Sherry

SHERRY, MICHAEL: The Rise of American Air Power                                                    
Thesis: “Traces the origins of the dangerous illusion that the bombing of cities would be so horrific that nations would not dare let it occur.”  
- Asserts that beliefs of airpower were dictated more by novelists and public opinion than by those who actually employed it.  These predictions ran far ahead of the realities of the current technology à the military was immoral for trying to do something that was not technologically feasible because the fantasy of what the people wanted airpower to do became more important that what it could do.  Public believed that technology would make war obsolete, therefore made an immoral action morally justified.  Argues that logic was never used to dictate the employment of airpower, that strategists could not show the reasons for striking the targets they did – ie: Industrial Web Theory.  
- Argues that strategic bombing was not necessary à fails to offer another option to replace CBO and his other option for the atomic bomb was a “demonstration” of the bomb.  States that planners were more attracted to the abstractions of what bombing could do than a realization of what it was doing à distance from the devastation made planners disconnected from the realities of bombing.  Counters Cataclysm’s info on what Arnold believed about airpower’s ability to win the war with Japan à Sherry say Arnold didn’t have a clear idea if airpower could win (pg 307), Wolk says he believed it could take longer, maybe Oct-Nov, but airpower could win the war (pg 180).  
- Claims that strategic bombing’s impact was “destruction delivered rather than political results achieved.”  Argues that the basic problem was that the link between the desired political and military effect and what airpower could actually deliver was too weak à the “problem” of airpower.  
  
  
  
  
'Applications to Strategy':
·      Example of the importance for strategist to know and understand the constraints and restraints that political policies establish à what are my lanes, how far can I go.  Military advisors owe their political leadership explanation on what the established boundaries mean as far as military action. 
·      Example of overlaying the ethics of one period of time over those of another. 
·      Demonstration that once all is said and done, the military is going to answer to someone at some point for their actions, even if they were  justified and legal at the time. 
·      “On Wolves, Sheep, and Sheepdogs” in real life. 
*Rise of AmericanAirpower
**Thesis
***Air power shaped the end of the world, it's just a matter of time
****It was the little decisions along the way that led to Nukes dropping
363
*Want to help people comprehend what happened as air war unfolded
*How thinking about bombing before Nukes dropped shaped attitudes to their dropping
ix
*The persistent thought prevailed
**Morality of Bombing Civilians
***Adm Tirpitz: Seems OK if done with majestic force
16
*Nukes, mass fires are no different than Bio/Chem weapons
33
*Only stupid fascist do this
70
*Debate lacked focus
119
*Lack of official guidance
**Americans told to PRODUCE
121
*Needed to use it for something or FDR faced political backlashing
**War Department senior admin recorded threats of Congressional investigation of Manhattan project
***Fate of civilians little attention compared to famous buildings
122
*De Seversky
**Strategy must be geared toward elimination
129
*JFK
**Hoped it could be done with bombing over invasion
133
*Christians said little of consequence
139
*Should have said much bombing served little military purpose
139
*Bombing only justified if shortened war "absolutely certain" 
139
*Not required unless SURVIVAL is at stake
141
*LeMay troubled and defensive about morality of bombing
272
*No one's innocent
287
*Use a LOT of force so not to prolong a war
28
*Truman just ran noninterference...the plan was already set
341
*23% of U.S. polled wanted more Nukes dropped and were disappointed the war ended
355
*More vengance!
**Air power is indecisive
***Destructive, but that's it
17
*L-H, Douhet false prophets
24
*D, confused the character of war with its pupose
28
*World fell pray to air propaganda
*Critical weakness in ACTS doctrine: failure to ID objective of morale or war-industry
5
*Mitchell advocated U.S. empire expansion in Far East -- air would make it possible
58
*It can take nothing nor hold anything
63
*SOME-BODY has to deal with the enemy's body -- the Russians
145
*Eliot: Cannot bring direct pressure on Japan unless you do something immoral like city-bombing
67
*Doolittle raid did little other than propaganda
123
*Actually promised to escalate Japanese tensions
124
*FDR added fuel to unrestrained war
124
*Cannot give a precise definition of success or failure
**If a sink sank the Admiral was fired, lost ground = fired Army General...how do you fire an AF guy?
154
*Unless you say we hit a BAD target
**Diplomacy ended the war....not the BOMB
355
*Why did the Allies believe what they did about airpower?
*How necessary was the bombing? Were other methods acceptable? Possible?
*Was Allied bombing in WWII ethical?
*What is the relationship between ethics and strategy?
*Chapters 8,9,10
**How U.S. demoralized itself
***Munich crisis
****Triggered change in thinking and accelerated momentum to use it
75
*FDR
**Saw air power as an instrument of negotiation and intimidation
79
*Terror of bombing will give quick victory
**Sheer numbers: economic productivity and government efficiency, not strategic genius
97
*Threatened extermination of Japanese race if they continued executing U.S. POWs 
170
*Threat to Japan prior to Pearl Harbor
103
*Deterrence threat of bombing
*Interest in Philippines as base for American action
*FDR attraction to air power
*FDR froze Japans U.S. assets
**Racist attitudes
114
*Attrition and annihilation replaced speed and selectivity
117
*Pacific war seemed remote
118
*Issue became how best to bomb, not how to win the war through bombing
149
*LeMay apparently acted on his own
282
*Set up for moral and strategic accountability if politically backfired
*Like "Bomber" Harris
**All cities legitimate targets
289
*The Japanese will decide when it stops
**Naval Blockades are better
***Too slow to satisfy passions
15
*FDRs initial strategy
60
*Eliot says so too
67
*Reconciles National Security and political freedom problem
*War will not go away and neither air power or nukes will make it happen either
7
*Less destruction
287
*Just make people hungry for a while -- they are already malnourished
**Strategic air power
***Air attack on enemy's capacity and will to sustain military operations, rather than those on operations themselves
12
*Background
**Michael S. Sherry
***Professor of History at Northwestern University
**Published by Yale University Press, 1987
*IC notes
**Spanking with wrong motives
**Comps
***600 and 632 most important courses
***Be able to distinguish Douhet from Mitchell, etc.
*Big Idea
**Perceived self preservation makes the time line shrink on when you will use technology
252
*you may not have considered their effects
*There is a time to spank but your motives must be right
*Might for right or might is right