen videregiver i givet fald oplysningerne til Kommunikationsudvalget.
3.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at alle relevante oplysninger om rettigheder, vilkår, procedurer, gebyrer, afgifter og afgørelser i forbindelse med generelle tilladelser, brugsrettigheder og tilladelser til at installere faciliteter offentliggøres og ajourføres på passende vis, så alle interesserede parter har let adgang til disse oplysninger.
4.   Hvis oplysningerne i stk. 3, navnlig oplysninger om vilkår og procedurer for tilladelse til at installere faciliteter, føres af andre instanser, træffer den kompetente myndighed under hensyntagen til de dermed forbundne omkostninger alle rimelige foranstaltninger for at oprette en brugervenlig oversigt over disse oplysninger, herunder oplysninger om de respektive kompetente statslige niveauer og deres myndigheder, med henblik på at lette ansøgningerne om tilladelse til at installere faciliteter.
5.   Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at der offentliggøres oplysninger om de særlige forpligtelser, der pålægges virksomhederne i henhold til dette direktiv, med angivelse af det specifikke produkt og den specifikke tjeneste og de geografiske markeder. Med forbehold af behovet for at beskytte kommerciel fortrolighed, sikrer de, at ajourførte oplysninger gøres offentligt tilgængelige på en måde, der sikrer, at alle interesserede parter har let adgang til disse oplysninger.
6.   Medlemsstaterne giver Kommissionen de oplysninger, de har offentliggjort i henhold til stk. 5. Kommissionen stiller disse oplysninger til rådighed i lettilgængelig form og videregiver dem til Kommunikationsudvalget, når det er relevant.
Artikel 121
Underretning og overvågning
1.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder meddeler senest den 21. december 2020 samt umiddelbart efter eventuelle ændringer Kommissionen navnene på de virksomheder, der er udpeget til at varetage forsyningspligten i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 2, artikel 86 eller artikel 87.
2.   De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder underretter Kommissionen om, hvilke virksomheder der i henhold til dette direktiv er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, og hvilke forpligtelser de pålægges i medfør af direktivet. Enhver ændring, der har betydning for de forpligtelser, der pålægges virksomheder, eller hvilke virksomheder der er omfattet af dette direktiv, skal straks meddeles Kommissionen.
Artikel 122
Revisionsprocedurer
1.   Senest den 21. december 2025 og hvert femte år derefter undersøger Kommissionen, hvorledes dette direktiv fungerer, og aflægger beretning herom til Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet.
Disse undersøgelser evaluerer navnlig indvirkningen på markedet af artikel 61, stk. 3, og artikel 76, 78 og 79, og hvorvidt forhånds- og andre interventionsbeføjelser i medfør af dette direktiv er tilstrækkelige til at give de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder mulighed for at bekæmpe konkurrencefjendtlige oligopolistiske markedsstrukturer og sikre, at konkurrencen på markederne for elektronisk kommunikation fortsat blomstrer til gavn for slutbrugerne.
Med henblik herpå kan Kommissionen anmode medlemsstaterne om oplysninger, som stilles til rådighed uden unødig forsinkelse.
2.   Senest den 21. december 2025 og hvert femte år derefter tager Kommissionen forsyningspligtens omfang op til nyvurdering navnlig med henblik på at foreslå Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet, at omfanget ændres eller omdefineres.
Nyvurderingen foretages på grundlag af den samfundsmæssige, økonomiske og teknologiske udvikling, idet der bl.a. tages hensyn til mobilitet og transmissionshastighed under hensyn til den fremherskende teknologi, der anvendes af flertallet af slutbrugerne. Kommissionen forelægger Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet en rapport om resultatet af denne nyvurdering.
3.   BEREC afgiver senest den 21. december 2021 og derefter hvert tredje år en udtalelse om den nationale gennemførelse af den generelle tilladelse, dens funktion og indvirkningen på det indre markeds funktion.
Kommissionen kan under nøje hensyntagen til udtalelsen fra BEREC offentliggøre en rapport om anvendelsen af del I, afsnit II, kapitel II, og bilag I og kan fremsætte et lovgivningsforslag om ændring af disse bestemmelser, hvis den finder det nødvendigt for at afhjælpe hindringer for et velfungerende indre marked.
Artikel 123
Særlig revisionsprocedure vedrørende slutbrugernes rettigheder
1.   BEREC overvåger markedsudviklingen og den teknologiske udvikling med hensyn til de forskellige typer af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og offentliggør senest den 21. december 2021 og derefter hvert tredje år eller efter begrundet anmodning fra mindst to af sine medlemsstater en udtalelse om denne udvikling og dens indvirkning på anvendelsen af afsnit III i del III.
I denne udtalelse vurderer BEREC, i hvilket omfang afsnit III i del III opfylder de mål, der er fastsat i artikel 3. Udtalelsen skal navnlig tage hensyn til anvendelsesområdet for afsnit III i del III for så vidt angår de omfattede typer af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester. Som grundlag for udtalelsen analyserer BEREC navnlig:
a)
i hvilket omfang slutbrugere af alle elektroniske kommunikationstjenester er i stand til at foretage frie og kvalificerede valg, herunder på grundlag af fuldstændige aftalemæssige oplysninger, og er i stand til nemt at skifte udbyder af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester
b)
i hvilket omfang en eventuel mangel på de i litra a) omhandlede muligheder har resulteret i markedsforvridning eller skade for slutbrugerne
c)
i hvilket omfang effektiv adgang til beredskabstjenester er væsentligt truet, navnlig som følge af øget brug af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, af manglende interoperabilitet eller den teknologiske udvikling
d)
de sandsynlige omkostninger ved potentielle justeringer af forpligtelserne i afsnit III i del III eller indvirkning på innovation for udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester.
2.   Kommissionen offentliggør under størst mulig hensyntagen til BEREC's udtalelse en rapport om anvendelsen af afsnit III i del III og forelægger i givet fald et lovgivningsforslag om ændring af afsnit III, hvis den finder det nødvendigt for at sikre, at de mål, der er fastsat i artikel 3, fortsat opfyldes.
Artikel 124
Gennemførelse i national ret
1.   Medlemsstaterne vedtager og offentliggør senest den 21. december 2020 de love og administrative bestemmelser, der er nødvendige for at efterkomme dette direktiv. De meddeler straks Kommissionen teksten til disse love og bestemmelser.
Medlemsstaterne anvender disse love og bestemmelser fra den 21. december 2020.
Disse love og administrative bestemmelser skal ved vedtagelsen indeholde en henvisning til dette direktiv eller skal ved offentliggørelsen ledsages af en sådan henvisning. De skal også indeholde oplysning om, at henvisninger i gældende love og administrative bestemmelser til de direktiver, der ophæves ved dette direktiv, gælder som henvisninger til dette direktiv. Medlemsstaterne fastsætter de nærmere regler for henvisningen og træffer bestemmelse om affattelsen af den nævnte oplysning.
2.   Uanset stk. 1 i denne artikel finder dette direktivs artikel 53, stk. 2, 3 og 4, anvendelse fra den 20. december 2018, hvor harmoniserede betingelser er blevet fastsat ved tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF for at muliggøre brug af radiofrekvenser til trådløse bredbåndsnet og -tjenester. For så vidt angår radiofrekvensbånd, for hvilke harmoniserede betingelser ikke er fastsat den 20. december 2018, finder dette direktivs artikel 53, stk. 2, 3 og 4, anvendelse fra datoen for vedtagelsen af de tekniske gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF.
Uanset stk. 1 i nærværende artikel anvender medlemsstaterne de foranstaltninger, der er nødvendige for at efterkomme artikel 54 fra den 31. december 2020.
3.   Medlemsstaterne meddeler Kommissionen teksten til de vigtigste bestemmelser i national ret, som de vedtager på det område, der er omfattet af dette direktiv.
Artikel 125
Ophævede direktiver
Direktiv 2002/19/EF, 2002/20/EF, 2002/21/EF, 2002/22/EF, som fremgår af listen i bilag XII, del A, ophæves med virkning fra den 21. december 2020, uden at dette berører medlemsstaternes forpligtelser med hensyn til de i bilag XII, del B, angivne frister for gennemførelse i national ret og datoerne for anvendelse af direktiverne.
Artikel 5 i afgørelse nr. 243/2012/EU ophæves med virkning fra den 21. december 2020.
Henvisninger til de ophævede direktiver gælder som henvisninger til nærværende direktiv og læses efter sammenligningstabellen i bilag XII.
Artikel 126
Ikrafttræden
Dette direktiv træder i kraft på tredjedagen efter offentliggørelsen i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
.
Artikel 127
Adressater
Dette direktiv er rettet til medlemsstaterne.
Udfærdiget i Strasbourg, den 11. december 2018.
På Europa-Parlamentets vegne
A. TAJANI
Formand
På Rådets vegne
J. BOGNER-STRAUSS
Formanden
(
1
)
  
            
EUT C 125 af 21.4.2017, s. 56
.
(
2
)
  
            
EUT C 207 af 30.6.2017, s. 87
.
(
3
)
  Europa-Parlamentets holdning af 14.11.2018 (endnu ikke offentliggjort i EUT) og Rådets afgørelse af 4.12.2018.
(
4
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/19/EF af 7. marts 2002 om adgang til og samtrafik mellem elektroniske kommunikationsnet og tilhørende faciliteter (adgangsdirektivet) (
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 7
).
(
5
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/20/EF af 7. marts 2002 om tilladelser til elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester (tilladelsesdirektivet) (
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 21
).
(
6
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/21/EF af 7. marts 2002 om fælles rammebestemmelser for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester (
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 33
).
(
7
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/22/EF af 7. marts 2002 om forsyningspligt og brugerrettigheder i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationsnet og tjenester (forsyningspligtdirektivet) (
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 51
).
(
8
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/58/EF af 12. juli 2002 om behandling af personoplysninger og beskyttelse af privatlivets fred i den elektroniske kommunikationssektor (direktivet om databeskyttelse inden for elektronisk kommunikation) (
EFT L 201 af 31.7.2002, s. 37
).
(
9
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1211/2009 af 25. november 2009 om oprettelse af Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Tilsynsmyndigheder inden for Elektronisk Kommunikation (BEREC) og dens støttekontor (
EUT L 337 af 18.12.2009, s. 1
).
(
10
)
  
            
EUT C 77 af 28.3.2002, s. 1
.
(
11
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2010/13/EU af 10. marts 2010 om samordning af visse love og administrative bestemmelser i medlemsstaterne om udbud af audiovisuelle medietjenester (direktiv om audiovisuelle medietjenester) (
EUT L 95 af 15.4.2010, s. 1
).
(
12
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/53/EU af 16. april 2014 om harmonisering af medlemsstaternes love om tilgængeliggørelse af radioudstyr på markedet og om ophævelse af direktiv 1999/5/EF (
EUT L 153 af 22.5.2014, s. 62
).
(
13
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2015/1535 af 9. september 2015 om en informationsprocedure med hensyn til tekniske forskrifter samt forskrifter for informationssamfundets tjenester (
EUT L 241 af 17.9.2015, s. 1
).
