1994年墨西哥金融危機

墨西哥比索危機是1994年12月墨西哥政府突然貶值墨西哥比索兌美元引發的貨幣危機，成為由資本外逃引發的第一個國際金融危機。

During the 1994 presidential election, the incumbent administration embarked on expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. The Mexican treasury began issuing short-term debt instruments denominated in domestic currency with a guaranteed repayment in U.S. dollars, attracting foreign investors. Mexico enjoyed investor confidence and new access to international capital following its signing of the 北美自由贸易协议 (NAFTA). However, a violent uprising in the state of 恰帕斯州, as well as the assassination of the presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, resulted in political instability, causing investors to place an increased 風險溢價 on Mexican assets.

In response, the Mexican central bank intervened in the foreign exchange markets to maintain the Mexican peso's peg to the U.S. dollar by issuing dollar-denominated public debt to buy pesos. The peso's strength caused demand for imports to increase in Mexico, resulting in a trade deficit. Speculators recognized an overvalued peso and capital began flowing out of Mexico to the United States, increasing downward market pressure on the peso. Under election pressures, Mexico purchased its own treasury securities to maintain its 貨幣供應量 and avert rising interest rates, drawing down the bank's dollar reserves. Supporting the money supply by buying more dollar-denominated debt while simultaneously honoring such debt depleted the bank's reserves by the end of 1994.

The central bank devalued the peso on December 20, 1994, and foreign investors' fear led to an even higher 風險溢價. To discourage the resulting capital flight, the bank raised interest rates, but higher costs of borrowing merely hurt economic growth. Unable to sell new issues of public debt or efficiently purchase dollars with devalued pesos, Mexico faced a default. Two days later, the bank allowed the peso to float freely, after which it continued to depreciate. The Mexican economy experienced 通货膨胀 of around 52% and 共同基金s began liquidating Mexican assets as well as 新兴市场 assets in general. The effects spread to economies in Asia and the rest of Latin America. The United States organized a $50 billion bailout for Mexico in January 1995, administered by the 國際貨幣基金組織 (IMF) with the support of the G7 and 國際清算銀行. In the aftermath of the crisis, several of Mexico's banks collapsed amidst widespread mortgage defaults. The Mexican economy experienced a severe 经济衰退 and poverty and unemployment increased.

背景 

With 1994 being the final year of his administration's sexenio (the country's six-year executive term limit), then-President 卡洛斯·萨利纳斯 endorsed Luis Donaldo Colosio as the 革命制度党's (PRI) presidential candidate for the Mexico's 1994 general election. In accordance with party tradition during election years, Salinas de Gortari began an unrecorded spending spree. Mexico's current account deficit grew to roughly 7% of 国内生产总值 that same year, and Salinas de Gortari allowed the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico's treasury, to issue short-term peso-denominated treasury bills with a guaranteed repayment denominated in U.S. dollars, called "tesobonos". These bills offered a lower yield than Mexico's traditional peso-denominated treasury bills, called "cetes", but their dollar-denominated returns were more attractive to foreign investors.

Investor confidence rose after the 北美自由贸易协议 (NAFTA) was signed. Upon NAFTA's entry into force on January 1, 1994, Mexican businesses as well as the Mexican government enjoyed access to new foreign capital thanks to foreign investors eager to lend more money. International perceptions of Mexico's political risk began to shift, however, when the 萨帕塔民族解放军 declared war on the Mexican government and began a violent insurrection in 恰帕斯州. Investors further questioned Mexico's political uncertainties and stability when PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated while campaigning in 蒂華納 in March 1994, and began setting higher risk premia on Mexican financial assets. Higher risk premia initially had no effect on the peso's value because Mexico had a fixed-exchange rate.

Mexico's central bank, 墨西哥银行, maintained the peso's value through an exchange rate peg to the U.S. dollar, allowing the peso to appreciate or depreciate against the dollar within a narrow band. To accomplish this, the central bank would frequently intervene in the open markets and buy or sell pesos to maintain the peg. The central bank's intervention strategy partly involved issuing new short-term public debt instruments denominated in U.S. dollars. They then used the borrowed dollar capital to purchase pesos in the 外汇市场, which, in turn, caused the peso to appreciate. The bank's purpose in mitigating the peso's depreciation was to protect against inflationary risks of having a markedly weaker domestic currency, but with the peso stronger than it ought to have been, domestic businesses and consumers began purchasing increasingly more imports, and Mexico began running a large trade deficit. Speculators began recognizing that the peso was artificially overvalued and led to speculative capital flight that further reinforced downward market pressure on the peso.

