Comps

Tulsa 
Board: Hughes, Kiras, Hemmer (AWC Int’l Relations Instructor) 
Almost all questions from Hughes and Kiras were in direct response to points I had made previously.  Only Hemmer seemed to have distinct questions.  
Hemmer: 
- Many theories of technology development state that the utility/importance of a new technology rises, peaks at some point, and then declines.  Where is air power in relation to that curve? 
- Using Waltz’s three images as a lens, how do those lenses inform or guide the actions of Iranian leadership in their pursuit of nuclear weapons? 
- In reference to Janis’ discussions on group think, how does SAASS avoid group think?  And then how can a commander avoid group think in the operational AF? 
- Is there warfare outside of Clausewitzian war? 
Hughes: 
- For the last 30 years, fighter generals have been in charge of the Air Force.  Has that proven effective?  Which tribe is next in line? 
- What’s the Air Force’s next “big thing?” 
- Is air superiority less important now than it was in the past? 
- Why does the military have a rank structure?  (follow up to Hemmer’s group think question) 
Kiras: 
- How does the Air Force sell the image of the indirect approach without being overly parochial? 
- What book would you recommend for the CSAF reading list and why? 
- What is cyberspace? 
- Does cyber need to become a separate force when it can produce decisive effects in warfare? 
- What ideas or concepts constitute group think at SAASS?  Specifically, which book do we (SAASS faculty or the academic community) hold in such regard that it constrains our thinking?  I answered Schelling’s construct of nuclear deterrence approaches a group think mentality that inhibits the effective development of space and cyber deterrence literature . 
- How is the nature of thermonuclear war different from Clausewitzian war?  Previously I had said thermonuclear war was a different from Clausewitzian war. 
McClam 
Board: Yeisley, Deiale, Whitt (AWC History Instructor) 
Like Tulsa, they played off my answers.  Every question after the initial one served as a catalyst for the next question.  Twice they intentionally changed the subject to add variety. 
Yeisley: 
-       Do you see any area where China can take the role as the Global Sheriff?  If so, what roles specifically will China undertake? 
-       What roles do I see the U.S conceding or sharing with China? 
-       Explain power?  
-       How would a realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist view power? 
-       Considering the success of the Wright Brothers, how did airpower theorist and airpower do during the First World War?  
Whitt: 
-       Is there a great risk to the United States by taking on the rebalance towards the Asia Pacific Region? 
-       Do you think there is a greater risk of our allies in the region picking a fight they cannot manage during the rebalance? 
-       When is the use of force likely to produce the effects that a state desires? 
-       Give a historical example that supports your idea from Waltz that man is inherently bad/evil? 
-       If you have the right strategy, can you still lose war? 
-       The U.S. seems too always prepare for the last war, is this true?  How suited is America to innovate during conflict? 
-       What was your most challenging book of the year or one that changed you the most?  What book would you recommend to a junior Marine officer?  What book would you replace in the curriculum? 
Deiale: 
-       What would you tell Marines upon return to the operating forces about your experience at SAASS?  Would you recommend they attend the course? 
-       What is the role of airpower and its influence on the decision-makers ability to value maximize? 
-       Is inter-service rivalry a good thing? 
-       What has SAASS taught you? 
Chode 
Panel = Muller, Bailey, Schwonek 
(M) The counter-terror drone campaign has become quite controversial lately, using just war concepts construct a pro and con argument for targeting individuals. 
(B)  As we continue the trend of removing the human element from direct combat, does this impact perceptions of honor in combat and how important is that? 
(S)  Isn’t this just assassination?  What stops us from doing this/should we? 
(M)  Comparing this to the assassination of Yamamoto during WWII can you make a case for the drone campaign? 
(B)  As we develop RPA technology is there a tension between a technological momentum that says this is the right way to use this and social values against it?  What does this have to do with Thomas Kuhn’s ideas on paradigms? 
(S) Does the morality of the drone campaign hinge on the availability of other options? 
(B) The US has been playing global sheriff for some time now (Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan). If China is a rising hegemon and you are Hu Jintao’s strategic advisor what advice would you give him on filling this role?  Does a hegemon have an obligation to be a global sheriff? 
(S) How would you characterize the current administration’s policies from an IR theory standpoint (liberal, realist, etc)? 
(M) There has been a lot of nostalgia recently surrounding the Cold War.  People argue that it was a much simpler time from a national strategic and airpower strategy standpoint.  Do you think this is justified? 
(S)  Brodie suggested that there is a persistent problem in the Air Force operating at the boundary between policy and strategy?  Agree or disagree? 
(B)  Is there an overconfidence in information?  Vietnam happens right at the beginning of the “Cybernetic Age,” how does that affect the war? 
(B)  My favorite quote from Dr Winton is, “Reality is a harsh arbiter of strategy.”  What do you think? 
(B)  How does your answer inform your vision of yourself as a strategist in the Air Force? 
(S) What is the role of logistics in warfare?  What ideas shape your appreciation of logistics, it’s importance to strategy, the key terms and ideas? 
(B) There is a divide between those who believe that a strategist should start with logistic constraints and then construct their strategy, and those who believe that strategy comes first and logistic requirements must make them a reality.  Which side do you fall on? 
(S) Does logistics planning impose a straight jacket on strategy? 
(M)  Nixon gets a bum wrap following Vietnam.  Is this justified?  Rate him as a strategist? 
(B) While stationed on Curacao there was an initiative to open a space port there and charge $95,000 for a 30 min flight into space.  It gathered a lot of enthusiasm for the growth of commercial space.  With the decline of NASA and the growth of commercial space what implications do you believe this has for military space?  What do the next 30 years look like if this trend continues? 
(M) Douhet’s reputation is in tatters following WWII, but he encounters a resurgence later on and we still read his work?  Why?  What are the big things that he got right? 
(B) What factors do you think define the nature of war?  What is the character of war and how does this change the nature of war (if at all)? 
Debrief Items:  
Use books where needed.  Don’t summarize an entire argument from an author if you only need one part of it, but it is good to drop names/titles where appropriate.  
You control the tempo.  If you know the answer, go ahead.  If you need time to write a few quick thoughts down, that is a good technique.  BL:  Don’t start talking and hope that you will stumble onto the right answer.  
Factual accuracy is also important.  Don’t throw out a historical example if you are unsure of the details because they will catch you. 
Sarah 
Board: Chiabotti (lead); Tucci; Mary Hampton (ACSC Asst Dean). 
