FEELINGS

The second main class of mental phenomena should be studied with great care by the rhetorician. No one would have the presumption to play upon an organ with a score of stops unless he were skilled in their management. The human being is capable of a greater variety of feelings than an organ is of tones. The orator who does not understand the laws of feeling may not make audible discords, but he is sure to violate the harmonic principles of a far higher and more wonder¬ful music. Only a brief outline of the theory of the feelings can be given here. We shall consider (1) the
CLASSIFICATION of the feelings ; (2) the PRODUCTION Of emotions, and (3) the MODIFICATION of emotions.
L CLASSIFICATION.
1. Necessary Imperfection.
Any classification of the feelings must be imperfect from the nature of this mode of mind. It is easy to classify objects which may be pointed out and named, but states of feeling are not so easily distinguished. Any classification must be cumbrous and superficial, and can only supply an outline.
2. Sensations and Sentiments.
If the finger be pricked with a pin, apart from the knowledge that the cuticle has been punctured, there
is something else which we call pain. Such a feeling produced in the bodily organism is called a sensation.
You stand in the presence of a beautiful painting representing a benevolent act. Apart from the knowl¬edge of the skill with which the painting is executed and the utility of the act, you are conscious of beauty in the picture and morality in the act. This sense of beauty and of morality we call sentiments.
It is not the part of the rhetorician to deal with sensations, which are bodily affections, but he must understand the sentiments, which are mental affections, or he can never skillfully move to action the mind addressed.
8. Scheme of the SentIments.
The following scheme, modified for our purpose from Hamilton, may be useful in exhibiting the vari¬ous sentiments which govern human action :
iSentiments.	Tedium.
Contemplative. i Truth.
Aisthetic emotions.
{
Self-preservation.
Enjoyment of existence. Practical. Preservation of the species. Self-development.
Moral law.
Any existing form of sentiment, simple or complex, may be called an emotion. This term will be used in¬terchangeably with the word sentiment. For a full treatment of these sentiments, reference may be made to Hamilton's Metapliysics.
IL THE PRODUCTION OF EMOTION.
1. The Necessity of Feeling.
That action is impossible without feeling, in the sense in which it is here used, has been shown by Dr. Campbell. "To say that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions, is but at best a kind of specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always in persuading, addresseth himself to the passions in some way or other. This he cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so ; to make me act, it is ne¬cessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me It is for my honor.' Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, It is for my interest.' Now you bespeak my self-love. It is for the public good.' Now you rouse
my patriotism. It will relieve the miserable.' Now you touch my pity. So far therefore is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them." *
2. Emotions Involuntary.
No one can produce a given kind of feeling by sim¬ply willing to do so. Dr. Whately compares feeling to the involuntary organs and processes of the body. We cannot alter any of the bodily secretions by a voli¬tion, nor can we directly retard or accelerate the pul¬sations of the heart. Our control over the feelings
depends upon the use of the appointed means. As we may affect the secretions, or the action of the heart, by taking medicines, so we may excite a feeling of a certain kind by presenting the stimulating objeots to the mind. To arouse the emotion of beauty, we must present a beautiful object ; to excite pity, we must present a scene or person that will call it forth.
S. Stimulating Circumstances.
Several circumstances are specially adapted to the production of feeling.
(1)	Probability.—Probability is based on proof, and so operates upon the emotional nature with the force of conviction. When the probability is absolute, feeling has the assurance of demonstration. The most ingenious speculations are often devoid of interest if wanting in probability.
(2)	Verisimilitude.—Verisimilitude arises from a consistent narrative. It must be distinguished from probability, which has relation to actuality, while veri¬similitude has reference to consistency. A story want¬ing in verisimilitude, requires strong external evidence to render it probable. A narrative may want verisi¬militude and still be true, or it may possess verisimili¬tude, and still be false. Probability results from proof ; verisimilitude is an internal consistency. The historian aims at probability ; the poet and novelist aim at verisimilitude. The latter alone is necessary to the production of sympathetic interest. Fiction arouses our emotions as well as history, and produces the same sympathetic effect.
