Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign

Municipal governments and health care providers in one State fall victim to a ransomware campaign launched by a non-State group in a second State. The ransomware campaign disables municipal and health care services in the first State. The scenario explores how the ransomware campaign may be classified under international law. It first considers whether the campaign is a breach of an international obligation attributable to a State. It then discusses the possible legal responses available to the victim State.
== Scenario ==
=== Keywords ===
Attribution, cyber operation, due diligence, prohibition of intervention, ransomware, retorsion, sovereignty, State responsibility, use of force
=== Facts ===
[F1] A previously unknown strain of ransomware is directed toward several municipal governments and a variety of health care services providers in State A through the use of phishing emails. Upon opening the emails by government and health care services employees, computer systems are affected. In a major metropolitan city in State A, the local court is forced offline because the ransomware has encrypted its computer systems and the police are forced to revert to using pen and paper to issue traffic citations. Morever, police are unable to effectuate warrants and ongoing investigations into crimes must be postponed. Thousands of computers at the State A Department of Transportation stop working. Processing of applications for drivers’ licenses and permit renewals is halted. City authorities refuse to pay ransom to the attackers and are forced to spend considerable sums to repair and restore the affected computer systems.
[F2] The same ransomware infects hospital systems in a separate city in State A. Doctors are unable to access patient data stored digitally. Staff resort to using paper charts, transmitting messages in person and being able to perform only basic treatment without access to X-rays or ultrasound scans. Health records system of a major company incorporated in State A is also infected, leaving thousands of patient medical files inaccessible. The inaccessibility of patient data coupled with the disruption to the hospital computer systems results in the inability of the medical staff to perform critical surgeries. Patients are admitted to the emergency rooms when absolutely necessary, but cannot be operated on in a timely manner, resulting in several otherwise preventable injuries, but fortunately no loss of life. Lesser harm is caused to patients who cannot be given necessary medication because their medical records are inaccessible. A significant economic loss is caused by the need to reroute patients to other hospitals. 
[F3] After several weeks, the ransomware attacks stop.
[F4] Authorities in State A determine that the ransomware was created by a group of hackers in State B. The hackers’ relationship to State B is not clear. However, the methodology utilized by the hackers bears a striking similarity to a previous cyber operation attributed to State B. Moreover, State B, while formally denying any involvement in the incidents, praises the actions of the hackers as a just and foreseeable reaction to what State B characterizes as State A’s foreign policy misdeeds. State A and State B have strained relations.
[F5] State A indicts the hackers, but State B does not cooperate in extraditing the hackers to State A for prosecution under criminal laws of State A for several reasons. Firstly, State B is prohibited by its constitution from extraditing its citizens for criminal prosecution in other States. Secondly, relations between State A and State B are such that, even in the absence of the foregoing reasons, State B would be disinclined to co-operate with State A. Finally, State media in State B has lauded the actions of the hackers as a just response to State A’s purported misdeeds.
=== Examples ===
* Sony Pictures Entertainment attack (2014)
* WannaCry (2017)
* NotPetya (2017)
* Texas Municipality ransomware attack (2019)
* SamSam ransomware attack (2018)
* Springhill Medical Center ransomware attack (2019)
* Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack (2021)
* Kaseya VSA ransomware attack (2021)
== Legal analysis ==
For a general overview of the structure of analysis in this section, see Note on the structure of articles.
[L1] The analysis in this scenario focuses on the legal qualification of the ransomware attacks from the perspective of international law. In particular, it examines whether the relevant conduct is attributable to State B and whether it amounts to a breach of an international obligation owed by State B to State A. It then discusses the possible legal responses available to the State A.
=== Attribution ===
==== State organs and exercise of governmental authority ====
[L2] It is not clear that the hackers are a State organ of State B, nor that they are exercising governmental authority on behalf of State B.
==== Non-State actors ====
[L3] As non-State actors, the actions of the hackers may be attributable to State B if they were acting under the instructions or effective control of State BILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 8. or if State B acknowledges and adopts the actions as its own.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 11. First, there is no evidence to suggest that the hackers were operating under the instructions or effective control of State B. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to indicate that State B adequately acknowledged and adopted the behaviour of the hackers as its own. Although State B, including its State media, praised the actions of the hackers as a just and foreseeable reaction to what State B characterizes as State A’s foreign policy, this is unlikely to satisfy the acknowledgment and adoption standard which is applied narrowly and requires more State involvement that mere endorsement or expression of approval.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 17, para 16. Moreover, a minority view holds that the acknowledgement and adoption standard only applies prospectively, and, thus, under this view, State B’s praise of the actions of the hackers after the fact would not suffice to meet the standard.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 17, para 18.
