CELEX ID: 61962CJ0026

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Document:
Parties
Subject of the case
Grounds
Decision on costs
Endorsements
Operative part
Parties
IN CASE 26/62
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH AND UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, A NETHERLANDS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HAVING FINAL JURISDICTION IN REVENUE CASES, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
N.V . ALGEMENE TRANSPORT - EN EXPEDITIE ONDERNEMING VAN GEND & LOOS, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT UTRECHT, REPRESENTED BY H.G . STIBBE AND L.F.D . TER KUILE, BOTH ADVOCATES OF AMSTERDAM, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
AND
NEDERLANDSE ADMINISTRATIE DER BELASTINGEN ( NETHERLANDS INLAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION ), REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AT ZAANDAM, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY,
Subject of the case
ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS :
1 . WHETHER ARTICLE 12 OF THE EEC TREATY HAS DIRECT APPLICATION WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A MEMBER STATE, IN OTHER WORDS, WHETHER NATIONALS OF SUCH A STATE CAN, ON THE BASIS OF THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION, LAY CLAIM TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH THE COURTS MUST PROTECT;
2 . IN THE EVENT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY, WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF AN IMPORT DUTY OF 8% TO THE IMPORT INTO THE NETHERLANDS BY THE APPLICANT IN THE MAIN ACTION OF UREAFORMALDEHYDE ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REPRESENTED AN UNLAWFUL INCREASE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE EEC TREATY OR WHETHER IT WAS IN THIS CASE A REASONABLE ALTERATION OF THE DUTY APPLICABLE BEFORE 1 MARCH 1960, AN ALTERATION WHICH, ALTHOUGH AMOUNTING TO AN INCREASE FROM THE ARITHMETICAL POINT OF VIEW, IS NEVERTHELESS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS PROHIBITED UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 12;
Grounds
I - PROCEDURE
NO OBJECTION HAS BEEN RAISED CONCERNING THE PROCEDURAL VALIDITY OF THE REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, A COURT OR TRIBUNAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT ARTICLE . FURTHER, NO GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE COURT TO RAISE THE MATTER OF ITS OWN MOTION .
II - THE FIRST QUESTION
A - JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ON THE GROUND THAT THE REFERENCE RELATES NOT TO THE INTERPRETATION BUT TO THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS, AND THAT IN PARTICULAR THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECIDE, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY PREVAIL OVER NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION OR OVER OTHER AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE NETHERLANDS AND INCORPORATED INTO DUTCH NATIONAL LAW . THE SOLUTION OF SUCH A PROBLEM, IT IS CLAIMED, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, SUBJECT TO AN APPLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY ARTICLES 169 AND 170 OF THE TREATY .
HOWEVER IN THIS CASE THE COURT IS NOT ASKED TO ADJUDICATE UPON THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH REMAINS THE CONCERN OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, BUT IS ASKED, IN CONFORMITY WITH SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY, ONLY TO INTERPRET THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE SAID TREATY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY LAW AND WITH REFERENCE TO ITS EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS . THIS ARGUMENT HAS THEREFORE NO LEGAL FOUNDATION .
THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FURTHER ARGUES THAT THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE GROUND THAT NO ANSWER WHICH THE COURT COULD GIVE TO THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE WOULD HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE RESULT OF THE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT IN THAT COURT .
HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE COURT IN THE PRESENT CASE IT IS NECESSARY ONLY THAT THE QUESTION RAISED SHOULD CLEARLY BE CONCERNED WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE LED A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL TO ITS CHOICE OF QUESTIONS AS WELL AS THE RELEVANCE WHICH IT ATTRIBUTES TO SUCH QUESTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CASE BEFORE IT ARE EXCLUDED FROM REVIEW BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE . IT APPEARS FROM THE WORDING OF THE QUESTIONS REFERRED THAT THEY RELATE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . THE COURT THEREFORE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ANSWER THEM .
THIS ARGUMENT, TOO, IS THEREFORE UNFOUNDED .
B - ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE
THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE IS WHETHER ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY HAS DIRECT APPLICATION IN NATIONAL LAW IN THE SENSE THAT NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES MAY ON THE BASIS OF THIS ARTICLE LAY CLAIM TO RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURT MUST PROTECT .
TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY EXTEND SO FAR IN THEIR EFFECTS IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE SPIRIT, THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE WORDING OF THOSE PROVISIONS .