墨西哥银行 deviated from standard central banking policy when it fixed the peso to the dollar in 1988. Instead of allowing its 貨幣基數 to contract and its interest rates to rise, the central bank purchased treasury bills to prop up its monetary base and prevent rising interest rates—especially given that 1994 was an election year. Additionally, servicing the tesobonos with U.S. dollar repayments further drew down the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. Consistent with the macroeconomic trilemma in which a country with a fixed exchange rate and free flow of financial capital sacrifices 货币政策 autonomy, the central bank's interventions to revalue the peso caused Mexico's money supply to contract (without an exchange rate peg, the currency would have been allowed to depreciate). The central bank's foreign exchange reserves began to dwindle and it completely ran out of U.S. dollars in December 1994.

危機 
On December 20, 1994, newly inaugurated President 埃內斯托·柴迪洛 announced the Mexican central bank's devaluation of the peso between 13% and 15%. Devaluing the peso after previous promises not to do so led investors to be skeptical of policymakers and fearful of additional devaluations. Investors flocked to foreign investments and placed even higher risk premia on domestic assets. This increase in risk premia placed additional upward market pressure on Mexican interest rates as well as downward market pressure on the Mexican peso. Foreign investors anticipating further currency devaluations began rapidly withdrawing capital from Mexican investments and selling off shares of stock as the 墨西哥證券交易所 plummeted. To discourage such capital flight, particularly from debt instruments, the Mexican central bank raised interest rates, but higher borrowing costs ultimately hindered 经济增长 prospects.

When the time came for Mexico to roll over its maturing debt obligations, few investors were interested in purchasing new debt. To repay tesobonos, the central bank had little choice but to purchase dollars with its severely weakened pesos, which proved extremely expensive. The Mexican government faced an imminent 主权违约.

On December 22, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float, after which the peso depreciated another 15%. The value of the Mexican peso depreciated roughly 50% from 3.4 MXN/USD to 7.2, recovering only to 5.8 MXN/USD four months later. Prices in Mexico rose by 24% over the same four months, and total 通货膨胀 in 1995 was 52%. 共同基金s, which had invested in over $45 billion worth of Mexican assets in the several years leading up to the crisis, began liquidating their positions in Mexico and other developing countries. Foreign investors not only fled Mexico but emerging markets in general, and the crisis led to financial contagion throughout other financial markets in 亚洲 and the Americas. The impact of Mexico's crisis in 智利 and 巴西 became known as the "Tequila effect" ().

救助 

In January 1995, U.S. 比尔·克林顿 held a meeting with newly confirmed 美国财政部长 罗伯特·鲁宾, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman 艾伦·格林斯潘 and then-Under Secretary for the Treasury 勞倫斯·薩默斯 to discuss an American response. According to Summers' recollection of the meeting:

 Secretary Rubin set the stage for it briefly. Then, as was his way, he turned to someone else, namely me, to explain the situation in more detail and our proposal. And I said that I felt that  was required, and one of the President’s political advisers said, “Larry, you mean .” And I said, “No, I mean .” ... There was a certain pall over the room, and one of his [Clinton's] other political advisers said, “Mr. President, if you send that money to Mexico and it doesn’t come back before 1996, you won’t be coming back after 1996.”

Clinton decided nevertheless to seek Congressional approval for a bailout and began working with Summers to secure commitments from Congress.

Motivated to deter a potential surge in illegal immigration and to mitigate the spread of investors' lack of confidence in Mexico to other developing countries, the United States coordinated a $50 billion 紓困 package in January 1995, to be administered by the IMF with support from the G7 and the 國際清算銀行 (BIS). The package established loan guarantees for Mexican public debt aimed at alleviating its growing risk premia and boosting investor confidence in its economy. The 墨西哥经济 experienced a severe 经济衰退 and the peso's value deteriorated substantially despite the bailout's success in preventing a worse collapse. Growth did not resume until the late 1990s.