C: Talk to us about your thesis.  
H: Many follow-on questions related to thesis; civil-military relations focused (Feaver; Huntington; Janowitz...of which we only covered Feaver in SAASS, but I examined the other two in my thesis. Also mentioned Posen and Rosen as addressing civilian role (or not) in change in military orgs.)
C: Talk about the origins of Feaver’s construct.
C: What are the limits of his theory?
T: Can you apply Feaver's principal-agent construct to another historical case study, one where it was useful? (Led to Cold War discussion ref Huntington; led to discussion of Johnson and civ-mil relations in Vietnam.)
T: What about in the case of Nixon's approach to Vietnam?  (Driving at President becoming the agent of Congress with the Case-Church Amendment, which prohibited continued ground action in Vietnam without Congressional approval. I didn't answer with this specificity; I talked about popular support for the war collapsing after Lam Son 719 and Nixon responding to that popular pressure; failure of Vietnamization; bigger game of Russia, China and election.)
T:  Tell us how some of the classics dealt with civil-military relations.  (Clausewitz, Moltke, etc)
T:  Use Thucydides as a case study for civil-military relations.
T:  How does the United States government factor popular opinion into the political process?
T:  What's the difference between the US Senate and the House of Reps?  
T:  How does the United States avoid being subjected to the whim of public opinion you described in
Thucydides?
C: You said in your response that the US wouldn't work well as a popular democracy.  Why? (This led to a discussion on republic/representative democracy versus popular democracy and more Thucydides.)
H: How would you characterize international order?
H: What is the difference between international order and the international system?
H: The international order post-WWII was bipolar, though.  Do you think the international order has changed since then?  Are we still operating under the same paradigm?
H: How will we know if the international order is changing?
C: When did Britain transition from underwriting the international order to the United States underwriting it?
C: What was the US airpower strategy and the British strategy in WWII?
C: How would Pape characterize the US strategy in WWII against Germany? Was it successful or unsuccessful, why or why not?
H: Why do you think the British and the Americans took a different approach to strategic bombing in WWII?
C: Why did Hitler think Germany lost in WWI?
C:  Why didn't Hitler fully mobilize the German economy until late in the war?  (Followed from discussion on Tooze.)
C: What was Britain's assumption about their morale bombing strategy?
H: How did FDR organize or what was his strategy in theory development in the interwar years here at Maxwell?  (ACTS history.)
H: Is FDRs approach to theory development for airpower instructive for cyber and what lessons can we glean from that?
H: How would you organize to develop cyber?
C: Who owns the Coast Guard and relate that to Dr. Hampton's question about cyber. T: How does time factor into strategy?
T:  How does Boyd address time?
C:  Does time matter as much at the strategic level as at the tactical level?
T:  Give me the title of the thesis paper that describes your year at SAASS.  
Winder
Board: Yeisley (chair), Kiras, Allsep (AWC)
(Y) – Given the 3 IR theories we’ve studied at SAASS, what is power and how does it relate to institutions?
Multiple follow up IR questions that focused on the definition and construction of interests; the contemporary international system, and whether we live in a realist or Liberal world?
(A) – Is the US led more by grand strategy or policy?  
(K) – A French strategist recently said that, “in modern strategy, space is irrelevant, but time is everything,”  do you agree or disagree?
(Y) – If you were a Chinese strategist, do you think you can better meet your goals by working within the existing international order or by seeking to change the system?
(A) – Within the context of strategic culture, do you think the military culture encourages or discourages effective strategic thought?
(A) – Can the US deter or defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda?
(A) – Was the AF prepared to fight the current war?  What is the biggest threat in the future and what should the force look like to be prepared? 
(Y) – From the 50s to the 90s 9 mil people died in “irregular wars”, yet the superpowers did not fight, was this good or bad?
(K) – How does nuclear deterrence relate and is the nuc still a political weapon?
(Y) – What should the US strategy be toward China today?  What if you have to assume a retrenchment approach, how does that change the strategy?
(K) – If you were a Chinese AF officer and were trying to model the Chinese AF with a non-US historical example, who and why?
(A) – With respect to military technology, the character or war, and the character of the warrior, what should future Airmen look like and who should the AF recruit into the Academy?
(A) – Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt believed the US was a seafaring nation and that the Navy was the primary source of US power, is this still true today?
(Y) – Based on the last 10 years of IW, is this the new normal for war?
(K) – Provide a positive and negative example of an airpower strategist.
(K) – name a WWII airpower biography you would recommend to Capts in your next assignment. 
Debrief comments – Talk slower.  Don’t need to relate as many authors to your answer, just give us your synthesized answer…answer the question more directly.  
Gordo:  Forsyth, Dolman, LaSine
F: If you had do pick three books for a class on strategy, what would they be?
In the answer to this first question, I was able to tie in a personal theme for the year, and nearly all the follow-on questions were related to topics/books I had introduced.
L: You seem to be critical of Crane.  Do military historians get the details right, do we capture it correctly, and if not, why not?
D: You mentioned social constructivism; is strategy deterministic, or socially constructed?
F: You mentioned deterrence, do Shelling and Brodie and their body of work have relevance today?
L: You talk like you’re a realist, but some of the things you say make you sound like you acknowledge liberal assertions, which is it?
F: Hypothetical scenario; 20 years in the future and China has a bigger economy, military, and has undergone a democratic transition.  You’re advising the SECDEF, do you tell him we need the military capacity to fight China?
L: You still sound like a liberal, is Waltz wrong and can we avoid a great power war at the next hegemonic transition?
L: Please relate 18th-19th Century British economic policy to the Bretton Woods accords, and how that relationship might inform a possible hegemonic transition from the US to China (dumb stare from Gordo…)
F: Can terrorists or other extremists be understood through the RAM lens?  
F: We’re at the end, you have the pen, write (tell us) one sentence that captures you year here at SAASS.
Dipoma (Panel: Kiras, Dolman, Hemmer).
Kiras:
What are good/bad examples of airpower leaders who you would think of recommending to your subordinates to emulate?
If you are an advisor to China, what historical lessons would you recommend to inform the future development of their Air Force?
Is China’s current strategy offensive or defensive?
What episode from Thucydides would you recommend that the President and his staff read and why?
Does our focus on Clausewitz lead to groupthink at SAASS and how could we prevent that according to Janis.
Using organizational theory, explain why your old squadron has changed in the ways it has.
Using organizational theory, explain why AFSOC is the way it is.
What book did we read that it the most dangerous to SAASS students and why?
