nyuuzyou/wikis huggingface dataset:
Individual criminal responsibility under international law

== Definition ==
Individual criminal responsibility under international law
Acts committed by cyber means could lead to individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law for genocide (Article 6 of the Rome Statute),The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3. See also the Amendments on the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 11 June 2010, Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute. crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the Rome Statute), war crimes (Article 8 of the Rome Statute) and aggression (Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute).See generally Kai Ambos, ‘International Criminal Responsibility in Cyberspace’ in Nicholas Tsagourias and Russell Buchan (eds), Research Handbook on Cyberspace and International Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2021). See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 84 (on “Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes”). Individual criminal responsibility for each of these offences requires that the perpetrator committed the requisite actus reus with the corresponding mens rea.See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2nd rev ed, Martinus Nijhoff 2014), Chapter IV. 
Pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, different forms of incurring individual criminal responsibility may be envisaged: (1) individual commission; (2) joint commission; and (3) commission through others.Art 25(3)(a) Rome Statute. Criminal responsibility could also arise for instigating, assisting in, facilitating, and aiding or abetting the commission, or attempted commission by cyber means (Article 25(3)(b)-(d) of the Rome Statute). Furthermore, Article (3)(f) of the Rome Statute envisages individual criminal responsibility for attempts to commit a crime when the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions.
In accordance with Article 28 of the Rome Statute and customary international law,ICRC CIHL Study, Rules 152 and 153. commanders and other superiors may be criminally responsible for cyber operations that qualify as international crimes and that were conducted by their subordinates.See Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 85; Elies van Sliedregt, ‘Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks’, (2016) 21(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 505.
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
* Crime of genocide
* Crimes against humanity
* War crimes
* Scenario 19: Hate speech
* Scenario 31: Sharing degrading content
* Scenario 32: Crime of aggression
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
Category:Individual criminal responsibility under international law
Category:Legal concepts
International humanitarian law (jus in bello)

==Common positions==
===African Union (2024)===
===European Union (2024)===
==National positions==
===Australia (2020)===
===Austria (2024)===
===Brazil (2021)===
===Canada (2022)===
===Costa Rica (2023)===
===Cuba (2024)===
===Czech Republic (2020)===
===Czech Republic (2024)===
===Denmark (2023)===
===Estonia (2021)===
===Finland (2020)===
===France (2019)===
===Germany (2021)===
===Ireland (2023)===
===Israel (2020)===
===Italy (2021)===
===Japan (2021)===
===Kenya (2021)===
===Netherlands (2019)===
===New Zealand (2020)===
===Norway (2021)===
===Pakistan (2023)===
===Poland (2022)===
===Romania (2021)===
===Singapore (2021)===
===Sweden (2022)===
===Switzerland (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2018)===
===United Kingdom (2021)===
===United States (2012)===
===United States (2016)===
===United States (2020)===
=== United States (2021)===
==Appendixes==
===See also===
===Notes and references ===
===Bibliography and further reading===
Category:International humanitarian law
Category:Legal concepts
Iranian internet blackout (2019)

Date 	23 November 2019
Actor 	Iran
Victims 	N/A
Target systems	Internet service providers in Iran
Method 	In response to protests, the Iranian Government ordered a week-long internet blackout. Some networks had entirely withdrawn their traffic routes, while some only blocked traffic.Doug Madory, ‘Historic Internet Blackout in Iran’, Oracle Blogs (18 November 2019). Through the blackout, the Iranian ‘national information network’, i.e. the internal network infrastructure, was still maintained and was accessible.Al Jazeera, ‘After Internet Blackout, Iranians Take Stock’ (Tehran, 27 November 2019).
Purpose 	To quell internal protests
Result 	While Iranians were deeply affected, whether the blackout affected other jurisdictions has not been widely reported.
Aftermath 	N/A
Analysed in 	Scenario 24: Internet blockage
Collected by: Gurshabad Grover & Arindrajit Basu
Category:Example
Category:2019
Israeli attack against Hamas cyber headquarters in Gaza (2019)

