CELEX ID: 32012H0772

--- ENGLISH ---

Document:
12.12.2012
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 338/41
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
of 6 December 2012
on aggressive tax planning
(2012/772/EU)
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292 thereof,
Whereas:
(1)
Countries around the world have traditionally treated tax planning as a legitimate practice. Over time, however, the tax planning structures have become ever-more sophisticated. They develop across various jurisdictions and effectively, shift taxable profits towards States with beneficial tax regimes. A key characteristic of the practices in question is that they reduce tax liability through strictly legal arrangements which however contradict the intent of the law.
(2)
Aggressive tax planning consists in taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability. Aggressive tax planning can take a multitude of forms. Its consequences include double deductions (e.g. the same loss is deducted both in the State of source and residence) and double non-taxation (e.g. income which is not taxed in the source State is exempt in the State of residence).
(3)
Member States find it difficult to protect their national tax bases from erosion through aggressive tax planning, despite important efforts. National provisions in this area are often not fully effective, especially due to the cross-border dimension of many tax planning structures and the increased mobility of capital and persons.
(4)
With a view to moving to a better functioning of the internal market, it is necessary to encourage all Member States to take the same general approach towards aggressive tax planning, which would help diminishing existing distortions.
(5)
To this end, it is necessary to address instances in which a taxpayer derives fiscal benefits through engineering its tax affairs in such a way that income is not taxed by any of the tax jurisdictions involved (double non-taxation). The persistence of such situations can lead to artificial capital flows and movements of taxpayers within the internal market and thus harm its proper functioning as well as erode Member States’ tax bases.
(6)
In 2012 the Commission carried out a public consultation on double non-taxation in the internal market. Since it is not possible to address all the issues covered by that consultation through one single solution, it is appropriate, as a first step, to deal with the issue which is linked to certain frequently used tax planning structures that take advantage of mismatches between two or more tax systems and often lead to double non-taxation.
(7)
States often undertake, in their double taxation conventions, not to tax certain items of income. In providing for such treatment, they may not necessarily take account of whether such items are subject to tax in the other party to that convention, and thus whether there is a risk of double non-taxation. Such risk may also occur if Member States unilaterally exempt items of foreign income, irrespective of whether they are subject to tax in the source State. It is important to address both situations in this Recommendation.
(8)
As tax planning structures are ever more elaborate and national legislators are frequently left with insufficient time for reaction, specific anti-abuse measures often turn out to be inadequate for successfully catching up with novel aggressive tax planning structures. Such structures can be harmful to national tax revenues and to the functioning of the internal market. Therefore, it is appropriate to recommend the adoption by Member States of a common general anti-abuse rule, which should also avoid the complexity of many different ones. In this context, it is necessary to take account of the limits imposed by Union law with regard to anti-abuse rules.
(9)
So as to preserve the autonomous operation of existing Union acts in the area concerned, this Recommendation does not apply within the scope of Council Directive 2009/133/EC 
(
1
)
, of Council Directive 2011/96/EU 
(
2
)
 and of Council Directive 2003/49/EC 
(
3
)
. A revision of those Directives with a view to implement the principles underlying this Recommendation is currently considered by the Commission,
HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:
1.   Subject matter and scope
This Recommendation addresses aggressive tax planning in the area of direct taxation.
It does not apply within the scope of Union acts whose operation could be affected by its terms.
2.   Definitions
For the purpose of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:
(a)
‘tax’ means income tax, corporation tax and, where applicable, capital gains tax, as well as withholding tax of a nature equivalent to any of these taxes;
(b)
‘income’ means all items which are defined as such under the domestic law of the Member State which applies the term and, where applicable, the items defined as capital gains.
3.   Limitation to the application of rules intended to avoid double taxation
3.1.
Where Member States, in double taxation conventions which they have concluded among themselves or with third countries, have committed not to tax a given item of income, Member States should ensure that such commitment only applies where the item is subject to tax in the other party to that convention.
3.2.