What lessons could China take from the Battle of Britain?
Is there something about airpower that makes the Air Force more or less likely to produce “zealots” than other services?
What would a general airpower theory (Overy’s) look like for China?
Can zealots ever be a good thing and how are they different than advocates?
What did Clausewitz say about the defensive versus the offensive?
Dolman:
Why did Athens invade Sicily and was there a reasonable justification for it?
What do you think about the 5 Generals who wrote to the press five years after the invasion to say that they knew it was a bad idea but nobody listened to them?
What are your criteria for whether or not you would resign your commission as a general officer.
Why did we not understand that Iraq was going to turn into a 10 year occupation?
Did anyone warn that Iraq would not be over quickly and why weren’t they heard?
If you are the Chief of Staff and you think a policy is wrong and will get people unnecessarily killed, do you go to The SecDef? Congress? The Press?
What are American objectives vis-à-vis Syria?
We used to be the department of war, now we are the department of defense.  What are the differences between deterrence and defense?
Can you deter terrorism?
Can you deter a suicide bomber?
How does Clausewitz’s understanding of the defensive versus the offensive apply to our challenge with terrorism?
Hemmer:
Should we intervene in Syria?
If you were to build a coalition to intervene in Syria or anywhere, what would the challenges be?
If you are told you will intervene in Syria, what does that intervention look like?
Make a case that Thucydides was a realist, liberalist and constructivist (all three).
Define Groupthink.
(Spin off)  What are “mindguards”?  (I misconstrued Janis’s use of the term).
Is cyber power theory better informed by airpower theory or naval theory?
Allison and Zelikow’s Model II talks about organizational behavior, what other theories that you read this year are “Model Two” Theories.
What is the democratic peace hypothesis and what would it say about the Peloponnesian War?
What specific example from Posen’s book do you think is better explained by something other than balance of power theory? (After I had argued about why I didn’t like Posen’s theory in response to an organizational question)
Give a good and bad example of a senior military leader in the last ten years in terms of the advice they have given the political leadership.
ADVICE:  (1) If any question that could be related to nuclear deterrence comes up, be SURE that you understand whether the panelist is asking about nuclear, conventional, or theoretical deterrence, EVEN IF you think it is clear.  Just clarify.  (2) It is impossible to remember every detail from each course so if you are still studying, I would consider this based on my comps and other people listed above: Go in with just a little bit of detail on current events, especially with respect to China, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.  Be ready to talk domestic political issues and civ mil relations, which is where my hardest questions came from.  You will not get docked for not knowing what dudes like Wylie or Legro said about whatever, but current events will be used to frame multiple questions and you will look better with some fresh knowledge to make sense of the question.
Trav:  Tucci, Yeisley, Farquhar (History Professor USAFA)
T: What are the biggest differences between US and Australian grand strategy?
Mentioned that Australia considered itself a Pivotal Power.
T: Outside of the Asia Pacific, is there another example of a pivotal power?
Mentioned Iran as a regional not a pivotal power.
F: Is Iran a Regional power or a Revolutionary Power?
F: Is the Quds, and Iranian support for Hizbollah and Assad proof that Iran is a revolutionary power?
F: Could Hizbollah survive without Iranian support?
Y: Australia has aligned itself to the US, what would it take for Australia to realign with China?
Y: 10 years from now you are providing advice to the Chinese government. What advice would you give them regarding creating a viable strategy to promote their interests in the face of the US continuing to act as a global sheriff?
F: How should Australia respond to simultaneous requetss for support in dealing with Chinese aggression against Philippines and Vietnamese interests in the region?
F: Is there a difference in the way in which China is managing its rise compared with the way Japan did in the 1930s?
T: Colin Gray said that Rome was a land power, Great Britain was a sea power, and that America is an air power? What does he mean, and do you agree?
T: (Follow-on) Is there a space power? Is there a cyber power?
Y: What does the evolution of US strategic bombing during WWII from the CBO, to the Firebombing of Dresden and Japan, and the dropping of the Atomic bombs say about shifting American morality?
F: (Pile on from my answer) Would the US have used the A Bomb on Germany had it been possible in 1943?
F: (Based on my response “No” due to the different motivators in play) What would Thucydides have to say about the US approach to WWII?
G: If you ran in Clausewitz at the bar and told him that we had now removed friction and chance from the battlefield, what would he say?
G: Is the US setting a precedent using Drone strikes against Pakistan? And what might this mean for the US in the future?
F: If you were teaching an undergraduate class, would you see any utility in teaching them the remarkable trinity?
F: If you were teaching an undergraduate class on strategy, what books from the course would you assign them?
T: At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartan king Archidamus discussed the problems of war with the Athenians. Talk us through his argument.
T: Has there been another leader in history who acted in a similar way in response to a similar situation?
G: Was nuclear deterrence the reason that there was no war between the US and the USSR during the Cold War?
G: What does deterrence mean then in dealing with non-state actors?
T:  If SAASS was a thesis, what would be the question, and what would be your thesis statement?
Brutus – Board Wright (W)  (Chair), Winton (Wi) and Erickson (E) 
(E) – History – The Combined Bomber Offensive.  Was it a stupid idea executed well or a good idea given the environment.  Spoke to Mitchell sell of airpower capability vs. reality which leads to rhetoric and reality.  Also brought in conversations about Morality and the Supreme Emergency.  Winton brought up that at the base level, Airpower was a hell of a lot better than Trench Warfare.
(Wi) – Airpower Theory – Which of the two naval theory proponents are more closely aligned with Airpower and why?  I said Corbett because of fleet in being, hold tgts at risk without controlling all critical nodes.
            Reattack: Now make an argument for Mahan – Mahan believed that control of the sea came from     direct engagement with naval forces and that the source of nation’s power and security emanated           from economic prosperity.  Similarly, Airpower has become a vital component for the economic             vitality of the US.
(W) – Theory – Think broadly about theory (IR, IW, Cyber, Space…).  How has your exposure to all these theories changed the way you view the world as compared to when you showed up at SAASS? Spent my time building a definition, and then only applied to one or two courses.  He wanted to me to bridge the gap across a wider range of course material.
(E) – Does Grand Strategy exist?  If yes, then what is it.  If no, what should it be.  Provide examples of when  Grand Strategy was effective for the nation.  I brought up interwar period and the Cold War.
            Reattack: What’s the risk of retrenchment or isolationism?  Power and Prestige in the           international environment.  Bolster regional alliances, sounds like offshore balancing.