(8) Ideal Presence.—The power of fiction to affect the mind is wholly owing to ideal presence, or im
aginative realisation of relations. In a perfect act of memory, it is the ideal presence which excites emo¬tion. In reading fiction, this ideal presence may be SQ vividly realized by the imagination as to seem for the moment actual. In reading history also, it is the same ideal presence which occupies the mind. Lord Karnes remarks that history and fiction here stand upon the same footing. Nor is the emotion produced by history less modified by reflection than that produced by fiction. If the reflection that a description is pure fiction will destroy our sympathy, so to an equal degree will the reflection that the historical personages are not in ex¬istence. Why should the story of Ca3sar's assassination excite our horror, when Ca3sar has been past help for nearly twenty centuries ? Why should the story- of little Nell, as told by Dickens, move our sympathy, when we know that little Nell is a creation of the brain ! The picture is truthful and vivid, the scenes are idealli present, and hence momentarily real.
(4) Minute Details.—Since the feelings are awak ened by contemplation, it is important to dwell upon the ideas which excite the feelings. These are not abstractions, but minute and pictorial details. The word " battle " is not very terrible, but a detailed ac¬count of a battle, from the first shock of encounter to the personal sufferings of the wounded and dying, and the desolation of the bereaved, touches the whole emo¬tional nature, and we "live the battle o'er." This principle is instinctively acted upon when in annonnc-, ing sad news we suppress all details. Homer with con¬summate art represents the messenger as announcing, the death of Patroclus to Achilles in the brief sentence, 46 Patroclus is fallen ;" to the reader, whose sympathy,
must be aroused, he gives a detailed account of the battle in. which Patroclus fell.
(5)	Pro:dmity of Time.—The effect of proxim¬ity of time upon the feelings may be illustrated in many ways. Events long past do not affect us like those of yesterday. The accident of the hour creates a gen¬eral sensation, while a more terrible catastrophe of by¬gone years scarcely engages the attention. Death is the inevitable termination of every life, but that event touches our feelings only as it is believed to be near. Ingenious story-tellers represent their tale as new. Orators impress upon their auditors the necessity of immediate action because of immediate consequences. As a rule, men are more interested in the future than in the past.
(6)	Proxingtr of Plaoc—Nearness of locality has an effect corresponding to proximity of time. Space seems to be a closer bond of interest than time. Men are more generally interested in historical events of their own country during preceding centuries, than in the occurrences of the same century in far off lands. Some lands, by classic or religious associations, are of special interest notwithstanding their distance. We are more interested in the prosperity of our neighbors than in that of aliens. An accident in Europe excites but little sympathy compared with a mishap to a fellow townsman, although he be not a personal acquaintance. The scenes of great events are more expressive than their anniversaries.
(7) Personal Relation.—The ties of consanguinity, friendship, acquaintance, even citizenship, are influ¬ential in arousing our feelings. A relative under arrest, a friend in trouble, an acquaintance killed
.
in battle, a fellow citizen unjustly treated,—are more likely to stir our sympathy than foreigners in like con¬ditions. This general statement is subject to some limitation. The tendency of modern life, inspired by, the precepts of Christian fraternity, is toward broader sympathies and the extinction of the clannish spirit.
(8)	Indireotaeati.—In order to convince the un¬derstanding, it is necessary to keep before the mind the precise point to be established. The method of argumentation is, therefore, direct. The opposite method is most readily productive of feeling. Hence the less formal and announced, and the more inciden¬tal and indirect the presentation of ideas intended to excite the emotions, the more successful it will be. Men are generally suspicious of any dictation to their feelings, and accordingly set themselves in opposition to any obvious attempt to arouse feeling.