To give effect to point 3.1, Member States are encouraged to include an appropriate clause in their double taxation conventions. Such clause could read as follows:
‘Where this Convention provides that an item of income shall be taxable only in one of the contracting States or that it may be taxed in one of the contracting States, the other contracting State shall be precluded from taxing such item only if this item is subject to tax in the first contracting State’.
In case of multilateral conventions, the reference to the ‘other contracting State’ should be replaced by a reference to the ‘other contracting States’.
3.3.
Where, with a view to avoid double taxation through unilateral national rules, Member States provide for a tax exemption in regard to a given item of income sourced in another jurisdiction, in which this item is not subject to tax, Member States are encouraged to ensure that the item is taxed.
3.4.
For the purposes of points 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 an item of income should be considered to be subject to tax where it is treated as taxable by the jurisdiction concerned and is not exempt from tax, nor benefits from a full tax credit or zero-rate taxation.
4.   General anti-abuse rule
4.1.
To counteract aggressive tax planning practices which fall outside the scope of their specific anti-avoidance rules, Member States should adopt a general anti-abuse rule, adapted to domestic and cross-border situations confined to the Union and situations involving third countries.
4.2.
To give effect to point 4.1, Member States are encouraged to introduce the following clause in their national legislation:
‘An artificial arrangement or an artificial series of arrangements which has been put into place for the essential purpose of avoiding taxation and leads to a tax benefit shall be ignored. National authorities shall treat these arrangements for tax purposes by reference to their economic substance’.
4.3.
For the purposes of point 4.2 an arrangement means any transaction, scheme, action, operation, agreement, grant, understanding, promise, undertaking or event. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part.
4.4.
For the purposes of point 4.2 an arrangement or a series of arrangements is artificial where it lacks commercial substance. In determining whether the arrangement or series of arrangements is artificial, national authorities are invited to consider whether they involve one or more of the following situations:
(a)
the legal characterisation of the individual steps which an arrangement consists of is inconsistent with the legal substance of the arrangement as a whole;
(b)
the arrangement or series of arrangements is carried out in a manner which would not ordinarily be employed in what is expected to be a reasonable business conduct;
(c)
the arrangement or series of arrangements includes elements which have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other;
(d)
transactions concluded are circular in nature;
(e)
the arrangement or series of arrangements results in a significant tax benefit but this is not reflected in the business risks undertaken by the taxpayer or its cash flows;
(f)
the expected pre-tax profit is insignificant in comparison to the amount of the expected tax benefit.
4.5.
For the purposes of point 4.2, the purpose of an arrangement or series of arrangements consists in avoiding taxation where, regardless of any subjective intentions of the taxpayer, it defeats the object, spirit and purpose of the tax provisions that would otherwise apply.
4.6.
For the purposes of point 4.2, a given purpose is to be considered essential where any other purpose that is or could be attributed to the arrangement or series of arrangements appears at most negligible, in view of all the circumstances of the case.
4.7.
In determining whether an arrangement or series of arrangements has led to a tax benefit as referred to in point 4.2, national authorities are invited to compare the amount of tax due by a taxpayer, having regard to those arrangement(s), with the amount that the same taxpayer would owe under the same circumstances in the absence of the arrangement(s). In that context, it is useful to consider whether one or more of the following situations occur:
(a)
an amount is not included in the tax base;
(b)
the taxpayer benefits from a deduction;
(c)
a loss for tax purposes is incurred;
(d)
no withholding tax is due;
(e)
foreign tax is offset.
5.   Follow-up
Member States should inform the Commission on the measures taken in order to comply with the present Recommendation, as well as on any changes made to such measures.
The Commission will publish a report on the application of this Recommendation within three years after its adoption.
6.   Addressees
This Recommendation is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 6 December 2012.
For the Commission
Algirdas ŠEMETA
Member of the Commission
(
1
)
  
            
OJ L 310, 25.11.2009, p. 34
.
(
2
)
  
            
OJ L 345, 29.12.2011, p. 8
.
(
3
)
  
            
OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 49
.