The conditionality of the bailout required the Mexican government to institute new monetary and 财政政策 controls, although the country refrained from 国际收支 reforms such as trade 贸易保护主义 and strict 資本管制s to avoid violating its commitments under 北美自由贸易协议. The loan guarantees allowed Mexico to restructure its short-term public debt and improve 市场流通性. Of the approximately  assembled in the bailout,  was contributed by the United States,  by the IMF,  by the BIS,  by a consortium of Latin American nations, and 加拿大元$1 billion by Canada.

The Clinton administration's efforts to organize a bailout for Mexico were met with difficulty. It drew criticism from members of the 美国国会 as well as scrutiny from the news media. The administration's position centered on three principal concerns: potential unemployment in the United States in the event Mexico would have to reduce its imports of U.S. goods (at the time, Mexico was the third-largest consumer of U.S. exports); political instability and violence in a neighboring country; and a potential surge in illegal immigration from Mexico. Some congressional representatives agreed with American economist and former Chairman of the 美国联邦存款保险公司, L. William Seidman, that Mexico should just negotiate with creditors without involving the United States, especially in the interest of deterring 道德风险. On the other hand, supporters of U.S. involvement such as Fed Chair 艾伦·格林斯潘 argued that the fallout from a Mexican 主权违约 would be so devastating that it would far exceed the risks of moral hazard.

Following the 美国国会's failure to pass the Mexican Stabilization Act, the Clinton administration reluctantly approved an initially dismissed proposal to designate funds from the 美国财政部's 匯率穩定基金 as loan guarantees for Mexico. These loans returned a handsome profit of $600 million and were even repaid ahead of maturity. Then-美国财政部长 罗伯特·鲁宾's appropriation of funds from the Exchange Stabilization Fund in support of the Mexican bailout was scrutinized by the United States House Committee on Financial Services, which expressed concern about a potential 利益衝突 because Rubin had formerly served as co-chair of the board of directors of 高盛, which had a substantial share in distributing Mexican stocks and bonds.

經濟影響 
墨西哥经济 experienced a severe 经济衰退 as a result of the peso's devaluation and the flight to safer investments. The country's GDP declined by 6.2% over the course of 1995. Mexico's financial sector bore the brunt of the crisis as banks collapsed, revealing low-quality assets and fraudulent lending practices. Thousands of mortgages went into default as Mexican citizens struggled to keep pace with rising interest rates, resulting in widespread 强制收回 of houses.

In addition to declining GDP growth, Mexico experienced severe inflation and extreme poverty skyrocketed as real wages plummeted and 失業 nearly doubled. Prices increased by 35% in 1995. Nominal wages were sustained, but real wages fell by 25-35% over the same year. Unemployment climbed to 7.4% in 1995 from its pre-crisis level of 3.9% in 1994. In the formal sector alone, over one million people lost their jobs and average real wages decreased by 13.5% throughout 1995. Overall household incomes plummeted by 30% in the same year. Mexico's extreme poverty grew to 37% in 1996 from 21% in 1994, undoing the previous ten years of successful poverty reduction initiatives. The nation's poverty levels would not begin returning to normal until 2001.

Mexico's growing poverty affected 市区s more intensely than 农村s, in part due to the urban population's sensitivity to labor market volatility and macroeconomic conditions. Urban citizens relied on a healthy labor market, access to credit, and consumer goods. Consumer price inflation and a tightening credit market during the crisis proved challenging for urban workers, while rural households shifted to 自給農業. Mexico's gross income per capita decreased by only 17% in 农业, contrasted with 48% in the financial sector and 35% in the 建筑施工 and commerce industries. Average household consumption declined by 15% from 1995 to 1996 with a shift in composition toward essential goods. Households saved less and spent less on healthcare. 侨民s living abroad increased 僑匯s to Mexico, evidenced by average net unilateral transfers doubling between 1994 and 1996.

Households' lower demand for primary healthcare led to a 7% hike in mortality rates among infants and children in 1996 (from 5% in 1995). 婴儿死亡率 increased until 1997, most dramatically in regions where women had to work as a result of economic need.

Critical scholars contend that the 1994 Mexican peso crisis exposed the problems of Mexico’s neoliberal turn to the 华盛顿共识 approach to development. Notably, the crisis revealed the problems of a privatized banking sector within a liberalized yet internationally subordinate economy that is dependent on foreign flows of finance capital.

參考

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外部鏈接 
 墨西哥的經濟動盪
 院長彼得克羅外交事務數字檔案館