CELEX ID: 61962CJ0026

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Document:
Parties
Subject of the case
Grounds
Decision on costs
Endorsements
Operative part
Parties
IN CASE 26/62
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH AND UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, A NETHERLANDS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HAVING FINAL JURISDICTION IN REVENUE CASES, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
N.V . ALGEMENE TRANSPORT - EN EXPEDITIE ONDERNEMING VAN GEND & LOOS, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT UTRECHT, REPRESENTED BY H.G . STIBBE AND L.F.D . TER KUILE, BOTH ADVOCATES OF AMSTERDAM, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
AND
NEDERLANDSE ADMINISTRATIE DER BELASTINGEN ( NETHERLANDS INLAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION ), REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AT ZAANDAM, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY,
Subject of the case
ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS :
1 . WHETHER ARTICLE 12 OF THE EEC TREATY HAS DIRECT APPLICATION WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A MEMBER STATE, IN OTHER WORDS, WHETHER NATIONALS OF SUCH A STATE CAN, ON THE BASIS OF THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION, LAY CLAIM TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH THE COURTS MUST PROTECT;
2 . IN THE EVENT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY, WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF AN IMPORT DUTY OF 8% TO THE IMPORT INTO THE NETHERLANDS BY THE APPLICANT IN THE MAIN ACTION OF UREAFORMALDEHYDE ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REPRESENTED AN UNLAWFUL INCREASE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE EEC TREATY OR WHETHER IT WAS IN THIS CASE A REASONABLE ALTERATION OF THE DUTY APPLICABLE BEFORE 1 MARCH 1960, AN ALTERATION WHICH, ALTHOUGH AMOUNTING TO AN INCREASE FROM THE ARITHMETICAL POINT OF VIEW, IS NEVERTHELESS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS PROHIBITED UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 12;
Grounds
I - PROCEDURE
NO OBJECTION HAS BEEN RAISED CONCERNING THE PROCEDURAL VALIDITY OF THE REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, A COURT OR TRIBUNAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT ARTICLE . FURTHER, NO GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE COURT TO RAISE THE MATTER OF ITS OWN MOTION .
II - THE FIRST QUESTION
A - JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ON THE GROUND THAT THE REFERENCE RELATES NOT TO THE INTERPRETATION BUT TO THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS, AND THAT IN PARTICULAR THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECIDE, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY PREVAIL OVER NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION OR OVER OTHER AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE NETHERLANDS AND INCORPORATED INTO DUTCH NATIONAL LAW . THE SOLUTION OF SUCH A PROBLEM, IT IS CLAIMED, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, SUBJECT TO AN APPLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY ARTICLES 169 AND 170 OF THE TREATY .
HOWEVER IN THIS CASE THE COURT IS NOT ASKED TO ADJUDICATE UPON THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH REMAINS THE CONCERN OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, BUT IS ASKED, IN CONFORMITY WITH SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY, ONLY TO INTERPRET THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE SAID TREATY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY LAW AND WITH REFERENCE TO ITS EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS . THIS ARGUMENT HAS THEREFORE NO LEGAL FOUNDATION .
THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FURTHER ARGUES THAT THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE GROUND THAT NO ANSWER WHICH THE COURT COULD GIVE TO THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE WOULD HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE RESULT OF THE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT IN THAT COURT .
HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE COURT IN THE PRESENT CASE IT IS NECESSARY ONLY THAT THE QUESTION RAISED SHOULD CLEARLY BE CONCERNED WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE LED A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL TO ITS CHOICE OF QUESTIONS AS WELL AS THE RELEVANCE WHICH IT ATTRIBUTES TO SUCH QUESTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CASE BEFORE IT ARE EXCLUDED FROM REVIEW BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE . IT APPEARS FROM THE WORDING OF THE QUESTIONS REFERRED THAT THEY RELATE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . THE COURT THEREFORE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ANSWER THEM .
THIS ARGUMENT, TOO, IS THEREFORE UNFOUNDED .
B - ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE
THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE IS WHETHER ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY HAS DIRECT APPLICATION IN NATIONAL LAW IN THE SENSE THAT NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES MAY ON THE BASIS OF THIS ARTICLE LAY CLAIM TO RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURT MUST PROTECT .
TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY EXTEND SO FAR IN THEIR EFFECTS IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE SPIRIT, THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE WORDING OF THOSE PROVISIONS .