Summary:
Aggressive tax planning
The Commission is suggesting ways to address legal technicalities and loopholes which some companies exploit to avoid paying their fair share of tax.
ACT
Commission recommendation 
2012/772/EU
 of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax planning
SUMMARY
Tackling aggressive tax planning is one aspect of a detailed and complex 
Commission action plan
 designed to combat tax evasion and tax fraud.
The action plan sets out practical ways to improve 
administrative cooperation
 between EU countries, fight abuse and double-non taxation, and tackle issues related to 
tax havens and tax-related crimes
.
Currently, some taxpayers may use complex, sometimes artificial, arrangements to relocate their tax base to other jurisdictions within or outside the European Union. In doing this, they take advantage of mismatches in national laws to ensure that certain items of income remain untaxed anywhere or to exploit differences in tax rates. This problem is referred to as 
aggressive tax planning
.
The key difficulty is that increasingly sophisticated tax planning shifts taxable profits to countries with countries with taxation systems that are more beneficial for the taxpayer. This practice reduces tax liability through arrangements that abide by the letter of the law but violate its spirit - i.e. 
legal loopholes
.
Aggressive tax planning takes many forms, and its consequences include 
double deductions
 (for example the same loss is deducted both in the country of source and that of residence) and 
double non-taxation
 (for example income which is not taxed in the country where it is earned and is exempt in the country of residence).
The Commission is therefore encouraging EU countries to ensure that double tax conventions concluded with other EU and non-EU countries include a clause designed to resolve a specifically identified type of double non-taxation.
It also recommends the use of a 
common general anti-abuse rule
 to help to ensure consistency and effectiveness in an area where practice varies considerably between EU countries.
There are many other proposals in this area. For example, the current VAT system has been identified as being vulnerable to fraud. The Commission therefore decided to set up an EU VAT forum. Here, business representatives and tax authorities can exchange views on practical aspects of VAT administration applicable to transactions between EU countries. They can also identify and discuss best practices that could help make it more straightforward to manage the VAT system and cut compliance costs, while also securing VAT revenue.
REFERENCES
Act
Entry into force
Deadline for transposition in the Member States
Official Journal
Commission Recommendation 
2012/772/EU
-
-
Official Journal L 338 of 12.12.2012
REFERRED DOCUMENTS
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: An action plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion
. (
COM(2012) 722 final
 of 6.12.2012 - not published in the Official Journal)
Proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States.
 (
COM(2013) 814
 final of 25.11.2013 - not published in the Official Journal)
The parent-subsidiary directive (Directive 2011/96/EU) was originally designed to prevent same-group companies based in different EU countries from being taxed twice on the same income (double taxation). However, certain companies have exploited provisions in the directive and mismatches between national tax rules to avoid being taxed in any EU country at all (double non-taxation).
The proposed amendment will tighten up the directive so that specific tax planning arrangements (hybrid loan arrangements) cannot benefit from tax exemptions. Under the proposal, if a hybrid loan payment is tax deductible in the EU country where the subsidiary is based, then it must be taxed by the EU country where the parent company is established. This will stop companies with branches in more than one EU country from planning payments between branches in different countries so as to benefit from double non-taxation.
last update 21.02.2014

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Document:
12.12.2012
DA
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
L 338/41
KOMMISSIONENS HENSTILLING
af 6. december 2012
om aggressiv skatteplanlægning
(2012/772/EU)
EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde, særlig artikel 292, og
ud fra følgende betragtninger:
(1)
Lande rundt om i verden har traditionelt behandlet skatteplanlægning som en legitim praksis. Med tiden er skatteplanlægningen dog blevet mere og mere sofistikeret. Den strækker sig over forskellige retssystemer og medfører reelt, at skattepligtige overskud overføres til stater med fordelagtige skattesystemer. Det er et typisk træk ved de pågældende praksisser, at de reducerer skattepligten gennem arrangementer, der er fuldt lovlige, men som strider mod lovens hensigt.