(
14
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2120 af 25. november 2015 om foranstaltninger vedrørende adgang til det åbne internet og om ændring af direktiv 2002/22/EF om forsyningspligt og brugerrettigheder i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester og forordning (EU) nr. 531/2012 om roaming på offentlige mobilkommunikationsnet i Unionen (
EUT L 310 af 26.11.2015, s. 1
).
(
15
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/679 af 27. april 2016 om beskyttelse af fysiske personer i forbindelse med behandling af personoplysninger og om fri udveksling af sådanne oplysninger og om ophævelse af direktiv 95/46/EF (generel forordning om databeskyttelse) (
EUT L 119 af 4.5.2016, s. 1
).
(
16
)
  Domstolens dom af 26. april 1988, Bond van Adverteerders m.fl. mod den nederlandske stat, sag C-352/85, ECLI: EU:C:1988:196.
(
17
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2015 af 29. april 2015 om typegodkendelseskrav for indførelse af et køretøjsmonteret eCall-system, der er baseret på 112-tjenesten, og om ændring af direktiv 2007/46/EF (
EUT L 123 af 19.5.2015, s. 77
).
(
18
)
  Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 305/2013 af 26. november 2012 om supplering af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2010/40/EU for så vidt angår harmoniseret tilrådighedsstillelse af et interoperabelt EU-dækkende eCall-system (
EUT L 91 af 3.4.2013, s. 1
).
(
19
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse nr. 243/2012/EU af 14. marts 2012 om indførelse af et flerårigt radiofrekvenspolitikprogram (
EUT L 81 af 21.3.2012, s. 7
).
(
20
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 531/2012 af 13. juni 2012 om roaming på offentlige mobilkommunikationsnet i Unionen (omarbejdning) (
EUT L 172 af 30.6.2012, s. 10
).
(
21
)
  Navnlig Domstolens dom af 16. oktober 2012, Europa-Kommissionen mod Republikken Østrig, Sag C 614/10, ECLI; EU:C:2012:631.
(
22
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/61/EU af 15. maj 2014 om foranstaltninger for at reducere omkostningerne ved etablering af højhastighedsnet til elektronisk kommunikation (
EUT L 155 af 23.5.2014, s. 1
).
(
23
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 593/2008 af 17. juni 2008 om lovvalgsregler for kontraktlige forpligtelser (Rom I) (
EUT L 177 af 4.7.2008, s. 6
).
(
24
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets beslutning nr. 676/2002/EF af 7. marts 2002 om et frekvenspolitisk regelsæt i Det Europæiske Fællesskab (frekvenspolitikbeslutningen) (
EUT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 1
).
(
25
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2003/98/EF af 17. november 2003 om videreanvendelse af den offentlige sektors information (
EUT L 345 af 21.12.2003, s. 90
).
(
26
)
  Kommissionens henstilling 2003/361/EF af 6. maj 2003 om definitionen af mikrovirksomheder, små og mellemstore virksomheder (
EUT L 124 af 20.5.2003, s. 36
).
(
27
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2013/11/EU af 21. maj 2013 om alternativ tvistbilæggelse i forbindelse med tvister på forbrugerområdet og om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 2006/2004 og direktiv 2009/22/EF (direktiv om ATB på forbrugerområdet) (
EUT L 165 af 18.6.2013, s. 63
).
(
28
)
  Kommissionens afgørelse 2002/622/EF af 26. juli 2002 om nedsættelse af en frekvenspolitikgruppe (
EUT L 198 af 27.7.2002, s. 49
).
(
29
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/30/EU af 26. februar 2014 om harmonisering af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om elektromagnetisk kompatibilitet (
EUT L 96 af 29.3.2014, s. 79
).
(
30
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2014/35/EU af 26. februar 2014 om harmonisering af medlemsstaternes love om tilgængeliggørelse på markedet af elektrisk materiel bestemt til anvendelse inden for visse spændingsgrænser (
EUT L 96 af 29.3.2014, s. 357
).
(
31
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2016/1148 af 6. juli 2016 om foranstaltninger, der skal sikre et højt fælles sikkerhedsniveau for net- og informationssystemer i hele Unionen (
EUT L 194 af 19.7.2016, s. 1
).
(
32
)
  Rådets henstilling 1999/519/EF af 12. juli 1999 om begrænsning af befolkningens eksponering for elektromagnetiske felter (0 Hz-300 GHz) (
EUT L 199 af 30.7.1999, s. 59
).
(
33
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse (EU) 2017/899 af 17. maj 2017 om anvendelsen af 470-790 MHz-frekvensbåndet i Unionen (
EUT L 138 af 25.5.2017, s. 131
).
(
34
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2000/31/EF af 8. juni 2000 om visse retlige aspekter af informationssamfundstjenester, navnlig elektronisk handel, i det indre marked (direktiv om elektronisk handel) (
EUT L 178 af 17.7.2000, s. 1
).
(
35
)
  Kommissionens henstilling 2005/698/EF af 19. september 2005 om opsplitning af regnskaber og omkostningsregnskabssystemer i henhold til rammebestemmelserne for elektronisk kommunikation (
EUT L 266 af 11.10.2005, s. 64
).
(
36
)
  Kommissionens henstilling 2013/466/EU af 11. september 2013 om sammenhængende forpligtelser vedrørende ikkediskriminering og metoder til beregning af omkostninger for at fremme konkurrencen og forbedre investeringsmiljøet for bredbånd (
EUT L 251 af 21.9.2013, s. 13
).
(
37
)
  Rådets direktiv 93/13/EØF af 5. april 1993 om urimelige kontraktvilkår i forbrugeraftaler (
EUT L 95 af 21.4.1993, s. 29
).
(
38
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2011/83/EU af 25. oktober 2011 om forbrugerrettigheder, om ændring af Rådets direktiv 93/13/EØF og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 1999/44/EF samt om ophævelse af Rådets direktiv 85/577/EØF og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 97/7/EF (
EUT L 304 af 22.11.2011, s. 64
).
(
39
)
  Kommissionens direktiv 2002/77/EF af 16. september 2002 om konkurrence på markederne for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester (
EFT L 249 af 17.9.2002, s. 21
).
(
40
)
  
            
EUT L 123 af 12.5.2016, s. 1
.
(
41
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 182/2011 af 16. februar 2011 om de generelle regler og principper for, hvordan medlemsstaterne skal kontrollere Kommissionens udøvelse af gennemførelsesbeføjelser (
EUT L 55 af 28.2.2011, s. 13
).
(
42
)
  
            
EUT C 369 af 17.12.2011, s. 14
.
(
43
)
  Kommissionens direktiv 2008/63/EF af 20. juni 2008 om konkurrence på markederne for teleterminaludstyr (
EUT L 162 af 21.6.2008, s. 20
).
(
44
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2018/1971 af 11. december 2018 om oprettelse af Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Tilsynsmyndigheder inden for Elektronisk Kommunikation (BEREC) og Agenturet for Støtte til BEREC (BEREC-kontoret), om ændring af forordning (EU) 2015/2120 og om ophævelse af forordning (EF) nr. 1211/2009 (se side 1 i denne EUT).
(
45
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 526/2013 af 21. maj 2013 om Den Europæiske Unions Agentur for Net- og Informationssikkerhed (ENISA) og om ophævelse af forordning (EF) nr. 460/2004 (
EUT L 165 af 18.6.2013, s. 41
).
(
46
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1315/2013 af 11. december 2013 om Unionens retningslinjer for udvikling af det transeuropæiske transportnet og om ophævelse af afgørelse nr. 661/2010/EU (
EUT L 348 af 20.12.2013, s. 1
).
(
47
)
  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2012/19/EU af 4. juli 2012 om affald af elektrisk og elektronisk udstyr (WEEE) (
EUT L 197 af 24.7.2012, s. 38
).
BILAG I
LISTE OVER VILKÅR, SOM KAN KNYTTES TIL GENERELLE TILLADELSER, BRUGSRETTIGHEDER TIL RADIOFREKVENSER OG BRUGSRETTIGHEDER TIL NUMMERRESSOURCER
Dette bilag indeholder en udtømmende liste over de vilkår, som kan knyttes til generelle tilladelser for elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester (del A), elektroniske kommunikationsnet (del B), elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester (del C), brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser (del D) og brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer (del E).
A.   Generelle vilkår, som kan knyttes til generelle tilladelser
1.
Administrationsgebyrer i overensstemmelse med artikel 16.
2.
Beskyttelse af personoplysninger og privatlivets fred, der er specifik for den elektroniske kommunikationssektor, i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2002/58/EF.
3.
Oplysninger, som skal fremlægges som led i en anmeldelsesprocedure i henhold til artikel 12 og til andre formål som anført i artikel 21.
4.
Kompetente nationale myndigheders mulighed for lovlig aflytning i overensstemmelse med forordning (EU) 2016/679 og direktiv 2002/58/EF.
5.
Betingelser for brug til meddelelser fra offentlige myndigheder til offentligheden med det formål at advare mod overhængende farer og afbøde følgerne af større katastrofer.
6.
Betingelser for brug i tilfælde af omfattende katastrofer eller nationale nødsituationer med henblik på at sikre kommunikationen mellem beredskabstjenester og myndigheder.
7.
Andre adgangsforpligtelser end de i artikel 13 omhandlede, der gælder virksomheder, der udbyder elektroniske net eller tjenester.
8.
Foranstaltninger, hvis formål er at sikre overholdelse af de i artikel 39 omhandlede standarder eller specifikationer.
9.
Transparensforpligtelser for udbydere af offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet, der udbyder offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, med henblik på at sikre end-to-end-konnektivitet i overensstemmelse med målene og principperne i artikel 3 og, hvor det er nødvendigt og rimeligt, adgang for de kompetente myndigheder til de oplysninger, de har brug for til at kontrollere offentliggørelsens korrekthed.
B.   Særlige vilkår, som kan knyttes til en generel tilladelse til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationsnet
1.
Samtrafik mellem net i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
2.
Must carry-forpligtelse i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
3.
Foranstaltninger i overensstemmelse med EU-retten til beskyttelse af folkesundheden mod elektromagnetisk stråling fra elektroniske kommunikationsnet, idet der tages størst muligt hensyn til henstilling 1999/519/EF.
4.
Opretholdelse af de offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnets integritet i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv, herunder vilkår for at forhindre elektromagnetisk interferens mellem elektroniske kommunikationsnet eller tjenester i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2014/30/EU.
5.
Sikring af offentlige net mod ulovlig adgang i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2002/58/EF.
6.
Vilkår for brug af radiofrekvenser i overensstemmelse med artikel 7, stk. 2, i direktiv 2014/53/EU, hvor en sådan brug ikke er gjort afhængig af tildeling af individuel brugsrettigheder, jf. artikel 46, stk. 1, og artikel 48 i nærværende direktiv.
C.   Særlige vilkår, som kan knyttes til en generel tilladelse til udbud af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester
1.
Interoperabilitet mellem tjenester i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
2.
Slutbrugeres adgang til numre fra den nationale nummerplan, UIFN-numre og, hvor det er teknisk og økonomisk gennemførligt, fra andre medlemsstaters nummerplaner samt vilkår i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
3.