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EEC TREATY, WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON MARKET, THE FUNCTIONING OF WHICH IS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE COMMUNITY, IMPLIES THAT THIS TREATY IS MORE THAN AN AGREEMENT WHICH MERELY CREATES MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE CONTRACTING STATES . THIS VIEW IS CONFIRMED BY THE PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY WHICH REFERS NOT ONLY TO GOVERNMENTS BUT TO PEOPLES . IT IS ALSO CONFIRMED MORE SPECIFICALLY BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS ENDOWED WITH SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, THE EXERCISE OF WHICH AFFECTS MEMBER STATES AND ALSO THEIR CITIZENS . FURTHERMORE, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE NATIONALS OF THE STATES BROUGHT TOGETHER IN THE COMMUNITY ARE CALLED UPON TO COOPERATE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THIS COMMUNITY THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE .
IN ADDITION THE TASK ASSIGNED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 177, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO SECURE UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY BY NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, CONFIRMS THAT THE STATES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COMMUNITY LAW HAS AN AUTHORITY WHICH CAN BE INVOKED BY THEIR NATIONALS BEFORE THOSE COURTS AND TRIBUNALS . THE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS IS THAT THE COMMUNITY CONSTITUTES A NEW LEGAL ORDER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF WHICH THE STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, ALBEIT WITHIN LIMITED FIELDS, AND THE SUBJECTS OF WHICH COMPRISE NOT ONLY MEMBER STATES BUT ALSO THEIR NATIONALS . INDEPENDENTLY OF THE LEGISLATION OF MEMBER STATES, COMMUNITY LAW THEREFORE NOT ONLY IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS ON INDIVIDUALS BUT IS ALSO INTENDED TO CONFER UPON THEM RIGHTS WHICH BECOME PART OF THEIR LEGAL HERITAGE . THESE RIGHTS ARISE NOT ONLY WHERE THEY ARE EXPRESSLY GRANTED BY THE TREATY, BUT ALSO BY REASON OF OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE TREATY IMPOSES IN A CLEARLY DEFINED WAY UPON INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS UPON THE MEMBER STATES AND UPON THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .
WITH REGARD TO THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE TREATY AS IT RELATES TO CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT ARTICLE 9, WHICH BASES THE COMMUNITY UPON A CUSTOMS UNION, INCLUDES AS AN ESSENTIAL PROVISION THE PROHIBITION OF THESE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES . THIS PROVISION IS FOUND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PART OF THE TREATY WHICH DEFINES THE 'FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY '. IT IS APPLIED AND EXPLAINED BY ARTICLE 12 .
THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 12 CONTAINS A CLEAR AND UNCONDITIONAL PROHIBITION WHICH IS NOT A POSITIVE BUT A NEGATIVE OBLIGATION . THIS OBLIGATION, MOREOVER, IS NOT QUALIFIED BY ANY RESERVATION ON THE PART OF STATES WHICH WOULD MAKE ITS IMPLEMENTATION CONDITIONAL UPON A POSITIVE LEGISLATIVE MEASURE ENACTED UNDER NATIONAL LAW . THE VERY NATURE OF THIS PROHIBITION MAKES IT IDEALLY ADAPTED TO PRODUCE DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR SUBJECTS .
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 12 DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION ON THE PART OF THE STATES . THE FACT THAT UNDER THIS ARTICLE IT IS THE MEMBER STATES WHO ARE MADE THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGATIVE OBLIGATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THEIR NATIONALS CANNOT BENEFIT FROM THIS OBLIGATION .
IN ADDITION THE ARGUMENT BASED ON ARTICLES 169 AND 170 OF THE TREATY PUT FORWARD BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT IN THEIR STATEMENTS OF CASE IS MISCONCEIVED . THE FACT THAT THESE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY ENABLE THE COMMISSION AND THE MEMBER STATES TO BRING BEFORE THE COURT A STATE WHICH HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT MEAN THAT INDIVIDUALS CANNOT PLEAD THESE OBLIGATIONS, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT, ANY MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THE TREATY PLACES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION WAYS OF ENSURING THAT OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON THOSE SUBJECT TO THE TREATY ARE OBSERVED, PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY, IN ACTIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT, OF PLEADING INFRINGEMENTS OF THESE OBLIGATIONS .
A RESTRICTION OF THE GUARANTEES AGAINST AN INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 12 BY MEMBER STATES TO THE PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE 169 AND 170 WOULD REMOVE ALL DIRECT LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THEIR NATIONALS . THERE IS THE RISK THAT RECOURSE TO THE PROCEDURE UNDER THESE ARTICLES WOULD BE INNEFFECTIVE IF IT WERE TO OCCUR AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL DECISION TAKEN CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY .
THE VIGILANCE OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS AMOUNTS TO AN EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION IN ADDITION TO THE SUPERVISION ENTRUSTED BY ARTICLES 169 AND 170 TO THE DILIGENCE OF THE COMMISSION AND OF THE MEMBER STATES .
IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT, ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT, THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE WORDING OF THE TREATY, ARTICLE 12 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
III - THE SECOND QUESTION
A - THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
ACCORDING TO THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE BELGIAN AND NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS, THE WORDING OF THIS QUESTION APPEARS TO REQUIRE, BEFORE IT CAN BE ANSWERED, AN EXAMINATION BY THE COURT OF THE TARIFF CLASSIFICATION OF UREAFORMALDEHYDE IMPORTED INTO THE NETHERLANDS, A CLASSIFICATION ON WHICH VAN GEND & LOOS AND THE INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AT ZAANDAM HOLD DIFFERENT OPINIONS WITH REGARD TO THE 'TARIEFBESLUIT' OF 1947 . THE QUESTION CLEARLY DOES NOT CALL FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY BUT CONCERNS THE APPLICATION OF NETHERLANDS CUSTOMS LEGISLATION TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF AMINOPLASTS, WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION CONFERRED UPON THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES BY SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 .
THE COURT HAS THEREFORE NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE REFERENCE MADE BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE .
HOWEVER, THE REAL MEANING OF THE QUESTION PUT BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE IS WHETHER, IN LAW, AN EFFECTIVE INCREASE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES CHARGED ON A GIVEN PRODUCT AS A RESULT NOT OF AN INCREASE IN THE RATE BUT OF A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT ARISING FROM A CHANGE OF ITS TARIFF DESCRIPTION CONTRAVENES THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY .
VIEWED IN THIS WAY THE QUESTION PUT IS CONCERNED WITH AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION OF THE TREATY AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE MEANING WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CONCEPT OF DUTIES APPLIED BEFORE THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE .
THEREFORE THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE A RULING ON THIS QUESTION .
B - ON THE SUBSTANCE
IT FOLLOWS FROM THE WORDING AND THE GENERAL SCHEME OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY THAT, IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT HAVE BEEN INCREASED CONTRARY TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THE SAID ARTICLE, REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES ACTUALLY APPLIED AT THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY .
FURTHER, WITH REGARD TO THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY, SUCH AN ILLEGAL INCREASE MAY ARISE FROM A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE TARIFF RESULTING IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER A MORE HIGHLY TAXED HEADING AND FROM AN ACTUAL INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY .
IT IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE HOW THE INCREASE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES OCCURRED WHEN, AFTER THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE, THE SAME PRODUCT IN THE SAME MEMBER STATE WAS SUBJECTED TO A HIGHER RATE OF DUTY .
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 12, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN ABOVE, COMES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COURT WHICH MUST ENQUIRE WHETHER THE DUTIABLE PRODUCT, IN THIS CASE UREAFORMALDEHYDE ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IS CHARGED UNDER THE CUSTOMS MEASURES BROUGHT INTO FORCE IN THE NETHERLANDS WITH AN IMPORT DUTY HIGHER THAN THAT WITH WHICH IT WAS CHARGED ON 1 JANUARY 1958 .
THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CHECK THE VALIDITY OF THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO IT DURING THE PROCEEDINGS BUT MUST LEAVE THEM TO BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL COURTS .
Decision on costs
THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EEC AND THE MEMBER STATES WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED THEIR OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT .
Endorsements
ON THOSE GROUNDS
UPON READING THE PLEADINGS;
UPON HEARING THE REPORT OF THE JUDGE - RAPPORTEUR;
UPON HEARING THE PARTIES;
UPON HEARING THE OPINION OF THE ADVOCATE - GENERAL;
HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLES 9, 12, 14, 169, 170 AND 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY; HAVING REGARD TO THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY;
HAVING REGARD TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES;
Operative part
THE COURT
IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE BY DECISION OF 16 AUGUST 1962, HEREBY RULES :
1 . ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY PRODUCES DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
2 . IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT HAVE BEEN INCREASED CONTRARY TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY, REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE DUTIES AND CHARGES ACTUALLY APPLIED BY THE MEMBER STATE IN QUESTION AT THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY .
SUCH AN INCREASE CAN ARISE BOTH FROM A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE TARIFF RESULTING IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER A MORE HIGHLY TAXED HEADING AND FROM AN INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY APPLIED . 3 . THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IN THESE PROCEEDINGS IS A MATTER FOR THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE .

Summary:
The direct effect of European Union law
SUMMARY OF:
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration – the fundamental principle of direct effect
WHAT DOES THE JUDGMENT ESTABLISH?
In its judgment, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union
 (the Court) enshrines the 
direct effect
 of 
European Union
 (EU) law.
The judgment states that 
EU law
 not only engenders 
obligations for EU 
Member States
, but also 
rights for individuals
. Individuals may therefore take advantage of these rights and directly invoke EU law before national and European courts, independently of whether the national law test exists (that is, where there is no judicial remedy under national law).
KEY POINTS
Horizontal and vertical direct effect
There are two aspects to direct effect: a vertical aspect and a horizontal aspect.
Vertical direct effect
 is of consequence in relations between individuals and the country. This means that individuals can invoke a provision of EU law in relation to the state.
Horizontal direct effect
 is of consequence in relations between individuals. This means that an individual can invoke a provision of EU law in relation to another individual.
According to the type of act concerned, the Court has accepted either a 
full direct effect
 (i.e. a horizontal direct effect and a vertical direct effect) or a 
partial direct effect
 (confined to a vertical direct effect).
Direct effect and primary law
As far as 
primary law
 is concerned, the Court established the 
principle of direct effect
 in the 
Van Gend en Loos
 judgment. However, it laid down the 
condition
 that the obligations must be 
precise, clear and unconditional
 and that they must 
not call for additional measures
, either national or European.
In the 
Becker
 judgment, the Court rejected direct effect where the countries have a margin of discretion, however minimal, regarding the implementation of the provision in question. In 
Kaefer and Procacci v French State
, the Court affirmed that the provision in question was unconditional because it left no discretion to the Member States and therefore had direct effect.
Direct effect and secondary law
The principle of direct effect also relates to acts from 
secondary law
, that is acts adopted by the EU institutions, such as regulations, directives and decisions, which are derived from the principles and objectives set out in the 
treaties
. However, the 
application of direct effect depends on the type of act
.
Regulations
 are directly applicable in the Member States, as specified in Article 
288
 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union , and have therefore direct effect. However, in line with the general principles, this applies only under the condition that the rules are sufficiently clear, precise and relevant to the situation of the individual litigant (direct effect as clarified by the 
Politi v Ministero delle finanze
 Court judgement).
Directives
 are acts addressed to Member States which must be transposed into national law. However, in certain cases, the Court recognises the direct effect of directives in order to protect the rights of individuals. Therefore, the Court laid down in its 
Van Duyn v Home Office
 judgment that a directive has direct effect when its provisions are unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise and when the Member State has not transposed the directive by the deadline. However, it can only have direct vertical effect – Member States are obliged to implement directives but directives may not be cited by a Member State against an individual (see 
Ratti
 judgment).
Decisions
 may have direct effect when they refer to a Member State as the addressee. The Court therefore recognises only a direct vertical effect (
Hansa Fleisch v Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg
 judgment).
International agreements
.
 In its 
Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd
 judgment, the Court recognised the direct effect of certain agreements in accordance with the same criteria identified in the 
Van Gend en Loos
 case.
Opinions
 and 
recommendations
 do not have legal binding force. Consequently, they do not have direct effect.
BACKGROUND
Along with the 
primacy of EU law
 (also known as precedence), direct effect is a fundamental principle of EU law.
MAIN DOCUMENT
Judgment of 
5 February 1963
, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 
C-26/62
, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Judgment of 
10 November 1992
, Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt 
GmbH & Co
. KG v Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg, 
C-156/91
, ECLI:EU:C:1992:423.
Judgment of 
12 December 1990
, Peter Kaefer and Andréa Procacci v French State, joined cases 
C-100/89 and C-101/89
, ECLI:EU:C:1990:456.
Judgment of 
30 September 1987
, Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, 
C-12/86
, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400.
Judgment of 
19 January 1982
, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 
C-8/81
, ECLI:EU:C:1982:7.
Judgment of 
5 April 1979
, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, 
C-148/78
, ECLI:EU:C:1979:110.
Judgment of 
4 December 1974
, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, 
C-41-74
, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133.
Judgment of 
14 December 1971
, Politi s.a.s. v Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic, 
C-43/71
, ECLI:EU:C:1971:122.
last update 
25.11.2022

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