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EEC TREATY, WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON MARKET, THE FUNCTIONING OF WHICH IS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE COMMUNITY, IMPLIES THAT THIS TREATY IS MORE THAN AN AGREEMENT WHICH MERELY CREATES MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE CONTRACTING STATES . THIS VIEW IS CONFIRMED BY THE PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY WHICH REFERS NOT ONLY TO GOVERNMENTS BUT TO PEOPLES . IT IS ALSO CONFIRMED MORE SPECIFICALLY BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS ENDOWED WITH SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, THE EXERCISE OF WHICH AFFECTS MEMBER STATES AND ALSO THEIR CITIZENS . FURTHERMORE, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE NATIONALS OF THE STATES BROUGHT TOGETHER IN THE COMMUNITY ARE CALLED UPON TO COOPERATE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THIS COMMUNITY THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE .
IN ADDITION THE TASK ASSIGNED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 177, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO SECURE UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY BY NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, CONFIRMS THAT THE STATES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COMMUNITY LAW HAS AN AUTHORITY WHICH CAN BE INVOKED BY THEIR NATIONALS BEFORE THOSE COURTS AND TRIBUNALS . THE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS IS THAT THE COMMUNITY CONSTITUTES A NEW LEGAL ORDER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF WHICH THE STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, ALBEIT WITHIN LIMITED FIELDS, AND THE SUBJECTS OF WHICH COMPRISE NOT ONLY MEMBER STATES BUT ALSO THEIR NATIONALS . INDEPENDENTLY OF THE LEGISLATION OF MEMBER STATES, COMMUNITY LAW THEREFORE NOT ONLY IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS ON INDIVIDUALS BUT IS ALSO INTENDED TO CONFER UPON THEM RIGHTS WHICH BECOME PART OF THEIR LEGAL HERITAGE . THESE RIGHTS ARISE NOT ONLY WHERE THEY ARE EXPRESSLY GRANTED BY THE TREATY, BUT ALSO BY REASON OF OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE TREATY IMPOSES IN A CLEARLY DEFINED WAY UPON INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS UPON THE MEMBER STATES AND UPON THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .
WITH REGARD TO THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE TREATY AS IT RELATES TO CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT ARTICLE 9, WHICH BASES THE COMMUNITY UPON A CUSTOMS UNION, INCLUDES AS AN ESSENTIAL PROVISION THE PROHIBITION OF THESE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES . THIS PROVISION IS FOUND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PART OF THE TREATY WHICH DEFINES THE 'FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY '. IT IS APPLIED AND EXPLAINED BY ARTICLE 12 .
THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 12 CONTAINS A CLEAR AND UNCONDITIONAL PROHIBITION WHICH IS NOT A POSITIVE BUT A NEGATIVE OBLIGATION . THIS OBLIGATION, MOREOVER, IS NOT QUALIFIED BY ANY RESERVATION ON THE PART OF STATES WHICH WOULD MAKE ITS IMPLEMENTATION CONDITIONAL UPON A POSITIVE LEGISLATIVE MEASURE ENACTED UNDER NATIONAL LAW . THE VERY NATURE OF THIS PROHIBITION MAKES IT IDEALLY ADAPTED TO PRODUCE DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR SUBJECTS .
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 12 DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION ON THE PART OF THE STATES . THE FACT THAT UNDER THIS ARTICLE IT IS THE MEMBER STATES WHO ARE MADE THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGATIVE OBLIGATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THEIR NATIONALS CANNOT BENEFIT FROM THIS OBLIGATION .
IN ADDITION THE ARGUMENT BASED ON ARTICLES 169 AND 170 OF THE TREATY PUT FORWARD BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT IN THEIR STATEMENTS OF CASE IS MISCONCEIVED . THE FACT THAT THESE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY ENABLE THE COMMISSION AND THE MEMBER STATES TO BRING BEFORE THE COURT A STATE WHICH HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT MEAN THAT INDIVIDUALS CANNOT PLEAD THESE OBLIGATIONS, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT, ANY MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THE TREATY PLACES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION WAYS OF ENSURING THAT OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON THOSE SUBJECT TO THE TREATY ARE OBSERVED, PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY, IN ACTIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT, OF PLEADING INFRINGEMENTS OF THESE OBLIGATIONS .
A RESTRICTION OF THE GUARANTEES AGAINST AN INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 12 BY MEMBER STATES TO THE PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE 169 AND 170 WOULD REMOVE ALL DIRECT LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THEIR NATIONALS . THERE IS THE RISK THAT RECOURSE TO THE PROCEDURE UNDER THESE ARTICLES WOULD BE INNEFFECTIVE IF IT WERE TO OCCUR AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL DECISION TAKEN CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY .
THE VIGILANCE OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS AMOUNTS TO AN EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION IN ADDITION TO THE SUPERVISION ENTRUSTED BY ARTICLES 169 AND 170 TO THE DILIGENCE OF THE COMMISSION AND OF THE MEMBER STATES .
IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT, ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT, THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE WORDING OF THE TREATY, ARTICLE 12 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
III - THE SECOND QUESTION
A - THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
ACCORDING TO THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE BELGIAN AND NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS, THE WORDING OF THIS QUESTION APPEARS TO REQUIRE, BEFORE IT CAN BE ANSWERED, AN EXAMINATION BY THE COURT OF THE TARIFF CLASSIFICATION OF UREAFORMALDEHYDE IMPORTED INTO THE NETHERLANDS, A CLASSIFICATION ON WHICH VAN GEND & LOOS AND THE INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AT ZAANDAM HOLD DIFFERENT OPINIONS WITH REGARD TO THE 'TARIEFBESLUIT' OF 1947 . THE QUESTION CLEARLY DOES NOT CALL FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY BUT CONCERNS THE APPLICATION OF NETHERLANDS CUSTOMS LEGISLATION TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF AMINOPLASTS, WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION CONFERRED UPON THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES BY SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 .
THE COURT HAS THEREFORE NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE REFERENCE MADE BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE .
HOWEVER, THE REAL MEANING OF THE QUESTION PUT BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE IS WHETHER, IN LAW, AN EFFECTIVE INCREASE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES CHARGED ON A GIVEN PRODUCT AS A RESULT NOT OF AN INCREASE IN THE RATE BUT OF A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT ARISING FROM A CHANGE OF ITS TARIFF DESCRIPTION CONTRAVENES THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY .
VIEWED IN THIS WAY THE QUESTION PUT IS CONCERNED WITH AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION OF THE TREATY AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE MEANING WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CONCEPT OF DUTIES APPLIED BEFORE THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE .
THEREFORE THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE A RULING ON THIS QUESTION .
B - ON THE SUBSTANCE
IT FOLLOWS FROM THE WORDING AND THE GENERAL SCHEME OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY THAT, IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT HAVE BEEN INCREASED CONTRARY TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THE SAID ARTICLE, REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES ACTUALLY APPLIED AT THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY .
FURTHER, WITH REGARD TO THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY, SUCH AN ILLEGAL INCREASE MAY ARISE FROM A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE TARIFF RESULTING IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER A MORE HIGHLY TAXED HEADING AND FROM AN ACTUAL INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY .
IT IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE HOW THE INCREASE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES OCCURRED WHEN, AFTER THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE, THE SAME PRODUCT IN THE SAME MEMBER STATE WAS SUBJECTED TO A HIGHER RATE OF DUTY .
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 12, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN ABOVE, COMES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COURT WHICH MUST ENQUIRE WHETHER THE DUTIABLE PRODUCT, IN THIS CASE UREAFORMALDEHYDE ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IS CHARGED UNDER THE CUSTOMS MEASURES BROUGHT INTO FORCE IN THE NETHERLANDS WITH AN IMPORT DUTY HIGHER THAN THAT WITH WHICH IT WAS CHARGED ON 1 JANUARY 1958 .
THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CHECK THE VALIDITY OF THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO IT DURING THE PROCEEDINGS BUT MUST LEAVE THEM TO BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL COURTS .
Decision on costs
THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EEC AND THE MEMBER STATES WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED THEIR OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT .
Endorsements
ON THOSE GROUNDS
UPON READING THE PLEADINGS;
UPON HEARING THE REPORT OF THE JUDGE - RAPPORTEUR;
UPON HEARING THE PARTIES;
UPON HEARING THE OPINION OF THE ADVOCATE - GENERAL;
HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLES 9, 12, 14, 169, 170 AND 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY; HAVING REGARD TO THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY;
HAVING REGARD TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES;
Operative part
THE COURT
IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE BY DECISION OF 16 AUGUST 1962, HEREBY RULES :
1 . ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY PRODUCES DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
2 . IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT HAVE BEEN INCREASED CONTRARY TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY, REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE DUTIES AND CHARGES ACTUALLY APPLIED BY THE MEMBER STATE IN QUESTION AT THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY .
SUCH AN INCREASE CAN ARISE BOTH FROM A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE TARIFF RESULTING IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER A MORE HIGHLY TAXED HEADING AND FROM AN INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY APPLIED . 3 . THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IN THESE PROCEEDINGS IS A MATTER FOR THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE .

Summary:
The direct effect of European Union law
SUMMARY OF:
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration – the fundamental principle of direct effect
WHAT DOES THE JUDGMENT ESTABLISH?
In its judgment, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union
 (the Court) enshrines the 
direct effect
 of 
European Union
 (EU) law.
The judgment states that 
EU law
 not only engenders 
obligations for EU 
Member States
, but also 
rights for individuals
. Individuals may therefore take advantage of these rights and directly invoke EU law before national and European courts, independently of whether the national law test exists (that is, where there is no judicial remedy under national law).