Date 	On 4 May 2019, an airstrike was conducted against a building that housed Hamas cyber operatives in Gaza.C Cimpanu, “In a first, Israel responds to Hamas hackers with an air strike”, 5 May 2019, ZDNet.
Suspected actor	Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officially announced having targeted a building where the Hamas cyber operatives had worked, in retaliation for an earlier cyber operation launched by Hamas.IDF’s Twitter post of 5 May 2019.
Target 	Building located in Gaza which housed Hamas’ cyber headquarters.
Target systems 	N/A
Method 	Kinetic operation. After having stopped the attempted cyber attack launched by Hamas through non-kinetic means, the IDF retaliated with an air strike against a building that housed Hamas cyber operatives.
Purpose 	Retaliation and deterrence.Cyber Defense Project (CDP) and Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zürich, “Israel’s National Cybersecurity and  Cyberdefense Posture”, 2020, at 12. The airstrike was conducted in retaliation for an attempted cyber attack carried out by Hamas, in the context of an escalation of violence between Israeli forces and Hamas.V Romo, "Netanyahu Orders Continued Pounding In Gaza As 600 Rockets Fired Into Israel", 5 May 2019, NPR.
Result 	The air strike partially destroyed the building that housed Hamas’ cyber headquarters.DM Halbfinger, I Kershner, “After Intense Fighting in Gaza, Israel and Palestinians Observe Ceasefire”, 5 May 2019, The New York Times. An IDF’s spokesperson said that “Hamas no longer has cyber capabilities after our strike”.Z Doffman, “Israel Responds To Cyber Attack With Air Strike On Cyber Attackers In World First”, 6 May 2019, Forbes. No official information was found about whether the air strike resulted in casualties among Hamas members and/or civilians.
Aftermath 	The attack raised particular attention as the first case of a publicly announced kinetic attack used as immediate response to a non-kinetic operation during an armed conflict.L Hay Newman, “What Israel's Strike on Hamas Hackers Means For Cyberwar”, 6 May 2019, Wired; R Chesney, “Crossing a Cyber Rubicon? Overreactions to the IDF’s Strike on the Hamas Cyber Facility”, 6 May 2019, Lawfare Blog.
Analysed in 	Scenario 18: Legal status of cyber operators during armed conflict
Collected by: Giulia Carlini
Category:Example
Category:2019
Category:Non-international armed conflict
Law of the sea

== Overview ==
Modern law of the sea derives largely from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 1 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 397 which is considered to generally correspond to customary international law.Tullio Treves, ‘Law of the Sea’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2008-, updated April 2011) para 59 (concluding that ‘there is a presumption that the provisions of the Convention correspond to customary law’).
=== Flag State jurisdiction ===
=== Freedom of navigation ===
=== Sovereign immunity ===
===Maritime law enforcement===
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
* Scenario 16: Cyber attacks against ships on the high seas
=== Notes and references ===
===Bibliography and further reading===
Category:Legal concepts
Category:Law of the sea
Category:Flag State jurisdiction
Category:Freedom of navigation
Category:Sovereign immunity
Category:Maritime law enforcement
Main Page (Chinese)

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{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center"	S01干预选举 	S02政治间谍活动 	S03电力设施 	S04国际组织
S05刑事侦查 	S06协助国 	S07黑客工具 	S08认证机构 	
S09经济间谍活动 	S10网络武器 	S11监控工具 	S12计算机数据 	
S13武装冲突 	 	 	 	
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NotPetya (2017)

Date 	27-28 June 2017
Suspected actor	Russian Federation (official attribution statements made by Ukraine,P Polityuk, “Ukraine points finger at Russian security services in recent cyber attack” (1 July 2017), Reuters. US and UKS Marsh, “US joins UK in blaming Russia for NotPetya cyber-attack” (15 February 2018), The Guardian.)
Victims 	Ukrainian public and private sector (80% of affected systems);J Wakefield, “Tax software blamed for cyber-attack spread” (28 June 2017), BBC News. multinational companies (Maersk, Merck, FedEx, Saint-Gobain and others)
Target systems 	Microsoft Windows-based systems
Method 	The NotPetya malware was spread by a centralised update to the MeDoc tax accounting software used by many Ukrainian businesses.J Wakefield, “Tax software blamed for cyber-attack spread” (28 June 2017), BBC News. The malware was using the EternalBlue exploit,K Sood and S Hurley, “NotPetya Technical Analysis – A Triple Threat: File Encryption, MFT Encryption, Credential Theft” (29 June 2017), CrowdStrike blog. possibly developed by the NSA, leaked by a hacker group calling itself the Shadow Brokers, and repurposed by the GRU.E Nakashima, “Russian military was behind ‘NotPetya’ cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA concludes” (12 January 2018), Washington Post. It acted as a ransomware, encrypting the target computers’ hard drives and demanding ransom in bitcoin. It was only supposed to spread through internal networks, probably to make it more targeted; however, the transnational companies which had their offices in Ukraine had their internal networks infected globally.E Auchard, J Stubbs, and A Prentice, “New computer virus spreads from Ukraine to disrupt world business” (27 June 2017), Reuters.
Purpose 	Primarily causing economic loss to Ukrainian entities by irreversibly encrypting their data;F Bajak and R Satter, “Companies still hobbled from fearsome cyberattack” (30 June 2017), Associated Press. the financial gain for the actor was most likely a cover-up (the ransom collection was too simplistic compared to the other parts of the operation and only about USD 10,000 of ransom were collected by 4 July 2017).A Hern, “Hackers who targeted Ukraine clean out bitcoin ransom wallet” (5 July 2017), The Guardian.
Result 	Estimated global economic losses exceeding USD 10 billion;A Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History” (22 August 2018), Wired. radiation monitoring system at Ukraine’s Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant went offline.J Henley and O Solon, “ ‘Petya’ ransomware attack strikes companies across Europe and US” (27 June 2018), The Guardian.
Aftermath 	The campaign was followed by an extensive public attribution to Russia, which denied all allegations. No further publicly known measures were taken by the victims against Russia.
Analysed in 	Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organizationScenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools
Collected by: Tomáš Minárik
Category:Example
Category:2017
Peaceful settlement of disputes

