1976/Chisholm/x

; Person and Object (1976) : Roderick Chisholm 
<I>Person and Object</I> (1976) was entitled by Chisholm 
deliberately, as a revolting rejoinder to Quine's 
<I>Word and Object</I> (1960). Thereby he argued for the 
primacy of mental  over linguistic intentionality.
Simply, of psychological  over linguistic meaning,
mostly, as theorized by the triangle of reference.
In <I>The First Person</I> (1981), he extended that view 
toward the direct attribution theory of reference 
such that we refer to things other than ourselves 
by directly attributing properties to things, and 
that we indirectly attribute properties to things 
by directly  attributing  properties to ourselves.
1. A man M is in bed B with a woman W, say, M-B-W.
2. A woman W is in bed B with a man M, say, W-B-M.
If I were M and you were W, then I could directly 
attribute to myself the property (1) M-B-W, while 
indirectly to you the property (2) W-B-M, thereby 
referring to you. Explicit M-B-W & implicit W-B-M.
That is, to explicate M-B-W is to implicate W-B-M.
To say M-B-W directly is  to say W-B-M indirectly.
The "indirect attribution" (1981) is  relevant to 
Mary Douglas (1975) <I>Implicit Meanings</I> 
Paul Grice (1975) "implicature",
John Searle (1975) "indirect speech act",
Paul Ricoeur (1975) <I>The Rule of Metaphor</I>,
James Gibson (1977) "affordance", and so on.