Regler om forbrugerbeskyttelse, som gælder specifikt for den elektroniske kommunikationssektor.
4.
Begrænsninger i forbindelse med transmission af ulovligt indhold i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2000/31/EF og begrænsninger i forbindelse med transmission af skadeligt indhold i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2010/13/EU.
D.   Vilkår, som kan knyttes til brugsrettigheder til radiofrekvenser
1.
Forpligtelse til at yde en tjeneste eller anvende en type teknologi inden for rammerne af artikel 45, herunder, hvor det er passende, krav vedrørende tjenesters dækning og kvalitet.
2.
Faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af radiofrekvenser i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
3.
Tekniske og operationelle vilkår, der er nødvendige for at undgå skadelig interferens og for beskyttelse af folkesundheden mod elektromagnetiske felter, idet der tages størst muligt hensyn til henstilling 1999/519/EF, når sådanne vilkår er forskellige fra dem, som indgår i den generelle tilladelse.
4.
Maksimal varighed i overensstemmelse med artikel 49 med forbehold af eventuelle ændringer i den nationale frekvensplan.
5.
Overdragelse eller udlejning af rettigheder på initiativ af rettighedshaveren og vilkår for sådanne overdragelser i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
6.
Afgifter for brugsrettigheder, jf. artikel 42.
7.
Eventuelle tilsagn, som den virksomhed, der opnår brugsrettigheder, har afgivet i forbindelse med udstedelse eller fornyelse af en tilladelse inden udstedelsen af tilladelsen eller, hvor det er relevant, indkaldelsen af ansøgninger om brugsrettigheder.
8.
Forpligtelser til at samle eller dele radiofrekvenser eller tillade adgang til radiofrekvenser for andre brugere i bestemte regioner eller på nationalt plan.
9.
Forpligtelser i henhold til relevante internationale aftaler om brug af radiofrekvensbånd.
10.
Forpligtelser, der specifikt vedrører brug af radiofrekvensbånd til forsøgsformål.
E.   Vilkår, som kan knyttes til brugsrettigheder til nummerressourcer
1.
Angivelse af, hvilken tjeneste nummeret skal bruges til, herunder eventuelle krav i tilknytning til udbuddet af denne tjeneste og, for at undgå, at der opstår tvivl, takstprincipper og maksimumspriser for bestemte nummerserier for at sikre beskyttelse af forbrugerne i overensstemmelse med artikel 3, stk. 2, litra d).
2.
Faktisk og effektiv udnyttelse af nummerressourcer i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
3.
Nummerportabilitetskrav i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv.
4.
Pligt til at stille offentlige telefonbogsoplysninger om slutbrugere til rådighed som foreskrevet i artikel 112.
5.
Maksimal gyldighedsperiode i overensstemmelse med artikel 94 med forbehold af eventuelle ændringer af den nationale nummerplan.
6.
Overdragelse af rettigheder på initiativ af rettighedshaveren og vilkår for sådanne overdragelser i overensstemmelse med dette direktiv, herunder ethvert vilkår om at brugsrettigheden til et nummer er bindende for alle virksomheder, til hvem rettighederne overdrages.
7.
Afgifter for brugsrettigheder, jf. artikel 95.
8.
Eventuelle tilsagn, som den virksomhed, der opnår brugsrettigheder, har afgivet under en konkurrencepræget eller sammenlignede udvælgelsesprocedure.
9.
Forpligtelser i henhold til relevante internationale aftaler om brug af numre.
10.
Forpligtelser vedrørende ekstraterritorial anvendelse af numre inden for Unionen for at sikre overholdelse af forbrugerbeskyttelsesregler og andre nummerrelaterede regler i andre medlemsstater end landekodens medlemsstat.
BILAG II
BETINGELSER FOR ADGANG TIL DIGITALE TV- OG RADIOTJENESTER, DER SENDES TIL SEERE OG LYTTERE I UNIONEN
Del I:
Betingelser for anvendelse af adgangsstyringssystemer i overensstemmelse med artikel 62, stk. 1
I forbindelse med adgangsstyring for digitale tv- og radiotjenester, som udsendes til seere og lyttere i Unionen, skal medlemsstaterne i overensstemmelse med artikel 62 sikre, at følgende betingelser finder anvendelse uanset transmissionsform:
a)
alle operatører af adgangsstyringstjenester, der tilbyder adgang til digitale tv- og radiotjenester, og hvis adgangsstyringstjenester radio- og tv-selskaberne er afhængige af for at nå ud til en gruppe potentielle seere eller lyttere, skal uanset transmissionsform:
—
på redelige, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår og i overensstemmelse med Unionens konkurrenceret tilbyde alle radio- og tv-selskaber tekniske tjenester, der gør det muligt for seere eller lyttere at modtage radio- og tv-selskabernes digitale transmissioner ved hjælp af dekodere, der administreres af operatørerne, og overholde Unionens konkurrenceret
—
føre særskilte regnskaber for deres aktiviteter som udbydere af adgangsstyring
b)
når indehavere af den industrielle ejendomsret til adgangsstyringsprodukter og -systemer giver licens til fabrikanter af forbrugsudstyr, skal det ske på redelige, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår. Når der gives licens, hvor der skal tages hensyn til tekniske og handelsmæssige faktorer, kan rettighedshaverne ikke opstille betingelser, der forbyder eller på anden måde forhindrer, at selve produktet udstyres med:
—
enten en standardiseret grænseflade, der giver mulighed for forbindelse med flere andre adgangsstyringssystemer
—
eller særligt udstyr til et andet adgangsstyringssystem, forudsat at licensmodtageren opfylder de relevante rimelige bestemmelser, som for dennes vedkommende garanterer sikkerheden for de transaktioner, der udføres af operatører af adgangsstyring.
Del II:
Andre faciliteter, som kan underlægges betingelser i henhold til artikel 61, stk. 2, litra d)
a)
adgang til API'er
b)
adgang til (EPG).
BILAG III
KRITERIER FOR FASTSÆTTELSE AF ENGROSTERMINERINGSTAKSTER FOR TALEOPKALD
Principper, kriterier og parametre for fastsættelse af engrostermineringstakster for taleopkald i fastnet- og mobilmarkeder som omhandlet i artikel 75, stk. 1:
a)
takster skal bygge på dækning af en effektiv operatørs omkostninger. Vurderingen af de faktiske omkostninger skal bygge på aktuelle kostpriser. Metoden til beregning af de faktiske omkostninger skal bygge på en bottom-up-model, hvor der anvendes langsigtede trafikafhængige meromkostninger ved at yde tjenesten til engrosterminering af taleopkald til tredjepart
b)
de relevante meromkostninger ved tjenesten til engrosterminering af taleopkald skal fastsættes gennem forskellen mellem de samlede langsigtede omkostninger for en operatør, der tilbyder et fuldt udbud af tjenester, og de samlede langsigtede omkostninger for en operatør, der ikke tilbyder en tjeneste til engrosterminering af taleopkald til tredjemand
c)
kun de trafikrelaterede omkostninger, som ville være undgået, såfremt der ikke blev udbudt en tjeneste til engrosterminering af taleopkald, skal indgå i opgørelsen af den relevante meromkostning ved terminering
d)
omkostninger i forbindelse med yderligere netkapacitet skal kun medregnes, i det omfang de skyldes behovet for at øge kapaciteten med det formål at håndtere yderligere trafik, der er forbundet med engrosterminering af taleopkald
e)
afgifter på radiofrekvenser skal ikke medregnes i meromkostningen ved mobilterminering
f)
der skal kun medregnes de engroshandelsomkostninger, som er direkte forbundet med udbud af tjenesten til engrosterminering af taleopkald til tredjepart
g)
alle fastnetoperatører skal anses for at udbyde tjenester til terminering af taleopkald til samme enhedspris som en effektiv operatør, uanset deres størrelse
h)
mindstestørrelsen for et effektivt net skal fastsættes til en markedsandel på mindst 20 % for mobilnetoperatører
i)
økonomisk afskrivning skal anvendes som den relevante afskrivningsmetode, og
j)
valget af teknologi for det modellerede net skal være fremadrettet, baseret på et IP-kernenet og tage hensyn til de forskellige teknologier, der sandsynligvis vil blive anvendt i gyldighedsperioden for den maksimale takst. For fastnet skal opkald udelukkende anses for at være pakkekoblede.
BILAG IV
KRITERIER FOR VURDERING AF TILBUD OM SAMINVESTERING
Når de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder vurderer et tilbud om saminvestering i henhold til artikel 76, stk. 1, skal de kontrollere, at mindst følgende kriterier er opfyldt. De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan overveje yderligere kriterier, for så vidt de er nødvendige for at sikre potentielle investorers adgang til saminvesteringen, i lyset af særlige lokale forhold og markedsstrukturen:
a)
Enhver virksomhed skal under hele levetiden for det net, der opføres inden for rammerne af et saminvesteringstilbud, have adgang til saminvesteringstilbuddet på ikkediskriminerende vilkår. I tilbuddet kan virksomheden, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition, inkludere rimelige betingelser vedrørende en virksomheds finansielle kapacitet, så potentielle medinvestorer f.eks. skal kunne vise, at de er i stand til at foretage trinvise betalinger, som danner grundlag for planlægningen af udrulningen, accept af en strategisk plan, som danner grundlag for udarbejdelse af udrulningsplaner på mellemlang sigt, osv.
b)
Saminvesteringstilbuddet skal være transparent:
—
tilbuddet er tilgængeligt og let at finde på webstedet for virksomheden, der er udpeget som havende en stærk markedsposition
—
de fulde, detaljerede vilkår skal gøres tilgængelige for potentielle tilbudsgivere, der har tilkendegivet interesse, uden unødig forsinkelse, herunder saminvesteringsaftalens retlige form og, hvor det er relevant, hensigtserklæringen om reglerne for styring af saminvesteringsorganet, og
—
forløbet, såsom køreplanen for oprettelsen og udviklingen af saminvesteringsprojektet, skal fastlægges på forhånd, eventuelle medinvestorer skal modtage en tydelig forklaring på skrift, og alle vigtige milepæle skal på en tydelig måde meddeles alle virksomheder uden diskrimination.
c)
Saminvesteringstilbuddet skal omfatte vilkår for potentielle medinvestorer, som fremmer bæredygtig konkurrence på lang sigt, særlig:
—
Alle virksomheder skal tilbydes fair, rimelige og ikkediskriminerende vilkår og betingelser for deltagelse i saminvesteringsaftalen, der afhænger af, hvornår de tilslutter sig aftalen, herunder hvad angår den finansielle modydelse, der kræves for at opnå bestemte rettigheder, hvad angår den beskyttelse, som de pågældende rettigheder giver medinvestorerne under såvel opbygningsfasen som driftsfasen, f.eks. ved at tildele umistelige brugsrettigheder i hele det saminvesteringsomfattede nets forventede levetid, og hvad angår betingelserne for tilslutning til og potentiel opsigelse af saminvesteringsaftalen. I denne sammenhæng forstås ved ikkediskriminerende vilkår ikke, at alle potentielle medinvestorer skal tilbydes nøjagtig samme vilkår, herunder finansielle vilkår, men at alle variationer af de tilbudte vilkår skal begrundes ud fra de samme objektive, transparente, ikkediskriminerende og forudsigelige kriterier, såsom det antal slutbrugertilslutninger, der indgås tilsagn om.
