Abstract - Published: February 2004

Windows XP Service Pack 2 addresses new challenges to the security of personal computers by making a number of basic improvements to the operating system. It reduces common attack vectors four ways: it enhances protection of the network, increases protection for memory, handles e-mail more safely, and browses the Internet more securely. Service Pack 2 also makes it easier to keep the system up-to-date; makes it easier for an administrator to control security throughout an enterprise; and makes it easier to use Bluetooth devices from Windows. Service Pack 2 also includes DirectX 9 and Windows Media Player 9, which contain security, performance, and functionality improvements.
Introduction
Historically, operating systems have had to find a balance between ease of use and security. Early versions of Windows were designed primarily for ease of use, which was appropriate for computers used by one person, without any connection to the outside world beyond an occasional shared floppy diskette. For an isolated, single-user system, even requiring a username and password seemed unnecessary.
Today's connected computing environment commonly exposes computers to a variety of security threats. The majority of computers connect to the Internet at least occasionally. Almost all computers are used for e-mail and/or Web browsing. Many computers connect to the Internet full-time over cable modem or DSL links, or through corporate networks. Most of these are also used to play music and view video content. Many users enjoy instant messaging and peer-to-peer collaboration programs, as well as interactive games. Each of these conveniences also exposes the computer to new threats.
New Security Challenges
Widespread connectivity has opened the door to fast-spreading computer viruses, worms and Trojan horse programs. Computer users have protected themselves from these threats by using firewalls and antivirus programs, and by applying system and application patches as they become available. Microsoft has responded to threats that take advantage of system flaws by developing, testing, and distributing system and application patches to fix those flaws. Antivirus vendors update their virus signature files as often as daily as new viruses are detected.
The cycle in which vendors constantly supply new virus signatures and new system patches in response to each outbreak of new viruses and worms is not really a cure for the problem. It is only a continual attempt to alleviate the problem, which can never quite anticipate the next threat. Essentially, in this scenario we can't drain the ocean that's threatening to flood our farmlands: we can only keep plugging the dikes. Defense by updates and patches not only requires constant work from vendors, it also requires users to be diligent about downloading and applying the updates and patches promptly, which can become a significant burden.
Users are not always diligent about applying patches. For example, the Blaster worm, which was discovered August 11, 2003, exploited a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) security vulnerability for which a patch had already been issued. A firewall could also easily stop Blaster by closing the port used by RPCs. While many users had already applied the patch and/or had a firewall in place, many had not: so many left themselves vulnerable that the worm spread rapidly throughout the world, seriously affecting Internet and corporate network bandwidth for several days.
Late in August and early in September, Blaster again became a problem, when students arrived at colleges and universities for the fall term with infected computers. In some cases, these naïve students compromised the college's entire network. Some colleges1, ones that instituted isolation zones, mandatory system patching, and mandatory antivirus policies, had no network problems, although individual students were inconvenienced by having their campus network and Internet access delayed by the security measures until their computers were certified to be virus-free and in compliance with network policies. Other colleges and universities2 that started out with permissive policies were forced to shut down their networks completely for hours, and to distribute patches and antivirus software on CD, dorm to dorm.
Administrators have not been immune to such problems, either. The W32.Slammer worm aggressively compromised SQL Server installations worldwide in January, 2003, flooding many enterprise networks and major portions of the Internet, and denying service to many Web sites. However, W32.Slammer was discovered six months after a patch had been issued to fix the vulnerability exploited by the worm. In many cases, administrators had delayed applying the patch to public SQL Server instances because they wanted to avoid downtime on shared databases. The same attitude kept administrators from applying a subsequent service pack that included the patch. The result was, unfortunately, more downtime and much more disruption from the worm than would have resulted from the application of the original patch and/or the service pack.
Not even large organizations and branches of government are immune. In December, 2003, the US Treasury Department's Inspector General Report3 criticized the department's information security systems, including the Internal Revenue Service, for (among other issues) failing to apply vendor patches to systems, leaving them open to known vulnerabilities.
With Windows XP Service Pack 2, Microsoft has rolled up the patches to all known vulnerabilities to the Windows XP operating system and its utilities. In addition, it has attempted to increase the inherent security of the system in the face of future threats, whether or not the system is fully patched, while making the process of obtaining and applying the appropriate patches easier and less time-consuming. At the same time, Microsoft has attempted to maintain Windows XP's ease of use, with simple but flexible user interfaces to the new functionality.
A More Secure System
The major goal of Windows XP Service Pack 2 is to reduce common openings for attack of the Windows operating system. It reduces the most common attack vectors four ways: it better shields the network, enhances protection of memory, handles e-mail more safely, and browses the Internet more securely.
Network protection is the largest area of improvement in Windows XP Service Pack 2, and the one with the most implications for existing software. It starts with an improved Windows Firewall (previously known as Internet Connection Firewall, or ICF), which is enabled by default. The new firewall turns on very early in the system boot cycle, before the network stack is fully enabled, reducing the possibility of intrusions during the boot cycle. It also turns off very late in the shutdown cycle, after the network stack has been disabled, reducing the possibility of intrusions during system shutdown.
Windows Firewall is now enabled for all network interfaces by default, has a convenient control panel graphical user interface to enable exceptions by application, and can be placed under administrative control in a domain through new Group Policy settings. In addition, the netsh command-line tool, which was added to Windows XP in the Advanced Networking Pack to support IPv6, has been enhanced to support Windows Firewall configuration.
The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service has been made less vulnerable to outside attack, and new permission levels have been added to allow administrators to control which RPC servers are blocked, which are exposed only to the local subnet, and which are exposed to the entire network. Windows Firewall has been enhanced to support these permissions, and to limit port openings from alleged RPC servers based on the security context in which they run.
The Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) infrastructure has additional access control restrictions to reduce the risk of a successful network attack. By default, only authenticated administrators can remotely activate and launch COM components, and only authenticated users can remotely call COM components. Administrators can apply fine control to individual services to allow only appropriate users to use the services, or to restrict services to local use.
On CPUs that support execution protection (NX) technology, Windows XP Service Pack 2 marks data pages non-executable. This feature of the underlying hardware prevents execution of code from pages marked in this way. This prevents attackers from overrunning a marked data buffer with code and then executing the code; it would have stopped the Blaster worm dead in its tracks. The only processor families that currently support NX are the 64-bit AMD K8 and Intel Itanium; however, Microsoft expects future 32-bit and 64-bit processors to provide hardware based execution protection..
In addition to supporting NX, Service Pack 2 implements sandboxing. All binaries in the system have been recompiled with buffer security checks enabled to allow the runtime libraries to catch most stack buffer overruns, and "cookies" have been added to the heap to allow the runtime libraries to catch most heap buffer overruns.
In SP2, a new version of Outlook Express can block images and other external content in HTML email, warn about other applications trying to send mail, and control the saving and opening of attachments that could potentially be a virus. Outlook Express also coordinates with the new application execution service, to better protect the system from the execution of harmful attachments. Users also have the option to read or preview all messages in plain text mode, which can avoid potentially unsafe HTML. Windows Messenger and MSN Messenger share the improvements to attachment control made for Outlook Express.
Internet Explorer (IE) has been made much more secure in Service Pack 2. It now manages add-ons and detects crashes due to add-ons, controls whether or not binary behaviors are allowed to run, and applies the same safety restrictions to all URL objects that previously applied only to ActiveX controls. It has more control over the execution of all content. It dramatically restricts the capabilities of the Local Machine zone, to block attacks that attempt to use local content to run malicious HTML code. IE now requires that all file-type information provided by Web servers be consistent, and "sniffs" files for malicious code trying to masquerade as a benign file type.
IE now disallows access to cached scriptable objects: HTML pages can only script their own objects. This better blocks attacks on the IE cross-domain security model, disallowing scripts that listen to events or content in other frames, such as a script that might try to capture credit card information from a form. IE now has a built-in facility to block unwanted pop-up windows, and manage the viewing of desired pop-up windows. It can block all signed content from an untrusted publisher, will block signed code with invalid digital signatures by default, and will only display one prompt per control per page. Further, IE now keeps scripts from moving or resizing windows and status bars to hide them from view or obscure other windows.
DirectX 9 and Windows Media Player 9 both contain security, performance, and functionality improvements. For more information about improvements to DirectX, consult the DirectX home page at http://www.microsoft.com/windows/directx/. For more information about improvements to Windows Media Player, refer to the Windows Media Player home page at http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/.
Easier Maintenance
Windows XP Service Pack 2 features automatic updates, using Windows Update Version 5. An Express Install option makes it easy for users to quickly get just the critical and security updates they need, and an Automatic Updates control panel makes updating a set-and-forget task instead of a constant chore. In addition, Microsoft has endeavored to make most new patches smaller than they have been in the past, although Service Pack 2 is itself huge.
The new Security Center provides a central location for information about the security of your computer, with an easy-to-use graphical interface. Windows Installer 3.0 provides more security options for software installation, and provides patch management infrastructure that helps to keeps patches small through "delta compression" technology. Windows Installer 3.0 helps to avoid the downloading of unneeded, superseded or obsolete patches, and supports patch removal reliably.
Implications of the Improvements
Overall, most of the improvements introduced with Windows XP Service Pack 2 serve to make the operating system more secure without materially affecting the user experience. However, there are a few areas where users, administrators, and developers will have to make adjustments to maintain functionality without compromising security.
For users, the most common adjustments have to do with allowing exceptions to the improved security. Users who never ran ICF before will see a new popup security alert dialog whenever they run a new application that wants to act as an Internet server. Users will need to think about whether they want to grant each application this privilege, but they only have to think about it once, and they can change their minds easily later. Most users will want to allow their preferred instant messaging application this privilege when they expect to receive a video. Most users will deny the privilege to an unfamiliar application, especially if the publisher is unknown, lest it turn out to be a virus, worm, or Trojan horse.
Users will also find that Security Center nags them a bit if they lack an antivirus program, if their antivirus signatures are out of date, if they ignore critical system updates, or if they turn off their firewall. Most users will find this extra vigilance by the operating system more of a comfort than an annoyance; knowledgeable users can turn off any incorrect warnings by telling Security Center about their third-party security applications.
Users who have regularly scheduled tasks on their system may have to revisit them, once, to enter passwords. Scheduled tasks created to use the default security context, rather than a specific user ID, no longer work in Windows XP Service Pack 2. This helps limit a potential avenue of attack for intruders.
Administrators will need to explicitly allow access to server applications on their networks. Since access can be limited to the local subnet or allowed from any source, administrators have more control than ever before. Administrators and other IT professionals should read about this in detail on the Windows XP SP2 Web site, paying specific attention to http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dnwxp/html/securityinxpsp2.asp.
Windows and Web application developers will have to revisit distributed applications that use RPCs or DCOM. They may also have to apply patches to their development tools and allow their tools Windows Firewall privileges to allow remote debugging to work.
Web application developers may also have to reexamine their use of ActiveX controls and binary behaviors and make minor adjustments, as security has been tightened around these technologies. Web pages that need to run locally and have active content may need an additional "signature" line or a change of extension to allow them to run correctly.
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