(W) - Question comes from NPR.  Is cyber security a national issue or is it more appropriately handled internationally?
(E) – Does the current USAF culture allow for an officer like Bernard Schriever to exist?  As a follow up, what does it say for technological change?
(Wi) – What’s harder, innovation in Peacetime or Innovation in Wartime?  Provide examples.  I brought in invention as the counter to innovation and then compared and contrasted when each was easier based on the environmental considerations.  
(Wi) – The calculus of uncertainty in peacetime or the calculus in war, which is more difficult to deal with and why?  After I rolled upside down and pulled, I figured out he was talking about Clausewitz’s idea of Fog.  Since he does very little discussion of peacetime operations, I had to take the concept and apply it to peace.  I said that the calculus of uncertainty is more difficult in peacetime because you don’t have an enemy to develop strategy against, thus “you don’t know what you don’t know”
(E) – What’s the current state of civil military relations in the current environment?  Two decades of war, pivot to Asia, fiscally constrained.  Led to a discussion about the focus on sexual assault.  I said that Congress was able to spend more time on topics like this because they weren’t concerned with combat operations and effects, thus the periphery concerns become primary (caveated that it should never be acceptable to have sexual assault).
(W)  - What’s your speech to your squadron with respect to sexual assault?  1) Moral Issue 2) Detracts from Combat Effectiveness 3) Hammer the UCMJ option 4)  Soften by stating the squadron takes care of each other.
General Debrief Comments:  Spent too much time “building the watch” as opposed to asking what time it is.  BL:  ATFQ and then provide context as necessary.  This was different than I had practiced, but I think it is committee dependent.  Grasp of concepts more important than memorization of book and author.  Like the use of course examples paired with personal examples to show synthesis.  Cheers, Brutus
Squeeze.  Board: Forsyth (F), Tucci (T), Schwone (S).
F- If you had to write a strategy course for SAASS, what three books would you chose.
T- How would you use Thucydides (since I said I wouldn’t include Thucydides).
S – How does the use of military force and military strategy fit into the international system?  Essentially, what’s the use of force in my interpretation of how the world hangs together?
S – Why did you single out Keenan and why does he inform your interpretation of the world so much?
F – If Keenen were here, what would he say about drone attacks? 
S – Why do you say that drone attacks are a bad strategy?
T – What does Mitchell have to say about airpower and airmindedness, and how does that change WRT drones?
S – If the age of manned flight is over (his presumption, I refuted, but…), what are the implications of USAF culture?
T – What are the implications to what Mitchell had to say about airmindedness in an unmanned world? Do we still need airmindedness?
F – With Mitchell and Warden as your two chronological bookends, what three airpower leaders cast the longest shadow in between?
S – What about Harris and Dowding and their precedence on how to wage an air campaign? 
*** at this point, Forsyth declares that we are going to switch to ‘uncomfortable questions out of my comfort zone’***
T – Tell me what you think about national level decision processes and how they effect strategy, and in doing so, evaluate Truman, Eisenhower, and Bush II and give them a grade on their effectiveness
F- Explain the theory behind Allison and Zelikow’s three models
F – Now that you answered the question above, explain how you adjudicate rationality between cultures.
S – Explain why the Iranians are acting they way they are, how does this fit into an analysis of rationality, and what is the outcome?
F – If you were the CEO of the USAF, and your stock was tanking, how would you revitalize the business?
F – (spin-off from above) Which would you split off from the USAF: Air, Space, or Cyber, and why?
T – What is your impression of economics and economic principles, and where would you fit further readings into the course?
F – In one sentence, what’s the last thing you’d say to SAASS? 
Debrief – stayed practical and Forsyth liked that. No need to be showy and continually quote books and authors.  
Ouipe.  Board:  Buono (lead), Winton, Farquhar (History Professor USAFA)
B – What’s your definition of strategy and what books from this year have informed that definition?
B – Are objectives static?  How can they change, does there need to be concern over mission creep?
F – How would Thucydides respond to your definition of strategy?  Is there something missing? à he was getting at the human component of war.
W – Are there enduring principles? (this was a follow-on to the first question.)
W – What are the principles you focus on for strategy?
W – Talk to me about Clausewitz’s use of COGs in Book 8.  What two situations was he considering?  à Carl’s looking at total war – defeat of a nation - in which his 3 COGs apply.  The other situation is a limited war where he says that you don’t want to attack the enemy’s COG because that will drive the war to a more total condition.
F – What is the purpose of principles?
W – So Schelling and Clausewitz walk into a bar together.  They sit down, have a beer, and start arguing over war.  Give me a couple rounds of their argument.  What does one say and the other counter with?  (I about shit myself…ended up putting Schelling in the total war with nuclear weapons and Clausewitz in the more limited conflict)
B – What was the biggest lesson taken from the Cold War for today?
W – Explain what happens in Thucydides through a liberal and then realist lens.  Which is more informative to you?
B – Can airpower be deceive?
B – Was airpower deceive in Kosovo?
B – What mechanism would Pape say we used in Kosovo?  (This led to a series of short exchanges on Pape and his 4 forms of coercion and why I thought his argument wasn’t very good)
F – Should the AF consider cyber a separate domain?
B – What were the reasons for a separate AF?  Do they translate to cyber today?
W – Name your most and least effective air campaign planner and provide evidence why.  What sections would an article titled “Air Genius” on air campaign planning have that you were writing?
Chief Board: Smith, J (lead); Bailey; O’Mara (AWC Chief of Strategy I think)
S: What is strategy and what makes up a strategist?  Incorporate the point of SAASS?
S: What is the difference between Strategy and Planning
O: If I am not familiar with the military operations how would you explain Strategy?
B: It seems like the Deuces are in 2 camps on whether means drives strategy or not? (similar question to this can’t remember exactly)
S: What are the 3 books if you were building a strategy course that you would include and why? (Take a risk—I just used Clausewitz, Thucydides, Osinga)
S & O: What should I get out of Clausewitz, what is the basis of his argument and expand?
O: What is the separation in Clausewitz between Policy and the military?
O: What grammar is specific to Clausewitz?
O: Contrast Sun Tzu to Clausewitz?
O:  Thinking about Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are the Chinese at war with the US?
B: With regards to cyber and how cyber is somewhat considered in the interwar period like airpower was between WWI and WWII talk about the connection between innovation and strategy?  How should we think about innovations? (No sure of the exact question, but getting to social constructivism vs technological determinism.)
