nyuuzyou/wikis huggingface dataset:
Zwan 2003-02-08

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== Notes ==
* Billy Corgan plays piano on "Endless Summer" and "Desire"
* Last linked version of "Jesus, I" / "Mary Star of the Sea" until 2016-03-23
== Banter ==
== Photos and memorabilia ==
Zwan 2003-02-17

== Setlist ==
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Zwan 2003-03-08

March 8, 2003 was The Fifth Waltz, which was the fifth annual benefit concert run by Nicholas Tremulis for Heartland Alliance's Neon Street program to help fight teenage homelessness. Billy Corgan and Jimmy Chamberlin also performed at the Fourth Waltz the previous year, and Corgan also performed at the First Waltz and Third Waltz shows.
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== Notes ==
* "Riverview" and "Prairie Song" performed solo acoustic
* "I Fought the Law" performed by Jon Langford with Jimmy Chamberlin on drums
* "Freedom" performed by Kurt Elling with Billy Corgan on guitar and Chamberlin on drums
== Banter ==
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Category:Live performances for charity
Zwan 2003-03-31

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* Soundcheck is incomplete
== Banter ==
Zwan 2003-04-09

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== Notes ==
* "The Sky Is Crying" with William Corgan Sr. on lead vocals & guitar
== Banter ==
Zwan 2003-04-17

Moved from Mesa Amphitheatre due to slow sales.
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Zwan 2003-04-22

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== Banter ==
Zwan 2003-05-03

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Zwan 2003-05-04

Music Midtown festival, 2003.
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* "The Sky Is Crying" with William Corgan Sr. on guitar and vocals
== Banter ==
(unknown)
Zwan 2003-06-03

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* Final Zwan performance of "A New Poetry"; Smashing Pumpkins will play it 4x beginning on 2015-06-15
== Banter ==
== Photos and memorabilia ==
Zwan 2003-06-05

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== Banter ==
Zwan 2003-06-13

June 13, 2003 was Zwan's appearance at the Nuke festival in Austria. It was Zwan's final live performance before disbanding. 23 additional tour dates, running through a scheduled appearance at the Fuji Rock festival on July 25th, were canceled for "family reasons".
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* Last performances of "For Your Love" and "Of a Broken Heart" until 2005-07-28
* Last performances of "Jesus, I" and "Mary Star of the Sea" until 2016-03-22 (final non-linked performance of both)
* Last performance of "Lyric" until 2016-05-21
* Last performance of "Honestly" until 2019-06-17
* Last performance of "Endless Summer" until 2019-06-19
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Main Page

__NOTOC__
Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.
About the project
The Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 32 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the common positions and national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center"	S01Electioninterference 	S02Politicalespionage	S03Powergrid 	S04Internationalorganization
S05Criminalinvestigation 	S06EnablingState 	S07Hackingtools 	S08Certificateauthority	
S09Economicespionage 	S10Cyberweapons 	S11Surveillancetools 	S12Computerdata 	
S13Armedconflict 	S14Ransomwarecampaign 	S15Cyberdeception 	S16Highseas 	
S17Collectiveresponses 	S18Cyberoperators 	S19Hatespeech 	S20Medicalfacilities 	
S21Misattribution 	S22Methods of warfare 	S23Vaccineresearch 	S24Internetblockage 	
120px|link=Scenario 25: Cyber disruption of humanitarian assistanceS25Humanitarianassistance	S26Exportlicensing 	S27Redirectingattacks	S28Incidentalharm 	
S29Waterinfrastructure 	S30Backdoors andimplants	S31Degradingcontent 	S32Crime ofaggression
APT-29 cyber operations against government agencies of Norway and the Netherlands (2016-2017)