(2)
Aggressiv skatteplanlægning består i at udnytte alle teknikaliteter i et skattesystem eller uforeneligheder mellem to eller flere skattesystemer for at slippe med lavere skat. Aggressiv skatteplanlægning kan antage mange forskellige former. Den kan føre til dobbelte fradrag (f.eks. når det samme tab trækkes fra i både kildestaten og bopælsstaten) og dobbelt skattefritagelse (f.eks. når indkomst, der ikke beskattes i kildestaten, fritages for skat i bopælsstaten).
(3)
Medlemsstaterne finder det vanskeligt at forhindre en undergravning af deres nationale skatteberegningsgrundlag som følge af skatteplanlægning, trods en betydelig indsats. De nationale bestemmelser på dette område er ofte ikke tilstrækkeligt effektive, især fordi megen skatteplanlægning går på tværs af grænserne, og fordi der er stigende mobilitet for kapital og personer.
(4)
For at forbedre det indre markeds funktionsevne er det nødvendigt at opmuntre alle medlemsstater til at anlægge samme generelle strategi for at modvirke aggressiv skatteplanlægning, hvilket vil kunne bidrage til at mindske de eksisterende fordrejninger.
(5)
Med henblik herpå er det nødvendigt at gøre noget ved de tilfælde, hvor en skatteyder opnår en skattemæssig fordel ved at tilrettelæge sine skatteforhold på en sådan måde, at indkomsterne ikke beskattes i noget af de berørte skatteområder (dobbelt skattefritagelse). Hvis denne situation får lov til at fortsætte, kan det føre til kunstige kapitalstrømme og skatteyderbevægelser i det indre marked til skade for markedets korrekte funktion, og det kan undergrave medlemsstaternes beskatningsgrundlag.
(6)
I 2012 gennemførte Kommissionen en offentlig høring om dobbelt skattefritagelse i det indre marked. Da der ikke findes en enkelt løsning på alle de problemer, der blev rejst under høringen, vil det være hensigtsmæssigt som et første skridt at håndtere det problem, der knytter sig til visse hyppigt anvendte skatteplanlægningsmetoder, der udnytter uforeneligheder mellem to eller flere skattesystemer og ofte fører til dobbelt skattefritagelse.
(7)
I deres dobbeltbeskatningskonventioner forpligter stater sig ofte til ikke at beskatte bestemte indkomster. I den forbindelse tager de ikke nødvendigvis hensyn til, om disse indkomster beskattes af den anden part i konventionen, og dermed heller ikke til, om der er risiko for dobbelt skattefritagelse. Denne risiko kan også forekomme, hvis medlemsstaterne skattefritager udenlandsk indkomst, hvad enten den beskattes i kildestaten eller ej. Det er vigtigt at behandle begge situationer i denne henstilling.
(8)
Da skatteplanlægningen bliver mere og mere sofistikeret, og nationale lovgivere ofte får utilstrækkelig tid til at reagere, kan specifikke foranstaltninger til bekæmpelse af svig ofte vise sig at være utilstrækkelige til at holde trit med nye aggressive skatteplanlægningsmetoder. Sådanne metoder kan være skadelige for de nationale skatteindtægter og det indre markeds funktionsevne. Det er derfor hensigtsmæssigt at henstille til medlemsstaterne, at de vedtager en fælles generel regel om bekæmpelse af misbrug, og dermed udgår de problemer, der opstår, når der benyttes mange forskellige regler. I denne sammenhæng skal der tages hensyn til EU-lovgivningens begrænsninger med hensyn til regler om bekæmpelse af misbrug.
(9)
For fortsat at kunne anvende de eksisterende EU-retsakter på det berørte område, gælder denne henstilling ikke på anvendelsesområdet for Rådets direktiv 2009/133/EF 
(
1
)
, Rådets direktiv 2011/96/EU 
(
2
)
 og Rådets direktiv 2003/49/EF 
(
3
)
. Kommissionen er i færd med at overveje, om disse direktiver skal revideres for at implementere de principper, der ligger til grund for denne henstilling —
VEDTAGET DENNE HENSTILLING:
1.   Genstand og anvendelsesområde
Denne henstilling vedrører aggressiv skatteplanlægning på området direkte beskatning.