=== Breach of an international obligation ===
[L4] This section considers whether the ransomware attacks are a breach of an international obligation—specifically, the prohibition on the use of force, the prohibition on intervention, the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States, and the duty of due diligence.
==== Use of force ====
[L5] It is unlikely that the ransomware attacks amount to a use of force. A consideration of eight factors proposed by the Tallinn Manual — severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, State involvement, and presumptive legality — shows that to be so.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 69, para 9. However, the eight factors do not constitute an official framework that must be used when assessing the threshold of use of force, but are rather non-exhaustive indicators, similar to those that States are likely to consider.
[L6] Crucially, the ransomware attacks’ overall severity was significant. While the disruption in municipal functions caused only inconvenience for citizens and municipal agencies, the harm that resulted from the disruption to medical services was significant. Several patients admitted to hospitals in State A for emergency procedures were unable to be operated on in a timely manner, resulting in several instances in otherwise preventable injury. Other patients could not receive their medication due to the inaccessibility of their medical records.
[L7] The consequences of the ransomware attacks did not follow immediately from the cyber activities. In most cases, the penetration of the affected systems occurred weeks before the ransom notice was directed to the victim, and monetary costs incurred by the victims to recover data and restore their systems followed weeks or months thereafter. States are more likely to view a cyber operation that causes immediate consequences as a use of force, as distinguishable from consequences that are delayed or manifest slowly over time. Likewise, the less opportunity a State has to mitigate or forestall the effects of a cyber operation, the more likely it is that the operation will be considered as a use of force.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 69, para 9. State A, in fact, had the choice of making a ransom payment and thus preventing the consequences of the attacks.
[L8] The effects of the ransomware attacks on State A were not directly connected to the underlying cyber activity. Directness depends on the degree of attenuation between the initial act and its consequences.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 69, para 9. The initial act in this case was the sending of phishing emails. When those emails were opened, the ransomware infected the recipient’s computers. Computer files were then encrypted and rendered inaccessible. Because the victims failed to make ransom payments, the files were not readily decrypted. Inability to access the files ultimately and indirectly resulted in harm to the victim organizations. While the attacks did have indirect consequences, in the form of the costs incurred to restore backed-up data and to implement improved security, the degree of attenuation between the initial act and its consequences means that directness of the attacks’ cause and effects may not be viewed as comparable to the direct harm caused to people or objects by a kinetic attack.
[L9] The hackers did indeed invasively probe the networks of municipal governments and healthcare providers; however, these were not top-secret networks that were necessarily intended to have the highest level of security. And the networks that the hackers did access were not amongst the most secure maintained by the victims: for instance, emergency response networks were untouched. The effects of the ransomware attacks cannot be calculated with certainty, even if a numerical sum can be affixed to the remediation costs.
[L10] There is no indication that the attacks had a military character. No link has been established between the hackers and the military of State B or of any other State. Nor were the military forces of State A the target of the ransomware campaign.
[L11] Likewise, no State is publicly alleged to have been involved, either directly or indirectly, in the campaign. In this regard, the lack of a clear attribution of the cyber operation to a State would also preclude the characterization of the operation as a use of force, which applies only between States.
[L12] Finally, the reconnaissance and network probing activities of the hackers were qualitatively similar to espionage activities, which are not per se regulated under international law and thus not presumptively judged to be uses of force.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 69, para 9. Most scholars agree that peacetime espionage is not the breach of an international obligation, but several have disagreed. See, e.g., Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 67 (1984) (reasoning that peacetime espionage is illegal under international law if it involves an intrusion of foreign territory); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 79–80 (1964) (labeling peacetime espionage “an international delinquency and violation of international law”); Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 836, 849 (1960) (stating that peacetimeespionage is an “illegitimate enterprise[] because [it] manifest[s] a lack of respect for foreign territory”).
[L13] Considering each one of the foregoing factors, severity is the only one that could feasibly cause the ransomware attacks to meet the criteria of a use of force. However, severity is subject to a de minimis rule.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 69, para 9. It is likely that the severity of the ransomware attacks was not sufficient to meet that de minimis. While the otherwise preventable injuries to persons are certainly more than mere inconveniences, it is unclear whether the limited number of injuries, in light of the ransomware attacks’ failure to meet any of the other criteria, renders the attacks so severe as to constitute a use of force. However, scholars and States may reach different conclusions in their assessment.
==== Prohibition of intervention ====
[L14] There is no suggestion that the ransomware attacks in any way involved the external affairs of State A, but certain effects of the ransomware did implicate the domaine réservé of State A. For example, the conduct of traffic police, the operations of the Department of Transportation, or the provision of essential medical care,For the provision of medical care, see national positions of Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. are certainly fields of activity not committed to international law and possibly form part of the domaine réservé of State A.
