Raven paradox

https://medium.com/@ontologik/a-solution-to-the-so-called-paradox-of-the-ravens-e257d051d0f0
One logician that stands out in suggesting an explanation for the Paradox of the Ravens is W. V. Quine, who suggested (in ‘Natural Kinds’) that there is no paradox in the first place, since universal statements of the form All Fs are Gs can only be confirmed on what he called natural kinds, and that ‘non-black things’ and ‘non ravens’ are not natural kinds. Basically, for Quine, members of a natural kind must share most of their properties, and there’s hardly anything similar between all ‘non-black things’, or all non-ravens.
While statistical/Bayesian and other logical proposals still have not suggested a reasonable explanation for the Ravens Paradox, we believe that the line of thought Quine was perusing is the most appropriate. However, Quine’s natural kinds were not well-defined. In fact, what Quine was alluding to, probably, was that there is a difference between what we call logical concepts and those that are ontological concepts.