KEY POINTS
Horizontal and vertical direct effect
There are two aspects to direct effect: a vertical aspect and a horizontal aspect.
Vertical direct effect
 is of consequence in relations between individuals and the country. This means that individuals can invoke a provision of EU law in relation to the state.
Horizontal direct effect
 is of consequence in relations between individuals. This means that an individual can invoke a provision of EU law in relation to another individual.
According to the type of act concerned, the Court has accepted either a 
full direct effect
 (i.e. a horizontal direct effect and a vertical direct effect) or a 
partial direct effect
 (confined to a vertical direct effect).
Direct effect and primary law
As far as 
primary law
 is concerned, the Court established the 
principle of direct effect
 in the 
Van Gend en Loos
 judgment. However, it laid down the 
condition
 that the obligations must be 
precise, clear and unconditional
 and that they must 
not call for additional measures
, either national or European.
In the 
Becker
 judgment, the Court rejected direct effect where the countries have a margin of discretion, however minimal, regarding the implementation of the provision in question. In 
Kaefer and Procacci v French State
, the Court affirmed that the provision in question was unconditional because it left no discretion to the Member States and therefore had direct effect.
Direct effect and secondary law
The principle of direct effect also relates to acts from 
secondary law
, that is acts adopted by the EU institutions, such as regulations, directives and decisions, which are derived from the principles and objectives set out in the 
treaties
. However, the 
application of direct effect depends on the type of act
.
Regulations
 are directly applicable in the Member States, as specified in Article 
288
 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union , and have therefore direct effect. However, in line with the general principles, this applies only under the condition that the rules are sufficiently clear, precise and relevant to the situation of the individual litigant (direct effect as clarified by the 
Politi v Ministero delle finanze
 Court judgement).
Directives
 are acts addressed to Member States which must be transposed into national law. However, in certain cases, the Court recognises the direct effect of directives in order to protect the rights of individuals. Therefore, the Court laid down in its 
Van Duyn v Home Office
 judgment that a directive has direct effect when its provisions are unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise and when the Member State has not transposed the directive by the deadline. However, it can only have direct vertical effect – Member States are obliged to implement directives but directives may not be cited by a Member State against an individual (see 
Ratti
 judgment).
Decisions
 may have direct effect when they refer to a Member State as the addressee. The Court therefore recognises only a direct vertical effect (
Hansa Fleisch v Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg
 judgment).
International agreements
.
 In its 
Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd
 judgment, the Court recognised the direct effect of certain agreements in accordance with the same criteria identified in the 
Van Gend en Loos
 case.
Opinions
 and 
recommendations
 do not have legal binding force. Consequently, they do not have direct effect.
BACKGROUND
Along with the 
primacy of EU law
 (also known as precedence), direct effect is a fundamental principle of EU law.
MAIN DOCUMENT
Judgment of 
5 February 1963
, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 
C-26/62
, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Judgment of 
10 November 1992
, Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt 
GmbH & Co
. KG v Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg, 
C-156/91
, ECLI:EU:C:1992:423.
Judgment of 
12 December 1990
, Peter Kaefer and Andréa Procacci v French State, joined cases 
C-100/89 and C-101/89
, ECLI:EU:C:1990:456.
Judgment of 
30 September 1987
, Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, 
C-12/86
, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400.
Judgment of 
19 January 1982
, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 
C-8/81
, ECLI:EU:C:1982:7.
Judgment of 
5 April 1979
, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, 
C-148/78
, ECLI:EU:C:1979:110.
Judgment of 
4 December 1974
, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, 
C-41-74
, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133.
Judgment of 
14 December 1971
, Politi s.a.s. v Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic, 
C-43/71
, ECLI:EU:C:1971:122.
last update 
25.11.2022

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Document:
I sag 26/62
angående en anmodning, som i medfør af artikel 177, stk. 1, litra a og stk. 3 i traktaten om oprettelse af Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab af Tariefcommissie, en nederlandsk forvaltningsdomstol, der som sidste instans træffer afgørelse i skattesager, er indgivet til Domstolen for i den sag, der verserer for nævnte ret mellem
SELSKABET ALGEMENE TRANSPORT EN EXPEDITIE ONDERNEMING VAN GEND & LOOS, med hovedsæde i Utrecht, repræsenteret af H. G. Stibbe og L. F. D. ter Kuile, begge advokater i Amsterdam, med valgt adresse ved Nederlandenes generalkonsulat i Luxembourg,
og
DEN NEDERLANDSKE FINANSFORVALTNING, repræsenteret af inspektøren for told- og forbrugsafgifter, med valgt adresse ved den nederlandske ambassade i Luxembourg, at opnå en præjudiciel afgørelse af følgende spørgsmål:
1.