O: Looking back at ACTS…was the CBO socially constructed or technologically determined and why?
O: What is the word we use for socially constructed?  Doctrine
S: Was ACTS successful and how do we view it now?  What was the lesson from the bomber study after WWII?  How did we move forward post WWII? 
S:  Talk about Kuhn and his paradigms?
S:  Talk us through the spectrum of Realism through Liberalism with specific examples?
O: How does a realist explain Peace?
O: From a realist perspective was going into Iraq right or wrong in 2003?
S: Name a conflict from a realist perspective?  Recently?
B:  Talk about Hegemony and if the US is declining, is China going to be the International Sherriff and should they based on Hegemony theory?
B:  Does SAASS produce strategists?  How?
S:  With current budget situation, how can you justify SAASS for the future? (Last 2 question were similar to these)
Canyon:  Board: Smith “Coyote” (lead); Kiras, Springer (ACSC – Comparative Military Studies, Dept of Strategy & Leadership)
C: Why did you come to SAASS
C: One book from the year that influenced you the most
C: List & explain people who have influenced you the most in the following areas and what is the common thread amongst them?
-       General War theorist: 
-       General Maritime theorist:
-       General Air theorist:
S: Who are the most applicable theorist prior to 1900 that is most applicable to space policy today
S: We have not deployed autonomous weapons full scale, at least not as much as we can.  How do you see autonomous weapons?  Are they legal/ethical/moral?  Are they right to use?
S.  You are going to fly RPVs at Creech.  When the pilot gets off work and leaves the base, is he a combatant?  What is a legal combatant and have our views changed with new technology?
K: Why does Clausewitz use the trinity & how does it advance his argument?
-       Where does IW fit into Clausewitz trinity?  Is the trinity still applicable?
K: Understanding the concept of the trinity is tension between the three variables, how can we use the trinity to explain warfare today?
K: What does a strategist have more to learn from, success of airpower in WW II or failure of airpower in Vietnam
C: Give us an abstract of your thesis
C: How has the evolution of cyber in your mind called into question the nature of warfare
C: How should cyber roles & missions be divided between the agencies & services
-       What roles & missions in cyber are outside the control of DOD & who should own those roles
K: Are you espousing improving stability & control in the caoplexic environment of cyber?
S: Given the global war against terror, what should the military effort be today?
S: Redesign the DOD.  What service would go away, what would combine, what wouldn’t change? Why?
S: From a rising power, or other power around the world, what vulnerabilities exist in US military campaigns today from an adversary’s perspective
S: There’s a lot of talk about reducing the nuclear stock piles.  Is a complete global reduction possible?  Is that good or bad for the US?  What are the affects?
K: What is just war from Walter’s perspective?
K: Is the use of SOF & drones “just” according to Walzer?  Is their use legally defensible?
S: Do RPAs allow the US to wage war with impunity?  Is this just?  Does this make their use “easier” for decision makers?  Why?
K: What leaders have you studies this year that you found good & bad, in respect to which ones you’d recommend to junior officers in the cyber community to emulate?  Why?
Waldo:  Board: Buns, Woody, & Lukasic (I have no idea how to spell that, but he’s a History dude from ACSC)…majority of the questions were pile-ons – building on previous answers
B: What’s your definition of strategy?
L: Grand Strategy.  What is it?  Do we have one?  What is it?  
L: Is the difficulty with grand strategy and execution of it a function of our democratic system?  Are democracies particularly challenging with regard to executing a focused grand strategy?
W: Is there another form of government that is better developing and executing strategy?  If so, what is it?  
W: What made Pericles’s strategy so successful?  What lesson might we take from it and apply today?
B: Is cyberspace a domain?  What does that mean vis-à-vis crafting cyber strategy?
L: Taking the arguments of early air power advocates, discuss why their views on establishment of a separate Air Force would or would not apply to space and cyberspace.
L: You’ve discussed the differences between cyberspace and other domains – use classical tenants of air power theory to explain how they are similar.
W: What does Clausewitz say about the value of offense versus defense?  What would early airpower theorists say about it?  Apply those views to cyberspace.  Is cyberspace inherently offensive or defensive?  Will it remain that way?
B: What did you take away from the IR class that you found most useful?
L: Why are China and India pursuing blue-water navies?  Why the leap from land power to sea power?  Is their pursuit of greater sea power good or bad for the US?  What about in the context of Mahan?  What would he advise both countries?  
W: What if China didn’t pursue a greater sea power?  Would that increase or decrease the prospects for peace in the region?  Apply that to space.
W: There are significant economic ties between the US and China.  Does that make the prospect of war more or less likely?  Can you compare that to any other time in history?
B: Tell me about the four strategies included in Pape’s framework and give an example of each post-Desert Storm
L: With regards to RPAs, is strategy driving the weapon/technology or the other way around?
W: Warden says that during Clausewitz’s days, “the morale was to the physical as 3 is to 1.”  Today, Warden says, it’s at least even.  He says it’s very hard to affect the morale aspect, but we can reduce the physical to almost zero.  Would you agree with that?
L: Sun Tzu talks a lot about the effectiveness of plans in strategy.  He says that one must seek to disrupt the adversary’s strategy and alliances.  Apply those thoughts to the US and global terrorism.  Who is better at disrupting the other’s strategy and alliances?
W: You’re Truman in July of 1945.  You have three choices: Drop the A-bomb, continue the blockade and try to starve Japan out, or execute an amphibious invasion.  Which one is most moral?  Which one would you choose?
Pasha: Chiabotti, Bailey, Farquhar 
C: Tell us about your Thesis 
(led to Qs about Indian Security Risks, Indian foreign policy (no export of ideology and no territorial ambitions) which led to Strategy. Chiabotti in opening remarks had already defined it ; similar to Dolman’s continuing advantage)
B: Define Strategy 
(led to a little discussion about time {I had said that the only two things that you can’t control ; are enemy’s reaction (like CvC clash of wills) and time (clocks ticking)}  thus put continuing advantage in perspective the average lifespan is 30-40 years (contributing to strategic process) thus if you seek say a 300 year advantage it takes a series of individuals/ generations; to simplify the cognitive process we break it down to short and long term successes that should lead to long term advantage.. 
F: Does the Indian mindset restrict strategy?