Den gælder ikke på anvendelsesområdet for EU-retsakter, hvis anvendelse kunne blive berørt af dens formuleringer.
2.   Definitioner
I denne henstilling forstås ved:
a)   
»skat«
: indkomstskat, selskabsskat og, hvor det er relevant, kapitalvindingsskat samt kildeskat af en art, der svarer til en af disse skatter
b)   
»indkomst«
: alt hvad der er defineret som indkomst i henhold til den indenlandske lovgivning i den medlemsstat, hvor udtrykket anvendes, samt i relevante tilfælde alt, hvad der er defineret som kapitalgevinst.
3.   Begrænsning til anvendelse af regler, der tager sigte på at undgå dobbeltbeskatning
3.1.
Når medlemsstaterne i dobbeltbeskatningskonventioner, som de har indgået med hinanden eller med tredjelande, har forpligtet sig til ikke at beskatte en given indkomst, bør medlemsstaterne sikre, at denne forpligtelse kun gælder i de tilfælde, hvor indkomsten er skattepligtig i den anden part i konventionen.
3.2.
Medlemsstaterne opfordres til at gennemføre punkt 3.1 ved at indsætte en bestemmelse herom i deres dobbeltbeskatningskonventioner. En sådan bestemmelse kan f.eks. formuleres således:
»Når det er fastsat i denne konvention, at en indkomst kun er skattepligtig i én af de kontraherende stater, eller at den kan beskattes i en af de kontraherende stater, må den anden kontraherende stat kun være afskåret fra at beskatte denne indkomst, hvis der opkræves skat af den i den første kontraherende stat.«
I multilaterale konventioner bør udtrykket »den anden kontraherende stat« erstattes af »de andre kontraherende stater«.
3.3.
Når en medlemsstat for at undgå dobbeltbeskatning ved hjælp af ensidige nationale retsregler har indført en regel om skattefritagelse for en given indkomst, der hidrører fra et andet skatteområde, hvor denne indkomst ikke er skattepligtig, tilskyndes medlemsstaterne til at sikre, at denne indkomst beskattes.
3.4.
I punkt 3.1, 3.2 og 3.3 bør en indkomst anses for at være skattepligtig, når den behandles som skattepligtig i det pågældende skatteområde og ikke er fritaget for skat eller er omfattet af en fuldstændig skattegodtgørelse eller nulsats-beskatning.
4.   Generel regel om bekæmpelse af misbrug
4.1.
For at modvirke aggressiv skatteplanlægning, der ikke rammes af medlemsstaternes særlige regler om bekæmpelse af skattetænkning, bør de vedtage en generel regel om bekæmpelse af misbrug, der både er egnet til indenlandske forhold, til forhold, der går på tværs af grænserne i EU, og til forhold, der involverer tredjelande.
4.2.
Medlemsstaterne opfordres til at gennemføre punkt 4.1 ved at indføre følgende bestemmelse i deres nationale lovgivning:
»Der skal ses bort fra et kunstigt arrangement eller en kunstig serie arrangementer, som er tilrettelagt med det hovedformål at undgå beskatning, og som medfører en skattefordel. Skattemæssigt skal myndighederne behandle disse arrangementer ud fra deres reelle økonomiske indhold.«
4.3.
I punkt 4.2 forstås ved »arrangement«: enhver transaktion, plan, handling, operation, aftale, tildeling, forståelse, løfte, tilsagn eller begivenhed. Et arrangement kan omfatte flere trin eller dele.
4.4.