==Common positions==
===African Union (2024)===
===European Union (2024)===
==National positions==
===Austria (2024) ===
===Canada (2022)===
===Costa Rica (2023)===
===Czech Republic (2024)===
===Estonia (2021)===
===Japan (2021)===
===Kenya (2021)===
===Singapore (2021)===
===Switzerland (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2022)===
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
Category:Peaceful settlement of disputes
Category:Legal concepts
Plea of necessity

== Definition ==
Plea of necessity
The plea of necessity allows a State to act in exceptional cases when there is grave and imminent peril to an essential interest of the State and the action in question is the sole means of safeguarding that interest.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 25(1)(a). Even then, the plea of necessity requires that the injured State’s action be balanced with the interests of any States that would be affected and with those of the international community.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 25(1)(b). The injured State’s action must not seriously impair the essential interests of any other State.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 25(1)(b). The plea of necessity is not available to injured States that have substantially contributed to the situation in which they find themselves.ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Art 25(1)(b). However, the plea of necessity can be asserted to take action against non-State actors and can justify actions that violate the rights of non-responsible States, if these conditions are met. In case the situation of necessity is caused by the conduct of non-State actors, attribution of this conduct to a State is not a precondition for acting based on the plea of necessity.
Publicly available common and national positions that address this issue include:
 (2024),
 (2024),
 (2019), 
 (2021), 
 (2021), 
 (2019), 
 (2021),
 (2022), 
 (2021).
==Common positions==
===European Union (2024)===
==National positions==
===Czech Republic (2024)===
===France (2019)===
===Germany (2021)===
===Japan (2021)===
===Netherlands (2019)===
===Norway (2021)===
===Sweden (2022)===
===Switzerland (2021)===
==Appendixes==
===See also===
*Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign
===Notes and references===
=== Bibliography and further reading===
Category:Plea of necessity
Category:Legal concepts
Retorsion

== Definition ==
Retorsion
An act of retorsion is “an unfriendly but nevertheless lawful act by the aggrieved party against the wrongdoer”.E Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Transnational 1984) 5. Such acts may include the prohibition of or limitations upon normal diplomatic relations, the imposition of trade embargoes or the withdrawal of voluntary aid programmes.Articles on State Responsibility, commentary to Part Three, Chapter II, para. 3. Cyber-specific retorsions may include sending warnings to cyber operatives belonging to another State, observing the adversary’s cyber activities on one’s own network using tools such as “honeypots”, or slowing down malicious cyber operations conducted by other States.Jeff Kosseff, ‘Retorsion as a Response to Ongoing Cyber Operations’ in Taťána Jančárková et al (eds), 20/20 Vision: The Next Decade (CCD COE 2020) 17–22.
Publicly available common and national positions that address this issue include:
 (2024),
 (2023),
 (2024), 
 (2021), 
 (2021), 
 (2019), 
 (2020), 
 (2021),
 (2022), 
 (2021), 
 (2021),
 (2022), 
 (2016),
 (2021).
==Common positions==
===European Union (2024)===
==National positions==
===Costa Rica (2023)===
===Czech Republic (2024)===
===Estonia (2021)===
===Germany (2021)===
===Netherlands (2019)===
===New Zealand (2020)===
===Norway (2021)===
===Poland (2022)===
===Singapore (2021)===
===Switzerland (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2022)===
===United States (2016)===
===United States (2021)===
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
* Countermeasures
* Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign
* Scenario 17: Collective responses to cyber operations
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
Category:Retorsion
Category:Legal concepts
Right to life

