Philosophical Zombies

== Introduction ==
The Philosophical Zombies (PZ) argument leads to some of the most misleading artwork and titles in philosophy as a whole. The core idea is of a hypothetical being that looks and acts like a human, but without any of the conscious experience, (i.e. Qualia and the like). What this basically means is that you could poke one with a large stick and it wouldn't feel any pain, but it would act like it had, or if you showed it the finale of Breaking Bad, it would act the right way, but not actually be feeling anything inside. (you thought I was going to spoil it, didn't you?). 
It is intended as a counter to Physicalism as a whole and so it can be tweaked and used in response to materialism, behaviourism and functionalism. Some philosophers, like Davey-boy Chalmers, would argue that because a PZ would be physiologically identical to us, even the hypothetical idea of them is a sound enough reason to dump physicalism. On the other hand philosophers like Daniel Dennett say that's a bag of crap, but he's one of them physicalist people, so he does kind of have to refute it. 
== Breakdown: ==
This is roughly how Chalmers' argument goes:
Premise 1: Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical.
Premise 2: So, any world which is physically identical to this world must contain consciousness.
Premise 3: Yet, we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one but in which there is no conscious experience.
Conclusion: Therefore, physicalism is false.
== Basically... ==
It is possible to imagine a world where no-one apart from yourself is actually conscious, they are all machines, or zombies, reacting to stimuli in the same manner as you would though automatically, without mental function.
Category:Philosophy of Mind
Category:Physicalism
Category:Z