Date 	2016-2017.De Volkskrant, ‘Russian hackers tried to break into the Ministry of General Affairs’ (4 February 2017).
Suspected actor	Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (‘APT29’), also known as ‘Cozy Bear’. In February 2017, Rob Bertholee, the then head of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), attributed the attack on the Dutch ministries to Russia. Similarly, in January 2017, Arne Christian Haugstøyl, then section chief of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), attributed the attacks on Norwegian entities to Russia.NRK, ‘Norway exposed to an extensive hacker attack’ (3 February 2017).
Target 	In the Netherlands, the Dutch Ministry of General Affairs was targeted, alongside other unnamed ministries. In Norway, email accounts of civil servants in the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Norwegian Labor Party and the PST were targeted.
Target systems 	N/A
Method 	Spear-phishing. Both the Dutch and Norwegian targets were sent malicious emails designed to extract sensitive information.USA Today News, ‘Norway: Russian hackers hit spy agency, defense, Labour party’ (3 February 2017).
Purpose 	Whilst the precise motives of APT-29 are unknown, the group have been accused of various attacks against other democratic governments, parties and institutions across the world including in Germany, the US and South Korea.Securelist, ‘The CozyDuke APT’ (21 April 2015). Accordingly, the 2016-2017 attacks fit into a similar pattern of attempting to covertly collect political and military intelligence via cyber operations.
Result 	The Dutch did not report that the attacks had been successful. Similarly in Norway, it was also not reported that the attacks had succeeded in breaching the targeted systems.
Aftermath 	Erna Solberg, the then Norwegian Prime Minister, described the attacks as a ‘serious attack on our democratic institutions’. A subsequent report conducted by the PST indicated that Russian cyber espionage was one of the biggest threats to Norway,NRK, ‘PST on Russian mapping of Norway: - Can shake our ability to hold the country’ (1 February 2017). an assessment that was criticised by the Russian Embassy as ‘striving to achieve a return to the times of the Cold War.’NRK, ‘Russia against PST's threat assessment: - Anti-Russian!’ (2 February 2017). 
In the Netherlands, the AIVD did not specify any consequences or measures to be taken following the attack, though the government opted to count votes for the contemporary March 2017 general election by hand, rather than digitally.The Guardian, ‘Dutch will count all election ballots by hand to thwart hacking’ (2 February 2017).
Analysed in 	Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments
Collected by: Tom Davies
Category:Example
Category:2016
APT32 attacks on Chinese government (2020)

Date 	From at least January to April 2020Scott Henderson, Gabby Roncone, Sarah Jones, John Hultquist, Ben Read, Vietnamese Threat Actors APT32 Targeting Wuhan Government and Chinese Ministry of Emergency Management in Latest Example of COVID-19 Related Espionage, 22 April 2020, Mandiant.com.
Suspected actor	Hacking group APT32 (also known as OceanLotus or APT-C-00), allegedly working for the Vietnamese government.Carl Thayer，Did Vietnamese Hackers Target the Chinese Government to Get Information on COVID-19? , 4 May 2020, the Diplomat. Vietnam has denied all allegations as groundless.Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the United States of America, FIREEYE'S GROUNDLESS STATEMENT ON VIET NAM ASSISTED THE APT32 HACKER GROUP, 24 April 2020.
Victims 	Various Chinese public authorities, including China’s Ministry of Emergency Management and the government of Wuhan province. In addition, the operation also allegedly affected Chinese-speaking individuals who were interested in COVID-19.
Target systems 	Computers belonging to the Chinese government and affected Chinese-speaking individuals.
Method 	1.	Sending phishing emails with tracking links. APT32 sent emails with embedded tracking links to China’s Ministry of Emergency Management using the sender address. The embedded link contained the victim’s email address and code to report back to the actors if the email was opened.
2.	Using a decoy document. APT32 likely used COVID-19-themed malicious attachments against Chinese-speaking targets. While the full execution chain has not been uncovered, FireEye uncovered a Metaljack loader displaying a Chinese-language titled COVID-19 decoy document while launching its payload. The shellcode payload collected system information and appended it to URL strings, and if successfully called, it loaded Metaljack into memory.
Purpose 	Cyber espionage which was allegedly designed to collect intelligence on the COVID-19 crisis.
Result 	It is unclear if the intrusion attempts in China were successful. Confidential COVID-19 related state and government data may have been compromised.Jack Stubbs, Raphael Satter, Vietnam-linked hackers targeted Chinese government over coronavirus response: researchers, 22 April 2020, Reuters.com. Additional trojans and malware infections may also have been installed, allowing data exfiltration in the future.CISOMAG, Vietnam’s APT32 Group Uses COVID-19 to Target Chinese Health Authorities, 27 April 2020, cisomag.com.
Aftermath 	It is unclear whether the APT32 intrusions have usefully contributed to the Vietnamese government’s public health response.Ankit Panda, Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Public Health Intelligence: Vietnam, APT32, and COVID-19, 24 April 2020, The Diplomat. In any case, Vietnam has denied all allegations as groundless.
Analysed in 	Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments
Collected by: Wei Xinyu
Category:Example
Category:2020
African Union headquarters hack (2020)