I punkt 4.2 forstås ved »kunstig« som karakteristik af et arrangement eller en serie arrangementer: som er uden reelt forretningsmæssigt indhold. Når de nationale myndigheder skal afgøre, om arrangementer eller serier af arrangementer er kunstige, bør de overveje, om der er tale om en eller flere af følgende situationer:
a)
Den juridiske karakter af de enkelte trin, som arrangementet består af, er uden sammenhæng med den juridiske substans i arrangementet som helhed.
b)
Arrangementet eller serien af arrangementer udføres på en måde, som ville være usædvanlig i en forretningspraksis, der kan anses for fornuftig.
c)
Arrangementet eller serien af arrangementer omfatter elementer, der udligner eller ophæver hinanden.
d)
Der gennemføres cirkeltransaktioner.
e)
Arrangementet eller serien af arrangementer resulterer i en betydelig skattelettelse, men dette afspejles ikke i den forretningsrisiko, som skatteyderen indgår, eller i skatteyderens likviditetsstrømme.
f)
Det forventede overskud før skat er ubetydeligt i forhold til størrelsen af den forventede skattefordel.
4.5.
Ved anvendelsen af punkt 4.2 anses formålet med et arrangement eller en serie arrangementer for at være at undgå beskatning, hvis arrangementet eller arrangementerne hindrer de skatteregler, der ellers ville gælde, i at finde anvendelse i overensstemmelse med deres hensigt, formål og ånd, og det uanset skatteyderens subjektive hensigter.
4.6.
Ved anvendelsen af punkt 4.2 anses et givet formål for at være hovedformålet, hvis andre formål, som arrangementet eller serien af arrangementer tilskrives eller kunne tilskrives, forekommer ubetydelige, alle omstændigheder i sagen taget i betragtning.
4.7.
Når de nationale myndigheder skal afgøre, om et arrangement eller en serie arrangementer har medført en skattefordel som omhandlet i punkt 4.2, bør de sammenligne det beløb, en skatteyder skal betale i skat med reference til de pågældende arrangementer, med det beløb, som den samme skatteyder skulle betale i skat under de samme omstændigheder uden disse arrangementer. I denne forbindelse bør det undersøges, om en eller flere af følgende situationer forekommer:
a)
Et beløb indgår ikke i beskatningsgrundlaget
b)
Skatteyderen får fordel af et fradrag
c)
Der opstår et skattemæssigt tab
d)
Der skal ikke betales kildeskat
e)
Udenlandsk skat udlignes.
5.   Opfølgning
Medlemsstaterne bør underrette Kommissionen om de foranstaltninger, de træffer for at efterkomme denne henstilling, samt om eventuelle ændringer af disse foranstaltninger.
Kommissionen offentliggør en rapport om anvendelsen af denne henstilling, senest tre år efter at den er vedtaget.
6.   Adressater
Denne henstilling er rettet til medlemsstaterne.
Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 6. december 2012.
På Kommissionens vegne
Algirdas ŠEMETA
Medlem af Kommissionen
(
1
)
  
            
EUT L 310 af 25.11.2009, s. 34
.
(
2
)
  
            
EUT L 345 af 29.12.2011, s. 8
.
(
3
)
  
            
EUT L 157 af 26.6.2003, s. 49
.

Summary:
Aggressiv skatteplanlægning
Kommissionen foreslår måder, hvorpå der kan tages højde for juridiske spidsfindigheder og smuthuller, som nogle virksomheder udnytter til at undgå at betale deres rimelige andel af skatten.
RETSAKT
Kommissionens henstilling 
2012/772/EU
 om aggressiv skatteplanlægning.
RESUMÉ
At tackle aggressiv skatteplanlægning er et aspekt af en detaljeret og kompleks 
handlingsplan fra Kommissionen
, der har til formål at bekæmpe skatteunddragelse og skattesvig.
Handlingsplanen opstiller praktiske måder til at forbedre 
administrativt samarbejde
 mellem EU-landene, bekæmpe misbrug og dobbelt ikke-beskatning og tackle spørgsmål vedrørende 
skattely og skatterelaterede lovovertrædelser
.