—
Tilbuddet skal give mulighed for fleksibilitet med hensyn til størrelsen af og tidsplanen for hver enkelt medinvestors tilsagn, f.eks. i form af en aftalt og potentielt stigende procentdel af det samlede antal slutbrugertilslutninger i et givet område, som medinvestorer gradvist kan øge deres tilsagn om, og som fastsættes på et enhedsniveau, der gør det muligt for mindre medinvestorer med begrænsede ressourcer at deltage i saminvesteringen i et rimeligt minimumsomfang og gradvist at øge deres deltagelse, samtidig med at det sikres, at det oprindelige tilsagn er tilstrækkeligt. Fastsættelsen af den enkelte medinvestors finansielle modydelse skal afspejle, at de første investorer påtager sig en større risiko og indskyder kapital på et tidligere tidspunkt.
—
Et merbidrag, som øges over tid, skal anses for berettiget for tilsagn, der indgås senere i forløbet, og for nye medinvestorer, der tilslutter sig saminvesteringen efter projektets start, for at afspejle de aftagende risici og modvirke et eventuelt incitament til at tilbageholde kapital i de tidlige faser.
—
Saminvesteringsaftalen skal give mulighed for, at medinvestorer kan overdrage erhvervede rettigheder til andre medinvestorer eller til tredjeparter, som ønsker at tilslutte sig saminvesteringsaftalen, med forbehold af at den overtagende virksomhed forpligter sig til at opfylde alle den overdragende virksomheds oprindelige forpligtelser i henhold til saminvesteringsaftalen.
—
Medinvestorerne skal på fair og rimelige vilkår og betingelser give hinanden gensidige rettigheder til adgang til den saminvesteringsomfattede infrastruktur med henblik på udbud af tjenester i de efterfølgende led, herunder til slutbrugere, på transparente betingelser, som skal være transparente i saminvesteringstilbuddet og efterfølgende aftaler, særlig når medinvestorer individuelt og særskilt har ansvaret for udrulningen af bestemte dele af nettet. Hvis der oprettes et saminvesteringsorgan, skal det give alle medinvestorer adgang til nettet, uanset om det er direkte eller indirekte, på equivalence of inputs-basis og på fair og rimelige vilkår og betingelser, herunder finansielle betingelser, der afspejler de forskellige risikoniveauer, som de enkelte medinvestorer har accepteret.
d)
Saminvesteringstilbuddet skal sikre en bæredygtig investering, der sandsynligvis vil kunne dække fremtidige behov, ved at udrulle nye netelementer, som i væsentlig grad bidrager til udrulningen af net med meget høj kapacitet.
BILAG V
MINIMUMSSÆT AF TJENESTER, SOM DEN TILSTRÆKKELIGE BREDBÅNDSINTERNETADGANGSTJENESTE I OVERENSSTEMMELSE MED ARTIKEL 84, STK. 3, SKAL VÆRE I STAND TIL AT UNDERSTØTTE
1)
e-mail
2)
søgemaskiner, der gør det muligt at søge efter og finde alle typer information
3)
grundlæggende onlineværktøjer til træning og uddannelse
4)
aviser eller nyheder på nettet
5)
køb eller bestillinger af varer og tjenester på nettet
6)
jobsøgning og jobsøgningsværktøjer
7)
erhvervsmæssige netværksaktiviteter
8)
netbanktjenester
9)
brug af e-forvaltningstjenester
10)
sociale medier og instant messaging
11)
opkald og videoopkald (standardkvalitet)
BILAG VI
BESKRIVELSE AF FACILITETER OG TJENESTER OMHANDLET I ARTIKEL 88 (KONTROL MED UDGIFTER), ARTIKEL 115 (YDERLIGERE FACILITETER) OG ARTIKEL 106 (UDBYDERSKIFT OG NUMMERPORTABILITET)
Del A
Faciliteter og tjenester omhandlet i artikel 88 og 115
Når den anvendes på grundlag af artikel 88, gælder Del A for forbrugere og andre kategorier af slutbrugere, hvis medlemsstaterne har udvidet anvendelsesområdet for, hvem der er omfattet af artikel 88, stk. 2.
Når del A anvendes på grundlag af artikel 115, gælder den for kategorier af slutbrugere som fastlagt af medlemsstaterne, undtagen for så vidt angår denne dels litra c), d) og g), som kun gælder for forbrugere.
a)
Specificerede regninger
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder med forbehold af bestemmelserne i den relevante ret om beskyttelse af personoplysninger og privatlivets fred kan fastlægge et mindsteniveau for de specificerede regninger, som udbydere skal tilbyde slutbrugerne uden beregning, for at disse kan:
i)
kontrollere og styre, hvilke beløb der er debiteret for anvendelse af internetadgangs- eller talekommunikationstjenester, eller nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester for så vidt angår artikel 115, og
ii)
følge tilstrækkeligt med i deres forbrug og udgifter og på den måde til en vis grad styre regningernes størrelse.
For en rimelig pris eller gratis kan slutbrugerne eventuelt tilbydes en større detaljeringsgrad.
Sådanne specificerede regninger skal udtrykkelig oplyse leverandørens navn og varigheden af tjenester i forbindelse med eventuelle overtakseringsnumre, medmindre slutbrugeren har anmodet om, at disse oplysninger ikke nævnes.
Opkald, der er gratis for den kaldende slutbruger, herunder opkald til hjælpetjenester, er ikke forpligtet til at figurere på den kaldende slutbrugers specificerede regning.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan kræve, at operatører stiller nummervisning gratis til rådighed.
b)
Gratis selektiv spærring af udgående opkald eller SMS eller MMS med overtaksering eller, så vidt det er teknisk muligt, andre tilsvarende applikationer.
Herved forstås en gratis facilitet, hvor slutbrugeren efter anmodning til en udbyder af talekommunikationstjenester, eller nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester for så vidt angår artikel 115, kan få spærret udgående opkald eller SMS eller MMS med overtaksering eller andre tilsvarende applikationer af nærmere bestemte typer eller til nærmere bestemte typer numre.
c)
Forudbetalingssystemer
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan forlange, at udbydere giver forbrugerne mulighed for forudbetaling af adgang til det offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet og af brug af talekommunikationstjenester eller internetadgangstjenester, eller nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester for så vidt angår artikel 115.
d)
Ratevis betaling af oprettelsesgebyrer
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder kan forlange, at udbydere giver forbrugerne mulighed for at betale for tilslutning til det offentlige elektroniske kommunikationsnet i flere rater.
e)
Ubetalte regninger
Medlemsstaterne tillader, at der træffes nærmere bestemte, rimeligt afpassede, ikkediskriminerende og offentliggjorte foranstaltninger med det formål at få dækket ubetalte regninger udstedt af udbydere. Disse foranstaltninger skal omfatte bestemmelser om, at slutbrugeren på forhånd varsles behørigt om eventuelle følger i form af afbrydelse af tjenesten eller afkobling fra nettet. Bortset fra tilfælde af bedrageri, gentagne tilfælde af for sen betaling eller manglende betaling sikres det ved disse foranstaltninger, at det, så vidt det er teknisk muligt, kun er den berørte tjeneste, der afbrydes. Afkobling fra nettet på grund af manglende betaling finder først sted, efter at slutbrugeren har fået en advarsel herom passende tid i forvejen. Medlemsstaterne kan tillade en periode med begrænset service inden fuldstændig frakobling, hvorunder der kun er mulighed for opkald, som er gratis for slutbrugeren (f.eks. opkald til alarmnummer »112«), og et minimumstjenesteniveau for internetadgangstjenester, som medlemsstaterne fastlægger i lyset af nationale forhold.
f)
Rådgivning om takster
Herved forstås den facilitet, hvorved slutbrugere kan anmode en udbyder om at tilbyde oplysninger om alternative lavere takster, hvis sådanne er tilgængelige.
g)
Udgiftskontrol
Herved forstås den facilitet, hvorved udbydere tilbyder andre midler, som eventuelt er fastlagt af de kompetente myndigheder i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, til at kontrollere udgifterne til talekommunikationstjenester eller internetadgangstjenester, eller nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester for så vidt angår artikel 115, herunder gratis underretning af forbrugerne i tilfælde af unormale og overdrevne forbrugsmønstre.
h)
Facilitet til at deaktivere tredjepartsfakturering
Herved forstås den facilitet, hvorved slutbrugere kan deaktivere tredjepartstjenesteudbyderes mulighed for at anvende regningen fra en udbyder af en internetadgangstjeneste eller en udbyder af en offentligt tilgængelig interpersonel kommunikationstjeneste til at opkræve betaling for deres produkter eller tjenester.
Del B
Faciliteter omhandlet i artikel 115
a)
Nummervisning
Herved forstås, at den kaldte part kan se den kaldende parts nummer, inden samtalen etableres.
Denne facilitet skal udbydes i overensstemmelse med den relevante ret om beskyttelse af personoplysninger og privatlivets fred, navnlig direktiv 2002/58/EF.
I det omfang, det er teknisk muligt, stiller operatørerne data og signaler til rådighed for at gøre det lettere at tilbyde nummervisning og tonesignalering på tværs af medlemsstaternes grænser.
b)
Videresendelse af eller adgang til e-mails efter opsigelse af en aftale med en udbyder af en internetadgangstjeneste
Denne facilitet skal på anmodning og gratis gøre det muligt for slutbrugere, som opsiger deres aftale med en udbyder af en internetadgangstjeneste, enten at få adgang til deres e-mails modtaget på den eller de e-mailadresser, som bygger på den tidligere udbyders virksomhedsnavn eller varemærke, i en periode, som den nationale tilsynsmyndighed skønner nødvendig og rimelig, eller få videresendt e-mails, der sendes til denne eller disse adresser i den pågældende periode, til en ny e-mailadresse, som slutbrugeren angiver.
Del C
Gennemførelse af bestemmelserne om nummerportabilitet i artikel 106
Kravet om, at alle slutbrugere med numre fra den nationale nummerplan efter anmodning kan beholde deres nummer eller numre uafhængigt af, hvilken virksomhed der leverer tjenesten, gælder
a)
for så vidt angår geografiske numre på et bestemt sted og
b)
for så vidt angår ikkegeografiske numre på et hvilket som helst sted.
Denne del finder ikke anvendelse på nummerportabilitet mellem net, der udbyder tjenester på et fast sted, og mobilnet.
BILAG VII
BEREGNING AF EVENTUELLE NETTOOMKOSTNINGER VED FORSYNINGSPLIGTEN OG FASTLÆGGELSE AF EN EVENTUEL KOMPENSATIONS- ELLER DELEORDNING I HENHOLD TIL ARTIKEL 89 OG 90
Del A
Beregning af nettoomkostninger
Ved forsyningspligt forstås den pligt, som en medlemsstat pålægger en virksomhed til at udbyde forsyningspligtydelser som fastsat i artikel 84-87.