== Definition ==
Right to life
The right to life is a fundamental right whose protection is a precondition for the enjoyment of all other individual rights and freedoms. It is protected under both treaty and customary international human rights law (IHRL). It is generally accepted that, along with all other human rights, it must be protected online just as it is protected offline.See, eg, United Nations Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/13 (1 July 2016), para 1. Its wording differs across treaty instruments, which means that its interpretation must be carried out at the level of specific primary rules arising under specific treaty regimes.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrines the right to life in Article 6: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” According to the Human Rights Committee, “[t]he obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life.”UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, ‘Article 6: Right to Life’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, para 7. In other words, the obligations stemming from the right to life are not confined to intentional deprivations of life.
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
* Scenario 27: Contesting and redirecting ongoing attacks
=== Notes and references ===
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
Category:International human rights law
Category:Right to life
Category:Legal concepts
Russia's sovereign internet (2019 onward)

Date 	2019 onward
Actor 	Russia
Victims 	N/A
Target systems	Internet infrastructure and service providers in Russia
Method 	Amendments to Russia’s law governing communication and information technology, popularly dubbed as the “Sovereign Internet Law”, pave the way for state-controlled and centralized management of telecommunication networks.Alena Epifanova, ‘Deciphering Russia’s “Sovereign Internet Law”: Tightening Control and Accelerating the Splinternet’ Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia 2020, Policy Brief 2. This includes a mechanism for control of internet traffic crossing Russia’s borders. As part of this policy, Russia performed an exercise in December 2019 where it ‘unplugged’ its network from the broader Internet, in order to demonstrate successful isolation of its networks.Jane Wakefield, ‘https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50902496 Russia “Successfully Tests” Its Unplugged Internet’ BBC News (24 December 2019)
Purpose 	Ostensibly, achieving internet sovereignty
Result 	Not a lot of details about the effects of the experiment on other jurisdictions are in the public domain, but reports claim that the exercise did not have an effect on ordinary users in Russia.
Aftermath 	N/A
Analysed in 	Scenario 24: Internet blockage
Collected by: Gurshabad Grover & Arindrajit Basu
Category:Example
Category:2019
Self-defence

== Definition ==
Self-defence
A State may respond with force to a cyber operation that qualifies as an “armed attack” pursuant to the customary right to self-defence, as codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Most commentators consider only grave uses of force – typically, those that kill or injure persons or damage or destroy property – to constitute armed attacks.Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 95.
The United States, however, takes an outlier position, consistently arguing that any illegal use of force gives rise to the use of force in self-defence.US Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, Law of War Manual (June 2015), paras. 1.11.5.2, 16.3.3.1.
In Nicaragua, the ICJ identified “scale and effects” as criteria upon which to judge whether a use of force constitutes an armed attack. In the Court’s view, only “the most grave” uses of force do so.Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 191. Thus, only cyber operations that seriously injure or kill a number of persons or cause significant damage to, or destruction of, property would undoubtedly constitute armed attacks.Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 71, para 8.
Publicly available common and national positions that address this issue include:
 (2024),
 (2020),
 (2024), 
 (2021),
 (2022),
 (2024), 
 (2023),
 (2021), 
 (2020), 
 (2019), 
 (2021), 
 (2020), 
 (2023), 
 (2020), 
 (2021),
 (2021), 
 (2019), 
 (2020), 
 (2021),
 (2022),
 (2021),
 (2022),
 (2021), 
 (2018), 
 (2021), 
 (2012), 
 (2020),
 (2021).
==Common positions==
===European Union (2024)===
==National positions==
===Australia (2020)===
===Austria (2024)===
===Brazil (2021)===
===Canada (2022)===
===Cuba (2024)===
===Denmark (2023)===
===Estonia (2019)===
===Estonia (2021)===
===Finland (2020)===
===France (2019)===
===Germany (2021)===
===Ireland (2023)===
===Iran (2020)===
===Israel (2020)===
===Italy (2021)===
===Japan (2021)===
===Netherlands (2019)===
===New Zealand (2020)===
===Norway (2021)===
===Poland (2022)===
===Singapore (2021)===
===Sweden (2022)===
===Switzerland (2021)===
===United Kingdom (2018)===
===United Kingdom (2021)===
===United States (2012)===
===United States (2020)===
===United States of America (2021)===
==Appendixes==
===See also===
*Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign
===Notes and references===
=== Bibliography and further reading===
Category:Self-defence
Category:Legal concepts
Short form citation

Short form 	Full citation
AP I 	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (signed 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3
AP II 	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (signed 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609
GC I 	Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31
GC II 	Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85
GC III 	Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135
GC IV 	Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (signed 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287
ICRC CIHL Study 	J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2005)
ILC Articles on State Responsibility	ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Yearbook of the ILC (2001) vol II, part two
ILC DARIO 	ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, Yearbook of the ILC (2011) vol II, part two
Rome Statute 	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90
Tallinn Manual 2.0 	MN Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (CUP 2017)
VCCR 	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967) 596 UNTS 261
VCDR 	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 95
VCLT 	Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1908) 1155 UNTS 331