Note: Between 2012 and 2017, data was exfiltrated from the African Union’s headquarters – see African Union headquarters hack (2018). It is unclear whether the two incidents are linked.
Date 	First discovered on 17 January 2020.Raphael Satter, ‘EXCLUSIVE Suspected Chinese hackers stole camera footage from African Union – memo’ Reuters (16 December 2020).
Suspected actor	Bronze President, a hacking group allegedly based in China.
Target 	African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Target systems 	Security cameras.Center for Strategic International Studies, ‘Significant Cyber Incidents’ (undated, accessed on 19 July 2021).
Method 	Data exfiltration from the IT system of the African Union’s headquarters. The hackers had rigged a cluster of servers to access and redirect surveillance footage from the African Union’s headquarters’ offices, parking areas, corridors, and meeting rooms. However, the relevant footage did not contain any audio recordings.Salem Solomon, ‘Experts: Report of China Hacking African Union HQ Fits Larger Pattern’ VOA News (5 January 2021). The outgoing data was transmitted only during working hours and was hidden within the regular outgoing data stream.
Purpose 	Unclear. According to Joshua Meservey, a senior policy analyst on Africa at the Heritage Foundation, the purpose might have been to add to China’s artificial intelligence capabilities by compiling video and other data and feeding it into machine learning systems.
Result 	According to an internal memo circulated within the African Union, ‘a huge volume of traffic’ was exfiltrated. The exact quantity and value of the stolen data is unknown.
Aftermath 	China denied involvement,China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference’ (21 December 2020). alleging that the report of the cyber-incident was an attempt to harm Sino-African relations.‘So-called accusations of “China bugging the AU headquarters” are totally fake news: Chinese FM’ Global Times (21 December 2020).
Analysed in 	Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization
Collected by: Darryl Chan
Category:Example
Category:2020
Alleged hacking of Patriot missiles (2014-2015)

Date 	Late 2014 or early 2015
Suspected actor	Unknown
Target 	The German military
Target systems 	German-owned Patriot Missiles
Method 	A German outlet reported that German-owned Patriot systems stationed on Turkey’s border with Syria were observed to execute “mysterious commands” in either late 2014 or early 2015. According to the publication and subsequent reports, the vulnerability was residing in either the system’s Sensor Shooter Interoperability (SSI) or in the computer chip responsible for guiding missiles to the target.Darlene Storm, “Did hackers remotely execute 'unexplained' commands on German Patriot missile battery?” (ComputerWorld, 8 July 2015) The SSI is tasked with the real-time exchange of data between the command and weapon systems.Beyza Unal and Patricia Lewis, “Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences”, Chatham House Research Paper, January 2018, p. 6.
Purpose 	Unknown
Aftermath 	The reports on the hacking of the Patriot systems were characterised by the German Defence Ministry as “baseless”. The Ministry asserted that there is no evidence to suggest such hacking of its systems. According to the editor-in-chief of Behörden Spiegel, the outlet that initially reported the alleged hacking, similar vulnerabilities had been observed in US weapons systems. He further claimed that the source for the German systems’ incidents came from within the German armed forces sector.Zulfikar Abbany, “Has Germany's Patriot missile system been hacked?” (DW, 8 July 2015)
Analysed in 	Scenario 27: Contesting and redirecting ongoing attacks
Collected by: Tsvetelina van Benthem, Henning Lahmann
Category:Example
Category:2014
Applicability of international law

==Common positions==
===African Union (2024)===
===European Union (2024)===
==National positions==
===Australia (2020)===
=== Austria (2024) ===
===Brazil (2021)===
===China (2021)===
===Costa Rica (2023)===
===Cuba (2024)===
===Czech Republic (2020)===
===Denmark (2023)===
===Estonia (2019)===
===Estonia (2021)===
===Finland (2020)===
===France (2019)===
===Germany (2021)===
===Iran (2020)===
===Ireland (2023)===
===Israel (2020)===
===Italy (2021)===
===Japan (2021)===
===Kenya (2021)===
===Netherlands (2019)===
===New Zealand (2020)===
===Norway (2021)===
===Pakistan (2023)===
===Poland (2022)===
===Romania (2021)===
===Russia (2021)===
===Singapore (2021)===
===Sweden (2022)===
===Switzerland (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2018)===
===United Kingdom (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2022)===
===United States (2012)===
===United States (2016)===
===United States (2020)===
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
Category:Applicability of international law
Category:Legal concepts
Bangladesh internet outage (2008)

Date 	2008
Actor 	Unknown
Victim 	Bangladesh
Target systems	Submarine cables connecting Bangladesh with other parts of the world
Method 	A submarine cable was damaged or severed.‘Severed Cables Disrupt Internet’ BBC News (31 January 2008).
Purpose 	N/A
Result 	Disruption of internet connectivity in several countries, including Bangladesh.
Similarly, damage to a single submarine cable in 2012 caused a week-long internet disruption in Bangladesh, with its citizens either unable to access the Internet or experiencing extremely slow connections.‘Bangladesh Internet down after Submarine Cable Cut’ Phys.org (7 June 2012); ‘Bangladesh Suffers Internet Disruption after Cut Cable’ BBC News (8 June 2012).
Aftermath 	The Government of Bangladesh has realised this as an issue. Its International Long Distance Telecommunication Services Policy of 2010 outlined the country’s aim is to increase redundancy in interconnection, and have multiple pathways to the international networks.International Long Distance Telecommunication Services (ILDTS) Policy, 2010. This can ensure uninterrupted connectivity to the Internet in Bangladesh in case a particular foreign network or cable fails.
Analysed in 	Scenario 24: Internet blockage
Collected by: Gurshabad Grover & Arindrajit Basu
Category:Example
Category:2008
Breach of an international obligation

