Progressive Left Emerging Strategy

==The Progressive Left: An Emerging Strategy==
: By Bart Mongoven
Activists who label themselves as "progressives," from the liberal wings of the Democratic Party, met June 12-14, 2006, in Washington, D.C. Organizers had two apparent objectives for the conference, called "Take Back America" -- to organize the Democratic Party around specific themes, and to send a message to the party's idealistic base that the Democrats still have a place for activists. High-profile leaders, including Sens. John Kerry, D-Mass., Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., and Barack Obama, D-Ill., were featured speakers.
Evident at the conference was an interesting schism between the idealism of the party's liberal activists and a newfound pragmatism among those on the political left. The idealist strain was obvious when activists cheered Democratic Party leaders who called for the Bush administration to withdraw troops immediately from Iraq (and jeered others, including Clinton, who did not make such demands). But pragmatism was evident with every other issue discussed -- and particularly when the issue at hand was taking back power in Washington.
As the "Take Back America" theme suggests, the meeting was about ending the Republican Party's dominance of federal policy. The Democrats discussed issues in a realistic political context, with the idea of getting and retaining power as the guiding frame.
With progressives, apparently resigned to the idea that they cannot change the current U.S. approach to Iraq, energy issues became a focal point. It is in this area that liberal idealists (who appeared to make up most of the attendance at the conference) believe they can make significant headway on both the path to political power and toward their idealistic goals -- which is important, since these paths usually diverge. The interesting question is whether idealistic political activists can develop a strategy that allows the Democrats to win power and also allows them to keep it long enough to make significant policy changes.
The answer to the first question appears to be yes: There is a strategy emerging from progressive activists that promises the potential to win significant public support. The answer to the second question is more difficult to discern, but our read at this point is that it is not likely that supporters of the progressives' policies will keep power long enough to achieve their goals.
===The Religious Right: Political Precedent===
Conferences involving the most idealistic activists of any political party -- even if they are ostensibly focused on politics and elections -- usually give way quickly to debates about the issues themselves: how important the issue is; why the status quo is bad; how "our side" is going to address this important issue. This is a natural progression since idealists as a rule tend to view politics and policymaking through the lens of the issue to which they are dedicated -- and because what drives them to attend conferences generally is not a thirst for power, but a desire to make the world "better" or "right."
With that in mind, it is a noteworthy event at which idealists begin to think and speak in terms of power, rather than issues.
Power-focused idealists last emerged in the late 1980s with the evangelical right in the United States. What members of this movement found was that idealism was an anchor: It gave the movement its identity, but it also held the movement in place. Religious conservatives had strong grassroots support and operations, but their range of motion politically was limited by their idealistic set of demands. The challenge that political evangelicals faced was finding a way to remain anchored to their ideals while capitalizing on their grassroots base to take power.
The religious right grew in the churches, where politically charged discussion mingled with religious guidance, generating a dedicated base of activists. Yet, after a decade of recruitment and activism -- during which leaders apparently believed that the messages that resonated within the churches would be effective in other forums as well -- it became apparent that the movement had little more power in 1992 than it did in 1982. President George H.W. Bush was not working toward their goals, the Supreme Court had just upheld Roe v. Wade in the Casey decision, and liberals still controlled Congress.
Casey forced the movement's leaders to reassess their strategy. Ralph Reed, architect of the religious right strategy in the 1990s, has observed that the same rhetorical style that won donations and mobilized conservative activists generated a hostile reaction from moderates and liberals. Recognizing this, the movement chose new messengers who did not default to portraying their battle as one against "bad" (much less "evil") people. In Reed's estimation, this new style allowed people to hear the evangelicals' message better -- the messengers were not immediately being tuned out. This approach did not necessarily win political converts, but it dramatically softened the non-supporters' view of evangelicals.
The religious right also adjusted its legislative priorities, adopting an incremental approach to change. As a part of this, it stopped lambasting Republicans for making political compromises on the movement's second- and third-tier issues. This allowed growing numbers of Republican leaders to feel that the religious activists understood that the success of the two wings was linked: The religious right would allow politicians to do what they had to do to stay in power, and the politicians would deliver on key issues and votes. This tacit understanding reduced the unease between mainstream Republican politicians and the evangelicals and allowed the right to carve out a permanent place in the party's leadership.
===Pragmatic Progressives?===
Progressives have taken a different route than the evangelicals, but see themselves now as being in a similar situation.
