O’Hanlon

Hypothesis:
Space weaponry, under current and foreseeable circumstances, is neither necessary nor wise.  However, he can imagine the situation changing partly: (x, 20) 
-        because military activities in space are hard to verify, making lasting bans on space weaponry impractical
-        because as other countries gain more military capability in space, their satellites may threaten American interests
-        due to ballistic missile defense technologies
Main Points:
Although space is becoming increasingly militarized, it is not yet weaponized. That is no country deploys destructive weapons in space, for use against space or Earth targets, and no country possesses ground-based weapons designed explicitly to damage objects in space. (8)
Opponents say the risk of hitting an economic satellite is too great or that the US is pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. (16)
The US should avoid most types of formal arms control categorization prohibiting the weaponization of space, even as it seeks to delay the arrival of that weaponization indefinitely. (20)
The US enjoys a remarkably favorable military position in space today, without suffering much political and strategic fallout for making major use of the heavens for military purposes.  It should preserve that situation as long as possible. (21)
Extreme positions that would either hasten to weaponize space or permanently rule it out are not consistent with technological realities or US security interests. (22)
To proceed on the basis of worst-case assumptions and hasten development of ASAT capabilities would be to ignore the serious political and strategic consequences of any US rush to weaponize the heavens. (22)
The US should pursue some types of binding arms controls on military space activities and, even more important, show unilateral restraint on its space activities in a number of ways. (23)
-        It should agree to a ban on any tests in space that would create debris. (23, 107)
-        It should publicly declare that it will forgo space tests of any antisatellite system for the foreseeable future. (23, 107)
-        It should also seriously consider revising its military space doctrine to declare that it will not even develop dedicated ASAT technologies in the coming years. (23, 107)
-        A debate on whether to permanently ban space-to-Earth weapons should also begin; this is a sufficiently futuristic matter that urgent attention is not required, however. (107)
EMP vulnerabilities (69)
By racing to develop its own space weapons, the US would cause two unfortunate sets of consequences: (121)
-        Militarily, it would legitimate a faster space arms race than is otherwise likely – something that can only hurt a country that effectively monopolizes military space activities today.
-        It would reinforce the current prevalent image of a unilateralist US, too quick to reach for the gun and impervious to the stated will of other countries.
Side Notes:
What is the difference between a cautious military planner and a cautious strategic planner? (132)