De nationale tilsynsmyndigheder tager alle midler under overvejelse med henblik på at give virksomhederne (udpegede eller ikkeudpegede) det fornødne incitament til at udbyde forsyningspligtydelser på en omkostningseffektiv måde. Nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligten beregnes som forskellen mellem de nettodriftsomkostninger, en virksomhed har med denne pligt, og de nettodriftsomkostninger, den ville have uden denne pligt. Der lægges vægt på, at omkostninger, som virksomheden ville have valgt at undgå, hvis der ikke havde været nogen forsyningspligt, vurderes så korrekt som muligt. Der tages ved beregningen af nettoomkostningerne højde for de fordele, herunder immaterielle fordele, der kommer forsyningspligtudbydere til gode.
Beregningen baseres på de omkostninger, der kan henføres til:
i)
elementer af de pågældende tjenester, som kun kan udbydes med tab eller på omkostningsbetingelser, der falder uden for almindelige forretningsmæssige standarder.
Dette kan f.eks. omfatte adgang til beredskabstelefontjenester, visse offentlige betalingstelefoner, bestemte tjenester eller bestemt udstyr til slutbrugere med handicap mv.
ii)
bestemte slutbrugere eller grupper af slutbrugere, som, under hensyntagen til omkostninger og indtægter ved bestemte net- og tjenesteudbud samt eventuelle af medlemsstaten foreskrevne, geografisk bestemte gennemsnitstakster, kun kan betjenes med tab eller på omkostningsbetingelser, der falder uden for almindelige forretningsmæssige standarder.
Dette omfatter f.eks. slutbrugere eller grupper af slutbrugere, som ikke ville blive betjent af en kommerciel udbyder uden forsyningspligt.
Nettoomkostningerne ved bestemte aspekter af forsyningspligten beregnes særskilt for at undgå at medregne eventuelle direkte eller indirekte fordele og omkostninger to gange. Forsyningspligtens samlede nettoomkostninger beregnes for alle virksomheders vedkommende som summen af nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligtens enkelte komponenter iberegnet eventuelle immaterielle fordele. Den nationale tilsynsmyndighed har ansvar for at kontrollere, at nettoomkostningerne er korrekt beregnet.
Del B
Kompensation af nettoomkostninger ved forsyningspligt
Dækning eller finansiering af eventuelle nettoomkostninger ved forsyningspligt kan kræve, at virksomheder med forsyningspligt godtgøres for de tjenester, som de udbyder på ikkeforretningsmæssige vilkår. Eftersom en sådan godtgørelse indebærer finansielle overførsler, sikrer medlemsstaterne, at disse overførsler foretages på en objektiv, transparent, ikkediskriminerende og forholdsmæssigt afpasset måde. Dette betyder, at overførslerne medfører mindst mulig konkurrence- og brugerefterspørgselsforvridning.
I overensstemmelse med artikel 90, stk. 3, anvender en deleordning, der bygger på en fond, en transparent og neutral måde til opkrævning af bidrag, som undgår risikoen for dobbelt pålæggelse af bidrag på både input- og outputsiden for virksomheder.
Det uafhængige organ, der forvalter fonden, er ansvarligt for at opkræve bidrag fra de virksomheder, som vurderes at skulle bidrage til nettoomkostningerne ved forsyningspligt i den pågældende medlemsstat, og skal føre tilsyn med overførsler af skyldige beløb eller administrative betalinger til de virksomheder, der har ret til at modtage betalinger fra fonden.
BILAG VIII
OPLYSNINGSKRAV I HENHOLD TIL ARTIKEL 102 (OPLYSNINGSKRAV VEDRØRENDE AFTALER)
A.
Oplysningskrav til udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester
Udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester, bortset fra transmissionstjenester, der anvendes til levering af maskine-til-maskine-tjenester, skal stille følgende oplysninger til rådighed:
1)
som en del af de vigtigste egenskaber for hver udbudt tjeneste: eventuelle minimumsniveauer for kvaliteten af tjenesten, i det omfang sådanne tilbydes, og for andre tjenester end internetadgangstjenester: de specifikke lovede kvalitetsparametre.
Når der ikke tilbydes nogen minimumsniveauer for kvaliteten af tjenesten, udfærdiges der en erklæring herom
2)
som en del af prisoplysningerne, når og i det omfang det er relevant, de respektive priser for at aktivere elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og for eventuelle tilbagevendende eller forbrugsrelaterede gebyrer
3)
som en del af oplysningerne om aftalens varighed og betingelserne for fornyelse og opsigelse af aftalen, herunder eventuelle opsigelsesgebyrer, i det omfang, der gælder sådanne betingelser:
i)
eventuelle minimumskrav til anvendelse og varighed, som skal være opfyldt for at kunne nyde godt af kampagnevilkår
ii)
eventuelle gebyrer i forbindelse med skift samt kompensations- og refusionsordninger ved forsinkelser eller misbrug i forbindelse med skift og information om de respektive procedurer
iii)
oplysninger om retten for forbrugere, der anvender forudbetalte tjenester, til tilbagebetaling efter anmodning af en eventuel resterende kredit i tilfælde af udbyderskift, jf. artikel 106, stk. 6
iv)
eventuelle gebyrer ved for tidlig opsigelse af aftalen, herunder information om, hvordan terminaludstyr låses op, og dækning af omkostninger i forbindelse med terminaludstyr
4)
eventuelle godtgørelses- og refusionsordninger, herunder, hvor det er relevant, en udtrykkelig henvisning til forbrugernes rettigheder, såfremt det kontraktfæstede niveau for kvaliteten af tjenesten ikke opfyldes, eller hvis en udbyder reagerer utilstrækkeligt på en sikkerhedshændelse, en trussel eller en sårbarhed
5)
hvilken type handlinger udbyderen kan foretage som reaktion på sikkerhedsmæssige hændelser eller trusler eller sårbarheder.
B.
Oplysningskrav til udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester
I.
Ud over kravene i del A skal udbydere af internetadgangstjenester og offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester stille følgende oplysninger til rådighed:
1)
som en del af de vigtigste egenskaber for hver udbudt tjeneste:
i)
eventuelle minimumsniveauer for kvaliteten af tjenesten, i det omfang sådanne tilbydes, og under størst mulig hensyntagen til BEREC's retningslinjer, som er vedtaget i overensstemmelse med artikel 104, stk. 2, i forbindelse med:
—
internetadgangstjenester: som minimum latenstid, jitter og pakketab
—
offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, hvor de som minimum udøver kontrol over nogle af nettets elementer eller har en serviceleveranceaftale herom med virksomheder, der udbyder adgang til nettet: som minimum tiden for oprettelse af den første forbindelse, fejlsandsynlighed og forsinkelse på opkaldssignal i overensstemmelse med bilag X og
ii)
uden at det berører slutbrugernes ret til at bruge terminaludstyr efter eget valg, jf. artikel 3, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2015/2120, eventuelle betingelser, herunder gebyrer, pålagt brugen af det leverede terminaludstyr af udbyderen
2)
som en del af prisoplysningerne, når og i det omfang det er relevant, de respektive priser for at aktivere elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og for eventuelle tilbagevendende eller forbrugsrelaterede gebyrer:
i)
detaljerede oplysninger om de specifikke abonnements- og prisvilkår i henhold til aftalen og for alle sådanne abonnements- og prisvilkår typerne af tilbudte tjenester, herunder, hvor det er relevant, kommunikationsmængderne (f.eks. MB, minutter, beskeder) for den enkelte afregningsperiode og prisen på yderligere kommunikationsenheder
ii)
i tilfælde af abonnements- og prisvilkår med en forudbestemt kommunikationsmængde muligheden for, at forbrugerne kan overføre en eventuel uudnyttet del af denne mængde fra den foregående faktureringsperiode til den følgende faktureringsperiode, når denne mulighed fremgår af aftalen
iii)
faciliteter til at sikre transparente regninger og overvåge forbruget
iv)
takstoplysninger vedrørende numre eller tjenester, for hvilke der gælder særlige prisvilkår; de kompetente myndigheder kan i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder, hvad angår individuelle kategorier af tjenester, derudover kræve, at sådanne oplysninger gives umiddelbart inden etablering af opkaldet eller forbindelsen med udbyderen af tjenesten
v)
for pakketjenester og pakker, herunder både tjenester og terminaludstyr, prisen på de enkelte elementer i pakken, i det omfang de også markedsføres separat
vi)
oplysninger om og betingelser, herunder gebyrer, for eventuel eftersalgs-, vedligeholdelses- og kundeservice og
vii)
metoderne til at indhente ajourførte oplysninger om alle relevante takster og vedligeholdelsesgebyrer
3)
som en del af oplysningerne om varigheden af aftalen om pakketjenester og betingelserne for fornyelse og opsigelse af aftalen, hvor det er relevant, betingelserne for opsigelse af pakken eller dele heraf
4)
med forbehold af artikel 13 i forordning (EU) 2016/679 oplysninger om, hvilke personlige oplysninger der skal gives inden udførelsen af tjenesten eller indsamles i forbindelse med leveringen af tjenesten
5)
detaljerede oplysninger om produkter og tjenester udformet til slutbrugere med handicap, og hvordan ajourførte oplysninger kan opnås
6)
hvordan en procedure til bilæggelse af tvister indledes, herunder både nationale tvister og tvister på tværs af grænser, jf. artikel 25.
II.
Ud over kravene i del A og i punkt I skal udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester også stille følgende oplysninger til rådighed:
1)
eventuelle begrænsninger på adgang til beredskabstjenester eller lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part på grund af manglende tekniske muligheder, for så vidt som tjenesten tillader slutbrugere at spore opkald tilbage til et nummer i en national eller international nummerplan
2)
slutbrugernes ret til selv at afgøre, om deres personoplysninger skal medtages i en telefonbog, og i så fald de typer af relevante oplysninger, der medtages, i henhold til artikel 12 i direktiv 2002/58/EF.
III.
Ud over kravene i del A og i punkt I skal udbydere af internetadgangstjenester også stille de oplysninger, der kræves i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2015/2120, til rådighed.
BILAG IX
OPLYSNINGER, DER SKAL OFFENTLIGGØRES I HENHOLD TIL ARTIKEL 103 (GENNEMSIGTIGHED OG OFFENTLIGGØRELSE AF OPLYSNINGER)
Den kompetente myndighed er i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ansvarlig for, at oplysningerne i dette bilag offentliggøres som foreskrevet i artikel 103. Den kompetente myndighed afgør i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, hvilke oplysninger det er relevant, at udbydere af internetadgangstjenester eller offentligt tilgængelige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester offentliggør, og hvilke oplysninger der skal offentliggøres af den kompetente myndighed selv i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, for at sikre, at alle slutbrugerne har mulighed for at træffe et informeret valg. De kompetente myndigheder kan i koordination med, hvis det er relevant, de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder fremme selv- eller samregulerede foranstaltninger forud for indførelse af eventuelle forpligtelser, hvis det skønnes hensigtsmæssigt.
1.
Virksomhedens kontaktoplysninger
2.