I answered it pulling in the role of force (use or not) in strategy, so a short term loss may be a long term advantage (sliding time scale; example of global commons and oil, if I monopolize then China may go to war; rather than that I share {get less oil} but long term peace with China) I took it to CvC war is for a purpose, a better state of peace.. led to next 30 min on CvC (Economy of force; Offense vs defence; Culmninating Point; Trinity; Fog/Friction/ Coupd’oil)
C: What does Boyd emphasize on in the oOda loop?
This led to follow on questions about what was he trying to get at in the big O, I answered  Strategic paralysis; Nope….Relative time compression; Nope. finally rephrased Q to get to Information (which was what he were looking for..) they had a 3 minute discussion on observe was more important or a weakness; I let them resolve it… and added observe is collection/assimilation of information, Orientation is processing/putting it into context; they were ok with that.
F: Do the principles of war apply to Cyperpower 
(I defined war as violence only; and said the rest is more of semantics {war on drugs, economic war etc but said that those terms are attractors for leaders to get funding or focus nation attention to a desired area); then went to the origins of cyber ; its man made for open use; then listed the four layers of cyber   social+ libicki 3 layers) and said it can be rebuilt to separate the machine code layer from the info carrying layer) then went to attribution and said either way its and advantage; then defined cyber as a domain as you can contest for its control if you can attribute then defend; if you can’t then attack; thus cyber princples ; I then continued that weapons are artifacts or tools of the time (I took to CvC nature and character of war; nature does not change and men fight to win; character does (CvC says so … with the age of time and general character of man…. ) Used that to  say that technology is temporary; wanting to win is permanent; we use weapons available to us to fight to win, brought in nukes
C: What do you think of Morality of the USAF bombing in Germany and Japan
I talked them through the development of air power; why it was offensive :  brought in the theorists and both British and American campaign (I told them I would put out the context); for Germany and Japan; linked to ACTS precision in Ge and Lo-Lo incendiary in Jap… then the invasion and then brought in revenge; Brits vs Ge and US vs Jap thus explaining the character of the differences in the respective bombing campaigns   
F: yoy have the A bomb in 1943 would US use against GE
No (no personal fight with the Germans; however; if you knew about hitler and the camps then maybe)
B: You said technology is a tool then what three significant technologies do you think changed the character of war
I answered Gunpowder, Internal combustion engines and Aircraft ; he followed up by why air craft (linked to pape; army only denial ; navy weaker form of denial and punishment and airforce all; an army or navy on defensive can only do denial first while the AF can choose any of the 4 and YOU CANT DEFEND EVERY WHERE AND THUS AF IS inherently OFFENSIVE)
B: Why do states go to war? Answer using different models
Defined war, and started with waltz, then liberal, and constructivist..
B: what do you believe in (wanted to know which camp I fell into)
I answered based on my culture and thoughts ideas a constructivist…(when back to India’s foreign policy) brought in legro old idea-crises-new idea, compared it to Khun, peace as NS and war as the revolution; linked to legro and cited Unconditional surrender in WWII for Ge and Jap , and threw in UN, world banks etc as the new idea after the crisis (they liked that)
C: Does that clash with CvC  (not being aggressive)
I answered that defensive goes with CvC, but if they start, we will finish…..
With that the comps ended…
Blue skies
JT:  Kiras, Tooch, Terino (ASCS Air-guy – taught Science/Tech at SAASS).
K:  Based on your Irregular Warfare background, what books would have made your life easier if you had read them 4 years ago, why?   (Mackinlay – cause vs. symptom,  Allison/Zelikow – levels of analysis, Kalyvas – control/info in CI fight).
K:  What would Kalyvas say about Allison/Zelikow?  (Kal says too much research WRT IW is based on the RAM, not enough on Model II/III)
Tooch:  Pick one, time or money.  (Time).
Tooch:  How have temporal factors changed the way we view war/strategy:  (ICBMs, no time for last-second strategy, have to plan during peacetime, give President (executive) more responsibility in fighting wars --   speed of advance w/ mechanization led to creation of operational level of war, no longer focus on single engagement, think – then another-like  Napoleon).
Tooch:  How does Craig’s (Burning the Village?) book describe temporal issues WRT Strategy?
K:  Your thesis mentions the importance of Information Asymmetry during IW, how do you best achieve this?
Terino:  You mentioned PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) in your last answer, if PRTs are so important, why doesn’t the USAF reward PRT command?  (PRTs are more selective now –discussed Vietnam analogy where advisors received “commander credit” --  this turned into a further discussion about if PRT command qualifies you to run and USAF group/Wing --  tribal/culture issues in the USAF – why doesn’t DoD just increase the size of the Army to fill these slots, why doesn’t SOF do this mission?) 
K:  You mentioned Sun Tzu in one of your earlier answers; defend why it should be in the SAASS curriculum.     – led to a discussion on do we have enough Eastern authors in the curriculum.
Tooch:  Since you kept Sun Tzu in the curriculum, which other works are worth keeping that build off of him? 
Terino:  What is your definition of Air-mindedness?  What does air-mindedness mean for the intelligence profession?
Tooch:  Lets go back to my previous question where you didn’t choose money, You’re going to CENTCOM which, according to the Pivot, will have less resources in the future.  What books about economics will help you deal w/ this issue (Castle, Battles, Bombs o--  Tooze --  Opportunity Cost)
K:  632 considers how states interact, 644 considers non-state actors…  connect theories from 632 to 644 ( I discussed how states still have the monopoly of violence in their territories – so you can work through them to get at non-staters, etc)
Terino:  What theorists can you apply to the Battle of Britain…  (all of them?)
Was the use of Radar/Inteceptors during the Battle of Britain due totechnological determinism or due to social factors?
K:  If you had to add a Philosophy or a Morality/Ethics block to SAASS, which would you choose?  Why? 
Nukem:  Board: Deaile “Slideshow” (lead), Smith “Coyote”; Johnson(ACSC – Naval historian (go figure)
D: Which book from 601 helped frame the course?
D: In evolution of airpower, what anomalies or significant events have occurred that change the way we view airpower?
D: Was John Warden a paradigm shift or just normal science?
D: What was Warden’s message?
J:  How does cyberpower affect the way we view strategy and war?  Benefits? Downsides?
S: Compare and contrast two landpower theorists, two airpower theorists, and two nuclear theorists, and weave a common thread throughout them?
J: Compare and contrast Mahan and Corbett with airpower strategists.
J: What are your thoughts on Airsea battle based on the theorists you’ve read.
D: What is your definition of strategy?
S: Give me four books that you can weave your definition of strategy throughout.
J: How do new technologies influence our traditional sense orf war?
