ONI Contingency LARSON

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==1. REVISION HISTORY==
This document created: 254█-01-22
This document last updated: 2552-12-23
Emergency Situational Update: 2552-12-23
Emergency Situational Update: 2552-12-04
Emergency Situational Update: 2552-11-10
Emergency Situational Update: 2552-10-20
Further revision history is available from ONI DAIS-D upon request.
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==2. DEFINITIONS==
"A"	"B"
"C"	"D"
==3. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE==
Contingency LARSON is (as of the time of writing) the penultimate item in a series of documents preparing for the potential overrun of core UEG worlds by the Covenant [MP-A003], following Contingencies RED FLAGNote [2552-07-17]: SECTION 1 TRENDS & INTENTIONS has projected rapid, unexpected spike of intercept-probability for EPSILON ERIDANI II // REACH. CINCONI expected to action RED FLAG imminently.ESU [2552-07-29]: Flash transmission from SPECWAR indicates contact at EPSILON ERIDANI II // REACH. RED FLAG to execute IMMEDIATELY. Further ESU updates in RED FLAG documentation. and URAL, and preceding Contingency ████ ██████. However, LARSON was commissioned due to concerns about the viability of existing contingencies; in particular, the ability to conduct even Limited Planetary Evacuation (LPE) operations in a highly contested environment with primarily civilian craft was deemed to be grossly over-optimistic at bestFurther details and minutes of Contingency Review Session S03-CR0919 are to personnel of JADE clearance or above on request from DAIS-D..
==4. CONTINGENCY LARSON ==
===4.1 WORKING ASSUMPTIONS===
: 4.1.1 On the infeasability of defending Sol from determined Covenant assault.
Contingency LARSON is closely related to Contingencies URAL, HAYLES, ███ ██████ and ██████, in that it assumes that a sustained defence of Earth, and Sol System as a whole, is not viable against significant Covenant assault. To recapitulate: operational simulations conducted by AIMost notably [ONI.001.AI_SOF-0031-1], [ONI.001.AI_RAY-8104-5], and [UNSC.AI_ALX-8149-3]. and UNSC human wargaming have near-unanimously concluded that a light scouting or medium expeditionary force could only be successfully repelled at the cost of significant attrition of UNSC Navy and Air Force assets. 
Even under optimal scenariosRepresenting best-case replenishment of naval losses by ships drawn from other critical duties to replace naval losses, and expedited COE repair of surviving orbital defences., remaining UNSC forces would be unable to prevent a rapid collapse upon a second-wave assault. It is further notable that FLEETCOM Sector One command staff have not contested these assessments.
Thus this panel concludes, in concurrence with prior sessions S03-CR0905 through -CR0918, that continuing operations on Earth without contingencies for a shift off-world is unacceptable.
: 4.1.2 On the limitations of existing early warning capabilities.
Unlike Contingencies URAL and HAYLES, LARSON assumes that little or no advanced warning will be available before the arrival of Covenant forces in-system. To date, remote scanning outposts have been constructed in the Jovian moons and L3/4 points, and RSOs are also under construction at the Jovian L5 and other strategic positions within cis-Neptunian space; however, these can cover only a fraction of potential arrival vectors and incur substantial operating expense.
Furthermore, intelligence available from Naval assets is unable to provide timely warning of any Covenant offensive. In addition to the inferior and inconsistent speeds of current human SFTE technology, the random jumps required by General Order 098831A-1 (the "Cole Protocol") introduce a further delay in any information on force location or disposition from reaching ONI and the UNSC as a whole.
As a result of this, the lead times required by existing contingencies have been deemed by this panel to be unacceptably long. The industrial transfer proposed in URAL takes no fewer than sixteen (16) months in best-case simulations, and while HAYLES is substantially faster in the transfer phase it requires substantial fortification and concealment that is both visible and vulnerable until completion. In either case, any incursion into the Sol System would immediately jeopardise contingency preparations, and the substantial resources required for both contingencies leaves them with no safe failure modes.
Thus this panel concludes that a contingency for LPE of ONI/UNSC/UEG-critical assets from Sol, one that is capable of IMMEDIATE ACTION in the event of a Covenant incursion, is necessary.
: 4.1.3 On the assumed survivability of critical ONI // UNSC // UEG infrastructure.
Any Covenant incursion into the Sol system 
Further related the unrealistic optimism of contingencies dealing with LPE scenarios, 
: 4.1.3 On the increasingly limited effectiveness of General Order 098831A-1Commonly known as the Cole Protocol..
Extensive simulations by SECTION 1 TRENDS & INTENTIONS have consistently projected a growing increase in the ability of 
===4.2 THREAT PROFILE===
===4.3 MEASURES & MITIGATIONS===
==5. ADDENDA==
 
===5.1 Documentation Dissemination===
This document and its supplementary materials are required reading for:
In the event of [X], this document and its supplementary materials will be provided to:
Further dissemination may follow, dependent on escalation.
This document cleared for disclosure to UNSC HIGHCOM liaisons.
 
===5.2 Further Information===
===5.3 Footnotes===
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