Om EØF-traktatens artikel 12 har national virkning, med andre ord om de retsundergivne i medfør af denne artikel kan påberåbe sig individuelle rettigheder, som dommeren skal beskytte;
2.
i bekræftende fald om anvendelsen af en toldsats på 8 % ved den af sagsøgeren i hovedsagen foretagne import til Nederlandene af urinstofformaldehyd hidrørende fra Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland udgør en ulovlig forhøjelse efter EØF-traktatens artikel 12, eller om der i det foreliggende tilfælde kun har været tale om en rimelig ændring af den før 1. marts 1960 gældende toldsats, som, selv om den rent aritmetisk udgør en forhøjelse, ikke kan betragtes som forbudt efter artikel 12,
afsiger
DOMSTOLEN
sammensat af: præsidenten A. M. Donner, afdelingsformændene L. Delvaux og R. Rossi, dommerne O. Riese, Ch. L. Hammes (refererende), A. Trabucchi og R. Lecourt,
generaladvokat: K. Roemer
justitssekretær: A. Van Houtte
følgende
DOM
Præmisser
I — Vedrørende proceduren
Der er ikke rejst nogen indsigelse mod lovligheden af den procedure, hovrefter anmodningen i medfør af EØF-traktatens artikel 177 om en præjudiciel afgørelse er indgivet til Domstolen af Tariefcommissie, som er en ret i denne artikels forstand;
anmodningen giver heller ikke anledning til påtale ex officio i denne henseende.
II — Vedrørende det første spørgsmål
A — Domstolens kompetence
Den nederlandske og den belgiske regering bestrider Domstolens kompetence med den begrundelse, at det i det foreliggende tilfælde ikke drejer sig om en anmodning om fortolkning men om anvendelse af traktaten inden for rammerne af den nederlandske forfatningsret;
især skulle Domstolen ikke være kompetent til at træffe afgørelse om, hvorvidt der i givet fald skal anerkendes en forrang for EØF-traktatens bestemmelser frem for den nederlandske lovgivning og andre overenskomster, der er afsluttet af Nederlandene og optaget i deres nationale ret; løsningen af et sådant problem skulle efter disse regeringers opfattelse henhøre under de nationale domsmyndigheders enekompetence med forbehold af et søgsmål på de i traktatens artikler 169 og 170 fastsatte betingelser;
i det foreliggende tilfælde har man imidlertid ikke henvendt sig til Domstolen, for at denne skal træffe afgørelse om traktatens anvendelse efter principperne i den nationale nederlandske ret, hvilket henhører under de nationale domsmyndigheders kompetence, men udelukkende ifølge traktatens artikel 177, litra a anmodet om en fortolkning af rækkevidden af denne traktats artikel 12 inden for fællesskabsrettens rammer og i henseende til dens virkning for den enkelte;
denne indsigelse er således ikke retligt begrundet;
den belgiske regering påberåber sig endvidere, at Domstolen ikke er kompetent, fordi det svar, som den kan give på Tariefcommissie's første spørgsmål, ikke er relevant for udfaldet af den for denne ret indbragte sag;
for at anerkende Domstolens kompetence i den foreliggende sag er det imidlertid nødvendigt og tilstrækkeligt, at det med tilstrækkelig klarhed fremgår, at det stillede spørgsmål angår en fortolkning af traktaten;
de overvejelser, som den nationale ret ved udvælgelsen af spørgsmålene kan have ladet sig lede af, og den relevans, som den tillægger dem inden for rammerne af en sag, der er forelagt den til påkendelse, er unddraget Domstolens bedømmelse;
spørgsmålene angår efter deres ordlyd fortolkning af traktaten;
de falder derfor ind under Domstolens kompetence;
denne indsigelse er derfor ikke begrundet.