J: How does just war theory and cyber war reconcile with each other?
S: Sound bites—gave me fill in the blank sentence  with answers (was too busy answering to write down specifics)—Thucydides (fear/honor/interest), Sun Tzu, Clausewitz (trinity, Cogs, absolute vs real war).
S: Why would Brodie say nuclear war has not occurred?
S: Discuss Douhet and Mitchell theories and compare/contrast.  
S: How does Mitchell discuss air-mindedness?
S: walk through me through the evolution of an independent AF from pre-WWI through post-WWII.
D: First CC Call, Capt asks why go to SAASS—answer.
D: Can’t recall specific question, but spent a lot of time talking through Pape—risk, denial, punishment, decapitation. 
'''
'''
JT:  Kiras, Tooch, Terino (ASCS Air-guy – taught Science/Tech at SAASS).
K:  Based on your Irregular Warfare background, what books would have made your life easier if you had read them 4 years ago, why?   (Mackinlay – cause vs. symptom,  Allison/Zelikow – levels of analysis, Kalyvas – control/info in CI fight).
K:  What would Kalyvas say about Allison/Zelikow?  (Kal says too much research WRT IW is based on the RAM, not enough on Model II/III)
Tooch:  Pick one, time or money.  (Time).
Tooch:  How have temporal factors changed the way we view war/strategy:  (ICBMs, no time for last-second strategy, have to plan during peacetime, give President (executive) more responsibility in fighting wars --   speed of advance w/ mechanization led to creation of operational level of war, no longer focus on single engagement, think – then another-like  Napoleon).
Tooch:  How does Craig’s (Burning the Village?) book describe temporal issues WRT Strategy?
K:  Your thesis mentions the importance of Information Asymmetry during IW, how do you best achieve this?
Terino:  You mentioned PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) in your last answer, if PRTs are so important, why doesn’t the USAF reward PRT command?  (PRTs are more selective now –discussed Vietnam analogy where advisors received “commander credit” --  this turned into a further discussion about if PRT command qualifies you to run and USAF group/Wing --  tribal/culture issues in the USAF – why doesn’t DoD just increase the size of the Army to fill these slots, why doesn’t SOF do this mission?) 
K:  You mentioned Sun Tzu in one of your earlier answers; defend why it should be in the SAASS curriculum.     – led to a discussion on do we have enough Eastern authors in the curriculum.
Tooch:  Since you kept Sun Tzu in the curriculum, which other works are worth keeping that build off of him? 
Terino:  What is your definition of Air-mindedness?  What does air-mindedness mean for the intelligence profession?
Tooch:  Lets go back to my previous question where you didn’t choose money, You’re going to CENTCOM which, according to the Pivot, will have less resources in the future.  What books about economics will help you deal w/ this issue (Castle, Battles, Bombs o--  Tooze --  Opportunity Cost)
K:  632 considers how states interact, 644 considers non-state actors…  connect theories from 632 to 644 ( I discussed how states still have the monopoly of violence in their territories – so you can work through them to get at non-staters, etc)
Terino:  What theorists can you apply to the Battle of Britain…  (all of them?)
Was the use of Radar/Inteceptors during the Battle of Britain due totechnological determinism or due to social factors?
K:  If you had to add a Philosophy or a Morality/Ethics block to SAASS, which would you choose?  Why? 
FIDEL – Deaile, Smith M, Reese 
Admin – First 5 minutes were “Explain to us your thesis, conclusions, and how it impacts your targeted audience”
(R) What is strategy? (wanted first some authors that talk about it..then my definition)
(R) You mentioned strategy is “flexible”….does it have to be and why?
(R) Which theory of land warfare most resonates with you?  ( said Clausewitz because it covers both overarching strategy, defines war, and explains the interaction of wills)
(C) Explain a theorist that helps and is most related to a general theory of airpower. (I went Mahan and then lead them down the path of his points as related to Dolmans theory of space control)
(C) Give me 2xtheorists/works from the B.C. timeframe…2xLand Power Theorists…2x Maritime…and 3 Airpower that influence you as a strategist then weave them in together. 
                  (D) Give me one that talks about air and other domains. ( I picked Slessor and went through that)
(C) What were Slessor’s 3xpriorities for Air?  (balked here, 1) CAS, 2) Interdiction, 3) Strategic Attack)
(D) From 1903 to Present day, name 3 people/events that have shaped airpower:
                  - I went Tunner – extends time and provided a method to support political and military objectives with enabling functions of air and not just munitions….Kenney-My idea of the first modern day JFACC and his interactions with the JFC despite the creation of 20th AF and Lemay…Schwarzkopf- I explained that the greatest advocate for airpower is an “airminded” military leader that isn’t in a blue uniform. If another service is demanding a holistic approach to air then I’ve made money in the Joint arena
(R) Explain to me Airpower’s contribution to WWII….i spoke about setting conditions for a ground component in Europe as well as demonstrating Tucachevski(sp?) Deep Battle Concept….Pacific was the option for political leaders to end a war without the utilization of a land component in mainland Japan
(R) Explain how Pape would characterize these two theaters (Punishment in Pacific….Denial (US) and Punishment (UK) in Europe)
(R) He looked around the room and read the definition of what SAASS grads to and one of the items is attempt to create “good strategy” which is “rare” (on our board somewhere)….is this really the case?  I started with Hart… “must create strategy that answers the current conflict but looks forward to the ensuing peace” and Reilly’s Ops Design which illustrates the need to look into “what happens when we win?”
(D) Is Wardens Rings new or a repackaging of old ideas? What are the rings?
(D) Switching to Cyber….is STUXNET and act of war?
(C) Is there an author in your mind that would help explain good/bad reason (great pimp by Coyote)…I went through Walzer and used this to give bookends to reasons to go to war and Cyber actions may or may not be one depending on what they accomplish
(C) Can machines go to war?  I answered maybe, but currently they are still tied to the programming of a human…I mentioned lack of living awareness by computers
(C) You are working for the Chief and you need to address sexual harassment…what can you fall back on to help explain and create a strategy to address this issue?  I used the news article where sexual harassment in the military was a “cancer”….equated it to an ideology that is unfortunately part of service members today and used Killcullen’s model (infestation, contagion, intervention, rejection) as a method to battle an ideology, this would allow me to address the issues on the various levels vice just assume that all airmen think of sexual assault the same way.