== Definition ==
Breach of an international obligation
The second element of an internationally wrongful act is conduct amounting to a breach of an international obligation owed by the relevant entity.Cf. ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 2(b). In this regard, it is undisputed that a cyber-related action or omission by a State may constitute a breach of its international obligations.For a detailed discussion of a breach of an international obligation by a cyber-related act, see rule 14 of Tallinn Manual 2.0 and commentary 2–11 thereto. International obligations arise from primary rules of international law:ILC Articles on State Responsibility, General commentary, para 1. international treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law.Statute of the International Court of Justice, of 26 June 1945, annexed to the UN Charter, Art 38(1)(a)–(c). Fault, such as intent or negligence on part of the wrongdoing State, is not a necessary element of a breach of an international obligation, unless there exists such a requirement in the relevant primary rule.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 2, para 10. Similarly, there is no general requirement for the injured party to have suffered any damage—again, unless such a requirement forms part of the primary obligation in question.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 2, para 9.
It is impossible to provide a list of all international obligations that may be violated by resort to cyber means. However, certain rules appear with higher frequency than others. These include the prohibition on the use of force; the prohibition of intervention; the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States; the obligation to respect the right to privacy; the obligation of due diligence; and a few others (such as, for instance, the rule of distinction in the context of the law of armed conflict).
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
Category:Legal concepts
Category:Breach of an international obligation
Bundestag Hack (2015)

Date 	Detected in May 2015
Suspected actor	The investigations of the German Authorities indicate that the Russian hacking group 'APT 28' is responsible for the attack. BBC, "Russia 'was behind German parliament hack", (13 May 2016), BBC News. The British Cyber defense agency has alleged that this group is linked to the Russian military secret service 'GRU' which has also been accused of meddling with the US Presidential elections in 2016. UK National Cyber Security Centre, "Reckless campaign of cyber attacks by Russian military intelligence service exposed", (3 October 2018), NCSC News.
Target 	The network of the German Federal Parliament used by all MPs as well as the German chancellor
Method 	At the beginning of 2015, MPs received an email from the address 'UN.org' which was designed like a UN News Bulletin. Clicking on the link contained in the email led to the installation of the malware on the computer. The malware was then able to spread and eventually infiltrated the networks of the Parliament. J Delcker, "Germany fears Russia stole information to disrupt election", (20 March 2017, last updated 28 January 2018), Politico.
Purpose 	The hackers were able to access internal confidential communication data (such as confidential emails of MPs), their schedules, meeting details as well as other sensitive data.
Result 	The group was able to maintain unauthorized access for several months until the attack was detected in May 2015 and even managed to access a computer in the parliamentary office of the chancellor. A Biselli, "Wir veröffentlichen Dokumente zum Bundestagshack: Wie man die Abgeordneten im Unklaren ließ", (7 March 2016), Netzpolitik. Approximately over 16 GB of data was stolen. M Baumgartner, P Beuth, J Diehl, C Esch et al, "The Breach from the East", (18 March 2018), Der Spiegel.
Aftermath 	The German parliament's computer system was shut down for four days for maintenance works and additional safety mechanisms were installed. AFP, "Bundestag IT system shut down after hacker attack", (20 August 2015), Deutsche Welle Investigations initiated by the German intelligence service led to the conclusion that the attack had been launched by a 'foreign intelligence service'. According to Die Zeit, the Chancellery staff considered responding to the malicious activity since they were convinced that the intruders had been acting on behalf of Russia. P Beuth, K Biermann, M Klingst, H Stark, "Merkel and the Fancy Bear", (12 May 2017), Die Zeit.
Analysed in 	Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments
Category:Example
Category:2015
Caucasus internet outage (2011)

Date 	March 2011
Actor 	Individual based in Georgia
Victims 	Armenia, Azerbaijan
Target systems	International fibre optic cable in Georgia
Method 	In March 2011, a person in Georgia accidentally damaged an international fibre optic cable that connected parts of Caucasus with Europe.Giorgi Lomsadze, ‘A Shovel Cuts Off Armenia’s Internet’ Wall Street Journal (8 April 2011).
Purpose 	N/A
Result 	The incident caused a 12 hour internet outage in Armenia, with partial disruptions in Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Aftermath 	N/A
Analysed in 	Scenario 24: Internet blockage
Collected by: Gurshabad Grover & Arindrajit Basu
Category:Example
Category:2011