[L15] It is less likely that the attacks were coercive efforts designed to influence outcomes in those fields of activity. While the hackers may have manipulated hospitals in State A and the municipal government of a city in State A into making a choice between paying a ransom or spending considerably more to remedy the effects, that choice was not coercive in the sense that it was designed to compel the State A to adopt a particular policy, or to deprive it of its ability to control its affairs, with regard to traffic, policing, hospitals, or municipal policy.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 24. Instead, the coercion was intended to compel the payment of ransom.
[L16] Accordingly, the ransomware attacks would likely not be considered a coercive intervention in the domaine réservé of State A.
==== Obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States ====
[L17] The attacks caused injury to persons (option 2 above), and they resulted in severe losses of functionality (option 3). Everything from normal employee workstations at the Department of Transportation to sophisticated surgical systems and diagnostic equipment at the hospital were unable to function. Medical services were disrupted. Municipal offices were forced offline for weeks. The loss of functionality required spending considerable sums of money on IT support and repair and reinstallation of software to remediate.
[L18] Moreover, the ransomware attacks also interfered with the performance of inherently governmental functions (option 4 above). The court and police operations of State A’s cities are inherently governmental functions, which although not usurped were certainly subject to interference.
[L19] Thus, provided the ransomware attacks were attributable to State B (on which, see above), they would likely amount to a violation of the State A’s sovereignty.
==== Due diligence obligation ====
[L20] Breaches of the due diligence obligation do not require that the act in question be attributable to a State. Instead, the duty of due diligence assumes the role of three parties: the target State toward which the cyber operation is directed; the territorial State; and a third-party author of the cyber operation.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 7. The third party may be another State, a non-State group, or a private person. The threshold is whether the underlying act, if committed by the territorial State, would have violated a rule of international law (i.e., would have been considered an internationally wrongful act) (condition 3). While, in general, it is States, not individuals or private entities, that are able to violate international law, cyber operations carried out by individuals or private entities that nevertheless result in serious adverse consequences fall within a State’s due diligence obligation.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 21.
[L21] Thus, if State B has knowledge of the hackers’ operations, those operations affect the rights of and cause serious adverse consequences to State A, and State A intimates that State B take action to stop the interference in its internal affairs, State B has a duty to take feasible action to stop the ransomware attacks. While the harm caused by a cyber activity must be serious, the due diligence principle does not require that there be physical damage to objects or injuries to persons.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 28.
[L22] In the present case, the ransomware attacks affected State A’s sovereign right to perform inherently governmental functions—operating courts and police departments (condition 1). Moreover, the attacks caused serious adverse consequences for the victim State. The loss of functionality in hospital equipment caused injury to patients, and the encryption of health records led to improper medical care resulting in injury to patients (condition 4).
[L23] Regarding the required knowledge, a State is in breach even if it is unaware of cyber activity conducted from its territory but “objectively should have known that its territory was being used”Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 6, para 39. (condition 5). State A believes that State B knew that the hackers were operating from its territory (conditions 2 and 5). State B, on the other hand, argues that it had no such knowledge. It is not reasonable to assert that State B objectively should have known that the hackers were utilizing its cyber infrastructure to launch attacks against State A because the ransomware employed was complex and previously unknown. State B cannot be expected to prevent the use of malware of which is it entirely unaware. 
Given that the knowledge requirement was not clearly met in this case, State B’s lack of response did not amount itself to a violation of its duty of due diligence (condition 6).
=== Permissible responses by State A ===
[L24] Having established that the ransomware attacks do not meet the criteria of an internationally wrongful act, this section examines the options available for State B to take in response. Cyber operations may, in general, be met with four responses under international law: countermeasures, the plea of necessity, self-defense, and retorsion. For the reasons explained below, only retorsion is available to State A.
==== Countermeasures ====
[L25] Countermeasures are not an available response to the ransomware attacks in the present scenario because the object of countermeasures must be a State, and, as seen above, it was not possible to attribute these ransomware attacks to a State. Moreover, there must be an internationally wrongful act to justify countermeasures. Even if there was one, countermeasures should be limited to ensuring that the unlawful act stops, potentially obtaining assurance and guarantees of non-repetition from the responsible State, and compelling the responsible State to make reparations. Because the ransomware incidents have stopped, countermeasures would have to be limited to compelling the responsible State to guarantee that the incidents do not resume and providing compensation for damages. Countermeasures may not be punitive or have a retaliatory effect.
[L26] State A would be advised to take precautions not to violate an obligation owed to a third State if engaging in countermeasures in response to the ransomware attacks even if they were attributable to State B because if the countermeasures were to violate a legal obligation owed to a third State, State A could itself be in breach of international law. The wrongfulness of such a breach is not precluded by the validity of the countermeasure against the responsible State. Thus, State A could find itself in breach of its international law obligations.