B — Vedrørende realiteten
Tariefcommissie stiller i første række spørgsmålet, om traktatens artikel 12 har umiddelbar virkning i den nationale ret, således at medlemsstaternes statsborgere i medfør af denne artikel kan påberåbe sig rettigheder, som skal beskyttes af den nationale dommer;
ved undersøgelsen af, om en international traktat har en sådan rækkevidde, må man tage traktatens ånd, opbygning og ordlyd i betragtning;
målet for EØF-traktaten, at oprette et fællesmarked, hvis funktion direkte berører de retsundergivne i Fællesskabet, indebærer, at denne traktat udgør mere end en aftale, som blot skaber gensidige forpligtelser mellem de kontraherende stater;
denne opfattelse bekræftes ved traktatens præambel, som ikke blot omtaler regeringerne men også befolkningerne, og på mere konkret måde ved oprettelsen af organer, som har fået overdraget suveræne rettigheder, hvis udøvelse berører såvel medlemsstaterne som disses borgere;
det skal i øvrigt bemærkes, at statsborgerne i de i Fællesskabet forenede stater gennem Europa-Parlamentet og Det økonomiske og sociale Udvalg skal bidrage til dette Fællesskabs funktion;
endvidere bekræfter den opgave, som er pålagt Domstolen i henhold til artikel 177, og som tjener til at sikre en ensartet fortolkning af traktaten ved de nationale retter, at staterne har anerkendt, at fællesskabsretten har en gyldighed, som deres statsborgere kan påberåbe sig for disse retter;
heraf må man drage den slutning, at Fællesskabet udgør et nyt folkeretligt system, til hvis fordel staterne, om end inden for begrænsede områder, har indskrænket deres suveræne rettigheder, og hvis retssubjekter ikke blot er medlemsstaterne men også disses statsborgere;
uafhængigt af medlemsstaternes lovgivning pålægger fællesskabsretten derfor ikke blot private forpligtelser, men den skal også give dem rettigheder, som bliver en del af deres juridiske formue;
disse rettigheder opstår ikke blot, når de udtrykkeligt er indrømmet i traktaten, men også, når traktaten pålægger private såvel som medlemsstater og Fællesskabets institutioner entydige forpligtelser;
under hensyntagen til traktatens opbygning på området for told og afgifter med tilsvarende virkning skal det understreges, at artikel 9, hvorefter Fællesskabets grundlag er en toldunion, som den vigtigste forskrift indeholder forbudet mod told og afgifter;
denne bestemmelse findes i indledningen til den del af traktaten, som nærmere fastlægger »Fællesskabets grundlag«; den anvendes og belyses i artikel 12;
artikel 12 indeholder et klart og ubetinget forbud, som ikke er en pligt til at handle men til at undlade;
ydermere knytter der sig ikke til denne forpligtelse noget forbehold fra staternes side om, at dens gennemførelse skal være afhængig af vedtagelsen af en udtrykkelig national retsforskrift;
selve dette forbuds karakter gør det særdeles velegnet til at skabe umiddelbare virkninger i de retlige relationer mellem medlemsstaterne og deres retsundergivne;
gennemførelsen af artikel 12 kræver ikke, at staterne vedtager nogen lovgivning;
den omstændighed, at det i henhold til denne artikel er medlemsstaterne, der er pligtsubjekter for nævnte undladelsesforpligtelse, medfører ikke, at deres statsborgere ikke kan drage fordel af den;
den på traktatens artikler 169 og 170 støttede indsigelse, som er gjort gældende af de tre regeringer, der i deres indlæg har fremsat bemærkninger for Domstolen, er i øvrigt ugrundet;
den omstændighed, at traktaten i de nævnte bestemmelser giver Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne mulighed for at indstævne en stat, som ikke har opfyldt sine forpligtelser, for Domstolen, indebærer ikke, at det skulle være umuligt for private i givet fald at gøre disse forpligtelser gældende for den nationale dommer, lige så lidt som den omstændighed, at traktaten giver Kommissionen midler til at sikre overholdelsen af de forpligtelser, der er pålagt de traktatundergivne, udelukker muligheden for i sager mellem private for den nationale dommer at påberåbe sig krænkelsen af disse forpligtelser;
hvis garantierne mod medlemsstaternes overtrædelse af artikel 12 alene begrænses til procedurerne i artiklerne 169 og 170, vil dette udelukke enhver umiddelbar beskyttelse af deres statsborgeres individuelle rettigheder;
der er en risiko for, at anvendelsen af disse artikler bliver virkningsløse, såfremt den skal afhænge af gennemførelsen af en national beslutning, som tilsidesætter traktatens forskrifter;
agtpågivenheden hos de private, som er interesserede i at beskytte deres rettigheder, medfører en effektiv kontrol, der supplerer den kontrol, som det i artiklerne 169 og 170 overlades til Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne at drage omsorg for.
det følger af de forudgående overvejelser, at artikel 12 ifølge traktatens ånd, opbygning og indhold skal fortolkes således, at den har umiddelbar virkning og medfører individuelle rettigheder, som de nationale domsmyndigheder skal beskytte.