Beskrivelse af de tjenester, der udbydes
2.1.
Omfanget af de tjenester, der udbydes, og de vigtigste egenskaber for hver udbudt tjeneste, herunder eventuelle minimumsniveauer for kvaliteten af tjenesten, hvor sådanne tilbydes, og enhver begrænsning, som pålægges af udbyderen, i brugen af leveret terminaludstyr
2.2.
Takster for de udbudte tjenester, herunder oplysninger om kommunikationsmængder (såsom begrænsninger på dataforbrug, antallet af taleminutter, antallet af beskeder) for bestemte abonnements- og prisvilkår og de gældende takster for yderligere kommunikationsenheder, numre eller tjenester, for hvilke der gælder særlige prisvilkår, gebyrer for adgang og vedligeholdelse, alle former for brugsgebyrer, særlige og målrettede takstordninger samt eventuelle ekstragebyrer og omkostninger til terminaludstyr
2.3.
Tilbudt eftersalgs-, vedligeholdelses- og kundeservice og de relevante kontaktoplysninger
2.4.
Standardaftalevilkår, herunder i givet fald oplysninger om aftalens varighed, gebyrer ved for tidlig opsigelse af aftalen, rettigheder i forbindelse med opsigelse af pakketilbud eller dele heraf og procedurer og direkte gebyrer i forbindelse med nummerportabilitet og andre identifikationsmidler
2.5.
Oplysninger om adgang til beredskabstjenester og lokaliseringsoplysninger om den kaldende part eller oplysninger om eventuelle begrænsninger for sidstnævnte, hvis virksomheden er udbyder af nummerbaserede interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester. Oplysninger om, i hvilken grad adgang til beredskabstjenester er understøttet eller ej, hvis virksomheden er udbyder af nummeruafhængige interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester
2.6.
Detaljerede oplysninger om produkter og tjenester, herunder eventuelle funktioner, praksis, politikker og procedurer og ændringer i driften af tjenesten, specifikt udformet til slutbrugere med handicap, jf. EU-retten om harmonisering af tilgængelighedskrav til produkter og tjenesteydelser
3.
Tvistbilæggelsesordninger, herunder ordninger, der er fastlagt af den pågældende virksomhed.
BILAG X
PARAMETRE FOR TJENESTEKVALITET
Parametre, definitioner og målemetoder for tjenestekvalitet, jf. artikel 104
For udbydere af adgang til et offentligt elektronisk kommunikationsnet
PARAMETER
(note 1)
DEFINITION
MÅLEMETODE
Leveringstid for tilslutning
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Fejlhyppighed pr. abonnentledning
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Ventetid for fejlretning
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
For udbydere af interpersonelle kommunikationstjenester, der som minimum udøver kontrol over nogle af nettets elementer eller har en serviceleveranceaftale herom med virksomheder, der udbyder adgang til nettet
PARAMETER
(note 2)
DEFINITION
MÅLEMETODE
Etableringstider for opkald
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Klager over urigtig fakturering
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Opkaldskvalitet
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Procent afbrudte opkald
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Procent mislykkede opkald
(note 2)
ETSI EG 202 057
ETSI EG 202 057
Fejlsandsynlighed
Forsinkelse på opkaldssignal
Der er tale om version 1.3.1 af ETSI EG 202 057-1 (juli 2008)
For udbydere af internetadgangstjenester
PARAMETER
DEFINITION
MÅLEMETODE
Latenstid (forsinkelse)
ITU-T Y.2617
ITU-T Y.2617
Jitter
ITU-T Y.2617
ITU-T Y.2617
Pakketab
ITU-T Y.2617
ITU-T Y.2617
Note 1
Parametrene måles således, at der kan foretages en præstationsanalyse på regionalt niveau (dvs. mindst med en detaljeringsgrad, der svarer til niveau 2 i Eurostats nomenklatur for statistiske territoriale enheder (NUTS)).
Note 2
Medlemsstaterne kan beslutte ikke at kræve ajourførte oplysninger vedrørende kvalitetsmålene for disse to indikatorer, hvis det kan dokumenteres, at kvaliteten inden for disse to områder er tilfredsstillende.
BILAG XI
INTEROPERABILITET FOR UDSTYR TIL BILRADIOMODTAGERE OG FORBRUGERUDSTYR TIL DIGITALT TV SOM OMHANDLET I ARTIKEL 113
1.
Fælles krypteringsalgoritme og modtagelse af ukrypterede signaler
Alt forbrugerudstyr til modtagelse af digitale tv-signaler (dvs. udsendelse via jordbaseret transmission eller kabel- eller satellittransmission), som i Unionen sælges, udlejes eller på anden vis stilles til rådighed og er i stand til dekryptering af digitale tv-signaler, skal kunne:
a)
dekryptere sådanne signaler baseret på en fælles europæisk krypteringsalgoritme, der administreres af en anerkendt europæisk standardiseringsorganisation, p.t. ETSI
b)
gengive signaler, der transmitteres ukrypteret, forudsat at lejeren overholder den gældende lejeaftale, hvis der er tale om lejet udstyr.
2.
Interoperabilitet for digitale tv-apparater
Alle digitale tv-apparater med indbygget skærm, der markedsføres med henblik på salg eller leje i Unionen, og hvis synlige skærmbillede målt diagonalt er større end 30 cm, skal være udstyret med mindst ét stik baseret på en åben grænseflade (som enten er standardiseret af, eller som overholder en standard, der er vedtaget af en anerkendt europæisk standardiseringsorganisation, eller er i overensstemmelse med en industrispecifikation), der muliggør en enkel tilslutning af periferiudstyr, og som skal kunne overføre alle relevante elementer af et digitalt tv-signal, herunder information vedrørende interaktive og adgangsstyrede tjenester.
3.
Interoperabilitet for bilradiomodtagere
Bilradiomodtagere, der er indbygget i et nyt køretøj i klasse M, som er gjort tilgængeligt på markedet til salg eller leje i Unionen fra den 21. december 2020, skal bestå af en modtager, som kan modtage og gengive mindst radiotjenester udsendt via digital jordbaseret radiotransmission. Modtagere, som er i overensstemmelse med harmoniserede standarder, hvis referencer er offentliggjort i 
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
, eller med dele heraf, anses for at opfylde dette krav, der er omfattet af disse standarder eller dele deraf.
BILAG XII
Del A
Ophævede direktiver med oversigt over efterfølgende ændringer heraf
(jf. artikel 125)
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/21/EF
(
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 33
)
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2009/140/EF
(
EUT L 337 af 18.12.2009, s. 37
)
Artikel 1
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 544/2009
(
EUT L 167 af 29.6.2009, s. 12
)
Artikel 2
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 717/2007
(
EUT L 171 af 29.6.2007, s. 32
)
Artikel 10
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/20/EF
(
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 21
)
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2009/140/EF
(
EUT L 337 af 18.12.2009, s. 37
)
Artikel 3 og bilag
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/19/EF
(
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 7
)
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2009/140/EF
(
EUT L 337 af 18.12.2009, s. 37
)
Artikel 2
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2002/22/EF
(
EFT L 108 af 24.4.2002, s. 51
)
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2009/136/EF
(
EUT L 337 af 18.12.2009, s. 11
)
Artikel 1 og bilag I
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2120
(
EUT L 310 af 26.11.2015, s. 1
)
Artikel 8
Del B
Frister for gennemførelse i national ret og anvendelsesdatoer
(jf. artikel 125)
Direktiv
Frist for gennemførelse
Anvendelsesdato
2002/19/EF
24. juli 2003
25. juli 2003
2002/20/EF
24. juli 2003
25. juli 2003
2002/21/EF
24. juli 2003
25. juli 2003
2002/22/EF
24. juli 2003
25. juli 2003
BILAG XIII
SAMMENLIGNINGSTABEL
Direktiv 2002/21/EF
Direktiv 2002/20/EF
Direktiv 2002/19/EF
Direktiv 2002/22/EF
Nærværende direktiv
Artikel 1, stk. 1, 2 og 3
Artikel 1, stk. 1, 2 og 3
Artikel 1, stk. 3a
Artikel 1, stk. 4
Artikel 1, stk. 4 og 5
Artikel 1, stk. 5 og 6
Artikel 2, litra a)
Artikel 2, nr. 1
—
—
—
—
Artikel 2, nr. 2
Artikel 2, litra b)
Artikel 2, nr. 3
Artikel 2, litra c)
Artikel 2, nr. 4
—
—
—
—
Artikel 2, nr. 5
—
—
—
—
Artikel 2, nr. 6
—
—
—
—
Artikel 2, nr. 7
Artikel 2, litra d)
Artikel 2, nr. 8
Artikel 2, litra da)
Artikel 2, nr. 9
Artikel 2, litra e)
Artikel 2, nr. 10
Artikel 2, litra ea)
Artikel 2, nr. 11
Artikel 2, litra f)
Artikel 2, nr. 12
Artikel 2, litra g)
—
Artikel 2, litra h)
Artikel 2, nr. 13
Artikel 2, litra i)
Artikel 2, nr. 14
Artikel 2, litra j)
—
Artikel 2, litra k)
—
Artikel 2, litra l)
—
Artikel 2, litra m)
Artikel 2, nr. 15
Artikel 2, litra n)
Artikel 2, nr. 16
Artikel 2, litra o)
Artikel 2, nr. 17
Artikel 2, litra p)
Artikel 2, nr. 18
Artikel 2, litra q)
Artikel 2, nr. 19
Artikel 2, litra r)
Artikel 2, nr. 20
Artikel 2, litra s)
Artikel 2, nr. 21
—
—
—
—
Artikel 2, nr. 22
Artikel 3, stk. 1
Artikel 5, stk. 1
—
—
—
—
Artikel 5, stk. 2
Artikel 3, stk. 2
Artikel 6, stk. 1
Artikel 3, stk. 3
Artikel 6, stk. 2
Artikel 3, stk. 3a, første afsnit
Artikel 8, stk. 1
—
—
—
—
Artikel 8, stk. 2
—
—
—
—
Artikel 7, stk. 1
Artikel 3, stk. 3a, andet afsnit
Artikel 7, stk. 2 og 3
Artikel 3, stk. 3a, tredje afsnit
Artikel 9, stk. 1 og 3
—
—
—
—
Artikel 9, stk. 2
Artikel 3, stk. 3b
Artikel 10, stk. 1
Artikel 3, stk. 3c
Artikel 10, stk. 2
Artikel 3, stk. 4
Artikel 5, stk. 3
Artikel 3, stk. 5
Artikel 11
Artikel 3, stk. 6
Artikel 5, stk. 4
Artikel 4
Artikel 31
Artikel 5
Artikel 20
—
—
—
—
Artikel 22
Artikel 6
Artikel 23
Artikel 7
Artikel 32
Artikel 7a
Artikel 33
—
—
—
—
Artikel 33, stk. 5, litra c)
Artikel 8, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 3, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 8, stk. 5
Artikel 3, stk. 3
Artikel 8a, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 4, stk. 1 og 2
—
—
—
—
Artikel 4, stk. 3
Artikel 8a, stk. 3
Artikel 4, stk. 4
—
—
—
—
Artikel 29
Artikel 9, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 45, stk. 1 og 2
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Artikel 45, stk. 3
Artikel 9, stk. 3
Artikel 45, stk. 4
Artikel 9, stk. 4 og 5
Artikel 45, stk. 5 og 6
Artikel 9, stk. 6 og 7
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Artikel 9a
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Artikel 9b, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 51, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 9b, stk. 3
Artikel 51, stk. 4
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Artikel 51, stk. 3
Artikel 10, stk. 1
Artikel 95, stk. 1
Artikel 10, stk. 2
Artikel 95, stk. 3
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Artikel 95, stk. 2
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Artikel 95, stk. 4
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Artikel 95, stk. 6
