Incidents/2022-08-16 Beta Cluster 502

==Summary==
After an inadvertent restart of some WMCS cloudvirts and their associated VMs, all sites within the Beta Cluster (e.g. https://meta.wikimedia.beta.wmflabs.org/wiki/Main_Page) failed to load, with Error: 502, Next Hop Connection Failed — this persisted post-restart of the relevant VMs.
Drafting: possibly an apache config/puppet failure (https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T315350#8159826), restarting trafficserver seems to have fixed it (https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T315350#8159954)
The incident was complicated by the lack of Beta Cluster's maintenance meaning ongoing "normal" errors distracted from the cause.
==Timeline==
All times in UTC.
*2022-08-16 17:57 OUTAGE BEGINS: Uptime monitoring "pages" TheresNoTime, who informs #wikimedia-operations & #wikimedia-releng
**This coincides with the WMCS VM accidental restarts ([Cloud] [Cloud-announce] Some cloud-vps servers just rebooted)
*2022-08-16 18:21 T315350 logged
*2022-08-17 00:57 OUTAGE ENDS
==Detection==
* TheresNoTime has an uptime monitor at https://uptime.theresnotime.io/status/wmf-beta which "paged" her
* User reports
* CI errors from beta sync
==Conclusions==
===What went well?===
* A number of volunteers were available to triage
===What went poorly?===
* no paging/alerting surfaced on IRC, so minimal initial visibility
* lack of fast response from people with sufficient knowledge
* beta is already broken in weird and wonderful ways
===Where did we get lucky?===
* No deployments were affected
* Beta wasn't needed due to test/replicate production issues during the time.
(Use bullet points) for example: user's error report was exceptionally detailed, incident occurred when the most people were online to assist, etc
===How many people were involved in the remediation?===
* 3 Volunteers
* 2 Release Engineers
* 2 SRE - 1 Search Platform, 1 ServiceOps
* 1 WMCS admin
(Use bullet points) for example: 2 SREs and 1 software engineer troubleshooting the issue plus 1 incident commander
==Links to relevant documentation==
*…
Add links to information that someone responding to this alert should have (runbook, plus supporting docs). If that documentation does not exist, add an action item to create it.
==Actionables==
* logspam watch broken on beta 
* Remove two cherry-picked reverts from deployment-puppetmaster04 
* Rebase & merge or re-cherry-pick 668701 on deployment-puppetmaster04
* Replace certificate on deployment-elastic09.deployment-prep 
* Add basic alerting
Create a list of action items that will help prevent this from happening again as much as possible. Link to or create a Phabricator task for every step.
Add the #Sustainability (Incident Followup) and the #SRE-OnFIRE (Pending Review & Scorecard) Phabricator tag to these tasks.
==Scorecard==
Incident Engagement ScoreCard
 	Question 	Answer
(yes/no)	Notes
People 	Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? 	no 	
People 	Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively 	no 	
People 	Were fewer than five people paged? 	yes	
People 	Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? 	no 	
People 	Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers? Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours.	yes	
Process 	Was the incident status section actively updated during the incident? 	no 	
Process 	Was the public status page updated? 	no 	
Process 	Is there a phabricator task for the incident? 	yes	
Process 	Are the documented action items assigned? 	no 	
Process 	Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? 	yes	
Tooling 	To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are
open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented.	no 	
Tooling 	Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? 	yes	
Tooling 	Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? 	no 	
Tooling 	Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? 	no 	
Tooling 	Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? 	no 	
Total score (count of all “yes” answers above)	Total score (count of all “yes” answers above) 	5