III — Vedrørende det andet spørgsmål
A — Domstolens kompetence
Ifølge de bemærkninger, den belgiske og nederlandske regering har fremsat, synes formuleringen af dette spørgsmål at kræve, at Domstolen ved dets løsning foretager en undersøgelse af den toldmæssige betegnelse af urinstofformaldehyd, som er importeret til Nederlandene, idet denne bedømmes forskelligt af Van Gend & Loos og inspektøren for told og forbrugsafgifter i Zaandam i relation til »Tariefbesluit« af 1947;
denne problemstilling indebærer efter regeringernes opfattelse ikke en fortolkning af traktaten men angår et tilfælde af anvendelse af den nederlandske toldlovgivning på tariferingen af aminoplast, hvilket falder uden for den kompetence, der ved artikel 177, litra a er tillagt Fællesskabets Domstol;
Domstolen skulle derfor være inkompetent til at tage stilling til Tariefcommissie's anmodning ;
den virkelige betydning af Tariefcommissie's spørgsmål er imidlertid, om en effektiv forøgelse af tolden på en bestemt vare retligt strider mod forbudet i traktatens artikel 12, når den ikke er en følge af en tarifforhøjelse men af en ny indplacering af varen efter en ændring af dens toldmæssige betegnelse;
under denne synsvinkel angår spørgsmålet fortolkning af denne traktatbestemmelse og særlig af den rækkevidde, der skal tillægges begrebet, de ved traktatens ikraftsættelse anvendte toldsatser;
Domstolen er derfor kompetent til at besvare spørgsmålet.
B — Vedrørende realiteten
Det følger af indholdet og opbygningen af traktatens artikel 12, at man ved konstateringen af, om told og afgifter med tilsvarende virkning er blevet forhøjet under tilsidesættelse af det deri indeholdte forbud, skal tage hensyn til de toldsatser og afgifter, der faktisk fandt anvendelse på tidspunktet for traktatens ikrafttræden;
en sådan i forhold til forbudet i artikel 12 ulovlig forhøjelse kan lige så vel fremkomme ved en ændret opdeling af tariffen, hvorved varen henføres til en position med en højere afgift, som ved en egentlig forhøjelse af toldsatsen;
når det står fast, at en vare i en medlemsstat er blevet pålagt en højere sats efter traktatens ikrafttræden, er det underordnet på hvilken måde toldforhøjelsen har fundet sted;
anvendelsen af artikel 12 hører ifølge ovenstående fortolkning ind under den nationale dommers kompetence; denne skal undersøge, om den toldpligtige vare, i det foreliggende tilfælde urinstofformaldehyd hidrørende fra Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland, ved toldmæssige foranstaltninger, som er blevet sat i kraft i Nederlandene, er blevet pålagt en importtold, som er højere end den, der hvilede på varen den 1. januar 1958;
Domstolen er ikke kompetent til på dette punkt at prøve rigtigheden af de modstridende erklæringer, som er blevet forelagt den under sagen, men skal overlade dette til de nationale instansers bedømmelse.
På grundlag af disse præmisser,
kender
DOMSTOLEN
vedrørende den anmodning om en præjudiciel afgørelse, der er forelagt den af Tariefcommissie ved kendelse af 16. august 1962, for ret:
1.
Artikel 12 i traktaten om oprettelse af Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab har umiddelbar virkning og medfører individuelle rettigheder for de retsundergivne, som de nationale domsmyndigheder skal beskytte.
2.
Ved konstateringen af, om told eller afgifter med tilsvarende virkning er blevet forhøjet under tilsidesættelse af forbudet i artikel 12, skal der tages hensyn til de toldsatser og afgifter, der faktisk fandt anvendelse i den omhandlede medlemsstat på tidspunktet for traktatens ikrafttræden;
en sådan forhøjelse kan lige så vel ske ved en ændret opdeling af tariffen, hvorved varen henføres til en position med en højere afgift, som ved en forhøjelse af den anvendte toldsats.
Afsagt i offentligt retsmøde i Luxembourg den 5. februar 1963.
A. Van Houtte
Justitssekretær
A. M. Donner
Præsident

Summary:
Den direkte virkning af Den Europæiske Unions lovgivning
RESUMÉ AF:
Dom afsagt af Den Europæiske Unions Domstol, Van Gend en Loos mod den nederlandske finansforvaltning — det grundlæggende princip for direkte virkning
HVAD FASTSLÅR DOMMEN?
I sin dom fastslår 
Den Europæiske Unions Domstol
 (Domstolen) den 
direkte virkning
 af 
Den Europæiske Unions
 (EU) lovgivning.
Dommen fastslår, at 
EU-rette
 ikke blot afføder 
forpligtelser for EU’s 
medlemsstater
, men også 
rettigheder for privatpersoner
. Privatpersoner kan derfor drage fordel af disse rettigheder og direkte påberåbe sig EU-retten for nationale og europæiske domstole, uanset om der foreligger lovtekster i national lovgivning (dvs. hvor der ikke er mulighed for appel ifølge national lovgivning).
HOVEDPUNKTER
Direkte horisontal og vertikal virkning
Der er to sider af den direkte virkning, den vertikale og den horisontale.
Den direkte vertikale virkning
 vedrører forbindelserne mellem borgerne og landet. Den betyder, at privatpersoner kan påberåbe sig en bestemmelse i EU-retten over for staten.