Artikel 10, stk. 3
Artikel 95, stk. 7
Artikel 10, stk. 4
Artikel 95, stk. 8
Artikel 10, stk. 5
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Artikel 11
Artikel 43
Artikel 12, stk. 1
Artikel 44, stk. 1
Artikel 12, stk. 2
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Artikel 12, stk. 3
Artikel 61, stk. 2
Artikel 12, stk. 4
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Artikel 12, stk. 5
Artikel 44, stk. 2
Artikel 13
Artikel 17
Artikel 13a, stk. 1, 2 og 3
Artikel 40, stk. 1, 2 og 3
Artikel 13a, stk. 4
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Artikel 40, stk. 5
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Artikel 40, stk. 4
Artikel 13b, stk. 1, 2 og 3
Artikel 41, stk. 1, 2 og 3
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Artikel 41, stk. 4
Artikel 13b, stk. 4
Artikel 41, stk. 7
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Artikel 41, stk. 5
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Artikel 14
Artikel 63
Artikel 15, stk. 1, 2 og 3
Artikel 64, stk. 1, 2 og 3—
Artikel 15, stk. 4
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Artikel 66
Artikel 16
Artikel 67
Artikel 17
Artikel 39
Artikel 18
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Artikel 19
Artikel 38
Artikel 20
Artikel 26
Artikel 21, stk. 1
Artikel 27, stk. 1
Artikel 21, stk. 2, første og andet afsnit
Artikel 27, stk. 2
Artikel 21, stk. 2, tredje afsnit
Artikel 27, stk. 3
Artikel 21, stk. 2, fjerde og femte afsnit
Artikel 27, stk. 4
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Artikel 27, stk. 5
Artikel 21, stk. 3
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Artikel 21, stk. 4
Artikel 27, stk. 6
Artikel 21a
Artikel 29
Artikel 22, stk. 1
Artikel 118, stk. 1
Artikel 22, stk. 2
Artikel 118, stk. 3
Artikel 22, stk. 3
Artikel 118, stk. 4
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Artikel 11, stk. 2
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Artikel 118, stk. 5
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Artikel 117
Artikel 23
Artikel 119
Artikel 24
Artikel 120, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 25
Artikel 122, stk. 1
Artikel 26
Artikel 125
Artikel 28
Artikel 124
Artikel 29
Artikel 127
Artikel 30
Artikel 128
Bilag II
—
Artikel 1
Artikel 1, stk. 1
Artikel 2, stk. 1
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Artikel 2, stk. 2
Artikel 2, nr. 22
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Artikel 2, nr. 23
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Artikel 2, nr. 24
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Artikel 2, nr. 25
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Artikel 2, nr. 26
Artikel 3, stk. 1
Artikel 12, stk. 1
Artikel 3, stk. 2, første punktum
Artikel 12, stk. 2
Artikel 3, stk. 2, andet, tredje og fjerde punktum
Artikel 12, stk. 3
Artikel 3, stk. 3
Artikel 12, stk. 4
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Artikel 4
Artikel 15
Artikel 5, stk. 1
Artikel 46, stk. 1
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Artikel 46, stk. 2 og 3
Artikel 5, stk. 2, første afsnit
Artikel 48, stk. 1
Artikel 5, stk. 2, andet afsnit, første punktum
Artikel 48, stk. 2
Artikel 5, stk. 2, tredje afsnit
Artikel 48, stk. 5
Artikel 5, stk. 2, andet afsnit, andet punktum
Artikel 48, stk. 3
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Artikel 48, stk. 4
Artikel 5, stk. 3
Artikel 48, stk. 6
Artikel 5, stk. 4 og 5
Artikel 93, stk. 4 og 5
Artikel 5, stk. 6
Artikel 52
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Artikel 93
Artikel 6, stk. 1-4
Artikel 13
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Artikel 47
Artikel 7
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Artikel 55
Artikel 8
Artikel 36
Artikel 9
Artikel 14
Artikel 10
Artikel 30
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Artikel 11
Artikel 21
Artikel 12
Artikel 16
Artikel 13
Artikel 42
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Artikel 94
Artikel 14, stk. 1
Artikel 18
Artikel 14, stk. 2
Artikel 19
Artikel 15
Artikel 120, stk. 3 og 4
Artikel 16
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Artikel 17
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Artikel 18
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Artikel 19
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Artikel 20
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Bilag
Bilag I
Artikel 1, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 1, stk. 2 og 3
Artikel 2, litra a)
Artikel 2, nr. 27
Artikel 2, litra b)
Artikel 2, nr. 28
Artikel 2, litra c)
Artikel 2, nr. 29
Artikel 2, litra d)
—
Artikel 2, litra e)
Artikel 2, nr. 30
Artikel 3
Artikel 59
Artikel 4
Artikel 60
Artikel 5
Artikel 61
Artikel 6
Artikel 62
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Artikel 8
Artikel 68
Artikel 9
Artikel 69
Artikel 10
Artikel 70
Artikel 11
Artikel 71
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Artikel 72
Artikel 12
Artikel 73
Artikel 13
Artikel 74
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Artikel 75
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Artikel 76
Artikel 13a
Artikel 77
Artikel 13b
Artikel 78
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Artikel 80
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Artikel 81
Artikel 14
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Artikel 15
Artikel 120, stk. 5
Artikel 16, stk. 1
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Artikel 16, stk. 2
Artikel 121, stk. 4
Artikel 17
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Artikel 18
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Artikel 19
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Artikel 20
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Bilag I
Bilag II
Bilag II
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Bilag III
Artikel 1
Artikel 1, stk. 4 og 5
Artikel 2, litra a)
—
Artikel 2, litra c)
Artikel 2, nr. 32
Artikel 2, litra d)
Artikel 2, nr. 33
Artikel 2, litra f)
Artikel 2, nr. 34
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Artikel 2, nr. 35
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Artikel 2, nr. 37
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Artikel 2, nr. 38
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Artikel 2, nr. 39
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Artikel 83
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Artikel 85
Artikel 3
Artikel 86, stk. 1 og 2
Artikel 4
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Artikel 5
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Artikel 6
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Artikel 7
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Artikel 8, stk. 1
Artikel 86, stk. 3
Artikel 8, stk. 2
Artikel 86, stk. 4
Artikel 8, stk. 3
Artikel 86, stk. 5
Artikel 9
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Artikel 87
Artikel 10
Artikel 88
Artikel 11
—
Artikel 12
Artikel 89
Artikel 13
Artikel 90
Artikel 14
Artikel 91
Artikel 15
Artikel 122, stk. 2 og 3
Artikel 17
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Artikel 99
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Artikel 101
Artikel 20, stk. 1
Artikel 102
Artikel 20, stk. 2
Artikel 105, stk. 3
Artikel 21
Artikel 103
Artikel 22
Artikel 104
Artikel 23
Artikel 108
Artikel 23a
Artikel 111
Artikel 24
Artikel 113
Artikel 25
Artikel 112
Artikel 26
Artikel 109
Artikel 27
—
Artikel 27a
Artikel 96
Artikel 28
Artikel 97
Artikel 29
Artikel 115
Artikel 30, stk. 1
Artikel 106, stk. 2
Artikel 30, stk. 2
Artikel 106, stk. 4
Artikel 30, stk. 3
Artikel 106, stk. 4
Artikel 30, stk. 4
Artikel 106, stk. 5
Artikel 30, stk. 5
Artikel 105, stk. 1
Artikel 31
Artikel 114
Artikel 32
Artikel 92
Artikel 33
Artikel 24
Artikel 34
Artikel 25
Artikel 35
Artikel 116
Artikel 36
Artikel 121
Artikel 37
—
Artikel 38
—
Artikel 39
—
Artikel 40
—
Bilag I
Bilag V
Bilag II
Bilag VII
Bilag III
Bilag IX
Bilag IV
Bilag VI
Bilag V
—
Bilag VI
Bilag X
Bilag IV

Summary:
Europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation
RESUMÉ AF:
Direktiv (EU) 
nr. 2018/1972
 om oprettelse af en europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation
HVAD ER FORMÅLET MED DIREKTIVET?
Direktivet
:
fastlægger et opdateret regelsæt til regulering af elektroniske kommunikationsnetværk (telekommunikation), telekommunikationstjenester og tilhørende faciliteter og tjenester
fastlægger opgaver for nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre relevante myndigheder og fastlægger et sæt procedurer for at sikre, at de lovgivningsmæssige rammer harmoniseres i hele 
Den Europæiske Union
 (EU)
har til formål at stimulere konkurrence og øget investering i 
5G
1
 og netværk med meget høj kapacitet, så alle borgere og virksomheder i EU kan nyde forbindelse af høj kvalitet, et højt niveau af forbrugerbeskyttelse og et øget udbud af innovative digitale tjenester.
HOVEDPUNKTER
Direktivet fastlægger en 
europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation
, et omfattende sæt nye eller reviderede regler for telekommunikationssektoren som en del af en pakke med telekommunikationslove, herunder forordning (EU) 2018/1971 om oprettelse af 
Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Tilsynsmyndigheder inden for Elektronisk Kommunikation
 (BEREC) og Agenturet for Støtte til BEREC (BEREC-kontoret).
Det erstatter og ophæver direktiv 
2002/19/EF
, 
2002/20/EF
 og 
2002/21/EF
 samt artikel 5 i afgørelse 
nr. 
243/2012/EU
. 
Evaluering og revision
 af direktiv 
2002/58/EF
 (
direktivet om databeskyttelse inden for elektronisk kommunikation
) er blevet udført separat.
De generelle mål er at:
fremme konnektivitet
 og ibrugtagning af net med meget høj kapacitet, herunder fastnet, mobilnet og trådløse net, blandt alle borgere og virksomheder i EU
fremme EU-borgernes interesser ved at:
skabe størst mulige fordele for så vidt angår valgmuligheder, pris og kvalitet gennem 
effektiv konkurrence
opretholde 
sikkerheden på netværk og i tjenester
sikre 
beskyttelse af forbrugerne
 ved hjælp af specifikke regler og
tilgodese 
behovene hos særlige sociale grupper
, især personer med handicap, ældre personer og personer med særlige sociale behov
lette adgangen til markedet og 
fremme konkurrencen
 inden for levering af telekommunikationsnetværk og tilknyttede faciliteter
bidrage til udviklingen af 
det 
indre marked
 inden for telekommunikationsnetværk og -tjenester i EU ved at 
udvikle fælles regler og forudsigelig regulering
, herunder:
reel, effektiv og koordineret anvendelse af 
radiofrekvenser
åben innovation
udvikling af 
transeuropæiske net
tilgængelighed af og interoperabilitet mellem 
paneuropæiske tjenester
 samt
end-to-end-konnektivitet
.