Feedback- Overall it went great.  The wheel house seemed to be airpower and the history that surrounded it, but I continued to drive that and tie in the other courses in an attempt to prevent me from exhausting my airpower history knowledge.  Deaile recognized that and said it was strength and the panel was happy to hear different aspects of SAASS and not just Douhet and Mitchell
Wilbur's Comps Questions:
1.       If Thucydides were looking back at the last 12+ years of war, what insights would he offer
a.       Democracies, after many years at war, tend to adopt the worst vestitures.
b.      Fear, honor, and interests evolved in priority and in kind
2.       May factors go into and affect strategy. In your judgment, what are the key factors impacting strategy?
a.       First, realize that compsmenship requires you to use examples to illustrate your point.
b.      Second, in a question like this, it also requires you to bound your answer – est a context.
                                                               i.      E.g. “I’m going to talk about it in this context….”
c.       One way to approach this question might be resources: ref On Protracted War, The Air War, etc.
3.       Many theories discuss strategy in terms of ends, ways, and means. Using ends as the independent variable, how does strategy change if means or ways are the dependent variable?
a.       This is an intellectual exercise – don’t fight the scenario (if that wasn’t already obvious).
b.      Post 1943, the ends were kept constant in WWII…
4.       What role and what considerations does technology bring to the strategy table?
a.       Note: technology and its implications are threaded through almost every course
b.      One approach might be to discuss this from a technological determinism standpoint and compare that with a social construction standpoint.
5.       It proved challenging to integrate airpower into both commercial and warfare applications. Similarly, space and cyber face integration challenges. Compare and contrast the integration of air, space, and cyber power into the commercial and military operations of the US.
a.       Supposedly this is a “very difficult” question.
b.      Again, fighting the scenario would sound something like “I don’t think it was challenging to integrate airpower.” Fight away my friends, fight away.
c.       There are several elements to this question so this is one you may want to jot down.
d.      One approach might be to attack this from a dual-use domain framework.
e.      You could also use airpower as a baseline in your argument, picking a couple of airspace integration issues and then applying them to space and cyber.
f.        One takeaway on this question is that you probably need to scope your answer significantly and then pick a thread that you can weave through your entire answer such as domains, weaponization, or even warfare.
6.       Discuss the unique contribution of the USAF to national security in the air, space, and cyber domains.
a.       If you don’t already have an answer to this one, you should be ashamed. Seriously.
7.       Discuss why the US needs an independent air force. Should such a force include space and cyber?
a.       For the first part of the question, reference 6a.
b.      For the second part, the AF breakaway from the Army in 1947 is a good stepping off point.
8.       Has there been an RMA since the end of the Cold War? Discuss in terms of any paradigmatic shifts, technological changes, or conceptual changes in the nature or character of war.
a.       If you’re like me, you’ve already forgotten what defines an RMA – go review.
b.      Check out Bousquet and Londsdale for good discussions.
c.       Think through information warfare and compare with the stirrup, cannon, or even social media.
d.      Lonsdale is good on nature vs character of war.
e.      Kuhn for what a paradigmatic shift is.
f.        Conceptual changes might be things such as design or effects based operations.
9.       Look around the room at the art on the wall. What does it say to you about the USAF culture and values? How have AF culture and values changed since WW2 and what were the key factors shaping both?
a.       This question tests two things:
                                                               i.      Can you bring in material from outside the curriculum and meld it with SAASS concepts?
                                                             ii.      Can you make stuff up?
Bailey's comps questions:1. What factors affect the crafting of strategy?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using too much art or science?
3. WRT the treatment of the Boston Marathon suspect: crime, terrorism, or war?  What's the distinction?
4. What are the necessary elements that make a criminal act an act of terror?
5. Was the Gulf War I more a tactical victory or strategic one?  (Think in terms of Dolman's definition of strategy.)
6. How important are heuristics to the strategist?
8. Where does state-sponsored assassination fit into our national strategy, or does it? 
 1. When do you think the last RMA occurred?
 
 2. How would you define USAF culture today?
 
 3. Should the Boston bomber be treated at a combatant or criminal? What is the debate really about?
 
 4. Brief a 3-star general on three books that shaped your strategic thinking.
 
 5. Reality is a harsh arbiter of strategy. Agree or disagree?
 
 6. How important are heuristics to strategists? If we are fallible and susceptible to heuristic error, is it something we can overcome?
Buns comps questions:
1) Has the nature of war changed in the "Information Age"? 
2) Using concepts from 632 (Int'l Politics), detail some of the ramifications of North Korea's recent (third) nuclear detonation (as perceived regionally, internationally, or both). 
3) Compare and contrast airpower in its infancy with cyber power today. Do any parallels you identify argue for a separate Cyber Force? 
4) Do you see a correlation between Allison's models 1, 2, and 3 and Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism? 
5) Use international relations terms (from 632) to describe the current position of the US in the int'l system---and where you project its trajectory to be leading us. Follow on: what worldview best describes what you just said, Realism, Liberalism, or Constructivism? 
6) Is "cyber" an RMA? 
7) It's been said that "Airpower is inherently offensive" (by whom?) -- can the same be said of cyber power? (Defend) 
8) A 2011 headline read: "DOD views Cyber Attack as Act of of War" -- what are some of the problems inherent in such a statement? What are its [likely intended] benefits? 
9) Recently published US strategy documents reference the plan to deter enemies in cyberspace. Dissect this idea. 
10) What is the domain of "cyberspace"? Why have we separated it out as a domain? What is gained by that? Would it be any more useful to call "time" a domain? 
11) US and China -- Athens and Sparta? Discuss. 
12) What two books on cyberspace and cyber power would you recommend to the CSAF to read? Why? 
13) Does deterrence theory, as put forth by Schelling, apply in cyberspace? 
14) Tie these three books together: Jervis (Perception and Misperception), Khong (Analogies at War), Morozov (Net Delusion). (Find common themes, find how one carries a concept from another forward into another realm of reason, pick a scenario and ideas from each book to it...it's wide open). 
15) Explain your interpretation of the argument Morozov makes in The Net Delusion, and follow that by explaining whether recent events in Libya, Syria, Egypt Iran, etc., contradict or support his posit. 
16) What similarities/analogies can you draw out between airpower (and its evolution), space power, and cyber power? (Some things you might consider: Khong and analogies, separate service for the Air Force, difference in domains, dependence on technology, strategy, C2, conduct versus nature of war, peaceful (civilian) uses, delivery of effects without delivery of forces.) 
17) Use the lenses of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism to explain why Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. 
18) Has the advent of cyber power changed the nature of strategy?