Den direkte horisontale virkning
 vedrører forbindelserne mellem privatpersoner. Den betyder, at en privatperson kan påberåbe sig en bestemmelse i EU-retten over for en anden privatperson.
Alt efter hvilken type retsakt der er tale om, har Domstolen accepteret, enten at den har 
fuld direkte virkning
 (dvs. både horisontal og vertikal virkning), eller at den har 
delvis direkte virkning
 (dvs. kun vertikal virkning).
Direkte virkning og primær ret
For så vidt angår 
primærretten
 fastslog Domstolen princippet om 
direkte virkning
 i 
Van Gend en Loos
-dommen. Den anførte imidlertid som 
betingelse
, at forpligtelserne skal være 
præcise, klare og ubetingede
, og at de ikke må 
nødvendiggøre supplerende foranstaltninger
 hverken på nationalt plan eller på EU-plan.
I 
Becker
-dommen afviste Domstolen den direkte virkning, når EU-landene har et vist råderum, også selv om dette er meget begrænset, med hensyn til gennemførelsen af den pågældende bestemmelse. I 
Kaefer and Procacci mod den franske stat
 bekræftede Domstolen, at den pågældende bestemmelse var ubetinget, fordi den ikke overlader medlemsstaterne noget skøn, og derfor havde direkte virkning.
Direkte virkning og afledt ret
Princippet om direkte virkning vedrører også retsakter i 
afledt ret
, dvs. retsakter vedtaget af EU’s institutioner, såsom forordninger, direktiver og afgørelser, som er udledt af de principper og målsætninger, der er fastlagt i 
traktaterne
. Dog er 
rækkevidden af den direkte virkning afhængig af typen af retsakt.
Forordninger
 finder direkte anvendelse i medlemsstaterne, som fastlagt i artikel 
288
 i Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde og har derfor direkte virkning. I overensstemmelse med de generelle principper finder dette imidlertid kun anvendelse, hvis reglerne er tilstrækkeligt klare, præcise og relevante for den enkelte sagsøgers situation (den direkte virkning præciseres af 
Polico mod Ministero delle finanze
 afgørelse).
Direktiver
 er retsakter, der er rettet mod medlemsstaterne, og som skal gennemføres i national lovgivning. Domstolen anerkender dog i visse sager direktivers direkte virkning for at beskytte privatpersoners rettigheder. Derfor fastslog Domstolen i sin 
Van Duyn mod Home Office
-dom, at et direktiv har direkte virkning, når bestemmelserne i det er ubetingede og tilstrækkeligt klare og nøjagtige, og når EU-medlemsstaten ikke har gennemført direktivet inden fristen. Det kan dog kun have direkte vertikal virkning, dvs. at medlemsstaterne er forpligtede til at gennemføre direktiver, men at en medlemsstat ikke kan påberåbe sig et direktiv over for en privatperson (se 
Ratti
-dommen).
Afgørelser
 kan have en direkte virkning, når de er rettet mod en medlemsstat. Domstolen anerkender derfor kun direkte vertikal virkning (
Hansa Fleisch mod Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg
-dommen).
Internationale aftaler
.
 I sin 
Demirel mod Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd
-dom anerkendte Domstolen en direkte virkning af bestemte aftaler i henhold til samme kriterier, som er anvendt i 
Van Gend en Loos
-sagen
Udtalelser
 og 
henstilling
 do not have legal binding force.har ingen bindende retsvirkning. Følgelig har de ikke direkte virkning.
BAGGRUND
Ligesom 
EU-rettens forrang
 (også kendt som rangfølge) er direkte virkning et grundlæggende princip i EU-retten.
HOVEDDOKUMENT
Dom afsagt 
5. februar 1963
, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos mod Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 
C-26/62
, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
TILHØRENDE DOKUMENTER
Dom afsagt 
10. november 1992
, Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt 
GmbH & Co
. KG mod Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg, 
C-156/91
, ECLI:EU:C:1992:423.
Dom afsagt 
12. december 1990
, Peter Kaefer and Andréa Procacci mod den franske stat, forenede sager 
C-100/89 and C-101/89
, ECLI:EU:C:1990:456.
Dom afsagt 
30. september 1987
, Meryem Demirel mod Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, 
C-12/86
, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400.
Dom afsagt 
19. januar 1982
, Ursula Becker mod Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 
C-8/81
, ECLI:EU:C:1982:7.
Dom afsagt 
5. april 1979
, straffesag mod Tullio Ratti, 
C-148/78
, ECLI:EU:C:1979:110.
Dom afsagt 
4. december 1974
, Yvonne van Duyn mod Home Office, 
C-41-74
, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133.
Dom afsagt 
14. december 1971
, Politi s.a.s. mod Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic, 
C-43/71
, ECLI:EU:C:1971:122.
seneste ajourføring 
25.11.2022