==== Plea of necessity ====
[L27] A State’s “essential interest” is not clearly defined. It would certainly include healthcare, justice, and policing.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 26, para 2. Thus, the ransomware attacks on healthcare service providers and police and court systems certainly impaired essential interests of State A. It is unlikely that the temporary interruption in functionality the ransomware caused was sufficient to put those essential interests in grave and imminent peril. It is also unlikely that no other means existed to safeguard those interests. In any case, the ransomware attacks have abated, if temporarily, and the plea of necessity could only be invoked to end the harmful activity.
==== Self-defence ====
[L28] The ransomware attacks did not amount to an armed attack. As discussed previously, the attacks were not even a use of force. Based on a consideration of following eight factors — severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, State involvement, and presumptive legality — the ransomware campaign is not at the level of a use of force (see above). Because the ransomware attacks failed to meet the criteria of use of force they could equally not amount to an armed attack triggering the right to self-defense. State A therefore has no right under international law to respond to the attacks with force.
==== Retorsion ====
[L29] Retorsion is the only way for State A to respond to the ransomware campaign without a determination that another State B has breached an international obligation owed to it. State A is likely to view State B’s refusal to extradite or prosecute the attack’s perpetrators as an unfriendly act. State A may signal its displeasure at State B’s unfriendly action through common methods of retorsion such as expelling State B’s diplomats or imposing financial sanctions on State B.
== Checklist ==
* Can the ransomware attacks be attributed?
** Are the authors of the ransomware attack State organs or non-State organs exercising governmental authority?
** Are the authors of the ransomware attack non-State actors acting under the instructions or effective control of another State?
* Is the ransomware a use of force?
** What was the severity of the ransomware attacks?
** Did the effects of the ransomware attacks manifest immediately?
** Were the effects of the ransomware attacks directly connected to the underlying cyber activity?
** Did the ransomware attacks involve invasive penetration of top secret networks?
** Were the effects of the ransomware attacks measurable?
** Did the ransomware attacks have a military character?
** Was a State involved in carrying out or supporting the ransomware attacks?
** Are the ransomware attacks presumptively legal under international law?
* Is the ransomware a prohibited intervention?
** Did the ransomware campaign bear on the internal or external affairs of State A?
** Did the ransomware campaign coerce State A by depriving it of its freedom of choice concerning its internal or external affairs?
* Is the ransomware a violation of the targeted State’s sovereignty?
** Was the ransomware campaign conducted by a State organ of State B physically present on the territory of State A?
** Did the ransomware campaign result in physical damage or injury on State A’s territory?
** Did the ransomware campaign cause a loss of functionality of State A’s computer systems?
** Did the ransomware campaign interfere with State A’s inherently governmental functions?
* Due diligence
** If the ransomware attacks were committed by the territorial State, would they have violated a rule of international law?
** Did the territorial State have knowledge of the attacks?
* What responses are permissible?
** Is the object of countermeasures a State?
** Was an essential interest of the victim State in grave and imminent peril?
** Did the ransomware attacks constitute an armed attack, thus justifying resort to force in self-defense?
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
* Attribution
* Countermeasures
* Due diligence
* Use of force
* Plea of necessity
* Prohibition of intervention
* Retorsion
* Self-defence
* Sovereignty
* Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid
* Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory
* Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
* William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions After Tallinn 2.0, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1487 (2017)
* Luke Chircop, ‘A Due Diligence Standard of Attribution in Cyberspace’ (2018) 67 ICLQ.
* James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013).
* Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany, 'A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice' (2018) 112 AJIL. 
* Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace (NATO CCD COE 2013).
* ET Jensen and S Watts, ‘A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: Gentle Civilizer or Crude Destabilizer’ (2017) 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1555
* Christian Payne & Lorraine Finlay, Addressing Obstacles to Cyber-Attribution, 49 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 535 (2017).
* Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2014).
* Michael N. Schmitt, ‘“Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’, 54 Va. J. Int’l L. 697 (2014).
* Michael N Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (CUP 2017).
* US Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, Law of War Manual (June 2015)
=== Contributions ===
* Scenario by: Kenneth Kraszewski
* Analysis by: Kenneth Kraszewski
* Reviewed by: Anna-Maria Osula, Peter Stockburger, David Wallace
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Category:Attribution
Category:Countermeasures
Category:Due diligence
Category:Non-State actors
Category:Plea of necessity
Category:Prohibition of intervention
Category:Retorsion
Category:Self-defence
Category:Sovereignty
Category:State organs
Category:Use of force
Category:Scenario
Category:Ransomware