I øjeblikket kan nogle skatteydere bruge komplekse, til tider kunstige, arrangementer til at flytte deres skattegrundlag til andre jurisdiktioner i eller uden for Den Europæiske Union. Ved at gøre dette udnytter de uoverensstemmelser mellem de nationale lovgivninger til at sørge for, at visse indtægter forbliver ubeskattede overalt eller til at udnytte forskelle i skattesatser. Dette problem kaldes 
aggressiv skatteplanlægning
.
Det centrale problem er, at stadig mere sofistikeret skatteplanlægning flytter skattepligtige overskud til lande med skattesystemer, der er mere fordelagtige for skatteyderen. Denne praksis reducerer skattebetalingen gennem ordninger, der overholder lovens bogstav, men krænker dens ånd - 
juridiske smuthuller
.
Aggressiv skatteplanlægning antager mange former, og dens konsekvenser omfatter 
dobbelte fradrag
 (f.eks. fradrages samme tab både i kildelandet og i bopælslandet) og 
dobbelt ikke-beskatning
 (f.eks. indkomst, som ikke beskattes i det land, hvor den er optjent, og er fritaget i bopælslandet).
Kommissionen opfordrer derfor EU-landene til at sikre, at overenskomster om dobbeltbeskatning indgået med andre lande i EU og lande uden for EU indeholder bestemmelser, der er beregnet på at løse en specifikt identificeret type dobbelt ikke-beskatning.
Den anbefaler også brugen af en 
fælles generel regel om bekæmpelse af misbrug
 med henblik på at bidrage til at sikre sammenhæng og effektivitet på et område, hvor praksis varierer betydeligt mellem EU-landene.
Der er mange andre forslag på dette område. For eksempel er det konstateret, at det nuværende momssystem er sårbart over for svig. Kommissionen har derfor besluttet at oprette et EU-momsforum. Her kan repræsentanter for erhvervslivet og skattemyndighederne udveksle synspunkter om de praktiske aspekter af den momsadministration, der finder anvendelse på transaktioner mellem EU-landene. De kan også identificere og diskutere god praksis, der kan hjælpe med at gøre det mere ligetil at styre momssystemet og nedbringe omkostningerne til overholdelse og samtidig sikre momsprovenuet.
REFERENCER
Retsakt
Ikrafttrædelse
Gennemførelsesfrist i medlemsstaterne
Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
Kommissionens henstilling 
2012/772/EU
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Den Europæiske Unions Tidende C 338 af 12.12.2012
CITEREDE DOKUMENTER
Meddelelse fra Kommissionen til Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet: En handlingsplan for at styrke bekæmpelsen af skattesvig og skatteunddragelse
 (
COM(2012)722 final
 - ikke offentliggjort i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende).
Forslag til Rådets direktiv om ændring af direktiv 2011/96/EU om en fælles beskatningsordning for moder- og datterselskaber fra forskellige medlemsstater
 (
COM(2013)814
 final - ikke offentliggjort i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende).
Moder- og datterselskabsdirektivet (direktiv 2011/96/EU) blev oprindeligt udformet med henblik på at forhindre, at selskaber inden for samme koncern i forskellige EU-lande blev beskattet to gange af den samme indkomst (dobbeltbeskatning). Nogle selskaber har imidlertid udnyttet bestemmelser i direktivet og uoverensstemmelser mellem nationale skatteregler til at undgå at blive beskattet i nogen EU-lande overhovedet (dobbelt ikke-beskatning).
Den foreslåede ændring vil stramme op på direktivet, således at nærmere bestemte skatteplanlægningsarrangementer (hybride lånearrangementer) ikke kan drage fordel af skattefritagelser. Ifølge forslaget skal en hybrid lånebetaling, hvis den er fradragsberettiget i det EU-land, hvor datterselskabet har hjemsted, beskattes af det EU-land, hvor moderselskabet er etableret. Dette vil forhindre selskaber med afdelinger i mere end ét EU-land i at planlægge betalinger mellem afdelinger i forskellige lande for at opnå dobbelt ikke-beskatning.
seneste ajourføring 21.02.2014