EU-medlemsstaternes ansvar er at:
samarbejde med hinanden og med 
Europa-Kommissionen
 om den 
strategiske planlægning og koordinering
 af politikken for radiofrekvenser og undgå skadelig interferens gennem 
Frekvenspolitikgruppen
sikre, at opgaver, der er fastlagt i direktivet, udføres af en 
relevant myndighed
garantere, at nationale tilsynsmyndigheder og andre relevante myndigheder er 
uafhængige
 af producenter af telekommunikationsudstyr og tjenesteudbydere
sikre, at de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder:
er beskyttet mod indblanding udefra eller politisk pres, der kan forhindre en uafhængig vurdering
er økonomisk uafhængige og har tilstrækkelige økonomiske og menneskelige ressourcer til at udføre de opgaver, de er tildelt.
Nye mål og opgaver
Udover at erstatte og ophæve eksisterende lovgivning indfører direktivet en række nye mål og opgaver.
Styrkede forbrugerregler
 har til formål at gøre det lettere at skifte mellem tjenesteudbydere og tilbyde bedre beskyttelse, for eksempel for personer, der abonnerer på samlede tjenester. Forbrugerne vil drage fordel af et ensartet, højere beskyttelsesniveau i hele EU.
Telekommunikationstjenester inkluderer nu 
tjenester, der leveres over internettet
, som ikke bruger opkaldsnumre, såsom messaging-apps og 
e-mail
. En evalueringsmekanisme har til formål at sikre, at forbrugerrettigheder forbliver robuste og opdaterede, når forretningsmodeller og forbrugeradfærd ændres.
Tilstrækkelig bredbåndsinternetadgang til en overkommelig pris
 skal være tilgængelig for alle forbrugere, uanset deres placering eller indkomst.
Personer med handicap
 skal have lige adgang til teletjenester.
Medlemsstaterne opretter et 
offentligt advarselssystem
, der skal sende alarmer til borgerne på deres mobiltelefoner i tilfælde af en naturkatastrofe eller anden større nødsituation i deres område.
Medlemsstaterne skal tilbyde operatører 
forudsigelig regulering af licenser til radiofrekvenser
 til trådløst bredbånd i mindst 20 år for at fremme investeringer, især i 5G-konnektivitet, samt øget konvergens af nationale udvælgelsesprocedurer gennem et peer review-forum.
Nye frekvensbånd til 5G-konnektivitet
 til hurtigere internetforbindelser og bedre konnektivitet sammen med koordineret timing af frekvenslicensering og et enklere regelsæt for opstilling af mindre udstyr til mobilnetværk.
Regler for 
operatørers adgang til netværk
 for at fremme konkurrence gør det lettere for virksomheder at investere i ny infrastruktur med meget høj kapacitet (downloadhastigheder på 100 Mbps eller mere), herunder i fjerntliggende områder, samtidig med at de sikrer effektiv markedsregulering.
Nye værktøjer kan bidrage til at løse problemer, der kan opstå under visse markedsforhold. 
Symmetrisk regulering
2
 gælder for udbydere af elektroniske kommunikationsnetværk 
i nogle meget specifikke situationer
 for at sikre konkurrence.
Gennemførelsesretsakter og delegerede retsakter
Kommissionen har vedtaget følgende 
gennemførelsesretsakter
:
Forordning (EU) 
2019/2243
 om fastlæggelse af en model for den aftalerapport, der skal anvendes af udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og
Forordning (EU) 
2020/1070
 om angivelse af karakteristika for trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde.
Kommissionen har vedtaget de følgende 
delegerede retsakter
, der supplerer direktiv (EU) 2018/1972:
Forordning (EU) 
2021/654
 om fastsættelse af en fælles maksimal EU-dækkende 
termineringstakst for taleopkald
 i mobilnet og en fælles maksimal EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald i fastnet
Forordning (EU) 
2023/444
 om foranstaltninger, der skal sikre effektiv adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikation til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112«.
HVORNÅR GÆLDER REGLERNE FRA?
Direktivet skulle være 
gennemført
 i national lovgivning den 
21. december 2020
. Disse regler trådte i kraft den samme dato.
Direktiv (EU) 2018/1972 
omarbejder
 og erstatter direktiv 2002/19/EF, 2002/20/EF og 2002/21/EF (og deres efterfølgende ændringer) som skulle indarbejdes i national lovgivning inden 2003.
BAGGRUND
For yderligere oplysninger henvises til:
Det digitale indre marked: EU’s forhandlere indgår en politisk aftale om at opdatere EU’s regler for telekommunikation
 — pressemeddelelse (Europa-Kommissionen)
Det digitale indre marked: Politisk enighed om reglerne for telekommunikationsmarkederne i 5G-æraen
 — memo (Europa-Kommissionen)
Frekvenser i Den Europæiske Union
 — faktablad (Europa-Kommissionen)
Mere og bedre internetforbindelse kræver investeringer i netværk med høj hastighed og kvalitet
 — faktablad (Europa-Kommissionen)
Indekset for den digitale økonomi og det digitale samfund (DESI)
 (Europa-Kommissionen)
Konnektivitet med henblik på et europæisk gigabitsamfund
 (Europa-Kommissionen)
Elektronisk kommunikation
 (Europa-Kommissionen).
VIGTIGE BEGREBER
5G.
 Den nyeste generation af mobilkommunikation, som er kendetegnet ved høj datahastighed, reduceret latenstid, energibesparelse, omkostningsreduktion, højere systemkapacitet og bedre forbindelse mellem enheder.
Symmetrisk regulering.
 Den samme regulering af alle netudbydere (i modsætning til asymmetrisk regulering, der gør forskel på udbydere, overordnet set for at skabe lige vilkår mellem udbydere af mindre og større betydning).
HOVEDDOKUMENT
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 
2018/1972
 af 
11. december 2018
 om oprettelse af en europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation (omarbejdning) (EUT L 321 af 
17.12.2018
, 
s. 36-214
).
Efterfølgende rettelser til direktiv (EU) 2018/1972 er blevet indarbejdet i grundteksten. Denne 
konsoliderede udgave
 har ingen retsvirkning.
TILHØRENDE DOKUMENTER
Kommissionens delegerede forordning (EU) 
2023/444
 af 
16. december 2022
 om supplerende regler til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2018/1972 med foranstaltninger, der skal sikre effektiv adgang til beredskabstjenester via alarmkommunikation til det fælleseuropæiske alarmnummer »112« (EUT L 65 af 
2.3.2023
, 
s. 1-8
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 
2022/612
 af 
6. april 2022
 om roaming på offentlige mobilkommunikationsnet i Unionen (omarbejdning) (EUT L 115 af 
13.4.2022
, 
s. 1-37
).
Kommissionens gennemførelsesafgørelse (EU) 
2022/173
 af 
7. februar 2022
 om harmonisering af 900 MHz-båndet og 1 800 MHz-båndet for jordbaserede systemer, der kan levere elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i Unionen, og om ophævelse af beslutning 2009/766/EF (EUT L 28 af 
9.2.2022
, 
s. 29-39
).
Kommissionen delegerede forordning (EU) 
2021/654
 af 
18. december 2020
 om supplerende regler til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2018/1972 ved at fastsætte en fælles maksimal EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald i mobilnet og en fælles maksimal EU-dækkende termineringstakst for taleopkald i fastnet (EUT L 137 af 
22.4.2021
, 
s. 1-9
).
Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 
2020/1070
 af 
20. juli 2020
 om angivelse af karakteristika for trådløse adgangspunkter med lille rækkevidde i henhold til artikel 57, stk. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2018/1972 om oprettelse af en europæisk kodeks for elektronisk kommunikation (EUT L 234 af 
21.7.2020
, 
s. 11-15
).
Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 
2019/2243
 af 
17. december 2019
 om fastlæggelse af en skabelon for aftaleresuméer til anvendelse for udbydere af offentligt tilgængelige elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 2018/1972 (EUT L 336 af 
30.12.2019
, 
s. 274-280
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 
2018/1971
 af 
11. december 2018
 om oprettelse af Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Tilsynsmyndigheder inden for Elektronisk Kommunikation (BEREC) og Agenturet for Støtte til BEREC (BEREC-kontoret), om ændring af forordning (EU) 2015/2120 og om ophævelse af forordning (EF) 
nr. 1211/2009
 (EUT L 321 af 
17.12.2018
, 
s. 1-35
).
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv (EU) 
2016/1148
 af 
6. juli 2016
 om foranstaltninger, der skal sikre et højt fælles sikkerhedsniveau for net- og informationssystemer i hele Unionen (EUT L 194 af 
19.7.2016
, 
s. 1-30
).
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 
2015/2120
 af 
25. november 2015
 om foranstaltninger vedrørende adgang til det åbne internet og om ændring af direktiv 2002/22/EF om forsyningspligt og brugerrettigheder i forbindelse med elektroniske kommunikationsnet og -tjenester og forordning (EU) 
nr. 531/2012
 om roaming på offentlige mobilkommunikationsnet i Unionen (EUT L 310 af 
26.11.2015
, 
s. 1-18
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning 
2015/758
 af 
29. april 2015
 om typegodkendelseskrav for indførelse af et køretøjsmonteret eCall-system, der er baseret på 112-tjenesten, og om ændring af direktiv 2007/46/EF (EUT L 123 af 
19.5.2015
, 
s. 77-89
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 
2014/61/EU
 af 
15. maj 2014
 om foranstaltninger for at reducere omkostningerne ved etablering af højhastighedsnet til elektronisk kommunikation (EUT L 155 af 
23.5.2014
, 
s. 1-14
).
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse 
nr. 
243/2012/EU
 af 
14. marts 2012
 om indførelse af et flerårigt radiofrekvenspolitikprogram (EUT L 81 af 
21.3.2012
, 
s. 7-17
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
Kommissionens beslutning 
2008/411/EF
 af 
21. maj 2008
 om harmonisering af 3 400-3 800 MHz-båndet for jordbaserede systemer, der kan levere elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i Fællesskabet (meddelt under nummer K(2008) 1873) (EUT L 144 af 
4.6.2008
, 
s. 77-81
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets beslutning 
nr. 
676/2002/EF
 af 
7. marts 2002
 om et frekvenspolitisk regelsæt i Det Europæiske Fællesskab (frekvenspolitikbeslutningen) (EUT L 108 af 
24.4.2002
, 
s. 1-6
).
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 
2002/58/EF
 af 
12. juli 2002
 om behandling af personoplysninger og beskyttelse af privatlivets fred i den elektroniske kommunikationssektor (direktiv om databeskyttelse inden for elektronisk kommunikation) (EUT L 201 af 
31.7.2002
, 
s. 37-47
).
Se den 
konsoliderede udgave
.
seneste ajourføring 
11.4.2023