In 2000, many progressives voted for Ralph Nader, arguing that the ideological differences between Bill Clinton, Al Gore and George W. Bush were negligible. After six years of the Bush presidency and 10 years of Republican control of Congress, differentiating between Gore and Bush now seems easy for most Nader supporters. As the reception that Hillary Clinton received at the "Take Back America" conference shows, the need to end the war in Iraq has emerged as the liberal idealists' equivalent of the evangelicals' Roe v Wade in that it is not an issue on which they are willing to compromise. At the same time, progressives increasingly are signaling that they are willing to temper their idealism in return for political power.
At the recent conference, for instance, two issues dominated conversation -- energy and retaking power. The two are becoming closely related. Conference participants apparently viewed winning political power as the ultimate goal, and the energy issue emerged as the primary vehicle through which they could achieve it. At the center of this strategic concept is the recognition that energy -- and energy policy -- connect to almost all other political issues including foreign policy, economics, labor and the environment.
The core strategy of the progressives is to argue that Republicans have failed on most major political issues, and the high price of gasoline sets the energy issue apart as a tangible proof of this failure. Having won support for that argument, progressives also will contend that the GOP's failings are evident in the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States, entanglements in the Middle East (including the war in Iraq), climate change, inflation and high interest rates. They will frame the issue as one of competence (saying Republicans have failed) and one of corruption (arguing that only the Republicans' buddies in the oil industry benefit from the current situation).
===The Apollo Alliance and a Political Paradox===
The Democrats apparently are hoping that, with the GOP's current weakness, energy rhetoric will carry the party to victory in either the House of Representatives or the Senate in November. Their strategy apparently will be to offer a series of energy-related proposals that -- though highly unlikely to be passed into law -- will allow Democrats to differentiate themselves from Republicans and to show the public the far-reaching consequences of energy policy.
Progressives appear ready to play a role in this near-term strategy. But, significantly, they increasingly are pinning their hopes to a longer-term strategy that promises not only to promote the interests of the Democratic Party but also to advance the goals of labor, environmental and other progressive constituencies.
The longer-term energy strategy is being organized by a group called the Apollo Alliance. This is a coalition of labor and environmental activists who have built up new arguments and policies that could emerge as a model for political organizers on the left. Apollo is dedicated first and foremost to building and maintaining grassroots support, and from there, it is patiently creating a national political movement. In doing this, it follows the strategic model that was advanced by the religious right, and it also reflects the strategies being used by its member groups: Environmental campaigns increasingly are focused on state-based change, and labor increasingly is shifting attention away from Washington and toward basic organizing and city-based campaigning.
The leaders of the Apollo Alliance say they have studied past failures and learned that new strategies are in order. It appears that Apollo is following many of the guidelines suggested in a critique of modern environmentalism called "The Death of Environmentalism," which was published in 2004. In that report, authors Michael Shellenberger and Ted Norhaus (who describe themselves as "frustrated environmentalists") focus on the lessons to be derived from the failures of the national environmental movement over the past 15 years.
"The Death of Environmentalism" paints a picture of the environmental movement that is remarkably similar to the circumstances in which the religious right found itself in 1992. The authors claim the movement has suffered for too long from a narrow view of its role in policymaking. They say environmental groups have started with the premise that their role is to protect the environment rather than to promote a broader vision of a common good.
The remedy Shellenberger and Nordhaus suggest has many parts, but it begins with a call for environmentalists to adopt a broader ideological approach to environmental issues. They say that environmentalists must work closely with labor and other liberal constituents, and that they must be willing to compromise with these groups against their common political opponents (Republicans and corporations). Apollo is doing just this.
What will emerge as Apollo begins to build momentum at the grassroots level is a political milieu with energy efficiency and alternative energy at its center, and which further politicizes the corporations involved in energy issues.
But within this, there resides a paradox: The Apollo Alliance is a progressive movement attempting to build a power base that will translate to political strength in Washington. But ask the rank-and-file religious right, which has achieved power using a similar strategy, if they are happy with the progress Republicans have made on their issues over the past six years, and the answer is likely to be a resounding no. Ask a progressive if the religious right has too much power and influence, and the answer is a clear yes.
Almost by definition, then, idealists seldom see themselves winning. They see progress (albeit too slow for their liking), and they see defeat. As a result, it is difficult for them to hold political power in Washington for very long without succumbing to infighting and paralysis.
The Apollo strategy is compelling, and -- by bringing energy to the center of the policymaking spectrum -- its impact could be enormous. The outstanding question, though, is whether progressives can live with power if they get it.
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