(9)	General Importance.—Ideas move us accord 
ing to their importance. When multitudes are affected, when great worth and dignity are involved, when the interests of society are at stake, when useful schemes of public improvement are presented, interest is pro¬portionally great.
(10) Connection with the Consequenoes.—Inter 
est reaches its highest development when the indi¬vidual sees himself to be involved. Appeals to self- preservation, self-development, or enjoyment of ex¬istence, are certain to produce interest. Self is the center of interest. Sympathy is but a reflected intex¬est. The consequences to society may be very poter.t in moving good men, but consequences to self are efficacious in moving all men. Most social motives may be made personal motives. Thus if a person be
touched with pity at the sight of suffering, his relation to the suffering may be exhibited in such a light as to touch the principle of self-preservation. As a general rule, no idea is assimilated to the mind addressed so as to be most effective, until it has been put in its closest possible relation to the principles of self-love. The nature of the idea may prevent its being carried beyond the circle of sympathy, but the aim should be at the core of human interest.
In. THE MODIFICATION OF EMOTION.
1. The Law of Change.
The emotions are the most complex part of mental experience. One law, however, runs through the whole emotional nature,—the law of change. No state of feeling is uninterruptedly persistent. Emo¬tion is subject to ceaseless ebb and flow, and ita transi¬tions are often instantaneous. The same cause will not sustain the same emotion for a great length of time. Its duration may be prolonged only by an in¬creasing cause, like a climax, but even this means soon fails by reaching its utmost.
2. Dominant States of Feeling.
Certain states of feeling, however, become habitual, and dominate over those of less frequent occurrence. In some men there is a frequent recurrence of the esthetic sentiments, in others of the moral sentiments, in others of the selfish sentiments. These predominant states of feeling give character to the mind, and men become enthusiasts in art, in religion, and in self-ado 
ration. These established states of feeling are the gov¬erning motives in life. To change them when deeply rooted, is difficult, if not impossible. The more nat¬ural rhetorical use of them is, to treat them as laws of action, and to address new ideas to them in such a man¬ner as to deflect the course of action, without attempt¬ing to change the dominant feelings. One class of writers and speakers are specially called upon to modify these permanent states. Ministers of the Gospel aim to change the established sentiments as well as the con¬victions of men. This most difficult task requires su¬perior and peculiar qualifications. Rhetoric alone is here an inadequate help. Power must be sought from more spiritual sources.
8. Temporary Emotions.
There are, however, certain temporary states of feeling which may be modified, and whose modifica¬tion depends upon established rhetorical principles. Fear, anger, gratitude, admiration, and their like, are all capable of modification, as regards any given object. The modes of modification are two.
(1) giving the Peelinge.—A feeling may be allayed by the representation of the object in an as¬pect which does not tend to arouse the unfavorable emotion. As soon as the aspect of the object exciting the emotion is banished from the consciousness, and a new aspect is presented tending to excite a different emotion, the first emotion will be allayed; This is a far more successful expedient than the attempt to sup¬press all emotion. Feeling, once excited, may be readily changed to the most opposite extremes, as from• laughter to tears, but the absolute and instantaneous
suppression of any emotion is impossible. Like a flow¬ing river, it may be turned into new channels, but it cannot be suddenly checked. A character in a story may call forth the contempt of the reader by an un¬worthy act. This feeling of contempt may be allayed by presenting a noble motive as the prompter of the act, so that, although admiration may not be engen¬dered, the contempt may be neutralized by the nobility of the motive.
(2) Diverting the Peelinge.—If the feeling can¬not be allayed, it may be diverted from the object which called it forth. For example, a man is shown to be guilty of an infamous deed, and excites our con¬demnation and disgust. It may not be easy or even possible to transmute this feeling into one of a differ¬ent character. The remaining expedient is, to direct this feeling against a Afferent object, by showing that another person has really planned and forwarded the transaction, and that the accused is the dupe of an other's criminality.